Indonesia: Doing ‘Normative Power’ Differently?

David Camroux

ISA Second Global South Conference 9th January 2015

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

CAVEATs

This document is a (lengthy) ‘presentational cart’ that I have put before the ‘written paper horse’. The presentation follows the structure and arguments which shall be found in the written paper. My apologies to the chair, discussant and fellow panel members that a heavy load of correcting a massive number end of term papers, as well as some family complications hindered my fulfilling completely my academic obligations.

Outline of the Argument 1.  Since its creation (1945-1949) Indonesia has been a norm entrepreneur in

security governance in Southeast Asia. 2.  These norms spring from domestic praxis – Javanese world views,

revolutionary war, the dwi fungsi governance of a multi-ethnic geographically dispersed, archipelagic state, etc – impacted upon by the Cold War context.

3.  Since the end of authoritarian rule, ( Reformasi , 1998) and the end of the Cold War these norms have become increasingly hybridised (rhetorically at least, Westernised) as Indonesia has become a global as well as regional actor (e.g. membership of the G20).

4.  The election in July 2014 of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) a first president of Indonesia not drawn from the New Order elite, and a product of the country’s democratic/decentralized transition indicates initial elements of continuity and change in Indonesia’s normative approach.

Indonesian actorness n  Middle power, in terms of three dimensions: statistical (demographics,

economy), perceived (normative) and statecraft. The latter involves a dynamic of hybridisation creating and recreating itself both internally and externally (Ping 2005).

n  A “pivotal state” for US foreign relations, i.e. one that is strategically important and central in its region, potentially playing a key role in global negotiations (Bresnan 1999).

n  A “global swing state”, that is a nation that possesses a large and growing economy, occupies a central position in a region and has a democratic system of government (Kilman & Fontaine 2012).

n  Gestaltungsmächte, roughly translated as a “shaping power” embracing many of the elements in the two US policy community perspectives mentioned above, but intellectually more satisfying, for it gives weight to the importance of ideas and norms.

n  Using the last of these perspectives, this paper thus seeks to describe Indonesian actorness as that of a norm entrepreneur transposing indigenous norms at the regional level.

‘Western’ conceptualisations Two broad concepts have defined the analysis of Indonesian foreign relations

since independence. Both of them were first developed at the LSE. The first enunciated by the late Michael Leifer (1983) is that of a sense of vulnerability. The second, was that developed by his most brilliant Indonesian PhD student at the LSE, Rizal Suzma (1999), undoubtedly today the most prolific and influential opinion-maker in Jakarta in the area of foreign relations, who demonstrated how foreign policy has been used as an instrument of regime legitimisation.

Leifer, writing at the height of the New Order regime, also insisted on Indonesia’s sense of regional entitlement (p.173), i.e. the sense of a leading role in ASEAN.

Since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 and the on-going process of democratisation - and the concomitant decentralisation - on the one hand, a sense of vulnerability has been attenuated and, on the other, using foreign relations as a vector of legitimisation now requires meeting new parameters, in particular, acting globally and not only regionally.

Indonesian centrality in Southeast Asia?

Designated a ‘National Hero’ by Sukarno, Sultan Agung, who extended the central Javanese kingdom of Mataram to its maximum extent in the first half of the 17th century and defended it against the Dutch VOC, is here depicted on a 2006 commemorative stamp.

‘Traditional’ Javanese geopolitical concepts « The mandala (circle of influence, interest or ambitions) can be described as a complex of geopolitical relations, relating to boundaries and to contact with foreign countries. The doctrine emphasized the cult of expansion… A state’s belligerence is in the first place directed towards its closest neigbors, thus making necessary the friendship of the state next to the foe, which, because of its proximity is also a natural enemy of the foe. But if the mutual foe should be conquered, the two allies would become close neighbors, which would create a new enmity. So this circle of alignment and alienation would steadily expand until a universal peace is reached by the establishment of a world-state with a sole and supreme ruler (chakravatin) » Moertono (2009 {1968}: 71.

The colonial legacy’s impact on Indonesian foreign relations views n  While Indonesia political leaders may appeal to past empires and post “golden

ages” Indonesia within its present borders is a colonial creation, the succesor to the Netherlands East Indies.

n  In high school textbooks the colonial period is depicted in wholly negative terms particularly the use by the Dutch of divide and rule strategy to maintain their control.

n  Hence the obsession till reformasi with maintaining a centralized, unified state despite its problematical nature for an archipelagic nation of some 16,000 islands and over 200 linguistic groups.

n  The bitter revolutionary struggle gave strong anti-imperialist tinge to foreign relations rhetoric which still finds expressions today in multiple forms of economic nationalism.

Decolonisation, the watershed transformational moment. Fromit emerged the concept of a Politik Luar Negeri Bebas dan Actif (independent and active foreign policy), dependent on perjuangen (struggle) and diplomasi (diplomacy)

Statue at the entrance of the Sukarno-Hatta International Airport of Jakarta, depicting the first President and first Vice-President of an independent Indonesia.

The former the epitome of the

romantic (if bespoke-tailored and womanising) revolutionary idealist and the latter the sober diplomat. A tension that continues till today in Indonesia’s external relations.

Mendajung Antara Dua Karang (“Rowing between Two Coral Reefs”)… ‘soft hedging’ a l’indonesienne? Speech of Mohammad Hatta before the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) on 2 September 1948, i.e. more than a year before effective independence

Dr Mohammad Hatta, Vice-President of Indonesia, 1945 (1949) – 1956 NB It needs to be underlined that, since independence, political leaders have conceptualized Indonesia’s external relations in bahasa Indonesia, not, say, as in Malaysia or India, in a global lingua franca, e.g. English. The role of the discourse of foreign relations addressed to a domestic audience therefore has a particular acuity, for the use widespread use of bahasa has been an essential vector in developing a sense of national unity.

Embedded within the formative revolutionary struggle, a realpolitik view of international relations in the service of the new Nation was already at sway… and the need to find a way to interact with the new hegemonic power.

“… Indonesia’s fate ultimately depends on the fate of Anglo Saxon capitalism and imperialism… It is clear that till now Dutch power has simply been a pawn in a political chess game that the British have been playing, But we must recognize that Dutch power here has by no means the same significance for American as it does for British foreign policy. In this fact lies possibilities for us to win a new position for ourselves in harmony with the political ambitions of the Giant of the Pacific, the United States” (quoted in Leifer 1983: 80, my emphasis) Sutan Sjahir, mythologized as the “Teacher to the Nation”, Indonesia’s first Prime Minister & Foreign Minister in 1945.

Sukarno, a norm entrepreneur? pre-Independence speech on Pancasila (the official 5 point ideology) on 1st January 1945 “The first two principles, nationalism and internationalism, can be pressed to one, which I used to call 'socionationalism.' Similarly with democracy 'which is not the democracy of the West' together with social justice for all can be pressed down to one, and called socio-democracy. Finally - belief in God. 'And so what originally was five has become three: socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and belief in God.' 'If I press down five to get three, and three to get one, then I have a genuine Indonesian term - GOTONG ROYONG [mutual co-operation]. The state of Indonesia which we are to establish should be a state of mutual co-operation. How fine that is ! A Gotong Royong state.”

Mutual cooperation and consensus… domestic foundations

Gotong royong (Moving house in Java) Musyawarah (Chatting during voluntary work)

The 1955 Asian-African (Bandung) Conference: placed Indonesia on the global stage… setting the norms of the “ASEAN way” … and for other Asian regionalisation initiatives (Photo: President Sukarno opens the conference)

Wawasan Nusantara: the sea which unites rather than divide

With the benefit of hindsight the other major success of the Sukarno period, one with both profound domestic and international repercussions, was the enunciation of this archipelago principle first mooted in 1957 and promoted from 1962. This concept of territorial unity regards Indonesia as an inseparable union of land and water (tanah-air or homeland). This principle is now enshrined in the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by all the major powers except the US.

Three noteworthy normative effects, perhaps unintended, emerged from the conference both defining Indonesian foreign relations praxis and impacting on ASEAN:

1.  The articulation and advancement of basic principles in the conduct of international relations such as respect for sovereignty, non-interference, anti-colonialism (today a critical distance from the West).

2.  Non-alignment (or at least a distancing) from rival power blocs, power-balancing that today can be seen as soft hedging.

3.  Mutual cooperation and and consensus as basic principles of the regional modus operandi.

(see See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya (eds, Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008)

Ketahan nasional (national resilience): the regional

security rhetoric and praxis of the New Order regime of

President Suharto (1967-1998)

Suharto came to power after an ostensibly failed Communist inspired coup attempt in 1967… and was ousted in 1998 victim of the Asian Financial Crisis. Yet in a sense once the dynamics of the Cold War had played out his situation became untenable.

General Suharto, a “Cold War hero”

and Father of Development

New Order Foreign Policy n  Suharto came to power in the height of the Cold War, his takeover of power being

abetted by a US Administration wary of Sukarno’s increasing closeness to the Partai Kommunist Indonesia

n  Suharto’s immediate external challenge was to restore peaceful relations with Indonesia’s nearest neighbours, Malaysia and Singapore who had been the object of Sukarno’s konfrontasi policy of low level conflict.

n  Thus as has been amply demonstrated (Anwar 1994, Haftel 2010) Indonesia took a leading role in the creation of ASEAN, the first members of which other than Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were Thailand and the Philippines.

n  ASEAN initially grouped the non-Communist nations of SEA and was encouraged by the West as a bulwark against Communism.

n  Suharto’s purpose was both to acquire a new legitimacy both domestically and regionally for its leading role and to restore confidence through a series of incremental measures that continue to this day.

n  Building a resilient ASEAN was thus the regional expression of building a resilient (i.e. economically developed) Indonesia. Yet it was not one of the front line states organizing a common front against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

Ketahan nasional (national resilience) n  Concept introduced in the early 70s, in particular by the Lembaga Ketahan

Nasional (National Resilience Council) a military think tank set up todevelop ideological and strategic thinking within the context of the dwi fungsi (dual role) ascribed to the Military.

n  The concept is holistic, viewing security as involving non-military aspects such as ‘human security’, ‘energy security’ development and ‘correct behavoir’

n  The cultural references and metaphors used to give substance to the concept mostly allude to the nation as a tenacious warrior who experiences hardships and, thanks to self reliance, overcomes dangers.

n  As with the concepts of gotong royong and musyawarah this holistic view of self reliant resilience is promoted as a regional norm.

n  The ASEAN Charter (2008) launched in Jakarta (where the Secretariat of the Association is based) uses much of the discourse.

… and, hence, regional resilience, the sum total of the national resilence of individual ASEAN members.

« If each member nation can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience can result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of it constituent parts. » (Jusuf Wanandi 1994: 305. Wanandi an influential Sino-Indonesian businessman,châtelain, founder of the CSIS (Indonesia’s Chatham House) and owner of the Jakarta Post, has been for many years a central figure, alongside the late Hadi Soesastro, in Indonesia’s two track diplomacy, successfully negotiating the transition into the post-Reformasi era.

Foreign Relations since the end of the New Order: compounding international engagement with regionalization and domestic resilience: a synthesis of the

two preceding periods?

Reformasi: democratization and internationalization since Suharto. n  The end of Suharto dictatorship, often described as a strong regime with a

weak state, continues to see the entry of new actors in Indonesian foreign relations:

a)  A vocal countervailing power in a Parliament that is no longer a rubber stamp.

b)  Competing voices dues to empowerment of politicians at the local level. c)  A flourishing media expressing a multitude of opinions. d)  Civil society groups (think tanks, religious organizations, academia, etc.)

all claiming a right to be heard. e)  Business groups with a greater degree of autonomy in relation to the

political order. f)  A professionalized and increasingly competent foreign ministry. g)  A continuation of a tradition of independently minded foreign ministers.

B.J. Habibie (May 1998 - October 1999)

•  Sought a new hybridisation making Indonesia more respectable.

•  Introduced major reforms freeing the media and decentralizing power to the provinces.

•  Ended the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, thus removing a major scar on the country’s international image.

•  As a further reflection of this concerted effort to end Indonesia’s marginal role and to acquire greater legitimacy he ratified six major UN conventions – including the Convention against Torture and that for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination – as well as four conventions of workers rights.

Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) (October 1999 – July 2001)

•  The former leader of the largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, he symbolized a particular moderate approach to the Muslim world.

•  As such he gave legitimacy to the ideal a secular Indonesia at a time when, linked to the dismantling of the repressive apparatus of Suharto, inter-ethnic conflict with a strong religious (Muslim vs Christian) connotation was particularly rife.

•  With strong echoes of the pan-Asianism of Bandung he proposed on a visit to Delhi the creation of a triangular partnership between Indonesia, India and China.

•  Considered an expression of his erratic behaviour this idea was not taken up.

Megawati Sukarnoputri (July 2001 – October 2004)

•  The daughter of Indonesia’s first president had to deal with the aftermath of 9/11 and the Bali bombings (2002).

•  Avoided joining a US led war on terrorism, while accepting US and Australian assistance for dealing with home grown terrorism as an exercise in policing and education.

•  Political Islam, however, became more influential in the Indonesian foreign policy agenda, partly as a response to domestic pressure.

•  As did a stress on supporting democratisation within ASEAN, an element that became more pronounced with her successor.

•  However an initiative in May 2003 to set up an ASEAN Peace Centre and an ASEAN intervention force failed to be supported by other ASEAN members.

A resilient Indonesia’s(?) renewed confidence as a global actor (Photo source: Official portrait of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2004-2014)

“We are a proud nation who cherish our independence and national unity. We are the fourth most populous nation in the world. We are home to the world’s largest Muslim population. We are the world’s third largest democracy. We are also a country where democracy, Islam and modernity go hand-in-hand. We will stay our course with ASEAN as the cornerstone of our foreign policy”

(Speech before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs, 19 May 2005, quoted in Murphy (2012:88)

Greater confidence, international legitimisation and national – and regional - resilience n  Multiplication of foreign relations actors with the downgrading of the

military role (although SBY and many of his ministers are ex-generals), strengthening of the DEPLU (the Foreign Ministry) and a greater influence of civil society actors.

n  Reclaiming Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN, by taking the ‘moral high ground’.

n  E.g. by promoting a more critical approach to the Burmese junta (constructive engagement)

n  Mediating role in the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute. n  Promotion of a the Political-Security Community as one of the three

communities within the 2008 ASEAN Charter (the other two are economic and socio-cultural)

n  Frustrated attempt to create an ASEAN Human Rights Commission with coercive powers. Opposed by the more authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaderships of the other member states.

Achieving BRI(I)Cdom? SBY as global statesman, global salesman

With the US’ ‘first Pacific president’, Barack Obama, a relatively popular figure in Indonesia having spent part of his childhood in Jakarta with his anthropologist mother

Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy welcomes SBY at the G20 Summit in Cannes, 3rd-4th November 2011.

Indonesia’s regional and global normative agenda today: « Dynamic equilibrium » n  Developed by the non-Javanese Marty

Natalegawa (BSc, LSE; M Phil, Cambridge; PhD, ANU), Foreign Minister since Oct. 2009.

n  Articulated late 2010 initially for a foreign audience in the language of IR.

n  In a recent speech (2013) has argued that the Indo-Pacific faces three challenges: a ‘trust-deficit’; unresolved territorial claims; managing the impact of change.

n  Therefore a new paradigm is required: « A dynamic equilibrium … is marked by an absence of a preponderant power not through the rigidity, rivalry and tensions common to the pursuit of a balance of power model. Instead through the promotion of a sense of common responsibility in the endeavour to maintain the regions peace and stability » (p.5)

Source: Amitav Acharya, Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power, Singapore: World Scientific, 2015, p. 15.

Source: Amitav Acharya, Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power, Singapore: World Scientific, 2015, p. 16

Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi’s) inauguration as President of Indonesia, 22nd October 2014

Source: Nikkei Asian Review 7.11.2014

The Jokowi Presidency: Initial Impressions n  To be completed

Conclusions n  This brief and, by necessity simplified, overview has stressed a great many of

the continuities in Indonesia’s foreign relations actorness since independence. n  As Kivaimaki (2003) has argued Indonesia has been highly successful in

preserving and extending its sovereignty and in maintaining the regional hegemon (the US) at a distance.

n  Internally the sense of vulnerability of the decolonisation and Cold War period and fears of national disintegration have greatly diminished (despite occasional inter-ethnic tensions). The post Reformasi decentralisation that has accompanied democratisation would seem to express a heightened degree of national-cohesion.

n  Multilateralism has comforted Indonesian sovereignty (e.g. Wawasan Nusantara) and, since Bandung, has provided platforms for the promotion of a regional role.

n  The evolving norms articulated by political leaders over the last 70 years have defined Southeast Asia as a security community.

n  First indications are that the newly elected President, Joko Widodo and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry are continuing a normative approach although it is too early to judge the impact within ASEAN

Exhaustive bibliography

n  Acharya, Amitav (2014a) Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics, Whose IR?, London: Routledge. n  ---------------------- (2014b) “Remaking Southeast Asian Studies: Doubt, Desire and the Promise of Comparisons”, Pacific

Affairs 87 (3): 463-483. n  ----------------------- (2015), Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power, Singapore: World Scientific. n  Ahmad Fauzi, Abdul Hamid (2012) “Religion, secularism and state in Southeast Asia” in Arlene Tickner & David Blaney

(eds), Thinking International Relations Differently, London: Routledge, pp. 253-274. n  Alatas, Ali (2001), A Voice for a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches of Ali Alatas, Jakarta: PT Gramedia. n  Alles, Delphine (2013) “Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sino-américaine”, Politique étrangère

2013/4: 175-185. n  ------------------------------- (forthcoming 2015), Transnational Islamic Actors and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Transcending

the State, London: Routledge. n  Anak Agung, Banyu Perwita (2007), Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of

Soeharto and Beyond, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press.. n  Anderson, Benedict (1990), Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca NY: Cornell University

Press. n  Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (1994), Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies. n  --------------------------- (1998) “Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian

Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 477-512. n  --------------------------- (2010) “The Impact of Domestic and Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy”, Southeast

Asian Affairs: 126-141.

n  -------------------------- (2013) “Indonesia: Building Norms and Consensus on the World Stage”, Global Asia 8 (4): 8-12. n  Ba, Alice (2009), (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations, Stanford CA: Stanford University, Press. n  ------------- (2014) “Outside-in and inside-out: political ideology, the English School and East Asia” in Barry Buzan &

Yongjin Zhang (eds), Contesting International Society in East Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 119-143. n  Bland, Ben (2013) “Indonesia wins new friends as regional power game heats up”, Financial Times, 3 October. n  Boyd, David & Dosch, Jörn (2011) “Securitisation practices in Indonesia and the Philippines and their impact on the

management and security challenges in ASEAN and the ARF” in Jurgen Haacke & Noel Morada (eds), Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, London: Routledge, pp.

n  Bresnan, John (1999) “Indonesia” in Robert Chase; Emily Hill & Paul Kennedy (eds), The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, New York: W.H. Norton, pp. 15-39.

n  Brewster, David (2011) “The Relationship between India and Indonesia”, Asian Survey 51(2): 221-244. n  Butcher, John (2009) “ Becoming an Archipelagic State: the Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the ‘Struggle’ to Gain

International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle” in Robert Cribb & Michelle Ford (eds), Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 28-48.

n  Camroux, David (2013) ‘Engaging Indonesia’, Brief n° 34, September, European Union Institute of Security Studies (accessible at www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_01.pdf)

n  ---------------------- & Srikandini, Annisa (2013) “EU-Indonesia Relations: No Expectations-Capability Gap?” in Thomas Christiansen, Emil Kirchner & Philomena Murray (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 554-570.

n  Capie, David (2013) “Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence Diplomacy”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35 (1): 1-26.

n  Chandra, Alexander (2008), Indonesia and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Nationalists and Regional Integration Strategy, Lanham MD: Lexington Books.

n  Chatterjee Miller, Manjari (2013) Wronged by Empire : Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China, Stanford CA : Stanford University Press.

n  Chong, Ja Ian (2012) External Intervention and the Politics of State Formation: China, Indonesia and Thailand, 1893-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 7.

n  Ciorciari, John (2010) The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

n  Clapton, William & Hameiri, Shahar (2012) “The domestic politics of international hierarchy: Risk management and the reconstruction of international society”, International Politics 49 (1): 59-77.

n  Clark, Marshall (2011) “Indonesia’s Postcolonial Regional Imaginary: From a ‘Neutralist’ to an‘All-Directions’ Foreign Policy”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 12(2): 287-304.

n  --------------------- & Pietsch, Juliet (2014) Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Cultural heritage, politics and labour migration, London: Routledge.

n  Connelly, Aaron (2014) “Indonesian foreign policy under President Jokowi”, Lowy Institute Analysis, October. n  Cooper, Andrew; Higgott, Richard & Nossal, Kim (1993), Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing

World Order, Vancouver BC: UBC Press / Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. n  Darmosumarto, Santo (2011) “Overcoming Challenges to Indonesian Foreign Policy towards China”, Global & Strategy 5(2)

159-167. n  David, Steven (1991) “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics 43 (2): 233-256.

n  Denmark, Abraham; Sukma, Rizal & Parthemore, Christine (2010) Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Kind of US-Indonesia Relations, Washington DC: Center for a New American Security.

n  de Borja, Marciano (2014) The State Department Boys: Philippine Diplomacy and its American Heritage, ????: Vellum. n  Djalal, Hasjim (2012), “Indonesia’s maritime challenges and priorities” in Johua Ho & Sam Bateman (eds), Maritime

Challenges and Priorities in Asia: Implications for Regional Security, London: Routledge, pp. 61-71. n  Egreteau, Renaud & Jagan, Larry (2013) Soldiers and Diplomacy: in Burma: Understanding the Foreign Relations of the

Burmese Praetorian State, Singapore: Singapore University Press. n  Emmers, Ralph (2005) “Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesia and

Vietnam”, Asian Survey 45 (4): 645-665. n  -------------------- (2014) “Indonesia’s role in ASEAN: A case of incomplete and sectorial leadership”, The Pacific Review 27

(4): 543-562. n  Fealy, Greg (2014) “’Look Over Here!’: Indonesian Responses to the Arab Spring” in Amin Saikal & Amitav Acharya (eds),

Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia: Social Protest and Authoritarian Rule after the Arab Spring, London: I.B. Taurus, pp. 233-247.

n  Febrica, Senia (2010) Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia”, Asian Survey 50 (3): 569-590.

n  Felker, Greg (2008) “Southeast Asia and Globalization: the Political Economy of Illiberal Adaptation” in Erik Kuhonta, Dan Slater & Tuong Vu (eds), Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region and Qualitative Analysis, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 274-301.

n  Fontaine, Richard & Kilman, Daniel (2013) “International Order and Global Swing States”, Washington Quarterly, 36 (1): 93-109

n  Geertz, Clifford (1980) Negara: the Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press” n  -------------------- (2007 {1972) “Afterword: The Politics of Meaning” in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia,

Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (reprint of the 1972 edition: Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 319-336. n  Goh, Evelyn (2013) The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post Cold-War East Asia, Oxford:

Oxford University Press. n  ---------------- (2015) “Evaluating Southeast Asian responses to China’s rise: the vital context of managing great power

resurgence” in Mingjiang Li & Kaylan Kemburi (eds), China’s Power and Asian Security, London: Routledge, pp. 199-213. n  Graham, Duncan (2009) “Hassan Wirajuda: Keeping his cool”, Jakarta Post, 19th August. n  Habir, Ahmad et al (2014) “Normative priorities and contradictions in Indonesia’s foreign policy: From Wawasan Nusantara

to democracy”, National Security College Issue Brief n°7, May (accessed at www.nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article7.pdf)

n  Hadi, Syamsul (2012) “Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of China: Indonesia in the Midst of East Asia’s Dynamics in the Post-Global Crisis World”, International Journal of China Studies 3 (2): 151-166.

n  Hadi, Vedi (2010), Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

n  --------------- & Robison, Richard (2004), Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of Markets, London: Routledge.

n  Haftel, Yoram (2010) “Conflict, Regional Cooperation, and Foreign Capital: Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Formation of ASEAN”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 6: 87-106.

n  Hamilton-Hart, Natasha (2009) “Indonesia and Singapore: Structure, Politics and Interests”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 31 (2): 249-271.

n  ------------------------------ (2012) Hard Interests, Soft Illusions: Southeast Asia and American Power, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

n  Hatta Mohammad (1953) “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs 31 (3): 441-452. n  ------------------------ (1958) “Indonesia Between the Power Blocs”, Foreign Affairs 36 (3): 480-490 n  ----------------------- (1972) Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings, The Hague: Mouton Publishing. n  He Kai (2008) “Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: international pressure, democratization, and policy change”

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (1): 47-72. n  ----------- (2015) “Facing the challenges: ASEAN’s institutional responses to China’s rise” in Mingjiang Li & Kaylan

Kemburi (eds), China’s Power and Asian Security, London: Routledge, pp. 181-198.. n  Hermawan, Yulius et al (2011) The Role of Indonesia in the G-2O: Background, Role and Objectives of Indonesia’s

Membership, Jakarta: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Indonesia Office. (accessed at: <http://ibrary.fes.de/pdf-files/brreros/indonesian/08365.pdf).

n  Horesh, Niv & Kavalski, Emilian (eds) (2014), Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations, Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmilllan.

n  Horowitz, Donald (2013) Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. n  Hourn, Kao Kim (2000) Asean’s Non-Interference Policy: Principles under Pressure?, London: ASEAN Academic Press. n  Jackson, Karl (1978) “The Political implications of Structure and culture in Indonesia” in Karl Jackson & Lucian Pye (eds),

Political Power and Communication in Indonesia, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, pp.23-42. n  Jalan Perubahan untuk Indonesia yang Berdaulat, Mandiri dan Berkepribadian (2014) Visi Misi, Dan Program Aksi, Jokowi-

Jusuf Kalla 2014, Jakarta, May n  Jeese, Neal et al (2012) “The Leader Can’t Lead when the followers Won’t Follow: The Limitations of Hegemony” in Kristen

Williams, Steven Lobell & Neal Jesse (eds), Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow or Challenge, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 1-30.

n  Jones, David Martin, Khoo, Nicholas & Smith, M.L.R. (2013) Asian Security and the Rise of China, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar

n  Jones, Lee (2012), ASEAN: Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan. n  Keyser, Donald & Shin Gi-Wook (2013), “Introduction, Asia’s Middle Powers: South Korea and Vietnam” in Joon-Woo

Park, Gi-Wook Shin & Donald Keyser (eds), Asia’s Middle Powers? The Identity and Regional Policy of South Korea and Vietnam, Stanford CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, pp. 1-28.

n  Khadijah Md Khalib & Shakila Yacob (2012) “Managing Malaysia-Indonesia relations in the context of democratization: the emergence of non-state actors” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12 (3): 355-387.

n  Khalik, Abdul (2009) “’Hassan’s boys’ shape RI’s current diplomacy”, Jakarta Post, 12th October. n  ------------------ & Haswidi, Andi (2011) “Indonesia’s soft power vibrates through others”, Jakarta Post, 17th January. n  Kivimaki, Timo (2003) US-Indonesia Hegemonic Bargaining: Strength of Weakness, Aldershot UK: Ashgate. n  Laksmana, Evan (2011), “Indonesia’s Rising Regional Role and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia 33 (2): 157-182. n  Lanti, Irman (2009) “Indonesia in triangular relations with China and the United States” in Evelyn Goh & Sheldon Simon

(eds), China, the United States and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security and Economics, London: Routledge, pp. 128-142.

n  Leifer, Michael (2013 {1983}) Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge (reprint of the 1983 edition London: Allen & Unwin).

n  Little, Richard (2014) “Conclusion: Eurocentrism, world history, meta-narratives and the meeting of international societies” in Shogo Suzuki, Yongjin Zhang & Joel Quirk (eds) International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West, London: Routledge, pp. 159-180.

n  Liu Hong (2011) China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965, Singapore: National University of Singapore Press / Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.

n  Malik, Adam (1968) “Promise in Indonesia”, Foreign Affairs 46 (2): 292-303. n  McDonald, Hamish (2014), Demokrasi: Indonesia in the 21st Century, Collingwood VIC: Black Inc. n  McRae, Dave (2013) “Indonesian politics in 2013: the emergence of new leadership?”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic

Studies 49 (3): 289-304. n  ------------------ (2014) “More Talk than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor”, Lowy Institute Analyses, February

(accessed at www.lowyinstitute.org/files/ mcrae_more_talk_web_0.pd n  Mietzner, Marcus (2011) “The political marginalization of the military in Indonesia” in Marcus Mietzner (ed.) The Political

Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, pp. 126-147 n  Moertono, Soemarsaid (2009 {1968}) State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th

Century, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (reprint of the 1968 edition: Ithaca NY: Cornell University). n  Murphy, Ann Marie (2012) “Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy: Implications for the United States”, Asia

Policy, 13, January: 85-111. (accessed at http://asiapolicy.nb.,org) n  -------------------------- (2014) “Indonesia’s Partnership with the United States: Strategic Imperatives Versus Domestic

Obstacles” in Ashley Tellis, Abraham Denmark & Greg Chaffin (eds), U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power (Strategic Asia 2014-15), Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 197-224.

n  Nabbs-Keller, Greta (2011) “Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence: The Strategic Implications of Closer-Indonesia-China Relations”, Security Challenges 7 (3):23-41.

n  --------------------------- (2013) “Reforming Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization and Leadership”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35 (1): 56-82.

n  Nabers, Dirk (2010) “Power, leadership, and hegemony in international politics: the case of East Asia”, Review of International Studies 36: 931-949.

n  Natalegawa, Marty (2013) “An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific” Keynote address at the CSIS Conference on Indonesia, 16th May (accessed at www.csis.org/files/attachments/130516)

n  Nolte, Detlef (2011) “Regional powers and regional governance” in Nadine Godehardt & Dirk Nabers (eds), Regional Powers and Regional Orders, London: Routledge, pp. 49-67.

n  Novotny, Daniel (2010) Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

n  Osius, Ted (2014) “Global Swing States: Deepening Partnerships with India and Indonesia”, Asia Policy 17: 1-24. n  Pham Quang Minh (2013) “East Asia and the Pacific: The Regional Roles of Vietnam and South Korea” in Joon-Woo Park,

Gi-Wook Shin & Donald Keyser (eds), Asia’s Middle Powers? The Identity and Regional Policy of South Korea and Vietnam, Stanford CA: Walter A. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, pp. 73-98.

n  Ping, Jonathan H. (2005) Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia Pacific, Aldershot UK: Ashgate. n  Prasad, M. Nagendra (2001) Indonesia’s Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem, Aldershot UK: Ashgate. n  Quayle, Linda (2013), Southeast Asia and the English School of International Relations: A Region-Theory Dialogue,

Basingstoke UK:Palgrave Macmillan. n  Reid, Anthony (ed.) (2012) Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Singapore: Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies. n  ------------------ & Zheng Yangwen (eds) (2009), Negotiating Aysmmetry: China’s Place in Asia, Singapore: National

University of Singapore Press. n  Reinhardt, Jon (1971) Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia, New Haven CT: Yale University

Southeast Asian Studies. n  Rieffel, Lex & Pramodhawardani, Jaleswari (2006) Out of Business and on Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in

Indonesia, Washington DC: Brookings Institution. n  Rother, Stefan (2012) “Wendt meets East: ASEAN cultures of conflict and cooperation”, Cooperation and Conflict 47 (1):

49-67.

n  Ruland, Jurgen (2009) “Deepening ASEAN cooperation through democratization? The Indonesian legislature and foreign policymaking” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9

n  3): 373-402 n  Rush, James (2014) “Sukarno, Anticipating an Asian Century” in Ramachandra Guha (ed.), Makers of Modern Asia,

Cambridge MS: Harvard University Press, pp. 172-198. n  Sebastian, Leonard (2006a) Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies. n  ----------------------- (2006b) “Domestic security priorities, ‘balance of interests’ and Indonesia’s management of regional

order” in Joseph Chinyong Liow & Ralf Emmers (eds), Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer, London: Routledge, pp. 175-195.

n  ------------------------ (2013) “Indonesia’s Dynamic Equilibrium and ASEAN Centrality”, unpiblished paper (assessed at www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2013/E-01.pdf)

n  ----------------------- & Lanti, Irman (2010) “Perceiving Indonesian approaches to international relations theory” in Amitav Acharya & Barry Buzan (eds), Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, London: Routledge, pp. 148-173.

n  Sheikh, Naveed (2003) The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic foreign policy in a world of states, London: Routledge. n  Slater, Dan (2010) Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. n  Sukarno (1998 {1946}), “‘The Birth of Pancasila’. Extract from speech given on 1 June 1946” in Clive Christie, Southeast

Asia in the Twentieth Century: A Reader, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 131-139. n  Sukma, Rizal (1999) Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship, London: Routledge. n  ---------------- (2003), Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, London: Routledge. n  ---------------- (2009) “Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Reengagement”, Asian Survey 49(4): 591-608.

n  ----------------- (2011a) “Indonesia Finds a New Voice”, Journal of Democracy 22 (4): 110-123. n  ---------------- (2011b), “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: The Case of Indonesia” in Sook Jong Lee & Jan Melissen (eds),

Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 91-115. n  Suryadinata, Leo (1996) Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership, Singapore: Times

Academic Press. n  Suryodinigrat, Meidyatama (2007) “Soft power needs hard thinking to get results”, Jakarta Post, 21st March. n  ------------------------------------ (2009), “Marty’s diplomacy: Same principles, new taglines”, Jakarta Post, 22nd July. n  Tan, Paige Johnson (2007) “Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia’s Worldview and Foreign Policy”, Asian Perspective

31(3): 147-181. n  Tan See Sang (2014) “Indonesia among the powers: Should ASEAN still ammtter to Indonesia”, National Security College

Issue Brief n°14, May (accessed at www.nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article14.pdf) n  Taylor, Jean Gilman (2013) Global Indonesia, London: Routledge. n  Thayer, Carlyle (2013) “New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?”, National Bureau of Asia

Research Commentary, 9th October (accessed at: www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/outreach/thayer_commentary_100913.pdf n  Tjhin, Christine (2011) “Indonesia’s Perceptions of the ‘China Threat’: From ‘Yellow Threat from the North’ to ‘Strategic

Partner” in Herbert Yee (ed.) China’s Rise – Threat or Opportunity, London: Routledge, pp. 191-211. n  ------------------------ (2012) “Two giants are Better than One? Indonesia’s Relations with China and Japan in Lam Peng Er &

Victor Teo (eds), Southeast Asia between China and Japan, Newcastle upon Tyne UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 98-122.

n  Umar, Ahmad Rizky Mardhatilah (2011) “A critical reading of the ‘Natalegawa doctrine’”, Jakarta Post, 7th January. n  Vaughn, Bruce (2011) “Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics and U.S. Interests”, Congressional Research

Service Report n  Vu, Tuong (2010) Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China and Indonesia, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. n  Wada Haruki (2015) “Historical legacies and regional integration” in Kimie Hara (ed.), The San Francisco System and its

Legacies, London: Routledge:, pp. 252-263. n  Wanandi, Jusuf (1994)”Security issues in the ASEAN region” in Karl Jackson & Hadi Soesastro (eds) ASEAN Security and

Economic Development, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, pp.297-308. n  -------------------- (2012) Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing. n  Weinstein, Franklin (2007{1976}) Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto,

Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (reprint of the 1976 edition: Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press). n  Wilson, Dick (1975) The Neutralization of Southeast Asia, New York: Praeger. n  Young, Oran (1991) “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International

Society”, International Organization 45 (3): 281-308. n  Yudhoyono, Susio Bambang (2009) “’Towards Harmony Among Civilizations’, Speech by SBY at the John F. Kennedy

School of Government, Harvard University”, Boston 29th September (accessed at www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2009)