Indian Journal of Human Development-Swagato Sarkar

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Indian Journal of Human Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008

* Doctoral candidate, University of Oxford, UK.

perspective

Civil Society and Exclusion: Partha Chatterjee on

The Politics of the Governed

Swagato Sarkar*

Partha Chatterjee has argued that the concept of civil society neither adequately describes nor

is analytically helpful in understanding the democratic life in a post-colonial society like India.

Civil society is the domain of the elites, who can claim full citizenship, and a vast number ofpeople are excluded from such a process. He proposes the concept of political society: the actual

domain of policy, where the government engages with the population. On the one hand, various

governmental functions and apparatus approach the population as the targets of policies. On

the other hand, the people participate in the political process by manoeuvring in this domain.

This space for manoeuvring is not available within the liberal space of civil society. According to

Chatterjee, this should be seen as a positive aspect rather than a pathological condition, since it

provides a scope for realizing the popular demands.

The concept of civil society is incorrigibly a spatial one, specifying the space of politicalengagements. Recently, a plethora of literature has tried to nd the signicance ofcivil society by highlighting its positive role in development and good governance.

Normatively, civil society has been identied as a domain for the expansion andrealization of rights and freedom (Cohen and Arato, 1992), and instrumentally, it is seenas a domain wherein distribution, exercise and control of power are (democratically)contested (Nonan-Ferrell, 2004). Taken together, civil society is an integral part ofdemocracy and a placeholder of institutions that facilitates better (civic) co-operation,resulting in enhanced economic growth and performance (Putnam, 1994; Narayanan,1997). The promotion of civil society is also seen as an antidote to authoritarian stateinterventions.

Partha Chatterjee re-frames the debate by desisting from either an exclusivelynormative or an instrumental discussion; he discourages us to consider post-colonialpolitics as a pathological condition of retarded modernity (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 75).Instead, he emphasizes the political dimension. He takes the concepts like citizenship

and individual will to task, and vehemently argues for considering community as asignicant analytical concept. Civil society is a limited concept and an undifferentiatedspace. Working through this critical engagement, he splits the political space, andconceptualizes a separate domainpolitical society, which is separate and distinctfrom civil society, to understand the democratic urge and peoples agency in


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450 Indian Journal of Human Development

postcolonial countries. In the following paragraphs, rst I will provide a sketch ofChatterjees criticism of the concept of civil society, and then present a critical review

of his concept of political society.

CHATTERJEES CRITIQUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Chatterjee considers civil society as the domain of the elite and their associational life,mediated through institutions located in the public sphere. This domain recognizes onlythe unencumbered individuals, severed of any primordial ties, and adequately sets thestandard for membership and political socialization. The members are recognized bythe state as citizens, empowered with certain rights. Since the primordial identities ofthe citizens are not invoked or referred to, they are rendered homogeneous before thestate, namely, as a nation. Citizenship, then, can be framed within the ethical conceptsof equality and freedom (Chatterjee, 2004). It is the will of the citizens, expressed as

their generalized political aspiration and popular sovereignty, which gives legitimacyto the state and forms the basis of democracy.

Chatterjee nds this concept of citizenship and the idea of democracy as restrictiveand problematic. It is restrictive because only a handful of the elite in post-colonialcountries can meet such criteria of citizenship. It is problematic because the conceptof community, which provides meaning to most of the people in these countries,is suppressed and relegated to the pre-modern historical time. The civil societyinstitutions become the next target of Chatterjees criticism. He argues that theinstitutions which we today recognize as part of civil society (in India) are a legacy ofthe colonial rule. The colonial rulers created such institutions to create a civil societyout of the natives who would be socialized in the language of modernity and act asinterlocutors and administrators of the colonial rule. These elite, then, were complicit

with the colonial projects. Yet, they remained, along with the rest of the societies, asa colonial subject not a citizen proper. After Independence, these elite could claimcitizenship and deliberate to steer the destiny of the new nation-state. The rest of thepopulation remained out the purview of these insular democratic processes. As can

be noticed here, Chatterjees criticism of civil society alludes to a process ofexclusion.

How did civil society become such a limited and exclusionary concept? Chatterjeedisentangles a suppressed narrative of community in the history of the idea of civilsociety in the West1 to show the exclusionary process. Chatterjee argues that the stateand the civil society in Western Europe are fundamentally shaped by divergences inconceptualizing (the) relation(ship) between rights and community (Chatterjee, 1993,p. 230 and passim). Such divergences are framed either as abolition of communityaltogether and thinking of rights as grounded solely in the self-determining individualwill, and on the other, attributing to community a single determinate form (i.e. thenation), delegitimizing all other forms of community. Chatterjee claims that thissubsequent historyis intricately tied with the history of capital. The individual andnation-state are embedded in the narrative of capital. The progressivist narrativeconstructs community as pre-modern and the pre-history of capital, and (de facto)sanctions the annihilation of community and its regulatory mechanisms by the processof primitive accumulation.


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Sarkar: Civil Society and Exclusion 451

Chatterjee argues against such a theoretical position and rejects the propositionof co-presence of several times (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 7), for example, modern, pre-

modern, etc. Instead he draws attention to the inherent tension between variousconcepts, on the one hand, and the real encounters with modernity, which producethese formations, on the other (ibid., pp. 7-8). Hence, the argument cannot be reducedto traditional versus modern (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 279). For Chatterjee, capital cannotsubsume community, and there is a necessary contradiction between capital andcommunity (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 237) and capital and community are antithetical(Chatterjee, 1998, p. 280). He considers Robert Putnams study on social capital, asone which highlights such a contradiction.

According to Putnam, the government in certain parts of northern Italy worksbetter because the civic institutions are robust and have the active participation ofcitizens. Such political socialization binds citizens in a mutual obligation and reciprocalsocial actions. The organizational features like trust, reciprocity and network of civicengagement can be called social capital, which unlike capital, is a public good.Putnam forwards examples from non-Western countries such as Indonesia, Nigeriaand Mexico. In each of these cases, local people have relied on their communalrelationship to arrange credit, as the conventional capitalist credit system would not

be able to operate under the given circumstances. Hence, (t)hese institutions are muchmore than merely economic; they are mechanisms that strengthen the solidarity of thecommunity.the concept of community is being invoked here to supply what doesnot properly belong to the concept of capital (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 280 and passim).He nds Putnams formulation of social capital as an attempt to do what capitalhas always failed to do, namely, ground the social institutions of modern capitalisteconomy in community.

However, Chatterjee does not attempt to recover or advocate the search of anautonomous community. He tries to show how community remains as a residualcategory which includes police and corporation (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 233). The publicsurveillance, which the civil society organizes, blurs the line of separation between theprivate and public, and such separation can only be contextual. Chatterjee reads thislack of objective separation as the instance through which the suppressed narrative ofcommunity raises its irrepressible head (ibid., p. 233). He draws attention to Hegelsinvocation of the term universal family to refer to the requirement of interventionat the household level to compel parents to send their children to school, to havethem vaccinated and so forth (Hegel, 1967, p. 277, additions to para 239). This allowsthe appropriation of the Hegelian framework by the dominant strand which claimsthat this role of the universal family can be properly played by the only legitimate

community in modern societythe nation (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 234 and passim). Asan inevitable consequence the contingent contractual domain of civil society must,after all, be unied at the higher, universal level of the absolute idea of Right, embodiedin the state as the political community. Such legitimized intervention by the nation-state, according to Chatterjee, is the basis for the governmentalization of the state, andis particularly signicant for understanding the politics of the societies wherein mostof the population does not include citizens.


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CHATTERJEE ON THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED

Chatterjees advocacy for the identication of a different political space beyond civilsociety rests on three moves. Firstly, he focuses attention on the sphere of governmentalintervention wherein, he claims, a different kind of political engagement between thelegal-bureaucratic apparatus and the people, who are excluded from civil society, can

be witnessed.

The post-colonial Indian state inherited the legal-bureaucratic apparatus, whichwas able to reach as the target of many of its activities virtually all of the populationthat inhabits its territory, the domain of civil social institutions, as conceived above isstill restricted to a fairly small section of citizens (Chatterjee, 2001, p. 172). Accordingto Chatterjee, this is a new paradigm wherein there is a clear shift from the abstracttheoretical domain of citizenship to the actual domain of policy. Following Foucault,he claims that the domain of policy is predicated upon a conception of the society

as one constituted by population, not citizens or elementary units of homogenousfamilies (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 279; 2001, p. 173). The regime secures legitimacy notby the participation of citizens in the matters of state, but by claiming to provide forthe well-being of the population (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 279). Thus, Chatterjees secondmove is to shift the focus from the normative category of citizens to the descriptiveand empirical category of population.

The concept of population is predicated upon an enumerable, descriptive, empiricalmass of people, and does not rely on a normative theory or abstraction. The populationis assumed to contain, large elements of naturalness and primordiality; the internalprinciples of the constitution of particular population groups is not expected to berationally explicable since they are not the products of rational contractual association,

but are, as it were, pre-rational (Chatterjee, 2001, p. 173 and passim). The concept of

population offers the governmental functions and apparatus an access to a set ofrationally manipulable instruments for reaching [a] large section of the inhabitants ofa country as the targets of policy.

Such interventions in the society-as-population, if we may call it, and the interactionbetween these governmental apparatus and the population groups inaugurate a newsite for strategic manoeuvring, resistance and appropriation. Chatterjee calls this sitethe political society. The strategic manoeuvre and mobilization that take place in thisdomain neither always conform, nor are consistent, with the principles of associationin civil society. Yet, Chatterjee identies an urge for democracy in this mobilizationin political society, as it channels the demands on the developmental state.

Chatterjee makes the third move by translating the subject of development into

a political subject, by assigning an identity to it and nding a normative groundfor it. Chatterjee is interested in exploring how people use the space opened by theintervention of governmental functions. As we have seen, such interventions perceivethe society as population and then categorize the latter into empirical groups which

become the target for policies. However, such categorization also infuses a newidentity within the group, and many a time, the constituents of the group emerge asdistinctpoliticalentities. These new groups have a territorial boundary, clearly dened


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in time and space (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 58 and passim). Consistent with his critique ofcivil society and the prominence of community, Chatterjee tries to demonstrate how

these groups become a communityand thus a collective, and also nds a normativeground for the latters demands. According to him, since the livelihood and existenceof many of the members of such groups are predicated upon a (collective) violation of(property) laws, they appear as illegal entities before the state. They are not recognizedas proper civic bodies, pursing legitimate objectives. Thus, to be recognized by thegovernmental functions, they must nd ways of investing their collective identitywith a moral content (ibid., p. 57 and passim) and thereby give to the empirical formof a population group the moral attributes of a community [emphasis in original]. Yet thiscommunity is about the shared interests of the members of association... theydescribethe community in [] terms of a shared kinshipthe most common metaphor isthat of a family.

Chatterjee never spells out what he means by the moral content of an identity,

but it seems that these new groups appropriate the proposition of the governmentsobligation to look after the poor and underprivileged population groups (Chatterjee,2004, p. 60). The objective of their mobilization is to secure the benets of governmentalprogram[me]s (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66), which they claim as a matter of rights anduse their association as the principal collective instrument to pursue that claim (ibid.,p. 59). This, according to Chatterjee, is a clear break with the erstwhile patron-clientexchanges, and an indication of their political assertion.

Chatterjee explains that the mobilization which takes place on the terrain of politicalsociety is necessarily temporary and contextual, and depends entirely on the abilityof particular population groups to mobilize support to inuence the implementation ofgovernment policy in their favour (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 60, emphasis added; note:

implementation, not policy formulation). Such strategic politics must operate withinthe constellation of the (mainstream) political formations (i.e., parties, but also non-governmental organizations?). The success of such strategic manoeuvring dependson applying the right pressure at the right places in the governmental machinery(Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66). However, they do not always have access to such rightplaces, and therefore, (t)o produce a viable and persuasive politics of the governed,there has to be considerable act of mediation (ibid., p. 64). Hence, there is a real needfor nding trustworthy mediators who can represent them.

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Chatterjee critically engages with the concept of civil society to show its limits and theexclusion that it entails. Thereafter, he splits the political eld into civil society and

political society, with the point of division being the modality of realization of rights.It is not that political society replaces civil society altogether, but he identies andconceptualizes a separate domain and privileges the former over the latter.

The problem with Chatterjees approach is that he does not leave his explicationof political society at the level of description or fully esh out the logics of Indianpopulism. Instead, in his attempt to appreciate the Indian politics, he offers a positive


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evaluation of political society and rehabilitates it as an innovative and promisingpolitical development.

Chatterjee argues that it is through manoeuvring in political society that certaingroups participate in political process, which is otherwise not possible within the liberalspace of the associations of civil society transacting business with the constitutionalstate (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 282). He claims that the working of political society opens upthe possibility to effectively work against the [existing] distribution of power in societyas a whole (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66). This possibility, according to him, is realized inthe case of distribution of property rights. The practices in political society are locatedin relation to the legal-political forms of the modern state (ibid., p. 74, and passim).As the new political entities wrangle over property and benets, they also strike at thefoundation of property relations. Property, Chatterjee reminds us, is the conceptualname of regulations by law of relations between individuals in civil society. But asthese social relations are yet to be mo(u)lded into proper forms of civil society, the

state must maintain a ction that in the constitution of its sovereignty, all citizens belongto civil society and are, by virtue of that legally constructed fact, equal subjects of thelaw. This ctional element must be addressed in the actual administrative processes.And when the non-citizens assert their agency through manoeuvring in political society,they force the state to adopt a dual strategy: on the one hand, para-legal arrangementsthat modify, re-arrange or supplement on the contingent terrain of political society theformal structures of property that must, on the other hand, continue to be afrmed andprotected within the legally constructed domain of civil society.

However, the reconstitution of property relationships that Chatterjee nds doesnot radically alter those relationships; such a reconstitution is generally compensatoryin nature, which otherwise preserves or facilitates to preserve the existing propertyrelationships. Chatterjees political agenda avoids articulating any demand for re-

distribution of property, and that is evident in his depiction of negotiation over illegalsquatting or encroachment of property as a positive political process. He is satised toobserve that the governmental functions and non-governmental agencies are forcedto recognize the demands of the members of political society in a different way.These agencies do not recognize these members or groups as part of civil society andconsequently, cannot negotiate with them according to the formal and strict proceduresand law of the land. Hence, there is a proliferation of layered mediations andpara-legalarrangements to resolve various contentious issues, and to meet the demands of thesegroups. The governmental bodies and political representatives deliberate and negotiateto identify the valid claims (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 69). However, such negotiations must

be hidden and not formally recorded, as (i)t is entirely possible that the negotiationson the ground did not respect the principles of bureaucratic rationality or even the

provisions of law (ibid. p. 73 and passim). Chatterjee appreciates this para-legalarrangement and the actions in political society as an act of actual expansion of thefreedoms of the people (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66). He briey refers to Amartya Senscapability approach, which embod[ies] a set of substantive freedoms rather thanutilities or income or primary goods (ibid., p. 68) to support his claim.

Nonetheless, the limit of this politics is captured in the context of the recentphase of capitalist transformation in India. In an article published in 2008, Chatterjee


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engages with the political economy of this transformation and tries to make his earlierobservations compatible with the new context. Here, the central problematic is the sole

ascendancy of private industrial-corporate capital in India to the position of hegemonicdomination which is accomplished with the connivance [in my words] of the urbanmiddle classesthe sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative modelsof bourgeois civil society (Chatterjee, 2008a, p. 57)and the parallel decline of theagrarian bourgeoisie (ibid., p. 56). Such ascendancy of industrial-corporate capital isrendered possible through primitive accumulation, namely, the dissociation of thelabourer from the means of labour [i.e. production] (ibid., p. 54) and the attendanttransfer of those means of production to the capitalists. Chatterjee thinks that politicalsociety again becomes a signicant eld of contestation and interventions in this newcontext: the need to reverse the effects of the primitive accumulation necessitate thatthe governmental agencies engage with political society to distribute the benets,following the modality described above. Thereby, he tries to rehabilitate political

society precisely when its limits are very much exposed.In response to this article, Amita Baviskar and Nandini Sundar, Mary E. John

and Satish Deshpande, and Mihir Shah (2008) have all criticized Chatterjee formisconstruing the present capitalist transformation in India and the location andstatus of the peasantry in that process. Baviskar and Sundar (2008) explain that it is thecapitalist imperative for accumulation that brings primitive or primary accumulationto the fore, which requires the transfer of property from one to another, achievedin contemporary India through an application of force. Such an application of forcemakes civil society not a domain of hegemony, but of domination (ibid., p. 89],implying that the division and distinction of civil and political societies along the axesof civility and legality is misleading. All the authors argue that in order to understandcontemporary subaltern resistances (in my words), one needs to analyse the politicaleconomy of rural societies, take into consideration the historical differentiation ofthe peasantry, the grip of nance and mercantile capital over rural production andexchange processes, and pay attention to various forms of welfarism in practice sincethe colonial times. Political activity cannot be restricted to a contest over reversing theeffects of the primitive accumulation (i.e. negotiating the amount of compensation orprovisions of other welfare benets, or identifying the beneciaries). Through suchnegotiations, politics in political society would simply allow the (corporate-) capitalisttransformation to take place, albeit at a cost, and thereby such politics would notthreaten the dominant: it will be easier for the dominant to meet those demands.

In order to appreciate the contemporary subaltern politics, these critics suggestthat one needs to study the cases of resistance (John and Deshpande, 2008, p. 86), to see

the success in getting the NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), theForest Act and the Right to Information Act as an outcome of peoples own degree oforganization and their increased ability to speak in terms of the very law that is usedto dispossess them (Baviskar and Sundar, 2008, p. 88) and the look out for spaces,which the ruling classes are compelled to open up in an attempt to legitimize theirpositions of power so as to (utilize) [those spaces] with a renewed creativity by thoseghting for a more equal, less exploitative social order (Shah, 2008, p. 81).


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Responding to his critics, Chatterjee claries that he does not see the policies toreverse the effects of the primitive accumulation being based on a need of capital

argument (Chatterjee, 2008b, p. 91 and passim), rather his argument in his 2008aarticle was not a transition argument at all. It [reversing the effects of the primitiveaccumulation] is a process that [...] is integral to the global reproduction of capital inits most advanced phase. The impulse for such ameliorative measures comes fromthe moral passionas Chatterjee (2008b, p. 92 andpassim) explains:

it is mistaken to claim that the dominant and propertied classes any longer set the standardsof morality for society; rather, in a democratic age, the moral passion of entitlement and outrageis on the side of those who have little

And in agreement with the critics, he underlines the political dimension of suchan engagement:

Since the intentions emerge from the arena of politics, it goes without saying that they are

shaped by the struggles between rival groups and classes in that arena.

The character of the politics which emerges in this elda eld created bygovernmentalityis populist, and populism is the only morally legitimate formof democratic politics today. Thus, it seems that Chatterjee stands by his earlierclaim that the politics of the governed is shifting the historical horizon of politicalmodernity in most of the world (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 75). It is through such politicalengagements that people are substantial[ly] reden[ing] property and law withinthe actually existing modern state (ibid., p. 75) and are devising new ways in whichthey can choose how they should be governed... people are learning, and forcing theirgovernors to learn, how they would prefer to be governed[which itself is a] good

justication for democracy (ibid., pp. 77-78).

The political leverage in political society is linked with the inherent majoritarianbias of electoral democracy (Chatterjee, 2008b, p. 90 and passim). And it is in thiscontext that new marginalized groups comprising low-caste and tribals, excludedfrom political society, have emerged: [p]olitical society and electoral democracy havenot given these groups the means to make effective claims on governmentality. Inthis sense, these marginalised groups represent an outside beyond. This third spaceis a new category in Chatterjees writing, which John and Deshpande (2008, p. 85) callthe liminal zone.

The presence of this third space makes it quite clear that the attempt to completelymap political spaces is difcult, and the criteria drawn up to differentiate these spacesalways leave out another space. But it seems that the two important issues at stake inthis debate are: (i) the centrality of governmentality in post-colonial political processes,and (ii) whether it is possible to work out the logics and limits of Indian populismfrom it. Chatterjee reiterates the centrality of governmentality2 as he says (2008b, p. 93,emphasis added):

they [members of political society] are not necessarily turning into republican citizens,but they are nonetheless acquiring a stake, strategically and morally, in the processes of

governmental power. And governmental power, we know, is no longer restricted to the branchesof the state but extends to a host of non-state and even non-governmental agencies.


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Although there are scopes to delve further for fathoming the process and degreeof expansion of governmental power and its capacity to shape and contain the

Indian populism, yet Chatterjee does not undertake that task. In fact, throughout hiswritings, governmentality has been handled in terms of its instrumentality, whichgives rise to the allegation that he has equate[d] intensions with outcomes (Johnand Deshpande, 2008, p. 84). Mediating on the logics and limits on Indian populismis beyond the purview of this article, but I would like to foreground an interestingtheoretical question, which has come out from Chatterjees defence of political society,particularly in the context of capitalist transformation, and Shahs remark that [g]overnmentality [in India] is [] in a crisis (2008, p. 80). The question is: Do thepractices of governmentality (i.e. positive policy interventions) manage to dispel orabsorb capitalist antagonisms?

As argued in this article, the imperatives of capitalist accumulation require theseparation of labour from the means of production (exploitation) and transfer of propertyfrom one to another (among other processes, via primitive/primary accumulation). Theantagonisms which emerge because of such separation are unavoidable, and the provisionof compensation would not always be sufcient to dispel or absorb that antagonism. Thisseparation induced by capitalism is fundamental in nature, creating polar opposite (and

broad) identities of owners of means of production, and owners of labour power and thedispossessed people. These identities are different from those infused by governmentalpolicies in the way as Chatterjee explains, i.e. empirical groups gain an identity from thecategory that the government assigns. The forms and content of political articulationsof these latter groups are already located within, and thereby subsumed by thegovernmental discourse. But, in the case of capitalist antagonism, political articulationsresist subsumption within capitalist and governmental discourses.

What the concept of political society warns us is that a certain section of thesociety is marginalized and that their demands do not become part of mainstreampolitical articulations in civil society; rather different sorts of demands are allowedto be raised and those are dealt in a piecemeal way. In fact, Chatterjee reminds us,that governmentality always operates on a heterogeneous social eld, on multiplepopulation groups, and with multiple strategies (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 60 andpassim).And we have seen that the politics in political society is necessarily temporaryand contextual. Thus, any political intervention that wants to overcome thisfragmentary and temporary politics would necessarily require an engagement inhegemonic politics, a process of constructing a broader political movement beyondthe fragmentary ones [for example, the way Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985)theorize hegemonic strategy]. A detailed discussion on this is beyond the scope of this

article.] The exclusions within and from civil society cannot be positively amelioratedor rehabilitated in another domain, namely political society, but a sustained politicalstruggle is required to re-constitute and restructure civil society as the very sphere ofrealization of rights to counter such exclusions and exclusionary practices.

The tasks that need to be undertaken, working through Chatterjees writing, are:(i) developing an analytical framework which helps us understand the specicity andcomplexity of power relationships in India and the changes within it, (ii) explicating


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the logics of Indian populism, and (iii) exploring its limits, which would inform usabout the new exclusions, and the possibility of re-organizing the political space.

NOTES

1. Here, Chatterjee criticizes Charles Taylors essay on civil society (see Taylor, 2005). Chatterjeedemonstrates that both Locke and Montesquieu had defended the sovereignty of the subjectivewill (from the state) by appealing and grounding it to a notion of community.

2. The centrality of governmentality was already indicated by Sudipta Kaviraj (1997, p. 54),though he called it the terrain of governance, which according to him, refers to the processof actual policy decisions within the apparatuses of the state and this ensure[s] that actualpolitical congurations do not become symmetrical to class divisions in society.

REFERENCES

Baviskar, Amita and Nandini Sundar (2008). Democracy versus Economic Transformation?,

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November 15, pp. 87-89.Chatterjee, Partha (2008a). Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, Economic and

Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 16, April 19-25, pp. 53-62.

(2008b). Classes, Capital and Indian Democracy, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46,November, pp. 89-93.

(2004). The Politics of the Governed, Columbia University Press, New York.

(2001). On Civil and Political Society in Post-colonial Democracies, in Sudipta Kavirajand Sunil Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, England.

(1998). Community in the East, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 6, February 7.

(1993). The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton.

Cohen, J. and A. Arato (1992). Political Theory and Civil Society, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1967). Philosophy of Right, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kaviraj, Sudipta (1997). A Critique of Passive Revolution, in Partha Chatterjee (ed.), State andPolitics in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a RadicalDemocratic Politics, Verso, London.

John, Mary and Satish Deshpande (2008). Theorizing the Present: Problems and Possibilities,Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November 15, pp. 83-86.

Narayanan, D. (1997). Designing Community-based Development, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/07/06/000094946_01062204004785/additional/585559324_20040284043342.pdf, accessed on 16 October 2008.

Nonan-Ferrell, C. (2004). The State, Civil Society and Revolutions: Building Political Legitimacy inTwentieth Century Latin America, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 294-304.

Putnam, R. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton.

Shah, Mihir (2008). Structures of Power in Indian Society: A Response, Economic and PoliticalWeekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November 15, pp. 78-83.

Taylor, Charles (2005). Invoking Civil Society, in Robert E. Goodwin and Philip Petit (eds)Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, Blackwell, Oxford.


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