Insurgency and SMALL WARS

DR WILLIAM DEAN

Overview1. Problems of definition

2. Types of Insurgency

3. Charles Callwell and Small Wars

4. T.E. Lawrence to Robert Thompson

5. French small wars

6. American small wars

7. Small wars and technology/air power

8. Small wars since Vietnam

What are Small Wars?

“The primary characteristic of small wars is that there is no obvious field of battle; there are only areas to be controlled, civilians to be protected, hidden foes to be subdued.” Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, 2002

Small Wars: by the Book

Small War Manual Definition: “As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.”

Irregular Small Wars

• Defeat of Braddock in the French and Indian War - 1754

• The U.S. campaign in the Philippines - 1898-1914

• French War against Samori Toure in West Africa - 1885-1898

• The Malayan Emergency - 1948-1960

Limited vs Total Wars

• Small wars are often limited for the western conquerors but total for their indigenous opponents

– Spanish conquest of Mexico - 16th century

– French conquest of Algeria - 1830-1857

– Anglo-Boer War - 1899-1902

Abd-al Qadir

Small Wars and Western Disasters

• In an “Operational/Tactical” sense Small Wars can be total for western forces

– First Afghan War - 1842

– Custer’s Last Stand - 1876

– Dien Bien Phu - 1954

Traditional Insurgencies

• French peasants in the Vendee (1790s)– Opposed draft, supported church, royalist

• Spanish guerillas (1808-1813)– Supported church, anti-French, banditry, used by

conservative regular forces

• Sepoy Rebellion (1857)– Wanted to restore Mughal dynasty, protect traditonal

religion

• Menalamba Revolt in Madagascar (1896-98)– Pro-Hova monarchy, protect hearth and home

Ideological Insurgencies

• Rif Rebellion is a transitional insurgency

• French Indochina 1946-54

• Communist Rebellion in Malaya 1948-60

• El Salvador 1980s

• Columbia, FARC, and ELN, 1980s til today

Charles Callwell: Eminent Theorist of Small Wars

Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, 1896

• Anglo-Irish family, born 1859

• Graduate of Royal Military Academy Woolwich

• Saw action in India, Afghanistan, and Natal

Callwell’s Biography

• From 1885-1899 he served at Camberley (British Army Staff College) or at the War Office

• During Anglo-Boer War he served on General Redvers Buller staff and then had a field command

• During World War I he rose to rank of Major General and was Director of Operations

Basic Ideas of Callwell

• Warfare is seen primarily in cultural terms not political terms

• Small Wars are seen in terms of imperial conquest and as a technical problem

• Small Wars is mainly a technical manual that deals with diverse tactical and operational issues from supply to hill warfare

– Lacks the abstraction and sophistication of Jomini and Clausewitz

Basic Ideas of Callwell

• Callwell argues that tactics and organization are more important than technology

• He ignores the role of machine guns and prophylactic medicine (tools of empire)

• He believes that victory is achieved in Small Wars because of “dash and vigor” rather than by “force of numbers”

The Insurgent is Not Unbeatable

• Callwell and other small war theorists (e.g. Thompson) argue contrary to revolutionary theorists that insurgencies are not unbeatable

• Every insurgency assumes a different complexion

• This complexion is determined by politics, ideology, culture, geography, and climate

Callwell and COGs

• To defeat traditional or revolutionary insurgency a commander must find opponent’s Center Of Gravity

• Callwell’s ultimate value is that he helps inform the violent end of MOOTW

• Examples of COGs: Zulu capital of Ulundi, capture of Abd-al Qadir, Boer farms, women and children

Weaknesses of Callwell’s Ideas

• He sees the solution to all Small Wars in military terms

• Not interested in western commanders learning local customs, culture, or language

• Opposed to “Hearts and Minds” method of Gallieni and Lyautey in Tonkin, Madagascar, and Morocco

Hubert Lyautey

T.E. Lawrence and the Triumph of the Insurgent

• After World War I there was a growing belief that the insurgent would always win and Callwell’s ideas appeared to be dated

• T.E. Lawrence’s Book Revolt in the Desert began to develop the “Cult of Invincibility” of the insurgent

• Lawrence stands as a transitional figure between colonial and revolutionary warfare

The Rise of Ideological Insurgencies

• From the end of WWI Marxist and nationalist inspired insurgencies spread throughout much of Africa and Asia

• Examples of these insurgencies were: Indochina 1946-54, Malaya 1948-60, Algeria 1954-62, Kenya 1952-55

• Callwell’s work was ignored because it appeared irrelevant

Ho Chi Minh

Robert Thompson: Theorist of Counter-Insurgency

• A major theorist of small wars in the era of decolonization

• He was a theorist of the British colonial government during the Malaya Emergency

• The British conduct of the Malaya Emergency was a model counter-insurgency

Context of the Malaya Campaign

• Chinese communists seek to end British rule

• Communist insurgents use Maoist strategy to capture the countryside to drown the cities

• 10,000 communist guerillas target civilians

Malaya Military Context (Continued)

• The British attempted to destroy communist military wing and concentrated on removing sources of discontent

• The peasants on the jungle fringe were relocated into new villages where they could be protected and kept from aiding the insurgents

Hearts and Minds

• Robert Thompson believed that the insurgents could be defeated by a “hearts and minds” campaign

• The new villages were protected by a wire enclosure and contained running water, schools, and medical clinics

Hearts and Minds

• Massive self-help programs and government aid was given to Chinese peasants

• Chinese and Malay peasants were given free land

• Malaya was made independent in 1957

New Villages and Strategic Hamlet Program

• Over 480 new villages were created and resettlement became the lynch-pin of British counter-insurgency strategy

• New villages led to greater humint gathering...many Chinese were paid for information

• Thompson advised U.S. Forces in Vietnam in the 1960s and the above village program was the basis for the strategic hamlet program

Military Option

• Throughout the Malayan Emergency the military was used in a variety of ways

• This campaign saw the birth of helicopter operations

• Special Air Service units penetrated deep into the jungle

Thompson’s Counter-Insurgency Doctrine

Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966) is Thompson’s Major Work

Five Basic Principles:1. Government must have a clear political aim

(politically and economically stable and viable)2. Government must function in accordance with the law

(concept of minimum force)3. Government must have an overall plan (civil and

military action)4. Government must give priority to defeating political

subversion not guerillas5. In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government

must secure its base area out of which it could then expand

Comparing Callwell and Thompson

• Callwell sees war in terms of military solutions only

• Thompson takes a “hearts and minds” approach with emphasis on socio-economic solutions

French Counter-Insurgency: Guerre Revolutionaire

• French counter-insurgency ideas came out of the war in Indo-China…in Vietminh POW camps conservative French officers were introduced to Maoist doctrine

• They came to see colonial wars as crusades against communism

• They believed France had a duty to preserve its colonies and spread Christianity

Guerre Revolutionaire in Practice

• Guerre Revolutionaire was tried in Algerian Conflict

• Key practitioners were: Roger Trinquier, Jean-Bastien Thierry, General Massu

• 5th Bureau was created for political indoctrination of the populace and psy-ops

Failure of Guerrre Revolutionaire

• The wide spread use of terror and torture by Trinquier, Massu, et. al. weakened France’s claim on Algeria in the UN

• The attempted assassination of DeGaulle destroyed domestic support of the counter-insurgents

Small Wars and Changing Technology

• Improved communications after World War II (more radios)

• Improved medical care—penicillin

• Improved fire power (more mobile artillery, ubiquitous machine guns)

Insurgents and New Technology

• Insurgents are better armed than previous colonial wars

• Opponents have radios—hence the need for SIGINT

• Insurgents have better fire power (e.g. Vietminh artillery at Dien Bien Phu)

• Insurgents have a great power sponsor—Soviet Union

Small Wars and Air Power

• Heavy use of aircraft in inter-war air policing (Iraq and the Rif Rebellion)

• Origins of modern helicopter warfare in Malaya and Algeria

• Airpower used for intelligence gathering from Malaya to Aden

Small Wars and Air Power (Continued)

• Post-war transport aircraft increases mobility (back to Callwell’s principles) and eases logistics

• Rise of the role of paratroopers (e.g. SAS and REP)

• Not always successful—Dien Bien Phu

American Small Wars • A long history of American small

wars - Indian Wars (Seminole and Trans-Mississippi)

• Guerilla operations in American Civil War

• Largest U.S. small war— Philippine Campaign - 1898-1914

• Banana Wars: Nicaragua and Haiti

• The Marines are the American “colonial infantry”

USMC operations in Nicaragua 1926-1932

• 2,000 devil dogs protect govt. of Adolfo Diaz• Diaz govt. opposed by Augusto Sandino• July 1917: major battle between Marines, Guardia

National and Sandinistas

• Battle shows folly of fighting conventional battle against US

Marine Innovations in Nicaragua

• After ‘28 election Hooverbegins Marine draw down

• Competent constabulary,Guardia National, created

• Led by Chesty Puller

• He will win five Navy Crosses, serve with great distinction in WW II, Korea

Reasons for US Success In Nicaragua

• Puller believed in nonstop patrol: at night, in rainy season

• 20 days a month in the field

• Light logistics

• Sandino’s forces held a small portion of the country

• Sandinistas did not take over after the US left in 1932

Best School for Counter-Insurgency

• A generation of Marines gained valuable experience in the Banana Wars

• They developed small unit operations, combat patrolling, close air support, the use of automatic weapons, and jungle fighting

• This would serve the Marines well in the jungles of the South Pacific in WWII

USMC Small Wars Manual

• Technical “How To” manual…not abstract like Clausewitz or Jomini

• Probably inspired by Callwell and often covers similar technical topics

• More sophisticated and extensive than Callwell in that it looks at civil-military relationships and creating free elections

Basic Principles of USMC Small Wars

Phases of Small Wars

• Initial landing or action of vanguard

• General military operations in the field

• Assumption of control of executive agencies and cooperation with legislative and judicial agencies

• Routine police functions

• Withdrawal from theater of operations

Small Wars: Vietnam

Was Vietnam a Small War?

• U.S. Marines create the CAP Program to fight VC and NVA in the tradition of Thompson

• U.S. Army unprepared to fight a small war in Vietnam (A. Krepinevich The Army and Vietnam)

• It failed to absorb British and French lessons

• Vietnam is both a Small War and a large conventional War

Small War Command and Control in Vietnam

• US officers not in command of ARVN forces as in the past

• ARVN commanders chosen because of political allegiance, family connections

• Inappropriate training, poor leadership = poor ARVN performance

• Strategic Hamlets not given a fair chance

Westmoreland and Counter-Insurgency

• Key to counterinsurgency is fire power, large unit search and destroy missions.

• Avoided major population areas, left pacification to ill-trained, ill-equipped Vietnamese militias

• Ignored history of small wars; believed problems lay with ARVN forces, not faulty doctrine & force structure

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS)

• Besides Westmoreland’s big war approach there was a pacification effort waged by the CIA, AID, the US Information Agency, and the State Department.

• In 1967 president Johnson unified all these effort under CORDS led by Bob Komer

• CORDS built schools and hospitals, resettled refugees, improved rice production, electrify rural areas, and spread pro-govt. propaganda

• This program experienced some success at winning Hearts and Minds

USMC Combined Action Platoon (CAP)• Gen Brute Krulak: tache d’huile and fighting in

populated areas

• FID experience in Banana Wars

• Enhancing village security

• Binh Nhgia in 1966

• Living with the people

• Popular Forces as HUMINT

• Limited application

• Highly effective

• High morale among Marines

Why America Lost

• Inability to fight an asymmetric and symmetric war at the same time

• Too large and inappropriately trained force• Problems of using draftees creates operational and

political problems• Forgetting history• Ignoring FID and Limited Use of CORDS and CAP• The most skillful and determined foe the US had

faced in a small war

Creighton Abrams’ One War Approach• Takes command over after TET• Pacification: no longer the

other war• Ended search & destroy;

more extensive night patrols with smaller units

• Phoenix Program was very effective• land reform finally initiated• Vietnamization• In 1970 90% of the South’s population was under Saigon’s

control

Success and Failure in Afghanistan

• Special Forces: quick and immediate use

• Goal: smallest footprint possible• Innovative coordination of air

power and special forces

• Failure of symmetric forces to adapt to a small war (Roberts Ridge)

• Problematic use of local auxiliaries

Shifting from Symmetric to Asymmetric War in Iraq

• Quick symmetric war with smaller forces • US military commanders surprised by shift from symmetric

war to asymmetric war• Most coalition forces not organized trained/equipped for

asymmetric warfare• Failure of PME,

a paucity of doctrine• Relearning the history of

small wars the hard way• Steep learning curve

with political consequences

SMALL WAR and IRAQ

• Four insurgencies in IRAQ

– Sunni tribalists

– Former Saddam regime loyalists

– Fighters of Moqtada al-Sadr

– Foreign jihadists

• Challenges for US Forces

• Different from Vietnam

• Way Ahead: Future of the insurgency

Counter-insurgency in Iraq

• Organization: Army, AF becoming more expeditionary

• Training: Army training catching up with combat realities

• Equipment: Army: too heavy but using armor innovativelyAir Force: focused on the F-22

• Doctrine? What doctrine!! We don’t need no stinking doctrine!! History is just regurgitation

• Only the Marines are prepared to fight a small war

Long term consequences and Implications for US Military

• Transformation: must change our thinking on doctrine, organization, training/education, C2

• Smaller, appropriately-trained forces

• Iraq and beyond: all branches must fight

• New CORDS, using civilian expertise

• Synergy between military forces,Intelligence, civilian efforts

Lessons of History

• The history of small wars is an excellent point of departure

• Small wars are the most difficult to study

• Mindset must change

• Lessons from current smallwars help become more operationally effective in the future

Col H.R. McMaster