Insecurity in the Supply of Electrical Energy: An Emerging Threat?

D

Simon Bennett, Director of theUniversity of Leicester’s Civil Safety

and Security Unit (CSSU), has aB.A. in Public Administration from

Sheffield City Polytechnic, SouthYorkshire, an M.A. in

Communications and Technologyand a Ph.D. in the Sociology of

Scientific Knowledge, from BrunelUniversity, Middlesex. His research

interests include resilience, riskperception, and human factors. He

has consulted to the airline andrailway industries. An advocate of

the interdisciplinary approach toknowledge-generation, and championof Actor-Network Theory, he draws

on political science, sociology, historyand psychology. When working forthe airline industry he uses actionresearch (observation, survey, and

interview) to develop and test theoryand improve safety. He has spent

many hundreds of hours on the jump-seat observing crews.

ecember 2011, Vol. 24, Issue 10 1040-6190/$

Insecurity in the Supply ofElectrical Energy: An EmergingThreat?

As populations grow and budgets are cut, the resilience ofthe electricity sector becomes an issue. This article usesqualitative data gleaned from case studies to illustrate theconsequences for advanced industrialized societies of thesudden loss of electrical energy, and argues for agovernment-led response to the ‘energy-gap.’Keynesianism may provide a remedy.

Simon Bennett

I. Introduction

This article has two objectives:

First, to understand the

consequences for advanced

industrial societies of major

power failures. Secondly, to

discuss how such societies can

improve their resilience. The

analysis is informed by actor-

network theory (ANT). ANT

posits that systems are composed

of numerous, more-or-less-

aligned human and non-human

actors (‘‘actants’’). Systems are the

product of ‘‘heterogeneous

–see front matter # 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights

engineering.’’1 Resilience has

most often been viewed from a

technical standpoint.2 This article

broadens the analysis to include a

wider range of actants (activists,

economists, bureaucrats,

politicians, markets, ideology,

topography, geopolitics, etc.). The

analysis is holistic and inclusive.

A s well as being one of the

main pillars of economic

growth, a secure electricity

supply helps maintain public

confidence in politicians,

businesspeople, bureaucrats, and

other authority figures. Insecurity

reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2011.11.003 51

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2011.11.003

There arefew

more obvioussigns of

52

of supply breeds distrust in

institutions and undermines

prosperity. As evidenced by

Edward Heath’s ejection from

office in February 1974, blackouts

can also undermine governments.

In the winter of 1973, with

industrial unrest spreading and

energy supplies dwindling, the

government was forced to act:

By 30 December [1973], the Gov-

ernment was forced to put indus-

try on a 3-day week because of

energy shortages, to reduce heat-

ing and lighting in offices and

shops, introduce a 50-m.p.h. speed

limit and force television to close

down by 10.30 p.m.3

he lesson is simple: if you

politicalfailurethan a

blacked-outcity.

T want to stay in office you

must keep the lights on. There are

few more obvious signs of

political failure than a blacked-

out city. There is nothing more

wasteful than an industrial base

disabled by power cuts. There is

no more disaffected public than

one that is deprived of heat, light,

and home entertainment.

As societies develop, their

systems (of industrial production

and distribution, power

generation, finance, public

administration, etc.) become more

complex and tightly coupled.

Systems are linked (often via ICT)

to produce ‘‘systems of systems’’

(mega-systems). Although more

efficient, mega-systems are

vulnerable.4 Systems can be

undermined by ignorance or

denial of vulnerabilities, less-

than-optimal system redundancy,

cost-cutting in the matter of

system architecture and

component quality, and

1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2011 Elsevi

‘‘trans-boundary propagation of

disturbances.’’5 Mega-systems are

also vulnerable to malfeasance

and terrorism.6,7,8 Institutional

responses have included

government task forces like the

U.S. President’s Commission on

Critical Infrastructure Protection,

which ‘‘concluded that the

security, the economy, the way of

life, and perhaps even the

survival of the industrialized

world were dependent on the

er Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.

triad of electric power,

communications, and

computers.’’9

Complex systems fail for a

number of reasons. Breakdown

may result from either structural

vulnerability,10,11 a sequential

process of failure,12,13 gradual

degradation occasioned by

reactive ‘‘patching,’’14 the

emergence of deviant cultural

norms,15,16,17 a gradual and

difficult-to-detect migration

towards the boundary of safe

operation (‘‘safety

migration’’)18,19 or subordination

of system safety and security to

economic objectives –

Hollnagel’s20 Efficiency-

tej.20

Thoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO).

ETTO ‘‘may lead to . . . an

increasing gap between design

assumptions and work as it is in

reality.’’21

P errow’s22 normal accident

theory (NAT) argues that

system failures are unavoidable –

the result of tight coupling and

interactive complexity. Drawing

on the safety migration argument,

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

physicist Ben Carreras talks of

mega-systems’ ‘‘self-organized

criticality’’: ‘‘[C]omplex systems

tend to rearrange themselves to be

close to their limits, living at the

edge of chaos.’’23

High reliability organization

(HRO) theory argues that the risk

of failure can be reduced through

the purposeful variation of

authority structures,24 the

cultivation of a flexible,

responsive and ‘‘mindful’’

organizational culture25,26,27 and

bureaucratic and technological

redundancy – the ‘‘belt-and-

suspenders’’ to design.28 Some

enterprises duplicate critical

infrastructure.29 Wackers30

reminds us that the risk of failure

can never be eliminated:

‘‘[V]ulnerabilities can arise in

system design, in maintenance

regimes, in operational practices

or in the planning and execution

of modification programmes.’’

The complexity, tight coupling,

and mutual dependency of

systems of systems mean that

failures may cause widespread

disruption: ‘‘[W]hat happens to

one infrastructure can directly

and indirectly affect other

infrastructures, impact large

11.11.003 The Electricity Journal


An over-stretched

D

geographic regions, and send

ripples throughout the national

and global economy.’’31

Addressing the problem of power

outages from an HRO perspective

Lovins and Lovins32 make the

case for engineered resilience: ‘‘A

resilient energy supply system

should consist of numerous,

relatively small modules with a low

individual cost of failure . . .. [A]

resilient supply system delivers

energy to its users via short, robust

links. Finally, such a system

should rapidly detect, isolate, and

repair failures.’’
electrical powergeneration anddistribution system can II. Case Studies
be thought of as a latenterror or residentpathogen within anation’s technologicalinfrastructure.

The world economy is in a state

of flux. While many western

economies suffer the effects of the

2008–2011 financial crisis,33 rising

stars like China, India, and Brazil

forge ahead.34 While it is difficult

to predict what the future holds

for Japan, Germany, Britain and

the United States, one thing is

clear: without a reliable source of

electrical energy the pioneers of

mass production, mass

consumption, and informatics

will be overtaken. To maintain

their pre-eminence the pioneers

must ensure that investment in

power generation and

distribution technologies keeps

pace with demand for electricity.

T he less spare capacity a

generation and distribution

system has, the greater the risk of

that system failing. Redundancy

or ‘‘slack’’ promotes resilience.

Over-optimization and tight

coupling erode resilience.35


Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly36

offer this analysis:

Information technology, deregula-

tion, and the many business mer-

gers during recent years are three

forces that have dramatically

affected the economic and business

aspects of the infrastructure envir-

onment . . .. [T]he move toward

deregulation of some sectors (such

as energy) resulted in the shedding

of excess capacity that had . . .

served as a shock absorber against

system failures. Mergers further

eliminated redundancy . . .. The

combination of these . . . forces has

created an environment in which

infrastructures are much more

interdependent than in the past,

have little or no cushion in case of

failures, and have few if any alter-

native sources of service.

An over-stretched electrical


distribution system can be

thought of as a latent error or

resident pathogen37 within a

nation’s technological

infrastructure. Backup generators

and battery packs are no

substitute for a robust and reliable

mains supply (see below).

Advanced industrial societies

require an adequate supply of


electrical energy. Without this the

entire edifice is put at risk.38

A. Introduction to the U.S.

case studies

The case studies concern the

Great Northeast Blackout of 1965,

the New York Blackout of 1977,

and the Northeast Blackout of

2003. All three failures affected

significant numbers of people, the

latter affecting an estimated 50

million people across the

northeastern United States and

Canada. Ironically these events

occurred in the country that

pioneered urban electrical


systems.39 During the Twentieth

Century heavy investment in

generating and distribution

technologies bestowed significant

benefits on the U.S.’s industrial,

business, and domestic

consumers. Electricity’s unit price

fell dramatically.40 Despite the fall

in the price of electricity,

increased demand meant that

returns to investors soared. (In

each of the three decades

following World War Two

consumption of electricity

roughly doubled). The country’s

electrical power generation

industry seemed in rude health:

‘‘To the casual observer . . . the

utility industry in mid-1965

appeared to be the picture of

success. Manufacturers produced

continuously improving

technology for generating

electricity, and utility companies

employed it to benefit their

companies, their stockholders,

and their customers. What could



54

have been better than this

smoothly running electric utility

system that provided universal

benefits?’’41 The Great Northeast

Blackout of November 1965

showed the industry in a different

light.

The innovationsserved the

industry until1977, when four

lightning boltsstarted a chain reactionthat plunged New York

into darkness for asecond time.

1. The Great Northeast

Blackout

In the 1950s America’s power

generating utilities installed

interconnectors to boost system

resilience. The new ‘‘grid’’ helped

balance supply and demand.42

A t 17:27 on Nov. 9, 1965, a

single faulty relay started a

progressive collapse that left

some 30 million people without

power: ‘‘This small failure

triggered a sequence of escalating

line overloads that quickly raced

down the main trunk lines of the

grid . . . Investigators [the Federal

Power Commission] referred to

the 1965 blackout as a ‘cascade

effect’ – much like a row of

dominoes falling one after

another.’’43 Lerner44 talks about a

‘‘chain-reaction’’: ‘‘If certain parts

of the grid are carrying electricity

at near capacity, a small shift of

power flows can trip circuit

breakers, which sends larger

flows onto neighboring lines to

start a chain-reaction failure. This

happened on Nov. 10 [sic], 1965

. . .. ‘‘The Northeast power grid

was a tightly coupled system. The

grid’s limited slack magnified

perturbations. Loosely coupled

systems with high levels of

redundancy dampen

perturbations. Shocks are

absorbed with little or no damage.

Rosness45 notes:


‘‘Tight coupling’’ means that a

system lacks ‘‘natural’’ buffers, so

that disturbances propagate

rapidly throughout the system,

and there is little opportunity for

containing disturbances through

improvisation.

espite being without
D electricity for some
14 hours, New Yorkers reacted

with restraint. There were no

major disturbances. Looting was

small-scale. There were several

positive outcomes. First,

consumers improved their

personal resilience: New Yorkers

stocked up on candles, flashlights,

and battery-powered portable

radios. Secondly, there were

administrative and engineering

responses: ‘‘After the 1965

blackout the industry set up

regional reliability councils, co-

ordinated by the North American

Electric Reliability Council, to set

standards to improve planning

and co-operation among the

utilities. A single-contingency-

loss standard was set up to keep

the system functioning if a single

unit, such as a generator or

transmission line, went out.

er Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.20

Utilities built up spare generation

and transmission capacity to

maintain a safety margin [slack]’’.

There was a concerted effort to

learn the lessons of failure,46 a

process known as isomorphic

learning.47 The innovations

served the industry until 1977,

when four lightning bolts started

a chain reaction that plunged

New York into darkness for a

second time. On this occasion

New Yorkers were not so pacific.

2. The New York Blackout

The New York of the 1970s was

very different to the New York of

the 1960s. The 1960s Big Apple

was, for the most part, a place of

optimism and wealth, of

community and civic pride. Oil

was cheap, jobs were plentiful,

confidence was high,

entertainments, automobiles and

white goods were accessible to

most. America was the most

powerful nation on earth. In the

final year of the decade the U.S.

sent men to the moon. Nothing

seemed impossible. Then came

Vietnam, the ‘‘oil shocks,’’

inflation, political assassination,

and Watergate. America, and its

East Coast jewel, New York,

seemed to lose its way. In July

1979 President Jimmy Carter

made reference to what he called

a ‘‘crisis of the American spirit.’’

New York’s politicians and

officials were losing their battle

against bankruptcy, crime, and

urban decay. The Big Apple was

rotting from the inside.

Residential blocks were

demolished and the land left

vacant. Worn-out brownstones



At aroundthe timeof thesecondNew Yorkblackoutthe U.S.embracedderegulation.

D

were fired by arsonists or

unscrupulous landlords and left

as hulks.

J ust when it seemed things

could not get any worse, they

got worse: on the night of July 13,

1977, four lightning bolts disabled

New York’s power supply. There

followed what can only be

described as a city’s descent into

hell. In Working-Class New York

social historian Joshua Freeman48

writes:

Within minutes of the electrical

shutdown, looting broke out in

widespread parts of the city . . .. In

the South Bronx and Bushwick,

fires burned out of control. By the

time Consolidated Edison restored

power the following evening,

looters, rioters and arsonists had

caused an estimated three hun-

dred million dollars in damages

and the police had arrested more

than three thousand people.

Over 1,000 fires burned across

New York. The neighborhoods of

Harlem, Brooklyn, and the South

Bronx were hardest hit. Fifty cars

were stolen from one Bronx car

dealership. The violence and

destruction drew widespread

comment. According to Time

magazine New Yorkers had

suffered a ‘‘Night of Terror.’’ The

events of July 13, 1977, confirmed

what many had suspected, that

New York had been balkanized

by racial discrimination,

inequality, and poverty. Society –

and the city – had fragmented.

Charles Luce, Consolidated

Edison’s chairman, attributed his

system’s collapse to an ‘‘act of

God.’’ Luce’s analysis was

greeted with derision by the

Mayor of New York, who claimed


Consolidated Edison (Con Ed)

was guilty of ‘‘[At] the very least

gross negligence – and at the

worst something far more

serious.’’49 With the benefit of

hindsight it is clear that New York

City’s power generating and

distribution system lacked

resilience. When the grid became

unstable New Jersey and New

England were automatically

disconnected. This left New

Yorkers in the hands of the Long

Island Lighting Company

(LILCO). LILCO prioritized its

own customers. It cut New York

loose, throwing a blanket of

darkness over the Big Apple:

‘‘New Jersey’s lighted shoreline

stood in stark contrast to the

darkened skyline of Manhattan.50

Two theories – high reliability

and organizational mindfulness –

can help us unpick the 1977

blackout. As mentioned above,

HROs have numerous reliability-

enhancing characteristics,

including a commitment to

organizational learning,

operational reliability, intellectual

openness, objective self-appraisal,

flexibility, and safety. These


objectives are underwritten by

‘‘Strong support for the

maintenance of the organisation’s

technology.’’51 HROs also possess

what Pettersen and Aase52 call

‘‘slack,’’ specifically ‘‘an

extensiveness of resources such as

time, knowledge, competence and

tangible assets (e.g., tools and

spare parts).’’ Slack supports safe

and reliable working.

The theory of organizational

mindfulness53 also contributes to

our understanding. To be mindful

an organization must evidence a

love of detail, intellectual

curiosity, reflexivity, alertness,

sensitivity to perturbations,

deference to expertise (regardless

of where it resides in the

hierarchy) and a commitment to

resilience.54

It is reasonable to suggest that

the northeast seaboard’s power


industry lost its way in the 1970s.

Insufficiently mindful (lacking

reflexivity), it fell short of the

ideal-type HRO. The net result

was that the Northeast’s power

grid lacked the engineering

resilience to absorb four lightning

strikes.

At around the time of the

second New York blackout the

U.S. embraced deregulation, a

process that rolled back the state,

promoted entrepreneurship, and

delegated key resource allocation

decisions to the markets.

Deregulation and marketization

were accelerated in the 1980s. This

was the era of Reaganomics and

Thatcherism. In the 1990s the

complementary impulses of

deregulation and marketization



56

penetrated the U.S. power


industry.55

F or most of its history the U.S.


distribution industry had

consisted of regulated, vertical

monopolies. Under this system

‘‘A single company controlled

electricity generation,

transmission and distribution in a

given geographical area. Each

utility generally maintained

sufficient generation capacity to

meet its customers’ needs, and

long-distance energy shipments

were usually reserved for

emergencies . . ..’’56 These

interlinked providers constituted

a single machine – ‘‘by many

measures, the world’s biggest

machine,’’ claims Lerner.57

It is important to note that

Lerner’s ‘‘single machine’’

(consisting of interlinked vertical

monopolies) was not designed to

support the marketization of

electrical power generation and

distribution, which required the

continuous long-range

transmission of power between

generators, purchasers, and

consumers. The architecture of

the single machine was

antithetical to marketized power

generation and distribution.

There was a mismatch between

technology and policy,

specifically that enshrined in the

1992 Energy Policy Act (which

launched the marketization

initiative):

In the view of [former utility

executive John] Casazza and many

other experts, the key error in the

new rules was to view electricity as

1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2011 Elsevier

a commodity rather than as an

essential service. Commodities can

be shipped from point A through

line B to point C, but power shifts

affect the entire singlemachine

[sic] system. As a result, increased

long-distance trading of electric

power would create dangerous

levels of congestion on transmis-

sion lines . . . The problems would

be compounded, engineers

warned, as independent power

producers added new generating

units at essentially random loca-

tions . . .. If generators were added

far from the main consuming

areas, the total quantity of power

flows would rapidly increase,

overloading transmission lines.58

here is a clear lesson here:
T namely that policy changes
with implications for the way a

technology is used must be

accompanied by a comprehensive

technology assessment. For that

assessment to be accurate it must

draw on both expert and ‘‘lay’’

knowledge (which in the case of

the power generation and

distribution industry means not

just administrators, scientists and

engineers, but also power station

employees, computer

programmers, fitters, electricians,

Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.20

line maintainers, and other craft

workers). Policy should emerge

from a process of risk

communication (see Irwin59 and

Bennett and Shaw60).

Successful implementation of

the 1992 Act required

organizational mindfulness. It

required that politicians,

entrepreneurs, administrators,

and engineers reflect upon the

ability of the grid to accommodate

the new modus operandi (the

routine switching of current

across large distances). This did

not happen. Consequently the

grid began to fail: ‘‘[E]lectricity

trading skyrocketed . . .. As

predicted the new trading had the

effect of overstressing and

destabilising the grid.’’61

Marketization had undermined

the largest machine in the world.

The scene was set for a

catastrophic failure.

3. The Northeast Blackout

On Aug. 14, 2003, the Northeast

grid, operating at near capacity,

was unable to accommodate a

series of failures. The failures,

which included a power station

dropping off-line, tripped

breakers, and failed transmission

lines, caused the progressive

collapse of the entire grid. It being

summer, many consumers were

running air conditioners.

Demand for electricity was high.

Operating at near capacity, the

grid had too little slack to absorb

major perturbations. Lerner62

writes: ‘‘When energy shifted

from one transmission line to

another, overheating caused lines

to sag into a tree. The snowballing



D

cascade of shunted power that

rippled across the Northeast in

seconds would not have

happened had the grid not been

operating so near to its

transmission capacity.’’ The

marketization of electric power

generation and distribution had

created a delivery system so

tightly coupled that it was unable

to cope with concurrent system

failures (power stations going off-

line, cable breaks, the degraded

performance of FirstEnergy’s

computer system that saw screen

refresh rates telescope from three

seconds to fifty-nine seconds, etc.).

W ith reference to Reason’s63

‘‘Swiss cheese’’ model of

failure, on Aug. 14 a specific

combination and pattern of

failures breached the grid’s

engineering (‘‘hard’’) and

procedural (‘‘soft’’) defenses,

causing it to collapse. Some 50

million U.S. and Canadian citizens

were affected. The grid lost 80

percent of its load. Bill Richardson,

former head of the Department of

Energy, said the U.S. had a third-

world electricity grid. The impacts

were many and varied.

i. Information and communi-

cations technologies

Communications were

disrupted. Land lines were

overwhelmed when cell phone

sites failed. Although such sites

had backup supplies, some

emergency generators ran out of

fuel. Cable and Internet networks

also failed. The demise of the

battery-powered domestic radio

meant that the civilian powers

found it difficult to communicate


advice to the general public. As

might have happened in the

aftermath of a nuclear attack,

amateur radio enthusiasts passed

on messages to neighbors. The

scale of ICT disruption was much

greater than in 1965 or 1977

(because of ICT proliferation). A

survey of 500 IT managers

revealed the outage’s ICT costs:

‘‘Two percent of those surveyed

said they suffered more than

$10m in productivity losses; 1%

reported losses of between $1m

and $5m, and 10% reported losses

of $100,000 to $500,000’’

(Thibodeau, 2003). Managers said

they planned to improve backup

power supplies. The total

cost to the U.S. economy was

estimated at between $7 and $10

billion.64 Government agencies

incurred $15 to $100 million in

overtime and emergency service

costs.65

ii. Transportation

Transportation was affected by a

gradual drying up of fuel supplies.

Many East Coast refineries ceased

production. Those stations with


reserves of gasoline were unable to

pump it. Gas stations that were

able to use their pumps cranked up

the price. Some motorists drove

their vehicles until they ran out of

fuel. Abandoned vehicles clogged

the roads. Electric rail and

tramway systems stopped.

Underground systems stopped.

Regional airports that had no

means of powering screening

equipment closed.

iii. Industry and utilities

Road congestion meant that

factories operating tightly

coupled just-in-time supply

chains ran out of components. At

one point trucks were queuing for

seven hours to cross the

Ambassador Bridge between

Windsor and Detroit. Many

factories shut down immediately.

It took some industries a week to

return to full production. As

water pumps cut out water

pressure fell, creating a

contamination risk.

iv. Law and order

The lawlessness of 1977 did not

repeat, even in New York’s most

deprived inner-city

neighborhoods. The incident did

demonstrate the fragility of the

grid to those who would harm the

U.S. and Canada, however. It

became clear that the system was

so tightly coupled that it could be

disabled with a relatively small

number of simultaneous attacks.

This fact would not have escaped

the attention of would-be

terrorists, either homegrown or

foreign.66



58

4. Post-mortem

High-reliability systems have

significant levels of engineered

redundancy. In 2003 the

Northeast power grid was shown

to be lacking in engineered

redundancy. Something had to be

done. The U.S. and Canadian

governments either had to change

the way the grid operated, or find

the money to improve it.

I n September 2003 the U.S.

House Energy and Commerce

Committee held a two-day

hearing. FirstEnergy was

criticized. FirstEnergy retorted

that it was they, the politicians,

who had sanctioned the long-

distance transmission of large

amounts of electrical power

across a grid designed to deliver

locally produced power to local

communities. ‘‘Events in our

system, in and of themselves,

could not account for the

widespread nature of the

outage,’’ said CEO Peter Burg.67

The fact that the Northeast

power grid had been stretched to

breaking point supports

Rasmussen’s68 observation, here

paraphrased by Rosness,69 ‘‘that

human activities tend to migrate

towards the boundary of

acceptable risk’’ and Reason’s70

observation, again paraphrased

by Rosness, ‘‘that organisations

tend to drift passively towards

increasing vulnerability unless

they are actively driven towards

the resistant end of the safety

space.’’ Given the new demands

placed upon them the grid’s

engineers had little room for

manoeuvre. Their ability to

‘‘navigate the safety space’’71 such


that they maintained an adequate

margin of safety was

compromised. Their job was to

make the technology fit the

politics of marketization. The

reflexive analysis of design

assumptions, capability, and

performance (i.e., double-loop

learning72) was, perforce,

abandoned. With reference to

Hollnagel’s73 ETTO theory,

FirstEnergy’s employees were

obliged to prioritize efficiency

over thoroughness. With

reference to Snook’s74 theory of

practical drift, FirstEnergy’s

employees responded

pragmatically to changed

environmental conditions.

5. Summary

The Great Northeast Blackout of

1965 and the New York Blackout of

1977 warned of the dangers of

letting the lights go out. Amory B.

Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins

reminded America of the dangers

in Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for

National Security:

The United States has for decades

been undermining the foundations

of its own strength. It has gradually


built up an energy system prone to

sudden, massive failures with cat-

astrophic consequences. The

energy that runs America is brit-

tle—easily shattered by accident or

malice . . .. This danger comes not

from hostile ideology but from

misapplied technology . . .. A brief

faltering of our energy pulse can

reveal—sometimes as fatally as to

astronauts in a spacecraft—the

hidden brittleness of our interde-

pendent, urbanized society.75

nfortunately for the
U approximately 50 million
Americans and Canadians

affected by the 2003 blackout, the

authorities failed to remedy the

demonstrated fragility of the

electrical supply industry. The

lesson for industrialists,

businesspeople, and the general

public is that politicians

sometimes fail to learn from

experience. Priorities change.

Events intercede. Bennett76 notes:

‘‘[W]hile the theory of isomorphic

learning would appear to work on

paper, in the real world our

capacity to learn and apply the

lessons of the past may be

compromised by interceding

social, economic and political

dynamics.’’ Dynamics include

‘‘loss of momentum . . . financial

constraints [and] processes of ‘de-

sensitisation’.’’77

B. Introduction to the UK case

study

Determined to roll back the

state, in 1990 the Conservative

government privatized the UK’s

electrical power generation and

supply industry. The National

Grid, a state monopoly, became

National Grid Transco (NGT).



D

The London Electricity Board

(LEB) was wound up. London’s

electricity was sourced from EDF

Energy (a subsidiary of Electricite

de France). Britain’s reconfigured

system of electrical power


(a reification of free-market

ideology) was overseen by the

Office of the Gas and Electricity

Markets Authority (Ofgem).

Ofgem was tasked to deliver ‘‘a

reliable electricity supply.’’78

National Grid Transco’s duties

included the maintenance of ‘‘an

efficient, co-ordinated and

economical system of electricity

transmission.’’79 NGT achieved a

higher rate of investment than that

of its predecessor. In the runup to

the 2003 power cut NGT’s network

had been 99.9 percent reliable.

However, at 18:20 on Aug. 28,

2003, that record suffered a major

setback when large parts of South

London and Kent were blacked

out for up to 55 minutes.80

1. The London and Kent power

cut

Following the 2003 blackout of

the northeastern United States and

Canada, Britain’s Energy Minister

stated: ‘‘[It] could never happen

here [in the United Kingdom] . . . it

is highly unlikely that a single fault

could lead to the collapse of the

whole system.’’81 The progressive

failure of the electricity supply to

South London and parts of Kent

started with a malfunction in a

substation at Hurst in Kent (a

county to the southeast of the

capital). Taking the substation off-

line meant that supplies to South

London were dependent upon a


single transmission circuit in

Wimbledon, a suburb located on

the western side of the capital.

Unfortunately a June 2001

maintenance error had left the

Wimbledon substation with a non-

optimal protection relay. When the

Hurst substation was switched out

this latent error became active:

‘‘The change in power flows due to

Hurst being disconnected caused

the protection relay to be

triggered.’’82 It is interesting that

both this blackout and the 1965

blackout (see above) were caused

by the failure of a single small

component – a relay. Tight

coupling and limited redundancy

amplify small shocks.

W ith reference to Reason’s83

‘‘Swiss cheese’’ model of

failure, at 18:20 on Aug. 28, 2003,

National Grid Transco’s system

defenses (compromised since

June 2001 by maintenance error

and inadequate technical audit)

were successively (and rapidly)

breached, causing a system

failure. Had the correct protection

relay been fitted at Wimbledon, or

had the initial error been spotted

during an inspection, the power


cut might have been avoided. The

power cut – the biggest in British

history84 – had significant

consequences for the capital,

some of which are listed below:

i. Transport

About 1,800 trains on London’s

above-ground railway network

were affected.85 According to

London Underground about 60

percent of the tube network was

affected. Thousands of tube

passengers were trapped in trains

for up to an hour.86 According to

the Greater London Authority87

the timeliness and quality of

London Underground’s internal

communications, and of its public

information broadcasts left much

to be desired:

The lack of information caused the

chaos . . . to deepen. London

Underground and railway staff

had received little information . . .

tube, rail and road users were left

with little or no information. This

resulted in dangerous flows of

people moving across London’s

main road junctions, that were no

longer traffic-signal-controlled . . .

ii. Emergency services

The London Fire Brigade took

around 400 calls and rescued some

100 people stuck in elevators.88

The Metropolitan Police Service’s

initial response was hampered by

a lack of information about the

cause and nature of the power

outage. National Grid Transco

received a good deal of criticism on

this count:

re

The National Grid did not inform

New Scotland Yard until 30 min-

utes after the power cut that the

served., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2011.11.003 59


60

loss of power was not due to a

terrorist incident . . .. [T]here is

manifestly room for improvement

in communications.89

St. Thomas’s Hospital, one of

London’s largest National Health

Service (NHS) assets, had to rely

on backup generators. The Mayor

of London’s reaction was

unequivocal. ‘‘We’ve never had

this catastrophic failure before,

and we clearly can’t have it

again,’’ said Ken Livingstone.90

Mayor Livingstone attributed the

outage to ‘‘under-investment in

the National Grid.’’91 National

Grid Transco defended itself:

‘‘This was a quite exceptional

event in a transmission system

which is modern, well invested,

well maintained and has

consistently demonstrated

impressive reliability.’’92

iii. Crisis-management ICT

systems

London Underground’s crisis-

management protocols and ICT

systems were found wanting. On

its own admission, London

Underground’s Network Control

Centre (NCC) was ill-equipped to

deal with such a large-scale crisis.

As more and more London

Underground staff tried to contact

the NCC its switchboards became

congested. Although deficiencies

in the train radio network had

been identified in the 1990s, the

new CONNECT system was not

scheduled to be fully implemented

until 2006. Regarding the ejection

of passengers from London

Underground’s (LU’s) premises

with little or no information,

London Underground’s general


manager for customer services

commented: ‘‘My priority is

to ensure that we close the

system and we have got

everybody out.’’93 Howarth’s

balkanized view of public safety

was criticized by the Greater

London Authority94:

We believe that LU must take

account of the safety of those

members of the public displaced

from their system by any such

failure. Thousands of people were

milling in the streets . . .. Traffic

lights were out of action. There

were no extra police officers on the

streets . . .

n July 7, 2005, Islamic
O fundamentalists launched
terrorist attacks in London.95 In

March 2009, after a period of peace

in Northern Ireland, two dissident

Irish Republican groups, the Real

Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

and Continuity Irish Republican

Army (CIRA), murdered two

soldiers and a police officer.96 In

April 2011 a Catholic police officer

was murdered. There is still a

residual risk of Republican

terrorism.97 It is important that the

ICT systems of key infrastructure


providers (like London

Underground) are able to function

under all conditions.

iv. Image

Some of those caught up in the

chaos felt that things could have

been done better. ‘‘There must be

something wrong with the

finances if they can’t fund a back-

up system for it’’ said a day-

visitor. ‘‘It’s quite amazing that a

big city like London can be

brought to a standstill like this.

The infrastructure is terrible – it’s

really quite worrying,’’ said a

teacher.98 During the outage

Andrew Pelling, chair of the

London Assembly’s Public

Services Committee, found

himself in the company of an

American tourist:

I walked with an American whom I

had not met before trying to find a

train from Waterloo Station having

left an evacuating London Bridge

Station . . .. My American compa-

nion for that walk to Waterloo said

he thought the English had said it

could not happen here and that it

would teach limeys for being so

cock-sure.99

n Sept. 10, 2003, the
O government asked the
Department of Trade and

Industry to investigate the Aug.

28 power cut in London and Kent

(and the Sept. 5 power cut in the

West Midlands).

v. Impacts on business and

industry

Although the power cut

occurred after the end of the

working day it caused alarm

among London’s business

leaders, many of whom voiced



D

concerns that the Aug. 28 power

cut could be a portent of things to

come. ‘‘It is an event of enormous

concern to businesses across

London. We estimate that the

cost will run into millions of

pounds. If it had happened

during the working day, the cost

would have been much greater.

What is even more alarming are

suggestions that this could

happen again. At a time of

economic weakness, London

cannot afford a series of

potentially crippling power

cuts,’’ said the chief executive of

the London Chamber of

Commerce. He also noted the

potential damage to London’s

image: ‘‘Having the tube go

down at the height of the evening

rush hour is the very worst

possible advertisement for

London.’’100

T he chairman of the policy

and resources committee at

the Corporation of London said:

‘‘The transport system has

enough problems without the

threat of power cuts.’’101 The

Confederation of British

Industry’s (CBI’s) London

director pleaded that such a

failure should not be allowed to

happen again: ‘‘What is needed

now is a calm assessment . . ..

Then we can judge if action is

needed . . ..’’102 London First

spokesman Andrew Marre

observed: ‘‘This underlines the

importance of having continuity

plans . . ..’’103 ‘‘The digital

economy is putting extreme stress

on what are elderly localised

[grid] systems,’’ claimed one

manager.104


III. Power Cuts: Cost andResponse

Power cuts threaten business

and industry. In September 2004

Berkeley National Laboratories

published a study of the 2003 U.S.

power outage. In 2006 UK-based

information technology firm

LogicaCMG used the Berkeley

study to estimate the cost to the UK

economy of a major power outage.

LogicaCMG calculated the hourly

cost to UK industry of a power

failure to be £800 for small to

medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)

and £8,500 for large commercial

and industrial enterprises. PR

Newswire Europe105 applied

LogicaCMG’s algorithms:

–se

[If] power outages led to the loss of

just one day a week, which could

be quite possible by 2015 [the year

when demand for electricity in the

UK might outstrip supply], the

annual loss to each SME would be

in the region of £300,000 per year.

For larger industrial and com-

mercial [I&C] companies the

average figure would escalate to

over £3.5 million . . .. These figures

denote economic losses that are

clearly unsustainable.

e front matter # 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights

In their March 2009 report A

Decade of Living Dangerously,

Patrick Woodman and Vidal

Kumar106 wrote: ‘‘[T]he

percentage of managers reporting

that continuity is regarded as

important in their organisation

has fallen over the past year from

76 percent to 64 percent.’’ The

mechanics of continuity

assurance can be problematic:

‘‘[B]ack-up generators may not be

practical, particularly in the City,

owing to safety and space

constraints.’’107

One response to fragile grids is

demand-side management: the

more efficient use of electrical

energy may reduce consumption

to the point where demand-

incurred outages are reduced or

eliminated. New homes are better

insulated. Monies are available

for insulating older properties.

Many of today’s white goods use

electricity more efficiently and

have power-saver modes. While

such developments are to be

welcomed, house building

continues while sales of

electrically powered consumer

items soar. Demand-side

management may be a zero-sum

game. Conceivably, design-based

reductions in power consumption

will be negated – or outstripped –

by the consequences of economic

and population growth.

In one sense arguments over

demand-side management and

preparedness are secondary to the

main issue: security of supply.

Without a secure supply of

electrical energy the whole

industrial, bureaucratic, and

business edifice is placed in



62

jeopardy. The key question,

therefore, is ‘‘How secure is my

mains supply of electrical

power?’’ As far as the United

Kingdom and United States of

America are concerned, the

answer is quite possibly ‘‘Not as

secure as it should be.’’ While

users should invest in resilience

where they can (not easy in the

current financial climate) they

should also argue for security of

supply.

IV. Energy Security inthe United Kingdom

In 2006 LogicaCMG reviewed

the health of Britain’s electricity

industry. The Energy Review

concluded that by 2015 peak-time

demand for electricity could

exceed supply by 23 percent and

that the energy gap could cost the

UK up to £108 billion per annum.

LogicaCMG’s managing director

for energy and utilities warned:

Action needs to be taken now to

reduce the energy gap . . .. If this

doesn’t happen, it is almost certain

that the power will go off and

businesses will lose money . . ..

While nuclear . . . may be a viable

solution for the 2020 period, it is not

going to be ready in time for 2015

. . .. We believe that . . . planning

laws around the . . . construction of

new generation facilities will need

to be changed . . ..108

n May 2007 the House of
I Commons Library published
Research Paper 07/42: Energy

Security.109 The paper identified

several threats to Britain’s oil and

gas supplies, including

‘‘heightened competition over


depleting energy sources,’’ ‘‘the

new scramble for Africa’s oil and

gas,’’ ‘‘security of supplies from

the Middle East,’’ and ‘‘energy-

rich countries using energy supply

and price as a political

weapon.’’110 As the 2011 popular

uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt,

Tunisia, Syria, and Libya evidence,

supplies of oil and gas from Africa,

the Middle and Near East cannot

be guaranteed. In politics the only

certainty is uncertainty:

With continuing protests in Gulf

countries like Yemen, Bahrain and

recently Oman, some market ana-

lysts are beginning to mention the

unmentionable. ‘‘What if the

revolution spreads to Saudi Ara-

bia?’’ . . .. Saudi Arabia is often

viewed as the one country that can

offset oil production declines that

follow on from natural disasters or

from conflict situations. So the

immediate reaction to the troubles

in Libya has been for the Saudis to

engage in emergency talks with

European oil refiners on how best

to cope with any expected short-

falls. Analysts at Goldman Sachs

. . . consider that the chance of the

‘contagion’ of civil unrest spread-

ing to the large energy producers

in the Gulf is ‘relatively low.’ But

what if they are wrong? Are we


prepared for an oil shockwave? . . ..

The term oil shockwave relates to a

policy war-gaming scenario

played out by various U.S. gov-

ernment agencies back in 2005.

Under this scenario, hypothetical

events, including civil unrest and

terrorist attacks, affected oil pro-

duction in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia

and Alaska. One participant, for-

mer CIA director Robert Gates and

current US Secretary of Defence,

stated after the exercise that, ‘‘[t]he

American people are going to pay

a terrible price for not having had

an energy strategy,’’ and, he con-

tinued, ‘‘the scenarios portrayed

were absolutely not alarmist;

they’re realistic.’’111

Responding to the Arab

rebellions, the UK’s energy

secretary said: ‘‘Getting off the oil

hook is made all the more urgent

by the crisis in the Middle East.

We cannot afford to go on relying

on such a volatile source of energy

when we can have clean, green

and secure energy from low-

carbon sources.’’112

T he European Union imports

about half its gas from

Russia. Russia limited the

flow of gas in 2006 (to Ukraine)

and 2009 (again to Ukraine). The

2009 dispute had serious knock-

on effects in many countries.

Slovakia declared a state of

emergency. Hungary, Poland,

Germany, Austria, and France

‘‘reported substantial drops in

supplies.’’113 Because gas

supplies from the North

Sea are dwindling, Britain is

becoming increasingly

dependent on Europe’s volatile

energy market. The Russia-

Ukraine dispute constitutes a

(political) latent error/resident



D

pathogen in the European gas

supply system.

T he consequences of the 2009

dispute (the restriction or

curtailment of supplies across

Europe) demonstrated the tight

coupling of Europe’s gas supply

network. The impact of the

dispute on the gas supply system

supports Weick’s114 argument

that coupling is not a fixed but a

dynamic property of socio-

technical systems. Unanticipated,

extraneous factors can act to

tighten coupling. Given this fact it

is possible that the perturbations

that result from international

competition and dispute (which

will surely intensify as

competition for resources

sharpens) will act to destabilize

large infrastructure systems (like

oil and gas supply networks and

power grids). Systems running at

near capacity would be especially

vulnerable. Some years ago

Lagadec115 observed: ‘‘Major

crises . . . are no longer

exceptional events. Indeed the

risk of crisis is even becoming

structural as large networks

become more complex, more

vulnerable . . ..’’

In their 2008 critique of UK

energy policy, A Pragmatic Energy

Policy for the UK, consultants

Candida Whitmill and Ian Fells116

commented: ‘‘Security of energy

supply must now be seen as

taking priority over everything

else, even climate change.’’ In an

interview with The Guardian Fells

observed: ‘‘We had a power cut in

2003 for about 12 hours in the City

of London – the consequential

loss was about £700m because


everything stops. All your IT

stops, the stock market doesn’t

work.’’117 Industrialist Andrew

Cook wrote an introduction to the

report:

We are increasingly dependent on

gas from Russia and other unstable

parts of the world . . .. We need

more electricity, yet increasingly

we lack the means to generate

it . . ..118

In December 2008 NATO

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop

Scheffer stated: ‘‘I do believe that

in a crisis situation NATO should

be ready to provide necessary

practical assistance, such as in

response to energy blackmail.119

In response to the 2011

insurrection in Libya, NATO

implemented a UN-sanctioned

‘‘no-fly’’ zone to protect civilian

populations. Libya is an oil and

gas producer, and potentially a

rich nation.120

In 1956 Britain became the first

nation to produce electrical

energy from nuclear fission on an

industrial scale.121 In 2003 the

Blair government rejected nuclear

power in favor of energy

efficiency and renewables. In


March 2006 the Sustainable

Development Commission

claimed there was no justification

for a new nuclear program. In July

2006 the government reversed its

position. In November 2007

Gordon Brown, Blair’s successor,

called for an accelerated nuclear

building program. In 2008

Russia invaded Georgia.

Describing Russia’s action as

‘‘dangerous and unacceptable,’’

Brown spelled out his energy

policy: ‘‘Without urgent action

we risk sleepwalking into an

energy dependence on less

stable . . . partners. That is why

we in the UK are . . . looking to

replace our ageing nuclear

power plants . . ..122 A Financial

Times/Harris poll conducted in

February 2008 revealed that six

out of 10 Britons ‘‘regarded

Russia as a foe.’’123 In November

2008 The Guardian’s Ian

Traynor124 observed:

Europe currently gets 42% of its

gas, a third of its oil and a quarter of

its hard coal from Russia. The

commission estimates that by

2030 Europe will be importing 84%

of its gas needs, up from 61% at

present.

Energy security is threatened

also by the world financial crisis.

It is fashionable to look to the

private sector for major

investments in energy

generation. This approach

only works, however, if banks

are willing to lend. On Nov. 25,

2008 the chief executive of

Ofgem explained the problem

to the House of Commons

business and enterprise

committee:



64

I don’t want to be a prophet of

doom. This does not mean I’m

not confident the market would

deliver. But I think we need to go

back and check [that our assump-

tions] still stand up to the new

world in which we live.125

I n September 2008 the world’s

first commercial wave-power

project went live off the coast of

Portugal. In mid-November 2008

the generators were towed back

to land. There were two

problems. First, the buoyancy

tanks leaked. Secondly, a

major investor withdrew its

support. ‘‘[T]he Agucadoura

project points up the risks of a

strategy relying on cutting-edge,

and potentially costly,

technology’’ observed Patrick

Blum126 in the International Herald

Tribune. According to Fells,127 if

nuclear technology is complex

and costly, so too are the new

technologies that support

renewable energy generation.

V. Conclusions

Several conclusions can be

drawn. First, unless there is

significant investment in

electricity generating and

distribution systems, the lights

may go out in the developed

world. As Perrow,128 Siemieniuch

and Sinclair129 and Petersen and

Aase130 have established,

reliability is partly a function of

redundancy and ‘‘slack’’ (a

sufficiency of physical and

human resources). Reliability is

also a function of financial

liquidity (because investment in


physical and human resources

costs money). In September 2009

The Daily Mail revealed that the

UK government was predicting

power cuts of 3,000 MWh per

year by 2017 and 7,000 MWh per

year by 2025.131 In 2011 the UK’s

Conservative-Liberal Democrat

coalition government

implemented an austerity

budget.

Secondly, utility managers must

be wary of political interventions

that put undue strain on tightly

coupled systems operating at near

capacity. Thirdly, politicians must

assess whether a distribution

system designed to accommodate

one set of operating assumptions

can accommodate another. A grid

designed to deliver electricity over

short distances may not be up to

the task of routinely distributing

electricity across a region or

country. Changing the way in

which a system is used may render

that system less effective. In

extremis it may cause it to collapse.

A technological system is a

social construct – the

physical embodiment of a

particular world-view.132,133


Change the politics of use (as

happened in the United States

with the marketization of electrical

power generation, and

transmission of electrical energy

over large distances), without

checking it is technically feasible

and the system may be

undermined.

Fourthly, resilience

engineering and contingency

planning cannot guarantee

continuity: Backup generators

are expensive and cumbersome.

It is argued that staff can work

from home. But what if there is

no electricity? How many

householders have backup

generators or battery packs?

If a company has a working

backup generator, how do staff

get into the office if public

transport is affected? What if

there are no trains or tubes?

What if there is gridlock? If

there is public disorder (for

example, looting), who would

risk going to work anyway? If

schools are closed, someone

has to stay at home to look

after the children. Power cuts

have myriad technical,

economic, political, and social

impacts. As Perrow134 explains,

complex systems (like aircraft,

nuclear reactors, or urban

societies) are prone to

unanticipated and difficult-to-

identify-and-control inter-

component interactions.

Fifthly, politicians’ preferences

change – for good or ill. In 2003

Tony Blair invested significant

political capital in green energy

(wind power, solar power,

energy conservation, etc.). In



D

September 2008 John Hutton,

Labour’s Business Secretary,

said:

The battle for energy security is

going to define the fight for Brit-

ain’s future . . .. No coal and no

nuclear equals no lights, no power,

no future.135

Table 1: Cost of Downtime for Public and Private Sector (Per Hour)

Industry Average Cost Per Hour US$

Brokerage 6,400,000

Energy 2,800,000

Credit card operations 2,600,000

Telecommunications 2,000,000

Manufacturing 1,600,000

Retail 1,100,000

Health care 640,000

Media 340,000

P oliticians’ volatile

relationship with nuclear

power should be considered

against the wider social backdrop

of a general disenchantment

with high technology, the

rejection of a dominating,

mechanistic science, a growing

fear of ‘‘technopathology’’ and

the dawn of the Risk

Society.136,137,138 The ‘‘euphoric’’

period of scientific and

technological development

peaked in the 1960s.139,140 Iconic

high-technology failures like the

Love Canal, Seveso and Bhopal

chemical poisoning incidents,

and the Three Mile Island (1979),

Chernobyl (1986), and

Fukushima Dai-ichi (2011)

nuclear accidents have

heightened public skepticism of

‘‘big science.’’ In the United

Kingdom skepticism has

manifested in a post-Fukushima

review of Britain’s revived

nuclear program.141,142 It has

manifested in the ‘‘climate camp’’

phenomenon where

environmental activists picket

airports, coal-fired power

stations, and other perceived

polluters.143 The Association

of Electricity Producers has

pointed out that the new

generation of coal-burning

power stations are some


20 percent less polluting

than the old.144 MacKenzie

and Wajcman145 observe:

‘‘It is notoriously impossible

[sic] to find consensus on the

environmental risk posed by

controversial technologies.’’

Finally, and perhaps most

crucially, it is clear that even the

most rigorously planned and

cleverly executed energy policy

can be undermined by events on

the world stage. A war in the

Middle East, for example, would

pose a serious threat to oil

supplies.146 A war in Eastern

Europe would threaten gas

supplies.147 The British

government may have

recommitted itself to nuclear

power, but it takes at least 10

years to build a plant. If a year

is a long time in politics,

10 years is an age. Much can

change.148 It is imperative that

industrialists, businesspeople,

and publics keep pressuring

government. While resilience

engineering and business

continuity planning are

important, the best way to

secure a society is to keep

the electricity crackling down

the line.


VI. A Plan of Action

Business continuity

management is predicated on the

assumption that situations can be

recovered and reputation

preserved. The argument

presented in this article is that one

risk – that posed by power

outages – can be mitigated, if not

eliminated at source, via

engineered resilience and

elimination of the energy gap.

Prevention is better than cure.

Why address the symptoms when

one can remove the cause?

In April 2008 the U.S.

Association for Facilities

Engineering (AFE)149 estimated

the cost of downtime per hour for

the private and public sector

(Table 1).

Boosting the resilience of the

U.S. supply grid could cost $100

billion.150 The figures shown in

Table 1 put that cost into

perspective. America – and other

countries with fragile grids – can’t

afford not to act. Improving

security of supply requires first,

that interested parties persuade

governments to act, and secondly,

that governments keep an open

mind: investing in infrastructure



66

will save money in the long term.

Instead of transferring the cost to

end users (the hardware and

software of business continuity

are expensive), governments

must internalize it. It is up to the

user community to make the case

for preventive action through

trade associations, consumer

groups (like ELCON, which

represents some two dozen

major corporations), and

consultancies. Pluralistic societies

offer numerous platforms. Now is

not the time to retreat from the

energy debate. The case for

foresight and active learning151 in

the matter of energy security is

cast-iron.&

Endnotes:

1. John Law, Technology andHeterogeneous Engineering: THE CASE OF

THE PORTUGUESE EXPANSION, IN THE

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNICAL

SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE

SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY,Eds. W.E. Bjiker, T.P. Hughes and T.J.Pinch (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1987), at 113.

2. Myriam Dunn, The Socio-PoliticalDimensions of Critical InformationInfrastructure Protection (CIIP),INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURES, 1 (2–3): 258.

3. David Childs, BRITAIN SINCE 1939:

PROGRESS AND DECLINE (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1995), at 173–174.

4. Arjen Boin and Allan McConnell,Preparing for Critical InfrastructureBreakdowns: The Limits of CrisisManagement and the Need for Resilience,J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT., 15 (1):50.

5. Wolfgang Kroger, CriticalInfrastructures at Risk: A Need for a NewConceptual Approach and ExtendedAnalytical Tools, RELIABILITY

ENGINEERING & SYSTEM SAFETY, 93:1781.


6. Robert M. Clark and Rolf A.Deininger, Protecting the Nation’sCritical Infrastructure: The Vulnerabilityof U.S. Water Supply Systems, J.CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT., 8 (2): 73.

7. Adilson E. Motter and Ying-ChengLai, Cascade-Based Attacks on ComplexNetworks, PHYSICAL REV. E, 66,065102(R), 2002.

8. Jeffrey S. Simonoff, Carlos E.Restrepo and Rae Zimmerman,Risk-Management and Risk-Analysis-Based Decision Tools for Attacks on

Electric Power, RISK ANALYSIS, 27 (3):547.

9. Myriam Dunn-Cavelty, CYBER-

SECURITY AND THREAT POLITICS

(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), at 10.

10. Brian Toft and Simon Reynolds,LEARNING FROM DISASTERS: AMANAGEMENT APPROACH (Oxford:Butterworth-Heinemann, 1994).

11. Charles Perrow, NORMAL

ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK

TECHNOLOGIES (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press, 1999).

12. Barry A. Turner, TheOrganisational and InterorganisationalDevelopment of Disasters,ADMINISTRATIVE SCI. Q., 21: 378–397.

13. Barry A. Turner, MAN MADE

DISASTERS (London: Wykeham, 1978).

14. David T.H. Weir, Risk and Disaster:The Role of Communications Breakdownin Plane Crashes and Business Failure, inDEBATES IN RISK MANAGEMENT, Eds.Christopher Hood and David K.C.


Jones, (London: UCL Press, 1996), at114–126.

15. Diane Vaughan, THE CHALLENGER

LAUNCH DECISION. RISKY TECHNOLOGY,CULTURE AND DEVIANCE AT NASA

(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,1997).

16. Scott Snook, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE

ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF U.S.BLACK HAWKS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press,2000).

17. Sydney W.A. Dekker, TEN

QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN ERROR (NewJersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005).

18. Jens Rasmussen, Risk Managementin a Dynamic Society: A ModellingProblem, SAFETY SCI., 27: 183–213.

19. James Reason, HUMAN ERROR

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.Press, 1990).

20. Erik Hollnagel, BARRIERS AND

ACCIDENT PREVENTION (Aldershot:Ashgate, 2004).

21. Ragnar Rosness, Derailed Decisions:The Evolution of Vulnerability on aNorwegian Railway Line, in RISKY WORK

ENVIRONMENTS. REAPPRAISING HUMAN

WORK WITHIN FALLIBLE SYSTEMS, Eds. C.Owen, P. Beguin and G. Wackers(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), at 54.

22. Perrow, supra note 11.

23. Keay Davidson, How a Butterfly’sWing Can Bring Down Goliath: ChaosTheories Calculate the Vulnerability ofMegasystems, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 15,2003, at A6.

24. Todd R. La Porte and PaulaConsolini, Working in Practice but Notin Theory: Theoretical Challenges of High-Reliability Organisations, J. PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH & THEORY, 1:19–47.

25. Karl E. Weick, OrganizationalCulture as a Source of High Reliability,CALIF. MGMT. REV., 29: at 112–127.

26. Ellen J. Langer, MINDFULNESS

(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,1989).

27. Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M.Sutcliffe, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED:ASSURING HIGH PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE

OF COMPLEXITY (SF: Jossey-Bass, 2001).



D

28. Karlene H. Roberts, SomeCharacteristics of One Type of HighReliability Organisation, ORGANISATION

SCI., 1: 160–176.

29. Kathryn M. Bartol and David C.Martin, MANAGEMENT (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1998).

30. Ger Wackers, OffshoreVulnerability: The Limits of Design andthe Ubiquity of the Recursive Process, inRISKY WORK ENVIRONMENTS, supra note21, at 81–98.

31. Steven M. Rinaldi, James P.Peerenboom and Terrence K. Kelly,Identifying, Understanding andAnalysing Critical InfrastructureInterdependencies, IEEE CONTROL

SYSTEMS MAGAZINE, Dec. 2001, at 11–25.

32. Amory B. Lovins and L. HunterLovins, BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (Andover, MA:Brick House Publishing, 1982).

33. VINCE CABLE, THE STORM (London:Atlantic Books, 2009).

34. Dominic Wilson, Alex Kelston andSwarnali Ahmed, Is This the ‘BRICSDecade?’ BRICs MONTHLY, Issue No:10/03, May 20, 2010, at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/.


36. Rinaldi et al. supra note 31.

37. Reason, supra note 19.

38. Simonoff et al., supra note 8.

39. Richard F. Hirsh, The ElectricUtility Industry in 1965: At the Pinnacleof Success before the Blackout, 1999, athttp://blackout.gmu.edu/archive/essays/hirsh_1999.html.

40. Id.

41. Id.

42. Blackout History Project, Events/1965 (Great Northeast Blackout), 2000,at http://blackout.gmu.edu/events/tl1965.html.

43. Id.

44. Eric J. Lerner, What’s Wrong withthe Electric Grid? THE INDUSTRIAL

PHYSICIST, Oct./Nov. 2003, at 8–13.

45. Rosness, supra note 21.

46. Blackout History Project, supranote 42.


47. Toft and Reynolds, supra note 10.

48. Joshua B. Freeman, WORKING-CLASS

NEW YORK: LIFE AND LABOR SINCE WORLD

WAR II (New York: New Press, 2000).

49. Blackout History Project, supranote 42.

50. Id.

51. Carys Siemieniuch and MurraySinclair, How Roles Change whenDisaster Strikes: Lessons Learnt from theManufacturing Domain, in DECISION

MAKING IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS,

Eds. M. Cook, J. Noyes and Y.Masakowski (Aldershot: Ashgate,2007), at 179–187.

52. Kenneth Pettersen and KarinaAase, Explaining Safe Work Practices inAviation Line Maintenance, SAFETY

SCIENCE, 46, at 510–519.

53. Weick and Sutcliffe, supra note27.

54. Andrew Hopkins, Working Paper 7:Safety Culture, Mindfulness and SafeBehaviour: Converging ideas? (Canberra:Australian National University,2002).

55. Rinaldi, et al., supra note 31.

56. Lerner, supra note 44.

57. Id.

58. Id.

59. Alan Irwin, CITIZEN SCIENCE

(London: Routledge, 1995).

60. Simon A. Bennett and Andrew P.Shaw, Incidents and Accidents onthe Ramp: Does ‘Risk Communication’


Provide a Solution? HUMAN FACTORS &

AEROSPACE SAFETY, 3 (4), at 333–352.

61. Lerner, supra note 44.

62. Id.


64. Inner City Fund (ICF) Consulting,The Economic Cost of the Blackout(Fairfax, VA: ICF, 2003).

65. Electricity Consumers ResourceCouncil (ELCON), The EconomicImpacts of the August 2003 Blackout(Washington, DC: ELCON, 2004).

66. Keay Davidson, How a Butterfly’sWing Can Bring down Goliath: ChaosTheories Calculate the Vulnerability ofMegasystems, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 15,2003, at A6.

67. British Broadcasting Corporation,U.S. Blackout Firm Had ‘No Clue,’2003, at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3082000.stm.

68. Jens Rasmussen, Risk Management,Adaptation and Design for Safety, inFUTURE RISKS AND RISK MANAGEMENT,Eds. B. Brehmer and N.E. Sahlin(Dordrecht: Kluwer AcademicPublishers, 1994).

69. Rosness, supra note 21.


71. Id.

72. Chris Argyris, GoodCommunication That Blocks Learning,HARVARD BUS. REV., July/Aug. 1994, at77–85.

73. Hollnagel, supra note 20.

74. Snook, supra note 16.

75. Lovins and Lovins, supra note 32.

76. Simon A. Bennett, Case Studies inArchitectural Surety, DISASTER RESEARCH

REPORT Vol. 2, No. 1 (Worcester:Institute of Civil Defence and DisasterStudies, 2001).

77. Id.

78. Boaz Moselle, Ofgem Statement tothe Greater London Authority Regardingthe Public Services Committee’sEvidentiary Hearing on the London PowerCut – 16 September, 2003 (London:Ofgem, 2003).


http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/

http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/

http://blackout.gmu.edu/archive/essays/hirsh_1999.html

http://blackout.gmu.edu/archive/essays/hirsh_1999.html

http://blackout.gmu.edu/events/tl1965.html

http://blackout.gmu.edu/events/tl1965.html

http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3082000.stm




68

79. Id.

80. National Grid Transco (NGT)Statement Regarding Power Cut in SouthLondon, Statement One – 21:25 hrs.(Warwick: National Grid Transco,2003).

81. Greater London Authority, ThePower Cut in London on 28 August2003, A Report from the LondonAssembly’s Public Services Committee(London: Greater London Authority,2004).

82. Id.


84. Power Cut Phenomenon StrikesAnother Two Countries, THE INSIDER,2003, at http://www.theinsider.org/news/article.asp?id=414.

85. British Broadcasting Corporation,Power Cut Causes Chaos, 2003, athttp://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/3189755.stm.

86. Sky News, Transport Back On TrackAfter Power Cut, 2003, at http://news.sky.com/.

87. Greater London Authority, supranote 81.

88. BBC, supra note 85.


90. BBC, supra note 85.

91. Transport Back On Track AfterPower Cut, Sky News, 2003, at http://news.sky.com/.

92. NGT, supra note 80.


94. Id.

95. Patrick Woodman, BUSINESS

CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT (London:Chartered Management Institute,2007).

96. John F. Burns, Police Chief in UlsterPlays Down Dissidents, INT’L. HERALD

TRIBUNE, Mar. 16, 2009, at 3.

97. Independent MonitoringCommission, Twentieth Report of


the Independent Monitoring Commission(London: The Stationery Office, 2008).

98. British Broadcasting Corporation,Commuters’ Blackout Misery, 2003,http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/3190055.stm,accessed Mar. 2009.


100. Jane Padgham and SteveHawkes, Blackout Costs ‘Run intoMillions,’ EVENING STANDARD, Aug. 31,

2003, at http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-6444607-blackout-costs-run-into-millions.do.

101. Id.

102. Id.

103. Id.

104. Id.

105. UK Energy Gap: Much Larger,Much Closer and More ExpensiveThan Reported, PR Newswire Europe,2009, at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=184802,accessed Mar. 2009.

106. Patrick Woodman and VidalKumar, A DECADE OF LIVING

DANGEROUSLY (London: CharteredManagement Institute, 2009).

107. Users Need to Be Prepared for PowerCuts, ComputerWeekly.com 2003, athttp://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/ArticlePage.aspx?ArticleID=197067.


108. PRNewswire Europe, supra note105.

109. Ruth Winstone, Paul Bolton andDonna Gore, Research Paper 07/42Energy Security 9 May, 2007 (London:House of Commons, 2007).

110. Id.

111. Brendan Barrett, From JasmineRevolution to Oil Shockwave, 2011, athttp://www.ourworld.unu.edu/en/from-jasmine-revolution-to-oil-shockwave/.

112. Toby Helm, Oil Prices: UrgentSteps Needed to Wean UK onto OtherEnergy Sources, MPs Say, THE

GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/mar/05/oil-uk-energy-sources.

113. David Gow, Luke Harding andIan Traynor, Brussels to Host EmergencyTalks as Tens of Thousands Lose Heatingin Their Homes, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 8,2009, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/08/russia-ukraine-gas.

114. Karl E. Weick, The VulnerableSystem. An Analysis of the Tenerife AirDisaster, J. MGMT., 16 (3), at 571–593.

115. Patrick Lagadec, Ounce ofPrevention Worth a Pound in Cure,MGMT. CONSULTANCY, June 1993.

116. Ian Fells and Candida Whitmill,A Pragmatic Energy Policy for the U.K.(Newcastle: Fells Associates, 2008).

117. Alok Jha, Energy Security ‘MoreImportant than Climate Change,’ THE

GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/17/renewableenergy.fossilfuels.

118. Fells and Whitmill, supra note116.

119. Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, EnergySecurity: NATO Secretary GeneralSpeaks Out on the Need for GreaterPartnership, 2008, at http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/Features_from_Lloyds/Energy_security_09122.

120. In Oct. 2011 Muammar Gaddafiwas killed by National TransitionalCouncil soldiers, ending the popularuprising. As far as the Russian mediawas concerned (most especially the


http://www.theinsider.org/news/article.asp%3Fid=414

http://www.theinsider.org/news/article.asp%3Fid=414

http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/3189755.stm



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http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release%3Fid=184802

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http://www.ourworld.unu.edu/en/from-jasmine-revolution-to-oil-shockwave/



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http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/Features_from_Lloyds/Energy_security_09122




D

television station RT) NATO’s Libyacampaign was all about energysecurity.

121. Childs, supra note 3.

122. Gordon Brown, This Is How WeWill Stand Up to Russia’s NakedAggression, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 31,2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/31/russia.georgia.

123. John Thornhill, Western Fears onRussian Energy, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb.17, 2008, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1bdaf4a8-dd7e-11dc-ad7e-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1bnIIhIc0.

124. Ian Traynor, EU Unveils Plan toWeaken Russian Grip on Gas Supply, THE

GUARDIAN, Nov. 14, 2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/14/russia-europe-gas-gazprom.

125. Mark Milner and TerryMacalister, Credit Crunch Warning overUK Energy Security, THE GUARDIAN,Nov. 26, 2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/26/utilities-energy-security-ofgem.

126. Patrick Blum, Ocean Power CastAdrift in Financial Storm, INT’L. HERALD

TRIBUNE: ENERGY, A SPECIAL REPORT,Mar. 16, 2009.

127. Ian Fells, We Need an ExpensiveMiracle, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 18,2008.


129. Carys Siemieniuch and MurraySinclair, How Roles Change whenDisaster Strikes: Lessons Learnt from theManufacturing Domain, in DECISION

MAKING IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS,Eds. M. Cook, J. Noyes and Y.Masakowski (Aldershot: Ashgate,2007), at 179–187.

130. Pettersen and Aase, supra note 52.

131. James Chapman, Blackout BritainWarning as Government Predicts SeverePower Shortages within a Year, DAILY

MAIL, 2009, at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/.

132. Donald MacKenzie and JudyWajcman, THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF

TECHNOLOGY (Buckingham: Open Univ.Press, 1993).


133. Langdon Winner, Do ArtefactsHave Politics? in THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF

TECHNOLOGY, supra note 132, at 26–38.


135. British BroadcastingCorporation, Energy Security‘Vital’ – Hutton, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7628937.stm.

136. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society:Towards a New Modernity (London:Sage, 1992).

137. Pat Kane, There’s Method in theMagic, in THE POLITICS OF RISK SOCIETY,Ed. J. Franklin (Cambridge: PolityPress, 1998), at 76–82.

138. John Durant, Once the Men inWhite Coats Held the Promise of a BetterFuture, in THE POLITICS OF RISK SOCIETY,Ed. J. Franklin (Cambridge: PolityPress, 1998), at 70–75.

139. Robin Clarke, SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT

(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985).

140. In Oct. 2011 the EuropeanCourt of Justice ruled against thepatenting of stem-cell products thatinvolve the destruction of humanembryos. Believing that humanlife begins at the embryo stage,religious groups had lobbied hard tosecure the ruling. The inability topatent stem-cell products will harmstem cell research. Companies thatare not able to secure theirintellectual property will not invest.It is feared that treatments forparalysis, blindness, and Parkinson’sdisease will be stymied. (EuropeanScience Stemmed, ECONOMIST, Oct. 192011, at http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/10/stem-cell-research.

141. Robert Edwards, UK NuclearPlans on Hold after Fukushima, THE

GUARDIAN, April 5, 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/apr/05/uk-nuclear-plan-fukushima.

142. The Review, published in Sept.2011 by the Health and SafetyExecutive’s Office for NuclearRegulation, emphasised the need forBritain’s nuclear industry to engage in


active learning. Nevertheless,nuclear remains one of the pillarsof Britain’s low-carbon electricitygenerating plan. See MichaelWeightman, Japanese Earthquakeand Tsunami: Implications for theU.K. Nuclear Industry (Bootle:Office for Nuclear Regulation,2011).

143. British BroadcastingCorporation, Police Defend PowerStation Raid, 2009, at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/.

144. Id.

145. MacKenzie and Wajcman, supranote 132.

146. In November 2011 theInternational Atomic Energy Agencyclaimed Iran’s nuclear programmemay have a military dimension. ‘‘TheUN nuclear watchdog showed lettersand satellite images . . . pointing tomilitary dimensions to Iran’s atomicactivities’’ reported Reuters. If true,such a development would act tofurther de-stabilize an already volatileregion (thrown into turmoil by the2011 Arab Spring).

147. If, as looks likely, Vladimir Putinis elected President of Russia in 2012,the country may become even morenationalistic in outlook than it is atpresent. Putin says he wants to raiseliving standards and make Russia‘‘stronger.’’

148. Brendan Barrett, From JasmineRevolution to Oil Shockwave, 2011, athttp://www.ourworld.unu.edu/en/from-jasmine-revolution-to-oil-shockwave/.

149. Peter Curtis, Transition to a DigitalSociety: An Antiquated System Holds UsBack (Smithtown, NY: Association forFacilities Engineering, 2008).

150. Electricity Consumers ResourceCouncil (ELCON), ‘‘Consumers NeedMore Voice in Solutions to Blackout,ELCON’s Anderson Says,’’ ELCON

REPORT, No. 3, 2003, at http://www.elcon.org/Documents/ELCONReport/ELCONReport_3_2003.pdf.

151. Toft and Reynolds, supra note 10.


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Insecurity in the Supply of Electrical Energy: An Emerging Threat?

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