Intel Interrogation May-1987

7/30/2019 Intel Interrogation May-1987

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Field Manual *FM 34-52 NO 34-52 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT O F THE ARMY

Washington. DC. 8 May 1987

INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION

Table of ContentsPage

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Chapter 1 Interrogation an d the Interrogator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-0 Principles of Interrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-0 Sources of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Personal Qualities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 Specialized Skills and Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Chapter 2 Role of the Interrogator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-0

Commander's Mission Under Air-Land Batt le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-0 Military Intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-0 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 Capabilities and Limita tions of In terrogators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 Chapter 3 Interrogat ion Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-0

Screening Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-0 Interrogating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-3 Chapter 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-0

Document Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-0 Document Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 Evacuation Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Documents Captured with a Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11 Chapter 5 Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-0

Advice and Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-0 Prepare an d Move to the Deployment Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-0 Establish a Site for Interrogation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Supervise the Interrogat ion Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Supervise the CED Processing Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Supervise Administra tive Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 /Approved for public release; distrib tion is unlimited.i "This publication supersedesd30.15. 29 September 1978


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Chapter 6 Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-0' Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-0 Tasking Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Support Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Interrogator Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

/Chapter 7 Strategic Debriefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0 Duties an d Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0 Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0 Plannin g an d Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0 Contact and Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0 Components of Strategic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 Chapter 8 Joint Interrogation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-0

Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-0 Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 Chapter 9 Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9-1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1 Interrogation Support to Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 The Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 Interrogation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 Appendix A STANAG Extracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Appendix B Sample Detainee Personnel Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-0

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Glossary-0 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .References-1

Appendix C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-0 Appendix D Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D-1 Appendix E Sample JINTACCS Salute Report Format and Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-0 Appendix F Sample Screening Report Format an d Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-0 Appendix G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-0 Appendix H Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .H-0 Appendix I Interrogation Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-0 Appendix J 1949 Geneva Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .J-0


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Preface This manua l sets forth t he basic principles of interrogation doctrine an d establishes proce-dures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations, applies to the doctrinecontained in FM 34-1, and follows operational procedures outlined in FM 100-5. I t providesgeneral guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in th e use of interroga-tion elements of Army intelligence units. I t outlines procedures for th e handling of thesources of interrogations, the exploitation a nd processing of documents, and the reporting ofintelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing and supervising interrogationoperations, conflict scenarios an d their impact on interrogation operations, and peacetimeinterrogation operations.These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-, andhigh-intensity conflicts; to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemi-cal (NBC) weapons; to the CI operations contained in FMs 34-60 an d 60A (S/NOFORN); andto the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained in FM 33-1.The provisions of thi s publication are th e subject of international agreements 1059(National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 2033 (Interrogation of Prisonersof War), 2044 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War), and 2084 (Handling andReporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents).These principles an d techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraintsestablished by FM 27-10, th e Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Uniform Code of Mili-tary Justice (UCMJ).Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisonersof war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents.Sources in stra tegic debriefings are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources.Unless otherwise sta ted, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men an d women areincluded.The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for improving this pub-lication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications a nd Blank Forms) an dforward it to Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN:ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.


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CHAPTER 1Interrogation and the Interrogator

Interrogation is the a rt of questioningand examining a source to obtain the maxi-mum amount of usable information. Thegoal of any interrogation is to obtain usablean d reliable information, in a lawfulmanner a nd in the least amount of time,which meets intelligence requirements ofan y echelon of command. Sources may becivilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec-tors, refugees, displaced persons, andagents or suspected agents. A successfulinterrogation produces needed informationwhich is timely, complete, clear, a nd accu-rate. An inter rogation involves the interac-tion of two personalities: the source an d theinterrogator. Ea ch contact between thesetwo difrers to some degree because of theirindividual characteristics an d capabilities,and because the circumstances of each con-tact an d the physical environment vary.

P R I N C I P L E S O F I N T E R R O G A T I O N

Intelligence interrogations are of man ytypes, such as the interview, debriefing, a ndelicitation. However, the principles of objec-tive, initiative , accuracy, prohibitionsaga ins t the use of force, and security applyto all types.OBJECTIVE

The objective of a ny interrogation is toobtain the maximun amount of usableinformation possible in t he least amoun t oftime. Each interrogation has a definitepurpose-to obtain information to satisfythe assigned requirement which contributesto the successful accomplishment of thesupported unit's mission. The interrogatormust keep this purpose firmly in mind a s heobtains the information. The objective maybe specific, estab lishing the exact locationof a minefield, or it may be general, seekingorder of battle (OB) information about aspecific echelon of the enemy forces. Ineither case, the interrogator uses the objec-tive as a basis for planning and conducting

the interrogation. He should not concen-trat e on the objective to th e extent tha t heoverlooks or fails to recognize an d exploitother valuable information extracted fromthe source. For example, during a n interro-gation, he learns of a n unknown, highlydestructive weapon. Although this informa-tion ma y not be in line with his specificobjective, he develops this lead to obta in allpossible information concerning thi s weap-on. It is then obvious that the objective ofa n interrogation ca n be changed a s neces-sa ry or desired.

INITIATIVEAchieving a nd maintaining the initiativeis essential to a successful interrogationjust a s the offense is the key to success incombat operations. The interrogator mustremain i n charge throughout the interroga-tion. He ha s certain advantages at thebeginning of a n interrogation, such a s thepsychological shock the source receives

when becoming a prisoner of war, whichenable him to gr asp the initiative an d assis thim in maintaining it. An interrogator maylose control during the interrogation byallowing the source to take control of theinterrogation. If th is occurs, he must post-pone the interrogation a nd reassess thesituation. To resume the interrogation, adifferent interrogator should conduct theinterrogation. I n addition, the interrogatormust identify a nd exploit leads developedduring the interrogation.ACCURACY

The interrogator makes every effort toobtain accurate information from thesource. He assesses the source correctly byrepeating questions a t varying intervals.The interrogator , however, is not the f inalana lys t and should not reject or degradeinformation because it conflicts with pre-viously obtained information. The interro-gator's primary mission is the collection ofinformation, no t evaluation. Conversely,the interrogator should not accept all


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information as t he truth; he views allinformation obtained with a degree ofdoubt. If possible, and when time permits,he should attempt to confirm informationreceived a nd annota te less credible orunproven information. I t is of great impor-tance to report accurate information to theusing elements. The interrogator checks hisnotes against the finished report to ensureth at the report contains a nd identifies theinformation a s heard, seen, or assumed bythe source.

P R O H I B IT I O N A G A I N S T U S E O F F O R CE

The use of force, mental torture, threats,insults, or exposure to unpleasant an dinhumane treatment of any kind is prohi-bited by law and is neither authorized norcondoned by the US Government. Experi-ence indicates that the use of force is notnecessary to gain the cooperation of sourcesfor interrogation. Therefore, th e use of forceis a poor technique, a s it yields unreliableresults, may damage subsequent collectionefforts, and can induce the source to sa ywhatever he thinks the interrogator wantsto hear. However, the use of force is not tobe confused with psychological ploys, ver-bal trickery, or other nonviolent and non-coercive ruses used by the interrogator inquestioning hesitant or uncooperativesources.

The psychological techniques and princi-ples outlined should neither be confusedwith, nor construed to be synonymous with,unauthorized techniques such a s brain-washing, mental torture, or any other formof mental coercion to include drugs. Thesetechniques and principles a re intended toserve as guides in obtaining the willingcooperation of a source. The absence ofthreats in interrogation i s intentional, astheir enforcement and use normally consti-tute violations of international law an dmay result i n prosecution under the UCMJ.

Additionally, the inabi lity to carry out athreat of violence or force renders a n inter-rogator ineffective should the source chal-lenge the threa t. Consequently, from bothlegal and moral viewpoints, t he restrictionsestablished by international law, agree-ments, and customs render threat s of force,

violence, and deprivation useless as inter-rogation techniques.S E C U R I T Y

The interrogator, by virtue of his position,possesses a great deal of classified informa-tion. He is aware constantly that his job isto obtain information, not impart it to thesource. He safeguards military informationa t all times a s well as the source of informa-tion. This becomes very clear when oneconsiders tha t among those persons withwhom the interrogator h as contact, thereare those at tempting to collect informationfor the enemy. The interrogator is alert todetect any at tempt made by th e source toelicit information.

S O U R C E S O F I N FO R M A T I O NThe interrogator is concerned primarilywith two sources of information in his intel-ligence collection effort: human sources andmaterial sources (mainly captured enemydocuments (CEDs)). The senior interroga-tor, depending on th e supported command-er's priority intelligence requirements (PIR)and information requirements (IR), decideswhich of these sources will be more effectivein the intelligence collection effort.

H U M A N S O U R C E SThe interrogator encounters manysources who vary greatly in personality,social class, civilian occupation, militaryspecialty, and political and religious beliefs.Their physical conditions may range fromnear death to perfect health, their intelli-gence levels may range from well below

average to well above average, and theirsecurity consciousness may range from th elowest to the highest. Sources may be ci-vilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec-tors, refugees, displaced persons, a ndagents or suspected agents. Because ofthese variations, the interrogator makes acareful study of every source to evaluate hismental, emotional, and physical stat e anduses it as a basis for interrogation. He dealsmainly with three categories of sources:cooperative and friendly, neutral and non-partisan, an d hostile an d antagonistic.


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Cooperative and FriendlyA cooperative and friendly source offerslittle resistance to the interrogation andnormally speaks freely on almost any topic

introduced, other tha n t ha t which will tendto incriminate or degrade him personally.To obtain the maximum amount of informa-tion from cooperative and friendly sources,the interrogator takes care to establish an dto preserve a friendly an d cooperativeatmosphere by not inquiring into those pri-vate affairs which a re beyond the scope ofthe interrogation. At the s ame time, hemust avoid becoming overly friendly andlosing control of the interrogation.

Neutral and NonpartisanA neutral and no n~ art is an ource iscooperative to a limited degree. He normallytakes the position of answering questionsasked directly, but seldom volunteersinformation. In some cases, he may beafraid to answer for fear of reprisals by theenemy. This often is t he case in low-intensi ty conflict (LIC) where the peoplemay be fearful of insurgent reprisals. Withthe neutral a nd nonpartisan source, theinterrogator may have to ask many specificquestions to obtain the informationrequired.

Hostile and AntagonisticA hostile an d antagonistic source is mostdifficult to interrogate. In many cases, herefuses to talk a t all an d offers a real chal-lenge to the interrogator. An interrogatormust have self-control, patience, and t act

when dealing with him. As a rule, at lowerechelons, it i s considered unprofitable toexpend excessive time and effort in interro-gating hostile and antagonistic sources.When time is available and t he sourceappears to be a n excellent target for exploi-tation, he should be isolated and repeatedlyinterrogated to obtain his cooperation. Amore concentrated interrogation effort canbe accomplished at higher levels, such ascorps or echelons above corps (EAC), wheremore time is available to exploit hostile andantagonistic sources.

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTSCEDs include any piece of recordedinformation which h as been in the posses-sion of a foreign nat ion and comes into US

possession. This includes US documentswhich the foreign nation may have pos-sessed. There a re numerous ways to acquirea document, some of the most commonways are: found in the possession of humansources, on enemy dead, or on the battle-field. There are two types of documents: (1)official (government or military) documentssuch a s overlays, field orders, maps, andcodes; (2) personal (private or commercial)documents such a s letters, diaries, news-papers, a nd books.

PERSONAL QUALITIESAn interrogator should possess an inter-est in human nature a nd have a personalitywhich will enable him to gain the coopera-tion of a source. Ideally, these a nd otherpersonal qualities would be inherent i n a ninterrogator; however, in most cases, aninterrogator ca n correct some deficiencies inthese qualities if he has the desire and is

willing to devote time to study and practice.Some desirable personal qualities in a ninterrogator are motivation, alertness,patience a nd tact, credibility, objectivity,self-control, adaptabili ty, perseverence, a ndpersonal appearance and demeanor.

MOTIVATIONAn interrogator may be motivated byseveral factors, for example, an interest inhuman relations, a desire to react to thechallenge of personal interplay, a n enthusi -asm for the collection of information, or justa profound interest in foreign languagesand cultures. Whatever the motivation, it isthe most significant factor used by a n inter-rogator to achieve success. Without motiva-tion, other qualit ies lose their significance.The stronger the motivation, the more suc-cessful the interrogator.

ALERTNESSThe interrogator must be constantly aware of the shifting attitudes which normally characterize a source's reaction to


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in ter rogat ion . H e notes th e source ' s everygesture, word, an d voice inf lection. Hede termines why the sou rce i s in a cer ta inmood or why h is mood suddenly change d . I ti s from the sou rce's mood a n d ac t ions th a tthe in ter rog ator de termines how to bestproceed wi th th e in ter rogation . H e watchesfo r an y ind ica t ion th a t t he sou rce i s wi th -hold ing informat ion . He mu st watch for atendency t o res is t fu r the r quest ion ing , ford imin ish ing res is tance , for contrad ic t ions ,or o ther tendencies , to inc ludesusceptibility.

PATIENCE AN D TACTTh e in te r roga to r mus t h ave pa t i ence an d

t a c t i n c r e a ti n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g r a p p o r tbe tween h imself an d th e source , thereby ,e n h a n c i n g t h e s u cc es s of t h e i n t e r r o g a t i ~ n .Add it ionally , the validi ty of th e source 'ss t a t em en t s an d the mo t ives beh ind theses ta t em en t s ma y be ob ta inab le on ly th roughthe exerc ise of tac t a n d pa t ience . Disp lay-ing impat ience en courages t he d if ficu l tsource to th ink th a t i f he r em a ins un res -ponsive for a l i t tle longer , the in ter rogatorwi ll s top h is q uest ion ing . Th e d isp lay ofimpa t i ence may cause the sou rce to lo serespect for the in ter rogator , thereby , reduc-ing h is e f fec t iveness. A n in ter rogator, w i thpa t ience a nd t ac t , is a b l e t o t e r m i n a t e a nin te r roga t ion a nd l a t e r con t inue fu rthe rin te r roga t ion wi thout a rous ing app rehen -s ion o r r e sen tmen t .

CREDIBILITYTh e in te r roga tor mu s t m a in t a in c r ed i-b i li ty wi th the source an d f r iendly forces .Fa i lu re to p roduce m a te r i a l r ewards w henpromised m ay adverse ly af fec t fu ture in ter -rogat ions . The impor tan ce of accura terepor t ing can not be overs t ressed , s incein ter rogat ion repor ts a r e often the bas is fortac t ica l dec is ions a nd opera t ions .

OBJECTIVITYT h e i n te r r og a t o r m u s t m a i n t a i n a n o b je c-t iv e a n d a dispass ionate a t t i tude , regard lessof th e emot iona l r eac t ions he m ay ac tua l ly

experience, o r which he m ay s imu la te dur -

in g the in ter rog at ion . Without th i s requiredobjectivity , he m ay unconsciously distor tthe in fo rma t ion acqu i r ed . He ma y a l so beunab le to va ry h i s in t e r roga t ion t echniqueseffectively.SELF-CONTROL

T h e i n te r ro g a t o r m u s t h a v e a n e x cep -tio na l degree of self-control to avo id dis-p lays of genuine an ger , i r r i ta t ion , sym-pa thy , o r wea r iness wh ich m ay cause h imto lo se th e in i t i a t ive du r ing th e in te r roga -t ion. Self-control is especia l ly imp or ta n twh en em ploying in ter rogat ion techniqueswhich require the d isp lay of s imula ted emo-t ions or a t t i tudes .ADAPTABILITY

An in te r roga to r mus t a da p t h imse lf to them an y a nd va r i ed pe r sona li ti e s wh ich hewill encounter . He should t ry to ima ginehimself in t he source's p osit ion. By beinga b l e to a d a p t , h e c a n s m o o th ly s h i f t h i st echniques a n d app roaches d u r ing inte rro -ga t ions . He mus t a l so ada p t h imse lf to theope ra t iona l env i ronmen t . I n m any cases, heh as to conduc t in t e r roga t ions unde r a va - -r iety of unfavo rable phy sica l condit ions.

PERSEVERANCEA te naci ty of purpose , in m an y cases , wil lm ake t he d if fe r ence between a n in te r roga -to r who i s merely good a nd one who i ssuperior. An in ter rogator w ho becomes eas-i ly disco uraged by opposit ion, noncoopera-t ion, or othe r diff iculties wil l ne itheraggress ively pursue t he objective to a suc-cessful conclusion no r seek leads to other

va luab le in fo rma t ion .PERSONAL APPEARANCE ANDDEMEANOR

Th e in te rroga to r 's pe r sona l a ppea ra ncem ay grea t ly in f luence the conduct of thein te r roga tion a nd the a t t i tude o f the sou rcetoward the in ter rogator . U sual ly a n e a t ,o rganized , an d profess ional appearan ce wi llfavorab ly in f luence the source . A f i rm,del iberate , an d business l ike m an ne r of


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speech and attitude may create a properenvironment for a successful interrogation.If the interrogator's personal mannerreflects fairness, strength, an d efficiency,th e source may prove cooperative an d morereceptive to questioning. However, depend-ing on the approach techniques, the inter-rogator can decide to portray a different (forexample, casual, sloven) appearance a nddemeanor to obtain th e willing cooperationof the source.

SPECIALIZED SKILLS ANDKNOWLEDGE

The interrogator must be knowledgeableand qualified to efficiently and effectivelyexploit human a nd material sources whichare of potential intelligence interest. He is'trained in the techniques and proficiencynecessary to exploit human an d materialsources. His initial train ing is in foreignlanguage, and h is entry-level training is inth e exploitation of documents and humansources. The interrogator must possess, oracquire through training a nd experience,special skills and knowledge.

W RIT IN G A N D S P E A K I N G S K I L L SThe most essential part of the interroga-tor's intelligence collection effort is report-ing the information obtained. Hence, hemust prepare and present both written an doral reports in a clear, complete, concise,and accurate manner. He must possess agood voice and speak English an d a foreignlanguage idiomatically and without objec-tionable accent or impediment.

Knowledge of a foreign language is nec-essary since interrogators work primarilywith non-English speaking people. Lan-guage ability should include a knowledge ofmilitary terms, foreign idioms, abbrevia-tions, colloquial and sl ang usages, a nd localdialects. Although a trained interrogatorwho lacks a foreign language skill caninterrogate successfully through an inter-preter, the results obtained by the linguisti-cally proficient interrogator will be moretimely and comprehensive. Language labs ,tapes, or instructors should be made avail-able wherever possible to provide refresher

and enhancement training for interrogatorlinguists.

K N O W LE D G E O F T H E U S A R M Y'S M I S S ION, ORGANI ZATI ON, A N D O P E R A T I O N S Interrogation operations contribute to theaccomplishment of the supported com-mander's mission. The interrogator musthave a working knowledge of the USArmy's missions, organizations, weaponsan d equipment, and methods of operation.This knowledge enables him to judge th erelative significance of th e information heextracts from the source.

K N O W L ED G E O F T H E T A R G E T C O UN T R Y Every interrogator should be knowledge-able about his unit's target country, such asarmed forces uniforms an d insignia, OBinformation, and country familiarity.

A r m e d F o r c e s U n i f o r m s a n d I n s i g n i aThrough his knowledge of uniforms, in-

signia, decorations, and other distinctivedevices, the interrogator may be able todetermine the rank, branch of service, typeof unit, and military experience of a mili-tary or paramilitary source. During theplanning an d preparation and th e approachphases, later discussed in this manual, theidentification of uniforms and insignia isvery helpful to th e interrogator.

O r d er o f B a t t l e I n f o r m a t i o nOB is defined as the identification,strength , command structure, and disposi-tion of personnel, units, and equipment ofan y military force. OB elements are separ-ate categories by which detailed informa-tion is maintained. They a re composition,disposition, streng th, training, combateffectiveness, tactics, logistics, electronictechnical d at a, an d miscellaneous data.During the questioning phase, OB elementsassist th e interrogator in verifying the

accuracy of the information obtained andcan be used as an effective tool to gain new


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information. Aids which may be used toidentify units are names of uni ts, names ofcommanders, home station identifications,code designations a nd numbers, uniforms,insignia, guidons, documents, military pos-tal system data, an d equipment and vehiclemarkings.

Country FamiliarityThe interrogator should be familiar withthe social, political, and economic institu-tions; geography; history; and culture of thetarget country. Since many sources willreadily discuss nonmilitary topics, theinterrogator may induce reluctant prisonersto talk by discussing the geography, eco-nomics, or politics of the target country. He

may, then, gradually introduce significanttopics into the discussion to gain importantinsight concerning the conditions and atti-tudes in the target country. He should keepabreast of major events a s they occur in thetarget country. By knowing the currentevents affecting the target country, theinterrogator will better understand the gen-eral situation in the target country, as wellas the causes and repercussions.

KNOWLEDGE OF COMMON SOLDIER SKILLS Interrogators must be proficient in al lcommon soldier skills. However, map read-ing a nd enemy material a nd equipment arekeys to the performance of interrogatorduties.

Map ReadingInterrogators must read maps wellenough to map track using source informa-tion obtained about locations of enemyactivities. Through t he use of his maptracking skills, the interrogator ca n obtaininformation on the locations of enemyactivities from sources who can read a map.Furthermore, his map reading skills areessential to translate information into mapterminology from sources who cannot reada map. Map reading procedures are outlinedin FM 21-26.

Enemy Material and EquipmentThe interrogator should be familiar withthe capabilities, limitations, a nd employ-ment of s tandard weapons and equipmentso that he may recognize a nd identifychanges, revisions, a nd innovations. Some

of the more common subjects of interest tothe interrogator include small a rms, infan-try support weapons, artillery, aircraft, ve-hicles, communications equipment, andNBC defense. FM 100-2-3provides informa-tion on enemy material and equipment.

Specialized TrainingThe interrogator requires specializedtraining in international regulations, secu-rity, an d neurolinguistics.

International AgreementsThe interrogator should know interna-tional regulations on the treatment of pris-oners of war a nd the general principles ofthe Law of Land Warfare an d The Haguean d Geneva Conventions.

SecurityInterrogators must know how to identify,mark, handle, an d control sensitive mate-rial according to AR 380-5. He should havereceived special training on Subversion andEspionage Directed Against the Army(SAEDA).

NeurolinguisticsNeurolinguistics i s a behavioral commu-nications model and a set of procedures thatimprove communication skills. The interro-

gator should read an d react to nonverbalcommunications. An interrogator can bestadapt himself to the source's personalityand control his own reactions when he hasan understanding of basic psychologicalfactors, traits , attitudes, drives, motiva-tions, an d inhibitions.


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CHAPTER 2Role of the Interrogator

An interrogation element does not operateon it s own. It conducts operations i n re-sponse to an assigned collection missionan d reports the information it collects backinto th e system to help support combatcommanders i n f ighting the air-land battle.The intelligence preparation of the battle-field (IPB)process is th e framework inwhich intelligence an d electronic warfare(IEW) operations take place. Interrogationassets operate within tha t framework tosupport the commander.

COMMANDER'S MISSIONUNDER AIR-LAND BATTLEAll combat commanders have the samebasic responsibility. They must destroy theenemy's capability to conduct further oper-ations within their assigned areas of opera-tion. To accomplish this mission, com-manders must locate, identify, engage, anddefeat enemy units. A commander c an onlyengage the enemy after tha t enemy ha sentered the commander's area of opera-tions. The depth of th is a rea is determinedby the maximum range of the weapon sys-tems controlled by th e commander. Hightechnology battlefields of the future will becharacterized by high mobility, devastatingfirepower, and tactics which take maximumadvantage of both. On such battlefields, acommander whose sole interest is his areaof operations is a commander who has lostthe initiative. Losing the initiative on a bat-tlefield means losing th e battle. Air-landbatt le doctrine projects a way for com-manders to preserve th e initiative. Itrequires commanders to expand their out-look on the battlefield to another area, thearea of interest. This area contains thoseenemy elements which may be close enoughto effect the outcome of combat operationsin the immediate future. If commanders canlocate, identify, and accurately predict the

intentions of enemy units while they are inthe area of interest, i t may be possible toinhibit or destroy their ability to conductfuture combat operations. In combat opera-tions against the enemy, air-land battle

doctrine concentrates on deep, close, andrear operations. Air-land battle doctrinerequires all commanders to have a mentalan d emotional commitment to the offensive.They must set primary an d secondary ob-jectives in terms of enemy formations, notterrain features. They must attack unitsand areas critical to coherent enemy opera-tions, not just the enemy's lead formations.Commanders must possess the spirit of of-fensive determination. They must directpowerful initial blows against th e enemy,placing him a t a n immediate disadvantage.These init ial blows must be rapidly followedby additional strikes to keep the enemy offbalance. To successfully implement theair-land battle doctrine, commandersmust-

Hold the initiative.Operate across th e entire width anddepth of the battlefield.React rapidly to changes in th e ene-my's intentions.Synchronize the operations of theirsubordinates.

The ai r-land battle doctrine places a nextremely heavy burden on all command-ers. However, these burdens must be borne,if commanders expect to win against heavyodds on the battlefield of the future.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCEAND INTELLIGENCE

PREPARATION OF THEBATTLEFIELD

Like all other intelligence assets , interro-gators serve the commander. Interrogationoperations a re of no value unless they con-tribute to the accomplishment of the sup-ported commander's mission. To under-stand the interrogator%role in missionaccomplishment, the overall contributionmade by military intelligence must beunderstood. Military intelligence is respon-sible for providing commanders with a naccurate and timely estimate of the enemy's


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capabi l i t ies an d probable courses of act ion.Th is es t imate m us t cons ider the t e r ra in f ea -tu res in the a re a of opera t ions , the numberan d t y p e of en em y u n i t s i n t h i s a r ea , an dthe p reva i l ing wea ther cond i t ions . In te l l i-gence as se t s co llec t a nd ana ly ze in forma-t ion to deve lop th i s es t imate , then , g ive thees t imate to com mand ers in su ff ic ien t t imefor use in the i r dec i sion makin g .

Com mand ers reques t the in fo rmat ionthey need . These in fo rmat ion reques ts a ret ran s la te d in to collect ion requirements . Thecollect ion requiremen ts ar e consol idatedinto collect ion miss ions a n d ass ig ned tospecific collection as sets . Collection as se tscbnduc t opera tions to ob ta in in fo rmat ion1

th a t sa t is fies their ass ig ned collect ion mis-s ions . As collect ion a sset s gath er informa-t ion, they repor t i t . Th e repor ted inform a-t ion i s conso l ida ted an d ana lyze d todetermine i ts re l iabi l itv an d val id itv . Val idin format ion is co l la ted an d used to p roduceintel l igence, which is th en provided to th ecom ma nders , an d s imultaneous ly to collec-t ion as sets to provide imm ediate feedbackto as s is t i n coi lect ion operat ions . Th is pro-ces s i s con t inuous , s ince comma nders m us treac t to a cons tan t ly ch ang ing ba tt le f ie ld.Th e fo llowing i l lus t r a t ion sho ws the overa l lprocess followed by intell igence p ersonn elin p roduc ing th i s es t imate .

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESSsq THE COMMANDERsEkkPIR/IR CREATED AND/OR REVISED TO COVER ALL THE IDENTIFIED NEEDS. uCOLLECTION MISSIONS

FORMULATED TO COVER ALL PIR/IR.

vMISSIONS ASSIGNED TO I SPECIFIC, CAPABLE COLLECTION ASSETS.

ASSETS RESPOND TO ASSIGNED MISSIONS BY

COLLECTING INFORMATION.

I I

STAFF ELEMENTS PLAN FUTURE OPERATIONS BASED ON INTEL PREDICTIONS.

INTEL USED TO PREDICT IPROBABLE ENEMY FUTUREACTIVITY. I

INFORMATION PROCESSED TO PRODUCE INTEL. I I

COLLECTED INFORMATION IS REPORTED BACK THRU

INTEL CHANNELS.

I


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Analysis is the hear t or center of theintelligence process. The collection effort isdriven by an analysis of the commander'smission and the information needs thisanalysis identifies. The information col-lected is analyzed to determine how well itfills the commander's needs. IPB is theinitial step in performing th is analysis. IPBintegrates enemy doctrine with the weatherand terrain as they relate to a specific bat-tlefield environment. This integrat ionallows enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities,and probable courses of action to be deter-mined and evaluated. On the battlefield,IPB is dynamic. It produces graphic esti-mates t ha t portray the enemy probablecourses of action in the immediate situa-tion. Commanders and their staff elementsuse IPB products to help them determinehow to achieve decisive results with limitedresources.

INTELLIGENCE ANDELECTRONIC WARFAREOPERATIONSIEW operations are conducted to satisfythe aggregate intelligence, counterintelli-

gence (CI), an d EW requirements of thecommander. IEW operations include bothsituation and targe t development activities.They are collectively oriented on the collec-tion, processing, analysis, a nd reporting ofall information regarding the enemy,weather, and terrain. IEW operations gen-erate combat information, direct targetingdata , all-source intelligence, and correlatedtargeting information. CI supports OPSEC,deception, rear operations, and EW. CI sup-port to OPSEC and deception protectsfriendly,command, control, and communi-cations (C3) programs. These are integral toIEW operations performed in support of thecommander's combat objectives.

SITUATION DEVELOPMENTSituation development requires the collec-tion of information t hat accurately de-scribes the enemy, weather, and terrainwithin t he supported commander's area ofinterest. The following questions exemplify

the types of information required.How will the terrain features an d cur-

rent weather affect the enemy's menan d equipment? How will these effectschange his operational timetables?What tactics will th e enemy employ toachieve his objectives? What equip-ment will he employ? How will heorganize his forces?Where will the enemy fight? What arehis current unit locations? What arethe st rengths and weaknesses of thosedispositions?What ar e the enemy's intentions?Where will he move next? What will hedo when he gets there? Will he at tack,defend, or withdraw? Where, When,How?Who, exactly, is the enemy? What arethe capabilities, limitations, and opera-tional patterns of specific enemy unitsand their commanders?Where is the enemy vulnerable? Whatare his technical, operational, andhuman weaknesses?

TARGETDEVELOPMENTTarget development requires the collec-tion of combat information, targeting data,

and correlated targeting information. Itsobjective is to accurately predict where andwhen the enemy will establish dispositionsth at will yield the most decisive resultswhen struck by a minimum of firepower.The following questions exemplify the typesof information required.Where, exactly, are the high valuetargets? Where are the locations ofenemy weapons systems, units, an dactivities that may impact on combatoperations?What, exactly, is at these locations?How much equipment? How many per-sonnel? To what units do they belong?How long will these locations betargets? When did the units, equip-ment, and personnel arrive? Where willthey locate?

Specific Information RequirementsTactical intelligence operations beginwith the commander. He conveys his


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information needs to the intelligence staffwho converts them into PIR and IR for thecommander's approval or modification. Theintelligence officer translates PIR and IRinto specific collection missions for subor-dinate, attached, and supporting units andrequests information from the next higherechelon. He receives a nd evaluates informa-tion from al l sources, develops and nomi-nates high-payoff targets (HPTs),andreports intelligence results to higher, lower,and adjacent units.Battalion Specific InformationRequirements

Battalion commanders need specificinformation an d accurate intelligence fromthe brigade and higher headquarters toplan their operations. They need timelycombat information and targeting da tafrom subordinate, adjacent, and supportingunits to refine their plan and to win theiroffensive and defensive battles. Their spe-cific information requirements (SIR) forattacking and defending are consolidated,due to the speed with which they must reacton the extremely dynamic and volatileair-land battlefield. They must know-

Location, direction, and speed of pla-toon and company-sized elementswithin the enemy's first-echelonbattalions.Location, direction, and speed ofenemy second-echelon battalionswhich indicate the first-echelon regi-ment's main effort.Disposition and strength of enemy de-fensive positions and fortifications.Location of ant it ank positions,crew-served weapons, individual vehi-cle positions, and dismounted infantry.Locations of barriers, obstacles, mine-fields, and bypass routes.Effects of terrain and prevailingweather conditions throughout thecourse of combat operations.Capability of enemy to employ airassets.

Possibility of special weapons.Probability of enemy use of NBCweapons.

Brigade Specific InformationRequirements

Brigade commanders need and use speci-fic information to plan, direct, coordinate,and support the operations of the divisionagainst enemy first-echelon regiments, theirbattalions, companies, an d combat supportunits-the sustainers. They also need accu-rate intelligence about enemy second-echelon regiments within first-echelon divi-sions a nd an y follow-on forces which canclose on their area of operation before thecurrent engagement can be decisivelyconcluded.

Brigades strive to a ttack enemy first-echelon forces while they are on the moveand before they can deploy into combatformations. The brigade commander needsspecific information about-Composition, equipment, st rengths,and weaknesses of advancing enemyforces.Location, direction, and speed ofenemy first-echelon battalions andtheir subordinate companies.Locations and activi ties of enemysecond and follow-on echelons capableof reinforcing their first-echelon forcesin the operations area.Location of enemy indirect fire weaponsystems and units.

- 0 Locations of gaps, assai lable flanks,and other tactical weaknesses in theenemy's OB and operat ions security(OPSEC) posture.Air threat.Enemy use of NBC.Effects of weather and terrain on cur-rent and projected operations.Anticipated timetable or event sched-ule associated with the enemy's mostlikely courses of action.Availability and probability of use of

enemy radio electronic combat (REC)assets to disrupt friendly C:'.


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Should the enemy succeed in establishinghis defensive positions, then, brigade com-manders' SIR increase. They must thenknow the specific types, locations, andorganization of enemy first- and second-echelon defensive positions and fortifica-tions. These include-

Barriers, obstacles, fire sacks, an dantitank strong points.Locations of antiaircraft and missileartillery units.Locations of surface-to-air missileunits.Location of REC units.Location of reserve maneuver forces.Enemy ability to conduct deep attackinto friendly rear area.

Brigade commanders given defensivemissions, or forced to defend given sectors,require specific information about assaul t-ing enemy companies, battalions, regi-ments, an d divisions-generally, theirstrength, composition, and direction ofattack. The same information is requiredabout enemy follow-on units th at can affectbrigade combat operations. Of specific con-cern are the locations, size, activities, direc-tion, and speed of enemy air-assaul t, heli-borne, and tactical air units capable ofdealing lethal an d decisive blows to brigadeuni ts a nd which could potentially be used tothwart a ny counterattack.

Specific information about enemy first-and second-echelon regimental C3facilitiesis of paramount concern to the brigadecommander, whether on the offense ordefense. He must know th e specific loca-tions of enemy-Division forward and main commandposts (CPs).

Regimental and battalion CPs.Fire direction control centers.Command observation posts.Radio an d radar reconnaissance sites.REC sites.Target acquisition sites.

The suppression, neutralization, and des-truction of enemy C3 systems and facilitiesare critical to the success of close opera-tions. Brigade commanders, in concert withsupporting division an d corps IEW, andmaneuver an d fire support units use allavailable means to identify, locate, disrupt,and destroy these extremely HPTs. Theirobjective is to neutralize the enemy com-manders' capability to command troops andcontrol weapon and combat support sys-tems. Thus, to degrade or deny the ability ofthe enemy commander to conduct his a ttackas planned, this is done by systematicallyattacking key nodes and information linksin the enemy commanders' command andcontrol (C2) system, which supports theirdecision-making process. This form of C2warfare is founded upon the basic tenets ofcommand, control, and communicationscountermeasures (C3CM)strategy and isdefined as-

The integrated use o f OPSEC,mil itary deception, jamming,and physical destruction, sup-ported by INTELLIGENCE, todeny information, influence,degrade, or destroy enemy C3capabilities and to protectfriendly C3.The protection of friendly C3-protectC3-is the number one priority under C3CMstrategy. Intelligence supports the protec-tion of friendly C3 primarily through CIsupport to OPSEC an d deception.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCEThe mission of CI is to detect, evaluate,

counteract , or prevent hostile intelligencecollection, subversion, sabotage, and inter-national terrorism conducted by or onbehalf of any foreign power, organization,or person operating to the detriment of theUS Army. CI personnel identify the hostileintelligence collection threat. They, togetherwith operations personnel, develop friendlyforce profiles, identify vulnerabilities, andmake recommendations to reduce thosevulnerabilities. CI operations supportOPSEC, deception, and rear operations.


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COUNTERINTELLIGENCESUPPORT TO OPERATIONSSECURITY

CI suppo r t to OP SEC i s the p r inc ipa l ro leof CI a t echelons d iv is ion a n d be low. I tincludes-Th e iden t if i ca t ion a nd ana ly s i s o fenem y reconnaissance , survei l lance ,a n d t a rge t acqu i s it ion (RSTA)capab i l i -t ies, personnel , un i ts , a n d ac t iv i ties .Th e iden t if i ca tion a nd ana ly s i s ofenemy R EC un i t s , loca t ions , an dactivities.Ass i s t ing in the deve lopmen t offrien dly force profiles.Determ ining f r iendly vu lnerab i l i t ies toenemy RSTA an d RE C ac t ivi ti e s.R e c o m m e n d in g a n d e v a l u a ti n gapprop r ia t e OPSEC an d decep tionmeasu res .

COUNTERINTELLIGENCESUPPORT TO DECEPTIONM ili ta ry decept ion opera t ion s arep lann ed , contro l led , d i rec ted , an d conductedby commander s at echelons abov e division.They a r e des igned to mis l ead enem y sen io rmil i ta ry a n d poli t ica l leaders regard ing ourt rue mi l i ta ry ob jec tives , our com bat capabi l i -t i e s an d l imi tat ions, an d the compos i tiona n d disposit ion of our com bat forces. Ba t-t lef ield deception is de liberate act io n toachieve surpr is e on the a i r - land ba t t le f ield .I t s pu rpose i s to m is l ead enem y g roundforce comm ander s a s to our t rue comba tobjec tives ; tac t ica l OB; ma jor ax i s o fadva nce; an d the d isposi t ion of our reservean d c omba t suppor t un i t s , de fens ive pos i-

t ions, for t if icat ions, a n d C3 facil it ies.COUNTERINTELLIGENCESUPPORT TO REAROPERATIONS

CI su ppor t to r ea r ope ra t ions includesi d en t if y in g a n d a n a l y z i n g t h e e n e m y t h r e a tto b rigade t r a in s an d bo th d iv i s ion suppor tc o m m a n d ( D IS C O M ) a n d c o rp s s u p p o r tcom mand (COSCOM) ope ra tions . C I pe r-sonne l r ecommend s t eps to neu t r a l ize

enem y agen t s , sabo teu r s , t e r ro r i st s , sym pa-th izers , an d specia l purpose forces . Br igadean d ba t t a l ion com mander s , t he i r s t a f f s , an da l l subo rd ina te pe r sonne l m us t be t r a inedan d p repa red to iden ti fy an d r epo rt enemyun i t s o r ac t iv it i es wh ich m ay pose a th r ea tto b r igade t r a in s , DISCOM , an d COSCOMopera t ions . Th e poten t ia l impa ct on c loseope ra tions f rom the r e a r ca nno t beoverlooked.B lack , g r ay , a nd wh i t e l i s t s iden ti fy pe r-sonn el of C I in teres t . CI team s conductope ra tions th a t p rov ide d a t a u sed to com-pi le these l i s t s . Black l i s t s con ta in th enam es o f pe rsons who a re hos ti l e to USin teres ts a n d whose ca p ture or nu l li f ica t ionof their effectiveness are of pr ime impo r-t ance . Gray l i s t s con ta in nam es of pe r sons

whose inc l ina t ions o r a t t i t udes toward U Sin teres ts a r e cer ta in . Whi te l i s t s conta innam es o f per sons who a re favo rab lyinc lined toward U S in te r e s t s an d need to bepro tec ted f rom enemy targe t ing .INTERROGATION SUPPORT TO CIIn te r roga t ion an d CI pe rsonne l mu s tin te rac t to defea t the enemy 's co llect ione ffor t an d the th r ea t posed to ou r r ea r a r eas .Th e in te r roga to r m us t work i n c lo se coordi -na t ion wi th CI pe r sonne l to keep ab reas t o fCI t a rge t s in th e even t he encoun te r s asource th a t possesses in forma t ion of C Iin teres t . Th e fo l lowing quest ions exempl i fyth e types of in form at ion required by CI :

W ha t specif ic intel l igen ce collect ionopera t ions ar e be ing conducted by th eenemy?W hat a spec t s of the enemy ' s p lanshav e been successfu l ly concealed f romour collection efforts?W ha t a spec t s of f ri end ly p lans havebeen d iscovered by th e enemy, an dhow were they d iscovered?Does the enem y p lan to conduc t sabo t -age ope ra tions?Does the en emy p lan to conduc t sub -versive operations?How ef fec t ive are our OP SE Cmeasu res?


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How effective are our attempts a t mil-itary deception?ELECTRONIC WARFARE

EW is an essential element of combatpower. I t can provide commanders both apassive and an active means to protect theirC3 systems and a passive and a n activemeans to attack the enemy commanders' C3systems a s well. Protecting C3is thenumber one priority for EW in accordancewith C3CMstrategy. Action t aken to deny,influence, an d degrade or destroy enemy C3capabilities and counter-C3is equallyimportant. EW, like other elements of com-bat power on the air-land battlefield, iswaged by employing a combination of bothoffensive and defensive operations, tactics,and procedures. Air-land battle doctrinean d the spirit of th e offense are the overrid-ing considerations in planning and con-ducting EW operations (see FM 34-1).

The following questions exemplify typesof information th at the interrogator pro-vides to EW operations:Will the enemy employ jammers?Will the enemy augment heavy elec-tronic equipment?What specific means of C3'arebeingused by the enemy?What problem has the enemy expe-rienced when using each of thesemeans?What ha s been the effect of ourattempts to influence, degrade, or de-stroy these means of C3?

CAPABILITIES ANDLIMITATIONS OFINTERROGATORSInterrogators are trained a s linguists toquestion sources an d to exploit CEDs. Theycollect an d report information th at per tainsto the IEW tasks. Reportable information isdetermined by comparing the information

obtained to the PIR and IR contained in theinterrogation element's collection mission.Interrogators collect information on politi-cal, economic, and a wide range of mili tarytopics. In doing this, they organize their col-lection effort according to the OB elementsused by the intelligence analyst . However,a t the tactical level, commanders and intel-ligence staff will generate requests for spe-cific intelligence an d combat informationPIR and IR tha t will allow them to betterconduct the war. Therefore, the collectioneffort should be limited to obtaining infor-mation that responds to the PIR and IR:

Missions. Information tha t describesthe present, future, or pas t missions ofspecific enemy units. Each unit forwhich mission information wasobtained i s identified.Compositions. Information th at identi-fies specific enemy units. This identifi-cation should include the type of unit(artillery, transportation, armor, an dso forth) an d a description of the unit'sorganizat ional chain of command.Strength. Information that describesthe size of enemy units in terms of per-sonnel, weapons, and equipment. Aunit identification must accompanyeach description.Dispositions. Information tha t estab-lishes locations occupied by the enemyunits or activities. The informationwill identify the military significanceof the disposition, other enemy unitsthere, and any security measures.Tactics. Information t hat describes thetactics in use, or planned for use, byspecific enemy units. The doctrinegoverning the employment of thesetactics will be included in thedescription.Training. Information that identifiesand describes the types of individualand collective training being con-ducted by the enemy. The descriptionwill include all information on thethoroughness, degree, and quality ofthe training.Combat effectiveness. Informationth at describes the ability and fighting


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quality of specific enemy units. Thedescription will provide unit identifica-tion and information about personneland equipment losses and replace-ments, reinforcements, morale, andcombat experiences of it s members.Logistics. Information that describesthe means by which the enemy movesan d sustains his forces. This includesany information on th e types an damounts of supply required, procured,stored, and distributed by enemy units

sonalities, passwords, unit histories,radio call signs, radio frequencies, unitor vehicle identification numbers, andPSYOP.The degree of success achieved by inter-rogation operations is limited by th e envi-

ronment i n which the operations are per-formed. Interrogators depend on the IEWprocess to give direction to their collectionefforts. They rely on the conduct of combatoperations to provide them with collectiontargets: sources an d CED.in support of current and future Interrogation operations ar e also limitedoperations. by the very nature of hu man intelligenceElectronic technical da ta . Information (HUMINT) collection. The source or CEDth at describes the operational parame-ters of specific enemy electronicequipment. This includes both com-munications and noncommunicationssystems.Miscellaneous data . Information tha tsupports the development of any of theother OB elements. Examples are per-

must actually have the desired informationbefore the interrogators can collect it. Withrespect to sources, there is a lways th e pos-sibility tha t knowledgeable individuals mayrefuse to cooperate. The Geneva an d HagueConventions a nd t he UCMJ set definitelimits on the measures which can be used toga in th e willing cooperation of prisoners ofwar.


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CHAPTER 3Interrogation Process

The inte rrogation process involves thescreening and selection of sources for inter-rogation an d the use of interrogation tech-niques a nd procedures. Both screening an dinterrogation involve complex interpersonalskills, and ma ny aspects of their perfor-mance ar e extremely subjective. Ea chscreening an d interrogation is uniquebecause of the interaction of the interroga-tor with the source. There ar e five interro-gation phases: p lanni ng an d preparation,approach, questioning, termination, a ndreporting.

SCREENING SOURCESScreening is the selection of sources forinterrogation. I t mus t be conducted at everyechelon to determine th e cooperativenessand the knowledgeability of sources and todetermine which sources can best satisfythe commander's P IR a nd IR in a timelymanner.

CONDUCT PRESCREENING Observe the Source

Screeners should personally observe thesource. During thi s observation, thescreener should first examine the EPW cap-tive ta g (Appendix D). The EPW captive ta gwill provide the screener informationregarding the source's circumstances ofcapture (when, where, how, by whom, an dso forth). This information can assi st theinterrogator in t he conduct of the screeningan d most importantly can show imme-diately if the source has the potential ofpossessing information which could answerthe supported commander's PIR an d IR.The screeners should pay particular atten-tion to rank insignia, condition of uniformsan d equipment, an d behavior demonstratedby t he source. Screeners should look forthings like attempts to talk to the guards,intentionally joining placement in thewrong segregation group, or an y signs ofnervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any sourcewhose appearance or behavior indicates

th at he is willing to tal k should be noted bythe screeners. During t he observation, thescreener should look for signs (such as thesource's bra nch insign ia or other identifi-able features) to indicate th at the sourcecould have knowledge of informationrelated to the supported commander's PIRan d IR.

Question GuardsScreeners should question guards aboutthe source. Since the guards are in constantcontact with t he source, they can provide

the information on th e source's behavior.The guards c an provide information on howthe source has responded to orders, whatrequests have been made by the source,what behavior has been demonstrated bythe source, and so forth. I n addition, theguards can help screeners with specificitems of interest to identify sources whomight answer the supported commander'sPIR a nd IR.

Examine DocumentsScreeners should examine th e documentscaptured with t he source and a ny docu-ments pertaining to the source. Documentscaptured with the source (identificationcard, letters, map sections, an d so forth) canprovide information tha t identifies thesource, his organization, his mission, andother personal background (family, knowl-edge, experience, an d so forth). Availabledocuments perta ining to the source (screen-

ing reports, interrogation reports, an dadministrative documents, such a s detaineepersonnel record (see Appendix B)) preparedby the military police, c an help the screenerby providing information on the source'sphysical an d emotional s tatus , knowledge,experience, and o ther background informa-tion. This information can be used to verifyinformation from documents captured withthe source and further assess his willing-ness to cooperate. When examining docu-ments, screeners should look for items tha twill indicate whether the source is coopera-tive or willing to cooperate based on any


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specific personal interest. In addition, thescreener should examine the documents todetermine if the source has informationwhich answers th e supported commander'sPIR an d IR.If the source has information pertaining

to new foreign material, contact the techni-cal intelligence element, an d if the sourcehas information of target exploitationinterest, contact the target exploitationelement.

C O O R D I N A T I O N W IT HC I E L E M E N T

Before initiat ing the interrogation an dscreening process, the interrogator estab-lishes close liaison with the supporting CIagents. The CI element provides PIR of CIinterest. During the interrogation a ndscreening process, interrogators identifysources of CI interest . After these sourceshave been interrogated for an y informationof immediate tactical value, (as needed)they a re turned over to CI personnel asquickly as possible. For example, CI isinterested in sources that the followingconditions apply:Have no identification documents.Have excessive identificationdocuments.Have modified identificationdocuments.Possess unusually large amounts ofcash or valuables.Possess knowledge of critical interest(for example, nuclear power plantoperations, chemical plant operations,weapons test and development, an d soforth).Are illegal border crossers.Attempt to avoid checkpoints.Are on the black, gray, or white list.Request to see CI or US Armyintelligence.Have family in the denied area.

Screeners should always consider coopera-tive, knowledgeable sources first. These

sources are identified through the screeners'review of documents, questioning of theguards, a nd their own personal observa-tions. Based on their notes, the screenersestablish the order in which these sourceswill be screened. The guards are then told tobring these sources, in a specified sequence,to the screening site one at a time.Screeners ask each source about the cir-cumstances of his capture, his personalbackground, his military job, and his unitof assignment. The goal is to get the sourceto talk. Once the source is talking, thescreeners try to identify any strong emo-tions and th e reasons for them. This willindicate how susceptible the source may beto interrogation and may identify theapproach techniques which have the great-

est chance of success. Screeners also injectquestions designed to identify those topicalareas in which the source possesses perti-nent information.

R E C O R D I N F O R M A T I O NA screener must record information a s itis obtained from the source on a screeningreport form. An example of th is form isshown in Appendix F. All of th e informa-tion shown is rarely obtained from any onesource. The blocks a re there to save thescreeners as much additional writing a spossible. If size, activity, location, unit, timean d equipment (SALUTE)reportableinformation is obtained during the screen-ing, i t must be exploited fully an d reportedas soon a s possible.

A S S I G N C A T E GO R YThe screening of a source ends when thescreener is sure tha t he can make a n accu-

ra te assessment of the source's potentialcooperation and pertinent knowledge. Atthi s time, the source is returned to the con-trol of the guards, an d the screener recordshis assessment on the screening reportform. The assessment is recorded by meansof a screening code. The screening code is anumber-letter designation which reflects th elevel of cooperation to be expected from thesource and the level of knowledgeability thesource may possess. The number "1" repre-sents a source who responds to direct ques-tions. The number "2" represents a source


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who responds hesitantly to questioning.T he numb er "3" re presents a source whodoes not respond to que stioning. The letter"A" re pre sent s a so urce who is very likely topossess information p ertinent to the sup-ported com mander's PIR . T he letter "B"represents a source who mig ht hav e infor-ma tion pertinent to th e supported com-ma nder's IR. T he letter "C" represents asource who does not app ear to hav e perti-nen t information.

Those sources who hav e been assigned toth e sam e category may be in terrogated inan y order deemed approp riate by th e seniorinterrogator. Category 1A sources shouldnormally be the first to be interrogated.Categ ory 1B sources ar e next, followed by

tho se assigne d to categories 2A, lC , 2B, 3A,2C, an d 3B. Category 3C sources are nor-ma lly interrogated las t. This order of priori-t ies ensures th e highe st probabili ty ofobtainin g the greatest am ount of pertinentinformation w ithin th e time available forinterrogatio ns. Scre ening codes m aychange w ith th e echelon. The h igher theechelon, th e more time is available to con-duct a n app roach. Th e following il lustra-tion depicts th e order in w hich sources willbe interrogate d.NOTE: T he term "screening category"should no t be confused with EPW - orsource-assigned category t ha t is assignedaccord ing to thei r intelligence value (seeAppendix A).

INTERROGATION PR IORITIES BY SCREEN ING CATEGORY

AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGEMOST LEAST

LEAST


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INTERROGATINGPROCEDURES

PLANNING AND PREPARATIONOnce the senior interrogator has assignedspecific sources to his subordinates, theinterrogators develop a plan for their inter-rogations. These plans reflect the currentsituation and the supported commanders'PIR and IR. If they do not, the subsequentinterrogations will not help the element tosatisfy i ts assigned collection mission, andinformation needed by the supported unitwill be missed. Each interrogator, wherefeasible, begins his preparation by examin-ing the situation map (SITMAP), the OBdata base, and pertinent information con-

tained in the interrogation element's files.Interrelation of Planning andPreparation and Approach

The planning and preparation phase andthe approach phase are interrelated. In theplanning and preparation phase, the inter-rogator gathers information on the source'scircumstances of capture, comments fromothers who have been with the source,information on the source's observed behav-ior, and information on some of the source'spersonal traits a nd peculiarities from thescreening sheet. This information helps theinterrogator develop a picture of the sourceand enables him to select approaches mostlikely to work. There are four primary fac-tors that must be taken into considerationin selecting tentative approaches:

The source's mental and physicalstate. I s the source injured, angry, cry-ing, arrogant, cocky, or frightened? Ifso, how can this state be best exploitedin the interrogation effort.The source's background. What is thesource's age and level of military orcivilian experience.The objective of the interrogation. Howmuch time is available for the interro-gation? I s the commander interestedonly in specific areas (PIR and IR)? Isthis source knowledgeable enough torequire a full OB interrogation?

The interrogator himself. What abili-ties does he have t ha t can be broughtinto play? What weaknesses does hehave tha t may interfere with the inter-rogation of the source? Can his per-sonality adapt to the personality of thesource?

Questioning GuardsInterrogators should question guards aspart of their preparations. The guards arein constant contact with the sources andmay be able to provide the following typesof information:

Physical condition.Demonstrated attitude an d behavior.Contact made with other guards orsources.How the source has been handled sincehis capture.Hearsay information from others whohave handled the source.Confirmation of capture data, espe-cially the circumstances under whichthe source was captured.

Each interrogator will unobtrusivelyobserve the source to personally confirm hisidentity and to check his personal appear-ance and behavior. 'Analyze Information

After the interrogator has collected allinformation available about his assignedsource, he analyzes it . He looks for indica-tors of any psychological or physical weak-ness tha t might make the source susceptibleto one or more approach techniques. Theinterrogator formulates a strategy to con-duct his analysis. He also uses the inxorma-tion he collected to identify the type andlevel of knowledge possessed by the sourceth at is pertinent to the element's collectionmission.

Modify Sequences of QuestioningThe interrogator uses his estimate of the

type and extent of knowledge possessed bythe source to modify t he basic topical


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sequence of questioning. He selects onlythose topics in which he believes the sourceha s pertinent knowledge. In this way, theinterrogator refines his element's overallobjective into a set of specific topics for hisinterrogation. The major topics that can becovered in an interrogation are shownbelow in their normal sequence. The inter-rogator is, however, free to modify thissequence as he deems necessary.

Mission.Organization.Personnel strength.Weapons a nd equipment strength.Dispositions.Tactics.Training.Combat effectiveness.Logistics.Electronic technical data.Miscellaneous.

Finalize Interrogation PlanAs a result of the planning a nd prepara-tion phase, the interrogator develops a p lanfor conducting his assigned interrogation.He must review this plan with the seniorinterrogator when possible. Whether writ-ten or oral, the interrogation plan must con-ta in a t least the following items ofinformation:

Identity of the source.Interrogat ion serial number.Topics, in sequence, that will becovered.Reasons why the interrogator selectedonly specific topics from the basicquestioning sequence.Approach strategy selected.Means selected for recording th einformation obtained.

The senior interrogator reviews each planand makes a ny changes that he feels neces-sary based on the commander's PIR a nd IR.After the plan is approved, the holdingcompound is notified to have a guard bring

the source to the interrogation site. Theinterrogator collects all available interroga-tion aids needed (maps, charts, writingtools, reference materials , and so forth) andproceeds to the interrogation site.APPROACH

The approach phase actually beginswhen the interrogator first comes in contactwith th e source and continues until the pris-oner begins answering questions pertinentto th e objective of the interrogation effort.Interrogators do not "run" a n approach byfollowing a set pattern or routine. Eachinterrogation is different, but all ap-proaches in interrogations have the follow-ing purposes in common:Establish and mainta in control overthe source an d the interrogation.Establish and maintain rapportbetween th e interrogator and thesource.Manipulate the source's emotions an dweaknesses to gain his willingcooperation.

The successful application of approachtechniques eventually induces the source towillingly provide accurate intelligenceinformation to t he interrogator. The term"willingly" refers to the source answeringthe interrogator's questions, not necessarilyhis cooperation. The source may or may notbe aware tha t he is actually providing theinterrogator with information about enemyforces. Some approaches may be completewhen the source begins to answer ques-tions. Others may have to be constantlymaintained or reinforced throughout theinterrogation. The techniques used in a napproach can best be defined a s a series ofevents, not just verbal conversationbetween the interrogator a nd the source.The exploitation of the source's emotion canbe either harsh or gentle in application(hand and body movements, actual physi-cal contact such as a hand on the shoulderfor reassurance, or even silence are all use-ful techniques tha t t he interrogator mayhave to bring into play).

Basic Concepts of ApproachesThe manipulative techniques within eachapproach are different, but there a re some


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f ac to r s common to a l l - approaches whichaffect the success or fa ilure of th e ap proac hi ts e lf . Th e in te r roga to r shou ld es tab l i sh an dma in ta in con tro l, e s tab l i sh a nd deve loprappor t , a s ses s the source, make smootht rans i t ions , app ear s incere , be conv inc ing ,an d recogn ize the b reak ing po in t .Establish and Maintain Control. T h ein ter roga to r shou ld appe ar to be the onewho controls a l l aspects of the in ter rog at ionto inc lude th e l igh t ing , hea t ing , a nd configu-rat ion of the in ter roga t ion room, as well a sthe food, she l te r, a nd c lo th ing g iven to th esource . Th e in te r roga to r mus t a lwa ys be incon tro l, he mu s t a c t qu ick ly a n d f i rmly .H o weve r, ev e r y t h in g t h a t h e s ay s a n d d o esmu s t be wi th in the l im i t s of the Geneva a ndHague Conven t ions, as well as t h e s t a n -da rds o f conduc t ou tl ined in the UCM J.Establish and Develop Rapport. Rap-p o r t b e tw een t h e i n t e r r o g a to r a n d t h esource i s r ea lly no th ing m ore tha n atwo-way flow of comm unicat ion. I t c ani nv o lv e s h o w i n g k in d n es s an d h u m an i t y i na n o t h e rw i s e h a r s h s i tu a t i o n, o r i t c anme an ba dger ing the source . Rappo r t ises tab li shed when the source reac t s to th ein te rroga to r' s s t a tement . Rappor t m us t bema in ta in ed th roughout th e inte r roga t ion ,no t on ly just in the approach phase . I f thein te r roga to r ha s es tab li shed good rapp or tin i ti a l ly a nd the n a ban do ns the e ffor t, thesource would r igh t fu l ly a s sum e th a t thein te rroga to r ca res l es s an d les s abou t h ima s the in fo rmation i s be ing ob ta ined . I f th i soccurs , r app or t i s los t an d th e source ma ycease answer in g quest ions. Rappor t m ay bedeveloped by-

Ask ing a bou t th e c i r cums tances o fcap tu re . By ask in g abou t th e source 'sc i rcumstances of capture , the in ter ro-g a t o r c an g a i n i n s i g h t i n t o t h e p r is on -er's ac tua l s ta t e of mind an d moreimpor tan t ly , he c an asce r ta in h i s pos-s ible break ing points .Ask ing background ques t ions . Af terask in g abou t the source' s c i r cums tan-ces of capture , the in ter rog ator c anfur ther ga in r appo r t by a sk ing ques -t ions abou t h i s background . Ap paren tin te res t ca n be bu il t by ask in g abou thi s fam ily, civil ian l ife, fr iends, l ikes,d i sl ikes, an d so fo r th . Th e m ain po in t

in ask in g abou t the source 's back-ground i s to deve lop rappor t , bu t non-per t inen t ques t ions m ay open newav en u es fo r t h e ap p r o ach a n d h e lpde te rmine w hether o r no t the t en ta t iveap p r o ach es ch o s en i n t h e p l an n i n ga n d p repara t ion phas e wi l l be e ffec-t ive . If nonpe r t inent que s t ions showt h a t t h e t en t a t i v e ap p ro ach es ch o senwill not be effective, a f lexible interro-ga to r c an eas i ly sh i f t th e d i rec t ion ofh i s approach wi thou t the source be ing-aw ar e o f t h e ch an g e .

Depend ing on the s i tua t ion , ci rcum-s t an ces, an d an y r eq u es ts t h e s o u rce m ayha ve m ade , the fo l lowing can a l so be usedto develop rapp ort:Offer ing real is t ic incent ives : su ch a simm ediate (coffee , c igaret tes , an d sofor th ) , shor t - t e rm (a mea l , shower , s enda l e t te r home, a nd so fo rth ) , an dlong- term (repatr ia t io n, pol i tical a sy-l u m , an d s o f o rt h ).Feig ning exper ience s imilar to those ofth e source.Show ing concern fo r the p r i sonerth rou gh th e use of vo ice v i ta l i ty an dbody language .Helping th e source to ra t ional ize hisguilt .S h o w i n g k i n d n es s an d u n d e r s t an d i n gtow ard the source 's predicamen t .Exo nera t in g the source f rom gu i lt .F la t ter in g th e source.

Assess the Source.A f t er h av i n g e s t ab -l i shed con t ro l of the source an d ha v in ges tab li shed rap por t , th e in te r roga to r con-t inual ly assesse s th e pr isoner to see i f th eapproaches , an d la te r th e ques t ion ing tech-n i qu es , ch o s en i n t h e p l an n i n g an d p r ep a -rat ion pha se wil l indeed work. Remembert h a t t h e ap p r o ach es ch o sen i n p l an n i n gan d p r ep a ra t i o n a r e o nl y ten t a ti v e an d a r ebased on th e somet imes scan ty in fo rmat ionava i lab le f rom documents , th e guards , a ndpersonal observa t ion . Th is may lead thein te r roga to r to s e lec t approaches whichma y be to ta l ly incor rec t fo r ob ta in ing th i ssource's w ill ing cooperation. A carefu las ses sment of the source is absolutelyneces sary to avo id was t ing va luab le t ime in


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the approach phase. Make assessment byasking background an d nonpertinent ques-tions which will indicate whether or not theapproaches chosen will be effective. Thequestions can be mixed or they can beseparate. If, for example, the interrogatorhad chosen a love of comrades approach, heshould ask t he source questions like "Howdid you get along with your fellow squadmembers?" If the source answers tha t theywere all very close and worked well as ateam, then the interrogator can go rightinto his love of comrades approach an d bereasonably sure of it s success. However, ifth e source answers, "They all hated myguts an d I couldn't st and any of them!,"then the interrogator should abandon thatapproach an d ask some quick nonpertinentquestions to give himself some time to workout a new approach.Make Smooth Transitions. The interro-gator must guide the conversation smoothlyan d logically, especially if he needs to movefrom one approach technique to another."Poking and hoping" in the approach mayalert the prisoner of ploys and will make thejob more difficult. Tie-ins to anotherapproach can be made logically an dsmoothly by using transi tional phrases.Logical tie-ins can be made by the inclusionof simple sentences which connect thepreviously used approach with the basis forthe next one. Transitions can also besmoothly covered by leaving the unsuccess-ful approach and going back to nonperti-nent questions. By using nonpertinent con-versation, the interrogator can more easilymove th e conversation in the desired direc-tion, an d a s previously stated, sometimesobtain leads an d hin ts as to source'sstresses or weaknesses or other approachstrategies tha t may be more successful.Be Sincere and Convincing. All profes-sional interrogators must be convincingan d appear sincere in working theirapproaches. If a n interrogator is usingargument a nd reason to get the source tocooperate, he must be convincing andappear sincere. All inferences of promises,situations, and arguments, or otherinvented material must be believable. Whata source may or may not believe depends onhis level of knowledge, experience, and

training. A good assessment of the source isthe basis for the approach and is vital tothe success of the interrogation effort.Recognize the Breaking Point. Everysource has a breaking point, but an interro-gator never knows what it is until it hasbeen reached. There are , however, somegood indicators th at the source is near hisbreaking point or has already reached it.For example, if during t he approach, thesource leans forward with his facial expres-sion indicating a n interest in the proposalor is more hesitant in his argument, he isprobably nearing t he breaking point. Theinterrogator must be alert and observant torecognize these signs in the approachphase. Once th e interrogator determinesthat the source is breaking, he should inter-ject a question pertinent to the objective ofthe interrogation. If the source answers it,the interrogator can move into the question-ing phase. If th e source does not answer orbalks a t answering it, the interrogator mustrealize that the source was not as close tothe breaking point a s was thought. In thiscase, the interrogator must continue withhis approach or switch to an alternateapproach or questioning technique and con-tinue to work until he again feels that thesource is near breaking. The interrogatorcan tell if the source has broken only byinterjecting pertinent questions. This pro-cess must be followed until the prisoner be-gins to answer pertinent questions. It isentirely possible tha t the prisoner maycooperate for a while and then balk a t an-swering further questions. If this occurs, theinterrogator can either reinforce t heapproaches th at initially gained thesource's cooperation or move into a differ-ent approach before returning to the ques-tioning phase of the interrogation. At thispoint, it is important to note that t heamount of time that is spent with a particu-lar source is dependent on several factors,tha t is, the battlefield s ituation, the expe-diency with which the supported command-er's PIR and IR requirements need to beanswered, and so forth.

Approach TechniquesInterrogation approach techniques ar eusually performed by one interrogator


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working alone. However, sometimes inter-rogators work together. He must alsoremember th at the tactical situation is veryfluid and that the commander needs infor-mation i n the shortest period of time. Thismeans that the tactical interrogator ha s lit-tle time to waste, especially during theapproach phase. Obviously, the more com-plicated a n approach technique is, the morepreparation time is required for it and itssuccessful use. For this reason, t heapproach techniques discussed a re thosethat t ake the least amount of time to pro-duce the most usable information possible.

The number of approaches used is limitedonly by the interrogator's imagination andskill. Almost any ruse or deception is usableas long a s the provisions of the GenevaConventions are not violated. The GenevaConventions do not permit a n interrogatorto pass himself off a s a medic, chaplain, oras a member of the Red Cross (Red Crescentor Red Lion). To every approach technique,there are literally hundreds of possiblevariations, each of which can be developedfor a specific situation or source. The varia-tions are limited only by the interrogator'spersonality, experience, ingenuity, an dimagination.

With the exception of th e direct approach,no other approach is effective by itself.Interrogators use different approach tech-niques or combine them in to a cohesive, logi-cal technique. Smooth transitions, logic,sincerity, an d conviction can almost alwaysmake a s trategy work. The lack of willundoubtedly dooms it to failure. Someexamples of combinations are-

Direct/futility/love of comrades.

The actual number of combinations islimited only by the interrogator's imagina-tion and skill. Great care must be exercisedby the interrogator in choosing theapproach strategy in t he planning andpreparation phase of interrogation and inlistening carefully to wha t the source is say-ing (verbally or nonverbally) for leads th atth e strategy chosen will not work. Whenthis occurs, the interrogator must adapt

himself to approaches t hat he now believeswill work in gaining the source'scooperation.

QUESTIONINGAlthough there i s no fixed point a t whichthe approach phase ends an d the question-ing phase begins, generally the questioningphase commences when the source beginsto answer questions pertinent to the specificobjectives of the interrogation. Questionsshould be comprehensive enough to ensureth at the topic of interest is thoroughlyexplored. Answers should establish thewho, what, when, where, how, and whenpossible why. Questions should be pre-

sented in a logical sequence to be certainth at significant topics are not neglected. Aseries of questions following a chronologi-cal sequence of events i s frequentlyemployed, but this is by no means t he onlylogical method of asking questions. Adher-ence to a sequence should not deter theinterrogator from exploiting informationalleads as they are obtained. The interrogatormust consider the probable response of thesource to a particular question or line ofquestioning and should not, if a t all possi-ble, ask direct questions likely to evoke arefusal to answer or to antagonize thesource. Experience has shown t ha t in mosttactical interrogations, the source is coop-erative. In such instances, the interrogatorshould proceed with direct questions.

Questioning TechniquesUse good questioning techniquesthroughout the questioning phase. Aninterrogator must know when to use the dif-

ferent types of questions. With good ques-tioning techniques, the interrogator canextract the most information in the shortestamount of time. There ar e many types ofquestioning techniques.In tactical inter

Intel Interrogation May-1987

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