INFS 767 Fall 2003 RBAC-MAC-DAC
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Transcript of INFS 767 Fall 2003 RBAC-MAC-DAC
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INFS 767 Fall 2003
RBAC-MAC-DAC
Prof. Ravi Sandhu
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RBAC96
ROLES
USER-ROLEASSIGNMENT
PERMISSIONS-ROLEASSIGNMENT
USERS PERMISSIONS
... SESSIONS
ROLE HIERARCHIES
CONSTRAINTS
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HIERARCHICAL ROLES
Engineer
HardwareEngineer
SoftwareEngineer
SupervisingEngineer
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WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC?
RBAC is policy neutral Role hierarchies facilitate security
management Constraints facilitate non-discretionary
policies
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LBAC: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
H
L
M1 M2
Read Write- +
+ -
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RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
HR
LR
M1R M2R
LW
HW
M1W M2W
Read Write-
+
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RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
user xR, user has clearance xuser LW, independent of clearance
Need constraints session xR iff session xW read can be assigned only to xR roles write can be assigned only to xW roles (O,read) assigned to xR iff
(O,write) assigned to xW
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LBAC: STRICT *-PROPERTY
H
L
M1 M2
Read Write-
+
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RBAC96: STRICT *-PROPERTY
HR
LR
M1R M2R LW HWM1W M2W
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Variations of DAC
Strict DAC Liberal DAC
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Strict DAC
Only owner has discretionary authority to grant access to an object.
Example: Alice has created an object (she is owner) and
grants access to Bob. Now Bob cannot grant propagate the access to another user.
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Liberal DAC
Owner can delegate discretionary authority for granting access to other users. One Level grant Two Level Grant Multilevel Grant
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One Level Grant
Owner can delegate authority to another user but they cannot further delegate this power.
Alice Bob Charles
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Two Level Grant
In addition a one level grant the owner can allow some users to delegate grant authority to other users.
Alice Bob Charles Dorothy
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Revocation
Grant-Independent Revocation. Grant-Dependent Revocation.
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Common Aspects
Creation of an object in the system requires the simultaneous creation of three administrative roles
• OWN_O, PARENT_O, PARENTwithGRANT_O
One regular role• READ_O
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OWN_O PARENTwithGRANT_O PARENT_O READ_O
Administration of roles associated with object O
OWN_O
PARENTwithGRANT_O
PARENT_O
Administrative role hierarchy
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Common Aspects II
We require simultaneous creation of Eight Permissions canRead_O destroyObjet_O addReadUser_O, deleteReadUser_O addParent_O, deleteParent_O addParentWithGrant_O,
deleteParentWithGrant_O
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Roles and associated Permissions
OWN_O• destroyObject_O, addParentWithGrant_O,
deleteParentWithgrant_O PARENTwithGRANT_O
• addParent_O, deleteParent_O PARENT_O
• addReadUser_O, deleteReadUser_O READ_O
• canRead_O
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Common Aspects III
Destroying an object O requires deletion of four roles and eight permissions in addition of destroying the object O.
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Strict DAC in RBAC96
Cardinality constraints as: Role OWN_O = 1 Role PARENTwithGRANT_O = 0 Role PARENT_O = 0
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One level DAC in RBAC96
Cardinality constraints as: Role OWN_O = 1 Role PARENTwithGRANT_O = 0
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Two Level DAC in RBAC96
Cardinality constraints as: Role OWN_O = 1
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U1_PARENT_O U1_READ_O
U2_PARENT_O
Un_PARENT_O
U2_READ_O
Un_READ_O
READ_O role associated with members of PARENT_O