IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR, …
Transcript of IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR, …
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA THE FLORIDA BAR,
CASE NO.: SC07-2 Complainant,
TFB NO.: 2004-10,635(20D) v. 2005-10,282(20A) 2005-10,465(20A) NADEGE ELLIOTT
Respondent.
_____________________________/
THE FLORIDA BAR'S INITIAL BRIEF
HENRY LEE PAUL Assistant Staff Counsel Florida Bar No. 508373 The Florida Bar
5521 W. Spruce St., Suite C-49 Tampa, Florida 33607-5958 (813) 875-9821
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ i TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................................ iii SYMBOLS AND REFERENCES .......................................................................... vii STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS .......................................................... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 15 STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................... 17 ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 18
I. THE REFEREE'S RECOMMENDATION OF A TWO-YEAR SUSPENSION DOES NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS IN EXISTING CASE LAW OR THE FLORIDA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS ................................................ 18
II. THE REFEREE ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ADDITIONAL
AGGRAVATING FACTORS THAT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND SUPPORT A SANCTION OF PERMANENT DISBARMENT. .................................................................................. 29
A. The Referee erred in failing to find in aggravation that Elliott
acted with a dishonest or selfish motive ................................... 30 B. The Referee erred in failing to find in aggravation that Elliott
engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process. ... 32 C. The Referee erred in failing to find in aggravation that Elliott
submitted false evidence, false statements or other deceptive
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practices during the disciplinary process. ................................. 35 D. The Referee erred in failing to find as an aggravating factor
Standard 9.22(h), the vulnerability of Elliott's victims ............. 40 E. The Referee erred in failing to find as an aggravating factor
Standard 9.22(j), in difference to making restitution ................ 41
III. PERMANENT DISBARMENT IS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR ELLIOTT'S EGREGIOUS AND CUMULATIVE MISCONDUCT. .................................................................................. 42
A. Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for the misuse of trust
funds. ......................................................................................... 43 B. Elliott's cumulative misconduct warrants permanent
disbarment. ................................................................................ 44 C. Elliott's misconduct during the disciplinary proceedings
demonstrates her complete unfitness for the practice of law. ... 46
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 50 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 51 CERTIFICATION OF FONT SIZE AND STYLE ................................................. 52 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................... A-1
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TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASES PAGE Chandris v. Yanakakis, 668 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1996) ................................................. 28 Florida Bar v. Batista, 846 So.2d 479 (Fla. 200) .................................................... 28 Florida Bar v. Bern, 425 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1982) ...................................................... 44 Florida Bar v. Della-Donna, 583 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1989) ........................................ 26 Florida Bar v. Forrester, 916 So.2d 647 (Fla. 2005) .............................................. 48 Florida Bar v. Germain, 957 So.2d 613 (Fla. 2000) ............................................... 17 Florida Bar v. Golden, 566 So.2d 1286 (Fla. 1990) ................................................ 45 Florida Bar v. Karten, 829 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2002) .................................................. 45 Florida Bar v. Korones, 752 So.2d 586 (Fla. 2000) ................................................ 49 Florida Bar v. Langston, 540 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1989) .............................................. 17 Florida Bar v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So.2d 241 (Fla. 2007) ................................. 26 Florida Bar v. Orta, 689 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1977) ...................................................... 25 Florida Bar v. Puente, 963 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2007) ...................................... 20, 24, 25 Florida Bar v. Roberts, 770 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 2000) ............................................... 45 Florida Bar v. Springer, 873 So.2d 317 (Fla. 2004) ............................................... 22
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Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1999) ................................................ 17 Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2000) ....................................... 20, 43, 44 Florida Bar v. Williams, 753 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 2000) ............................................. 45 Florida Bar v. Winter, 549 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1989) .................................................. 27 Florida Bar v. Zyne, 266 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1972) ...................................................... 48 RULES OF DISCIPLINE R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.7 ...................................................................................... 1 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.1 ................................................................................ 6, 21 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.4(a) .................................................................................. 9 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.4(b) ................................................................................. 9 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(a) ............................................................................ 6, 26 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(e) ................................................................................ 13 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(f) ............................................................................ 9, 13 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.15(a) .......................................................................... 7, 20 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.15(b) ............................................................................... 7 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.16(d) ........................................................................... 7, 9 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(a) ........................................................................ 7, 9, 13
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R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(c) ........................................................10, 24, 25, 26, 30 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1 .................................................................................... 43 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(a) ...................................................................... 7, 10, 20 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(b) ......................................................................... 10, 20 R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(e) ...................................................................... 7, 10, 13 FLORIDA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.0 ........................................................................ 19 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.1 ........................................................................ 19 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.11 ...................................................................... 19 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.5 ............................................................ 20, 22, 23 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.51 ...................................................................... 21 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.6 ........................................................................ 23 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.61 .......................................................... 23, 25, 26 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.1 ........................................................................ 24 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.11(f) .................................................................. 25 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 6.1 ........................................................................ 25 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 6.11(a) ................................................................. 25
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Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 7.0 .................................................................. 25, 26 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 7.1 ......................................................................... 26 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 8.0 ........................................................................ 26 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 8.1(a) .................................................................... 26 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(a) .................................................................... 3 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.22(b) ........................................................... 29, 30 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(c) .................................................................... 3 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(d) .................................................................... 3 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(e) ............................................................ 29, 32 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(f) ...........................................22, 25, 29, 32, 35 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(h) ............................................................ 29, 40 Fla. Stds. Imposing Law Sancs. 9.22(j) ............................................................. 29, 41
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SYMBOLS AND REFERENCES
In this Brief, the Petitioner, The Florida Bar, will be referred to as “The
Florida Bar” or “The Bar.” The Respondent, Nadege Elliott, will be referred to as
"Elliott" or “Respondent.”
“TR” will refer to the transcript of the final hearing before the Referee in
Supreme Court Case No. SC07-2 held on June 25, 26 and 27, 2007; July 2, 3, 9,
10, 11, 16, and 18, 2007; and September 17, 18, and 19, 2007. “SH” will refer to
the transcript of the sanctions hearing before the Referee held on October 16, 2007.
"RR" will refer to the Report of Referee dated October 4, 2007. "RR2" will refer
to the Report of Referee as to Sanctions dated October 23, 2007.
“HT” will refer to exhibits presented by The Florida Bar in relation to Count
I of the Complaint (Complaint of Harold Thomas). "LF" will refer to exhibits
presented by the Bar in relation to Count II (Complaint of Lucille Foster), and
"GG" will refer to exhibits presented by the Bar in relation to Count III (Complaint
of Glenn Green). “RT” will refer to exhibits presented by the Respondent in
relation to Count I, "RF" in relation to Count II, and "RG" in relation to Count III.
“Rule” or “Rules” will refer to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
“Standard” or “Standards” will refer to Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Elliott was found guilty of violating the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar in
three separate counts based on allegations made by three separate complainants:
Harold Thomas, Lucille Foster, and Glenn Green. The final hearing and the
sanctions hearing were held intermittently over a period of 13 days. The Referee
issued two reports: one dated October 4, 2007, addressing guilt (RR), and a second
report dated October 23, 2007, addressing sanctions (RR2). Copies of the
Referee’s Reports, which contain extensive factual findings, are attached to this
Brief as Appendices “A” and "B" for the Court’s convenience.
The Referee recommended that Elliott be found guilty of violating numerous
Rules and be suspended for a period of two years. Elliott filed a petition for
review. The Florida Bar filed a cross petition for review requesting that Elliott be
permanently disbarred. The Bar also requested a review of the Referee's failure to
find additional aggravating factors supported by the record. Elliott withdrew her
petition for review, and the Bar proceeded pursuant to its petition for review of
sanctions. Pursuant to Rule 3-7.7 the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked.
Although each case is distinct, there are substantial similarities among all
three cases. In each case, the Referee found that Elliott took funds belonging to
her clients by either failing to deposit funds into trust, or by making unauthorized
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and undisclosed disbursements from trust. RR. In each case, Elliott cloaked her
deception by failing to deliver an accounting for the use of funds to her clients,
despite requests to do so. RR. In each case, Elliott obtained fees and cost money
in a mixed contingent fee case. In each case, Elliott took an initial fee to evaluate
the case, and then took a much larger secondary fee after verbal agreements to
represent the clients. An adequate fee agreement was never presented to any client
prior to acceptance of the secondary fee. RR. None of the fee agreements were in
compliance with the Rules. RR. The purported fee agreement in the Green case
was entered into when Elliott, while on rehabilitative suspension, approached her
former clients in a parking lot, after hours, and obtained their signature on an
undated fee agreement. RR 15. This incident occurred approximately 18 months
after Elliott made an undisclosed and unauthorized $10,000 disbursement of the
$15,000 secondary fee that had been placed in trust. RR 15-16.
In addition to the foregoing violations, the Referee found Elliott to be
incompetent and to have charged a clearly excessive fee in the Thomas case. The
Referee further recommended that Elliott be ordered to pay $3,800 in restitution to
Foster and $11,500 to Green. RR2. The Florida Bar did not request restitution in
the Thomas case because Thomas had sued Elliott for malpractice and obtained a
compensatory settlement. HT 35a, TR 257-59.
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The Referee made no findings as to the applicable Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, except for aggravating and mitigating factors. The Referee
found the following aggravating factors to be applicable: Standard 9.22(a) prior
disciplinary offenses; (c) a pattern of misconduct; and (d) multiple offenses. The
Florida Bar requested findings of additional aggravating factors; however, the
Referee made no finding or comment regarding the additional requested
aggravating factors. Following is a review of the Referee's findings and supporting
evidence for each count of the Bar's Complaint.
COUNT I: This Count is based on the complaint of Harold Thomas, who
was described by Elliott as having “no lucidity.” HT 46 at 89-90. The lawyer who
subsequently represented Thomas in a malpractice case against Elliott stated that
Thomas was not sophisticated and did not understand what had transpired during
the representation. TR 242-44. Elliott represented Thomas in a whistleblower
claim against his former employer, the Collier County Sheriff. Thomas was
terminated on or about March 21, 2001. HT 1. On August 23, 2001, Thomas paid
Elliott a $2,500 research fee to determine if he had a viable cause of action. HT 4,
HT 5. The limitations period on this whistleblower claim ran on or about
September 22, 2001. RR 3; HT 51 at 31, HT 20, 27, 28, 31, 32; TR 250-54, 545-
46, 560. On November 7, 2001, two and one half months after the limitations
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period ran, Thomas paid Elliott $9,000 to file a whistleblower lawsuit against the
Sheriff. HT 8, 9. About this time, Elliott told Thomas the recovery would make
him “rich.” TR 79-80, 471. Thomas paid Elliott another $1,000 in May 2002. HT
17. She finally filed a lawsuit against the Sheriff on July 24, 2002. HT 19. Not
only was the lawsuit time barred, it was filed under the wrong statute (F.S. § 448 –
private whistleblower act) and misstated the date of termination as December
2001. Elliott accepted additional payments from Thomas totaling $2,172 in
December 2002 and January 2003. HT 23. Elliott ultimately charged and accepted
a total of $12,172 in fees after the limitations period had run. RR 6, 7.
On January 10, 2003, Elliott filed an amended complaint under the public
whistleblower act (F.S. § 112). HT 24. The initial complaint she filed under the
wrong statute was subject to a motion to dismiss. HT 20, 21. She attempted to
cure the limitations bar by alleging that Thomas had sent a letter to the Florida
Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) complaining about wrongful
termination. This letter had never been sent and was an after-the-fact fabrication.
RR 4. Elliott attached the false letter to the amended complaint. Although
Thomas testified that Elliott participated in creating this false letter, the Referee
found that this allegation was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. RR
5; HT 36, 38, 40; TR 106-23, 151-53, 525. Elliott wrongfully believed that this
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letter, if sent, would have remedied any limitations bar. RR 5; HT 6, HT 42, HT
51 at 28-32, 35-37, 72-75; TR 2009-10. The FCHR had no authority to consider a
claim against the Sheriff, and the letter, even if sent, would have had no impact on
the limitations period. RR 2-9; HT 27, 28, 31; TR 539-54. Elliott continued to
assert throughout the disciplinary process that the lawsuit was timely filed and that
FCHR was required to be given notice. TR 2009-10, HT 42, HT 51 at 28-32, 35-
37, 72-75.
Elliott claimed that Thomas deceived her as to the date of his termination
and falsely told her it was December 2001 as opposed to March 2001 and that this
alleged deception was the reason the limitations period expired. TR 1990-92, HT
51 at 81. Elliott made this claim despite the fact she had the notice of termination
in her file (HT 1), and later produced a letter to Thomas dated September 25, 2001
referencing his prior termination. HT 6. Elliott wrongfully believed that she had
to wait 180 days to file suit because she thought the Department of Insurance had
to be given notice pursuant to the Florida Tort Claims Act. HT 10, HT 45 at 23, 34
- 37, 65; HT 51 at 45; TR 93, TR 536-37.
Elliott deposited into her operating account the $9,000 received from
Thomas on November 7, 2001. She did so without authorization and with no
written fee agreement. RR 6-8. Elliott initially admitted that she had not provided
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Thomas with a “Bar approved Contingency Fee Agreement.” HT 37. Elliott later
produced a multitude of versions of purported fee agreements (HT 4, 9, 12, 17, 37,
39) and attempted to use the documents to justify her breach of trust.
In an attempt to justify her use of client funds, Elliott claimed she
represented Thomas on other matters and that Thomas verbally authorized the
deposit of funds into the operating account. HT 39, TR 55-56, 1961-62, SH 124.
Thomas denied giving any such authorization. TR 82-88, HT 40. The invoices she
presented to justify the fees were dated more than eight months after she placed the
$9,000 into her operating account. HT 39 at NET41, NET42. Although Elliott
provided these invoices to The Florida Bar (HT 37, 39), Thomas denied ever
receiving any such invoices and denied having any such agreement. HT 39, TR
167-76, 474-76. The Referee determined that Elliott’s defense was unfounded and
stated: “All of the fees paid to Respondent were paid in connection with the
doomed whistleblower’s lawsuit and to it alone.” RR 6. Elliott failed to provide
Thomas with an accounting of the funds he paid her. TR 149-50, 237-38, 1953-54.
Elliott also failed to provide Thomas with his file after the representation ended,
despite several requests. HT 33; TR 153, 237-38, 241-42, 246.
The Referee recommended that Elliott be found guilty of violating the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.1 (Competence); 4-1.5(a)
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(Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees); 4-1.15(a) (Clients' and Third Party
Funds to be Held in Trust); 4-1.15(b) (Notice of Receipt of Trust Funds; Delivery
and Accounting); 4-1.16(d) (Protection of Client's Interest); 4-8.4(a) (violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); 5-1.1(a) (Nature of Money
or Property Entrusted to Attorney); and 5-1.1(e) (Notice of Receipt of Trust Funds;
Delivery; Accounting).
COUNT II: Count II of the Complaint is based on the allegations of Lucille
Foster. Elliott and Foster attended the same church and participated in music
programs together. Foster hired Elliott, in part, because of the special trust she
afforded Elliott as a member of her church. TR 719-21, 820-21, SH 12. Foster
hired Elliott to represent her in a personal injury claim against Orkin, a pest control
company, for alleged excessive treatment of her home with pesticides.
Foster paid Elliott $2,600 on July 9, 2002. RR 9; LF 1, 2, 3. Foster signed a
one-page fee agreement which provided for a flat fee of $2,500 for research and a
$100 consultation fee. The agreement also provided for a $10,000 retainer for
“suit, + expenses + % of recovery.” No contingent fee percentage was stated and
no statement of client’s rights was provided. RR 9, LF 1, TR 735, 886.
In August 2002, Elliott told Foster that the money had been used up and that
she needed more money to proceed with the case. Foster paid Elliott $10,000
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more. TR 729-30. Elliott also told Foster that the case would require an expert
witness at a cost of as much as $7,000. TR 725-26. Based on these
representations, Foster gave Elliott an additional $10,000 on August 8, 2002.
Elliott requested 2 checks of $5,000 each. TR 727-29. She deposited $5,000 into
her trust account and $5,000 into her operating account. It was only after Elliott
had received the additional $10,000 that a written contingent fee agreement was
presented and signed. A statement of client’s rights was not attached to this fee
agreement. RR 9, LF 7, TR 735. Elliott filed suit against Orkin on behalf of Foster
on October 24, 2002. LF 8.
In January 2003, during a discussion at church, Elliott disclosed to Foster
that she had a problem with The Florida Bar and was facing possible suspension.
A month later, Elliott told Foster her problems with the Bar had been cleared up.
RR 10, TR 738-39, 865-67. The Report of Referee recommending a six-month
suspension was issued November 15, 2002. This Court approved the Report of
Referee by Order dated June 26, 2003, and Elliott's suspension was effective July
25, 2003. LF 10, 14.
Elliott disbursed $2,800 from trust to herself as fees on February 7, 2003
without Foster's knowledge or authorization. RR 12, LF 30A, TR 747-48. Elliott
made another unauthorized disbursement of $1,000 from trust to herself on May
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13, 2003. RR 12, LF 30A, TR 747-48. On June 25, 2003, Elliott charged Foster
another $2,500 for mediation expenses. RR 9-10; LF 13, 25; TR 749-50. A
mediation was held on July 18, 2003, just days before her suspension was to take
effect. Elliott deposited the $2,500 directly into her personal checking account
without Foster's knowledge or authorization. RR 10, TR 708, 716-17, 950-53.
Elliott did not inform Foster about her suspension until the mediation was
concluded. LF 25, TR 756-59, SH 17-19. After the mediation, Foster asked for an
accounting. RR 10, LF 25, TR 755-65. Elliott told Foster that an itemization of
expenses was not available at that time and that she would send it later. Foster
never received an accounting as promised. RR 11, LF 25, TR 755-65. Foster did
receive a check in the amount of $210.55 dated July 24, 2003. LF 18, TR 755-65.
It was only after the grievance committee found probable cause for further
disciplinary proceedings on January 27, 2006, that Elliott finally acknowledged
receipt of $2,500 and sent Foster a check in the amount of $2,569.58 on April 21,
2006. RR 10, LF 29. Elliott claimed that she was unaware that the $2,500 check
had been deposited into her personal checking account. TR 950-53.
The Referee recommended that Elliott be found guilty of violating the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.4(a) (Informing Client of Status
of Representation); 4-1.4(b)(Duty to Explain Matters to Client); 4-1.5(f)
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(Contingent Fees); 4-1.16(d) (Protection of Client's Interests); 4-8.4(a) (violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 5-1.1(a) (Nature of Money or
Property Entrusted to Attorney); 5-1.1(b) (Application of Trust Funds or Property
to Specific Purpose); and 5-1.1(e) (Notice of Receipt of Trust Funds; Delivery;
Accounting). RR 11-13. The Referee recommended restitution to Foster in the
amount of $3,800. RR2 2.
COUNT III: This Count is based on the complaint of Glenn Green. Green
was severely disabled with degenerative disk disease, partial paralysis, and
depression. TR 1016-17, 1063-64, 1303-04. During the representation by Elliott,
he wrote in an e-mail to her that he was “in an almost constant state of mental
fogginess.” GG 10a at NEG0207, GG 39 at 211-12, TR 1313-16.
Elliott was hired to represent Green in three separate matters related to his
disability: (1) an ADA claim against his employer, Gulf Coast Center, involving a
federal cause of action and related EEOC filings; (2) a state disability action
involving retirement disability benefits; and. (3) a claim for Federal Social Security
disability benefits. RR 13-14.
The first time Green paid legal fees to Elliott was on July 14, 2000. GG1.
Over the course of representation, which ended when Elliott’s suspension became
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effective on July 25, 2003, Green paid Elliott between $22,751.45 and $24,251.45
in legal fees. The Referee could not determine a precise figure because Elliott's
records "are so incomplete in almost every material respect.” RR 14. The Referee
found that Elliott's records did "not clearly reflect whatever work she did to earn
any of the fees she charged." RR 14.
Elliott took $15,000 from Green on January 29, 2002 for the claim against
Gulf Coast Center without a clear fee agreement in place. RR 15. Green believed
this money was needed for costs attendant to filing a federal lawsuit. RR18.
Elliott then disbursed $10,000 in fees to herself from her trust account on February
8, 2002 without Green's knowledge or authorization. RR 15-16, GG 31A, TR
1054-57, 1128-29, 1133-36. Elliott also received $1,500 from proceeds of the sale
of real property owned by Green. The HUD settlement statement described the
payment as “Attorney’s Consultant Fee.” GG 6, GG 6A. Green and his wife both
testified that Elliott did no work on this matter and that this disbursement was
made without their authorization. TR 1041-47, 1308-11. There was no fee
agreement concerning this matter. RR 16.
The first fee agreement entered into by Green and Elliott was dated October
19, 2000. GG 3. This one-page agreement provided for representation in “civil
matter against Gulf Coast Center.” It provided for a $5,000 retainer and $1,000 for
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costs. It also provided for a contingency in the Social Security disability matter.
The agreement further stated: “If and when it becomes apparent that [certain fees
and expenses described in the contract] will be expended under this agreement, an
additional sum to be set by the attorney will be deposited in the firm’s trust account
as requested by the attorney.” GG 3, RR 14-15. The second fee agreement, dated
February 28, 2001 provided for a 30 percent contingency in the State disability
matter. Green paid Elliott $3,651.45 in regard to this matter. GG 18, 18A, 18B, 19.
The third fee agreement was an undated contingent fee contract between
Elliott and Green and his wife, Joanna Dye Green. Joanna had not previously
signed any agreement with Elliott despite the fact that the federal lawsuit had been
amended on April 17, 2003 to add her as a plaintiff. GG 10B, 35, 36. The Referee
accepted the testimony of the Greens that Elliott approached them in a parking lot
within a month after her suspension became effective on July 26, 2003. TR 1115-
19, 1316-18. Elliott persuaded the Greens to sign the agreement because “she
needed the document for her file.” RR 15. Elliott also told Green that he needed
to sign the undated fee agreement because “the copy had been lost and this one was
being used to replace it.” TR 1124-25. Elliott denied all the events surrounding
the undated fee agreement but never explained why it was undated or when it was
signed. GG 39 at 185-87, 192; TR 1010-11, 1015.
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Green asked Elliott for an accounting of funds paid to her on several
occasions. RR 16, GG 25, TR 1114, 1125-39. Elliott never provided a full
accounting to Green. RR 14, 16; GG 25; TR 1125-39. At the end of the
representation, Green expected to receive the $15,000 he had paid Elliott for the
costs of pursuing the Gulf Coast federal lawsuit; however, Elliott returned only
$3,300. RR 18, TR 1129.
The Referee recommended that Elliott be found guilty of violating the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.5(e) (Duty to Communicate
Basis or Rate of Fee to Client); 4-1.5(f) (Contingent Fees); 5-1.1(e) (Notice of
Receipt of Trust Funds; Delivery, Accounting); and 4-8.4(a) (violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct). RR 17-18. The Referee recommended
restitution in the amount of $11,500. RR2
PRIOR DISCIPLINE
SC02-1203: TFB Nos.: 2001-10,224(20D), 2001-10,577(20D): Elliott
received a six-month suspension effective July 25, 2003, followed by two years
probation upon reinstatement. She plead to a misdemeanor offense that involved
forging documents using the notary stamp of another. She then presented the
forged documents to the court in a pending divorce proceeding. Elliott sent
threatening e-mails to the opposing party in another case who informed the court
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about the forgery, and also threatened to file criminal charges against the notary
whose stamp she had used. The threat to the notary related to the obligation of a
notary to safeguard a notary stamp. Elliott also filed a frivolous bar complaint
against the assistant state attorney who prosecuted her for illegal use of the notary
stamp. In addition, Elliott failed to comply with trust accounting rules by failing to
keep accurate records and commingling funds. The Referee stated Elliott engaged
in "a pattern of behavior. . . [of] lashing out at those critical of her." There was no
actual loss to any client. LF 10, 14, 38.
SC03-2071TFB File No. 2003-10,357 (20A): Elliott received a 75-day
suspension effective September 29, 2004. Elliott entered into a stipulation with
opposing counsel where it was agreed that Elliott would hold $20,360.55 in trust
until further order of the court. The stipulation was approved by court order. The
funds were marital property subject to equitable distribution. Without the court’s
approval or knowledge, Elliott disbursed $4,500 of the funds to herself as payment
of her fees in two separate disbursements of $3,000 on August 1, 2001, and $1,500
on September 15, 2001. Elliott also failed to prepare monthly reconciliations of
her trust account. There was no harm to the client. LF 39, SH 35.
SC04-650, TFB File No. 2004-11,461 (20A): Elliott was reinstated effective
April 19, 2005, with two years probation. LF 40, SH 35.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Elliott has demonstrated a complete unfitness for the practice of law, and an
extraordinary lack of respect for her clients, the profession, and the disciplinary
process. She was found guilty of misusing client funds in three separate cases.
Elliott took money from vulnerable clients that was to be held in trust, disbursed
funds to herself without her clients' knowledge or consent, and concealed her
misconduct by refusing to provide an accounting of the funds. Elliott not only
misused client funds and deceived her clients, she also provided grossly
incompetent representation, charged excessive fees, violated a prior disciplinary
order, and failed to provide her clients with proper contingency fee agreements.
Her disciplinary record includes two previous suspensions for dishonest conduct,
including a six-month suspension for notary fraud and a 75-day suspension for
disbursing escrow funds to herself without authorization. Given Elliott's
cumulative pattern of misconduct, the Referee's recommended suspension of two
years is without a reasonable basis in the existing case law or the Florida Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
In addition to the numerous violations found by the Referee, Elliott showed
a complete lack of respect for the disciplinary process. She continued her pattern
of lashing out at those critical of her, as was observed by the referee in Elliott's first
16
disciplinary case. In this case, Elliott claimed that essentially every adverse
witness had unclean hands, was untruthful, and had a grudge against her.
She failed to produce subpoenaed documents, failed to respond to requests for
information at all levels of the proceedings, made misrepresentations to the Bar,
and created after-the-fact documents and evidence in an effort to support her
defense. At the final hearing, Elliott falsely accused the Bar of tampering with
evidence. In her closing argument, Elliott explained that she believed she had no
obligation to provide information to The Florida Bar or participate in the
investigation.
The Referee made no findings as to the applicable Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, except for aggravating and mitigating factors. The Referee also
failed to make any findings regarding additional aggravating factors requested by
the Bar. The Bar submits that there is ample record evidence to support the
applicability of these aggravating factors.
Based on the seriousness of Elliott's violations, her cumulative misconduct,
and the aggravating factors, the two-year suspension recommended by the Referee
is an insufficient sanction and is not consistent with the case law or the Florida
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Bar requests this Court to impose
the sanction of permanent disbarment.
17
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's scope of review on recommendations for discipline is broader
than that afforded to a referee's findings of fact. Florida Bar v. Langston, 540
So.2d 118, 120-21 (Fla. 1989). Although a referee's recommended discipline is
persuasive, this Court does not pay the same deference to this recommendation as
it does to the guilt recommendation because this Court has the ultimate
responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction. Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753
So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). However, this Court will generally not second-guess
the referee's recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing
caselaw and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Id.
A referee's findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of
correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the
record. A referee's failure to find that an aggravating factor or mitigating factor
applies is due the same deference. Florida Bar v. Germain, 957 So.2d 613, 621
(Fla. 2007).
18
ARGUMENT
I. THE REFEREE'S RECOMMENDATION OF A TWO-YEAR SUSPENSION DOES NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS IN EXISTING CASE LAW OR THE FLORIDA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS.
The Referee recommended that Elliott be suspended from the practice of law
for two years. Given the Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of guilt, the
Bar suggests that permanent disbarment is a more appropriate sanction. Although
the Referee made extensive factual findings, the Referee made no findings as to the
applicability of Florida's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, except for
aggravation and mitigation. This Court has held that it will not second-guess a
referee's recommended discipline so long as it has a reasonable basis in existing
case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Referee's
recommendation of a two-year suspension is not supported by the case law or the
Standards.
In its Memorandum of Law as to Sanctions, The Florida Bar outlined a
number of Standards that apply to Elliott's misconduct. These Standards, when
applied to the Referee's findings, support the sanction of disbarment. When the
overall conduct of Elliott is considered, in conjunction with the aggravating
factors, a sanction of permanent disbarment is warranted.
19
The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide a format for
Bar counsel, Referees, and the Supreme Court to determine the appropriate
sanction in attorney disciplinary matters. Standard 3.0 directs the court to consider
the following factors in imposing a sanction:
(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The Bar suggests that the following specific Standards apply to the Referee's
findings and conclusions and support disbarment as the appropriate discipline.
Standard 4.1, Failure to Preserve Client’s Property, provides that absent
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and upon application of the factors set out
in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the
failure to preserve client property:
4.11 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury.
In all three counts, the Referee found that Elliott misused client funds by
paying herself fees from trust, or failing to deposit fees into trust, without
authorization. In Count I, the Referee found that Elliott should have deposited
Harold Thomas's $9,000 in trust but instead deposited the funds into her operating
account. Elliott paid this money to herself “without Harold Thomas’ knowledge or
20
consent.” RR 8. The Referee found this conduct violated Rules 4-1.15(a) (Clients'
and Third Party Funds to be Held in Trust) and 5-1.1(a) (Nature of Money or
Property Entrusted to Attorney). RR 8.
In Count II, the Referee found that Elliott improperly paid herself $3,800 out
of Lucille Foster's trust funds without earning it. Additionally, Elliott deposited
$2,500 of Foster's funds, intended to pay the costs of mediation, into her personal
checking account when it should have been deposited into trust. The Referee
found this conduct violated Rules 5-1.1(a) (Nature of Money or Property Entrusted
to Attorney) and 5-1.1(b) (Application of Trust Funds or Property to Specific
Purpose). The Referee recommended restitution in the amount of $3,800.
In Count III, the Referee found that Elliott transferred $10,000 out of
Green's trust account as earned fees without his knowledge or consent. The Referee
found this conduct violated Rule 5-1.1(e) (Notice of Receipt of Trust Funds;
Delivery, Accounting). Additionally, the Referee recommended restitution in the
amount of $11,500.
The presumptive penalty for the misuse of client funds is disbarment. See
Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2000); Florida Bar v. Puente, 658 So.2d
65 (Fla. 1995).
Standard 4.5, Lack of Competence, applies to cases involving failure to
21
provide competent representation to a client, and provides that absent aggravating
or mitigating circumstances:
4.51 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client.
In Count I, the Referee found that Elliott violated Rule 4-1.1 by failing to
provide competent representation to Harold Thomas. The Referee stated that
Elliott
profoundly mishandled the case. She did not know what the statute of limitations was in Mr. Thomas’ case. Not only did she file the original lawsuit ten months too late, it was filed under the wrong statute. Giving Respondent the benefit of every doubt on the fake document issue, she mistakenly thought its filing as part of the First Amended Complaint would rescue the lawsuit from the fatal statute of limitations bar. It turns out she was not even close on the law, and to make matters worse, Respondent ended up charging Harold Thomas a total of $14,672 in fees, with all but $2,500 being paid to her after the statute of limitations had run.
RR 5- 6. The Referee also found that Elliott “did not possess the necessary legal
knowledge or skill nor did she thoroughly prepare in a way necessary to represent
him competently.” RR 7.
Not only did Elliott injure her client by collecting $12,172 in fees after the
limitations period had expired, her incompetence caused Thomas's cause of action
to be forever barred. Her lack of competence is magnified by her attempts to
22
disguise her incompetence. Elliott's attempts to cover her incompetence are
discussed infra, in relation to aggravating factor 9.22(f) (submission of false
evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary
process).
Although the comments to Standard 4.5 caution that disbarment should
rarely be imposed for a single instance of incompetence, Elliott's representation of
Harold Thomas involved multiple acts of incompetence. Not only did Elliott miss
the limitations period and file under the wrong statute, she wrongly believed that
the 180-day notice period of Florida Tort Claims Act applied, and that the Florida
Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) was required to be given notice. She
also persisted in pursuing a cause of action and collecting fees after she had been
warned of these defects by opposing counsel. RR 5-6; HT 11, 20, 21, 23, 28, 42.
Elliott continued to assert throughout the disciplinary process that the lawsuit was
timely filed and that notice to FCHR was required. HT 42, HT 51 at 28-32, 35-37,
72-75; TR 2009-10.
Despite these acts of incompetence, Elliott professed to be experienced in
employment law and whistleblower cases. HT 46 at 50-66, TR 1936-37. Elliott’s
incompetence, although different in scope, is not unlike that of the respondent in
Florida Bar v. Springer, 873 So.2d 317 (Fla. 2004). As Justice Lewis stated in his
23
concurring opinion: “[the respondent] did more than just venture ill-prepared into
a new area of the law. He simply totally failed to perform, or incompetently
performed the basic tasks of his profession….” Id. at 322, n.1. Like Springer,
Elliott exhibited a lack of understanding of the most fundamental legal procedures
and obligations, resulting in serious injury to her client. Pursuant to Standard 4.5,
such incompetence warrants disbarment.
Standard 4.6, Lack of Candor, applies to cases where the lawyer engages in
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation directed toward a client, and provides that
absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances:
4.61 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly or intentionally deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another regardless of injury or potential injury to the client.
In Count I, the Referee found that Elliott engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 4-8.4(c). RR
12. This finding was based in part on Elliott's lack of candor with Lucille Foster
concerning Elliott's problems with The Florida Bar. RR 12. On November 15,
2002, a Report of Referee was issued in a pending disciplinary proceeding
recommending that Elliott receive a six-month suspension. In January 2003,
Elliott disclosed to Foster that she had a problem with The Florida Bar and faced
possible suspension. The next month, however, Elliott falsely told Foster that her
24
problems with the Bar had been cleared up. RR 10, TR 738-39, 865-67. This
Court issued an Order approving the Report of Referee on June 26, 2003, and
Elliott's suspension was effective July 25, 2003. It was only after Foster's
mediation concluded on July 18, 2003 that Elliott informed Foster of her
suspension. LF 25, TR 755-65.
The Rule 4-8.4(c) violation was also based on Elliott's disbursement of
$3,800 from Foster's trust account to herself without an accounting that Foster had
requested, and without having earned the fee. RR 12. This unauthorized
disbursement of client funds to herself was intentional and of obvious benefit to
Elliott. Her lack of candor regarding the disciplinary process was intended to keep
Foster as a client and to allow Elliott to collect additional funds. Moreover, in the
event of settlement at mediation, prior to suspension, Elliott would have been able
to collect a full contingency fee.
Knowingly deceiving a client with intent to benefit the lawyer creates a
presumption of disbarment pursuant to Standard 4.61. See Florida Bar v. Puente,
658 So.2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1995).
Standard 5.1, Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity, applies to cases
involving dishonest, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and provides that, absent
aggravating or mitigating circumstances:
25
5.11(f) Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.
This Standard applies to the same acts of dishonesty and deceit that support
the applicability of Standard 4.61, supra. A violation of Rule 4-8.4(c) can support a
violation of this Standard. See Florida Bar v. Orta, 689 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1977).
Standard 6.1, False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation applies to
cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that
involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to a court, and provides
that:
6.11(a) Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer, with intent to deceive the court, knowingly makes a false statement or submits a false document.
Although the Referee did not make a specific finding that Elliott attempted
to deceive the court, the Bar suggests that the record supports a finding of
aggravating factor 9.22(f) (submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process). This evidence is discussed
infra at Section II-C, in relation to aggravating factor 9.22(f). Intentional
deception of a court can support disbarment pursuant to Standard 6.11. See
Florida Bar v. Puente, 658 So.2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1995).
Standard 7.0, Violations of Other Duties Owed as a Professional, provides
that the following sanction is appropriate in cases involving other duties owed as a
26
professional:
7.1 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
Standard 7.0 provides for sanctions that are “generally appropriate in cases
involving false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s
services . . . unreasonable or improper fees . . . " This Standard applies to the
same conduct that resulted in the Referee's finding that Elliott violated Rule 4-
8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). See discussion of Standard
4.61, supra. A violation of Rule 4-8.4(c) can support a violation of this Standard.
See Florida Bar v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So.2d 241 (Fla. 2007).
Additionally, the finding by the Referee that Elliott violated Rule 4-1.5(a) by
collecting $12,172 in clearly excessive fees, supports the application of this
Standard. Extracting clearly excessive fees warrants disbarment. See Florida Bar
v. Della-Donna, 583 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1989).
Standard 8.0, Prior Discipline Orders, applies in cases involving prior
discipline and provides that:
8.1(a) Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally violates the term of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
In Count III, Elliott violated the terms of her suspension by having Green
27
and his wife, Joanna Dye Green, sign an undated contingent fee agreement while
she was suspended. Green had previously signed only a one-page retainer
agreement. GG 3. Joanna Dye Green had not previously signed any fee agreement
with Elliott despite the fact that the federal lawsuit had been amended on April 17,
2003 to add her as a plaintiff. GG 10B, GG 35, GG 36.
The Referee found that: “Another written fee agreement between the parties
is fundamentally flawed. It is undated, but the evidence clearly and convincingly
establishes that it was executed sometime after Respondent had been suspended
from the practice of law, and at least a year after she had been paid all but
$3,651.45 of the $22,000 plus fees charged to Mr. Green." RR 15. The Referee
found that, within about a month after Elliott's suspension became effective, she
approached the Greens in the parking lot of the attorney who had inherited many of
Elliott’s cases following her suspension. Elliott produced a document entitled
“Contingent Fee Contract” and had the Greens sign it, telling them she needed the
document for her file. RR 15, GG 10B, GG 35, GG 36, TR 1115-19, 1316-18.
Elliott also told Green that he needed to sign the undated fee agreement because
“the copy had been lost and this one was being used to replace it.” TR 1124-25.
This conduct constitutes a violation of the suspension order and can support
disbarment. See Florida Bar v. Winter, 549 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1989). The
28
surreptitious nature of the conduct supports an intentional and deceptive motive on
the part of Elliott. Elliott herself stated she “will not be able to communicate with
you [clients], for that would constitute a violation of the Court’s order." GG 15a.
Elliott acknowledged it would have been inappropriate for her to have this fee
agreement signed during the term of her suspension. GG 39 at 215, TR 1010-15.
Entering into a fee agreement constitutes the practice of law. Chandris v.
Yanakakis, 668 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1996).
Although the Bar did not charge Elliott with contempt for violation of the
suspension order, this conduct was encompassed by the allegations in the Bar's
Complaint. See Complaint, paras. 116 and 117. Although not specifically charged
as a rule violation, this conduct may be considered as an aggravating factor in
assessing the appropriate discipline. See Florida Bar v. Batista, 846 So.2d 479,
484 (Fla. 2003).
The foregoing Standards support disbarment as the appropriate sanction.
Elliott's misconduct includes misuse of client funds, gross incompetence, deceit,
and violation of a suspension order. Any one of these acts, standing alone creates a
presumption that disbarment is the appropriate penalty. When Elliott's misconduct
in total is considered together with her disciplinary history, and the additional
aggravating factors, the Bar submits that permanent disbarment is warranted. The
29
aggravating factors are discussed in the following Section.
II. THE REFEREE ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ADDITIONAL AGGRAVATING FACTORS THAT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND THAT SUPPORT A SANCTION OF PERMANENT DISBARMENT.
Almost as significant as the findings made by the Referee were the absence
of findings made in relation to aggravating conduct. The Referee found the
following aggravating factors applicable to Elliott's misconduct: prior disciplinary
offenses, a pattern of misconduct, and multiple offenses. The Referee found one
mitigating factor: good character.
The Florida Bar requested, in a Memorandum of Law for Sanctions and at
the Sanctions Hearing, that the Referee find the following additional aggravating
factors:
9.22 (b) dishonest or selfish motive; 9.22 (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 9.22 (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 9.22 (h) vulnerability of victim; 9.22 (j) indifference to making restitution.
The Referee failed to make any findings with respect to these aggravating
30
factors; nor did the Report of Referee contain any comment or finding in regard to
these additional requested factors. The Bar submits that the factual findings and
the evidence in the record support the following additional aggravating factors.
A. The Referee erred in failing to find aggravating factor Standard 9.22(b), dishonest or selfish motive. In all three counts, the Referee found that Elliott misused client funds by
either failing to deposit funds in trust, or by disbursing funds out of trust to herself
without the knowledge or consent of her clients. The Referee also found that
Elliott failed to provide an accounting for funds received from her clients, despite
their requests. The Bar argued that this refusal to provide an accounting was done
with the intent to hide her theft of funds from her clients. SH 94-101. The record
supports a finding that Elliott acted with a dishonest or selfish motive in all three
cases.
The Referee's finding that Elliott violated Rule 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) by her conduct in the Foster case
was based on Elliott's disbursement of $3,800 from Foster's trust account to herself
without a requested accounting and without having been earned. RR 12. This
finding was also based on the fact that Elliott deceived Foster about her problems
with The Florida Bar. Elliott falsely represented that her problems with the Bar
were over, when in fact the Referee had issued a report recommending a six-month
31
suspension, pending approval by this Court.
Additional record evidence supports the aggravating factor of a dishonest or
selfish motive. Mediation in Foster's case was initially scheduled for March 2003.
Foster, a school teacher, wished to continue the mediation until the summer break.
Foster testified Elliott reacted to this request in a “mean,” “nasty,” and “ugly”
manner. TR 739-40. Elliott told Foster she could not ask for a continuance
without proof of severe illness and a request from a physician. LF 12, TR 739-45,
1343-61. Although Elliott eventually filed a motion to continue mediation (LF
11), The Florida Bar argued that Elliott intended to discourage the request for
continuance because of a desire to settle the case prior to her suspension becoming
effective. TR 1852-53, SH 107.
Elliott's selfish motive is again highlighted by an incident that occurred
during her representation of Glenn Green. On the Greens' wedding day, Elliott
took personal items from the Greens' home as payment for legal fees. Elliott
removed some collectible glassware and a picture, telling the Greens that these
items would be put “on account.” Elliott never assigned a dollar value to the items
she took. Joanna Green said she allowed this to happen because she “trusted”
Elliott. There was no writing regarding this transaction. TR 1294-96, 1320-21,
1336-37.
32
B. The Referee erred in failing to find in aggravation that Elliott engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process. The Referee made no finding in relation to aggravating factor Standard
9.22(e). Although Elliott was not charged with failing to provide requested
information to The Florida Bar, she engaged in a pattern of being non-responsive
to requests for information and documents during the Bar's investigation of each
complaint. The full scope of this conduct did not become known until the final
hearing. In closing argument, Elliott stated: “The Florida Bar knows that I don’t
even have to participate in the investigation. But he [counsel for The Florida Bar]
tells the Court that I didn’t want to do anything, I didn’t participate, I didn’t gave
documents, I gave half documents. I didn’t have to.” TR 2106. This statement
articulates Elliott's refusal to cooperate with the Bar's investigation.
In all three cases, Elliott produced documents at the final hearing that had
never been previously provided to The Florida Bar or seen by her clients. The
failure to provide requested documentation during the investigation facilitated what
the Bar argued was after-the-fact creation of documents used to fabricate a defense
at the final hearing. The submission of false evidence is addressed in relation to
aggravating factor 9.22(f), infra at Section II-C.
One example of Elliott's failure to produce requested documentation
occurred during the final hearing. Elliott appeared at the final hearing on June 26,
33
2007, during the cross examination of Thomas, with five boxes of documents she
admitted had not been disclosed to The Florida Bar. TR 229-33, 423-24, 513-30,
1941-42. Elliott failed to produce these documents to the Bar despite the fact the
“complete file pertaining to Harold Thomas” had been subpoenaed by the
grievance committee. HT 43, 44; TR 599-605. Elliott previously stated in answer
to interrogatories served on April 16, 2007, and attached to a motion to compel
filed by The Florida Bar on April 13, 2007, that she had provided copies of all
client files to The Florida Bar. Only four pages out of the five boxes of documents
were admitted into evidence at the final hearing. TR 234, 443-45.
During the investigation of this case, The Florida Bar asked Elliott to
account for the funds received from Lucille Foster. LF 24, 26, 29. Elliott never
responded to the Bar's request dated December 1, 2004. LF 24. The Bar made
another request for an accounting on October 11, 2005. LF 26. Elliott provided an
incomplete response, in which she denied receiving a check for $2,500 from Foster
on June 25, 2003. LF 27.
Elliott also claimed to have disbursed $3,800 of Foster's funds for work on
other matters. LF 27. Elliott falsely stated that proof of time spent on the other
matters had been previously provided to The Florida Bar. In response to a
subpoena duces tecum (LF 28 at NEF0245–NEF0246) served on Elliott, she again
34
denied receipt of the $2,500 check from Foster on June 25, 2003. LF 28 at
NEF0230.
Elliott never provided the requested accounting to The Florida Bar and
repeatedly failed to provide information necessary for an accurate accounting. LF
24, 25, 26, 27, 28; TR 757-64, 933-54, 1400-09. Foster denied ever agreeing to
hire or pay Elliott for work on other matters, and the Referee made a finding that
Foster did not authorize payment for other legal matters. RR 10, TR 766-67.
In the Green case, despite repeated requests, Elliott never provided Green
with a full accounting of the funds he had paid her. RR 16, 18; GG 25; TR 1125-
39. Green expected to receive $15,000 from Elliott at the end of the
representation, but Elliott returned only $3,300. RR 18, TR 1129.
In response to Green's Bar complaint, Elliott provided several documents
purporting to account for and justify the use of the funds. GG 25, 26. These
documents included the undated fee agreement and other documents that amounted
to an incomplete and unsubstantiated explanation and justification for the use of
the funds. TR 1434-36. The Florida Bar then requested Elliott to provide a
detailed accounting with supporting documentation. GG 27. Elliott again
responded in an incomplete manner. GG 28, 29, TR 1497-1501. Most of these
documents had not been previously provided to Green. TR 1130-39.
35
During the Bar's investigation, Elliott was asked to provide a copy of her
entire file pertaining to her representation of Green. GG 27. In response, Elliott
provided only 13 pages of documents. GG 28, TR 1385-86. At the Referee level,
the Bar again requested her to produce Green's file. Elliott responded that the file
had already been produced. See Motion to Compel Production of Documents
served on April 13, 2007. Elliott had previously produced only the documents in
exhibits GG 26 and GG 27. TR 1385-86. Elliott subsequently produced about six
inches of documents in discovery. TR 1016. During the final hearing, Elliott stated
that she had reviewed five boxes of documents containing Green's file. TR 1003-
04. These documents were never produced during the investigation or final
hearing, despite requests by the Bar. TR 1003-04.
Elliott's repeated failure to produce the requested documents demonstrates
not only a lack of cooperation but a bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
process.
C. The Referee erred in failing to find in aggravation that Elliott submitted false evidence, false statements or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process (Standard 9.22(f)). During the disciplinary proceedings, Elliott falsely claimed that The Florida
Bar tampered with the evidence in an attempt to prove that she created a false
document in the Thomas case. The Referee rejected Elliott's claim that the Bar
36
sent her two computer disks in discovery containing the false letter attached to the
amended complaint in the Thomas whistleblower case. See RR 3-6. The Referee
found that: “There is absolutely no evidence that any disc in question has been
manipulated, altered or tampered with by anyone connected with the Florida Bar,
Dana Gallup, Chris Lietz or Wayne Evans. In fact there is no evidence that anyone
other than Harold Thomas or Respondent is in any way responsible for the content
of the disc at issue.” RR 5.
Elliott testified at the final hearing that, as a part of discovery, The Florida
Bar sent her two computer disks containing the false documents, at least one of
which (RT1a) had been tampered with by Sandra Kay, a secretary employed by the
Bar. TR 1526-29, 1549-50, 1925-27. Elliott introduced this disk into evidence.
RT1a.
The Florida Bar produced evidence that only one disk, a copy of HT 38a,
had been provided by the Bar to Elliott. TR 1738-48. This disk was obtained by
the Bar from Dana Gallup, Thomas's malpractice lawyer. HT 38, 38a, TR 264-76,
336-40. The Referee ordered Elliott to produce evidence that she had been
provided a second disk by the Bar. TR 1549-50. Elliott produced nothing other
than the transmittal letter that referenced one disk. TR 1680-82. Elaine Gill, a
secretary for The Florida Bar, testified that only one disk was sent to Elliott--a
37
copy of HT 38a made by Chris Lietz, the Bar's computer expert. TR 1738-48.
Sandra Kay testified she had never opened or viewed HT 38a. TR 336-42, 1731-
32. Lietz testified that the disk he examined (HT 38a, HT 26) showed no evidence
of being opened or altered by Kay. TR 422.
The Florida Bar argued that the disk entered by Elliott as RT1a was a
complete fabrication and was never sent to Elliott by the Bar. TR 1526-32, 2121-
24. Elliott used RT1a to claim that Kay had tampered with the disk, and attempted
to discredit the allegation that Elliott had assisted Thomas in creating a false
document to attach to the amended complaint. TR 1923-35. Elliott also claimed
that Lietz had tampered with the disk entered into evidence by the Bar. TR 1918-
22. Elliott further claimed that Dana Gallup, Thomas's malpractice lawyer,
tampered with the disk. TR 1927. The Referee categorically rejected these
allegations of tampering. The clear and convincing evidence is that only one disk
was sent to Elliott. Her statement that she received a second tampered disk was a
blatant misrepresentation. Elliott's false accusations before the Referee are further
evidence of her dishonesty and determination to obstruct the disciplinary
proceedings.
Elliott took a variety of inherently contradictory positions regarding her
handling of the Thomas case. For example, in her deposition in the malpractice
38
case, taken in May 2004, Elliott claimed that she filed Thomas' claim under the
private whistleblower statute “because in my research I could not classify the
Sheriff’s Office as public….I decided to pursue under the private statute.” HT 46 at
112-13, 116-17. See also HT 42, TR 568-72. Later, during the course of the Bar's
investigation of the Thomas complaint, Elliott changed her story to claim that she
always knew the public whistleblower act applied and that her mistake was caused
by poor editing. TR 39-41, 1943-45; HT 51 at 25-26.
On June 25, 2003 Elliott charged Foster another $2,500 for mediation
expenses. LF 13, LF 25; TR 748-51. She deposited this $2,500 directly into her
personal checking account without Foster's knowledge or authorization. TR 708,
716-17, 953. Elliott initially denied receipt of the $2,500. LF 27, 28. Elliott later
claimed, however, that she was unaware that the check had been deposited into her
personal checking account. TR 952-53.
In support of her defense that she was unaware the check had been deposited
into her personal account, Elliott introduced into evidence a purported letter from
herself to Joy Ann Demas, “Assistant Staff Counsel for the Florida Bar at the
Tampa Branch." RF 20. In the letter, dated July 21, 2005, Elliott requests a copy
of the $2,500 check and states, “I have no records that Ms. Foster gave me such a
check.” Elliott argued that if only The Florida Bar had sent her a copy of the
39
alleged check, she could have discovered that she had, in fact, received it and
deposited it into her personal checking account. TR 952-53.
The Florida Bar argued at final hearing that this purported letter was created
after-the-fact by Elliott in an effort to support her defense. TR 1845-50, 2152-53,
SH 107-109. Sandra Kay, the Bar secretary who maintained this file in The
Florida Bar's Tampa Branch, testified at the final hearing that the July 21, 2005
letter was not received by the Bar, and Demas had not been assigned to the case
until September 2005. Additionally, the case was not even assigned to the Tampa
Branch of The Florida Bar until September 2005. Prior to that date, the case had
been assigned to the Miami Branch and Arlene Sankel was the responsible staff
counsel. TR 1376-86.
When Elliott was questioned about why she allegedly addressed a letter to
Demas when Demas had not yet appeared in the case and the case was assigned to
Miami, Elliott stated she had previously received correspondence from Demas in
the case. The Referee ordered Elliott to produce this correspondence. TR 1619-
23. Elliott denied being ordered to do so and failed to produce any previous
correspondence from Demas. TR 1678-80. Elliott claimed to have sent her entire
file on the Foster case to The Florida Bar during the investigation. TR 939.
The foregoing evidence supports a finding in aggravation that Elliott
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submitted false evidence and made false statements during the disciplinary process
in an attempt to defend her misconduct.
D. The Referee erred in failing to find as an aggravating factor Standard 9.22(h), the vulnerability of Elliott's victims. The record evidence shows that Elliott took advantage of her clients'
vulnerabilities in all three cases. For example, Thomas was described by Elliott as
having “no lucidity.” HT 46 at 89-90. The lawyer who represented Thomas in a
malpractice case against Elliott stated that Thomas was not sophisticated and did
not understand what had transpired during the representation by Elliott. TR 242-44.
Lucille Foster placed a special trust in Elliott because she and Elliott
attended the same church. They participated in music programs of the church.
Foster testified that she hired Elliott, in part, because of the special trust she
afforded Elliott as a member of her church. TR 719-21, 820-21, SH 12.
Mr. Green was severely disabled with degenerative disk disease and
depression. TR 1016-17, 1063-64, 1303-04. During the representation by Elliott,
he wrote in an e-mail to Elliott that he was “in an almost constant state of mental
fogginess.” GG 10a at NEG0207, GG 39 at 211-12, TR 1313-16. Despite Green's
disabilities, Elliott failed to provide him with a clear fee agreement or a complete
accounting of the over $22,000 he paid her. RR 16-17. Additionally, Elliott took
personal items from the Greens on their wedding day in payment of fees.
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These facts show that Elliott took advantage of the trust and vulnerability of
her clients with the motive of enriching herself.
E. The Referee erred in failing to find as an aggravating factor Standard 9.22(j), indifference to making restitution. Elliott demonstrated an indifference to making restitution to Lucille Foster
by failing to pay back the $3,800 she took from Foster and improperly deposited
into her personal checking account. She also demonstrated an indifference to
making restitution by waiting until 2006 to return to Foster the $2,500 she
collected for the costs of mediation and improperly deposited into her personal
checking account in 2003. In his Report, the Referee found that Elliott “had the
duty to promptly deliver $3,800 plus $2,500 to Ms. Foster and did not.” RR 13.
Elliott never made restitution of $3,800 to Foster. It was only after the
grievance committee found probable cause for further for further disciplinary
proceedings on January 27, 2006, that Elliott finally acknowledged receipt of the
$2,500 and sent Foster a check in the amount of $2,569.58 on April 21, 2006. LF
29. Elliott also failed to make restitution to Glenn Green. The Referee
recommended that Elliott be ordered to pay $3,800 restitution to Foster and
$11,500 restitution to Green. RR2.
The Bar maintains that the Referee erred in failing to find the foregoing
additional aggravating factors requested by the Bar. The record provides clear
42
evidence that Elliott acted with a dishonest or selfish motive; intentionally
obstructed the disciplinary process; submitted false evidence and made false
accusations against the Bar during the disciplinary proceedings; took advantage of
vulnerable clients; and was indifferent to making restitution.
III. PERMANENT DISBARMENT IS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR ELLIOTT'S EGREGIOUS AND CUMULATIVE MISCONDUCT.
Due to the extremely serious and cumulative nature of Elliott's misconduct,
the Bar submits that permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction. This
sanction is supported by the case law, Standards, and aggravating factors.
The Referee found three aggravating factors in this case: a pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, and prior disciplinary offenses, and only one
mitigating factor—evidence of good character. RR2 3-4. The Referee found
Elliott guilty of 21separate violations of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar,
occurring in three separate client cases, and spanning a period of over two years.
In addition to the rule violations charged, the Bar discovered evidence of further
misconduct during the disciplinary investigation and prosecution, including
Elliott's violation of this Court's 2003 suspension order. Elliott engaged in
additional misconduct during the disciplinary process that supports the finding of
additional aggravating factors, as discussed supra. This Court should find that
Elliott is unworthy of practicing law and impose permanent disbarment.
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A. Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for the misuse of client trust funds. Elliott was found guilty of misusing client funds in all three cases before the
Referee. This violation alone warrants disbarment. This Court has repeatedly held
that the misuse of client funds held in trust is one of the most serious offenses a
lawyer can commit and that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate sanction.
Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 2000).
In Travis, the respondent was found guilty of violating Rule 5-1.1 for
writing unauthorized checks to himself from his trust fund. The referee found
extensive mitigation, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal
or emotional problems, cooperation during the proceedings, 28 years of
exceptional service to the legal profession and community, and providing legal
services to the poor. Id. at 690. Many witnesses, including attorneys and judges,
testified in support of Travis's character and fitness to practice law. Id.
Nevertheless, this Court disapproved the referee's recommendation of a 91-day
suspension and disbarred Travis, stating "[t]he overwhelming majority of cases
involving the misuse of client funds have resulted in disbarment regardless of the
mitigation present." Id. at 691. This Court held that the mitigating factors in
Travis did not overcome the presumption of disbarment.
In the instant case, the Referee found only one mitigating factor, good
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character, based on the testimony of several witnesses, including a client, an
attorney, and a personal friend. RR 4. This sole mitigating factor does not
outweigh Elliott's repeated misuse of client funds and the aggravating factors found
by the Referee. As this Court stated in Travis:
Though we commend the past good works that Travis has performed, we expressly hold . . . that such good works do not overcome Travis's pattern of conduct in which he intentionally misappropriated client funds for his own use. We again expressly state for the benefit of the members of the Bar that stealing from a client, which is what the taking of trust account funds plainly is, cannot be overcome merely because the attorney has committed prior good works and has no prior disciplinary history.
Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
Unlike Travis, who had no history of prior discipline, Elliott has been
suspended by this Court twice before. Elliott's disciplinary history indicates a
pattern of cumulative misconduct.
B. Elliott's cumulative misconduct warrants permanent disbarment.
It is well established that in rendering discipline, this Court considers the
respondent's previous disciplinary history and increases the discipline where
appropriate. Florida Bar v. Bern, 425 So.2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1982). This Court
deals more harshly with cumulative misconduct than is does with isolated
misconduct. Additionally, cumulative misconduct of a similar nature should
warrant an even more severe discipline than might dissimilar conduct." Id. In
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Florida Bar v. Williams, 753 So.2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 2000), this Court recognized
that "enhanced discipline is permissible when multiple violations occur or the
attorney has a prior history of misconduct."
Elliott's 75-day suspension in 2004 resulted from the unauthorized
disbursement to herself of $4,500 she was holding in trust in a dissolution case.
This misconduct is strikingly similar to her unauthorized taking of funds belonging
to Thomas, Foster, and Green. Although the 75-day suspension was imposed after
some of the conduct in the instant case occurred,1 this Court has held that
“cumulative misconduct can be found when the misconduct occurs near in time to
the other offenses, regardless of when discipline is imposed.” Florida Bar v.
Golden, 566 So.2d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 1990). See also Florida Bar v. Roberts, 770
So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 2000) (holding referee may consider prior disciplinary
proceeding even though conduct subject to that proceeding occurred after the
instant conduct); Florida Bar v. Karten, 829 So. 2d 883, 889 (Fla. 2002) (holding
referee could consider prior admonishment given after the conduct in the instant
case occurred).
Permanent disbarment is warranted because Elliott has failed to respond to
1 The unauthorized disbursement in SC03-2071 occurred in August and September 2001. LF 39. Harold Thomas hired Elliott to represent him in a whistleblower action on August 23, 2001. HT 4, 5.
46
lesser forms of discipline. She has repeatedly misused funds belonging to her
clients. She has demonstrated a pattern of deceitful and dishonest conduct in
multiple cases involving multiple clients and numerous ethical violations. This
pattern continued during the current disciplinary proceedings.
C. Elliott's misconduct during the disciplinary proceedings demonstrates her complete unfitness for the practice of law. The testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing provide a clear
picture of Elliott. She is a lawyer who practices with a complete lack of respect for
her clients, for the legal profession, and for the disciplinary process. In these
proceedings, Elliott took the position that each and every witness that gave
detrimental testimony had "unclean hands." She attempted to portray the
allegations against her as a fabrication motivated by some common scheme to
cause her harm. In Supreme Court Case No. SC02-1203, in which she was
suspended for six months, Judge Dubensky recognized in his Report of Referee
Elliott's propensity to aggressively challenge her adversaries. LF 10. This
propensity has not changed.
To support her defense, Elliott introduced fabricated evidence at the final
hearing. See Section II-C, supra. She failed to adequately respond to repeated
requests for information throughout the disciplinary proceedings, and then
proceeded to produce boxes of documents at the final hearing without any prior
47
disclosure or notice to The Florida Bar. In her closing argument, Elliott stated that
her non-responsive conduct was appropriate because she had no obligation to
provide information to The Florida Bar. TR 2106. Respondent consistently
refused to acknowledge what documents she provided to the Bar and what
documents she did not provide to the Bar.
The version of events spun by Elliott was, in essence, a general denial. It
was not only in direct conflict of the testimony of the witnesses, it was shown to be
inherently false as established by the Report of Referee finding her in violation of
the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. An example of false evidence provided by
Elliott was her insistence in her deposition and the final hearing that filing under
the wrong statute in the Harold Thomas case was an "editing error." She claimed
to have knowledge of the correct statute. This was an incredible reversal of
testimony, directly contradicted by Elliott's deposition testimony in the malpractice
case.
Respondent charmed vulnerable clients into giving her money, supposedly
to be held in trust, and then put what she could into her own pocket. The Referee
found that she improperly took $3,800 in trust from Lucille Foster, deposited
$2,500 of Foster's funds into her personal account instead of her trust account, and
took $10,000 from Glenn Green. This was done both before and after Elliott
48
testified on October 31, 2002, in a prior disciplinary proceeding, that she had taken
all necessary steps to correct her trust accounting problems and that she had not
taken money from clients. LF 38 at 60. Elliott even went so far as to pluck
antique glassware from the shelves of Glenn and Joanna Dye Green on their
wedding day as unspecified payment for legal services. This single act exemplifies
Elliott's behavior towards her clients. Knowing that Glenn Green was in "a
constant state of mental fogginess," she then had him sign an undated fee
agreement after she was suspended from the practice of law. This is a direct
violation of the Order of suspension and should be considered by this Court in
recommending the appropriate sanction. See Florida Bar v. Forrester, 916 So.2d
647 (Fla. 2005).
Permanent disbarment is appropriate where an attorney demonstrates a
complete unfitness for the practice of law. Florida Bar v. Zyne, 266 So.2d 668
(Fla. 1972). In Zyne, the respondent commingled client funds, deposited a client’s
check into his own account, and let the statute of limitations run in a case in which
there had been a previous offer to settle. Zyne had a previous six month
suspension. The referee found that Zyne was "quite incapable of ever developing
the moral character necessary to one whose business is handling the money, secrets
and affairs of others." Id. at 669. This Court approved the referee's
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recommendation of permanent disbarment for the respondent's "repeated and
completely unprofessional actions and his serious defalcations and damage to
client and to the profession." Id.
Permanent disbarment is necessary to protect the public from Elliott's
incompetent and unethical representation. In Florida Bar v. Korones, 752 So.2d
586 (Fla. 2000), this Court disbarred an attorney who misappropriated client funds
and explained the reason that misuse of client funds warrants such a severe
discipline:
The single most important concern of this Court in defining and regulating the practice of law is the protection of the public from incompetent, unethical, and irresponsible representation. The very nature of the practice of law requires that clients place their lives, their money, and their causes in the hands of their lawyers with a degree of blind trust that is paralleled in very few other economic relationships. Our primary purpose in the disciplinary process is to assure that the public can repose this trust with confidence. The direct violation of this trust by stealing a client's money, compounded by lying about it, mandates a punishment commensurate with such abuse.
Id. at 589 (emphasis added). Elliott's repeated misconduct demonstrates that she does not deserve the trust
placed in her by her clients. She took advantage of vulnerable clients by misusing
funds given to her in trust. She provided incompetent representation, charged
excessive fees, and failed to account to her clients for their funds. Elliott has
50
demonstrated a pattern of misconduct resulting in multiple violations and a history
of prior discipline. The protection of the public requires that Elliott be
permanently disbarred.
CONCLUSION
The Referee's recommendation of a two-year suspension is not supported by
the relevant case law or the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
The Referee erred in failing to find additional aggravating factors that are
supported by the record and by the Referee's factual findings. Given the egregious
and cumulative nature of Respondent's misconduct, The Florida Bar requests that
this Court impose the sanction of permanent disbarment. The Florida Bar further
requests that Respondent be ordered to pay the Bar's costs in these proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
_____________________________ Henry Lee Paul Assistant Staff Counsel Florida Bar No. 508373 The Florida Bar 5521 W. Spruce St., Suite C-49 Tampa, Florida 33607 (813) 875-9821
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original and seven (7) copies of this brief
have been provided by DHL Express, Waybill Number 6832858446 to The
Honorable Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, The Supreme Court of Florida, 500 South
Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927; a true and correct copy by regular
U.S. Mail to Nadege Elliott, Respondent, at her record Bar address of P.O. Box
121711, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312-0029 and her physical address of 1580
Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 130, Sunrise, Florida 33323-2860; by regular
U.S. mail to Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 650
Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, all this _______ day of
April, 2008.
___________________________________ Henry Lee Paul Assistant Staff Counsel
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CERTIFICATION OF FONT SIZE AND STYLE CERTIFICATION OF VIRUS SCAN
Undersigned counsel does hereby certify that this brief complies with the
font standards required by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure for computer-
generated briefs.
___________________________________ Henry Lee Paul Assistant Staff Counsel