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Transcript of INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION “Konfrontasi” 3(2) - INDONESIAN... · ISSUE # 2 (1500231013)...
ISSUE # 2 (1500231013)
VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER Number 3 Issue # 2 November 2013
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“Konfrontasi”
1963-1966
PJH
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BACKGROUNDER # 3 INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“KONFRANTASI” 1963-1966
Timeline
31 Jan 1960: The Malayan Emergency ended but Australian Forces remained as part of a British-commanded Far East Strategic Reserve.
May 1961 : Proposal to establish the Federation of Malaysia announced by the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Adbul Rahman. This proposal sought to merge Malaya, Singapore and the British colonies in Borneo, namely, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Brunei. Indonesia initially did not raise any objections, and its opposition to the proposal came only after the outbreak of the 1962 Brunei revolt. Indonesia also regarded the proposed Federation as having a neocolonial status contrary to that of revolutionary Indonesia, especially in light of the fact that Britain would continue to have military bases in Malaya and Singapore.
Dec 1962 : Brunei faced a revolt by a radical Muslim movement, the North Kalimantan National Army. Its leader, Sheikh Azahari, had close ties with Lim Chin Siong, a prominent left-wing union leader in Singapore. In response to the revolt, British troops were sent from Singapore to Brunei, where they crushed the revolt within days. During the last days of the revolt, Indonesia began making inflammatory statements to raise tensions in Borneo.
20 Jan 1963 : Indonesian Foreign Minister announced a policy of “Konfrontasi” towards Malaysia. While there were intermittent attempts at reaching a political understanding, Indonesian troops began engaging in raids, sabotage and attempted subversion in Sarawak and Sabah.
1963-1964: Australian Government would only allow its troops to be deployed to defend the Malay Penisular but would not permit them to serve in Borneo.
May 1963 : President Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman agree to hold a plebiscite on the Federation proposal. Indonesia secure control of West New Guinea.
Jun 1963: Averell Harriman US State Department indicated that,vwhile the Americans supported Malaysia, they wanted Britain , Australia and New Zealand to take the primary rrole. Harrimann also gave a strong hint that American support in Indonesia would be influenced by the strength of Australian support for the United States in Vietnam.
Jul 1963 : Tunku Abdul Rahman signs the London Agreement. In response, Indonesia declares the "Crush Malaysia" campaign.
16 Sep 1963 : The Federation of Malaya,Singapore, British North Boreno ( as the State of Sabah) and Sarawak merged to form Malaysia.
25 Sep 1963: Prime minister Menzies announced that Australia was willing to give military assistance to Britian and Malaysia to defend Malaysia’s independence and territorial integrity.
Apr 1964: 7 Field Squadron RAE deployed to Borneo.Later on 4 June HMAS SYDNEY deposited main body of 7 Field Squadron at Jesselton along with a number of RAAF Helicopters.
Jan 1965: Australian Government agrees to deployment of Australian troops in Borneo. 3 RAR
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arrives in Borneo in March 1965.
6 Feb 1965: SAS Squadron (Major Alf Garland) in Sabah and NW Sarawak
9 Aug 1965: Singapore was expelled from the Federation of Malaysia due to racial riots in Singapore related to accusations of mistreatment of Malays.
30 Sep 1965 : Indonesian army crushed an attempted coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This was followed by a massacre of PKI members.
Mar 1966 : Sukarno, whose support base lay with the PKI, was forced to transfer power to General Suharto. The latter became Indonesia's de facto political leader. Sukarno was put under house arrest and Suharto was formally installed as President.
Apr-Aug 1966: 28th Brigade 4 RAR served in Sarawak.
11 Aug 1966 : Suharto ended the “Konfrontasi”, signed a peace treaty in Bangkok and re-established normal relations with Malaysia and Singapore.
Front Cover : The Image was on the cover of First Edition of the 1978 novel, The Year of Living Dangerously by Christopher Koch 1978. Set primarily in Jakarta, it also describes a partly-fictionalized version of the events leading up to the coup attempt by the Communist Party of Indonesia on September 30, 1965.The novel's title refers to the Italian phrase vivere pericolosamente. It is roughly translated into English as "living dangerously". Indonesian President Sukarno used the phrase for the title of his National Day speech of August 17, 1964.
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BACKGROUNDER # 3 INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“KONFRANTASI” 1963-1966
FOREWORD
BACKGROUNDER # 3 Issue #1 July1998 has been updated to reflect the 2013 configuration of the Indonesian Confrontation Gallery. Between 1962 and 1966 Indonesia and Malaysia fought a small, undeclared war which came to involve troops from Australia and Britain. The antagonism that gave rise to Confrontation was already apparent in December 1962, when a small party of armed insurgents, with Indonesian backing, attempted to seize power in the independent enclave of Brunei, only to be defeated by British troops from Singapore. By early 1963 military activity had increased along the Indonesian side of the border in Borneo, as small parties of armed men began infiltrating Malaysian territory on propaganda and sabotage missions. These cross-border raids, carried out by Indonesian "volunteers", continued throughout 1963; by 1964 Indonesian regular army units had also become involved.
Australian units that fought during Confrontation did so as part of a larger British and Commonwealth force under overall British command. Australia's commitment to operations against Indonesia in Borneo and West Malaysia fell within the context of its membership in the Far East Strategic Reserve.
Two Australian battalions served in Sarawak, Borneo, and conducted extensive operations on both sides of the border (secret “Claret Operations “) and were involved in clashes with Indonesian regulars. Two squadrons of the Special Air Service (for the first time on operations) , a troop of the Royal Australian Signals, several artillery batteries and parties of the Royal Australian Engineers were also involved in Borneo. Ships of the Royal Australian Navy served in the surrounding waters and several RAAF squadrons were also involved in Confrontation.
Confrontation received little coverage in the Australian media. Despite intense fighting in the jungles of Borneo, Australia and Indonesia maintained diplomatic relations throughout Confrontation. Even as diplomats negotiated in London, Kula Lumpur, Canberra and Jakarta. Indonesian officers continued to train at Australian Military schools. Defence planners in both Australia and Indonesia were always prepared for a possible escalation of the conflict. On 11 August 1966 President Suharto ended the “Konfrontasi”, signing a peace treaty with Kuala Lumpur and re-establishing normal relations with Malaysia and Singapore.
The AWM Roll of Honour commemorates 21 Australians who died during Confrontation ,none of whom were repatriated to Australia. Confrontation following on the heels of the Malayan Emergency was another stage in preparing the Australian Military for the Vietnam War in which it was involved before ‘Konfrontasi’ ended. Hope this helps. Peter Hugonnet Voluntary Guide November 2013
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BACKGROUNDER # 3
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION “KONFRANTASI”
1963-1966
CONTENTS
Timeline
Foreword
• Section 1 BACKGROUND
• Section 2 AUSTRALIAN ARMY • Section 3 ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY • Section 4 ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE • Section 5 CLARET OPERATIONS
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BACKGROUNDER # 3
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION “KONFRANTASI”
1963-1966
Section 1
BACKGROUND
Contents
• Indonesian Confrontation,1963-66 .AWM website October 2013 • Confrontation.Australia’s curious war of diplomacy. WARTIME # 6 (1999) .Peter Edwards
• The Brunei Uprising and Borneo Confrontation 1962-1966. Major General RWL McAlister CB OBE January 2012 (http://www.paradata.org.uk)
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Indonesian Confrontation, 1963–66 (AWM website October 2013)
Between 1962 and 1966 Indonesia and Malaysia fought a small, undeclared war which came to involve troops from Australia, New Zealand and Britain. The conflict resulted from a belief by Indonesia's President Sukarno that the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, which became official in September 1963, represented an attempt by Britain to maintain colonial rule behind the cloak of independence granted to its former colonial possessions in south-east Asia.
The term "Confrontation" was coined by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, in January 1963, and it has come to refer to Indonesia's efforts at that time to destabilise the new federation, with a view to breaking it up. The actual war began when Indonesia launched a series of cross-border raids into Malaysian territory in early 1963.
The antagonism that gave rise to Confrontation was already apparent in December 1962, when a small party of armed insurgents, with Indonesian backing, attempted to seize power in the independent enclave of Brunei, only to be defeated by British troops from Singapore. By early 1963 military activity had increased along the Indonesian side of the border in Borneo, as small parties of armed men began infiltrating Malaysian territory on propaganda and sabotage missions. These cross-border raids, carried out by Indonesian "volunteers", continued throughout 1963; by 1964 Indonesian regular army units had also become involved.
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Malaya, 29 October 1964: captured infiltrators emerge from the jungle near Sungei Kesang, South of Terendak. D Coy
3 RAR troops guard them AWM P01499.003
Australian units which fought during Confrontation did so as part of a larger British and Commonwealth force under overall British command. Australia's commitment to operations against Indonesia in Borneo and West Malaysia fell within the context of its membership in the Far East Strategic Reserve.
At first the Australian government kept its troops from becoming involved in Confrontation, not least because of fears that the conflict would spread to the long - and difficult to defend - border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. Requests from both the British and Malaysian governments in 1963-64 for the deployment of Australian troops in Borneo met with refusal, though the Australian government did agree that its troops could be used for the defence of the Malay peninsula against external attack. In the event, such attacks occurred twice, in September and October 1964, when Indonesia launched paratroop and amphibious raids against Labis and Pontian, on the south-western side of the peninsula. Members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) were used in clean-up operations against the invading troops. Although these attacks were easily repelled, they did pose a serious risk of escalating the fighting; the Australian government relented in January 1965 and agreed to the deployment of a battalion in Borneo.
The military situation in Borneo thus far had consisted of company bases located along the border between Indonesia and Malaysia to protect centres of population from enemy incursions. By 1965 the British government had given permission for more aggressive action to be taken, and the security forces now mounted cross-border operations with the purpose of obtaining intelligence and forcing the Indonesians to remain on the defensive on their own side of the border. Uncertain where the Commonwealth forces might strike next, the Indonesians increasingly devoted their resources to protecting their own positions and correspondingly less on offensive operations, although these continued on a much reduced scale.
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Sarawak, British North Borneo, 1965: soldiers of 3 RAR board a Belvedere helicopter to search for Indonesian
infiltrators AWM P01706.003
The first Australian battalion, 3 RAR, arrived in Borneo in March 1965 and served in Sarawak until the end of July. During this time the battalion conducted extensive operations on both sides of the border, were engaged in four major contacts with Indonesian units, and twice suffered casualties from land mines. Its replacement, the 28th Brigade, 4 RAR, also served in Sarawak - from April until August 1966. Although it had a less active tour, the 28th Brigade also operated on the Indonesian side of the border and was involved in clashes
with Indonesian regulars. Altogether, two squadrons of the Special Air Service, a troop of the Royal Australian Signals , several artillery batteries and parties of the Royal Australian Engineers were involved in Borneo, in addition to the two infantry battalions. Ships of the Royal Australian Navy served in the surrounding waters and several RAAF squadrons were also involved in Confrontation.
Member of 4RAR cleaning a Bren gun at a camp near the Sarawak/Kalimantan border, 1966. The marks on his legs are an antiseptic applied to mosquito bites sustained on jungle patrols
Continuing negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia ended the conflict, and the two sides signed a peace treaty in Bangkok in August 1966. Twenty-three Australians were killed during Confrontation, seven of them on operations, and eight were wounded. Because of the sensitivity of the cross-border operations, which remained secret at the time, Confrontation received very little coverage in the Australian press.
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Further information is available on this website. • Map • Information Sheet • Databases • Australian Army commanders' diaries Sources and further reading Peter Dennis et al., The Oxford companion to Australian military history (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995)
P. Dennis and J. Grey, Emergency and confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975, vol. 5 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin and the Australian War Memorial, 1996)
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THE BRUNEI UPRISING AND BORNEO CONFRONTATION 1962-1966 Major General RWL McAlister CB OBE January 2012 (http://www.paradata.org.uk)
Borneo (Kalimantan to the Indonesians) is the second biggest island in the world. Along its northern coast, one third of the island lay three British dependant territories – the colony of Sarawak, the Sultanate of Brunei and, at the north easterly tip, the colony of North Borneo. The border of these with Indonesian territory, jungle and mountains, is a thousand miles long. In 1961, Tungku Abdel Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, proposed the formation of a Federation of Malaysia to combine Malaya, the colony of Singapore and the three (British) Borneo territories. Initially, all concerned accepted the idea but eventually both Brunei and Singapore would drop out - Brunei first, because the Sultan was unwilling to become a constitutional monarch like the others in Malaya; much later (in 1965) Singapore left, reluctantly, because its Chinese majority and outlook did not chime with Malaya. The new Federation of Malaysia was formally born on 31st August 1963.
Indonesia first viewed the Malaysian proposal as helpful in diminishing British influence. But President Sukarno had a wider strategic dream of the whole of Borneo/Kalimantan rightfully belonging to Greater Indonesia and determined to recover the northern territories. He felt confident that the ethnically related north Borneo peoples, if asked, would want to side with Jakarta and his agents became active in subversion. He had allies in the Chinese communities of North Borneo and Sarawak, largely communist, some 24,000 in number and known to Malaysian Intelligence as the Chinese Clandestine Organisation or CCO. They wielded strong financial influence locally, saw no advantage in swopping British authority for Malaysian and would watch and wait. There were pro-Indonesian activists also in Brunei where Sheikh Azahari, an Indonesian ‘freedom fighter’ against the Dutch, had found a military commander, Yassin Affendi, to begin recruiting, arming and training a clandestine ‘army’ around Brunei town and in the nearest division of Sarawak to the west, the 5th Division. He dubbed it grandiosely ‘’Tentora National Kalimantan Utara’ (TNKU) – ‘The North Kalimantan National Army’. Azahari, still hopeful of influence when, along with 14 other political supporters, he was elected a member of Brunei’s Legislative Council, became frustrated when he found himself outvoted at meetings by the Sultan’s 16 cannily nominated officials. The only way forward for Azahari was insurrection.
Azahari’s uprising started on 6th December 1962. In the face of the speedy despatch by air and sea of military units from Singapore, it lasted but eight days. His greatest tactical blunder was the failure to deny to British reinforcements the use of local airfields. By 14th December, Azahari’s woefully under-armed and undertrained ‘troops’ were routed in four brisk actions at Tutong, on the coast road to Seria by the 1st/2nd Gurkhas, at Seria, by the Queen’s Own Highlanders, at Limbang in the 5th Division of Sarawak by 42 Commando RM, and at the Shell depot at Miri by 1st Royal Greenjackets.
The mopping up took longer, stability had to be restored and deterrence established on the thousand mile border. This involved raising the irregular Border Scouts, bringing in the SAS, the Independent Guards Parachute Squadron and the Gurkha Parachute Squadron, plus further strong reinforcement of Gurkha and British units, HQ 3rd Commando Brigade (14th December), HQ 99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade, and on 19th December the arrival of Major General Walter Walker as Joint Force Commander, who established his HQ on Labuan Island where the RAF already ran a transit airfield. Azahari escaped to Manila but Affendi with his remnants was not captured, until May, by 1st/7th Gurkhas.
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The opening round was won but Sukarno had not been beaten. The first reference to the term ‘confrontation’ came in a speech by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister in late January 1963. ‘We cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaysia because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of the neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia’. Malaysia and Whitehall took the term to mean a blend of political, economic and military pressures just short of war. The speed and success of the military reaction boosted morale in the longhouses and in Kuala Lumpur but drove the CCO underground. The subversive threat was not eliminated.
The second round opened with an Indonesian-led raid, on 12th April 1963, on the Police post of Tebedu, three miles inside the First Division of Sarawak. Sporadic raids into Sarawak, 69 all told during the rest of 1963, increased in strength and audacity. General Walker’s tactic was to hold the bulk of his forces back ready to react to information from his eyes and ears. To facilitate the rapid deployment of ‘cut-offs’ at the border, units mapped the border tracks and built and numbered endless helicopter pads where troops could be ‘roped in’ behind the invaders. RAF, RNAS and Army helicopters played, from the start an increasingly vital and decisive role. As General Walker later wrote in 1997, in his Autobiography ‘Fighting On’: ‘The helicopter proved to be a real battle winner. Operationally, I reckoned that one minute in a helicopter equalled a day’s march in jungle; that one hour equalled five days; and that one battalion with six helicopters in direct support was equal to a whole brigade. So you can see how much I depended on them.’
The deepest raid yet, into the Third Division of Sarawak around Long Jawi in September 1963, was defeated by the 1st/2nd Gurkhas and their supporting helicopters. In January 1964 an Indonesian incursion at Tawau in North Borneo was severely dealt with by 1st/10th Gurkhas. Similar successes were scored by 2nd/10th Gurkha in the First Division of Sarawak in the first four months of 1964.The skirmishing on the frontier assumed a new dynamic in mid-1964 when Indonesian regular army units made their appearance close to the border, particularly threatening the approaches to the capital, Kuching in the First Division of Sarawak. An over-ambitious Indonesian sea landing at Pontian, in south west Johore on 17th August failed. Two weeks later in early September an even more ambitious airborne landing around Labis, central Malaya, was decisively dealt with by 1st/10th Gurkhas and a New Zealand battalion - a significant escalation.
General Walker signalled the Chiefs of Staff that ‘he was fighting a war with one arm tied behind his back’, seeking permission to seize the initiative by carefully controlled operations into Indonesian territory.
When the UN, following the sea and air incursions, formally recognised Indonesian aggression, permission was granted, subject to secrecy, and that all such operations must be deniable. Secrecy was in fact maintained largely because Indonesia would not admit that the war was now being fought on its own territory. From December 1964, almost every operation of note took place inside Indonesia, under codeword ‘Claret’. Penetrations of 5000 yards and more by rifle companies supported by field and even medium artillery forced the Indonesians onto the defensive. Battalions from Australia and New Zealand joined the action. The war once fought from scattered bases by sections and platoons against infiltrators became a more demanding company commander’s war against Indonesian regulars on enemy soil. Ambushes, fire fights and attacks on fortified positions could only be won by the superior use of infantry tactics and artillery support – more akin to the long-range patrolling against the Japanese in 1943 in the Chin Hills and down on the Chindwin.
One major Indonesian incursion took place in June 1965 when a regular army company attacked the small rear party of a 2nd Parachute Regiment company base at Plaman Mapu while the bulk of the company was out on operations. Under the CSM (later awarded the DCM) they gallantly repulsed the heavily armed attackers, though suffering two killed and eight wounded. In perhaps the major action of the war in November 1965 L/Cpl Rambahadur Limbu of the 2nd/10th Gurkhas won the
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VC in an attack on an Indonesian company position. Successful raids continued up to March 1966 when offensive operations were called off.
At its peak, some 17,000 Commonwealth troops based in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong had been deployed in Borneo. Two Royal Marine Commandos, fifteen British battalions, an Australian and a New Zealand battalion, eight Gurkha battalions and Malayan infantry, with their Gunner and RAF and naval helicopter support, bore the brunt. Six-month tours were followed by rest and retraining at home stations before redeployment for a second, third and even fourth operational tour. Behind them was the strategic deployment in-theatre of many, mostly small, Royal Naval patrol ships and fully armed RAF strike units defended by anti-aircraft defences; all these posed an explicit threat which Sukarno did not challenge, his scope for escalation limited to infantry in jungle boots. Troop carrying RN Commando carriers and RAF transport aircraft sustained the operation from start to finish. Psyops and the successful decrypting of Indonesian signal traffic also played a little-known but significant part.
A communist uprising in Indonesia and growing economic difficulties which called for rapprochement with neighbours made a continuation of confrontation an irrelevance. Dr Suharto, Sukarno’s successor, ended it all in May 1966.
Defence Minister Healy referred to the campaign as ‘one of the most efficient uses of military force in history’.
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BACKGROUNDER # 3
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“KONFRANTASI” 1963-1966
Section 2
AUSTRALIAN ARMY
Contents
• Overview - Australian Operations in Borneo. DVA website October 2013 • Private Larry Richard Downes. AWM website
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Operations
Overview - Australian Operations in Borneo
(DVA website October 2013)
GUNNERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN 102ND FIELD BATTERY ABOUT TO FIRE THEIR L5 PACK HOWITZER FROM A STRONGPOINT IN NORTH BORNEO. THE GUNNERS ARE PROVIDING FIRE
SUPPORT FOR A BRITISH ARMY GHURKHA UNIT. THE ITALIAN-MADE L5 PACK HOWITZER WAS AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON IN THE DIFFICULT TERRAIN OF NORTH BORNEO BECAUSE IT WAS LIGHT
ENOUGH TO BE EASILY TRANSPORTED BY HELICOPTER. [AWM CUN/65/0853A/MC]
Australian infantry, gunners, and members of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) saw action in Borneo during the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation.
The 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) carried out a two-year-long tour of duty in Malaysia from July 1963 as part of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The battalion’s first experience of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation occurred in October 1964 when some of its members cooperated with New Zealand infantry in rounding up a force of 50 Indonesian troops that had landed in southern Malaya.
In March 1965 3 RAR arrived in Borneo and relieved a Ghurkha unit at Bau in western Sarawak. The battalion remained in the area for four months, during which time it carried out patrolling and ambush operations on both sides of the border with Indonesia. Although the heaviest fighting of the battalion’s time in Borneo occurred in ambushes of Indonesian troops, the three Australian soldiers killed during this period were victims of mines laid by the Indonesians.
The 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (4 RAR) replaced 3 RAR in the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and served in Sarawak between April and August 1966. Operating from fortified bases around Bau, the battalion carried out patrols on both sides of the border, some of which led to clashes with Indonesian soldiers. In addition to military operations, the battalion conducted a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign designed to deter the locals from giving assistance to the Indonesians.
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The Australian 102nd Field Battery served in Borneo between May and August 1965. Equipped with L5 pack howitzers, the battery supported 3 RAR, Ghurkha units, and British Guards and Parachute Regiments. Although the battery’s main task was to provide defensive fire for Commonwealth infantry outposts, it also assisted with support fire for secret ‘claret’ operations in Indonesian territory.
Australian SAS soldiers were deployed overseas for the first time during the Indonesian Confrontation. The 1st Squadron of the Australian SAS Regiment served in Borneo from February to August 1965. Three months of this period were spent on ‘claret’ operations against the Indonesians. The squadron also conducted more conventional reconnaissance patrols and ‘hearts and minds’ operations. The 2nd Australian SAS Squadron operated in Borneo between February and July 1966, performing a range of tasks including ‘claret’ operations. Three members of the Australian SAS were killed in action in Borneo.
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Private Larry Richard Downes
L1A1 Self Loading Rifle : Private L R Downes, 3 RAR, RELAWM40263
Australian forces took part in the Malayan Emergency from 1950 to 1960. Throughout this time units of the Royal Australian Air Force were involved in bombing operations against the Communist guerrillas, hidden deep in the Malayan jungle.
In 1964 Australian troops joined British and Malaysian security forces patrolling the borders against Indonesian raids. On 17 May 1965, 3 Platoon of A Company, 3RAR, set out from their base at Stass on a reconnaissance patrol through the jungle. As they approached a well-known border crossing used by Indonesian troops to infiltrate Malaysia, Private Larry Downes tripped an M2A3 anti-personnel mine. He was killed instantly by the explosion, along with Sergeant Vincent Vella, the acting platoon commander.
The impact of shrapnel from the mine can still be clearly seen on the damaged stock and pistol grip of the rifle.
Roll of Honour - Larry Richard Downes Service Number: 1200029 Rank: Private Unit: 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Service: Australian Army Conflict: Confrontation, 1963-1966 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Borneo) Date of death: 17 May 1965 Place of death: Sarawak Cause of death: Killed in action Cemetery or memorial details: Kranji Military Cemetery, Singapore
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BACKGROUNDER # 3
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“KONFRANTASI” 1963-1966
Section 3
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY
Contents
• Royal Australian Navy-Indonesian Confrontation, John Perryman. RAN Website October 2013
• Confrontation with Indonesia –HMAS GULL.Hugonnet/Carwardine March 2008 • Lieutenant Commander Keith Murray DSC. The Telegraph 26 May 2013
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ROYAL AUSTRALIN NAVY –INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION John Perryman. RAN Website October 2013
Australian Service Medal –
Far East Strategic Reserve.
At the end of the Malayan Emergency Australia agreed to keep forces in Malaya-Singapore as part of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and the RAN had two frigates, Yarra and Parramatta there on duty when the Indonesian policy of 'confrontation' began with the new nation of Malaysia. Malaysia had been formed in 1963, embracing the British colonies of Malaya, Singapore (later to withdraw) Sarawak (North Borneo) and Sabah. Fearing that the new Federation posed a threat, Indonesia 's President Sukarno decided to demonstrate Indonesia 's opposition.
Indonesian forces made shore landings in Borneo and Malaya, paratroopers were dropped into Malaya early in the confrontation and naval skirmishes occurred in the straits of Malacca. Grave fears were therefore held for the stability of the region. As tension mounted, Australia increased its presence by sending HMAS Sydney, the destroyers Vampire, Vendetta and Duchess and the frigate, Derwent to the area. Sydney had by now been converted to a fast troop transport and carried troops and equipment to Jesselton in North Borneo.
The 16th Minesweeping Squadron comprising six Ton Class coastal minesweepers was also assigned for duties during Confrontation arriving in Malaysian waters in May 1964. Initially their patrol duties were centred in Borneo. They had a standard displacement of 360 tons, a maximum speed of 15 knots, a crew of three officers and 30 ratings and were armed with two 40/60mm Bofors guns, together with light automatic weapons.
Ton Class coastal minesweepers.
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On 10 November 1964 Prime Minister Menzies told Parliament that there had been a 'deterioration in Australia 's strategic situation' and announced big manpower and equipment increases in the navy, army and airforce. 'Indonesian attacks,' the Prime Minister told parliament, may create a real risk of war. it is tremendously important to us that Indonesia should not become Communist.
On 13 December 1964, as if to echo the Prime Minister's concerns, the minesweeper HMAS Teal, Lieutenant K. Murray, RAN, whilst operating as part of the Singaporean Straits patrol, was fired upon with automatic weapons by an unlit vessel. The attacking vessel (one of two) then shaped course for Indonesian waters but was overpowered and arrested by Teal following a further small arms engagement that resulted in the deaths of three Indonesian crew members. For his coolness and judgement during this, and a previous, interception Lieutenant Murray was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the only award for gallant or distinguished service made to the RAN during Confrontation.
Teal was involved in another interception on 23 February 1965 when she detected an unlit vessel nine miles off Cape Rachado. The suspicious vessel was closed and illuminated, and revealed nine fully armed infiltrators in uniform who surrendered immediately upon challenge. The contacts between December 1964 and February 1965 were symptomatic of a period of considerably heightened activity by the Indonesians, and although few of their infiltration parties actually made it ashore in Malaysia, the level of effort required to stop them stretched the security forces considerably.
Teal was not the only ship of the 16th Squadron to see action. On 13 March 1966 while patrolling off Raffles Light HMAS Hawk, under the command of Lieutenant J.D. Foster, RAN, came under fire from an Indonesian shore battery, even though the minesweeper was inside Singapore territorial waters. Two salvoes totalling 11 high explosive rounds were fired at the ship, landing within 200 yards of the vessel. Hawk retired at speed, and without retaliating, since fire ceased immediately the minesweeper got under way. The following morning Hawk 'evened the score' when it intercepted a sampan with five Indonesians.on board who were promptly arrested.
HMAS Yarra
This trend of interrogating suspicious vessels and making arrests continued throughout Confrontation. It was hard, long, tedious and exacting work with little to show as a result. During a five-month period on patrol activities in 1964-65, HMAS Ibis spent 87 of 100 days at sea. Throughout Confrontation the small Ton Class Minesweepers
proved to be a worthy gunboat with a useful all round capability. However it came as no comfort to those onboard to know that they were out-gunned by nearly every Indonesian warship in the region.
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As Indonesia continued its 'confrontation' the British organised substantial naval forces to defend Malaysia, RAN destroyers, frigates and minesweepers maintained their patrols in the Malacca, Singapore and Johore Straits and in the Tawau area of North Borneo as well as joining in exercises with fleet units of the Malaysian Navy. HMAS Melbourne with its embarked air group also maintained a presence under the SEATO auspices exercising in the region. When Indonesian forces crossed the border into eastern Sebatik Island near Tawau, Sabah on 28 June 1965, HMAS Yarra was called on to carry out bombardments designed to harass the withdrawal of the infiltrators. During three runs Yarra fired a total of 70 rounds. Bombardments of the border area of Sebatik were again carried out on 5 and 10 July, the targets on all occasions being within Sabah.
On the night of 30 September/1 October 1965, a communist inspired coup attempt occurred in Indonesia. Six senior generals were slain, but the coup failed and was followed by widespread violence and bloodshed. It proved a turning point for 'confrontation', which thereafter declined. On 13 August 1966 a formal agreement concluded between Indonesia and Malaysia brought the conflict to an end.
The Far East Strategic Reserve maintained an on-going presence in Southeast Asia until 1971 at which time the Five Power Defence Arrangements came into effect replacing the arrangements of earlier years associated with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.
Sources and Further Reading
• Stevens, D. The Royal Australian Navy - The Australian Centenary History of Defence Vol III, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001
• Odgers, G. Navy Australia, National Book Distributors, Brookvale, NSW, 1993 George Odgers
• Royal Australian Navy - A Brief History, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1985 • Grey, J. Up Top The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955-1972 • Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1998 • Foster, J. Hands to Boarding Stations - The Story of the Minesweeper HMAS Hawk • Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2003 Defence Report 1972, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1972
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Confrontation with Indonesia - HMAS GULL
HMAS GULL (M-1185) was a Ton class minesweeper built by J. S. Doig Limited at Grimsby in England as HMS SWANSTON for the Royal Navy, purchased by Australia in 1961 and commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy on 19 July 1962. It served with the 16th Mine Countermeasures Squadron during the Confrontation with Indonesia generally conducting anti-infiltration patrols. HMAS GULL paid off on 7 November 1969.
The flag on display in the Gallery was last flown in HMAS GULL in Singapore on 1 March 1967, when a new distinctively Australian White Ensign was adopted in place of the Royal Navy's (RN) ensign. The commanding officer, Lieutenant A M Carwardine, kept the flag as a souvenir. HMAS GULL and HMAS HAWK were the last minesweepers to return to Australia on 28 April 1967 after service in the Indonesian Confrontation.
This sign was worn on the front of the bridge by the minesweeper HMAS GULL in 1966. Originally part of the 16th Australian Minesweeping Squadron, Gull transferred to the 6th, British, Minesweeping Squadron. This Squadron, nicknamed 'Blackfoot', from the marks made by the stokers (engine room staff) on the teak decks, carried two of these signs, improvised from standard 'Give Way' road signs, one on each side of the funnel. The sign which came from an RN sweeper in dry dock was presented to Leut Carwardine by a ‘Blackfoot” Squadron Officer in late 1966 .The crew immediately overpainted it with the gold kangaroo. (Ref: Discussions PJH /Carwardine March 2008)
PJH
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Lt-Cdr Keith Murray The Konfrontasi (1962-66) was one of the last campaigns of Empire fought by Britain and her Commonwealth allies. President Sukarno, the autocratic ruler of Indonesia, opposed the amalgamation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak into the wider Malaysian Federation, and sent troops disguised as guerrillas and pirates to stir up trouble.
In December 1963 Murray was given command of the small 350-ton minesweeper Teal, one of two Australian ships based in Singapore which patrolled the rivers of Borneo and the Malacca Strait. The Strait, a narrow strip of water which divides the Malayan peninsular from the Indonesian island of Sumatra, was to prove an important battleground. Between August 1964 and February 1966 Teal spent some 300 days and nights on patrol, including the night of December 6 1964, when an unlit vessel was detected. Murray ordered a burst of machine-gun fire across its bows; the sampan stopped, and three Indonesian soldiers were arrested. A week later, on December 13, Teal was on patrol at the southern end of the Strait when another two boats were spotted, one of which escaped. The remaining vessel opened up with small arms fire and, as bullets buzzed over his head, Murray ordered Teal to return fire, killing three of the seven men in the large sampan before it surrendered. Murray’s prompt and decisive action was deemed to have deterred further attempts by Indonesian guerrillas to land on the Malaya peninsula and to have helped confine the war to the island of Borneo. He was awarded a DSC. Keith Murray was born in Sydney and brought up at Newcastle, New South Wales. His youth was marked by tragedy when in 1948 his father, brother and uncles disappeared in the fishing vessel Syd off the coast of Patonga, NSW . The next year Murray entered the Royal Australian Naval College, where he was nicknamed “Gus”. From 1954 to 1957 he trained in Britain. Murray served in Swan, Melbourne, Albatross and Anzac, and in 1959 completed an initial flying course. Due to the vagaries of Australian defence policy towards naval aviation, however, he returned to general service and took command of Teal. Soon after being promoted Lieutenant Commander in 1966, Murray resigned to pursue a career as a civilian pilot, flying helicopters to remote inland areas of Australia, and fixed-wing aircraft with the NSW air ambulance service. In 1970 he joined Qantas, graduating from flying twin-engined Dakota DC3s and DC4s over Australia to 707 and 747 jets on intercontinental routes. From 1971 to 1973 he worked for Air Fiji before returning to Qantas, from which he retired in 1996. Lt-Cdr Keith Murray, born February 19 1936, died April 16 2013 (The Telegraph 26 May 2013)
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BACKGROUNDER # 3
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“KONFRANTASI” 1963-1966
Section 4
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE
Contents
• THE RAAF IN ‘KONFRONTASI”. Pathfinder. Issue #76.October 2007
The Royal Australian Air Force had a limited involvement in Confrontation. No. 5 Squadron RAAF provided Iroquois helicopters for operations in the area around the Thai border while six C130 flights per month carried troops and supplies between Malaya and Borneo. The latter were provided by No. 36 Squadron which was based at Richmond in New South Wales but whose crews flew to a wide range of locales in their transport role. During the period of Confrontation 36 Squadron aircraft were also involved in supporting the Australian effort in Vietnam.(DVA website October 2013)
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Issue 76, October 2007
THE RAAF IN ‘KONFRONTASI’In the 1960s the RAAF faced the prospect of becoming involved in a regional confl ict in which Australian territory and interests were directly threatened for the fi rst time since World War II. As a consequence, some RAAF fi ghter squadrons were held on fi ve-minute alert status, and aircraft carried live ordnance while operating in a declared Air Defence Identifi cation Zone―the fi rst time this had happened since the Korean War ten years earlier. The RAAF response in these circumstances not only helped shape and deter the situation, but the RAAF itself was shaped by it.
The cause of so much anxiety was the British decision to grant independence to Malaya, Singapore and Britain’s territories of Borneo by incorporating them into a federation called Malaysia in September 1963. This was a step vigorously opposed by President Sukarno of Indonesia, who regarded the new entity as a neo-colonial creation. Rather than provoke all-out war over the issue, Sukarno embarked on a sustained program of political and military aggravation―including limited cross-border incursions―aimed at destroying Malaysia. This policy was termed ‘Konfrontasi’ (Confrontation) by Sukarno’s foreign minister, Dr Subandrio.
Because Australia (with Britain and New Zealand) had forces stationed in Malaysia as part of a regional stabilising force known as the Far East Strategic Reserve, Indonesia’s policy carried risks of wider involvement if there was any miscalculation or escalation in the military levels it employed. Australia’s air presence in the affected region was sizeable, with three RAAF squadrons―No. 2 (Canberra bombers) and Nos. 3 and 77 (Sabre fi ghters)―stationed at the Butterworth base opposite the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This proximity placed Australian air elements in
the immediate front-line in case of any serious outbreak of confl ict.
The fi rst deliberate incursion into Malaysian airspace to which the RAAF responded occurred on 17 July 1963 when two unidentifi ed aircraft, thought to be Indonesian MiG-19s, were separately sighted near the Malayan coast about 100 km south of Penang. One of the intruders was pursued back across the Strait of Malacca towards the Indonesian town of Medan. Following this incident, Far East Air Force (FEAF) commanders extended radar
surveillance at key bases, including Butterworth, to 24 hours a day and upgraded the readiness status of air defences.
From October 1963, the RAAF was required to keep two Sabres at ‘Alert 5’ status during daylight hours, requiring fi ghters to take off fi ve minutes after an order to scramble, with the RAF’s No. 60 Squadron (operating Javelins) taking over this duty at night.
Rules of engagement were initially complicated and only allowed RAAF fi ghters to engage Indonesian aircraft if a number of, not always well-defi ned, conditions were met. These rules were changed in October 1964, however, in response to continued Indonesian aggression, and thereafter any positively identifi ed Indonesian aircraft operating in Malaysian or Singaporean air space was to be destroyed.
While the Sabres of Nos. 3 and 77 Squadrons remained on alert for incursions by Indonesian aircraft, the Canberra bombers of No. 2 Squadron prepared for possible strikes against Indonesian targets. Crews familiarised themselves thoroughly with potential targets, such as Indonesian air bases on Sumatra, and regular training fl ights included simulated low-level air strikes. The need for such operations seemed about to be realised in September-October 1964,
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after Indonesian paratroops and amphibious vehicles raided Labis and Pontian on the south-western side of the Malayan peninsula, and Australian troops became involved in operations to mop-up the invaders. The Australian Government even felt compelled at this time to initiate a deployment of RAAF fi ghters to ward off any retaliatory strikes which the Indonesians might launch against Darwin (see Pathfi nder 48).
The Labis-Pontian raids also brought to light a radar blind spot over the Strait of Malacca, behind Penang Island, which meant that Indonesian aircraft could approach Butterworth from Medan undetected by 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (MCRU). This created a diffi cult air defence problem. Until a second MCRU could be established to close the radar gap, a radar-equipped Royal Navy destroyer had to patrol the Strait between Medan and Penang, and RAAF Sabres were required to mount armed dawn patrols to the west of Penang Island.
In conjunction with the armed incursions that were occurring on the ground and in the air, Indonesia was also applying political pressure which carried further implications for the RAAF. On 3 July 1964 the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was informed that two RAAF and eight RNZAF transport fl ights had been refused clearance to enter Indonesian air space, and a blanket clearance for C-130 courier fl ights from Darwin to Butterworth which also passed through Indonesian air space was withdrawn. In response, Australia’s ambassador to Indonesia, Mr Keith Shann, supported by Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Valston Hancock, proposed to test Indonesian resolve by fl ying a combat aircraft from Darwin to Singapore via the standard route taking it over waters claimed by Indonesia but regarded by Australia as international. Government procrastination over granting approval, however, meant that the proposal was never implemented, and for more than a year RAAF aircraft were obliged to travel to Butterworth and Singapore via the Cocos Islands to avoid Indonesian air space.
By November 1964 the Australian Government was announcing a range of new measures which refl ected its gloomy assessment of the strategic situation in the region, and sought to exercise a measure of deterrence. An increase of 4000 personnel to the RAAF’s strength (taking it to over 20,000) was announced in Parliament, along with plans to build new airfi elds at Tindal, south
of Darwin, as well as Wewak in New Guinea in case problems developed across Indonesia’s border with the then-Australian territory of Papua New Guinea. Proposals were also conspicuously debated to upgrade the airfi eld at Learmonth, Western Australia, to enhance the publicly-vaunted ability of new nuclear-capable F-111 bombers, ordered from the US in October 1963, to comfortably strike at targets as far away as the Indonesian island of Java.
In November 1965, a detachment of 77 Squadron was also moved to Labuan in Borneo to patrol the border with Indonesian Kalimantan. Pilots were authorised to carry out direct armed action against Indonesian Air Force aircraft known to be strafi ng villages on the Malaysian side of the border. This situation was fraught with danger of accidental encounters, since existing maps were inaccurate and pilots were forced to draw their own maps of the patrol area. Patrols were continued by a detachment of 3 Squadron until late December 1965.
Fortunately, Confrontation soon to come to an end. An attempted coup by Indonesian communists in September 1965 saw Sukarno removed from power and General Suharto installed as President. Tensions gradually eased, and a peace treaty was signed between Indonesia and Malaysia in August the following year. While it has since become history that matters never deteriorated to the stage where worst fears were realised, RAAF personnel in Malaysia had to contend with a tense war of nerves for the period that Confrontation lasted. The confl ict has received little media attention and today is completely overshadowed by Vietnam. Of some 3,500 Australians who served during Confrontation, there were only 23 fatalities, including four RAAF personnel.
Confrontation presented the greatest direct threat to Australian territory and interests in the fi fty years after the end of World war II
Although full-scale confl ict was avoided, air power was at the forefront of the Australian Government response
The fl exibility provided by air power undoubtedly helped to shape response and deter escalation of Indonesian military activity
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BACKGROUNDER # 3
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
“KONFRANTASI” 1963-1966
Section 5
CLARET OPERATIONS THE INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION (KONFRONTASI) (1963-1966):
((DVA website October 2013
A BRITISH WESTLAND WHIRLWIND HELICOPTER IN BORNEO IN 1966. MEMBERS OF THE 2ND AUSTRALIAN SAS SQUADRON ARE PREPARING TO LEAVE THE HELICOPTER AND BEGIN AN OPERATION. THE NATURE – AND EVEN THE EXISTENCE – OF THE ‘CLARET’ OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INDONESIANS CARRIED OUT BY THE SAS AND
OTHER COMMONWEALTH SOLDIERS IN BORNEO REMAINED UNDISCLOSED UNTIL THE 1970S. [AWM P05221.011]
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‘Claret’ was the codename for cross-border operations carried out by Commonwealth units into the Indonesian province of Kalimantan on the island of Borneo. The need for such operations was perceived early in the Confrontation when British and Malaysian planners realised that by operating only on the Malaysian side of the border they were allowing the Indonesians to seize and hold the initiative. To counter this a strategy allowing ambushes up to 2,000 yards into Indonesian territory or permitting troops to pursue the enemy up to the same distance as well as using mortar and artillery fire to hit Indonesian positions was devised.
Security and secrecy were of primary importance as official public policy held that Commonwealth troops would not cross the border. To this end deniability rested on the inability of the Indonesians to prove that the border had been crossed. Actions that took place before the eyes of villagers or in which civilians were killed would have been difficult to refute but encounters involving, and seen, only by soldiers made it difficult for the Indonesians to substantiate. Claret Operations
As deniability was essential to Claret operations Major General Walter Walker, Commander, British Forces Borneo, devised a set of rules. The earliest Claret missions had to be personally authorised by Walker and only experienced troops were to be involved. Claret’s first participants were therefore Gurkha units, the SAS and the SBS (Special Boat Service). From this group only those troops on their second tour of Borneo were able to participate in cross-border operations. Civilian lives were not to be risked and the distance covered on the Indonesian side of the border was limited. Soldiers were ordered to neither become, nor to take prisoners. Nor were any dead to be left to the enemy. So successful was the strategy that cross-border operations were not disclosed during the Confrontation and they remained secret for years afterwards, not being publically acknowledged until 1974.
By January 1965 the radius of Claret operations had been extended to 10,000 yards and the number of contacts and enemy killed in action increased dramatically. Australian units did not experience a contact on a Claret Operation until a patrol of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) engaged Indonesian troops in May 1965. 3RAR carried out 32 Claret operations during its four months in Borneo. Contacts were rare but elements of the battalion were involved in four major clashes with Indonesian troops. Each resulted from platoon ambushes and in one case, when the Indonesians launched a counter-attack, artillery was needed to cover the Australians’ withdrawal.