Industry Top Trends 2021 - S&P Global...2020/07/16 · Industry Top Trends 2021: Autos S&P Global...

S&P Global Ratings 1

Industry Top Trends 2021 Global Autos A Bumpy Road To Recovery From COVID-19

What’s changed? COVID-19 has forced automakers and suppliers to redefine their strategies substantially to manage the e-mobility transition in a no-growth environment.

China is showing stronger sales momentum than we anticipated, suggesting a different recovery path to that in Europe and North America.

Biden’s election bolsters U.S. resolve to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and accelerate the e-mobility transition.

What are the key assumptions for 2021? Only a gradual recovery of global auto sales in the next two years, with our projection for 2022 still below 2019 levels. China represents the only positive in this scenario. Cost control and highly selective capital allocation sit high on the industry agenda.

Pressure on cash flows from ongoing restructuring and the need to adapt to lower volumes, as well as from essential investments and research and development (R&D) expenditure.

Consolidation and partnerships are necessary for the industry to manage costs and reallocate capital to the most profitable programs and operations.

What are the key risks around the baseline? China could surprise us with stronger light-vehicle sales than we expect over 2021 and 2022, benefitting original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with material exposure to the country.

Electrification is a risk for the market positions and cash flows of incumbent OEMs, but could present an opportunity for some auto suppliers in the next five years.

Vehicle digitization and new technology could shake up long-term profit pools in the industry and challenge incumbents’ business positions.

December 10, 2020

Authors Vittoria Ferraris Milan +39 02 72 111 207 vittoria.ferraris @spglobal.com Claire Yuan Hong Kong +852 2533 3542 claire.yuan @spglobal.com Lukas Paul Frankfurt +49 693 399 9132 [email protected] Nishit Madlani New York +1 212 438 4070 nishit.madlani @spglobal.com Lawrence Orlowski New York +1 212 438 7800 lawrence.orlowski @spglobal.com Katsuyuki Nakai Tokyo +81 3 4550 8748 katsuyuki.nakai @spglobal.com

Additional Contacts Asa Watanabe

Benjamin Kania

Chloe Wang

Margaux Pery

Stephen Chan

Minjib Kim

David Binns

Fabiola Ortiz

Fabiana Gobbi

Humberto Patino

Industry Top Trends 2021: Autos

S&P Global Ratings December 10, 2020 2

Ratings trends Global Autos Chart 1 Chart 2

Ratings distribution Ratings distribution by region

Chart 3 Chart 4

Ratings outlooks Ratings outlooks by region

Chart 5 Chart 6

Ratings outlook net bias Ratings net outlook bias by region

Source: S&P Global Ratings. Ratings data measured at quarter end. Data for Q4 2020 is end October, 2020.

02468

101214

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Autos OEM Autos Suppliers

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North America Europe Asia-Pacific Latin America

Negative61%

WatchNeg8%

Stable29%

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AutosNet Outlook Bias (%)

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Net Outlook Bias (%)



The shape of recovery Table 1

Sector Outlook Heatmap

Sensitivities And Structural Factors Shape Of Recovery

COVID-19 sensitivity

Impact if no vaccine in

2021

Long-term impact on

business risk profile

Revenue decline –

2021 vs. 2019

EBITDA decline –

2021 vs. 2019

Revenue recovery

to 2019 levels

Credit-metric

recovery to 2019

levels

Auto OEMs

Global OEMs Moderate Moderate Low 0%-10% 10%-15% 2022 2022+

Auto suppliers

Investment grade Moderate Moderate Low 0%-10% 0%-10% (-2022+0 2022+

Speculative grade Moderate Moderate Low 0%-10% 0%-10% 2022+ 2022+

Source: S&P Global Ratings.

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread availability of effective immunization, which could come by the middle of next year. We use this assumption in assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic (see our research here: www.spglobal.com/ratings). As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly. This report does not constitute a rating action.

http://www.spglobal.com/ratings



Auto OEMs and suppliers Rating trends and outlook Our negative outlook on the auto industry has not changed since late 2019, when, ahead of the pandemic, we voiced concerns about the industry’s ability to manage the transition to e-mobility, digitalization, and autonomous driving in a no-growth environment. In our view, the pandemic has not materially altered these structural trends, but has weakened companies’ ability to fund the necessary investments. However, as is evident from the spectacularly good third-quarter results, the auto industry has demonstrated resilience, and an ability to manage the immediate challenges the pandemic has created, including an unprecedented stop to production for more than a month, disruption of value chains, and delays to critical product launches. This has led us to reassess the sector’s sensitivity to the pandemic to moderate from high. Investment-grade and high-speculative-grade issuers have seized the opportunity offered by massive liquidity injections in their countries’ financial systems to fund large cash burns in the second quarter, alleviating liquidity risks. Low-investment-grade issuers have suffered from more restricted access to third-party funding, and could suffer yet more in an environment characterized by increased competitiveness and a heightened risk of consolidation.

While effective vaccines might bring the pandemic to an end in 2021, industry challenges remain, magnified by the need for automakers to implement additional extraordinary measures to bring costs down. In this environment, we don’t see many opportunities for upgrades. However, evidence of superior execution of restructuring, coupled with prudent financial policies, could help auto companies recover rating headroom and pave the way for us to stabilize outlooks. Credit-friendly consolidation would be especially beneficial.

Our main assumptions for 2021 and beyond

1. A gradual and uneven recovery

After a very tough 2020 for automakers and suppliers, we believe the recovery will be gradual and uneven in 2021 and 2022. Despite an unexpectedly strong rebound in the third quarter of 2020, demand remains weak compared to 2019, and the outlook remains clouded by the resurgence of the pandemic and the likely negative impact on the economy.

2. Additional restructuring

The pandemic has made additional restructuring imperative to allow the industry to transition to e-mobility despite lower sales volumes than anticipated. We expect additional restructuring, inflexible R&D costs and capital expenditure (capex), and an increasing number of alternative powertrains to depress profitability and cash flows in the next two years.

3. Defensive consolidation

To rationalize costs, we think that the need for many players to look at consolidation and partnerships to share the burden of investments in new product development, digitalization, and new technologies is even more pressing than it was before the pandemic.



A gradual and uneven recovery

We forecast growth in global light-vehicle sales in the 7%-9% range in 2021 and 2022, after a close to 20% decline this year (see table 2). In 2021, Europe and the U.S. will only partially recover the ground they lost this year with a particularly protracted recovery in Europe. At the same time, China will likely outperform our expectation of a 6%-9% decline this year. We recently improved our outlook for China for 2021 thanks to the ongoing momentum in sales.

Table 2

Global light vehicle sales forecast

% year-on-year change 2020e 2021e 2022e

U.S. (15%)-(17%) 13%-15% 1%-3%

China (6%)- (9%) 4%-6% 2%-4%

Europe (20%)-(25%) 8%-10% 8%-10%

Rest of the world (25%) 6%-8% 10%-12%

Global light vehicle sales (18%)-(20%) 7%-9% 6%-8%

e—Estimate. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

We believe any further upside to our sales scenario will stem mainly from the Chinese market, the most dynamic but least predictable of the global auto markets. We think China may be the only market to catch up with 2019 volumes by the end of 2022. We plan to update our global forecast after the first quarter of 2021.

Additional restructuring

Controlling ever-rising investments in new products and technologies in a market slump and a subsequent slow recovery is inducing many issuers to embark on additional restructuring in an attempt to lower variable and fixed costs and free up capital. Most major OEMs and many suppliers have announced new cost-reduction programs or expanded restructurings they had launched before the pandemic. The associated cash outflows, in combination with sluggish markets and inflexible R&D spending and capex, will create headwinds for cash flow generation in 2021-2022. Free operating cash flow remains a pivotal driver of our financial risk profile assessments, and missteps in managing cash outflows could deplete rating headroom.

Compounding the cash flow pressures is the need for continued high spending on electrification and advanced driver-assistance systems as an interim step toward autonomous driving, as well as improvements in vehicle connectivity and software. We think all these items are nondiscretionary for OEMs and their key suppliers. This is evident from Volkswagen AG’s (VW’s) recent decision to raise its total spending on future technologies by more than 20% compared with its previous plan, including a near-doubling of its planned investments in vehicle digitization. We think VW’s competitors will need to consider making similar decisions if they have not already done so. These trends are credit-negative for the whole industry as they involve large cash outflows and possibly cost duplication for technologies whose market acceptance and future revenue contribution are uncertain.

However, issuers can mitigate the credit implications of high spending through effective partnerships and risk-sharing, thereby reducing the possibility of stranded investments and ballooning investment costs.



Defensive consolidation

Consolidation has gathered momentum since the end of the expansionary cycle in the auto industry in 2018. Tightening regulatory standards, new technological developments, increasing reliance on software, and product-related investments have pushed competitors into partnerships to share both costs and operating risks. We see a sound business rationale for this trend and view it as credit-positive overall, provided it does not weaken companies’ balance sheets.

Full mergers often reshape companies’ competitive advantage, scale and scope of operations, and operating efficiency. This may affect the ratings. Full mergers are relatively rare as integration can be painful—albeit powerful in terms of the potential cost synergies—and politically sensitive. Prominent recent examples include BorgWarner Inc.’s takeover of Delphi Technologies PLC (Delphi); the imminent combination of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. and Peugeot S.A.; and less certain, the merger of Volvo Car AB and Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd. (Geely). Because we see scale as key to repaying massive investments in electrification, digitization, and new technology, we believe some rated auto players may continue to see the rationale for full mergers.

Typically, partnerships based on equity stakes—cross-shareholdings or co-investments in joint ventures (JVs)—cover a limited range of the partners’ activities. The relevance of these partnerships for ratings depends on their scope and impact on the partners’ profitability and cash flow. Dividends typically capture the impact, as the activities are accounted for at equity. Such partnerships benefit the companies’ technological capabilities and competitive positions. Examples range from the alliance between Renault S.A., Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., and Mitsubishi Motors Corp.—which in our view is a relatively poor example of a value-creating partnership—to the Chinese JVs—through which global OEMs hope to gain control of operations in the world’s single largest auto market—to JVs between auto players and other industry champions, such as that between French auto supplier Valeo S.A. and Siemens AG. JVs become relevant for the ratings if and when they become fully consolidated. We generally view such consolidation as positive, provided the JV operates successfully and does not weaken balance sheets.

We see contract-based partnerships as less relevant to ratings than closer tie-ups. These initiatives typically aim to increase efficiency or obtain access to expertise not previously available. The payoff depends on the opportunities and costs. Alliances in this category include that between Ford Motor Co. and VW on products and platforms; General Motors Co. and Honda Motor Co. Ltd. on future vehicle purchase costs, R&D, and Internet-connected services; and Mercedes-Benz AG and Nvidia Corp., to build software-defined computing architecture for automated driving. If such alliances lead to better access to, or faster deployment of, new technology, they will be credit-positive, but the benefits will take time to materialize in our base-case scenarios.

Credit metrics and financial policy Earnings were solid in the third quarter of 2020, after an exceptionally weak second quarter. However, the resurgence of COVID-19 infections between September and November should weigh on the final quarter of 2020, especially in Europe, and to a lesser extent, in North America. Credit metrics will therefore be weak overall in 2020, with only a few exceptions. We reflect this weakness in our negative outlook on the industry. Our outlook also reflects the uncertainty around the timing and the intensity of the recovery in 2021 and 2022. That said, we expected sluggish conditions for the next two years even before pandemic. We don’t exclude the possibility of stabilizing our outlooks on individual companies that show resilience to the weak market environment and good cost and cash management. A strong market position in China should help. We expect to reassess the risks and rating headroom for most auto issuers after the first quarter of 2021.



In our base-case scenarios, auto issuers’ credit metrics should recover to 2019 levels by 2022, thanks to a recovery in global sales, coupled with the positive impact of restructuring measures. Agile capital structures proved key during the pandemic, and we believe auto OEMs and suppliers will maintain their focus on cash preservation. Discipline in dividend distribution was high in 2020, and we expect this to remain the case over 2021 and 2022, in order not to further burden capital structures. Similarly, we don’t expect any large debt-funded mergers and acquisitions, especially among OEMs.

Key risks and opportunities around the baseline

1. All hopes are pinned on China.

The world’s largest single market offers good growth potential and promises a steady transition to e-mobility over 2021-2025. Even during the pandemic, investments in China were high on automakers’ agendas, despite a general freeze on spending to withstand the pandemic.

2. Electrification will test the incumbent players.

Over the next five years, electrification will challenge the profitability and market positions of the incumbent players. We believe that the incumbents can catch up with advances in technology, but without financial incentives, profitability will remain a challenge. We see the lack of a battery supply chain in Europe as a risk.

3. The rise of digital services could shake up OEMs’ long-term competitive positions.

Over the rest of this decade, vehicle technology will play an increasing role in defining brands’ competitive advantage. Through technology, OEMs hope to generate new income streams from digital services that will help to offset the loss of earnings from manufacturing.

All hopes are pinned on China

A solid market position in China will be a competitive advantage over the next two years. China is the only market that will be able to restore auto sales volumes to 2019 levels by 2022, in our view, having been the first to emerge from the pandemic. We still see high growth potential over the medium-to-long term, given the low vehicle-ownership rate in China compared with other regions.

We expect Japanese and German auto OEMs to benefit from the momentum in the Chinese market in the next 12-24 months. Their share of the passenger-vehicles market grew to about 24% and about 26%, respectively, in 2020, from about 17% and about 20% in 2015, largely at the expense of U.S. and other European OEMs. VW, the top foreign auto player in the Chinese market, captures around 19% of passenger-vehicle sales alone through its JVs with SAIC Motor Corp. Ltd., China FAW Group Co. Ltd. (FAW), and to a lesser extent, JAC Motors. BMW AG and Daimler AG have not only expanded their market shares in China, but increasingly localized their production, and like VW, derive meaningful dividends of €1 billion-€3 billion. Honda, Toyota Motor Corp., and Nissan each have 6%-8% of the market.

Proprietary domestic brands have been losing steam, with the exception of Geely and Great Wall Motors Co. Ltd. U.S. brands have lost ground too, due to poor product pipelines, and likely negative sentiment about the worsening U.S.-China conflict. Alliances with international partners remain crucial for Chinese OEMs’ credit strength, given their overreliance on the operations of their JVs (70%-90% of revenues for companies such as BAIC Motor Corp. Ltd., Dongfeng Motor Group Co. Ltd., and FAW). The



Chinese government has declared that it is ready to remove restrictions on foreign ownership of companies operating in China from 2022. Any change of control in the JV would dampen Chinese OEMs’ business competitiveness and financial performance, and hence weigh on the ratings. Global OEMs and suppliers will not forgo the opportunity to take control of Chinese operations, in our view, which supports our view of these players’ business profiles.

However, any downside to near-term growth could intensify competition in the Chinese market, with divergent effects on the credit quality of global and domestic issuers. Competition has already been intensifying, particularly in the mass market (see chart 7). Low prices no longer provide a competitive edge for proprietary brands, as international brands have been narrowing the price gap and have developed entry-level products, such as VW’s Jetta. Premium brands performed resiliently in the first ten months of this year, registering growth of over 12% year on year. These brands accounted for 14% of China’s total passenger-vehicle sales in the same period, up from 6% in 2015.

Chart 7

Passenger-vehicle sales by brand 2015-2020

Source: China Passenger Car Association. Note: 10M 2020 refers to the first ten months of 2020.

While Chinese OEMs remain focused on the domestic market, some auto suppliers have quickly gained top-tier positions in the transition to e-mobility and will likely play an integral role in the automotive value chain. Battery production capacity is building in Europe, from virtually nothing, and in the U.S., but global battery production—estimated at around 300 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2020—is set to remain focused in Asia-Pacific. Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. is the go-to lithium-ion battery provider owing to its dominant market position and cost leadership. Smaller battery producers, such as Gotion High-tech Co. Ltd. and Farasis Energy (Gan Zhou) Co. Ltd., have attracted direct investments by Volkswagen (China) Investment Co. Ltd. (26% stake) and Daimler Greater China Investment Co. Ltd. (around 3%).The sustainability of this decade’s electric vehicle offensive is predicated on a stable battery supply chain, which still needs to be developed.

Electrification will test the incumbent players

Electrification remains the industry’s pivotal challenge over the next five years, with Europe and China aiming for 20% of light-vehicle sales to be electric vehicles by 2025 (see chart 8). The rate of electric vehicle adoption in the U.S. could be roughly only 10% by 2025, as low gas prices and reduced tax discourage EV purchases. However, with the

37.2% 40.7% 41.4% 40.8% 37.9% 34.5%

20.1% 19.1% 20.3% 22.2% 25.0% 26.4%

17.4% 16.6% 18.0% 19.6% 21.9% 24.3%

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election of Joe Biden, the new administration’s agenda for clean energy could impose stricter fuel-economy standards, thereby speeding up the shift toward zero-emissions light- and medium-duty vehicles and spurring on continual improvements in fuel efficiency for heavy-duty vehicles.

The penetration of electric vehicles correlates closely with government incentives, as evident in China and Norway. Government incentives have had a positive impact in 2020 in Europe, but it is uncertain how long this stimulus will last. Overall, we believe electrification is a challenge for incumbent OEMs, mainly because of punitive regulation that forces them to sell electric vehicles, which are less profitable than nonelectric vehicles. We see electrification as an opportunity for those auto suppliers that can provide cost- competitive components and systems to their customers.

Chart 8

Low-emission vehicle sales by region (BEVs and PHEVs)

e—Estimate. BEVs—Battery electric vehicles. PHEVs—Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. LTM—Last 12 months. Sources: S&P Global Ratings, European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, Wards Intelligence, China Association of Automobile Manufacturers.

Tesla Inc. dominates in the battery electric vehicle (BEV) segment. Deliveries of Model 3/Y reached about 280,000 units in the first nine months of 2020 (see chart 9). The second-best seller, the Nissan Leaf, lagged far behind. But for Tesla to sustain its first-mover advantage and brand appeal is far from guaranteed: it has to keep on the cutting edge of manufacturing technology and software prowess. Currently, we believe Tesla has an advantage over competitors in battery and powertrain technology (as measured by motor efficiency and range). Moreover, the company has developed considerable software expertise as demonstrated by its over-the-air and active safety capabilities.

Because the European market is skewed toward plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) rather than BEVs, German manufacturers have time to reduce the gap. Tesla’s S, X, and Y models will have to compete with key launches over 2021-2022, including VW’s ID4, Audi AG’s Q4 E-tron, BMW’s iX, and Daimler’s EQS models. While we see German OEMs catching up on product performance—typically range and acceleration—cost competitiveness could be their Achilles heel while volumes remain low. For now, the profitability of incumbent electric vehicle producers depends on battery costs and government incentives. Incumbents have two disadvantages: not only do they need to

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phase out old technologies, but they also need to invest in battery production. Tesla can already count on 35 GWh of proprietary battery capacity, set to increase to 54 GWh.

In China, Tesla has gained share rapidly in the new energy vehicle (NEV) segment and has been among the top two NEV sellers since March this year. Thanks to lower-cost batteries, Tesla cut prices several times in 2020 for its signature model 3. This will increase competitive pressure in the market. Apart from Tesla, we view VW’s and GM’s positions in electrification as strongest, given their scale and strong connections with local suppliers through well-established JVs. New startup NEV makers Nio Inc. and Xpeng are also ramping up gradually and taking market share. BYD Auto Co. Ltd. and BAIC Motor are still the top domestic NEV sellers, but they are seeing their market shares decline.

Chart 9

Main BEV+PHEV sellers

Source: LMC.

Our base case is that PHEVs will continue to dominate the European market for the next few years. Competition in the PHEV segment is increasing. Ford’s Kuga was the bestseller in Europe in the first seven months of 2020. However, the U.S. OEM had to recall vehicles to replace defective battery packs. BMW had a similar problem with the same battery supplier. The best PHEVs include the Volvo XC60, followed by VW’s Passat GTE, the Volvo XC40, the BMW 330e, the Mercedes A250e, the Peugeot 3008, and the Kia Niro.

The rise of digital services could shake up OEMs’ long-term competitive positions

Over the next five years, the amount of software in a car will increase to over 700 million lines of code from around 100 million lines of code. The auto industry is set to undergo a fundamental shift from hardware to software, with vehicles becoming moving smart devices capable of driving autonomously and achieving higher safety standards. At the same time, automakers are looking to move beyond their traditional business model of selling and leasing vehicles to tap into future revenue streams, such as from in-car digital services. A key credit risk for automakers and suppliers is that to achieve the future they envisage, they need to make strategic choices about technology now, but with patchy information, regulatory uncertainty, and an unpredictable market response.

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Geely GroupDaimler Group

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BAIC GroupGAC GroupFord Group

General Motors Group

Units

OE

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Global Deliveries, Jan.-Sep. 2020



Technological capability will increasingly define OEMs’ competitive strength

We think cutting-edge vehicle technology will become increasingly important for OEMs to differentiate themselves from their competitors. This could have long-term rating implications. Differentiation will be easier for OEMs that own the user interface of the operating system; key applications, such as infotainment and communications; and the autonomous drive software stack. Other areas, such as the powertrain and body control software, play less of a role in differentiation, and we expect that OEMs will look to partner with suppliers for these.

Larger scale, or a focus on premium segments, can help OEMs spread development costs, or recover them through better pricing, so we expect their technology choices to vary according to their market position. For now, these choices do not alter our view of an issuer’s competitive position, as long as we believe the prospective trade-off is managed without an adverse effect on margins or long-term market share.

New competitors may challenge established auto suppliers

We expect tier 1 auto suppliers such as Aptiv PLC, Robert Bosch GmbH, Denso Corp., and Continental AG to remain automakers’ preferred partners and to retain their competitive positions thanks to their established relationships, history of close cooperation, and the investments they have already made in advanced connectivity, software, and autonomous drive technology. However, we believe that the ascendancy of these technologies will continue to open market opportunities for technology players with high innovative capacity and specialist expertise, particularly from the software and semiconductor sectors. This could mean additional competitors for the established suppliers or force the established suppliers to collaborate with these entrants and share part of the value pool. For example, first movers in autonomous driving such as Tesla have been highly strategic about partnering with chipmakers like Nvidia and Intel Corp. and its subsidiary Mobileye to get new vehicles to market quickly. These players more or less dominate the autonomous driving hardware and software platform market in partnership with large OEMs.

To protect their competitive positions and avoid longer-term rating downside, it is crucial for auto suppliers to continue to rationalize their product portfolios to free up and redeploy cash to areas with growth potential, particularly software and electronic systems. This could involve smaller, bolt-on acquisitions to boost key competencies. As we expect the emergence of different competing technologies with limited visibility on demand, we view issuers with broad portfolios of technology solutions favorably. For instance, BorgWarner’s acquisition of Delphi significantly enhances its competitive position as BorgWarner can now offer power electronics products (including high-voltage inverters, converters, on-board chargers, and battery management systems) and capabilities (including software, systems integration, and thermal management).

Incumbents’ digital-service propositions are still nascent

Connectivity and over-the-air (OTA) updates of in-car software can unlock cost savings and establish recurrent revenue streams. Tesla has pioneered the OTA technology, and, in our view, continues to enjoy a competitive edge over most established carmakers. Tesla’s OTA software includes a wide variety of updates, from mere bug fixes to new powertrain and air conditioning settings and entertainment offerings. Competitors such as BMW have also developed OTA capabilities, including for navigation updates and optional features like adaptive suspension, but these do not match Tesla’s breadth of applications.

Remote monitoring and upgrades can not only cut maintenance costs, but also increase the efficiency of product development by providing data on wear and tear and usage. Moreover, a meaningful future revenue stream from user subscriptions to add digital services via the vehicle interface could enhance our view of OEMs’ business, given the



subscriptions’ recurrent nature and likely favorable margins. Daimler targets €1 billion in EBIT from such services by 2025. That said, we believe most OEMs’ efforts are still at an early stage. While we see a case for OEMs to market proprietary services related to the vehicle itself (for example, additional drivetrain configurations), we think they will be at a competitive disadvantage with respect to monetizing generic services that are similar to the broad pool of apps available through smartphones.

Related Research – How Hydrogen Can Fuel The Energy Transition, Nov. 19, 2020 – A Double-Digit Rebound Has Begun, But It's No Time To Celebrate, Oct. 6, 2020 – China Auto's Recovery Path Is Accelerating, Sept. 22, 2020 – Global Auto Sales Forecasts: Hopes Pinned On China, Sept. 17, 2020 – Industry Top Trends Update, Autos, July 16, 2020

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Industry forecasts Auto OEMs Auto suppliers Chart 10 Chart 11

Revenue Growth (local currency) Revenue Growth (local currency)

EBITDA Margin (adjusted) EBITDA Margin (adjusted)on

Debt / EBITDA (median, adjusted) Debt / EBITDA (median, adjusted)

FFO / Debt (median, adjusted) FFO / Debt (median, adjusted)

Source: S&P Global Ratings. Revenue growth shows local currency growth weighted by prior-year common-currency revenue share. All other figures are converted into U.S. dollars using historic exchange rates. Forecasts are converted at the last financial year-end spot rate. OEMs—Original equipment manufacturers. FFO—Funds from operations.

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Cash, debt, and returns Global autos Chart 12 Chart 13

Cash Flow And Primary Uses Return On Capital Employed

Chart 14 Chart 15

Fixed- Versus Variable-Rate Exposure Long-Term Debt Term Structure

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Cash And Equivalents / Total Assets Total Debt / Total Assets

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Global Ratings calculations. Most recent (2020) figures use the last 12 months’ data.

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500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

LT Debt Due 1 Yr LT Debt Due 2 YrLT Debt Due 3 Yr LT Debt Due 4 YrLT Debt Due 5 Yr LT Debt Due 5+ YrVal. Due In 1 Yr [RHS]

$ Bn

13

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Global Autos - Cash & Equivalents/Total Assets (%)

41

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Global Autos - Total Debt / Total Assets (%)

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