All Your Security Events are Belong to ... You!

InfoSecurity 2011 - Xavier Mertens

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• Xavier Mertens

• Senior Security Consultant

• CISSP, CISA, CeH

• Security Blogger

• Volunteer for security projects like:

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“The opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the speaker and do not reflect those of past, present or future employers, partners or customers”

Today’s Situation

Are You Ready?

• Most organizations are NOT prepared to deal with security incidents

• If anything can go wrong, it will!(Murphy’s law)

• Assigned internal resources?

Technical Issues

• Networks are complex

• Some components/knowledge are outsourced

• Millions of daily events

• Lot of console/tools

• Lot of protocols/applications

Find the Differences

Aug 27 14:33:01 macosx ipfw: 12190 Deny TCP 192.168.13.1:2060 192.168.13.104:5000 in via en1

%PIX-3-313001: Denied ICMP type=11, code=0 from 192.168.30.2 on interface 2

Economic Issues

• “Time is money”

• Real-time operations

• Downtime has a huge financial impact

• Reduced staff & budget

• Happy shareholders

Legal Issues

• Compliance requirements

• Big names

• Initiated by the group or business

• Local laws

• Due diligence & due care

Belgian Example: CBFAFrom a document published in April 2009:

“Tout établ i ssement qui connecte son infrastructure sur Internet dispose d’une politique de sécurité qui tient compte de:...la création, l’archivage de fichier “historique d’évènements” techniques adaptés à leur analyse, leur suivi et leur reporting.”

Challenges

• Creation & archiving of log files

• Analyze (Normalization)

• Follow-up

• Reporting

Layer Approach

Log Collection

Normalization

Storage

Search

Reporting

Correlation

Raw Material

• Your logs are belong to you

• If not stored internally (cloud, outsourcing), claim access to them

• All applications/devices generate events

• Developers, you MUST generate GOOD events

3rd Party Sources

• Vulnerabilities Databases

• Blacklists (IP addresses, ASNs)

• “Physical” Data

• Geolocalization

• Badge readers

The Recipe

Collection

• Push or pull methods

• Use a supported protocols

• Ensure integrity

• As close as the source

Normalization

• Parse events

• Fill in common fields

• Date, Src, Dst, User, Device, Type, Port, ...

Storage

• Index

• Store

• Archive

• Ensure integrity (again)

Search

• You know Google?

• Investigations / Forensic

• Looking for “smoke signals”

Reporting

• Automated / On-demand

• Reliable only if first steps are successfull

Correlation

• Generation of new events based on the way other events occurred (based on their logic, their time or recurrence)

• Correlation will be successful only of the other layers are properly working

• Is a step to incident management

Build Your Toolbox

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Let’s Kill Some Myths

• Big players do not always provide the best solutions. A Formula-1 is touchy to drive!

• Why pay $$$ and use <10% of the features? (the “Microsoft Office” effect)

• But even free softwares have costs!

• False sense of security

LM vs. SIEM

• A LM (“Log Management”) addresses the lowest layers from the collection to reporting.

• A SIEM (“Security Information & Event Management”) adds the correlation layer (and incidents management tools)

Grocery Shopping

• Compliance

• Suspicious activity

• Web applications monitoring

• Correlation

• Supported devices

• Buying a SIEM is a very specific project

Free Tools to the Rescue

Syslog Daemons

• Syslog is well implemented

• Lot of forked implementations

• syslogd, rsyslogd, syslog-ng

• Multiple sources

• Supports TLS, TCP

• Several tools exists to export to Syslog (ex: SNARE)

SEC

• “Simple Event Correlation”

• Performs correlation of logs based on Perl regex

• Produces new events, triggers scripts, writes to files

OSSEC• HIDS

• Log collection & parsing

• Active-Response

• Rootkit detection

• File integrity checking

• Agents (UNIX, Windows)

• Log archiving

Miscellaneous

• MySQL

• iptables / ulogd

• GoogleMaps API

• Some Perl code

• Cloud Services (don’t be afraid)

Personal Researches

• Examples based on OSSEC!

• MySQL integrity audit

• USB stick detection in Windows environments

• Detecting rogue access

• Mapping data on Google Maps

Visibility!

• LaaS (Loggly)

• Splunk

• Secviz.org

Example of Visualization

Conclusions• The raw material is already yours!

• The amount of data cannot be reviewed manually.

• Suspicious activity occurs below the radar.

• Stick to your requirements!

• It costs $$$ and HH:MM

• Make your logs more valuable via external sources

Thank You!Q&A?

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