Plato’s EuthyprhoReading Guide

The first and the most important thing we need to do when reading a philosophical text is

to locate the key questions and then clarify what is being asked. Having done that, the

next step is to identify the answers that are being put forward. In a conversation such as

the one that is taking place between Socrates and Euthyphro, we shouldn’t be surprised to

find that they consider several possible answers. In this reading guide we’ll mark the key

questions, assumptions and answers in bold face type. You should go ahead and mark

the questions and answers in your texts by putting a line under them or a star in the

margin next to them with a note that this is a key question or answer. Once we have

arrived at a clearer understanding of the key questions and purported answers, the next

step will be to work through the main reasons that are being given on each side for

thinking that that a given answer is adequate or inadequate.

1. The first part of the dialogue serves as an introduction to the characters, the topic

of discussion, and the questions they propose to address. The dialogue opens with

Euthyphro and Socrates running into each other on the way to the Athenian courts. In

the first few pages, we discover that Socrates is heading to the courts to face charges

that are being brought against him, and that Euthyphro is heading to the courts in

order to prosecute his own father.

2. Euthyphro claims that he knows, with complete certainty, that his action of

prosecuting his father is pious. He also knows his father’s action was unjust. His

father left a servant by the road with his hands and feet bound while waiting for a

messenger to return from the magistrate. This caused the death of the servant. The

reason the father did this was the servant killed a slave in a drunken rage.

3. A philosophical question is implied by what Socrates asks at 4e. He asks

Euthyphro if his “knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate

that, when those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted

impiously in bringing your father to trial?” What is necessary for someone, like

Euthyphro, to know that his own action is pious and that his father’s actions were

unjust?

a. Socrates seems to have doubts about whether or not Euthyphro is doing

the right thing. It is reasonable to suppose that Euthyphro’s father, mother,

and the other members of his family, all have similar doubts. Is it reasonable

for Euthyphro to have such confidence in his claim to knowledge if others

have such doubts?

4. Question #1 (5c-d): Socrates asks a more general question. What is piety? In a

similar vein, we can ask: What is the nature of justice? Piety and Justice are taken to

be virtues of character. As such, there is a more general question lurking in the

background: What, in general, is the nature of virtue?

a. What reason do we have for thinking that this if the main question being

asked in the first part of the dialogue? First of all, we can see that this

question is more general than the question that was asked earlier. What is

more, it is a harder question.

b. Most importantly, it is the question that Socrates focuses on for the next

several pages. In fact, it is the main question that he is trying to answer

throughout the dialogue.

5. Socrates asks: “Is the pious the same and alike in every action? Is all that is

impious the opposite of all that is pious? Does everything that is to be impious

present us with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious?” Euthyphro agrees

with Socrates: the answer to each of these three questions is “Yes.” Key

Assumptions: first, the pious is the same and alike in every action. Second, all that is

impious is the opposite of all that is pious. Third, everything that is to be impious

presents us with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious.

6. In order to understand rest of the dialogue, we need to see that Euthyphro and

Socrates are working on these three assumptions. For the sake of reading the

dialogue, the reader needs to be willing work from these assumptions—even if the

reader doesn’t agree with Socrates and Euthyphro.

a. What are they agreeing to when they adopt this assumption? It is not

obvious what Socrates means when he asks if piety has one form. Let us

consider two examples to see what he might mean.

b. First example: suppose two people step into a field filled with animals, all

of which appear to be fairly similar. If one asks, “What kind of animals are

these?” and the other answers “They are all horses, except the one right in

front of us, which is a mule” we are faced with a similar question. What is

necessary for this person to make a legitimate claim to the possession of

knowledge concerning the nature of horses generally?

c. Second example: suppose two people step into a laboratory in the

chemistry department and see a vial of a clear liquid, a fairly clear block of a

cold solid in a tray, and a light gaseous steam coming from a heated flask. If

the first person asks, “What is the composition of these things?” and the

second answers “I know that all three--this solid, this liquid and this gas--are

all water,” we are faced with a question. What is necessary for this person to

make a legitimate claim to the possession of knowledge concerning the nature

of water generally?

d. In both cases, we see that the possession of knowledge about the particular

case—that this liquid is water, and that this animal is a horse—depends upon

the possession of knowledge about something general. The person who really

knows what makes a horse a horse would be able to give a general definition

of the species horse. The person who really knows what makes a sample of

water the kind of thing that it is can give a general definition of water. The

person might, for instance, give a definition based upon the molecular

structure, saying that all water is composed of two atoms of hydrogen attached

to one atom of oxygen.

e. When we use the term ‘definition,’ we might mean one of two things.

First, the verbal definition of a word is an explanation of how we typically use

the word in conversation. Second, the real definition of a conception is an

explanation of what it really is. It is an account of the true answer to the

question: “What kind of thing is water?” What kind of definition is Socrates

searching for when he asks for the definition of piety? Is he looking for the

verbal definition of the term ‘piety’, or is he searching for the real definition

of what piety really is?

7. It is quite clear that Socrates is searching for an adequate definition of piety.

What is necessary to have knowledge of the real nature of piety? The idea expressed

in Assumption #1 is that there is one form, or one standard of the truth of the matter.

In order to have knowledge of the general nature of piety, there would have to be a

truth of the matter, and one would have to possess an adequate understanding of the

standard of the truth. One clear sign that you grasp the standard of the truth is that

you can explain it by giving an adequate definition of what piety really is. As such,

Socrates is offering part of an answer to Question #1: In order to know whether an

individual action is pious or just, one would have to know what piety and justice are

generally.

a. Some students might be of the opinion that there is no true answer to the

question “What is piety? or to the question “What is justice?” Such students

might very well think there are true answers to questions about the chemical

nature of water or the biological nature of horses. Is there really a true answer

when it comes to ethical questions about how we ought to live? Or, is really

just a matter of personal opinion?

b. For the sake of understanding this dialogue, it is essential that you start by

setting aside presuppositions that are contrary to those guiding the discussion.

Socrates and Euthyphro have agreed to Assumption #1. When we have come

to a better understanding of the dialogue, we can step back and ask questions

based on assumptions that are different from those adopted by the author of

the text. For now, however, it is important that we work from the assumptions

adopted by Plato as we try to understand the meaning of the Euthyphro.

8. Euthyphro’s first definition of piety is offered as an answer to Question #1 (5e):

“I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it

about murder or temple robbery or anything else; not to prosecute is impious.”

a. Socrates asks if there are many different examples of pious actions, and

Euthyphro agrees. This suggests Euthyphro’s answer is inadequate. The

reason is not due to the fact that the actions Euthyphro mentions--such as

prosecuting someone for murder or for temple robbery--are impious. Rather,

Euthyphro has given the wrong kind of answer. Socrates and Euthyphro

started off agreeing that piety must have one form that makes all pious actions

pious. If someone, such as Euthyphro, claims to possess knowledge of piety,

then that person would need to understand the form of piety.

9. One of the reasons Euthyphro has such confidence when he makes claims about

having knowledge of the nature of piety is that he thinks he has a special

understanding of the Athenian gods. Euthyphro knows that Zeus castrated his father,

Cronos, for having unjustly swallowed one of his own sons. As such, Euthyphro

thinks that his own action of prosecuting his father for killing the servant is similar to

Zeus’s action of castrating his father. Euthyphro is firm in claiming that he knows

many things about the gods, including the fact that the stories told by the poets to the

effect that the gods have gone to war against each other really are true stories.

10. At this point, Socrates restates his request (6e): “Tell me then what this form

itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of

yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.”

Euthyphro offers the following as a reply. Answer #1: “what is dear to the gods is

pious, what is not is impious.” Socrates indicates that this is the right kind of answer.

It might not be the correct answer, but it is the right kind of answer because it is a

general answer to the general question.

a. Let’s try to clarify what Euthyphro means when he says that the pious is

what is dear to the gods. To say that something is dear to the gods is to say

that is loved and cherished by the gods, and to say that some thing is hated by

the gods is to say that they despise it. On Euthyphro’s account, to say that

some things are pious—such as praying and offering sacrifices to the gods—is

to say that the gods look with great favor on these kinds of actions. To say

that something is impious--such as desecrating a temple—is to say that the

gods despise such actions. This account locates the nature of what is pious

and impious in the feelings, attitudes, emotions and desires of the gods.

b. So far, we’ve located the key question and identified the first answer.

What is more, we’ve tried to clarify what was being asked in the questions

and what was being offered in the answer. The next step is to see if the person

who is offering the answer has given us any reasons for thinking it is the right

answer to the question.

11. Socrates asks us to examine three claims. First, Socrates and Euthyphro have

agreed to a key assumption to the effect that the pious and the impious are opposites.

Second, Euthyphro insists that he knows the stories about the gods to the effect that

are sometimes in discord and fight with one another are definitely true stories. Third,

Euthyphro claims that the pious is what is loved by the gods and the impious is what

is hated by the gods. Socrates seems to think there is a problem here. Let’s try to

figure out what the problem is.

a. Starting with the second and third claims, Socrates points out that the

Athenian gods are thought to be similar to us in the following respect.

The things that they fight over are the very things that they love and hate.

b. We don’t fight over the answers to following kinds of questions: Which

number is greater? Which object is larger and which is smaller? Which

object is heavier and which is lighter? We don’t fight over such matters

because whenever these kinds of questions arise, we can find the answer

by counting the number, measuring the lengths, and weighing the objects.

In each case, we would apply some standard to as a basis for counting,

measuring or weighing. What is more, these aren’t the kinds of things that

get us riled up and lead us into discord with one another.

c. Rather, we have disputes over what is just and unjust, what is beautiful

and ugly, and what is good and bad. Like us, the gods love what is just,

beautiful and good, and they hate what is unjust, ugly and bad. They care

very deeply about these matters and, when they are unable to resolve their

differences, they tend to be drawn into conflict with one another.

12. What is the problem here? Socrates tries to explain the basis of the problem at 8a-

b. He is giving some reasons for thinking there is something wrong with Euthyphro’s

account of piety. In order to figure out what it is, it will help to do two things. First,

try to state the reasons Socrates is giving in a clear order. Second, whenever you are

faced with a series of points that are hard to make out, try to provide a diagram that

shows what is entailed by those reasons.

a. If we collect all three of the claims Euthyphro has made and agreed to in

one place, we should be able to see that all three can’t be true. There is a

contradiction in the claims. First: piety and impiety are opposites.

Second, piety is what is loved by the gods and impiety is what is hated by

the gods. Third, the gods are sometimes in conflict about what they love

and hate.

b. Try to diagram the relationship that holds between piety and impiety and

compare it to the relationship between what is loved the gods and what is

hated by the gods. If piety and impiety are opposites, there is no room for

a middle class between these two. The middle is excluded. Things are

different when we come to the relation between what is loved by the gods

and what is hated by the gods. Between these two extremes, there is a

middle class in which some of the gods love something and some hate the

very same thing. The things in this middle class are both god loved and

god hated.

c. As such, what is pious and what is loved by the gods cannot be the same.

The reason is that piety and impiety are opposites and do not admit of a

middle class, while what is loved by the gods and what is hated by the

gods are not opposites because these do admit of a middle class where the

gods are in conflict.

13. Euthyphro tries to modify his account in order to respond to the objection. He

says that the pious is what is loved by all the gods and the impious is what is hated by

all the gods. He doesn’t tell us what to do with the middle class, where some of the

gods love something and some of the gods hate it. At 9c, Socrates seems to think the

problem remains, but he doesn’t insist on the point. Instead, he asks another question.

14. Question #2 (9a): “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is

it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”

a. Euthyphro indicates that he doesn’t understand the meaning of the

question. It isn’t yet clear because he is so confused, but Euthyphro seems

to be assuming that the latter is true: something is pious because it is

loved by the gods. In other words, it is the activity by the gods of loving

certain things that we do--such as giving prayers--that makes such actions

pious.

b. In order to illustrate the point, Socrates makes a comparison between three

things: of something carried and something carrying, of something led

and something leading, and of something seen and something seeing.

Socrates says that there is a difference between the first in each pair and

the second, and Euthyphro says that he thinks he understands the

difference.

c. At first glance, the difference seems to consist in the following. The first

item in each pair is an activity that is done by an agent. The second item

is the property the object has when the activity is being done to it.

d. Clearly, the object has the property of being carried because there is an

agent that is carrying it around. As such, the activity of the agent is the

cause, and the object having that property is the effect.

e. Having stated the difference, Socrates frames the question he has asked in

the terms of the examples. He says: “It is not being seen because it is a

thing seen but on the contrary it is a thing seen because it is being seen;”

and the same holds true for the other examples.

15. Socrates states the point of the question in general terms: “I want to say this,

namely, that if anything is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not

being changed because it is something changed, but rather it is something

changed because it is being changed; nor is it affected because it is something

affected, but it is something affected because it is being affected. Or do you not

agree?” Euthyphro says that he agrees.

a. At this point, things seem to be getting clearer for Euthyphro. The gods

love certain things that we do--such as giving prayers--because our actions

are pious. But something is loved by the gods because the gods have

engaged in the activity of loving it. As such, what is pious and what is

loved by the gods cannot be the same.

b. A deeper point seems to be lurking in the comparison Socrates is making.

The point is directly related to the argument he gave earlier. In order to

gain a better understanding of the argument, try to set up the comparison

in a chart. The argument is an analogy, and it is important to see what the

terms of the comparison are. On one side of the chart, put carrying,

leading and seeing. On the other side, put carried, led and seen. Go ahead

and fill in an agent for each of the activities, and fill in an object for each

of the things on the other side. For example:

i. Jacob is carrying a carried book.

ii. Abbie is leading a led horse.

iii. Ella is seeing a seen sun.

iv. The gods are loving a loved action (e.g., prosecuting).

c. The relationship between piety and what the gods love works differently.

For an action that is pious, the fact that the action manifests this kind of

virtue is the cause of the gods loving it. Presumably, the gods love it

because the action is morally good.

16. At 11a-b, Socrates draws the conclusion. It is hard to make it out on first reading,

so you should read it more than once. The second or third time around, use the chart

as a guide as you work through each sentence. The first thing he says is this: “But if

the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyprho, then if the pious was

being loved because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being loved because it

was god-loved. . . .” At the end of the statement, Socrates claims that Euthyphro has

made the mistake of giving an affect or quality in his explanation of piety. He has not

given an adequate account of the nature of piety itself.

a. In order to see what is lurking in the background of the conclusion, let us

try to spell out the kind quality that the object has in each of the examples.

The book has the quality of being carried. The horse has the quality of

being led. And so on. For each of these qualities, the object has that

property because there is an agent that is engaging in an activity. As soon

as the activity is done, the object will no longer have the property. As

such, the book will no longer be carried when Jacob puts it down. The

horse will no longer be led when Abbie stops leading it.

b. Qualities that come and go are contingent properties. In this case, they are

contingent upon the activity of the agent. In particular, the property of

being loved by the gods is contingent upon the activity of the gods loving

what we do.

c. Other properties are not variable in this way. There are certain qualities

that make a book a book and that make a horse a horse. For instance, a

book contains ideas that are expressed in signs. Take that property away

from an object, and it is no longer a book. In asking “What is piety?”

Socrates is asking something similar to the question of what makes a book

a book. In other words, he is asking for an explanation of what is

necessary for any action to be pious. He doesn’t make this distinction

between contingent and necessary properties explicit in this argument, but

it seems to be lurking beneath the surface. As we will see shortly, he uses

this idea of what is necessary for something to be pious in framing the

next question.

17. At 11c, Socrates accuses Euthyphro of making statements that move around and

fail to stay put. Euthyphro accuses Socrates of being the one who makes things move

around. By asking such hard questions, it is Socrates’ fault that they answers won’t

stay put. Who is to blame here? Should we fault Socrates for asking hard questions,

or should we fault Euthyphro for giving inadequate answers?

a. In determining who is making things move around, we should reflect on

the questions Socrates is asking. Are they fair questions? Euthyphro

claims to know, with complete certainty, that the action of prosecuting his

father is a pious action. Could he have such knowledge if he doesn’t

possess knowledge of the general nature of piety?

b. Euthyphro asserts that he does have knowledge of the general nature of

piety—even if it is difficult to form adequate explanations of its nature. Is

it possible for Euthyphro to have this knowledge of the general nature of

piety if he can’t give an adequate explanation?

18. At this point, Socrates shifts the topic of the discussion. Question #3 (11e): “See

whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.”

a. Euthyphro agrees. The pious is necessarily a part of the just. In a similar

manner, shame is necessarily a part of fear, and odd is necessarily a part of

number.

b. Once again, try to diagram the relation. You might try using circles to

make the relations clearer. Socrates considers a range of possibilities.

One thing could belong entirely inside the other, or they could overlap.

There are other possibilities: they could be identical, or they could be

entirely separate. Just out of curiosity, do you think these are the only

possibilities?

c. A mathematician named Euler developed the use of such geometric

diagrams. You may have heard such diagrams constructed out of circles

called Venn diagrams. They are named after a logician who popularized

their use. As you make your way through various philosophical

arguments, always look to see if there is some kind of diagram that can be

used to make things clearer.

19. Socrates follows up on this by asking a series of further questions. He asks:

“what part of the just is it?” He clarifies this question using the example of numbers.

If we asked which part of number is even and which part is odd, we would say that

the even consists in whole numbers that are divisible into two equal parts. The odd

consists in whole numbers that cannot be divided in this way. Euthyphro’s answer is

that piety is concerned with the care of the gods, while justice is concerned with care

of both gods and men. With that answer in hand, Socrates wants to know what kind

of care we give to the gods when we act in a pious manner.

a. Socrates uses a series of examples in order to pin it down. Is it like the

care that a trainer gives to horses, and a hunter gives to dogs? In each

case, the care is given with the aim of providing some benefit to the object

that is being cared for.

b. Socrates presses the question: If there is an analogy between the care we

give to the gods and the care that a trainer gives to horses, then in what

way do we make the gods better.

c. Euthyphro sees that this can’t be the kind of care we give to the gods. In

the case of the trainer and the horse, it is the trainer who understands what

is good for the horse, and it is the trainer who makes the horse better. We

are not in the position of having knowledge about what is good for the

gods that the gods themselves lack. What is more, we are not able to

make the gods better.

20. Euthyphro suggests that the care we give to the gods is analogous to the care that

slaves give to their masters. Socrates asks Euthyphro to spell out the goal or aim that

the gods achieve using us as their servants.

a. He gives a series of examples in order to clarify the question.

i. What is the goal that doctors have when giving service to their

patients?

ii. What is the goal that shipbuilders have when building ships?

iii. What is the goal that house builders have when building houses?

iv. What is the goal of generals when they go to war?

v. What is the goal of farmers when they work the land?

b. Socrates offers the suggestion that the goal of generals is victory.

Presumably the goal of farmers is to raise crops we can eat and the goal of

shipbuilders is to make ships that will float. In each case, we can ask:

what makes any of these things good to achieve? The doctor should care

for the body with the aim of restoring health. Victory at war is good only

if it brings about a secure peace that is just. Producing crops is good only

if they are the kind of food that nourishes the body.

21. Euthyphro gives the following explanation: we act in a pious manner when we do

what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice. In turn, the gods reward us by

preserving “private houses and public affairs of state.” In other words, the gods

maintain peace and security in our families and in the polis (or city-state). Socrates

insists that this answer simply won’t do. Had he given an adequate answer, then

Socrates would have acquired “sufficient knowledge of the nature of piety.”

22. This suggests that we have arrived at a key question. The right answer to this

question is just what we need. It is clear that Euthyphro’s answer is inadequate

because he has returned to the original explanation: piety is what is loved by the

gods. This won’t work for the reasons spelled out earlier in the dialogue. Let’s make

the question Socrates is trying to answer as clear as possible. Given the examples of

the general and the farmer, we should see that he is asking the following. Question

#4: What is the proper aim of acting in a pious manner? What makes such an aim

good? As a lover of inquiry, Socrates insists that he “must follow his beloved

wherever it may lead him.”

a. The idea that Socrates is a lover inquiry—and that we should be too--is a

powerful idea. What is entailed in being a lover of inquiry? Does such a

person love truth above all? Or, does such a person love inquiry above

all? What, do you think, is necessary for inquiry to be an honest pursuit of

the truth?

b. At this point, Socrates tries to find better answers to the questions. Is piety

really a matter of trading with the gods, as Euthyphro seems to suppose?

Is piety really just a matter of giving the gods something that brings them

pleasure so that they, in turn, will give us peace and security? Is piety

really a trading skill between gods and men? Socrates’ tone in asking

these questions provides a hint as to why he thinks Euthyphro’s

explanation of piety is inadequate. Euthyphro is assuming that piety is

good because it brings something to the gods and, in return, the gods bring

something to us. On this account, piety is good because of the

consequences we receive from the actions of the gods. Is piety good

because we get something from the gods when we act in a pious manner,

or is piety good for its own sake?

c. At the end of the dialogue, Euthyphro starts to lose patience with the

questions. After all, he has important things that need to be done. He

needs to get to the courts so that he can prosecute his father. Socrates is

sorely disappointed because, as a lover of inquiry, he thinks there is

nothing that is more important than finding answers to these kinds of

questions.