Índice & Introducción & Yengoyan - Evolutionary Theory in Ethnological Perspectives (Abbyy)

This monograph was published with the support of the Envi-ronment and Policy Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii

1991 by the Regents of The University of Michigan The Museum of Anthropology All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN 0-915703-23-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Profiles in cultural evolution : papers from a conference in honor of Elman R. Service /edited by A. Terry Rambo and Kathleen Gillogly.

p. cm. (Anthropological papers / Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan ; no. 85)

Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-915703-23-8 (pbk. : acid free) : $20.00 1. Social evolutionCongresses. 2. EthnologySouth AmericaCongresses. 3.

EthnologyAsia, SoutheasternCongresses. 4. Human ecologySouth America Congresses. 5. Human ecologyAsia, SoutheasternCongresses. 6. Service, Elman Rogers, 1915- . I. Service, Elman Rogers, 1915- . I I . Rambo, A. Terry. III . Gillogly, Kathleen. IV. Series: Anthropological papers (University of Michigan. Museum of Anthropology) ; no. 85. GN2.M5 no. 85 [GN360] 305.8dc20 90-25676

CIP

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the ANSI Standard Z39.48-1984 (Permanence of Paper)

Contents

List of Figures, vii

List of Tables, viii

Foreword, xi HENRY T. WRIGHT

Introduction, xiii A. TERRY RAMBO, KATHLEEN GILLOGLY, KARL L. HUTTERER, AND JEFFREY R. PARSONS

List of Conference Participants, xvii

1. Evolutionary Theory in Ethnological Perspectives, 3 ARAM A. YENGOYAN

2. The Study of Cultural Evolution, 23 A. TERRY RAMBO

II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES IN TROPICAL SOUTH AMERICA

3. Cultural Evolution, Human Ecology, and Empirical Research, 113 ROBERT D. DRENNAN

4. Coevolution and the Development of Venezuelan Chiefdoms, 137 CHARLES S. SPENCER

5. The Nature of the Chiefdom as Revealed by Evidence from the Cauca Valley of Colombia, 167

ROBERT L. CARNEIRO

iii

6. Cultural Evolution in Amazonia, 191 BETTY J. MEGGERS

III. STAGE SEQUENCES AND THE DIRECTIONALITY OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION

7. Losing Track of the Tribes: Evolutionary Sequences in Southeast Asia, 219

KARL L. HUTTERER

8. The Diversity and Cultural Evolutionary Trajectories of Philippine "Negrito" Populations, 247

JAMES F. EDER

9. Technological Complexity, Ecological Diversity, and Fire Regimes in Northern Australia: Hunter-Gatherer, Cowboy, Ranger, 261

HENRY T. LEWIS

IV. THE QUEST FOR PRIME MOVERS IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION

10. Energy and the Evolution of Culture: A Reassessment of White's Law, 291

A. TERRY RAMBO

11. Social Integration and Energy Utilization: An Analysis of the Kubu Suku Terasing of Indonesia and the Temuan Orang Asli of Malaysia, 311

ALI M.A. RACHMAN

12. Esoteric Knowledge, Geographical Distance, and the Elaboration of Leadership Status: Dynamics of Resource Control, 333

MARY W. HELMS

V. DIVERSITY AND CHANGE

13. Similarities and Differences in Lifestyles in the Central Cordillera of Northern Luzon, Philippines, 353

JULES DE RAEDT

iv

14. The Development of Kinship in Tropical South America, 373 GERTRUDE E. DOLE

15. Social Ecology of Thai Peasant Society: The Impact of Larger and External Social Relations (1850-1950), 405

OPART PANYA

16. Ethnic Groups in Transition and Some of Their Impacts on the Hinterland Environments of Southeast Asia: Are There Lessons to Be Learned?, 429

PERCY E. SAJISE

V

Elman R. Service

Foreword Henry T. Wright, Director Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan

Almost three decades ago, in the autumn of 1961, a single event set the direction of my future research interests. I was one of the fortunate undergraduates who was able to register for Elman Service's course on primitive social organization. We students may have thought that we were to learn about the general principles of cultural evolution, the broad ideas discussed in a book Service had recently edited with Mar-shall Sahlins, Evolution and Culture (1960).

With the gentlest of smiles, Service quickly disabused us of this notion. If we were interested in such generalities we could read that volume or his forthcoming book, Primitive Social Organization (1962). In our course, Service would provide only a general introduction to this body of theory. If, however, we had any intention of mastering such ideas, evaluating them with the evidence of the ethnographic record, and contributing to the growth of the evolutionary perspective in anthro-pology, our most important task was to begin to master the ethnographic record. Therefore, each of us would be expected to read in depth the ethnography of four groups, ranging from hunting and gathering bands to simple states.

With all the self-confidence of the average Sophomore, I dove into the task, reading everything I could find on the Yaghan of Tierra del Fuego, and keeping detailed notes on file cards. By the time I had begun to wade though the sources on my fourth group, the Lozi of Central Africa, I had learned three things which I have no doubt Service wanted us to learn. First, the "ethnographic record" was a collection of unsystematic interpretations, with few sources that presented coherent accounts of what people actually said and did. Second, even the largely anecdotal information available on one community or group was so com-plex that it was not possible to "master" it in a few weeks or months. Third, all of these societies had been decimated by new diseases or "pacified" by colonial forces. They were no longer in full control of their own productive resources or responsible for their own defense, and one

xi

could assume that sociopolitcal structures had changed in response to these changes.

My experience with Service left me with an enduring interest in the evolution of chiefdoms and states, a belief that general explanations of such evolution would have to be tested with specific case materials, and a conviction that archeology and ethnohistory would provide the most secure evidence for evaluating evolutionary models. Many of my ideas have changed, but the interests and convictions are still important to me. I owe them in large part to Elman Service, and am very grateful that the editors have invited me to make this small introductory contri-bution to this book. Indeed, many of my colleagues at the Museum of Anthropology owe such debts to Service, and all of us at the Museum feel privileged to be able to bring this collection of papers out as one of our Anthropological Papers.

The reader will note that this is not a festschrift composed of small items that former students had been intending to publish somewhere. It is true that some contributors are former students, but others are the students of students or colleagues, and some have no formal relation with Elman Service at all. What unites these papers is their relevance to the present state of research on some of the many issues on which Service himself has written so cogently. For the most part, they are a complementary set of studies, emphasizing the diversity of thought and the ongoing spirit of healthy conflict within cultural evolutionary stud-ies. Thus, The first two papers deal with general theoretical issues, Yengoyan specifically on some of Service's constructions and Rambo on some strengths and weaknesses of recent cultural evolutionary thought. The next four papers (Chapters 3-6) deal with case studies from lowland South America, all based on new approaches in ar-cheology or ethnohistory, each providing new insight into aspects of the development and operation of chiefdoms. The next five papers ( Chap-ters 711) present similar case studies from Southeast Asia and the Pacific, all based primarily on ethnographic studies and providing in-sight into foragers or village agriculturalists. The final set of five papers (Chapters 1216) are in various ways explicitly comparative, the authors varying widely in the success which they claim for this ap-proach.

xii

Introduction

Elman R. Service has been one of the major influences on the post-World War II development of American anthropology. His contributions to cultural evolutionary theory have been especially significant. As Aram Yengoyan observes in the first chapter of this volume, the organi-zation of many introductory anthropology textbooks today reflects Ser-vice's thinking about cultural evolutionary stages. His ideas about the evolution of social organization also continue to guide much archeologi-cal research, an influence that is exemplified in several of the chapters in this volume.

In recent years, however, Service has been in eclipse in his own field of ethnology. This reflects the general turn away from evolutionary con-cerns in cultural anthropology in the 1970s and early 1980s. The study of evolution came to be regarded by many ethnologists as somewhat passe, a topic fit perhaps for archeologists and physical anthropologists, but no longer worthy of the attention of those who considered themselves to be cutting-edge thinkers. This may in part be attributed to the fad-dishness that sometimes characterizes the discipline, but it also re-flected the recognition that evolutionism had, by the mid-1960s, come to be a speculative and rather sterile field of inquiry, bogged down in endless arguments about the number of stages that separated Paleolithic hunters from the modern nation-state, and whether population increase was the cause or the consequence of the Agricultural Revolution. Since it appeared unlikely that ethnologists, unlike archeologists, could an-swer any of these questions, their attention turned to other concerns. Cultural evolutionism was not rejected out of hand, as it had been during the Boasian ascendancy; it simply was dropped off the research agenda.

Curiously, however, the questions that have long engaged cultural evolutionists have continued to arise anew. In part, this stemmed from the attention being paid to sociobiology and its claims to represent a genuinely Darwinian approach to cultural evolution. The evident steril-ity of functionalist explanations in human ecology, and the growing recognition that knowledge of history was an essential aspect of under-standing contemporary cultural adaptations, also tended to direct atten-

xiii

tion back to evolutionary concerns. By the mid-1980s there were signs that evolutionary questions were again being seriously addressed from within mainstream cultural anthropology.

It seemed, therefore, to be an especially appropriate time to organize a conference in honor of Elman R. Service. Held at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in August of 1986, the conference was attended by more than 20 scholars concerned with the study of cultural evolution (a list of participants follows this Introduction). Participants included Service's former colleagues, students, students of students, as well as scholars not directly influenced by Service but working within the gen-eral framework of cultural evolutionism. The stated goal of the confer-ence was to explore the relationship of ecology and cultural evolution, especially with regard to societies found in tropical habitats in Asia and the New World.

As it turned out, most of the papers emphasized questions of cultural evolution to a much greater extent than those of ecology. Many of the cases considered were in the tropics but tropical ecology, in the strict sense of the term, did not emerge as a major theme. Consequently, we have decided to give the title Profiles in Cultural Evolution to this volume of selected and revised papers, thus more accurately reflecting its contents. A strong ecological flavor characterizes many of the chap-ters, however, reflecting the original orientation of the conference to-ward problems of human ecology.

It should be evident to the reader that neither the contributors to this volume nor its editors share a monolithic view of the nature of cultural evolution. This is, in our view, a strength rather than a weakness. It is a reflection of the fact that all of the contributions in this volume repre-sent work in progress rather than final conclusions. This is wholly ap-propriate to the evolutionary theme with which they are all concerned. The study of cultural evolution, like evolution itself, is an ongoing process. Fixed conclusions are as vulnerable to extinction as fixed spe-cies. What contributors to this volume do share is the conviction that evolutionary questions are important in the study of culture and that cultural evolution is deserving of serious attention from anthropologists and other social scientists.

The diversity of viewpoints and topics represented in the papers has made this a difficult volume to organize in a neat and logical fashion. The approach finally adopted is somewhat of a compromise, in part grouping papers by type of evolutionary question addressed, in part by geographical focus.

Part I presents a background on the study of cultural evolution. Chapter 1 is an assessment of Elman Service's contributions to anthro-pology. We are grateful to Aram Yengoyan for accepting our post-con-

xiv

ference request to write this chapter. Although Yengoyan is a friend and former colleague of Service's, we feel that he has provided an insightful and eminently fair appraisal of Service's work, one that gives full credit for his contributions but avoids hagiography.

The second chapter, also written especially for this volume, is an extended review of major issues in the study of cultural evolution. In it Terry Rambo delineates different conceptual approaches to evolutionary research and suggests where the subsequent chapters in the present volume fit into this framework. Although presented as an introductory chapter, it is also intended to represent conclusions derived from this conference and to suggest some possible directions for future research.

The 14 conference papers are grouped into four parts. Part II pre-sents four chapters dealing with the evolution of complex societies in the tropics of South America. Chapter 3 by Robert Drennan suggests a theoretical framework and methodological approach for archeological research on chiefdoms in Colombia. Charles Spencer describes in Chap-ter 4 his ongoing research on interactions between chiefdoms and neigh-boring tribal societies in Colombia. Robert Carneiro reviews historical accounts of chiefdoms in the Cauca Valley of Colombia in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, Betty Meggers discusses cultural adaptation to the tropi-cal rain forest in Amazonia, suggesting that this environment was much less stable than previously believed.

Part III includes three chapters discussing stage sequences and direc-tionality in cultural evolution. In Chapter 7 Karl Hutterer reviews evi-dence for the existence of tribes as a distinct evolutionary stage in Southeast Asia and concludes that all such formations were secondary responses to intrusion of states into the region. James Eder, in Chapter 8, questions the applicability of conventional assumptions about the directionality of cultural evolution to Philippine Negrito groups, suggest-ing that each of these groups is following a different trajectory of change. Henry Lewis compares in Chapter 9 the systems of knowledge about fire ecology of Australian Aborigines, cowboys, and park rangers and concludes that the Aborigines have a more highly developed system than do the representatives of more complex evolutionary stages.

The three chapters making up Part IV examine the role of prime movers in cultural evolution. Leslie White's law that cultural evolution is the result of increased capture of energy is subject to empirical test in Chapter 10 by Terry Rambo. His conclusion that energy is not the prime mover of cultural evolution is supported by Ali Rachman's pres-entation in Chapter 11 of data on energy use by Kubu bands and Temuan tribes in Sumatra and Malaysia. In Chapter 12 Mary Helms discusses long-distance travel as a factor in elite power in complex societies. She suggests that differential access to knowledge may be as

XV

important as control over material resources in the emergence of a strati-fied society.

Part V has four chapters on diversity and change. Chapter 13 by Jules De Raedt describes the great cultural diversity characterizing the indigenous societies of the Cordillera in the Philippines. Gertrude Dole describes the many different systems of kinship of aboriginal groups in Amazonia in Chapter 14. In Chapter 15 Opart Panya examines the changing environment confronted by Thai peasants. He concludes that social selective factors have been more important than ecological ones in shaping of modern Thai peasant society. Percy Sajise, in Chapter 16, explores the impact of cultural evolution on the natural environment in Southeast Asia, suggesting that adaptation is a continuous process in which social sustainability is increasingly problematic.

Acknowledgments

Most of the funding for the conference was provided by the Environment and Policy Institute, East-West Center. Additional support came from the University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology and the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies.

Support for the editing of this volume was provided by the East-West Center. The editors especially thank Helen Takeuchi for her rigorous and meticulous editing job. Her skill and care are, as always, gready appreciated. Marilyn Li and Regina Gregory assisted in checking references and providing the logistical support needed to electroni-cally edit and transfer chapters across the continent.

Neil Jamieson, then a Fellow at EAPI, assisted in organizing and running the confer-ence and did the initial editorial work on several chapters in this volume.

The editors thank the contributors for the patience they have displayed while waiting for publication of this volume. Over this interval, all of the chapters have been revised at least once, most in 1988 and a few as recently as mid-1989.

A. Terry Rambo Kathleen Gillogly

Karl L. Hutterer Jeffrey R. Parsons

Honolulu and Ann Arbor April 1990

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CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Ms. Elisabeth A. Bacus Museum of Anthropology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Robert L. Carneiro Department of Anthropology American Museum of Natural

History Central Park West at 79th Street New York, NY 10024-5192

Dr. Jules De Raedt Division of Social Sciences University of the Philippines,

College Baguio Baguio City, Philippines 0201

Dr. Gertrude E. Dole Department of Anthropology American Museum of Natural

History Central Park West at 79th Street New York, NY 10024-5192

Dr. Robert D. Drennan Department of Anthropology Faculty of Arts and Sciences University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Dr. James F. Eder Department of Anthropology Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287

Dr. Richard I. Ford Museum of Anthropology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Ms. Kathleen Gillogly Department of Anthropology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Christian Guksch Schuberstrasse 31 6901 Bammental West Germany

Dr. Mary W. Helms Department of Anthropology University of North Carolina Greensboro, NC 27412-5001

Dr. Karl L. Hutterer Museum of Anthropology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Neil Jamieson Route 1, Box 61 Callao, VA 22435

Dr. Henry T. Lewis Department of Anthropology University of Alberta 13-15 HM Tory Building Edmonton, Canada T6G 2H4

xvii

Dr. Frank B. Livingstone Department of Anthropology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Robert McKinley Department of Anthropology Michigan State University East Lansing, MI 48824

Dr. Betty J. Meggers Department of Anthropology National Museum of Natural

History Smithsonian Institution Washington, DC 20560

Mr. Opart Panya RFD-KKU-FORD Social Forestry

Project National Forest Land Management

Division Royal Thai Forest Department Bangkaen, Bangkok 10900,

Thailand

Dr. Jeffrey R. Parsons Museum of Anthropology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Barbara Price Department of Anthropology Columbia University New York, NY 10027

Dr. Ali M.A. Rachman c/o Jurusan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial

Ekonomi Fakultas Pertanian, IPB Jalan Raya Pajajaran Bogor, Indonesia

Dr. A. Terry Rambo Environment and Policy Institute East-West Center 1777 East-West Road Honolulu, HI 96848

Dr. Percy E. Sajise Institute of Environmental Sciences and Management University of the Philippines, Los

Banos College Laguna, Philippines

Dr. William T. Sanders Department of Anthropology 409 Carpenter Building Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA 16802

Dr. Charles S. Spencer American Museum of Natural

History Central Park West at 79th St. New York, NY 10024-5192

Dr. Aram A. Yengoyan Department of Anthropology0855 University of California, Davis Davis, CA 95616

xviii

I. BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1 Evolutionary Theory in Ethnological Perspectives ARAM A. YENGOYAN

In attempting an overview of a scholar's intellectual contributions through his published works, one is bound to encounter numerous prob-lems both in terms of accurately conveying the spirit of the intellectual achievement and in trying to account for how the meaning of that scholar's achievements has changed over time. Appraisal of another's achievements is, by nature, fraught with difficulties, for the interpreter must avoid hagiography but must, at the same time, present a sympa-thetic and balanced reading of the work, a reading both critical and constructive. There will be omissions, there will be overstatements and understatements of ideas, as well as misinterpretations, but given these limits it is still important to venture into the endeavor with an open mind and with an eye toward understanding how and why the scholar's thoughts and practices developed as they did.

Elman Service's work ranges across a number of theoretical and em-pirical domains. His theoretical work has been identified as evolution-ary in perspective, but to leave it at that is far too simple; it would be simply wrong. Service has written on a number of topics ranging from kinship to political organization, from history of anthropological thought to a rethinking of certain historical figures in our pantheon of anthropo-logical luminaries, from the origin of the state to the evolution of the modern nation-state. He has also maintained a keen interest in ethnog-raphy and in how empirical realities relate to theoretical and compara-tive issues. His theoretical works have had a marked impact on certain strains of thought in ethnology and a great impact on archeological theory. Furthermore, as will be discussed, many of his comparative conceptualizations have been vital in influencing how textbooks have approached the subject matter of anthropology. In this essay, what I attempt to provide is a general survey of some of his contributions, and thus, due to spatial limitations, I can deal only with the more critical

3

4 PROFILES IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION

and lasting issues. For example, since I am not a Latin Americanist, it would be most difficult for me to make any judgments on Service's contributions to the comparative ethnography of Latin America; thus I will only make passing references to those works.

On a more personal level, I should note that I was a colleague of Elman's at the University of Michigan from 1963 (when I arrived) to 1968 (when he took a position at the University of California, Santa Barbara). During and prior to this period, evolutionary theory, in terms of developmental sequences, such as the trajectory of development from bands to tribes to chiefdoms to the state, was one of the major intellec-tual links which combined ethnology and archeology both at the under-graduate level and at the level of advanced graduate studies in the Department of Anthropology. With the presence of Leslie White, Mar-shall Sahlins, Eric Wolf, and Elman Service on campus, the anthropol-ogy department buzzed with ideas of how cultural change came about through evolutionary processes, how cultural evolutionary theory could be ethnographically supported, how the state was structured both in terms of its origins and in terms of its formative processes, and how evolutionary thinking might revolutionize our ideas on polity, kinship, and economy. It was a fervent time. Coming with a degree from the University of Chicago, where evolution was seldom if ever mentioned, into this Michigan foment, I was at times bewildered and amused at the degree of intensity and argumentation with which students discussed these ideas in classes, in corridors, and in the local pubs. As an out-sider, I was not expected to toe the evolutionary line. After all, I was not one of the "chosen"; the chosen had arrived in another context and in other ways. However, I might be converted.

This essay is concerned primarily with the ideas Service developed during his years at Michigan and Santa Barbara. Within an evolutionary framework, many facets of his theoretical and comparative writings have had an impact on our ideas on polity, on the evolution of political structures, on the evolution of cultures and changes in kinship systems, and on a rethinking of some of our intellectual ancestors.

EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT

Service's conception of culture and cultural evolution is in many ways different from those of his teachers, namely Leslie White and Julian Steward. Although it is difficult to find a general definition of culture in Service's writings, one is led to the conclusion that culture is adaptive and structurally complex, and complexity increases in and through evo-lutionary change, giving culture the ability to transform itself. Thus,

CHAPTER 1 YENGOYAN 5

Service's idea of culture as a conceptual category contrasts with, and is even the reverse of, that proposed by White, who saw culture as a symbolic entity. Specific cultures (and not "Culture" as a conceptual category) evolve and change through processual evolution, manifesting greater specialization and adaptation which might lead either to progres-sive changes or to involutional semi-stagnation.

The implications of this conceptualization in Service's writings are most marked in a number of directions. For Service, anthropology is the analysis of sociocultural differences and similarities as indicators of evolutionary development, and cross-cultural comparison must not be relegated simply to theory building about social organization in syn-chronic context. Order and logic are imputed through processual com-parisons and that order is provided in the scheme of bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and primitive states. These views are expressed in three different and revised editions of his analysis of comparative ethnology (Service 1958, 1963, 1978b) and in the two editions of his book on primitive social organization (Service 1962, 1971b).

Two important implications of this framework for processual develop-ment are to empiricize the idea of culture and to render it with temporal utility, both aspects which are lacking in Leslie White's framework. Furthermore, the shift away from a global concept of culture also means that cultures as results of particular historical and comparative develop-mental sequences must be comprehended in different ways. Service does not explain cultural change through reference to a single source as does White with his theory that the development of increasingly effec-tive means of harnessing energy was the causal mechanism for cultural growth and increasing cultural complexity. In 1968, Service severely criticized various theories of cultural evolution. He concludes by stat-ing:

Down with prime-movers. There is no single magical formula that will predict the evolution of every society. The actual evolution of the culture of particular socie-ties is an adaptive process whereby the society solves problems with respect to the natural and to the human-competitive environment. These environments are so diverse, the problems so numerous, and the solutions potentially so various that no single determinant can be equally powerful for all cases. [Service 1968:406]

Harris (1969) attacks Service on a number of relevant (and many irrelevant) issues, but the point is that Service's opposition to prime moverswhether they are manifested in mentalistic idealism, conflict theories, or technological imperativescan only be maintained through a dismissal of culture as a concept, that is, by rejecting culture both as a superorganic and sui generis entity (as exemplified by Kroeber and White) and as a symbolic subject. Whereas Kroeber saw the prime


mover in the human brain and White saw the prime mover in the har-nessing of energy, Service, by rejecting prime movers and thus dismiss-ing the concept of culture, is forced to change his position to that of a generalized particularism. He expresses this theoretical change by turn-ing toward an examination of the sequential processual developments of human cultures.

The flaw in Service's rejection of prime movers is based on two issues which at times are compounded and also confusing. First, Service seems to equate prime movers with general theory. As is well known, general theory, be it evolutionary or structural/functional, tries to ex-plain a set of empirical phenomena. However, theory in this sense is not a prime mover or a single causal factor from which everything emanates. The second issue is that by rejecting prime movers Service almost by definition seems to reject the idea that ethnology/social anthropology possesses a unifying subject matter. If culture is the subject matter (as expressed by Kroeber and White), or if universal mental structures are the subject matter of anthropology (as expressed by Lvi-Strauss), one must have a sense of a prime mover. One might not agree with what is defined as the subject matter or with the particular prime mover, but the point is that a global subject matter is integrally linked to the concept of a prime mover (a term with which I am uncomfortable); the two are logically and philosophically connected to each other. On the other hand, a change in subject matter requires different types of explanations for cultural differences and change. Thus, a move toward generalized particularism or extreme particularism requires other explanatory fac-tors such as ecological and/or adaptive explanations which account for given cultural forms and organizations through an almost infinite diver-sity of specific conditions; in these instances, prime movers are no longer viable explanations. Surely, prime movers are not explanatory devices, nor are they required in Steward's framework of cultural evolu-tion. One might argue that the concept of culture core was his prime mover, but Steward (1955) was often inconsistent in what he defined as constituting the cultural core in particular cases.

Service's understanding of culture and cultural evolution has been primarily informed by empirical realities derived from ethnography rather than archeology. In this sense, his work leans closer to Steward. Service's use of ethnography also reflects his concern for making cul-tural evolution an understandable process by connecting ethnography to theory and vice versa, by showing how theory can inform ethnography for comparative concerns. In a recent review of White's ethnological essays, Service (1988:767) notes that a large part of the impact of White's The Science of Culture (1949) was because scholars at that time were looking for more general theoretical perspectives as a means of


rescuing anthropology from the Boasian disarray (my words); but the same culturological essays and themes will not find the sort of audience in the late 1980s that existed in the late 1940s. This is surely the case, but it also means that the Whitean paradigm never really fit with Ser-vice's endeavors.

Thus, cultural evolution is understood as a framework within which the adaptive and structural complexity of different societies expresses itself over time and space and a method by which these cases can be compared in ways which have explanatory value. Whereas White ar-gued that theory and ethnography were distinct types of intellectual activities, a stand for which he was continuously criticized as having an inability to relate generalized evolutionary schemes to a corpus of ethno-graphic realities, Service muted this criticism by being able to relate ethnographic cases to a generalized framework. As a consequence, Ser-vice's evolutionary concepts have had a critical impact on certain theo-ries in ethnology as well as in archeology where his ideas are still much in evidence.

We must also note that Service's concept of "evolutionary potential" is not only a framework for looking at extinct stages and societies. In many of his writings, Service has attempted to understand current post-War developments in capitalism in the West and the development of communist China. Through his creative use of the concept of "evolution-ary potential," Service provides a theoretical explanation for these prob-lems and illuminates various facets of how and why capitalism can or cannot transform itself into the post-capitalistic state. If the evolution of a system like capitalism occurs under certain constraints and can only be understood in terms of its structure of operation as it evolves or changes, certain limits occur at the upper thresholds which impede or curtail its transformation. The semi-stagnation of capitalism due to lim-its on its evolutionary potential might result in changes which are either revolutionary or which trigger the onset of involutionary processes, vir-tually precluding any form of evolutionary change. Service's (1960b, 1971a) essays on the modern world and its evolutionary problems are probably now more critical and vital than when they were first published for any understanding of the current nation-state regardless of its eco-nomic structuring, be it capitalist, socialist, or communist.

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITY AND THE STATE

This section is premised on the assumption that the reader knows, or has read, Service's discussion and analysis of the evolution of polity as it culminates in the state in some particular localities. Since I plan to


summarize his findings, my discussion will take into account some of the theoretical and empirical issues which underlie Service's approach and the kinds of problems which were generated by that evolutionary approach.

In the three editions of Profile of Primitive Culture (1958, 1963, 1978b), Service proposed a number of taxonomic categories which pro-vided the evolutionary canopy for discussing structural similarities be-tween societies and for designating how each level of evolutionary devel-opment differed from others in terms of complexity. The 1958 edition grouped societies into four levels: bands, tribes, primitive states, and modern folk societies. In the 1963 and the 1978 editions, chiefdoms were established as a fifth category and placed between tribes and primitive states. Service's theoretical delineations for chiefdoms were originally published in Primitive Social Organization (1962). Not only did chiefdoms represent an increased level of complexity above the stage of tribes, they also displayed the beginnings of a theocratic com-ponent which served as a symbolic unity and was in concordance with political process. This introduction of the new category was an impor-tant addition that improved the conceptual focus of the earlier categories as well. The 1958 edition listed eight cases under tribe; and a quick ethnographic review of these cases shows such great organizational dif-ferences among them as to raise the question how and why societies as different as the Cheyenne and Nuer could be combined with Nootka and Tahitians. Thus, the 1963 edition of Profiles in Ethnology lists Nootka, Trobrianders, Tahitians, and Kalinga as examples of chiefdoms.

The placement of the Kalinga in the new category of chiefdom still presents a problem. In the 1958 edition the Kalinga were listed under primitive states along with the Maya, Inca, and the Ashanti. This proved infeasible, for while the Kalinga might have some state-like qualities, they are far from possessing the state structures found among the Maya and the Inca. Although the Kalinga possess a concept of law and political hierarchy which has some similarities with the Maya and Inca, differences in bureaucratic structures and military organization as well as kinship make the differences even more glaring. Indeed, the Kalinga fail to fit any of the three categories of tribe, chiefdom, or primitive state. The political structure of Kalinga, with the pangat1 system and the complexity of the legal structure, would exclude them from, and place them above, the category of tribe. As a chiefdom, the Kalinga fall somewhat short in comparison to the Tahitians, since they lack the ability to mobilize a military force or a semi-permanent army. Furthermore, the role of the Kalinga chief is not as all-inclusive as one finds in Polynesian cases. Finally, as noted, the Kalinga are not a


primitive state. In the 1978 edition, Service drops the Kalinga alto-gether and replaces them with the Rwala Bedouin, although one might also question this case. Obviously, the Kalinga are difficult to place within evolutionary categories, just as the upland insular societies of Southeast Asia were difficult for Sahlins (1968) to explain within the category of "tribesmen." Yet, while one can sympathize with Service in his dilemma, we must ask whether he omitted the Kalinga in 1978 merely to replace them with a more appropriate ethnographic example, or whether he realized that the Kalinga simply would not fit any of his categories.

During the 20-year period from 1958 to 1978, Service rethought some of the issues regarding his evolutionary typology. Just as Steward (1955) had problems with the composite band, Service (1962) felt that the composite band idea should be dropped, partly because it was not an aboriginal type and was probably an adaptive response to the pene-tration of Western cultures. Later, Service went even further and con-cluded that the stages of band, tribe, chiefdom, and primitive state were never true to "the aboriginal state of affairs," and that "They may be useful for a classification of modern ethnography but not useful if they are to be used in extrapolating from extant stages to extinct ages" (Ser-vice 1971a:157). This amounts to virtual abandonment of his original typology. He concluded that only three types of stages might exist as plausible evolutionary phases, that is "(1) the Egalitarian Society out of which grew (2) the Hierarchical Society, which was replaced in only a few instances in the world by the Empire-State that was the basis of the next stage (3) the Archaic Civilization or Classical Empire" (ibid.).

It is unfortunate that Service substituted Egalitarian, Hierarchical and Archaic civilizations for his earlier typology. In the first place, the new threefold typology is so general that it loses any potential value for theoretical and/or evolutionary explanation. Not only is the threefold typology difficult to operationalize, but it adds little to our understand-ing of particular ethnographic cases. Furthermore, the original fivefold classification was more significant because it was a sequence of evolu-tionary types. By "type" I mean ideal types in the Weberian sense, for one would seldom if ever find a type existing in empirical reality; the ideal type is not meant to exist in any single particular case. A "tribe," as an ideal type, is constituted by a number of structural properties which are interrelated with one another. The power of the type concept is that it directs our inquiries toward specific issues as we try to under-stand particular cases. Once the investigator notes how a certain case differs from the ideal type, the next methodological operation is to as-sess those local factors (e.g., ecology, history, extra-tribal interactions,


internal structures) that might explain the degree of divergence of the particular society from what the ideal type renders, and how and why this occurs.

The fruition of Service's ideas and thoughts culminate in his major empirical and theoretical works on the origin and structure of the state. One of the major themes of his analysis is the refutation of all prime-mover theories in the evolution of the state. Service rejects all forms of Marxist interpretations of the state as expressed in the works of Childe, Wittfogel, and, to a certain extent, Fried, through a minute analysis of early classical state formation and through a careful examination of modern primitive states. In example after example, Service (1975) dis-cusses various prime-mover theories with regard to particular cases to demonstrate that they do not work. According to him, Egypt and the Indus River Valley were civilizations, but they lacked urbanism as defined by Childe (ibid., 246). The major contrast between states and chiefdoms is that states are primarily secular while chiefdoms are char-acterized by a theocratic component which not only legitimates the po-litical process but enhances the hierarchical structure of redistribution. Furthermore, the establishment of the state is based on separation of powers with an increasing reliance on military structures which not only maintain internal peace but are part of the expansionist nature of early civilizations.

In recent years, students of both classical and archaic states as well as early civilizations have grappled with the endless problems of how states differ from advanced chiefdoms in particular cases. It is difficult to come forth with broad generalizations, and a close reading of each particular case makes it all the more difficult. Service's contributions to the understanding of these issues have been central, even though they have been challenged by archeologists of various theoretical persua-sions. Basically, the narrative which he (1975, 1978a) sets forth has a threefold aim:

1. To construct a plausible framework for the analysis of the origin and develop-ment of archaic civilizations through comparing different cases;

2. To classify them as a means of assessing prime-mover theories as proposed in the works of Marx, Wittfogel, Childe, Carneiro, and Lattimore; and

3. To provide an argument for the evolution of the state in opposition to Marxist interpretations which focus on issues such as class and social stratification.

As opposed to class theories, Service's work (1978a:29) stresses an integrationist explanation of early and archaic state formation through a detailing of the beneficient aspects of the state, especially in its early formative phases. These organizational benefits are accomplished through several developments, including increased production, a struc-

CHAPTER 1 - YENGOYAN 11

ture of redistribution which alleviates local disparities in resources across territories through the chiefly control of exchange, and the rise of a bureaucratic administrative structure which, over time, would en-hance and support the role of the chief, the court, and the priesthood, and ultimately would benefit the citizenry to a certain extent. The devel-opment of military structures and complex public works are also bene-fits which integrate society and cut across different interest groups (Ser-vice 1978a:32). Eventually the clustering of law, governmental struc-tures, and an able bureaucracy would not only perpetuate the social domination of rulers but would also provide organizational benefits for the populace. Although Service dedicates his Origins of the State and Civilization (1975) to his lifelong friend Morton Fried, Service's integra-tionist framework also contrasts with most Marxist and other class theo-ries of the state, of which Fried's (1967) approach is the most insightful.

A number of assumptions regarding Service's explanation of the ori-gin of the state need further discussion. If I read him correctly and, hopefully, if I interpret his analysis in the spirit in which it was in-tended, I am led to the conclusion that the state does not arise as a result of negative forces such as the repression and oppression of a citizenry or rampant external military conquests of neighboring socie-ties. For Service, the features central to understanding the emergence of early states and archaic civilizations are primarily positive and good. In different contexts throughout his two major pieces (1975, 1978a), he makes a distinction between positive and negative forces, arguing that benefits seem to characterize the emergence of early states and archaic civilizations, but over time and into the more modern period of the state under different ideological influences, negative influences have become dominant. If the state failed to provide the benefits in Western industri-alism, it might have a chance of establishing itself along more beneficial lines in other contexts, such as post-War China, where Western contact has not brought forth political submission and where domination by Western industrialized powers has been avoided, thus providing the state the means of creating new solutions to problems of energy. In this rendering of the state, the particular nature of state formation must be linked with the question of evolutionary potential.

If my interpretation of Service has some merit, it implies that there is a connection between Service's conception or vision of society and his theory of what constitutes the state. What I see as central in his theory (though Service does not mention it) is the idea of civil society as expressed by the Scottish Moralists (Ferguson 1966; Schneider 1967). In their view, civil society existed in early states, but over time it gradually eroded as the state became a more repressive class-structured form of sociopolitical domination.


This assumption is not neutral for it involves not only how Service envisions the state itself, but also how society relates to the state. How-ever, Cohen (1978:17) notes that for Service, Wright, and also himself, the state is neutral; it is neither good nor bad and it arises like a natural phenomenon. By stating that it is a natural phenomenon, Cohen leads one to the conclusion that the state is an expression of natural law, of processes in which the human agent is passive. If this is the case, it would be difficult for Service to accept the assumption that the state is an expression of natural law. In fact, in many other facets of his prolific writings, Service is quite explicit in downplaying the role of natural law which, in many ways, evokes theological explanations.

Service's evolutionary framework has had a critical and lasting im-pact on archeologists who are dealing with chiefdoms, early and archaic states, and the rise of civilization. Over the past 15 years, a number of conferences and anthologies have dealt with the issue of the state and, in one way or another, Service's ideas have been central to all the discussions. Some of the major interpretive works on Service's ideas are found in Gledhill et al. (1988), Haas (1982), and Schiffer (1983, 1987). The research problematic in contemporary archeology on state forma-tions, the theory of the state, and the investigation of particular prehis-toric and historic cases all emerge, in some form, from what Service set forth as early as 1958.

Within ethnology, the bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and state sequence is seldom discussed, but its heuristic value is much in evidence, par-ticularly in anthropology textbooks which continue to use this evolution-ary trajectory in conveying the idea of cultural differences and similari-ties as they exist through time and space.

KINSHIP AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION

The publication of Primitive Social Organization (1962, 1971b) was, in part, Service's response to Murdock's Social Structure (1949). Whereas Murdock stressed a purely formal approach to kinship termi-nology and kinship behavior, Service took a functional and evolutionary perspective, one which notes that an Eskimo kinship terminology exists for both the Eskimo as well as the New England Yankees but functions in different ways in each case. Service's writings on social organization are a brilliant attempt to show how the logic and structure of kinship and social groupings relate to larger institutional features which embed kinship. After some 20 or 30 years, one now reads Murdock for his definitions, while one reads Service for an understanding of how kinship and social formations operate within an evolutionary perspective.


Through the utilization of the segmentary model, Service dealt with a range of cases and established the tribe as a type which would have explanatory power for a range of different ethnographic cases. Much of his work is now part of our common and shared wisdom as it relates to social organization and culture.

One of Service's major contributions to the analysis of social organiza-tion is his contrasting of egocentric and sociocentric kinship terminolo-gies. By showing how sociocentric terminologies connect groups or cate-gories with one another, especially those which are socially distant, Service (1960a) was able to solve a major problem, that of trying to understand kinship apart from a genealogical and egocentric basis. He demonstrated how both forms of kinship relations occur within the same society. For example, he showed how, among the Aranda of central Australia, a subsection system exists above and apart from the genea-logical and egocentric kinship grid which regulates kinship behavior and marriage relationships. The logic of the Aranda system of subsec-tions cannot be fully generated from the egocentric framework; but through his approach, Service (1960c) was able to demonstrate how subsections work in relation to kinship and marital arrangements. Fur-thermore, he (1960a) was also one of the early writers on kinship to deal with the existence of status terminologies as part of the total kinship framework. Status terminologies are theorized to be part of the sociocen-tric terminological system. They occur and proliferate in societies which are not only larger but are also divided into corporate groups, along class lines, and into hierarchically ranked groupings. At a more com-plex level of cultural evolution, status markers also become part of the occupational specializations which are present in various societies char-acterized by a highly evolved organic solidarity. From an evolutionary perspective, the organizational basis of the supra-kinship orders can be differentiated from earlier forms of social structure which are primarily egocentric and possibly genealogical. Service's approach to this prob-lem, as well as other social organization issues, was and is a much needed corrective to the formalization of kinship started by Murdock and expressed in various works of the 1950s and 1960s on componential and formal analysis.

Another contribution of Service's work on kinship is his development and analysis of the concept of sodality. Although the term "sodality" was used by Lowie (1948), Service rethought the concept and redefined it as a "nonresidential association that has some corporate functions or purposes" (1971b: 13). Whereas Lowie saw it as primarily a voluntary category, Service conceived of sodalities as either voluntaristic or non-voluntaristic groupings with many purposes beyond any single function. For Service, sodalities need not be groups in the sense that all members


of that group come together for common action or common purposes; rather, they are segments of a group which come together based on common ends as well as a common membership which is emblemati-cally symbolized. As non-local and non-residential groups, sodalities have the ability to integrate different resident groups. In this sense, they are panlocal in that they are never fixed to a particular group or a particular locality.

Although sodalities do exist in band societies, they are mainly repre-sentative of tribal structures in which clans have members in different localities, thus permitting them to combine for certain purposes without involving all clan members, something that would be a practical impos-sibility. These pantribal sodalities, according to Service, are either identified through kinship idioms (like clan) or involve non-kin group-ings (like a warrior class or age grades). In either case, the sodality must be labeled. It must have a name through which individual mem-bers can establish common linkages to others who also adhere to that group and that label. The functions of sodalities can and do vary de-pending on the scale of a society. At the tribal level, however, it ap-pears that they are essentially political because they function to create and maintain alliances which cross-cut different local groups.

The initial impact of the concept of sodalities was marginal in the early 1960s; but in the past 10 years, many writers on kinship and social organization have returned to Service's original formulations in developing the idea of alliances and linkages, which articulate segments of society with each other both horizontally and vertically.

HISTORY, CULTURE, AND ETHNOLOGY

Over the past 10 years, Service (1981, 1985, 1987) has written on various aspects of the history of anthropology. Like all cultural evolu-tionists, he begins by addressing Lewis Morgan and what Morgan really meant. There is now a great deal of literature dealing with Morgan's writings, but it is still difficult to get a handle on the various positions which one finds in his work. At one time it was assumed that Morgan had only one or two possible readings, but in reality the readings of Morgan have not only been varied, but in most cases, contemporary interpretations are quite different from what Engels (1942), Stern (1931), and White (1964) presented in earlier generations. Terray's (1972) readings of Morgan's works stress their structuralist aspects, at least in terms of the language used by Morgan. Probably the most illu-minating recent rethinking of Morgan is by Trautmann (1987), who, in many ways, has finally settled the historical and intellectual context of


Morgan's writing of Systems (1870) and the kinds of influences which prevailed on him, either directly or indirectly.

In A Century of Controversy (1985), Service devotes at least two chap-ters to Morgan, and throughout the text there are various references to Morgan's impact on anthropological thought and the study of kinship. Both in this work and in the earlier piece on Morgan, Service always seems to be wrestling with the problem of interpreting Morgan as a materialist or as an idealist, or as some kind of mentalist. In fact, at times, one is puzzled by the use of all of these labels in trying to assess what Morgan was doing. Surely Morgan himself never thought in terms of "-isms" and "-ists," but nearly all recent writers on Morgan invoke such contrasts.

It is true that Morgan, in Ancient Society (1964), talks about the growth of the idea of government and of the idea of property or family. The usage of the term "idea" in this context cannot be utilized by recent writers to pigeonhole Morgan as a mentalist or as an idealist. What Morgan meant by the "idea of . . . " was what we now would term a concept. Morgan was talking about the concepts of government, prop-erty, and family, and how these concepts evolved and changed through the various stages and periods in the evolution of culture. There are other parts of Morgan's writings which are idealistic, but surely the term "idea of only means how the concept of property works, what it em-braces over time, and how such concepts relate to empirical realities. It is unfortunate that in this discussion, Service, to some extent, treats mentalism, idealism, and materialism as a set of oppositional catego-ries.

Furthermore, it is true, as Service (1985:50) correctly notes, that Morgan seldom delineates the causes for the evolution of institutions in a clear way. But again, in Morgan one finds passages which appeal to a natural logic of the brain as the means by which humans solve prob-lems. This reference to natural logic cannot be used to cast Morgan as an idealist or a mentalist. During the nineteenth century, the idea of a natural logic was premised on the concept of a psychic unity of human-kind which was essential in developing the idea that humankind was one and that the unity rested in the brain. Thus, the appeal to natural logic in Morgan is a statement of the oneness of humanity; differences in human societies must be accounted for in terms of different natural

I might have been overcritical of Service's reading of Morgan. His work is difficult, and one can find reference to many issues or pull out quotes in order to support a range of interpretations. Service (1981) is correct when he stresses the idea that reading Morgan with hindsight allows one to read into his work what one wishes to find. However, one


must always recognize the language and rhetoric which Morgan used; accounting for these factors is the basis of contextualization. I am not a specialist on Morgan, yet I do find inspiration in reading him and, in most cases, I find more inspiration in Morgan than in the myriad of writings on Morgan.

Service's most recent book, A Century of Controversy (1985), is an important volume in setting forth various issues of intellectual debate which have formed the essence of anthropological theory. Students who are looking for an intellectual overview will find it exciting reading. However, some sections are notably lacking in perspective. Thus, in discussing the debate between Boas and Kroeber on the question of anthropology as a science or as history, Service should have addressed a third vital component to that debate: Radin's (1965) position on sci-ence and history is essential to understanding how Boas responded to Kroeber. Radin was the dominant force in particularism, and his cri-tique of both Boas and Kroeber extends to virtually all of the Boasians, especially to Benedict and Mead. Radin's particularism might have been extreme relativism and can only be comprehended in terms of how Boas and Kroeber conceptualized generalization either in history or in science. In drawing his own contrasts, Service (1985:299, 1987:323 324) designates opposing views as evolutionism vs. relativism, when relativism should be the central factor in discussing how and why vari-ous Boasian writers wrote about science, history, configurations, and modal personality structure, almost always as an attempt to escape ex-treme relativism. Radin's position was not only the basis of extreme cultural relativism as a denial of science, historical reconstruction and history in general, along with culture and personality studies, but a positive insistence that anthropology and ethnography must develop cul-tural portraits based on minute ethnographic reporting which reflects as closely as possible what the "native" does and says. Radin's position, which was out of fashion during his time, is much in evidence in con-temporary anthropology through various renditions of "thick description and postmodernism."

It is unfortunate that A Century of Controversy ends at 1960. Many of the issues and debates of that time are still central to current anthropo-logical argumentation, many have acquired a new vigor since 1960, and in some cases the developments since 1960 have returned the debate to the initial level of ferment.

It is evident from how Service (1985, 1987) poses the various opposi-tions and contrasts that the evolution of anthropological explanations has occurred in most part through ongoing and redefined positions. Each side of these debates is strongly argued and in many cases is passionately expressed by the original proponents. What is critical to


note is that much of what we label theory and explanation in ethnology and social anthropology was forged through the proposition of ideas and opposition to them, rather than through eclecticism; the latter can be intellectually debilitating for a new discipline. On eclecticism, Harris (1969) appears to equate historical particularism and/or generalized par-ticularism with eclecticism, in that no single dominant prime mover or no single dominant theory is utilized. This kind of comparison brings forth the issue of what is being compared to what. Eclecticism refers to either shifting research strategies to suit the problem or the dominant concern to invoke all forms of explanation to explain a problem as a means by which the analyst attempts to cover the range of possibilities as well as warding off future criticisms. Generalized particularism (an oxymoron which might cause problems for some readers, coined by Yengoyan, not Service) differs from eclecticism in that it is a consistent research strategy that attempts to explain particular events and struc-tures in terms of preceding particular events and structures. Eclecticism is a dead-end intellectual endeavor, one which Service has been able to avoid in his writings.

SUMMARY

Evolutionary explanations in ethnology are not in vogue at present, although they are still critical for archeological problematics, for the understanding of temporal process as well as for ecological interpreta-tions. In fact, ecological explanations shorn of an evolutionary perspec-tive are simply another version of relativism. This point is evident in the contrast between the Boasian approach to environmental limitations and ecological problems and recent ecological approaches that combine evo-lutionary and population perspectives for explaining and comparing dif-ferent ecosystemic interactions. However, evolutionary accounts, in terms of specialized and generalized frameworks, are now seldom found in contemporary ethnology and social anthropology. In part, this is a result of the language we now use and the problems we now pursue. The interest in ethnohistories is couched in particularism and limited frame-works which are utilized in order to elucidate the data at hand. Further-more, the late 1980s in anthropology is a period in which we shun grand theories, broad generalizations, and comparisons. The term "theory" itself has a negative patina, and there is a general feeling that theories are dubious if they cannot be anchored to a corpus of ethnographic reporting. Furthermore, the current move away from theory and com-parison also reflects the ongoing debate on the nature of the subject matter of ethnology/social anthropology (see Yengoyan 1986).


If cultural evolution is no longer a major theoretical framework in ethnology/social anthropology, the source of this change must be sought not only in terms of other contemporary modes of explanation and inter-pretation, but also within cultural evolution itself. Although Service boldly argued against prime movers, he also confused prime movers with general theory. If one rewrote the prime-mover quote as cited earlier to apply to organic evolution, the following would emerge:

There is no single magical formula that will predict the evolution of every [spe-cies]. The actual evolution of the [population] of particular [species] solves prob-lems with respect to the natural and to the [speciesj-competitive environment. These environments are so diverse, the problems so numerous, and the solutions potentially so various that no single determinant can be equally powerful for all cases.

Statements such as these have only been made in a pre-Darwinian mode of thought. One of the shortcomings which has plagued almost all forms of cultural evolution is its inability to deal with the Darwinian framework. In part, this kind of pre-Darwinian thinking was a result of the acute division which our intellectual ancestors created between cul-ture and biology. From Boas to Kroeber and White and even to most forms of contemporary cultural evolutionism (Harris), the concern to comprehend culture as a sui generis phenomenon in order to avoid biological and psychological reductionism has had a dire consequence on most theories of cultural evolution.

Service's theoretical and comparative writings on various issues in ethnology and archeology represent one of the major contributions to that phase of anthropology during which the discipline was a generaliz-ing science or perhaps an expression of comparative humanism. In either context, much of Service's work is still vital to our endeavors now but will be more so in the future. Service's generalizations can be criti-cized, but then all generalizations are criticized these days. His typolo-gies might or might not work, since most human cultures are difficult to type, let alone to compare. In fact, one might say that Service's se-quence of bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and primitive states might only account for a minority of the ethnographic cases of which we are aware. But that is not the point. Service's concept of type is an ideal theoretical construct which facilitates our thinking on issues of structure and pro-cess.

In the past 40 years of thinking and writing, Service's work repre-sents an attempt to put order into things and to explain cultural events and cultures as part of a logic applied in an extremely broad sense (such as an evolutionary perspective) or a more narrow one (such as the prob-


lem of sociocentric kinship terminologies or sodalities). Generalized concepts or frameworks like Service's are part of anthropology even though we continuously question their foundations and their utility. It is part of the disciplinary training that we must question the general; but seldom, if ever, has an individual started fieldwork without a conceptual framework, be it broad or narrow. We cannot escape it. In an era in which the anthropological enterprise is under attack from inside and from outside the discipline, it is fashionable to enhance and, in fact, create one's career by attacking scholars who have put forth ideas, theories, and generalizations. Elman Service is a scholar who has put forth his ideas as he saw them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Nancy Thompson Price for her acute and critical reading of this paper, especially of those sections pertaining to polity and state formation. Her advice and scholarly acumen saved me from some potential problems.

Special thanks are also extended to Karl Hutterer and H. Clyde Wilson for their responses on various sections of this paper, and their clarification of some of my theo-retical discussion.

NOTE Pangat are defined as the most influential men of the Kadangyan class who have special political functions due to their high rank.

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