“Incumbent performance and electoral control”
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Transcript of “Incumbent performance and electoral control”
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Research Paper by John Ferejohn
“INCUMBENT PERFORMANCE AND ELECTORAL CONTROL”
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BACKGROUND TO PAPER• Pure theory of electoral competition based on idea that citizens
compare the platforms of two candidates and vote for the preferred
• Strategies of the candidates are represented by promises of future performance in office
• Models have been created based on these assumptions, in both static and dynamic settings
• Models of these sort possess the property that if the set of alternatives is “large enough” equilibrium platforms rarely exist
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• Does not consider differing preferences between the politician and his constituents
• It is assumed that promises will be kept by the officeholder
• A discipline mechanism may be set in place to make sure promises are kept
STATIC MODELS [MCKELVEY (1975)]
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• Assumes that any challenger will propose a platform that will defeat the incumbent
• Incumbent assumes he will lose the next election
• Voters recognize that any rational challenger’s platform would ignore their preferences while in office
DYNAMIC MODELS [KRAMER (1977)]
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PURPOSE OF PAPERPrevious models show that there is no predictable connection between voter preferences and public policy
• Author constructs a dynamic model where:
1. Electorate bases their vote on officeholder’s performance
2. Officeholder anticipates this behavior and chooses their policies
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PURPOSE OF PAPER (CONT.)
• Empirical evidence shows that the pure theory of elections only partially describes electoral behavior
• Recent data shows:
• Voters respond to the performance of incumbents and to promises of competing candidates
• Economic performance is relevant to the reelection of the incumbent
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ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
• Voters assume officeholder will act in their own interests while in office
• Voters will maximize their own welfare subject to the constraint that officeholders will pursue their own self-interest
• Voter behavior is constrained by the fact that it must be in the best interest of the voters at that time
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• Simple dynamic model only contains one voter (homogeneous electorate) and two or more candidates
• Analyzes the variation in electoral behavior
• Nonhomogeneous model contains several voters and changes the situation significantly
• Vote based on an aggregate criterion rather than individualistic
MODELS DEVELOPED IN THE PAPER
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MODEL WITH HOMOGENEOUS ELECTORATE • Voters have more control over officeholders if the value of office is high
• Officeholder is imperfectly monitored by members of the electorate
• Conclusion will hold up in more sophisticated models assuming disinterest in party reputations
In a two party system:
• Losing office is not as significant as it would be in a multiparty system so officeholders place less value in interests of electors
• Voter control is decreased if parties cannot distinguish themselves
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MODEL WITH NONHOMOGENEOUS ELECTORATE
• Because of differing voter preferences the incumbent is uncontrollable by the electorate
• Rational individual behavior will lead to an undesirable outcome which will arise in any model in which voter preferences are sufficiently diverse
• Potential exploitation by the incumbent leads voters to adopt “sociotropic” rules
• Voting based on aggregate performance
• Thus, induce the incumbent to provide the same level of service as in the homogenous model
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CONCLUSION• Simple model allows retrospective voting based on incumbent’s
performance
• Complex model requires electorate refusal to vote selfishly
• Further ideas to explore:
• Development of “sociotropic” rules
• Collusion between incumbent and challengers