RESEARCH ARTICLE

Oriana Skylar Mastro1,2

Published online: 21 November 2018# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2018

AbstractRising powers and the consequent shifts in the balance of power have long been identifiedas critical challenges to the international order. What is the likelihood that China and theUnited States will fall into the Thucydides Trap, meaning that the two countries will fight amajor war during a potential power transition? This article creates a framework of sevenvariables, derived from dominant international relations theories and Graham Allison’sBtwelve clues for peace,^ that predict the likelihood of major conflict between a rising andan established power: degree of economic interdependence, degree of institutional con-straints, domestic political system, nature of relevant alliances, nature of nuclear weaponsprograms, the sustainability of the rising power’s growth, and its level of dissatisfaction. Itthen evaluates the values of these variables in the context of the U.S.-China relationship todetermine whether pessimism about the prospects of peace is warranted. This analysis leadsto more mixed conclusions about the prospects of peace than liberal international relationstheory and Allison’s twelve clues would suggest. This research further operationalizespower transition theory and has practical implications for U.S. policy toward China.

Keywords U.S.-China relations .Thucydides trap .Power transition theory. Interstatewar.

Nuclear deterrence . Economic liberalism . International institutions

Introduction

Rising powers and the consequent shifts in the balance of power have long been identified ascritical challenges to the international order. Unsurprisingly, power transition theory—theidea that as the power disparity between an incumbent great power and a rising powerdecreases, the likelihood of major war increases—has led to an outpouring of research that

Journal of Chinese Political Science (2019) 24:25–45https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9581-4

* Oriana Skylar Mastroom116@georgetown.edu

1 Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA2 American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, USA

In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: InternationalRelations Theory and the Prospects for Peacein U.S.-China Relations

evaluates why major war occurs and whether it can be avoided [1]. Most recently, GrahamAllison has argued that China and the United States are more likely than not to fight a war,given the historical record: 12 out of the 16 times a rising power has accumulated enoughpower to challenge the hegemon, the result was major war [2]. He characterizes thisdynamic, in which the paranoia of the great power and the hubris of the rising power causearmed conflict, as the BThucydides Trap.^

Will the United States and China go to war as the power gap between them decreases?What are the most likely pathways to conflict? The current IR approach to U.S.-Chinarelations fails to adequately answer these questions for three reasons. First, it does notthoroughly evaluate the empirical record in the case of the United States and China. Forexample, Graham Allison derives from the four historical cases in which war was avoidedtwelve Bclues for peace,^ including variables such as institutionalization of the internationalsystem, nature of alliances, cultural similarity, economic interdependence, and nucleardynamics. But Allison does not operationalize these variables by clearly outlining the valuesthey can take and the ways those values correspond to the likelihood of war. This omissionleaves open the question of whether these variables take on the values that correspond to alower likelihood of war in the case of U.S.-China relations.1 And though many scholars andcommentators have criticized Allison’s analysis as excessively pessimistic, few have fo-cused their critiques on the degree to which these ‘clues for peace’ are applicable in theU.S.-China case.2

Second, the scholarship that does evaluate the empirical record with respect to U.S.-China relations tends to focus on only one variable at a time, failing to provide a compre-hensive picture of all the mitigating and exacerbating factors. For example, there is literatureon where alliance dynamics are stabilizing or destabilizing3; how nuclear weapons maydampen or increase tendencies to escalate to war; [10, 11] how economic relationships maymotivate war, prevent it, or be irrelevant4; and the degree to which international institutionsshape and constrain Chinese power [15, 16]. Few studies, however, weigh multiple factorsand assess how they may work together to affect the likelihood of conflict.

Third, the work that has attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of the factorsimpacting conflict is outdated, as the values of the variables in question have changeddrastically over the past ten to twenty years [17–22]. In the 1990s, China was just beginningto join international institutions—in 2000, China participated in 52 international organiza-tions, compared with 75 today [23, 24]. In 1999, China voted for the first time in favor of anonconsensual peacekeeping operation; now, it is the largest contributor of peacekeepingtroops among the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the third largestoverall donor to the UN [25, 26]. During the same period, China’s economy grew from$4.8 trillion in purchasing power parity to $23.16 trillion, a nearly five-fold increase.Lastly, its military modernization had only just begun in the 1990s. In 1996, China spent

1 Allison, Destined for War.2 For example, see [3–5]. One exception is Kang, who argues that Asian case studies reveal that power transitionsin Asia are rarely dictated by security dilemma action-reaction dynamics, but instead occur due to the voluntaryretreat and internal decline of the current hegemon and external challenges from the smallest powers [6].3 Glaser argues that if the United States did not support Taiwan, there would be no rationale for war, but thisclaim is controversial [7]. For criticism of Glaser’s argument, see [8]. Other work looks at whether theinvolvement of other countries can deter conflict [9].4 [12, 13]. The former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warns that the U.S.-China trade war couldescalate into a broader conflict if either side is backed into a corner [14].

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only 1% of its GDP on its military [27]. Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)had approximately four times as many personnel as the U.S. Army, China lagged severelybehind in tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.5 Thevast majority of vessels and aircraft in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force(PLAAF) were outdated. For example, most submarines and fighter aircraft were basedon 1950s Soviet designs.6 Between then and 2015, official military spending increased by620%, enabling China to make great strides in modernizing its equipment and profes-sionalizing its forces.7

In this article, I attempt to fill these gaps by doing three things. First, I create acomprehensive framework of the prospects for peace that synthesizes Allison’s twelveBclues^ with the independent variables explored in dominant international relationstheories about the causes of war and peace. The result is seven variables that areprevalent in scholars’ thinking on the likelihood of conflict between a rising and anincumbent great power. Then, I lay out these variables, explaining what values they cantake and how these values correspond to the likelihood of war. Lastly, I evaluate thevalues of these variables in the context of the U.S.-China relationship to determinewhether pessimism about the future prospects of peace is warranted.

Focusing on the applicability and predictions of the variables that purportedly dampenconflictive tendencies has both theoretical and practical implications. First, each of thetwelve Bclues^ is related to amajor debate within international relations theory. Determiningwhether these factors have the predicted impact in the case of a major power dyad, such asChina and the United States, is critical to assessing their empirical validity. Second, whilescholarship has evaluated some of these factors in the case of U.S.-China relations, the valueof the relevant variables, such as the military balance of power, has changed considerablyover the past ten years, and an updated analysis is needed. Third, evaluating multiple factorsside-by-side allows for a more accurate picture of the sources of instability and some insightinto the way conflict could break out. Lastly, understanding the salience and applicability ofmitigating factors can help policy makers in both countries work effectively to reduce thelikelihood of major war.

Evaluating the Prospects for Peace

While historical examples and power transition theory warn of the dangers of war between arising power and an established power, especially when their levels of power approachparity, war has occasionally been avoided. In Destined for War, Graham Allison positstwelve factors that have historically reduced the likelihood of conflict between a risingpower and an established power: powerful third parties that can help resolve the rivalrywithout war, international institutions that can constrain behavior, preferences of leaders;timing of action, cultural commonalities, advent of nuclear weapons, existence of mutuallyassured destruction (MAD), end to the justifiability of war between nuclear powers,credibility of nuclear deterrent, economic interdependence, nature of alliances, and domesticperformance of the rising power.8

5 Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 26.6 Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 26–27.7 Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 26.8 Allison, Destined for War, 187–213.

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These twelve clues, derived from historical case studies, correspond to a number ofarguments made with the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches to understanding thecauses of interstate war. In this section, I create a framework that synthesizes Allison’stwelve clues for peace with these dominant international relations theories to evaluatethe prospects of peace between the United States and China. This framework consists ofseven variables from the systemic to the domestic level: degree of dissatisfaction of therising power, economic interdependence, and institutional constraints; the nature of therelevant domestic political systems, alliances, and nuclear weapons programs; and thesustainability of the rising power’s growth. Below is a summary of these variables, thevalues they take, and their correspondence to the likelihood of war, according to thelogics of the relevant theories.

Prospects for Peace: A Historical and Theoretical Framework

Higher Likelihood of Peace Lower Likelihood of War

28 O. S. Mastro

Rising Power Dissatisfaction Low High

Economic Interdependence High Low

Institutional Constraints Strong Weak

Domestic Political System Democratic dyad Mixed or autocratic dyad

Nature of Alliances Conditional defensive Blank check promises

Nuclear Weapons MAD achieved MAD not achieved

Sustainability of Domestic Growth No Yes

Rising Power Dissatisfaction

The main premise of power transition theory is that conflict can erupt because the risingpower is dissatisfied with the current system and seeks to change it in its favor [28, 29].9

Specifically, the distribution of benefits in the international system becomes misalignedwith the distribution of power, and the rising power may use force to rectify the balance[31]. As the discrepancy between a country’s power and Bthe rules governing the interna-tional system, the division of spheres of influence, and most important of all, the interna-tional distribution of territory^ increases, the perceived costs of forcing changes to thesecomponents Bdecline relative to the potential benefits of doing so.^10 This is not to say thatthe blame for hegemonic war lies with the rising power alone. Even in the case of adissatisfied rising power, the incumbent power has the option to accommodate its demands[32]. However, a high degree of rising power dissatisfaction is a necessary condition forhegemonic conflict. I therefore focus on this dissatisfaction in the following case study.

Economic Interdependence

Economic liberalism plays a dominant role in the prospects for peace. In mostcircumstances, strong bilateral economic ties impose caution on leaders, encourage

9 The declining power launches a preventive war as a last-ditch attempt to hold onto its position in theinternational system. See [30].10 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 187.

de-escalation in crises, and improve overall bilateral relations. Contemporary interna-tional relations scholars argue that, especially in recent decades, globalization hasgreatly increased interdependence and that this economic interdependence affectsinternational behavior in a positive way. Specifically, scholars have argued thatincreased economic integration increases the opportunity costs of conflict, facilitatesunderstanding by promoting openness and frequent contact between states, and reducesincentives for conquest, since production power is best captured through trade [33–37].All else being equal, the higher the degree of economic interdependence between theUnited States and China, the lower the likelihood of conflict.

Institutional Constraints

International relations are characterized by anarchy, meaning that there is no central worldauthority akin to a government. Nevertheless, powerful transnational forces have influ-enced the relations amongmajor powers throughout history. Allison posits that historically,powerful third parties have forced accommodating policies on states, thus preventingconflict between a rising power and an incumbent power. For example, in the late fifteenthcentury, the pope acted as an arbiter between a rising Spain and an established Portugal,defining each country’s sphere of influence and imposing the framework on both. Thepapacy had a degree of power over both actors, as both accepted papal authority and hopedto avoid the costs of rejecting the pope’s proposals, such as excommunication.11

In contemporary international relations, the closest equivalents to the papal dynamic arethird-party intervention and mediation through international institutions. The liberal strandof international relations posits that international institutions, in particular, can facilitateinternational cooperation and reduce discord through several mechanisms [38, 39].12 Thefirst mechanism is material rewards and punishments: in the pursuit of a set of interests orpreferences, a state responds to positive and negative sanctions provided exogenously bythe institution or actors within the institution [41–44]. The second is interaction withdomestic actors and changes in the domestic distribution of power among social groups,which lead to different aggregated state preferences [45, 46]. The third is socialization ininternational institutions in a process of social interaction among policymakers that leads tothe internalization of norms, which in turn creates new interests and preferences [47, 48]. Ifinstitutional constraints on dangerous behaviors are strong, then the likelihood of conflict islower than when countries can easily circumvent them. Even if institutional constraints areweaker, the institutions can help countries coordinate their attempts to persuade the risingand established powers to reach a peaceful mutual understanding that avoids a war.

Domestic Political System

When the rising and established powers share democratic political cultures, the establishedpower may be less concerned about the rising power’s intentions and therefore mayaccommodate it enough to avoid war.13 Democratic peace theory posits that democraciesare less likely to resort to force to solve disputes with other democracies, either because their

11 Allison, Destined for War, 190.12 For a glimpse of this debate, see [40].13 Allison, Destined for War, 200.

In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations... 29

domestic institutions place constraints on the use of force or because they adhere to norms ofpeaceful resolution [49]. The main example of this theory in a case of power transition isGreat Britain’s failure to challenge the rise of the United States, which resulted in the loss ofGreat Britain’s dominance. While Great Britain’s decision was influenced by the improb-ability of the United States’ success, many argue that the democratic nature of both stateswas a determining factor [50]. Specifically, certain attributes of democracy, such as a freepress and domestic checks and balances, allow for transparency of intentions, whichencourages trust [51]. In the words of T. V. Paul, Ba democracy and a non-democracypitted against each other could be the biggest source of power transition conflict.^14

Nature of Alliances

While alliance structures are intended to create a balance of power that leads to stabilityand peace in the international system, two alliance dilemmas can impede efficientbalancing [52]. The first is entanglement, in which an alliance partner is dragged into aconflict because the survival of its ally is necessary to its own security. The second is buckpassing, in which a state does not form or adhere to external alliance commitmentsbecause it does not want to assume the burden of balancing.15 While both suboptimalbehaviors increase the likelihood of war, most scholars worry about the former in Asia –that alliances may embolden smaller U.S. allies such as the Philippines and Taiwan toengage in dangerous behaviors that drag the United States into a war with China [53, 54].

Thus, the nature of the alliance commitment determines whether it will contribute todeterrence or provoke a major power war. If the U.S. alliance commitments areconditional upon the allies’ refraining from provoking conflict, then alliances couldcontribute to balance of power and therefore stability and peace. However, if the U.S.signals a willingness to its allies to defend them even if they provoke conflict withChina, then Washington could be dragged into an avoidable major war with Beijing.16

Nuclear Weapons

The possession of nuclear weapons may make conventional war less likely if threeconditions are met: 1) no preventative war takes place during the transition period; 2) eachcountry that possesses nuclear weapons must have second strike capability with the abilityto inflict unacceptable damage; and 3) the nuclear arsenal must not be prone to accidental orunauthorized use [55]. The main issue of concern for the U.S.-China relationship is thesecond condition, given that both countries already have nuclear weapons and high degreesof civilian control. Specifically, both the rising and established powers must possess secondstrike capability, such that leaders in both capitals believe that the logic ofMAD applies.17 Ifboth countries Bhave [an] invulnerable nuclear arsenal, hot war is no longer a justifiableoption^ because leaders understand that conventional conflict could escalate to the nuclearlevel.18 States therefore act with more caution, given the high costs of war, and are unlikelyto run major risks for minor gains. In sum, nuclear weapons may reduce the likelihood of

14 Paul, The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics, 13.15 Christensen and Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks, 140–142.16 Allison, Destined for War, 211–212.17 Allison, Destined for War, 206–210.18 Allison, Destined for War, 208.

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conflict if the relevant parties possess nuclear weapons of sufficient quality, quantity, andsurvivability to assure mutual destruction.

Sustainability of Domestic Growth

Power transition theory posits that hegemonic war is the most likely when the power gapbetween the rising and established powers narrows to close to parity. Offensive realismfocuses on the balance of power more broadly, arguing that increased power—and theexpanding military capabilities that tend to accompany it—encourages revisionist andexpansionist behavior.19

Logically, the failure of a rising power to maintain the growth necessary to challengethe established power reduces the likelihood of hegemonic war. In recent history, anumber of countries with impressive economic growth have been unable, because ofdomestic political and economic challenges or normative constraints, to accumulate thepower necessary to become great powers––including Japan in the 1980s, Germanypost-reunification, and India today [56].20 While the Soviet Union did reach greatpower status, its economic collapse prevented it from maintaining its position andexpanding its dominance to Asia [58].21 When the rising power fails to sustain its rise,it does not challenge or threaten the established power, and war is avoided.

Applying the Prospects for Peace to U.S.-China Relations

In this section, I evaluate the values of the seven predictors of peace to determine thelikelihood of major power war between China and the United States.

Prospects for Peace Framework Applied

Value of Variable Likelihood of Peace

19 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.20 [57]; BCan India Become a Great Power?^ The Economist, March 30, 2013, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21574511-indias-lack-strategic-culture-hobbles-its-ambition-be-force-world-can-india.21 Allison, Destined for War, 213.

In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations... 31

Rising PowerDissatisfaction

Medium Medium (trendingtoward Low)

EconomicInterdependence

High High

InstitutionalConstraints

High participation, but weak constraints Medium (trendingtoward Low)

Domestic PoliticalSystem

Mixed dyad Low

Nature of Alliances Conditional defensive High

Nuclear Weapons Both possess nuclear weapons, but uncertaintyabout MAD

Indeterminate (trending towardHigh)

Sustainability ofDomestic Growth

Mixed expert opinions Indeterminate

Rising Power Dissatisfaction

China under the stewardship of Xi Jinping has demonstrated a medium, but trendingtoward high, level of dissatisfaction with its position in the international system. On theone hand, Xi has promoted since 2012 the idea of a New Type of Great PowerRelations (xinxing daguo guanxi,新型大国关系) in which the U.S. and China can avoidwar and prosper through continued cooperation [59]. In public speeches, Xi oftenadvocates a focus on enhancing consultation and expanding areas of cooperation[60–63]. This non-zero-sum/win-win view is also reflected in Xi’s signature Belt andRoad Initiative (一带一路倡议), with which he claims that China will Bestablish a newtype of international relations centered on cooperation and win-win and build apartnership relation with conversation rather than confrontation, and partnership ratherthan alliance.^ [64] Officially, the BOverall National Security Outlook…rejects oldconcepts such as zero-sum game, absolute security, and alliance theory. It establishes auniversal and inclusive national security concept.^ [65] Foreign Minister Wang Yiemphatically asserted at the United Nations on September 28, 2018 that BChina will notbecome, will not challenge, will not take the place of the United States.^ [66]

On the other hand, China frequently uses assertive rhetoric, and its behavior, espe-cially with respect to territorial issues, clearly signals a desire to change the status quo.Xi insists that China will never compromise on its core interests, a category of keyterritorial issues that could bring the U.S. and China to the brink of war [67–69]. Xi hasstaked his personal legitimacy on consistent statements along the lines of those madebefore the National People’s Congress in March 2018, when he asserted that Chinawould not cede a Bsingle inch^ of its territory to others.22 The 2015 National SecurityLaw of the PRC states that B‘national security’ means a status in which the regime,sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, welfare of the people, sustainable economic andsocial development, and other major interests of the state are not threatened internally orexternally and the capability to maintain a sustained security status.^ [70] Territorialintegrity includes all active or dormant territorial issues, including Taiwan, Tibet, HongKong, and maritime disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Since Xi cameto power, China has routinized its patrol in sea areas within 12 nautical miles of theDiaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China conducted patrols 50 times in 2013, 35 times in 2014,[71] 36 times in 2016, [72] and 28 times in 2017 [73]. China also had a major standoffwith India over disputed territory in Bhutan that lasted ten weeks during the summer of2017. China has been particularly aggressive in the South China Sea, where it hasreclaimed over 3200 acres of land.23 In 2017 alone, China constructed permanentfacilities covering about 290,000 square meters and has deployed missiles, air defensesystems, bombers, and fighter jets to islands in the South China Sea [74, 75].

In short, while China may be satisfied with aspects of the status quo, it is clearlydissatisfied with the distribution of territory, which power transition theory posits is themost critical aspect of the system.24 It is also important to note that the Trump

22 Times of India. China will guard its territory, not concede an inch of land: Xi. March 20, 2018.https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-will-guard-its-sovereignty-not-concede-an-inch-of-land-xi/articleshow/63375561.cms.23 Associated Press. May 13, 2016. China has reclaimed 3200 acres in the South China Sea, says Pentagon.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/13/pentagon-report-china-reclaimed-3200-acres-south-china-sea .24 The leadership transition may have exacerbated the issue. See [76].

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administration’s National Security Strategy mentions China 23 times and places theUnited States in the new position of identifying China as a Bstrategic competitor^across political, economic, military, and information domains, which suggests thataccommodation is unlikely [77]. This medium but increasing level of dissatisfactiondoes not bode well for the prospects of peace between the United States and China.

Economic Interdependence

Leaders in China and the U.S. emphasize that the relationship between the twocountries is best characterized as one of mutual dependence, given the strong economicties. China is the United States’ largest goods trading partner, and mutual foreign directinvestment flows have increased in recent years. In 2016, U.S. goods exports to Chinatotaled $115.6 billion, and goods imports reached $462.6 billion. In the serviceindustry, export and imports totaled nearly $70.3 billion in 2016, and the United Statesgained a trade surplus of $38 billion, an increase of 13.6% from 2015. Moreover,Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States was $27.5 billion in 2016, up63.8% from the previous year [78]. Meanwhile, U.S. foreign direct investment in Chinawas $92.5 billion in 2016, a 9.4% increase from 2015.25 The United Nations CTADdeemed China the Bmost promising source of FDI^ in 2016, and while the UnitedStates remains the top FDI destination, China came in at a close second.26 China alsoholds nearly $1187.8 billion of the U.S. federal debt.27

While closer economic ties are more promising for peace than a lack of interdepen-dence, it is important to recognize that such ties are not a silver bullet. If nationalsecurity is seen to be at risk, leaders are usually more willing to absorb the economiccosts of conflict than the political costs of concession. Moreover, perceptions of unfairChinese economic practices and concerns about Chinese economic coercion havecreated unfavorable views of China in the United States and in the Indo-Pacific region,which weakens the power of economic ties to encourage peace [79]. However, all elsebeing equal, economic interdependence dampens conflictive tendencies.

Institutional Constraints

Both China and the United States are members of international institutions that theoret-ically could impose constraints that would reduce the likelihood of conflict. China is moredeeply enmeshed in the U.S.-led international order than many earlier rising powers havebeen (though not to the degree of Germany or Japan in the 1980s and 1990s, which areillustrative cases of institutional constraints preventing dangerous behaviors during aneconomic rise). China is currently a member of 75 international institutions, and it is asignatory to the majority of multilateral arms control agreements [80, 81]. In the economicarea, China has signed 17 preferential trading agreements, roughly the same number as theU.S., Japan, Korea, and Australia [82]. In the 1990s, China replaced India as the World

25 USTR. U.S.-China Trade Facts.26 World Investment Report 2017. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 2018,http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf.27 Major foreign holders of Treasury Securities. Treasury.gov, March 2018, http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt.

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Bank’s largest borrower and major success story, and the Bank became China’s largestsingle source of long-term foreign capital in the early and mid-1990s.

But the empirical record shows that at most, the two countries could be Bpersuaded todefer to the constraints and decisions of supranational authorities or legal frameworks.^28

Both often ignore the demands of these third parties. China has a mixed record in itssupport for international legal tribunals and dispute settlement. China voted in favor ofestablishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and abstainedfrom voting on the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [83].It voted against the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, however,and chose not to become a member.29 When supranational bodies threaten to restrictChinese sovereignty, Beijing tends to reject their authority. The most notable example ofChina’s rejection of a ruling on international law is its refusal to acknowledge thelegitimacy of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s (ITLOS’s) decisionagainst China in 2016. After ITLOS ruled in favor of the Philippines’ claims in 2016,China stated that the judgment was Bwithout binding force^ and was Bnull and void.^ [84]Research is also mixed on the degree to which institutions have had a socializing impacton China’s policymaking or constrain its behavior [80, 85, 86].

The United States also frequently ignores some of the central tenets of theinternational institutions and norms that it helped to establish. For decades, theU.S. has regularly conducted military operations without approval from the UNSecurity Council, including NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, the U.S. invasion ofIraq, and the U.S. intervention in Syria [87]. In some instances, the U.S. hassimply ignored the rulings of international bodies of which it is a member. In2005, the WTO ruled against the U.S. in a dispute with Antigua, awardingAntigua $21 million from the U.S. The United States refused to comply withthe ruling, leading the WTO to allow Antigua to violate U.S. copyrights worth upto the original award amount of $21 million [88]. The U.S. has also previouslywithdrawn itself from the jurisdiction of international legal bodies after beingsubject to adverse decisions. In 1986, the U.S. withdrew from the general juris-diction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the UN’s primary judicial body)when the Court found that the U.S. had violated international law by arming rebelsand mining harbors in Nicaragua [89, 90]. After the ICJ in 2005 ordered U.S.courts to review convictions in which foreign nationals accused of crimes had beendenied contact with their consular representatives, the Bush administration with-drew the U.S. from the ICJ’s jurisdiction over disputes arising from the ViennaConvention on Consular Relations.30

Additionally, fifteen years ago China may have been largely compliant withthe norms and rules of these institutions, but China is increasingly challengingaspects of the U.S.-led international order [91, 92].31 China also seems to beadopting a strategy of institutional balancing to counter the US’s dominantposition and influence [93].32 Specifically, many worry that China is establish-ing its own set of regional and international institutions, such as the Belt and

28 Allison, Destined for War, 191.29 Zhu, China, the International Criminal Court, and International Adjudication.30 Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body.31 Johnston, Socialization in International Institutions: the ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory.32 He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic interdependence and China’s rise.

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Road Initiative or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to advance Chineseinterests and dilute American authority.33 In short, while China is enmeshed inthe international system, its integration has yet to tame China’s ambition tochallenge U.S. primacy. Moreover, both the United States and China have ahistory of ignoring legal frameworks and supranational authorities, especially incases that affect sovereignty and national security.34 Therefore, while institu-tions constrain behavior to a degree, their power is relatively weak and isdecreasing in the cases of the United States and China.

Domestic Political System

Unfortunately, the United States and China do not share a common political culturethat could have reduced the likelihood of conflict as China rises. Instead, theUnited States and China constitute a mixed dyad, with China exhibiting anautocratic domestic political system and the United States a democratic one. Interms of freedom of the press, the United States ranks 45th in the world, whileChina ranks 176th out of 180 countries [96]. Xi has made moves to crack downon civil society, increase surveillance across the mainland, and tighten restrictionson Internet usage. From its Bre-education^ camps for Muslims in Xinjiang to itsdetained human rights lawyers and activists, China’s Boutlook for fundamentalhuman rights…remains dire^ under Xi [97]. This lack of transparency and highlevel of control also characterize China’s military, which has especially lowtransparency in the realm of military expenditure [98].

Moreover, while democracies are less likely to use force against other democracies,they can be quite belligerent against autocracies. The current U.S. National SecurityStrategy states that it is the nature of the Chinese system, not necessarily its behavior,that makes it a potential enemy of the United States when it notes that Bthese arefundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and thosewho favor free societies.^ [77] China’s biggest fear is that the United States will notaccommodate its newfound power, no matter how it is wielded, because of the nature ofits domestic political system. If an elite consensus forms that this fear is well founded,then China will have fewer incentives to behave responsibility. Thus, the divergence inpolitical cultures predicts a relatively high likelihood of major war.

Nature of Alliances

The U.S. alliance system in Asia is characterized as a Bhub and spokes system^ composedof a series of bilateral alliances between the United States and individual Asian countries,specifically Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia with NewZealand.35 Without a formal alliance, the United States has also made a series of commit-ments to the defense of Taiwan. The risk of entanglement is much lower for China, as

33 Ikenberry and Lim, China’s emerging institutional statecraft: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank andthe prospects for counter-hegemony.34 On the United States, see [94]. On China, see [95].35 See [99].

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Beijing has no such alliance commitments and most Chinese strategists and scholarsoppose the formation of such relationships [100–102].36

While these commitments could bring the United States into conflict withChina, for the most part Washington has been careful not to issue a blankcheck to its allies that could embolden them in their confrontations with China.The United States has not stated, for example, that the 1951 Mutual DefenseTreaty signed with the Philippines would apply if China attacked or occupiedislands in the South China Sea over which Manila and Beijing have overlap-ping claims, even as the U.S. reiterates that its Bcommitment to defend thePhilippines is ironclad.^ [104]

The United States also maintains strategic ambiguity about the conditions underwhich it would defend Taiwan to simultaneously deter Beijing and restrain Taipei[105]. Unlike the treaties between the U.S. and Japan and between the U.S. and theROK, the Taiwan Relations Act does not guarantee military protection; it states onlythat BThe President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to thesecurity or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger tothe interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congressshall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by theUnited States in response to any such danger.^37

The U.S. treaty with Japan has the broadest mission to counter potential regionalthreats and maritime aggression from China and North Korea and therefore the mostpotential to entangle the United States in a conflict with China. As described in Article5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty, Japan enjoys extended deterrence provided bythe U.S. across all territories under its administration. U.S. Presidents have clearlystated that this includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands currently disputed by Japan andChina [106–108]. The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation articulatethat when an armed attack against Japan and/or its surrounding water and airspaceoccurs Bdespite diplomatic efforts and deterrence…Japan and the United States willcooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace andsecurity to Japan.^ [109]

There is less risk of entanglement in the cases of Australia, New Zealand, and SouthKorea because these countries have relatively positive relations with Beijing and theU.S. commitment is clearly defensive. The United States will come to the aid ofAustralia and New Zealand (and vice versa) if the territory of one of the parties, theisland territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or its armed forces, public vessels,or aircraft in the Pacific are attacked.38 The U.S.-South Korea alliance is not directed atChina, but it guarantees that when an armed attack occurs in territories now under theROK’s administrative control, the U.S. will act to support Korea [110]. China mayintervene in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but it is not dedicated to defendingNorth Korea and hopes to avoid engaging with U.S. or ROK troops in such a contin-gency [111]. In sum, because U.S. alliance commitments in Asia are conditional anddefensive in nature, they are unlikely to accidentally precipitate an unwanted war.

36 For a dissenting opinion, see [103].37 TRA 1979. Taiwan Relations Act. Pub. L. 96–8 Stat 14.38 Col lec t ive Defense Arrangements . U.S. Depar tment o f Sta te . h t tps : / /www.s ta te .gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/.

36 O. S. Mastro

Nuclear Weapons

The fact that both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons means that anywar could escalate to the nuclear level, which should impose caution on both sides.There is reason to believe, however, that the power of nuclear weapons to deterconventional conflict is relatively weak in the U.S.-China case because of uncertaintyabout whether China possesses a secure second strike.39 The concept of MAD wasbased on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship, in which both countries had thousands ofnuclear weapons and relative parity with one another.

This is not the case for the United States and China, the latter of which has chosen topursue a limited or minimum deterrence posture [113, 114]. Experts estimate that Chinahas approximately 260 nuclear warheads and that Beijing relies mainly on land-basedballistic missiles for their delivery. Until recently, most of these missiles were older,liquid-fuel, slow-launching missiles stored in easily targeted silos. But China started tomodernize its nuclear force in the 1990s, and now there are 50–75 launchers forintercontinental ballistic missiles, of which 33 are the newer road-mobile DF31 andDF31A. As of 2015, China also has a sea-based nuclear deterrence in its four Jin-classnuclear submarines, each of which carries 48 nuclear capable JL-2 submarine-launchedballistic missiles [115]. However, China’s mobile missiles still have the highest survivalrate, as the Jin-class submarines are easily tracked [116, 117].40 China may notcurrently have enough survivable systems to constitute a secure second strike. Evenif the U.S. needed 80 warheads to destroy one DF-31, given the challenges of detection,Washington could probably destroy enough that China could not reliably retaliate afterabsorbing an attack on its nuclear forces [118].41

The fact that the United States and China both possess nuclear weapons reduces thelikelihood of conventional conflict, but it does not make it unthinkable, given thepersistent asymmetry in vulnerability. Although the effects of nuclear weapons arecurrently indeterminate, China’s nuclear modernization efforts suggest that China isgetting closer to possessing a reliable survivable force capable of retaliation afterabsorbing an attack.

Sustainability of Domestic Growth

There are domestic political and economic reasons to doubt that China’s rise is sustain-able. China’s economic growth has already slowed down, from 4.31% of GDP in 2010 to2.48% of GDP in 2016, and a number of indicators point to trouble to come [119]. First,China’s domestic economy suffers from deep debt. In 2008, China’s total debt was about141% of its GDP, but by mid-2017 it had risen to 256%.42 Second, China’s financialsector remains less developed than that of the West, despite Xi’s attempts to overhaul it––particularly because it is hindered by the state-owned economy, which does not allowChina’s financial sector to evolve naturally in response to financial crises and booms, nor

39 For a summary and assessment of this debate, see [112].40 Wu, Survivability of China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Forces.41 Glaser and Fetter think it would be more difficult. Glaser and Fetter, Should the United States reject MAD?42 While this debt-to-GDP ratio ranks with other developed economies such as the United States, the UnitedKingdom, and Italy, China’s PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is just $15,400 (barely a fourth of the United States)[120].

In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations... 37

does it provide the flexibility needed for sustainable value creation and entrepreneurship[121]. Moreover, stimulus programs that favor SOEs have stunted China’s private sectorand flatlined its productivity growth [122]. Lastly, the environmental damage caused byChina’s economic boom is now diverting resources from China’s productive capability.As new environmental regulations are implemented, certain industries, such as China’shousing and construction sectors, could become vulnerable to collapse [123].

China also faces a number of domestic political challenges that could hinder its rise.Growing inequality, demographic problems, and infringements on civil liberty andhuman rights abuses are creating dissatisfaction among sectors of the Chinese public.For example, in 2015, the China Labor Bulletin found that the number of strikes andworker protests across China had escalated dramatically toward the end of 2015 aseconomic growth stagnated [124]. Little information about protests across China isavailable because Lu Yuyu, a journalist who created a Bprotest tracker^ of all strikes andprotests across China, was arrested and detained in 2016 [125]. In 2016, Tibet was givena 0 out of 16 rating, with all organized political activity outside the CCP deemed illegaland harshly punished [126]. In Xinjiang Autonomous Region, the CCP has implement-ed Bbig data^ systems to target dissent, including gathering DNA, installing surveillancein all corners of the region, andmonitoring all online activity [127]. In sum, if China getsbogged downwith internal threats, it may not be able to dedicate the resources necessaryto expand its reach externally, and therefore will not threaten U.S. hegemony in Asia.

However, there are a number of reasons to question this logic. First, some economistssuggest that China has made progress in rebalancing sources of economic growth, whichputs China on a more sustainable economic path [128]. And even if the Chinese economyslows down, it will surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy by 2032 [129].The Chinese government has made innovation a top priority in its economic reforms. Onehigh-profile initiative is the BMade in China 2025^ plan, which aims to upgrade andmodernize China’s key manufacturing hubs in ten sectors through government assistance[130]. Also, while China has sources of instability, the CCP’s hold on power is stronger thanever, with Xi Jinping maintaining his position at the head of the Party and state indefinitely.The Party has accumulated enough experience to know what an authoritarian regimeBshould not do, and must not do,^ and this Bpolitical adaptability^ allows the CCP to notonly prioritize internal security, but also find the appropriate means to achieve it [131].

In short, internal vulnerabilities may undermine China’s rise, but to date China hasmanaged these issues relatively successfully. It is difficult to assess their future impact,making the value of this variable indeterminate.

Implications for U.S.-China Relations

This analysis leads to more pessimistic conclusions about the prospects of peace thanliberal international relations theory and Allison’s twelve clues for peace wouldsuggest. Only two of the possible peace indicators suggest a relatively low likelihoodof war between the United States and China: economic ties and the relative condition-ality of U.S. defense commitments to its allies in the region. Unfortunately, two otherpotential contributors to peace exhibit the wrong values on the independent variables:domestic political systems and rising power dissatisfaction. The remaining threefactors—nuclear weapons, degree of institutional constraints, and sustainability of

38 O. S. Mastro

Chinese domestic growth—could tip the balance toward peace, but do not exhibit theextreme values needed to make a critical impact.

While the individual assessment of the seven variables gives reason for pessimism,how should we understand the aggregate impact of these variables? How we weigh theseven factors together matters in determining the prospects of peace—and scholarshiphas yet to clarify how we should weight the various historical and theoretical factorsthat contribute to peace during a power transition. But we can draw a few conclusions.

First, for most of the theories, it is assumed that there is a threshold at which thevariable comes into play—a minimal degree of economic interdependence, a number ofnuclear weapons, or a certain unsustainability of economic growth that has to bepresent. Currently, that threshold has been met only by the degree of economicinterdependence, which points to peace; domestic political systems, which increasinglypoints to war; and institutional constraints, which could go either way. Second, factorsthat exhibit extreme values will contribute the most to the likelihood of conflict.Reviewing the factors and their historical and theoretical basis, this assumption seemsto be true. If China collapsed economically or became a democracy, if both countrieshad peacenik leaders, or if supranational authorities or international institutions couldcontrol the behavior of even the most powerful countries, then war would not break outbetween China and the United States. But unfortunately, the variables that take valuesat the extreme, like political attributes, show the wrong value for peace, and those thatcould have more impact, such as institutional constraints or nuclear deterrence, are notextreme enough to override the other factors.

What, then, can the United States do to tip the likelihood of a conflict with China in thedirection of peace? In terms of policy, pushing one of the variables beyond the thresholdwill have a greater impact on the likelihood of peace than, for example, trying to increasethe degree of economic interdependence or institutional participation. But any U.S.attempts to undermine the sustainability of China’s growth, or to push it towards democ-racy, would likely cause the very war such a policy would be designed to prevent. TheUnited States could push China tomodernize its nuclear forces so that both sides recognizemutual vulnerability or try to convince Xi to reconceptualize China’ territorial integrity in anon-zero-sum manner—but its influence in these domestic Chinese matters is limited. Ifpeace with China is the priority, then the United States could encourage greater economicinterdependence, or attempt to expand the power of international institutions.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration is taking the opposite approach. In hisSeptember 2018 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Trump articulatedideas that go beyond the rhetoric of BAmerica First,^ in which he has claimed he canstrike a better deal for the United States. Trump expressed a political philosophy thatsecurity and prosperity can be achieved only by individual countries accountable onlyto themselves, if necessary with walls between them, and not by international institu-tions [132]. If the United States continues to disengage from international institutions,they will become weakened and will lose any ability they may have to restrain theUnited States and China. Moreover, the Trump administration has taken multipleapproaches that could reduce bilateral interdependence and threaten the sustainabilityof China’s economic growth. On June 15, 2018, Trump announced that the U.S. wouldimpose tariffs of 25% on $50 billions of Chinese imports. Most recently, in September2018, Trump directed the United States Trade Representative to place additional tariffson roughly $200 billions of Chinese imports [133].

In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations... 39

While history and theory provide a number of insights into the factors that could reducethe likelihood of major power war between the United States and China, an assessment ofthe values of these variables in the context of U.S.-China relations yields more pessimismthan optimism, in terms of both the value of the variables and their trajectories. Theframework presented in this article provides a checklist for policy makers and scholars.How these seven factors evolve over the next ten years will determine whether peace andstability continue in the Asia-Pacific or whether we enter a period of intense competitionand potentially hegemonic war. In sum, U.S. and Chinese strategies will determinewhether the stability in Asia of the past seven decades endures.

Acknowledgements The author thanks Annie Kowalewski, Christian Verhulst, and Qi Zhang for theirexpert research assistance.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of ForeignService at Georgetown University where her research addresses critical questions at the intersection ofinterstate conflict (in particular military strategy and operations), great power relations, and the challengesof rising powers –with a focus on China and East Asian security. In 2017–19, she was also a Jeane KirkpatrickScholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Mastro is the author of the forthcoming CornellUniversity Press book The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime. She holds a B.A. inEast Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. Forher research and commentary, see www.orianaskylarmastro.com.

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