In The Interest of A, B, and C

120 JUVENILE COURT JUDGES JOURNAL

In The Interest of A, B, and C Ed. Note: The following decision, reproduced verbatim is the rhird opinion to be carried in the Juvenile Court Judges Journal. ’/’he rlecision 10 waive u juvenile from the juvenile to the rriminal court, which usually rests exclusively within the judge’s discretion, is a most difficult one to make. The arguments and insights offered b y Judge Brown hopefully will aid those of his

that were brought out a t the hearing previously would be cumulative and not necessary to the disposition of this motion a t this time. The applica- tion to offer further Proof will be denied.

colleagues who do or will face similar situations. Upon applications for waiver of jurisdiction,

STATE O F WISCONSIN : COUNTY COURT : MILWAUKEE COUNTY CHILDREN’S DIVISION

In the Interest of A, B, and C, Children under eighteen years of age

DECISION ON WAIVER The following proceedings were had and testi-

mony taken upon the hearing of the abeve-matters before the HONORABLE HOWARD G. BROWN, Judge presiding, on the 20th day of March, 1965, a.m.

APPEARANCES : Mr. Ben Weiner, Deputy District Attorney of

James M. Shellow in behalf of A. Francis Croak in behalf of B and C. COURT:

place of Mr. O’Connell? MR. WEINER: That’s right, your honor. COURT:

Milwaukee County, in behalf of state.

Mr. Weiner, you are appearing in

Do you have anything further you wish to call to the attention of the court a t this time, Mr. Weiner?

MR. WEINER : No, your honor. COURT: Mr. Croak, do you have anything

further to present? MR. CROAK : Nothing further, your honor. COURT: Mr. Shellow? MR. SHELLOW: Yes, one matter that I have

learned of, to make an offer of proof on, I learned subsequent to the last hearing. That is that the incident that was described by the officer concern- ing the scratching with the nail file in the vocational school was apparently a matter that had had its genesis in the Plymouth school for boys, and that both of those young men who were involved in the incident, A and the other boy, had both been a t Plymouth together, and this is what A has advised me. If the court wishes, we can take testimony on that particular problem. And the other matter would be just in final rebuttal to Mr. Weiner’s last statements.

COURT : The court feels that any evidence af- fecting past conduct of A with reference to matters

the major issues are as follows : 1. Proof that the court has jurisdiction of the

alleged offenses and the parties, and that the proceedings are in order as to notice and compliance with appropriate statutory requirements.

Proof sufficient to establish that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the children charged were involved.

3. Proof of the matters to be considered in exercising disretion as to the granting of the waiver.

These three matters will be considered separately.

The record upor, which these matters are to be decided consists of the following : A. Testimony of the following named witnesses :

2.

Kenneth J. Marple and Gordon Glatzel, police officers. A and C, children involved. Jack Jorgenson and Washington Guyton, parole officers for A and B.

B. Copies of statements taken by the Milwaukee Police department from the following named persons or made by the police: Statements from Lena Mae Williams (2 ) . Two statements each from the three children involved. Four statements by police officers. Juvenile reports by the Milwaukee police department as to each child and signed by each child. Probation officers’ statements as to A and B.

C . The complete contents of the juvenile court file as to each child. On the initial issue of whether or not jurisdic-

tion exists in this matter, i t appears to the satisfac- tion of the court that the children in question are over sixteen years of age and under eighteen years of age, and within the jurisdiction of the court, and that they reside in Milwaukee County. Appropriate referrals have been received from the Milwaukee police department, preliminary investigations made as directed by sec. 48.19, and authorizations given for the filing of petitions. Petitions in proper form

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have been filed, and notice given to the parents as required by the statute. Attorneys have been ap- pointed and have appeared for the children involved. The district attorney has filed petitions and motions for waiver, and an adequate hearing has been held, with opportunity for all parties to present such material as they desire. The court is satisfied that all jurisdictional requirements have been met, and that the matter is properly before the court.

On the question of the establishment of the offense, the petition as to A alleges the commission of a murder, punishable by the terms of sec. 940.01 of the Wisconsin statutes. The petitions as to €3 and C allege tha t they were concerned in the commission of a murder, punishable under the terms of sec. 939.05. Upon the record made as above set forth, the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the offenses alleged have been committed, and that these children are involved therein. The court does not find i t necessary to determine at this time whether or not i t is required on these motions that probable cause to believe an offense was committed or probable cause to believe the children were involved, is required in view of the fact that these tests have been met in this instance. There is no statutory direction in this respect, but the court believes i t to be better to proceed with the establishment of such factors rather than to proceed solely upon a verified petition alleging offenses. There- fore, the court concludes that whatever is necessary to establish the circumstances upon which discretion must be exercised is now in the record.

The court a t this point will make a narrative statement of the circumstances of the offense. This is something that is not proved, but has been alleged and placed before the court for consideration upon these motions.

On February 27, 1965, about 7 : O O p.m., these three sixteen year old Negro boys, with three teen- age girls, were walking east from 25th Street on the north side of Burleigh, in the city and county of Milwaukee. John Baket, a sixteen year old white boy, was walking west on the south side of the same street, in the same block, with a twelve year old friend. One of the Negroes, unidentified, suggested trying to get some money from Baket. Thereupon the three children before the court crossed the street, surrounded Baket, and demanded money. When he refused and tried to get away he was struck in the face, apparently by A. After some struggle, a closed knife in the hand of A was knocked or fell to the ground, and Baket started away. B and C chased, caught, and started attack-

ing Baket. A in the meantime, recovered the knife from the ground, opened it, and ran to join his friends in the attack upon Baket. During that en- counter Baket was stabbed in the heart by the knife in the hand of A, and died shortly thereafter. The three Negro boys fled from the scene and were taken into custody the next day. Other than the demand for money, no further conversation between the parties is reported. It appears that Baket was not known to these boys prior to this incident.

I repeat that this is a report of the investigation, not proof on a trial. These facts have been alleged, and not established. There have not even been pleas to the charges entered in this court, by the children involved.

If these facts are established and proved, i t con- stitutes an unprovoked, vicious and dastardly as- sault and attack upon an innocent victim. The community outlaws such conduct and must do all in its power to prevent the repetition of this and similar acts. It must hold accountable the partici- pants. Nothing can be done to bring back the life of this innocent young man, horribly and brutally struck down a t the threshold of his manhood.

We come now to the next question before the court, that of considering the advisability of the waiver. The statutory framework upon which this proceeding is based is contained essentially in sec. 48.18 of the statutes, which provides in part, as follows :

“The criminal and civil courts shall have jurisdiction over a child 16 or older who is alleged to have violated a state law or county or municipal ordinance only if the juvenile court judge deems i t contrary to the best interests of such child or of the public to hear the case and enters an order waiving his jurisdiction and referring the matter to the district attorney, corporation counsel, or city attorney for appropriate proceeding in a civil or criminal court. . . .”

So f a r as material, this section of the statutes was adopted in its present form in 1955, at the time of the revision of the Children’s Code. Prior to that time, and apparently from the 1929 codification of the code until that time, adult courts had concurrent jurisdiction in criminal matters over children over sixteen years of age. In 1925, the legislature adopted a provision for concurrent jurisdiction over children over sixteen, but retained the right to transfer to an adult court by the juvenile court at any age for an offense involving state prison term. In 1923,


it was provided that the court could waive all law violations to the adult court, that on those over sixteen the adult court had exclusive jurisdiction, and that for those under sixteen there was concurrent jurisdiction in all cases involving prison offenses.

The idea of having a separate court for children and dealing with them separately is relatively new. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899, and the earliest juvenile court in Mil- waukee county was in 1901. A t that time it was limited to misdemeanors and to children of a relatively tender age. Our section of the statutes to which the court has made reference, sec. 48.18, is patterned after a model act which was drafted by the Committee on the Standard Juvenile Court Act of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in cooperation with the Children’s Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The section we are now considering is not materially different from the terms of the model act. Most other states have similar legislation of one kind or another : (a ) some provide for concurrent jurisdiction of certain offenses o r a t certain ages ; (b) some provide for exclusive jurisdiction on certain offenses in the adult court at any age, or for mandatory waiver on certain offenses; (c) some provide for varying age ranges for treating children as adults from fourteen to eighteen, and some beyond; (d) the discretion as to whether or not the matter shall be presented in juvenile court or in adult court is variously lodged with the police, the prosecuting officer, the adult court, or the juvenile court.

Very few cases appear to have been appealed involving the question of granting a waiver, the advisability of doing so, or the grounds for granting a waiver. Those few cases that the court was able to find were not particularly helpful because of the substantial difference in the statutes of the states where they arose.

In addition to sec. 48.18, we are to consider the provisions of sec. 48.01 of the Children’s Code, which, so f a r as it is material, provides as follows : “( 2) It is declared to be the intent of this chapter

to promote the best interests of the children of this state through :

Juvenile courts adequately equipped to review each case on its individual merits under procedures designed to safeguard the legal rights of the child and his parents. An integrated and co-ordinated pro- gram for all delinquent, neglected, and dependent children, both in their own

community and while in the custody of the state.

(c ) Adequate care and rehabilitation for all children who must be separated from their parents temporarily, for the child’s protection or that of the public.”

The section goes on to say, as to construction : “This section shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives in sub. ( 2 ) . The best interests of the child shall always be of para- mount consideration, but the court shall also consider the interests of the parents or guardian of the child and the interest of the public.”

Upon the petitions in these cases, appropriate available dispositions in juvenile court include probation, placement in private institutions, or transfer of legal custody to the state department of public welfare, as set forth in sec. 48.34. Transfer of custody to the department shall be until the child reaches the age of twenty-one years. Sec. 48.53 provides that all children adjudged delinquent and whose legal custody has been transferred to the department shall be discharged as soon as the department determines that there is reasonable probabil- ity that i t is no longer necessary, either for the rehabilitation and treatment of the child or for the protection of the public, that the department retain custody. Under this section, the department, in its discretion, may parole or discharge a child in its custody at any time to any other institution under the jurisdiction of the state department which i t deems appropriate for the care of the child. In sec. 48.50 and 54.27, the department is directed to make such study and examination of the child as is necessary to determine the type of placement best suited to his needs and to the protection of the public. It shall make adequate care and rehabilitation available for such child. Sec. 54.29. Finally, the department is authorized, under sec. 48.53 ( Z ) , to apply to the committing court for approval of an order extending the custody of a delinquent child for two-year periods beyond twenty-one, if the department believes that i t would be dangerous to the public because of the person’s mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality, to have him discharged. Similar two-year extensions may be sought so long as the department concludes that continuing custody is necessary for the purposes and reasons given. Procedure for handling such applications for extension is set forth in sec. 54.32 to 54.35, inclusive.

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If the child is tried in an adult court, the maxi- mum possible sentence is life imprisonment, with eligibility for parole consideration after about eleven years, with the best record of good behavior. If the conviction in the adult court is for less than murder, parole eligibility may come after two years of custody. The only alternative available to the adult court would be probation. There are no statutory provisions of which the court has knowledge directing that persons in custody in adult institutions are to receive diagnostic studies, or are to be rehabilitated and treated and returned to the community better than when they went in. The prime responsibility of the department for persons transferred to it as a result of an adjudication of crime is for safekeeping.

The records considered by the court disclose the following material facts as to each child :

C was born February 13, 1949, and was sixteen years and two weeks old at the time of this offense on February 27th. He is the oldest of nine children, resides with his mother and stepfather in Milwaukee, and has lived in Milwaukee for five years. He is enrolled in the 10-B class a t North Division high school, and has not been referred to the juvenile court or its probation department previously. No investigation of this boy and his family has been conducted by the probation department or was considered by the court. The record contains no information about the natural father of this child.

B was born on May 24, 1948, and was about sixteen years and nine months old at the time of the offense. He resides with his father and stepmother, an older sister, and four half-siblings in Milwaukee. The whereabouts of his mother is unknown. On December 19,1963, he was found delinquent by this court for having been involved in running away from home and engaging in a burglary, was placed under the supervision of the probation department of this court for one year, and permitted to live in his own home. On February 20, 1964, he was found to have violated the terms of his supervision and been again delinquent for having been involved in taking and operating an automobile without the owner’s consent and for an act of burglary. His supervision was terminated and his custody was transferred to the state department of public welfare until he was twenty-one years of age, and he was delivered to the reception center for boys at Wales. He was in the institution at Wales and Kettle Moraine from February 21, 1964, until June 5 , 1964, and then released on parole. His parole was revoked on September 4, 1964, for runaway

from home, attempted theft from a car, and attempted purse-snatching. He remained in the school for boys until February 12, 1965, when he was again released on parole, just over two weeks prior to the offense with which we are now concerned. His parole officer gave no indication of substantial misconduct while on parole, other than the offense for which his parole was revoked and a previous runaway when he was living in an un- occupied portion of a building occupied by a rela- tive.

A was born on October 9, 1948. He was sixteen years and nearly five months old at the time of this offense. He is the oldest of six children, and resides with his mother and the other children in Mil- waukee. The record indicates that the parents have been separated since 1949, that the father lives in Memphis, Tennessee, and the implication is that some or all of the younger children were born out of wedlock. This child, on his initial appearance in juvenile court on June 11, 1964, was found delinquent for having been involved in a burglary, violation of the curfew ordinance, and school truancy. His custody was transferred to the state department of public welfare for placement in the boys’ school until he was twenty-one. I repeat, this was his first court appearance. Prior to that time he had been referred to the probation department of this court on three occasions, once for riding in a stolen car which he did not know was stolen, a second time for disorderly conduct in having been involved in loitering or curfew violation, and a third time, on January 30, 1964, approximately five months before he was referred to court, for being involved in a burglary of a grocery store and in truancy. The nature and extent of the burglary was not disclosed by the record, but upon his prom- to make restitution the matter was handled on the basis of an informal supervision for a couple of months and then closed. The family came to Mil- waukee in 1955, and is now receiving aid to dependent children. From June 11, 1964, until July 21, 1964, A was at Wales. I t was apparently during this time that he received some psychological testing, and had an interview of about an hour and a half with a psychiatrist. Between July 21, 1964, and November 9, 1964, he was placed at the Kettle Moraine school. On the latter date, he was released on parole to field supervision. He remained out of the institution until January 29th, when he was returned to Kettle Moraine on a replacement, not a revocation of parole, a t the request of his parole officer. He remained there until February 26, 1965, when he was discharged, the day before the


occurrence now before the court. The replacement apparently took place because of his involvement in disorderly conduct at the vocational school on January 21, 1965, involving a fight with another student, in which the other student was allegedly injured in two places by a nail file in the hands of A. At that time he was suspended from the vocational school for thirty days. Previously and on November 8th, there had been a complaint of his drinking made by the vocational school. There is a suggestion in the record that A and some of the other children involved had been drinking wine on the day that this incident occurred. The amount thereof and its effect on him and the others is not disclosed. A school report is in the court file which indicates that this boy has a long history of mal- adjustment in school, that he has weak parental control and supervision, and testing indicates that he has a low average mental ability.

Before proceeding to consider the question of grounds for waiver, the court would like to comment on the questions involved in publicity. This court believes that news reporting of unacceptable community behavior is proper and needs to be made in the public interest. The court has always permitted reporters to participate o r observe the ses- sions of this court, upon assurance that there will be compliance with the provisions of the Children’s Code that the identifying information as to the children involved will not be disclosed. Only as the public is informed about what happens can the public take intelligent social action. One of the things that has been commented on in the publications and the reporting on this case is the problem of race relations. This is a topic of vital public interest to this community. Last evening the papers reported another incident of violence involving a Negro child under eighteen and a white person, resulting in an injury. These matters need to be brought to the attention of the community so tha t they can take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. We are concerned here in this proceeding with one of the remedies. However, it is the opinion of the court that the publishing of names of individuals involved in acts socially unacceptable o r acts of violence, dastardly crimes, or whatever you want to call them, does not necessarily help to solve the community problem. The court is satisfied that experience has demonstrated that it is possible to do a better job of carrying out the statutory responsibility of salvaging, rehabilitating and treating people if they are not made pariahs and social out- casts by reason of having their names published. I hope that in the reporting of these proceedings

there will be some reporting of the reasons or basis for the decision so that the community will have a further understanding of the problems involved.

We come now to the question of what considera- tions confront the court in deciding on the question of a waiver. Some of the factors indicating that i t would be contrary to the best interests of the child to dispose of this matter under the juvenile court law may be itemized as follows:

He needs somebody else to assert for him controls which he does not have. The court will agree that this may be the circumstances in these cases, without saying, necessarily, that certain kinds of controls or results must be achieved.

b. Again, he needs therapeutic punishment to teach him respect for law and the rights of others. I prefer to consider the handling of such situation as a matter of discipline and control rather than punishment.

c. He will receive better control in an adult institution. If this is the consideration involved, i t is within the discretion of the department to use an adult institution under a commitment from this court.

d. If he has a criminal record i t will deter him from future involvement, and imprisonment will teach him a lesson. I think the long experience of criminal law demonstrates that very few learn from simple incarceration. Unless efforts are made to treat and rehabilitate, to salvage and re-educate, we are merely perpetuating a n existing situation, sometimes even making it worse, by simple incarceration.

e. If this matter were transferred to the adult court, there would be a greater assurance of long time custody, which these boys seem to need. I think this does violence to the language of the statutes and to the discretion lodged in the department.

f . Finally, and this perhaps would be a material factor, the interests of the child will be better pro- tected in an adult court because he cannot be required to testify against himself and the burden of proof of the offense will be beyond a reasonable doubt and not simply on a preponderance of the evidence, as is required in juvenile court.

As I have indicated, I have discussed in this area some arguments that might be made for transferring jurisdiction from the point of view of the boys involved. I think there are other factors that in- dicate that i t is in the best interests of the child to dispose of the matter in the juvenile court. For one thing, such a disposition will not result in a criminal record and the disabilities resulting therefrom.

a.

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Second, there will be no public trial and identifica- tion so that he can be pointed a t and considered an outcast or pariah in society, so that there will be some hope of returning him some day to the community as a useful member thereof. A third factor in this area is that the institutional resources for dealing with his problems under a commitment from a juvenile court are, by law and in fact, designed and intended to salvage, re-educate, rehabilitate the child. They are limited in the accomplish- ment of these ends by the volume of work that the department is required to handle, with the resources available, and by the limitations on the knowledge available to handle the problems as- signed. We profess and hope that we are able to accomplish the ideals about which we talk in dealing with proceedings in juvenile court. We are unsuccessful in many situations because we know no better. The knowledge and resources on human behavior are not available.

We come then to a consideration of some of the factors indicating that i t is contrary to the best interests of the public to dispose of these cases in the juvenile court. For one thing, i t is claimed that we will have a greater assurance of long term incarceration or care. This of course again reflects upon the department as not exercising its responsibility to continue the care of a juvenile so long as such care is needed.

A second factor is tha t publicity of the results and the naming of the parties will act as a deterrent to others. In several years experience of this court, it clearly appears that the deterrent effect of punishment or incarceration or of publicity is minimal, particularly when i t concerns juveniles or when i t concerns offenses for which premeditation does not exist.

Transferring this case to the adult court would be in the public interest because it would satisfy a demand of society for vengeance, retribution, punishment-it would be an outlet for the frustration of society in its inability to deal with the problems presented by these boys.

It is believed that it would be a solution to the problems of interracial violence. You lock up the violators and you thereby eliminate the possibility of future offenses.

If the case were handled in adult court and there were first degree murder convictions, the discretion to release would be eliminated prior to about eleven years after trial. This long term incarceration would protect the community for at least that length of time.

It would be in the interests of the community to

transfer this case because the treatments given so f a r have failed and because the resources available for further treatment are inadequate and will be unsuccessful.

And finally, i t would be in the public interest to transfer these cases to the adult court on the theory that there will be such a hue and outcry against the failure to do so as to jeopardise the continuance of acceptance by the community of the philosophy and theory of the juvenile court law-if we do not put the law to the test, it can survive in limited areas.

On the other side of the coin, the interest of the public, are factors indicating that it would be in the best interests of the public to retain the case in the juvenile court. For one thing, the state will, of necessity, have to face up to the need for additional resources and additional research and knowledge in the field. So long as they can hide their problems by locking up people and forgetting about them, they don’t have to handle them or meet the problems.

Second, the community, in retaining this matter in this court, will see the need to adopt realistically the philosophy of the juvenile court in seeking the salvage and rehabilitation of nonconforming children. The communit,y will face up to the need to reject vengeance, punishment for its own sake, retribution, and the need for a scapegoat to purge its feelings of dissatisfaction in social conditions that we are frustratingly unable to solve or handle.

There are other factors, difficult to relate to the interest of the child or the interest of the community, which need to be examined, or may be examined and considered also in exercising discretion in this matter. One of them is the contention or theory or feeling or understanding of the community that misconduct such as this results from the exercise of free will. Often this is not the case. Years ago, we used to consider poverty as a delib- erate matter, and that people were t o be convicted of an offense and incarcerated for poverty. We have learned better. I believe the certainty of getting caught and the fear of getting caught and the certainty of having the matter dealt with and dealt with properly is much more substantial factor than severity of punishment as a deterrent.

The community has a philosophy that wrong- doing should be followed by punishment, by pain or injury. It believes that this will act as a deterrent to others, and that disobedience to the law will be discouraged by the awful example of the conse- quences. Thus, we say we need capital punishment to prevent people from committing murders. The court calls attention to the fact that the rate of


murder per population in states not having capital punishment does not exceed those in the states that do. Perhaps a better philosophy is stated, or is ex- pressed by the statement of George Bernard Shaw that to punish a man you must injure him, to re- form him you must improve him. Men are not im- proved by injuries.

Another argument that is made is tha t some children a re not children, they are too mature, they are old beyond their years of sixteen or seventeen, and therefore should be dealt with as adults. This statement has two aspects so f a r as this court is concerned. One is, what is the test of maturity? Is it physical, mental, or emotional? Physical maturity is obviously not material. Mental and emotional maturity is something that is almost impos- sible to measure. By what standards do you measure it? Do you measure it by the mental or emotional standards of an adult criminal? If so, how do you measure such standards -by psychological or psychiatric testing? No such tests are known to exist. The other aspect of this question of maturity is involved in the issue of whether or not it makes sense to forget about the problem presented by a criminal of any age simply by incar- cerating him. I submit that it does not.

A further argument that is made is that the child represents a hopeless problem as to salvage or rehabilitation. Hopeless problems don’t arise only at sixteen, or eighteen, twenty-one, or twelve. We may likewise expect that a child of twelve years of aye seems to be hopeless, just as we look a t a cancer case as hopeless. Do we therefore do nothing? Lock i t up and forget about i t ? Hide the problem? We used to do this with mental problems. Some- body who was insane was put in the institution and forgotten. We are no longer doing so. We are at- tempting to do the best we know how, and we are making progress. Likewise we are making progress in the treatment of cancer. It is argued that there is a lack of secure facilities for treatment. Secure facilities are available. It has been held in this state that the department may transfer children committed to it by juvenile court to adult institutions, and they do it on a number of occasions.

Incarceration alone does not secure or insure any benefits to a person who is imprisoned. On the contrary, it may be the most destructive thing that we can do to him. Perhaps even more destructive than capital punishment.

And finally, the argument is made that we must protect the juvenile court procedures against the outcry that it mollycoddles and lets crime develop. Can or have the adult courts done better in dealing

with the people with whom they deal? If the judge of a juvenile court has confidence in the Children’s Code and the philosophy which it embodies, and its promise for improvement in the community, the court may not avoid its responsibilities o r com- promise them.

The discretion to be exercised is to be measured objectively by the interests of the child and the public, and subjectively by the understanding of the individual judge. There is not a burden on the state to show cause o r grounds for transfer. Rather there is a burden upon the court to find reasons for transfer. He may transfer only if he finds reasons existing that it would not be in the best interests of the child or the community to have the matter disposed of in this court, and that such reasons have a real validity. The charge alone of a serious crime is not enough. The legislature did not say so, The vicious and despicable act which occurred in this case is to be condemned and not condoned.

We have abandoned for children under sixteen the theory of lifetime incarceration without treatment or hope of salvage or rehabilitation. We have ten- tatively adopted the same theory for those sixteen and seventeen years of age.

This court can find no reason for departing from the tentative adoption of such theory in these cases. I n fact, in the judgment of the court it makes sense to extend the concept of treatment and rehabilitation to older offenders.

The decision which the court has rendered today makes i t unnecessary to comment individually on the aspects or the situation as it involves the three children in this case. C was involved in law violation for which he was apprehended the first time in this instance. B had previous experience. He has demonstrated that he is still not acceptable as a member of the community. A has indicated by his past conduct and his present acts tha t he needs controls which he himself is not able to provide, and that the community must provide until something can be done about them.

Accordingly, orders will be entered in these cases denying the motions of the district attorney for waiver of jurisdiction of these boys to the adult court. The court a t this time will return the statements to the district attorney which were received in connection with the hearing in this matter, and will request, but not direct, the district attorney to assist the corporation counsel in the presentation of these matters to the juvenile court a t an appropriate time.

We have abandoned capital punishment.

Howard Brown, Judge

In The Interest of A, B, and C

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