The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 10 | Number 2 | Mar 03, 2014

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Indonesia’s Elections of 2014: Democratic Consolidation orReversal? 来るインドネシアの国政、大統領選　民主主義の確立か、後退か

David Adam Stott

Compared to its Asian neighbours, Indonesiawas late to join the so-called third wave ofdemocratisation that began in southern Europein the 1970s. After the fall of the authoritarianSuharto regime (1967-98) it successfullyconducted free and fair elections in 1999, 2004and 2009, becoming arguably the mostpolitically free country in Southeast Asia.1 Aburgeoning civil society and a relatively openmedia have helped consolidate democracy buttensions remain between Suharto's legacy andthe direction of Indonesia's democratictransition. In particular, Suharto-era oligarchsremain dominant and the armed forces retainsignificant influence even though their powerappears to have declined and is less absolutethan in much of Southeast Asia. The pluralismof Indonesia's national motto, Unity inDiversity, is also being jeopardised by thefailure to safeguard religious minorities againstattacks from hardline Islamists. Against thisbackdrop Indonesia will administer its fourthround of post-Suharto elections in 2014, withlegislative polls in April, followed by directpresidential elections in July.

This year's elections are a litmus test forIndonesia's own democratic transition, whichcould signal either a generational change ingovernment reinforcing democracy or thereturn of dictatorial or repressive forces tooffice. Of the confirmed candidates for thepresidential elections, the voting publiccurrently faces a stark choice between militaryprotégés of Suharto or oligarchs who madetheir fortunes under his authoritarian rule.

However, according to public opinion polls, thefavourite to win the presidency is the currentGovernor of Jakarta, Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo, anon-establishment figure with a wide popularbase. Whilst a Jokowi presidency wouldrepresent a clean break from the Suharto era,the party with which he is associated isadamant that it will only select its presidentialcandidate after the April legislative elections.Nevertheless, his populist and innovativeapproach to running the largest city inSoutheast Asia has raised hopes among theelectorate that Jokowi will also be able toreinvigorate the country's stalled reform driveat the national level. Indeed, Indonesia's firsttwo direct presidential elections, in 2004 and2009, were also won on a platform of politicalreform and clean government by retiredgeneral Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who willsoon reach the end of his term limit. Pro-poorpolicies and the prosecution of high-profilecorruption cases during his first termcontributed heavily to his success in theparliamentary and presidential elections of2009.2

Yudhoyono's legitimacy was also boosted by aresources and consumer boom which deliveredsteady economic growth of nearly six per cent ayear during his decade in office. An expansionof the middle class accompanied Indonesiaovertaking Malaysia as the world's biggestexporter of palm oil, Thailand as the topexporter of rubber, and Australia as the largestexporter of coal.3 High prices for these andother resource commodities, largely fed bydemand from China, increased the legitimacy

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of Yudhoyono personally, enabling him to bringvaluable stability to Indonesia amid globaleconomic turbulence. However, the president'spersonal approval ratings dipped during hissecond term as fuel subsidies were reducedand members of his own party became snaredin corruption scandals. The pro-poor policiesintroduced prior to the 2009 parliamentaryelection were mostly temporary. Despiteimprovements, Indonesia was still ranked 114out of 177 countries by TransparencyInternational in its latest annual survey oncorruption perceptions.4 Disenchantment withthe slow pace of reform, disillusionment withmoney politics and the lacklustre performanceof many elected officials is widely expected toresult in falling voter turnouts in 2014,especially if Jokowi is not nominated as apresidential candidate. Foreign investors havealso signalled their continuing frustration witha graft -r idden legal system, opaquegovernment policies and the country's creakinginfrastructure.

Consol idat ing the gains made underYudhoyono, a Jokowi victory could indicate ashift away from Suharto-era vested interests toa less-patrimonial style of politics and a newgeneration of leader. Regardless of outcome,Indonesia's elections are among the mostsignificant of 2014 given that it is the world'sthird largest electoral democracy, an ongoingtest case for the transition from authoritarianrule and a prominent model for democraticsurvival in multi-ethnic states. The significanceof these factors is compounded by Indonesianaspirations to play a leadership role bothamong developing countries and in SoutheastAsia, as the region's biggest country andeconomy. Given the continuing instability inThailand, the recent unrest in Cambodia andMyanmar's delicate democratic transition,democratic consolidation or reversal inIndonesia would carry symbolic weight at aregional level. This article opens with a briefhistory of post-reformasi elections in Indonesia,followed by an overview of the main parties and

candidates with a short analysis of politicalIslam. Thereafter it will consider the influenceof the media and the military upon Indonesia'scontinuing democratic transition.

Post-Reformasi Elections in Indonesia

Electoral reform in Indonesia marks thecountry's biggest departure from the Suhartoera. Whilst parliamentary and presidentialelections did take place under Suharto's so-ca l led New Order they were heavi lymanipulated by the regime to ensure successfor the president's own electoral vehicleGolongan Karya, usually shortened to Golkar.Electoral rules in place between 1973 and 1998permitted only two opposition parties tocontest parliamentary elections, thus forcingthe merger of the main opposition parties. Thefour largest Muslim parties became the UnitedDevelopment Party (Partai PersatuanPembangunan, PPP), whilst five secular partiesformed the Indonesian Democratic Party(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). Criticism ofgovernment policy by the PPP and the PDI wasnot allowed and government approval wasrequired for all campaign slogans. Everycandidate from every party was screened bythe regime and fully half of all members of thenational parliament were directly appointed bySuharto. Only Golkar was allowed to canvasssupport below the district level through localgovernment officials and regional militarycommanders, and all government employeeswere required to support Golkar.5 This gave theparty a huge advantage over its rivals inmobilising across the archipelago, a situationthat largely still persists in the more remoteareas of the country. Golkar's record in thepost-Suharto reformasi era has been mixed.Whilst it has repeatedly attempted to reducethe pace and depth of reform it has also madesome important contributions to Indonesia'sdemocratic transition since 1998. This apparentparadox has prompted one observer to note,"Just like Indonesian politics in general, Golkartoo is an ambiguous amalgam of progressive

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reformism and conservative status quoattitudes." 6

Presidential elections were also held every fiveyears during the New Order but these merelyrubber stamped Suharto's re-selection. Thisremained the case during the March 1998presidential election which unanimouslyselected him for another five year term whichwas due to end in 2003, by which time he wasalmost 82 years old. However, two months laterSuharto was forced to resign amidst a deepeconomic crisis, violent mass protests and aloss of elite support. Vice president B.J. Habibiereplaced his mentor and, in order to boost hisown legitimacy, hurriedly announcedparliamentary elections for the following year.By demonstrating his own reformist credentialshe hoped to secure a full term as president inhis own right. With the New Order restrictionslifted some 48 political parties contested the1999 parliamentary elections. The presidentwas still to be chosen by the upper house, thePeople's Consultative Assembly (MajelisPermusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), following theelections. However, Habibie withdrew hiscandidacy after his accountability report wasrejected by the new parliament and his partyGolkar subsequently threw its support behindAbdurrahman Wahid. Even though Wahid'sNational Awakening Party (Partai KebangkitanBangsa , PKB) only placed third in thelegislative elections, with less than 13 percentof the vote, he was also leader of the NahdlatulUlama (NU), a traditionalist Muslim body thatis Indonesia's largest civil society organisation.Wahid also proved adept at building thenecessary alliances to become president,relegating Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan,Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle) hadactually gained the most seats in the elections,to the position of vice president.

Wahid made a bright start as president in 1999,bringing a much more pluralistic approach tothe office. He opened up democratic space in

West Papua, began peace talks with the FreeAceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,GAM) and lifted the New Order restrictions onChinese cultural expression. These attempts atpeacebuilding, alongside efforts to reform themilitary, provoked resistance from the politicalelite and Wahid became mired in a corruptionscandal. This provided the pretext for the MPRto impeach him on charges of graft andincompetence in July 1999, and Megawatiassumed the presidency. Having convincinglywon the 1999 parliamentary elections,Megawati's elevation represented a triumph fordemocracy. Her party was widely perceived asthe main opposition in the late New Orderperiod, and Megawati herself is the daughter ofSukarno, Indonesia's founding president whowas ousted by Suharto in 1967. Despitebringing a measure of political stability toIndonesia, however, her conservativeadministration came to be seen as listless andlacklustre. In particular, Megawati showedlittle appetite for military reform, wasperceived as soft on regional terrorism andappeared unwilling to tackle corruption.Nevertheless, important constitutional reformswere instituted during her stewardship,including the establishment of the CorruptionE r a d i c a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n ( K o m i s iPemberantasan Korupsi , KPK) and theConstitutional Court, and the introduction ofdirect local elections. These institutions wouldbe developed further during her successor'spresidency. In contrast to his predecessorsHabibie, Wahid and Megawati, Yudhoyonovowed to lead the anti-corruption drivepersonally, and reaped the rewards at theballot box.7

The next round of national elections took placein 2004, contested by 24 political parties, andconstitutional reform meant that the parliamentwould now be fully elected, with no reservedseats for the military. The president was nowalso directly elected in separate polls after thenew parliament had been formed. The electionsof both 1999 and 2004 were conducted

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relatively cleanly, leading democracy advocacygroup Freedom House to categorise Indonesiaas a 'free' country in 2005 after adjusting itsstatus to 'partly free' following Suharto's fall.Meanwhile, Freedom House, which publishesannual reports that analyse the extent of civilliberties and political rights throughout theworld, downgraded the status of Thailand andPhilippines from 'free' to 'partly free' in 2006and 2007 respectively, underscoringIndonesia's progress in a regional context.8 It isalso worth noting that Indonesia's elections of1999, 2004 and 2009 were concluded mostlypeacefully, again in contrast to the experienceof Thailand and the Philippines in the sameperiod.

Further highlighting how free and fairIndonesian national elections have become isthe fact that in the first direct presidentialelections of 2004 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonowas able to defeat incumbent Megawati. Sheenjoyed the support of the largest party inparliament but Yudhoyono was able to converthis personal popularity with voters into victory.Indeed, ruling governments lost both the 1999and 2004 presidential elections, andYudhoyono's triumph in 2009 marked the firsttime since 1998 that a sitting president hasbeen re-elected to the highest office.Yudhoyono initially gained a reputation as aprogressive military reformer in the lateSuharto period, and had enhanced his standingwith cabinet posts under Wahid and Megawati.His high personal approval ratings as presidentalso enabled his relatively new DemocraticParty (Partai Demokrat, PD) to become thelargest party in parliament in 2009, overtakingGolkar and PDP-P. This clearly demonstratesthat, unlike regional neighbours Singapore,Malaysia and Cambodia, Indonesia has anelectoral system that has not been undulymanipulated to favour the ruling party.9 At thesame time, the emergence of new parties suchas Yudhoyono's PD has not led to the collapseof other major parties, unlike in Thailand, thePhilippines, South Korea and Japan where

parties often disappear after contesting one ortwo elections.10 The five largest parties fromIndonesia's 1999 legislative elections were stillrepresented in parliament after the 2009elections (see table below), although thenumber of minor parties has ebbed and flowed.Some 38 national parties contested the 2009legislative election but new rules have trimmedtheir number to 12 for this year's Aprilelections.

President Yudhoyono and his wife Kristianivote during the 2009 parliamentaryelections

Another distinguishing feature of party politicsin Indonesia which has likely contributed tothis stabilisation has been the fact that politicalparties do not usually engage in robustideological debates with one another. Whilstthe lack of substantive issue-oriented politicaldebate raises doubts about the quality ofIndonesia's democratic transition, it hasenabled the country to avoid the politicalpolarisation that has paralysed party politics inThailand and elsewhere. Instead Indonesianpolitics have become increasingly personalisticsince the introduction of direct presidentialelections in 2004, and the implementation ofsimilarly direct elections for provincialgovernors, mayors and district heads in 2005.11

This lack of ideological polarisation has enabledall governments since Wahid's first cabinet of

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1999 to be multi-party coalitions where powersharing appears to be the dominant mantra.Yudhoyono continued this trend in 2004 whennaming his first United Indonesia Cabinet inwhich only the PDI-P of the established politicalparties was not represented. Thus, in the 2009legislative elections these other parties wereunable to effectively challenge Yudhoyono's PDon policy differences. The president repeatedthis strategy for his second United IndonesiaCabinet, formed at the beginning of his secondterm, in which again the PDI-P was the onlymajor party not represented.12

Parties and Candidates

Electoral rules first applied in 2004 specify thata political party, or a coalition of parties, mustsecure a minimum of 25 percent of the vote or20 percent of the seats in the April legislativeelections to select a candidate to contest theJuly presidential elections. To win thepresidency therefore, a candidate must beskilled at building alliances with other parties.Whilst the Constitutional Court recently ruledthat this threshold is unconstitutional, electoralchanges will not come into force until the 2019polls. The Court also decided that the presentrequirement for voters to first elect parliamentfollowed by a president is also unconstitutional;meaning that from 2019 simultaneous polls willbe held. It is anticipated that this ruling mayincrease the number of candidates seeking toattain the highest office since until nowpresidential hopefuls have needed to secure thebacking of large political parties.

In the three elections since 1999 the largestpolitical parties have been Golkar, Suharto'sformer election vehicle, and the PDI-P, widelyseen as the main opposition in the late Suhartoperiod. The PDI-P won 33.74 percent of thevote in the 1999 legislative elections, withGolkar second on 20.46 percent. However, bothparties have been in decline, with Golkar losingthe strength it derived from the New Order's

military and bureaucratic apparatus and thePDI-P failing to develop its reputation as thestandard bearer of popul ist , secularnationalism. Since its founding in 2001 a newelectoral force in Indonesian politics hasemerged, that of Yudhoyono's election vehiclePD. In addition to Golkar and the PDI-P,support for other established political partieshas also declined, especially the PKB of formerpresident Wahid and the venerable PPP (thirdand fourth respectively in the 1999 elections).Fol lowing the template successful lyimplemented by Yudhoyono's PD, two otherelection vehicles for Suharto-era generals havealso emerged since 2004. They are Gerindra(Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, GreatIndonesia Movement Party) under theleadership of Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto'sHanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, PartaiHanura or People's Conscience Party). Thesenew parties have contributed to an increasingfragmentation in the party system and theirlongevity is questionable without theircharismatic leaders.13 Indeed, Yudhoyono's PDis widely predicted to see its share of the voteslashed in the April parliamentary electionswith its founder no longer on the ballot.

People's Representative Assembly (DPR)election results (vote percentage)14

2009 2004 1999PD 20.85% 7.45% N/AGolkar 14.45% 21.58% 22.46%PDI-P 14.03% 18.53% 33.74%PKS 7.88% 7.34% 1.36%PAN 6.01% 6.44% 7.12%PPP 5.32% 8.15% 10.71%PKB 4.94% 10.57% 12.62%Gerindra4.46% N/A N/AHanura 3.77% N/A N/A

The favourite to win the 2014 presidentialelection is Jokowi, the current Governor ofJakarta who has yet to be officially nominatedas a candidate. An opinion poll conducted inmid-January by Kompas, Indonesia's largestdaily newspaper, found that he would win 43.5

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percent of the vote, whilst another poll by theCentre for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), an influential Jakarta think tank,predicted he would win 34.7 percent. It iswidely assumed that Jokowi will be selected byMegawati's PDI-P, whom he represented in theJakarta gubernatorial elections, and its failureto officially nominate him has angered somePDI-P members. There has been speculationthat the party's matriarch would like one lastrun at the presidency for herself, in which caseJokowi could be her running mate. Megawatiherself has placed a distant fifth in mostpresidential surveys, having lost the previoustwo presidential elections to Yudhoyono. Jokowihas frequently appeared in public withMegawati, whether to either promote hiscandidacy or reflect some of the governor'spersonal popularity onto his party's leader.Regardless, Megawati has announced that theparty will only nominate its presidentialcandidate after the April parliamentaryelections, although this could be a strategicmistake.

If Jokowi is confirmed as its presidentialcandidate before the April elections, most pollssuggest the PDI-P would likely make significantgains in parliament, and overall voter turnoutwould also increase.15 Jokowi's candidacyseems likely to draw in many young voters whootherwise would not participate in theelections, and the party needs to secure asmany seats in parliament as possible to avoidbeing forced into a coalition. As Yudhoyonodiscovered, coalition governments reduce apresident's room for manoeuvre, a situationthat could be replicated under a Jokowi-ledcoalition. However, Megawati could be anxiousabout losing her family's control of the party toJokowi if she backs him for this year'spresidential elections. Before Jokowi's rise toprominence, Megawati had apparently beengrooming her son Prananda Prabowo forleadership of the party, whilst Megawati's latehusband Taufik Kiemas had been backing theirdaughter Puan Maharani for the role.16 Under a

Jokowi presidency Megawati could insteadbecome a powerful kingmaker - akin to India'sSonia Gandhi - but even without Jokowi thePDI-P is calculating that it could still win themost votes through being the main oppositionto Yudhoyono's unpopular government. Werehe not to be selected by the PDI-P it is likelythat Jokowi would be approached by otherparties to be a vice presidential candidate.

Jokowi first established a reputation for cleanand innovative governance when mayor of Soloin Central Java. His achievements thereincluded revitalising public spaces, easingtraffic congestion, improving health caredelivery, promoting investment and rebrandingthe city as a Javanese cultural center to rivalnearby Yogyakarta. He was re-elected mayorwith over 90 percent of the vote. Sincebecoming governor of Jakarta he has made aname for himself nationally, gaining areputation for transparency in the midst of acorrupt political system by attempting toreplicate his success in Solo. For instance, hisdeputy uploads recordings of meetings onYouTube and the pair publishes their ownsalary details online. A reputation for cleangovernance served Yudhoyono very well at theballot box until it began to unravel in hissecond term. Unlike Yudhoyono however,Jokowi appears humble and approachable onhis regular walkabouts to meet local residents,an approach he pioneered in Solo. Theseunscheduled tours often take in the city's mostdeprived areas and sometimes involveuninvited appearances at local governmentoffices. Such a hands-on style is a major reasonfor his high approval ratings both in Jakartaand further afield. In particular, Jokowi'sinformal style appeals to young voters who areeligible to vote in national elections for the firsttime.

As governor Jokowi has attempted to tackleJakarta's startling social disparities byinstituting several pro-poor policies. Soon afterhis election in October 2012 he introduced

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smartcards to provide free access to healthcare and education for needy residents. TheJakarta Health Card (Kartu Jakarta Sehat, KJS)programme entitles cardholders to free healthservices at all community health centers andsome hospitals across the city. The governorhad a target to enroll half of Jakarta's residentsin the scheme by the end of 2013. Likewise, theJakarta Smart Card (Kartu Jakarta Pintar, KJP)enables students from underprivileged familieswho hold the card to Rp240,000 (US $21) eachmonth in financial aid to pay for educationalmaterials, stationary, uniforms, transport andeven food.17 Jokowi's administration has alsoestablished affordable housing for some Jakartaresidents, and boldly increased the minimumwage by 44 percent for 2013.18 These socialinitiatives have been made possible by anincrease in tax revenues generated by thecapital's booming trade and service sector, andby the fact that between 2007 and 2012 Jakartaactually ran a budget surplus of 15-20percent.19 The governor has also improvedrevenue raising ability by widening the scope ofe-government and online transactions. This hasenabled his administration to improve the taxtake and reduce opportunities for briberywithout increasing taxes, as bureaucrats nowhave fewer direct dealings with businesspeople. Jokowi has also attempted to tackleJakarta's chronic gridlock by reviving long-stalled plans to install a mass transit railnetwork, funded by loans from the JapanInternational Cooperation Agency (JICA), andhas been upgrading bus services in themeantime. Polls suggest that most Jakartaresidents want him to see out his first term asgovernor, which ends in 2017.20

Jokowi's victory in the Jakarta gubernatorialelections against the incumbent Fauzi Bowo,who was backed by Yudhoyono, was perceivedas a victory for a new generation of politicianover an older, more patrimonial style ofpolitics. Indeed, 52 year-old Jokowi is the onlypresidential challenger to have arisen from thereformasi democratic era, and unlike many

Indonesian politicians does not hail from aprivileged background. His policies aimed atJakarta's poorest residents also represent abreak with the past. As a newcomer to thenational political arena Jokowi would face newchallenges as president, however. In particular,he would have to deal with the financialbackers that fund an expensive presidentialcampaign and a military that might try to clawback some of its political power. Moreover,there is the question of whether he would beable to push through his own policies or wouldmerely be a proxy for PDI-P leader Megawati,during whose conservative presidency therewas little appetite for reform. In opposition, theparty vociferously opposed the Yudhoyonogovernment's plans to decease fuel subsidies,and in March 2014 unveiled a party platformcritical of foreign investment.

Jakarta governor Jokowi (front right)cycles to work on Fridays (photo byl e n s a i n d o n e s i a(http://www.lensaindonesia.com/))

Trailing second behind Jokowi in mostpresidential polls has been former SpecialForces Commander Prabowo Subianto ofGerindra, campaigning on a platform of pro-poor and pro-agriculture protectionist policies.The Kompas mid-January poll predicted hewould win 11.1 percent of the presidential voteif he participated. Unable to secure the backingof Golkar as its presidential candidate, Prabowo

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and his wealthy tycoon brother HashimDjojohadikusum founded Gerindra specificallyto contest the 2009 presidential elections. In acampaign notable for the party's lavishspending on television advertising, it garnered4 .5 percen t o f the vo te in the 2009parliamentary elections and could not build thenecessary alliances to field Prabowo as apresidential candidate. Instead, Prabowo ran asrunning mate to the PDI-P's Megawati, and thepair won 27 percent of the vote in losing toincumbent Yudhoyono, who secured 61percent. For the 2014 elections Prabowo'sbrother, who also financed Gerindra's 2009campaign, has contracted a leading New Yorkadvertising agency to improve his sibling'selectability.

Prabowo is the son of Sumitro, an influentialeconomist who held cabinet posts under bothSukarno and Suharto, and was a controversialfigure during the late Suharto period. His rapidrise up the military hierarchy was seen asclosely linked to his marriage to Suharto'ssecond daughter Siti Hediati Hariyadi. Havingheld command posts in both East Timor andWest Papua he has been implicated in severalcases of human rights abuse, and also playedan incend ia ry ro l e i n the r i o t s anddemonstrations that accompanied the fall of histhen father-in-law in 1998. Prabowo was widelybelieved to be agitating to become Suharto'ssuccessor, firstly by capturing the post ofArmed Forces Commander held by GeneralWiranto. Troops under Prabowo's commandacted as agent provocateurs in kidnapping anddisappearing student activists and stoking the1998 riots, apparently in order to portrayWiranto as weak for not dealing more forcefullywith the protests. However, Suharto'ssuccessor B.J. Habibie faced down Prabowo'sdemand to be appointed Armed ForcesCommander and Wiranto kept his post.Prabowo subsequently spent a period of exile inJordan, before returning to Indonesia to join hisbrother's resource extraction business andbegin his political career.

Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra (photo byDian Triyuli Handoko/Tempo Magazine(http://store.tempo.co/search/?category=foto&fg=Dian+Triyuli+Handoko))

It has been widely forecast that Gerindra wouldbe unlikely to secure more than 10 percent ofthe vote in this year's parliamentary elections,meaning that an alliance with the Yudhoyono'sPD would be necessary for Prabowo to have arun at the presidency. If such an alliance doesnot materialise Gerindra might instead have topersuade some smaller Muslim parties tosupport its leader's candidacy, especially sincePrabowo was strongly associated with so-called'Green' Muslim factions in the armed forces inthe mid-1990s.21 Yet that strategy appearshamstrung by the continuing electoralweakness of Muslim-based parties in Indonesiaand possibly by the fact that Prabowo remainssingle after divorcing Suharto's daughter in1998. Prabowo's brother and chief campaignfinancier is also a devout Christian. The PPP ispredicted to secure at least five percent of thevote, to make it the largest Muslim-based partyin the next parliament, but its chairmanSuryadharma Ali seems to have implacablepersonal differences with Prabowo which wouldseemingly preclude the PPP backing Gerindra.Two other such parties, the PKB and theNational Mandate Party (Partai AmanatNasional, PAN), are both thought capable ofwinning up to four percent of the vote andGerindra has recently been in discussions withPAN chairman Hatta Rajasa to be Prabowo's

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running mate.22 Gerindra might also secure analliance with the Prosperous Justice Party(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), but pollstersbelieve that it will also struggle to obtain morethan five percent. The National Democrat Party(Nasdem) and the Indonesian Justice and UnityParty (Partai Keadilan dan PersatuanIndonesia, PKPI) are two new parties that areexpected to win less than two percent,rendering them of marginal significance inforging presidential election alliances.

Prabowo's former military nemesis Wirantoalso established his own electoral vehicleHanura to contest the 2009 elections. AlthoughWiranto faces many of the same challenges asPrabowo in securing alliances he is not asdivisive a candidate. In the late Suharto yearshe was part of the so-called 'red and white'secular nationalist faction of the military elitewhich opposed Prabowo's 'green' Islamicfaction.23 As Armed Forces Commander fromFebruary 1998 to October 1999, Wiranto was acentral player in the early reformasi period, inwhich he resisted hardliners such as Prabowoby refusing to impose military rule. Instead heplayed something of a restraining role duringthe post-Suharto transition, and subsequentlysupported the reduction of the military'sreserved seats in parliament and the separationof the police from the armed forces. However,Wiranto (along with five other generals) wasalso indicted by the UN-backed Special CrimesUnit in East Timor for crimes against humanityfor failing to stop the razing of East Timor bythe Indonesian military and its militias, afterthat territory's vote for independence in 1999.He entered politics as Golkar's candidate in the2004 presidential elections, placing third in thecontest behind Yudhoyono and Megawati with22.19 percent of the votes. In the 2009elections he campaigned unsuccessfully for thevice presidency as running mate to Golkarchairman Jusuf Kalla. Wiranto has placedfourth in most polls for this year's presidentialelections, and like Prabowo will need to formstrategic alliances with other parties to

participate in this year's presidential contest.

Wiranto's campaign blog emphasises hismilitary service

The current Golkar chairman and presidentialcandidate is prominent businessman AburizalBakrie, another controversial figure since heand his brothers control the huge Bakrie Groupfounded by the i r fa ther . Among theconglomerate's many subsidiaries is oil and gascompany Lapindo whose drilling triggered ahuge mudflow in 2006 that displaced thousandsof residents in Sidoarjo, East Java, destroyingsurrounding homes and farmland. Indonesia'sNational Commission on Human Rights(Komnas HAM) held the company responsiblefor the man-made disaster that it deemed ahuman rights violation. In 2013 BumiResources, another Bakrie asset and the largestthermal coal exporter in Asia, was involved inan unsavoury public row with the Rothschildbanking dynasty over control of the firm. TheGolkar chairman has been upbeat that neitherof these scandals will damage his electabilitybut there has been some disquiet within theparty over his candidacy.24

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Aburizal Bakrie on the campaign trail(photo by Muhamad Solihin/VIVAnews(http://us.news.viva.co.id/))

Golkar is widely forecast to gain 12 to 15percent of the vote in the parliamentaryelections but the party has yet to secure apresidential election victory in the post-Suhartoera, and Bakrie is currently the third favouriteto win this year's contest. The Golkar chairmanhas been a political insider since the Suhartoera, having served as President of the ASEANbusiness forum (1991-1995), President of theIndonesian Chamber of Commerce andIndustry (1994-2004), Coordinating Ministerfor Economy (2004-2005) and CoordinatingMinister for People's Welfare (2005-2009).Although Golkar retains its New Orderlogistical advantages over other parties in moreremote parts of the archipelago, it could sufferfrom breakaway parties Gerindra and Hanuradrawing away some of its votes, and theadvancing age of many of its leaders whostarted their political careers under Suharto.

Meanwhile, Yudhoyono's PD has yet to select apresidential candidate. Without its patron onthe ballot, support for the party is predicted todrop below 10 percent of the vote in 2014,underscoring how important a leader'spersonal charisma is for a party's electionprospects. As a consequence, there have beendiscussions within the PD that if its share of the

vote is smaller than Golkar's, then Yudhoyonowill back Golkar if his brother-in-law, PramonoEdhie Wibowo, is selected as Golkar's vicepresidential candidate. Under the presentsystem a presidential candidate typicallynominates a running mate after the legislativeelections in order to broker alliances to meetthe electoral threshold to run for president.Moreover, this enables smaller parties to fieldcandidates in the presidential elections. Mostnotably this was the case in 2004 whenYudhoyono selected Golkar chairman JusufKalla as his running mate after Golkar hadsecured the most seats in parliament. Thisstrategy gave Yudhoyono a much strongerpower base in parliament since his own partyhad secured only 55 seats (from 7.45 percent ofthe vote), compared to Golkar's 128 seats (from21.58 percent of the vote). However, thisprompted speculation as to whether it wasYudhoyono or Kalla who was actually the mostpowerful man in government. Yudhoyono'spersonal popularity was boosted by hisannouncement of several timely fuel pricereduct ions fol lowing the col lapse ofinternational oil prices after August 2008. A netoil importer since late 2004, this policy resultedin a stunning parliamentary election successfor Yudhoyono's PD, allowing its patron theluxury of disregarding party considerationswhen choosing a running mate. For the 2009presidential campaign Yudhoyono selected anon-party figure instead, former central bankgovernor Boediono, although this subsequentlyweakened his standing vis-a-vis parliament.

Political Islam

Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in theworld, with around 88 percent of its 240 millionpopulation identifying as Muslims. Unlike inneighbouring Malaysia, however, political Islamhas not become a dominant electoral force.Whilst Islamic-based parties secured acombined 39.33 percent of the vote in the 1955elections, Suharto's authoritarian rulesubsequently restricted the polit ical

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mobilisation of Islamist forces (see tablebelow). Generally lacking the charismaticleaders of secular parties, Islamic-based partieshave been unable to take advantage of thegreater political opportunities since 1998, andcontinue to split the Islamic vote amongstthem. In a bid to increase their electability, allof Indonesia's Islamic parties jettisoned theircampaigns for Sharia law and adopted morepluralistic party platforms. This stands inmarked contrast to their counterpartscontesting the 1955 election, all of whichadvocated an Islamic State of Indonesia(Negara Islam Indonesia) with Islam at thecentre of a revised constitution.

This shift seems to reflect the triumph of theinclusive principles on which Indonesia wasfounded, principles to which Indonesia'ssecular nationalist parties successfully appeal.Whilst Islam is the sole state religion inMalaysia, it is only one of six recognisedmonotheistic religions in the more inclusiveIndonesian constitution. 2 5 Moreover,Islamisation in Malaysia has largely beendesigned and implemented by political elites inKuala Lumpur, partly as a strategy tomarginalise ethno-religious minorities, whereasin Indonesia it has been driven by civil societygroups with only sporadic support from thestate.26 Islamic parties have been representedin all of Indonesia's coalition governments since1999 but their electoral prospects have beenhit by recent corruption scandals. In 2013 theformer leader of the PKS was jailed for 16years for corruption, and now the CorruptionEradication Commission is investigating twoseparate cases that threaten to implicate theleaderships of the PPP and the smallerCrescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang,PBB). Although there is awareness thatcorruption affects all political parties it isparticularly damaging for Islamic parties sincethey position themselves on the moral highground above their secular rivals. Therefore,these graft allegations will likely impact theelectoral chances of all Islamic-based parties.27

Surveys predict that the combined vote of thefive parties which appeal to Islamic voters -PPP, PKS, PBB, PAN and PKB - would total onlyaround 21 percent, less than they collectivelywon in the 2009 election, with each strugglingto gain more than five percent.28

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Vote shares in the previous 10 Indonesianelections (source The Jakarta Post

(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/06/nationalistic-parties-sell-not-islamic-ones.html))

The decline in the electoral appeal of theIs lamic part ies s ince 2004 has beenaccompanied by an increase in religiousintolerance and the rise of the fundamentalistvigilante group Islamic Defenders Front (FrontPembela Islam, FPI). Formed in the reformasiera of 1998 when restrictions on politicalassembly and free speech were lifted, the FPIpositions itself as a moral police force trying toenforce strict compliance with Sharia law inIndonesia. It has become notorious for itssweeps of nightclubs, bars, brothels, gamblingdens and even street vendors, particularlyduring the month of Ramadan, actions whichhave been popular with some conservativeMuslims.

The FPI is strongest in Jakarta and West Java,where it has forced the closure of manychurches and fatally attacked members of theAhmadiyah community, a minority Islamic sect.However, during the last five years it hasspread across Indonesia and clashed withethnic and religious minorities in Sumatra,Sulawesi and Kalimantan, typically when theFPI tries to prevent minority religions fromestablishing (temporary or permanent) placesof worship. The FPI has also become wellknown in the mainstream media for theprotests that forced the cancellation of LadyGaga's Jakarta concert in 2012, and the jailingof the editor of Indonesia's Playboy Magazineon charges of public indecency in 2010.

The FPI finances itself by extorting bars andnightclubs across Jakarta and West Java, and itis also rumoured to receive financial supportfrom political parties, the police and military. In2011 leaked American diplomatic cablessurfaced on WikiLeaks which alleged that theIndonesian security forces have beensponsoring the FPI to pressure the politicalestablishment. The Indonesian military

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similarly used Islamic hardliners to helpmassacre hundreds of thousands of allegedCommunists in 1965-66, and since then Islamicmilitia have been deployed by the securityforces in conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, Papua,Sulawesi and Maluku. There is also speculationthat the FPI might play a similar role formainstream Islamic organisations, includingN U a n d M u h a m m a d i y a h , w h o h a v econspicuously failed to denounce the FPI'sviolent actions.29

Despite using mass demonstrations, threatsand violence to intimidate its targets, the FPIhas so far avoided being labelled a terroristgroup because the Yudhoyono government hasbeen afraid of losing the support of Muslimvoters. Indeed, the judiciary and the policehave also been very reluctant to crack down onthe organisation, and some Islamic parties haveeven publicly supported the FPI. Most casesagainst FPI members never make it to court,and when convictions are made lenientsentences are the norm. Whilst the DPR hasdebated banning the organisation, bothpoliticians and judges do not want to be seen asun-Islamic by attacking the FPI. Both NU andMuhammadiyah, Indonesia's two largest civilsociety organisations, have also previouslyrejected calls to ban the group. The FPI eventargets expressions of traditional Indonesianculture, and its rise indicates a mainstreampolitical shift to the right, in which conservativeIslam appears to have become too significant aconstituency for political parties to antagonise.

An Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) rally inJakarta (photo by Supri /Reuters(http://www.reuters.com/))

This failure to prosecute the FPI has promptedthe United Nations, the European Union andmembers of the U.S. Congress to criticiseIndonesia over its lack of protection for thereligious minorities which constitute more than12 percent of its population. The FPI insists it isexercising its democratic right to freedom ofexpression but its actions undermine both thecountry's ongoing democratic transition andthe inclusive principles on which Indonesia wasfounded. Much stronger law enforcement isnecessary to tackle religious harassment andprotect the country's pluralist foundations. Thestate's reluctance to reign in the FPI representsa major failing of Yudhoyono's two terms inoffice and sets a dangerous precedent forfuture governments.

Media Influence

Another notable aspect of Indonesia'sdemocratic transition has been the changingrole of the media. Soon after Suharto resignedin May 1998 the government relaxed previouslystrict censorship rules leading to a rapidexpansion in print media, television channelsand radio stations. One of President Wahid'sfirst acts on taking office in 1999 was to abolishthe Ministry of Information, further

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consolidating media freedom. In the followingdecade the number of newspapers andmagazines tripled, the amount of nationaltelevision networks doubled and around 200local television networks appeared across thecountry. Between 1998 and 2008 the number ofhouseholds with at least one televisionincreased almost threefold.30 Internet usagealso increased dramatically and by June 2013Indonesia had almost 64 million activeFacebook users, the fourth largest numberbehind the United States, Brazil and India.31

The country also has around 30 million Twitterusers and in 2012 Jakarta became 'the world'smost active Twitter city', ahead of Tokyo,London and New York.32 Jokowi's skillful use ofsocial media enhances his appeal among youngvoters, 67 million of whom are eligible toparticipate for the first-time in this year'snational elections.33 Research indicates that 90percent of Indonesians between the ages of 15and 19 regularly go online, 80 percent of thecountry's internet users are under 35 years-oldand around 90 percent of all internet trafficgoes to social networking sites.34

According to Freedom House, "Indonesia'smedia environment continues to rank amongthe most vibrant and open in the region".35

Indeed, the media frequently takes the state totask on i s sues such as co r rup t i on ,environmental degradation and violenceagainst religious minorities, and there is agrowing awareness among politicians andbureaucrats that media reports of wrongdoingcan break a career. Moreover, it has beenargued that the explosion of social media inIndonesia has fostered a climate in whichpopular online trends can positively influencethe political agenda and deliver actual policyresults.36 On the other hand, this developingwatchdog ability is countered by spuriousdefamation lawsuits filed by powerfulindividuals, who have been able to bribecorrupt judges and law enforcement officials tostifle media scrutiny of their affairs.

Often referred to as the fourth pillar ofdemocracy, after the judiciary, legislative andthe executive, the media plays a key role inholding the other pillars accountable. This isespecially the case in a country such asIndonesia in which the integrity of the firstthree pillars is questionable. However, theincreasing influence of the mass media inIndonesia, in particular television, has beenlinked to the growing tendency of wealthyentrepreneurs to seek high office. Of the 12political parties on the ballot papers in thisyear's elections three have media moguls inleadership roles. Golkar chairman AburizalBakrie owns two television stations, TVOne andANTV. Likewise, Hanura's vice presidentialcandidate Hary Tanoesoedibjo is the owner ofMedia Nusantara Citra Group which runs threenational terrestrial stations - RCTI, Global TVand MNC TV - among the 20 that it controls.Surya Paloh, chairman of the new NasDemParty, runs news channel MetroTV whilstDahlan Iskan, owner of the Jawa Pos Group, iswidely tipped to be the PD's candidate tosucceed Yudhoyono. As a consequence, thereare concerns that the development of theIndonesian media's watchdog role will bestunted.

This is significant since a recent survey hasfound that most Indonesians rely heavily ontelevision coverage of political parties whendeciding who to vote for.37 Indeed, televisionremains the country's primary news source.Research conducted in 2012 with Indonesiansover the age of 10 revealed that 91.7 percentwatch television, compared to 18.57 percentwho listen to radio and 17.66 percent who readnewspapers and magazines.38 Biased televisioncoverage of the political scene has alreadybeen noted in the run up to this year'selections.39 In December 2013 the IndonesianBroadcasting Commission (KPI) admonished sixtelevision channels owned by Aburizal Bakrie,Hary Tanoesoedibjo and Surya Paloh forexcessive and partial coverage of their owners'election bids. The Bakrie family's TV One and

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ANTV were deemed to have run 430 AburizalBakrie and Golkar promotional videos inOctober 2013 alone. L ikewise, HaryTanoesoedibjo's MNC TV, RCTI and Global TVstations were all criticised for broadcastingprogrammes championing the candidacy of itsowner and his Hanura party chairman Wiranto.Meanwhile, Metro TV received censure forexcessive coverage of the NasDem Party and itsparty chairman Surya Paloh, who happens toown the station.40

Even in a mature democracy such as Italy,experience shows that having a media mogul ashead of government tends to compromisecoverage of the leader and his administration.With Silvio Berlusconi as prime minister, theFreedom of the Press Global Survey of 2004downgraded the status of the Italian mediafrom 'free' to 'partly free' in light of hisinfluence.41 Berlusconi was able to silencecritics and reduce coverage of his manyscandals due to his control of a large section ofthe Italian media, including state television.Likewise, in Thailand the prime ministership ofThaksin Shinawatra was dogged by allegationsof a conflict of interest as Thaksin used hismedia empire to manipulate reporting of hisactivities.42 In Indonesia the increasinginfluence of the mass media, especiallytelevision, has already been linked to thegreater personalisation of politics. AlthoughIndonesia's lively media has developed into oneof the most free in Asia, the Freedom of thePress Global Survey of 2013 ranks it as only'partly free' due to restrictive laws, such as oneprohibiting blasphemy, and harassment ofjournalists.43 The preponderance of vaguelyworded laws on the books in Indonesia wouldmake fertile ground for a media tycoon lookingto roll back press freedom if elected toexecutive office. This is of particular concernsince the political and economic dominance ofIndonesia oligarchs is already well served by acorrupt legal system and the relativeorganisational weakness of civil society.44

The Spectre of the Military

Whilst the military has lost much of its powersince the Suharto era, the presence of NewOrder generals Prabowo and Wiranto on theballot papers inevitably raises the question ofwhat influence it will have over futuregovernments. Unlike in Thailand and thePhilippines, the political influence of themilitary has further declined since 2004. Muchof the credit for this turnaround must go toYudhoyono himself. In 2004 the armed forceslost its 38 reserved seats in the nationalparliament and also its 10 percent share of allseats in local law making bodies. Likewise, themilitary's influence in the regions was furthereroded by the democrat i sa t ion anddecentralisation reforms instituted after 1999,as the power of successful businessmen, localofficials and civilian activists rose. As a result,in 2010 only the provincial governors of CentralJava, Central Sulawesi and West Papua wereformer military men, whilst the other 29governors had civilian backgrounds. Thiscontrasts with the Suharto era, in whichmilitary officers (usually retired) comprisedsome 80 percent of provincial governors in theearly 1970s and around 40 percent in the late80s.45

The military also lost key cabinet andinstitutional posts under Yudhoyono. TheMinistry of Home Affairs with its control ofpolice powers had been a bastion of its politicalpower since the 1960s, but in 2009 a careercivil servant was appointed to head up thecrucial ministry, whose tentacles reach rightacross the archipelago. Whilst Yudhoyono's2009 cabinet did include four retired militaryofficers, the Coordinating Minister for Political,Legal and Security Affairs was the only majorportfolio on offer. The military influence in theConstitutional Court (founded in 2003) has alsobeen reduced, and it has lost control over theState Intelligence Agency (Badan InteligenNegara, BIN), which briefs the president onmajor political issues. For the first time, a

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former police chief was selected to head theagency in 2009, thus reducing workopportunities in BIN for military officers.46

Nevertheless, Yudhoyono's record of militaryreform has been mixed, allowing the military toretain some of its long held privileges andinfluence. Most noteworthy is that thepresident has reduced the pace of institutionalreform, in particular defending the military'sterritorial command structure, which ensuresits presence in almost every corner of thearchipelago down to the village level. Thiscommand structure was heavily implicated inhuman rights abuses during the Suharto periodand its aftermath, investigations whichYudhoyono has also blocked. His party has alsofielded many more retired officers ascandidates in national and regional electionsthan either Golkar or the PDI-P. For instance,in the 2009 parliamentary elections, 6 percentof PD MPs came from a military background,compared to a national average of 2 percent.47

Whilst Indonesia has had a succession ofcivilian defence ministers in the post-Suhartoera, Yudhoyono has also continued to appointactive military officers to most senior staffpositions in the ministry.48 Moreover, theappointment of Djoko Suyanto, a class mate ofYudhoyono's at the Indonesian militaryacademy, to the post of Coordinating Ministerfor Political, Legal and Security Affairscontinued a long running tradition that thiscabinet position be held by a former armedforces commander, Djoko having beenappointed commander in 2006. This ministry isalso staffed by active military officers with thepower to direct other government departmentsand with direct access to the president.49

In much the same way as Suharto before him,Yudhoyono has taken a very personal approachto controlling the military, and it is doubtfulwhether a leader from a civilian backgroundcould have had the same success. Central tothis strategy has been the appointment of hispeers from the military academy's class of

1973, such as Djoko and Sutanto as the head ofBIN, to senior positions. Like Suharto, he hasalso promoted his former subordinates andfamily members through the ranks to ensurecontrol over the military.50 Whilst suchnepotism has drawn crit ic ism, i t hassignificantly reduced the military's appetite forindependent act ion . However , wi thYudhoyono's term in office set to expire, thereis concern that hardline officers will attempt toclaw back some of the military's political clout.For instance, in a speech last OctoberLieutenant General Gatot Nurmantyo, head ofKostrad the army's strategic command, wascritical of Indonesia's democracy andquestioned the wisdom of free elections.51 Suchpublic statements demonstrate the growingassertiveness of conservative generals inchallenging the military's removal from politics,following their success in stifling militaryreform at the beginning of Yudhoyono's secondterm.52

Nurmantyo's comments are significant becauseof his rapid rise up the military hierarchy;having previously been governor of the militaryacademy, East Java regional commander andleader of the army's training command.53 Whilstpassed over by Yudhoyono for the post of armycommander, it is possible that Nurmantyocould rise further under a more sympatheticpresident. Moreover, growing voter apathymight enable hardliners like Nurmantyo toreverse some of the gains Indonesia has madein reforming military-civil relations. A popularleader such as Jokowi with a clear mandate tocontinue reform may well be necessary toprevent some of these gains being eroded.However, he represents Megawati's PDI-P,which has long been cautious on militaryreform, mindful of the fact that the military waspartially responsible for her elevation from vicepresident to president in 2001. More recently,Prabowo ran as Megawati's running mate inthe 2009 presidential elections. Intriguingly,there are also signs that some Indonesians aregrowing nostalgic for the stability of the

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authoritarian Suharto period, with stickers andT-shirts of the Smiling General becomingincreasingly visible in Jakarta.54 In addition toGolkar, Suharto protégés Wiranto and Prabowoare hoping to translate this nostalgia into votesat the ballot box.

Suharto T-shirts on sale (photo by ZakirH u s s a i n(http://www.stasiareport.com/asiareport/profile/Zakir%20Hussain-582195))

Conclusion

When the Suharto era finally ended, theprognosis for Indonesia becoming a stabledemocracy was not good. A rapid return tomilitary rule, continued stagnation or a violentBalkanisation into several smaller states wereamong the gloomy predictions. Yet in thefollowing decade it has become arguably thefreest country in Southeast Asia, despite someserious structural issues and a continued, ifweakened, legacy of military rule. Post-Suhartoimprovements in both political freedom andcivil liberties mean that Indonesia is now alsoone of the freest Muslim-majority states. As thecountry's first directly elected president,Yudhoyono enjoyed an almost unprecedenteddegree of legitimacy. During his two terms inoffice democracy has been consolidated,politics stabilised and the military influence'sreduced. As a former general, Yudhoyono wasable to use his personal networks within the

security forces to curtail the influence ofcertain anti-democratic actors. However, mostof these gains were made during his first termin office (2004-09), and since 2009 hardlinerswithin the armed forces have been able toblock further military reform. Despite sustainedeconomic growth fed by resource exports,Indonesian voters who wholeheartedlyembraced Yudhoyono's vision of an efficientand clean state at the ballot box in 2004 and2009 have been disappointed by the corruptionscandals and slowing pace of reform during hissecond term.

Although his popularity was boosted by timelyoil price reductions before his second electionwin, Yudhoyono's victories demonstrated thatreform resonates with Indonesian voters.Among the major challenges facing thecountry's next president are reducing povertyand income inequality, tackling endemiccorruption, reforming the state's labyrinthinebureaucracy, upgrading the country's creakinginfrastructure and safeguarding the rights ofreligious minorities. Current Jakarta governorJokowi has shown a commitment to cleangovernment and a concern for the poverty-stricken unrivalled by both his predecessorsand other presidential hopefuls, and he is theonly potential presidential candidate to havearisen from the post-Suharto democratic era.Likewise, pro-poor policies contributed heavilyto Yudhoyono's 2009 success. A Jokowi victorywould signal a generational change away frompoliticians who were either military protégés ofSuharto or oligarchs who owed their fortunesto him, all of whom can count on backing fromthe military, the bureaucracy and/or bigbusiness. Given that parliament has previouslyopposed efforts by the Corruption EradicationCommission, the next president will need toforcefully back the agency in order to impovethe country's investment climate amid slowingeconomic growth. Whilst successful as mayor ofSolo and governor of Jakarta, Jokowi will findthe challenge much bigger at the national levelwhere he will need to balance the demands of

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coalition partners and the financial backers ofany election campaign. Indeed, corruptiontends to increase in the run up to elections asparties and candidates seek political funding.55

However, it is also possible that his widepopular base might revolutionise campaignfunding in Indonesia with his many supportersmaking small donations that total a significantamount. Even though it is widely assumed thathe will become the PDI-P's presidentialcandidate, how much freedom he would have todictate party policy is unknown. Likewise,Megawati could be concerned that her familywill lose control of the party to him in future.The PDI-P has long stood for an inclusivesecular nationalism that recalls Indonesia'sfounding under Sukarno. During the PDI-P'sonly previous presidency, under Sukarno'sdaughter Megawati, there was little appetitefor political or military reform.

Jokowi aside, surveying the list of confirmedcandidates for the 2014 presidential electionsdoes not inspire great confidence for improvedgovernance and further democrat icconsolidation. As a reaction to Yudhoyono'sperceived indecisiveness, a candidate whoappears strong and resolute could garner agreater share of the votes this year. Prabowoand Wiranto, Suharto-era generals both linkedto human rights abuses, are among theconfirmed presidential candidates, and theirrespective election vehicles have so farreceived the most campaign donations.56 Bothare well placed to tap into growing nostalgiafor Suharto's strong rule. Such sentimentindicates that despite the progress Indonesiahas made its democratic gains are notirreversible and major challenges remain inimproving the quality of governance,particularly in applying the rule of law to thepolitical and economic elite. Even Yudhoyono,who enjoyed high personal approval ratingsand led a political party with the most seats inparliament, found improving governanceincreasingly difficult in his second term.Moreover, a fundamental question is whether a

leader from a civilian background, withoutYudhoyono's military networks to draw on, cancontinue to hold the armed forces in check,especially at a time when military hardlinersseem to be growing in confidence. In addition,recent trends indicate a creeping economicnationalism.57 New trade and industry lawspassed in February 2014 seek to insulatedomestic firms from international competitionand follow similar (partially retracted)measures enacted in 2013 that restrictedimports of horticultural products.58 Prabowo,second favourite to win the presidentialelection, has called for further protectionistmeasures, such as banning rice imports andgas exports, and is considered wary of foreigninvestment and market forces. The PDI-P toohas unveiled a party platform that is critical offoreign investment.

Party politics in Indonesia, as in Thailand andthe Philippines, has become increasinglypersonalistic and presidential in which thecharisma of the leader eclipses a party'spolicies. In both Thailand and the Philippinesthis coincided with a resurgence of militaryinfluence, which has yet to occur in Indonesia.Instead, voter apathy has gradually taken holdafter the euphoria and high turnout of the 1999elections. Those who either did not vote orspoiled their ballot papers accounted for some23.3 percent of the electorate in 2004 and 39.1percent in 2009. This percentage is widelyforecast to rise again in 2014, especially ifJokowi is not among the candidates. 5 9

Nevertheless, democracy in Indonesia will mostprobably continue, but the possibility of itbeing undermined and subverted as in Thailandand the Philippines, cannot be discounted if thepresidency is captured by a Suharto-eraoligarch or former general. Further democraticconsolidation will likely require a resoundingvictory by a reform-minded presidentialcandidate capable of implementing such aprogramme.

David Adam Stott is an associate professor at

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the University of Kitakyushu, Japan and anAsia-Pacific Journal associate. His work centerson the political economy of conflict inSoutheast Asia, Japan's relations with theregion, and natural resource issues in the Asia-Pacific.

Recommended citation: David Adam Stott,"Indonesia's Elections of 2014: DemocraticConsolidation or Reversal?," The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol.12, Issue 10, No. 2, March 10,2014.

Notes

1 A c c o r d i n g t o F r e e d o m H o u s e(http://www.freedomhouse.org/) countryrankings for 2011, 2012 and 2013. Indonesiawas the only state in Southeast Asia to beranked 'free' in terms of both political rightsand civil liberties. East Timor, the region's nexthighest ranked country, was adjudged only'partly free' for each of those three years.

2 His government spent approximately US$2billion between June 2008 and April 2009 oncompensation payments for increased fuelprices, micro-credit programs and schoolingallowances. See Marcus Mietzner (2009),'Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Populism,Dynasties and the Consolidation of the PartySystem', Lowy Institute for International Affairs(http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDoQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F100187%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2Fdd53e6c2-57a0-4ebd-abcc-e7cccc637304%2Fen%2FMietzner_0509LowyAnalysis.pdf&ei=iUYYU4iTE8WNrgeKhoCQBw&u s g = A F Q j C N H S E y C W C p g S A z -W8Utr4CJAbQFM9A&bvm=bv.62577051,d.bmk).

3 International Monetary Fund (2012),Indonesia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IVConsultation

4 See the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2013.(http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/)Corruption prosecutions actually increased in2013, however.

5 Ehito Kimura (2012), Political Change andTerritoriality in Indonesia: ProvincialProliferation, Routledge, London

6 Dirk Tomsa (2008), Party Politics andDemocratization in Indonesia: Golkar in thePost-Suharto Era, London, Routledge, p.190

7 Since its founding in 2003, the CorruptionEradication Committee (KPK) has prosecuted72 members of parliament, eight governmentministers, six central bankers, four judges anddozens of CEOs, achieving a 100 percentconviction rate.

8 Marcus Mietzner & Edward Aspinall (2010).'Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: AnOverview', in Edward Aspinall & MarcusMietzner (ed.), Problems of Democratisation inIndonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society,Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS),Singapore, p.4

9 ibid, p.8

10 ibid, p.10

11 ibid, p.12

12 Newcomers Gerindra and Hanura were notrepresented either although Yudhoyono waslater keen to bring them in when conducting areshuffle.

13 Dirk Tomsa (2010), 'The Indonesian PartySystem after the 2009 Elections: TowardsStability?' in Edward Aspinall & MarcusMietzner (ed.), Problems of Democratisation inIndonesia, pp. 141-159.

1 4 Data from the Indonesian Elect ionC o m m i s s i o n ( K P U )(http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php)

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15 Hans Nicholas Jong, 'More Would Go To PollsIf Jokowi Ran: Survey', The Jakarta Post,J a n u a r y 3 1 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/30 /more -wou ld -go -po l l s - i f - j okowi - ran -survey.html)

16 Hans David Tampubolon, 'Sukarno's BloodStill Vital For PDI-P', The Jakarta Post, April 1,2 0 1 0(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/01/sukarno%D5s-blood-still-vital-pdip.html)

17 Although not school fees, which are coveredby a separate programme.

18 Chris Manning, 'Jakarta's Gamble: A BigJump In The Minimum Wage', East Asia Forum,D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 2 0 1 2(http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/18/jakartas-gamble-a-big-jump-in-the-minimum-wage/)

19 Sita W. Dewi, 'Jokowi Spends Less, ProvidesMore Than Foke, Say Observers', The JakartaP o s t , D e c e m b e r 9 , 2 0 1 3(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/09/jokowi-spends-less-provides-more-foke-say-observers.html)

20 The Jakarta Post, 'Jakartans Want Jokowi ToS t a y : S u r v e y ' , F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/10/jakartans-want-jokowi-stay-survey.html)

21 Andreas Ufen (2009), 'Mobilising PoliticalIslam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared',Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.47, No. 3, pp. 308-333

22 Margareth S. Aritonang, 'Gerindra ConsidersPrabowo-Hatta Ticket', The Jakarta Post,F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/13 /ger indra -cons iders -prabowo-ha t ta -ticket.html)

23 Ufen 2009.

24 Ridwan Max Sijabat, 'Opposition GrowsWithin Golkar To Aburizal's Presidential Bid',(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/23/opposition-grows-within-golkar-aburizal-s-presidential-bid.html)

T h e J a k a r t a P o s t , A p r i l 2 3 , 2 0 1 2(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/23/opposition-grows-within-golkar-aburizal-s-presidential-bid.html) and John McBeth, 'GolkarWavering Over Its Candidate', The StraitsT i m e s , J a n u a r y 2 9 , 2 0 1 3(http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/golkar-wavering-over-its-candidate)

25 The others are Catholicism, Protestantism,Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism.

26 Ufen 2009.

27 Haeril Halim, Nurfika Osman & MargarethAritonang, 'More Islamic Parties Hit By GraftScandals Ahead Of Polls', The Jakarta Post,F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/13/more-islamic-parties-hit-graft-scandals-ahead-polls.html)

28 The PPP, PKS and PBB are explicitly Islamicin their charter whilst the PAN and PKB areregarded as appealing to Muslim voters.

29 Henky Widjaja (2012), 'Convenient thugs: FPIThrives When Mainstream Muslim GroupsRemain Silent', Inside Indonesia vol. 109 Jul-S e p(http://www.insideindonesia.org/current-edition/convenient-thugs)

30 Ariel Heryanto (2010), 'Entertainment,Domestication, and Dispersal: Street Politics asPopular Culture', in Edward Aspinall & MarcusMietzner (ed.), Problems of Democratisation inIndonesia, p. 192.

31 Mariel Grazella, 'Facebook Users Rise To64m In Indonesia', The Jakarta Post, June 18,2 0 1 3

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(http://asianewsnet.net/Facebook-users-rise-to-64m-in-Indonesia-48079.html). These figures donot take into account the number of Facebookusers in China, where it is officially blocked.

32 Research conducted by Semiocast, a socialmedia analytics company, cited in GeorgeSteptoe, 'Sharing Is Caring', Southeast AsiaG l o b e , N o v e m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 1 3(http://sea-globe.com/sharing-caring-2-indonesia-social-media/).

33 Jokowi had 1.3 million Twitter followers atthe time of writing.

34 Research by Yahoo! and TNS cited in Steptoe( 2 0 1 3 )(http://sea-globe.com/sharing-caring-2-indonesia-social-media/).

35 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press GlobalS u r v e y o f 2 0 1 3 : I n d o n e s i a(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/indonesia)

36 This is the view of Enda Nasution, the 'fatherof Indonesian bloggers'. For example,#SaveKPK hashtag, critical of Yudhoyono'sinaction over police harassment of the KPK,reached 9.4 million internet users and forcedthe president to intervene. Cited in Steptoe( 2 0 1 3 )(http://sea-globe.com/sharing-caring-2-indonesia-social-media/).

37 The survey was conducted in December2013, involving 1,200 respondents from all ofIndonesia's 33 provinces, with a margin oferror of 2.83 percent. See The Jakarta Post,'Voters Rely On TV News, Not Campaign Ads:Indonesia Survey' , January 15, 2014(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/15/voters-rely-tv-news-not-campaign-ads.html)

38 Haeril Halim, 'Media Told To RemainImpartial During Polls', The Jakarta Post,J a n u a r y 4 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/

04/media-told-remain- impart ial -during-polls.html)

39 Nurfika Osman, 'Watchdogs Demand KPIPunish Partisan TV Stations', The Jakarta Post,J a n u a r y 1 7 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/17/watchdogs-demand-kpi-punish-partisan-tv-stations.html)

40 ibid

41 Freedom of the Press is an annual reportpublished by Freedom House which analysesthe extent of media independence in nationsa n d t e r r i t o r i e s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d .(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press)

42 Kelvin Rowley, 'The Downfall Of ThaksinShinawatra's CEO-State', APSNet PolicyF o r u m , N o v e m b e r 9 , 2 0 0 6(http://nautilus.org/apsnet/0634a-rowley-html/).Thaksin sold his family's media and telecomsempire to Singapore's Temasek in 2006.

43 See Freedom House, Freedom of the PressG l o b a l S u r v e y o f 2 0 1 3 : I n d o n e s i a(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/indonesia)

44 Jeffrey A. Winters (2013), 'Wealth, Power,and Contemporary Indonesian Politics',Indonesia Vol. 96, pp. 11-33

45 Marcus Mietzner (2011), 'The PoliticalMarginalization of the Military in Indonesia:Democratic Consolidation, Leadership, andInstitutional Reform', in Marcus Mietzner(ed.), The Political Resurgence of the Militaryin Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership,Routledge, London and New York, p.128

46 ibid, p. 132-135

47 ibid, p. 142

48 ibid, p. 144

APJ | JF 12 | 10 | 2

22

49 ibid

50 ibid, p. 145

51 Kompas, 'TNI Expresses "Doubts" AboutDemocracy, Desire To Return To Politics',O c t o b e r 2 8 , 2 0 1 3(http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/indoleft/2013/kompas_tniexpressesdoubtsaboutdemocracy_281013.htm)

52 Damien Kingsbury, 'Anti-reform Actors HoverOver Indonesia's Coming Elections', East AsiaF o r u m , J a n u a r y 1 6 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/16/anti-reform-actors-hover-over-indonesias-coming-elections/)

53 John McBeth, 'A President's UnfulfilledPromise', The Straits Times, December 19,2 0 1 3(http://news.asiaone.com/news/asian-opinions/presidents-unfulfilled-promise)

54 These depict a smiling Suharto asking inJavanese: "How're things? They were better inmy time, no?" See Zakir Hussain, 'GrowingNostalgia In Indonesia For Life Under Suharto',The Strai ts Times , January 29, 2014(http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-

report/indonesia/story/growing-nostalgia-i n d o n e s i a - l i f e - u n d e r -suharto-20140129#sthash.IcUrLm8P.dpuf)

55 Berni Moestafa & Novrida Manurung,'Indonesia Money Watchdog Warns OfBureaucratic Mafia After Polls', Bloomberg,F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 2 0 1 4(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-24/in d o n e s i a - m o n e y - w a t c h d o g - w a r n s - o f -bureaucratic-mafia-after-polls.html)

56 Haeril Halim, 'Gerindra, Hanura ReceiveLargest Campaign Donations', The Jakarta Post,D e c e m b e r 2 8 , 2 0 1 3(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/28/gerindra-hanura-receive-largest-campaign-donations.html-0)57 Such was the pattern during the New Orderwhen economic liberalisation polices werewound back as resource-driven growth slowed.

58 Vikram Nehru (2013), 'Survey of RecentDevelopments', Bulletin of IndonesianEconomic Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 139-166

59 The Jakarta Post, 'Bawaslu Anticipates" G o l p u t " ' , N o v e m b e r 2 4 , 2 0 1 3(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/24/bawaslu-anticipates-golput.html)