IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS...
Transcript of IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS...
Document of
The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: ICR00005129
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
TF-A2340
ON A
STATE AND PEACE BUILDING FUND (SPF) GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 4.90 MILLION
TO THE
Government of Central African Republic
FOR
Local Connectivity Emergency Project (P157923)
March 30, 2020
Transport Global Practice
Africa Region
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Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret
Regional Director: Riccardo Puliti
Practice Manager: Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge
Task Team Leader(s): Marc Marie Francois Navelet Noualhier, Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto
ICR Main Contributor: Shruti Vijayakumar
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAR Central African Republic
CEMAC The Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CPF Country Partnership Framework
DPF Development Policy Financing
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
EU European Union
FCV Fragile, Conflict, and Violence
FER Fonds d’Entretien Routier, Road Fund
FPA Fiduciary Principles Accord
FY Fiscal Year
GBV Gender-Based Violence
GP Global Practice
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA International Development Association – World Bank
LCEP Local Connectivity Emergency Project
LIPW Labor-Intensive Public Works
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MINTP Ministère des Travaux Publics, Ministry of Public Works
MINUSCA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OP Operational Policy
PAP Project-Affected Persons
PDO Project Development Objective
RAP Resettlement Action Plan
RCP Rural Connectivity Project
RCPCA Plan National de Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique, Plan for Recovery and Peace-Building
RN8 Route Nationale No. 8 – National Road No. 8
SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic
SPF State and Peace-Building Fund
TF Trust Fund
TTL Task Team Leader
UN United Nations
UNOPS United Nations Office of Project Services
USD United States Dollars
WB World Bank
WBG World Bank Group
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
1. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 4
2. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 9
3. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 15
4. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 17
5. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 19
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 22
ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 30
ANNEX 3. RECIPIENT, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ...... 31
ANNEX 4. PHOTOGRAPHS .................................................................................................... 32
ANNEX 5. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 36
ANNEX 6. MAP OF PROJECT INTERVENTION ......................................................................... 37
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DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information
Project ID Project Name
P157923 Local connectivity emergency project
Country Financing Instrument
Central African Republic Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
Government of Central African Republic United Nations Office for Project Services
Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO
The PDO is to reconnect the population of the Northeast CAR to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road. The project will contribute to the State and peace building efforts by ensuring basic transport connectivity between poorly connected areas in districts situated in the lagging regions (North-East). This should contribute to: (a) revitalize local economy by providing temporary employment at local level; (b) facilitate the movement of goods and domestic trade; and (c) State redeployment for development through the Ministry of Equipment and Transport, Civil Aviation, and Integration (Ministère de l’Equipement et des Transport, de l’Aviation Civile et du Désenclavement – METACD) decentralized civil servants along the targeted road.
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FINANCING
FINANCE_TBL
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)
Donor Financing
TF-A2340 4,900,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Total 4,900,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
Total Project Cost 4,900,000 4,900,000 4,900,000
KEY DATES
Approval Effectiveness Original Closing Actual Closing
03-Apr-2016 15-Apr-2016 30-Sep-2019 30-Sep-2019
RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions
15-Jan-2018 3.24 Change in Components and Cost
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual
Disbursements (US$M)
01 07-Feb-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.81
02 17-May-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.81
03 23-Oct-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.24
04 29-May-2018 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90
05 14-Dec-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90
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06 21-Oct-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.90
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director: Paul Noumba Um Jean-Christophe Carret
Director: Pierre A. Guislain Riccardo Puliti
Practice Manager: Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge
Task Team Leader(s): Marc Marie Francois Navelet Noualhier, Abel Paul Basile Bove
Marc Marie Francois Navelet Noualhier, Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto
ICR Contributing Author: Shruti Vijayakumar
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1. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1. The Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world. As a landlocked
country bordered by unstable neighbors, it has a long history of violence and conflict. With a Gross National Income
(GNI) per capita of US$581 in 2014, it ranked 187th out of 188th in the 2014 UN Human Development Index. Since
early 2013, CAR has experienced a massive political-security crisis, creating unprecedented humanitarian needs. The
conflict has had a negative effect on the fundamental underpinnings of society in the country, including the collapse
of the economy, the erosion of the state’s capacity to reach and care for the population, and large-scale forced
displacement.
2. The challenges faced by CAR are long-standing, and conflict and political violence predate the 2013 crisis. The crisis
is believed to be a result of long-lasting, structural fragility fueled by inadequate public sector governance and
dysfunctional and weak institutions.1 In 2015, the World Bank Group (WBG) and other donors prepared a Fragility
Assessment of CAR, which concluded six drivers of conflict and fragility to explain how the crisis developed a cyclical
aspect: (i) a lack of social cohesion at every level of society; (ii) political power concentrated in a very small elite with
very little legitimacy; (iii) social and regional disparities between Bangui, the capital, and the periphery and between
the East and the rest of the country; (iv) elite capture of scarce natural resources; (v) imputing and lack of prosecution
of criminals; and (vi) a lasting state of insecurity.2 The 2013 crisis was unprecedented in scale and had a particularly
devastating impact, as half of the country’s GDP was lost.3 Over 20 percent of the country’s population was displaced
and 2.7 million, over half of the population, needed humanitarian support.4
3. The crisis prompted a large-scale international response. Peacekeeping interventions followed by the African Union
(AU), France, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) forces as well as emergency relief by UN agencies
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As the crisis deepened, the country descended into localized violence
based on ethnic-religious lines. The need to reinforce peacekeeping led to the 2014 UN Security Council Resolution
2149, which authorized the deployment of a 12,000-men strong UN peacekeeping force, known as the UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which replaced the
former African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly MISCA) in September 2014.
4. National elections were held in February 2016, but challenges remain, and the conflict is not considered to be
over. The situation has continued to deteriorate with a rise in violence and fragmentation of armed groups in parts
of the country. At the time the project was prepared, there seemed to be clear consensus among local authorities
about the priorities for the country: peace, reconciliation, security, followed by good governance, the provision of
basic services, and economic development.5
1 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for the Central African Republic, Report No. 125268-CF, June 19, 2019 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Local Connectivity Emergency Project, Project Paper, Report No. PP1759, March 2016 5 SCD, June 2019
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5. The World Bank (WB) was one of the main development partners to reengage. The intervention was well-aligned
to the main objectives of the WB. The WB’s span of engagement included the CAR First State Consolidation
Development Program (DPF, P160123), the CAR Policy Notes (P157806), the CAR Recovery and Peacebuilding
Assessment (P160202), and the Turn Around Facility which led to the US$2 billion pledge in Brussels in November
2016. As elaborated in the Country Engagement Note for the CAR FY 2016-20176, the priorities were to (i) restore
core public sector institutions; (ii) provide basic support to livelihoods; and (iii) enhance basic social service delivery.
The operation was also aligned to recent WB analytical underpinning and strategies in Fragile, Conflict, and Violence
(FCV) countries, notably the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict Security and Development. The operational
implications included a focus on deepening partnerships and plans for enhanced implementation of the UN-World
Bank Partnership Agreements.
6. The State- and Peace-Building Fund (SPF) Trust Fund (TF) was able to quickly mobilize financing for this critical
operation for rapid infrastructure reconstruction in the CAR. The multi-donor TF was created in 2008 to finance
innovative approaches to state and peacebuilding in regions affected by FCV. It supports measures to improve
governance, institutional performance, and reconstruction and development in countries emerging from, in, or at
risk of sliding into crisis or arrears. In particular, the TF supports pilot innovative initiatives that address the challenges
of fragility and create a foothold for wider development involvement. The SPF remains an important part of the WB’s
broader efforts to address the drivers and impacts of FCV, and to contribute ultimately to peace, stability, and
prosperity. The project was processed under WB emergency procedures given the urgency of the needs.
7. At the time the project was prepared, the infrastructure deficit in CAR was enormous, particularly its road
network. Although the road network formed the backbone of the transport system in CAR, it remained
underdeveloped and in poor condition. Road density was low at only 1.5km per 100km2 compared to an average of
15km per 100km2 for Sub-Saharan Africa.7 Transit times remain high and many roads are only accessible for some
months of the year. Many communities were left isolated, exacerbated by the rainy season due to damaged and
flooded roads and bridges.
1.2 Theory of Change (Causal Chain)
8. The underlying logic of the proposed emergency intervention was clear. The project was intended to ensure basic
transport connectivity between poorly connected areas in districts situated in the lagging region of the Northeast of
the country, which would contribute to peacebuilding and development efforts. The project aims to reopen the
section of the National Road No. 8 (Route Nationale No. 8, RN8) between the city of Kaga-Bandoro to the Northeast
city of Ndélé, a gravel/earth road section of about 333km long. RN8 was prioritized and selected as the main
intervention of the project, and is the lifeline that runs through the Northeast of the country, from Sibut via Kaga-
Bandoro, Ndélé and Birao to the Sudanese border. It has a high symbolic value as it reconnects the capital Bangui to
the marginalized Northeast, a hotspot following the 2013 rebellion.
6 Country Engagement Note for the CAR FY 2016-2017, Report No. 96209-CF, July 13, 2015 7 Project Paper, March 2016
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9. The rehabilitation of RN8 enables the isolated rural populations of Northeast CAR to be physically connected to the
country’s other urban centers, particularly the capital Bangui. This would help to (i) revitalize the local economy by
providing temporary employment and related cash transfers; (ii) facilitate the movement of goods and internal trade;
(iii) make local governance more inclusive by engaging stakeholders and local communities in maintenance; (iv)
redeployment of state authority through civil servants.
10. The intervention focuses on tangible outputs (i.e. improvement of roads, bridges, drainage etc.) using Labor-
Intensive Public Works (LIPW)8 where feasible. This approach goes beyond infrastructure-building, to promote social
cohesion and economic inclusion of the vulnerable populations, while fostering community ownership and reviving
territorial connectivity along a humanitarian corridor.
8 Labor-Intensive Public Works (LIPW) tasks include clearing brush, manually opening diches, curing channels, and dealing with certain critical points as they arise.
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1.3 Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
11. The Project Development Objective (PDO), as stated in the Grant Agreement, is to reconnect the rural population of
the Northeast part of the Central African Republic to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-
Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road.
1.4 Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
12. The PDO indicators were as follows:
• Number of direct beneficiaries (including share of women) provided with an all-season access to the
Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road within a 2 km range under the project;
• Average daily traffic (all types of vehicle included); and
• Number of man-days created through Labor Intensive Public Works activities (including share of man-
days created for women).
13. Main beneficiaries. The main intended beneficiaries were the villages along the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui
– Ndélé road. Reopening the road was expected to benefit 74 villages, accounting for more than 37,000 people and
the recovery of traffic along the road. The population would also benefit from the temporary employment generated
through the LIPW and light maintenance, helping to revitalize the local economy. The population would benefit
directly from increased state presence and supervision through the redeployment of the Ministry of Public Works
(Ministère des Travaux Publics, MINTP) civil servants in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé. Furthermore, the reopening of this
road, RN8, a commercial road linking Bangui to the border with Sudan, was of strategic importance for MINUSCA
and was expected to also contribute to improving security along the road and fostering domestic and foreign trade
along the corridor.
1.5 Components
14. The US$4.9 million Local Connectivity Emergency Project (LCEP) consisted of four components:
a. Component 1: Drainage Improvement (US$ 2.8 million). This component finances the improvement of
drainage, road signaling, and rain barriers along the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road (333
km), including (a) the rehabilitation and construction of bridges, and box and pipe culverts; (b) the
construction of ditches; (c) the provision and installation of rain barriers; (d) the provision and installation of
road signaling through LIPW. This project’s main activity and accounting for 51 percent of project costs, this
component finances the construction of a new metal bridge over the Bamingui River to allow the crossing of
the river during all seasons.
b. Component 2: Road Protection and Maintenance (US$0.5 million). This component includes the
management of rain barriers, and the setting of light maintenance systems involving communities
(“cantonnage”) to ensure the protection and maintenance of the full length of road (333 km) during project
implementation.
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i. Sub-Component 2.1: Management of Rain Barriers (US$0.15 million). This sub-component finances
the management of 14 newly-installed rain barriers (one every 20-25km), provided and installed
under Component 1, for the protection of the road. The activities will contribute to restoring the
national operating system of rain barriers, by (a) recruiting and training local agents; (b) restoring
supervision from the MINTP at the local and national level; (c) setting a payment system
ii. Sub-Component 2.2: Light Maintenance Systems (US$0.35 million). This sub-component finances
the implementation of a light maintenance system on the full length of the road (333 km). This
system will allow the day-to-day local maintenance of the road for the duration of the project and
progressively following road rehabilitation. The system would be composed of segments of 20-25
km, each managed by a team composed of a chief cantonnier whom would manage 10 cantonniers.
It would include setting up a payment system and recruiting, training, and compensating local
workers. Local maintenance committees will be set up and trained in order to encourage the
sustainment of the light maintenance system, which will be handed over to the MINTP for
supervision and payment once the project ends.
c. Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (US$0.4 million). This component focuses
on carrying out a program of activities aimed at redeploying the Chefs de Services Préfectoraux to ensure
proper supervision and monitoring of the project, including the rehabilitation and reconstruction of offices
and supervision-related training for the Chefs de Service, and carrying out studies and workshops to identify
lessons learned from project-related activities and assess the project impact.
i. Sub-Component 3.1: Redeployment of the Chefs de Service Préfectoral of the MINTP in the sous-
prefectures (US$0.3 million). This sub-component finances (a) the rehabilitation and re-equipment
of MINTP offices in the sous-préfectures of Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé; (b) job-related expenses
(excluding salaries and compensations) for the Chefs de Service who will be in charge of the
monitoring of the project; (c) the training of the Chefs de Service in order to be able to conduct
proper supervision of the project.
ii. Sub-Component 3.2 Lessons Learned (US$0.1 million). This sub-component will finance a study and
a workshop for stakeholders, building on lessons learned from the project and other similar
initiatives. A baseline and impact study, taking into account the indicators of the project and the
impact on economic activity once the project is completed will also be financed.
d. Component 4: Project Management and Contingency Fund (US$1.2 million). This component will finance
the direct and indirect costs necessary for the implementation of the project. The Fiduciary Principles Accord
(FPA) provides 7 percent for indirect cost. Direct costs related to project implementation by United Nations
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) will be financed under this component. Project management will also (a)
include the hiring of a social specialist and a community facilitator to ensure the project implementation is
well coordinated with local authorities; (b) a rapid development assessment at the community level to gather
necessary data for successful project implementation; (c) inclusive engagement with local stakeholders and
setting up a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM); (d) the provision of contingency funds to cope with
unpredictable challenges during project implementation (US$0.5 million).
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15. Initial project costs and project costs at completion are included in Annex 2.
1.6 Other Significant Changes
16. Restructuring. A Level 2 restructuring was approved on January 16, 2018. The restructuring was intended to
reallocate costs to cover the additional costs involved in the construction of the Bamingui Bridge, the main activity
under the project (see Annex 2). It did not affect the theory of change for the project nor the originally expected
outcomes.
Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome
2.1 Relevance of PDOs
Rating: High
17. At the time when the operation closed, the development objectives remained consistent with the Bank’s strategy.
The Country Partnership Framework (CPF), currently under preparation, is based on the major findings of the
Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) published in June 2019. The CAR SCD concludes that improved mobility is a
critical aspect of an enabling environment for service delivery and income generation, whilst also helping to reduce
the rural-urban divide that might otherwise emerge when state presence is limited to mostly urban areas due to
security concerns. To address the low levels of security, emergency investments in road corridors (for example,
through labor-intensive programs) is specifically mentioned. Moreover, while upsurges of violence and instability can
be expected, creating an accountable state presence across the territory continues to be critical to addressing spatially
inequitable service delivery. In this regard, the operation continues to be highly relevant as it sought to address all
three binding constraints defined in the SCD: (i) low levels of security; (ii) grievances and spatially inequitable service
delivery; and (iii) inadequate growth and job creation. To put CAR in a trajectory towards poverty reduction and
growth, the need to address the country’s structural challenges including regional imbalances, weak institutions, and
lack of state presence outside the capital remains highly relevant.
18. The project remains fully aligned with the Government’s Plan for Recovery and Peace-Building (Plan National de
Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique, RCPCA), which was enacted in late 2016, during project
implementation. The RCPCA identified the widening gap between the elite and the rest of the population, and the
total neglect of large parts of the rural population, as root causes of the crisis. It emphasized the need to improve
road infrastructures across the country especially in rural areas. The project remains relevant as it helped to open
remote areas and foster access to market and trade. CAR’s post-crisis transportation policy also outlines the
importance of strengthening the capacity of sectoral institutions, especially outside the capital, and enhancing the
rural transportation network and services to open-up remote areas and promote national cohesion.9
9 Rural Connectivity Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. PAD2199, June 2017
2. OUTCOME
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19. Recognizing the ongoing need to close the infrastructure gap, the operation paved the way for preparation of the
$45 million IDA-financed Rural Connectivity Project (RCP). This is testament to the relevance of the project’s
objectives, design, and implementation arrangements. Given the emergency nature of the intervention, RCP is
consolidating works in the same geographic area, while incorporating the lessons learned. Reconnecting the isolated
Northeast region of the country by reopening a key section of the RN8 remains a key objective of the follow-on
operation, including the use of LIPW to create employment opportunities for vulnerable populations, which is
contributing to reconciliation and stabilization efforts. An additional financing for RCP is currently under preparation.
2.2 Achievement of PDO (Efficacy)
Rating: Substantial
20. The PDO of the project is to reconnect the rural population of the Northeast part of the Central African Republic to
urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road. This
essentially entailed the physical improvements on the gravel/earth road to ensure connectivity, including improving
the drainage system, the installation and maintenance of road signage and rain barriers, and the installation of a light
maintenance system throughout the road section. On the institutional and capacity building side, the project
rehabilitated and equipped the MINTP’s prefectural service chief offices in both Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé to ensure
proper supervision.
21. By project closure, the objective of reopening the road had been met. Two of the three PDO indicator target values
had been achieved:
a. Direct project beneficiaries. The number of targeted beneficiaries was met. The reopening of the Kaga-
Bandoro – Ndélé road directly benefited 74 villages along the road, accounting for more than 37,000 people.
The works have improved the traffic conditions. Some parts of the road still do not have all-weather access
as mechanized works were not completed on the entire stretch. The main bottleneck on the road, Bamingui
Bridge, was successfully constructed.
b. Average daily traffic (vehicles per day). The number of vehicles per day recorded at project closure was 20
vehicles, well below the target of 120. Although it did not meet the intended target, there is a significant
improvement from the baseline of 3 vehicles. Security conditions in the region is a major factor for the limited
number of vehicles travelling on the corridor. Generally, vehicle ownership in CAR remains very low and
consists primarily of intermediate means of transport (bicycles, animal carts, motorcycles), especially in
remote and isolated areas. The number of registered vehicles and transport permits and overall traffic levels
have declined dramatically because of looting and insecurity. This has discouraged transport firms from
operating in CAR. In addition, overloading of vehicles has increased. The benefits of the passable road may
take some time to materialize in view of the limited number of transport vehicles and high levels of insecurity
in the project area. This indicator also highlights the difficulty in setting realistic baselines and forecasts in
such FCV environments with crucial lack of data and connectivity, and high insecurity.
c. Number of man-days created through the Labor-Intensive Public Works (including share of man-days
created for women). At project closure, 100,830 man-days had been recorded, well exceeding the target of
75,000. However, the sub-indicator on the share of man-days created for women was only 27 percent, and
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below the intended target of 33 percent, despite measures taken such as sensitization and awareness raising,
and putting in place lotteries for employment, etc. Workers employed under the project to conduct LIPW
have been empowered through employment generated by the project. More than 50 percent of the LIPW
beneficiaries surveyed attested that these revenues have enabled them to obtain basic necessities
(mattresses, beds, cooking utensils, clothes, radios, and telephones); 26 percent said they used it to build a
decent home; 19 percent to provide health care for their families; 16 percent for food; and 13 percent for the
child’s schooling. 35 percent of beneficiaries surveyed invested in agricultural activities (e.g. acquisition of
seeds and other inputs) and 32 percent have used it to purchase livestock.10
22. Beyond the chosen project indicators, the following are illustrative outputs that bear testimony to the project’s
achievements with a limited amount of funds (photographs are included in Annex 4):
a. Construction of Bamingui Bridge: The main achievement of the project was the construction of a 45-meter
and 4.20-meter wide bridge over the Bamingui River. The bridge, which was completed in May 2019, links the
locality of Bamingui to Ndélé, an axis which is heavily used by MINUSCA, merchants from Sudan, South Sudan
and Bangui. Before the project, it was identified as a major bottleneck as the road had been almost impassable
during the rainy season because of the rising waters from the Bamingui River. The bridge was constructed
using a participatory and inclusive approach through LIPW, mobilizing about 1,200 people and creating 11,000
man-days of employment over 9 months.11 This approach has revitalized the local economy and ensured the
construction has the full support of the surrounding communities. One beneficiary woman who worked on-
site commented. “When it rains, the old bridge is flooded. This makes it invisible and therefore impractical.
The construction of the bridge has really boosted the economy, since the work began, I’m selling better, and
my business is doing well.”12 The completion of the bridge is a notable achievement particularly given the
challenges faced around the precarious security conditions in the area, the low capacity of enterprises in the
area, and the excessive rain which disrupted works during the construction period. Photographs of the bridge
are included in Annex 4.
b. Rehabilitation of Bridges and Culverts: Priority was given to critical points along the 333km road section. Out
of 78 structures identified by UNOPS for potential intervention, a total of 81 have been
constructed/rehabilitated under the project.
c. Supply and Installation of Rain Barriers and Road Signs: The project built and laid 12 barriers along the road,
out of the 14 initially planned. In addition, UNOPS installed 56 road signs in strategic points. These were made
according to safety and traffic code standards enforced in CAR.
d. Rain Barrier Management: For the management of the 12 installed rain barriers under the project, 12
managers were recruited and trained (3 women and 9 men). Given the objective is to re-establish the national
system of operating rain barriers, MINTP will take over supervision following project closure. At the time of
project closure, 11 of the 12 barriers were functional; and 1 is occupied by armed groups.
e. Establishment of Community Maintenance System (“cantonnage”): The project set up 13 maintenance
teams, composed of 143 people, consisting of 159,660 man-days for light maintenance along the 333-km
road.
10 Ibid. 11 UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019 12 Ibid.
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f. Institutional Strengthening of MINTP: Given responsibilities are handed over to MINTP following project
closure, it was necessary to rehabilitate and equip the offices of the prefectural services in Kaga-Bandoro and
Ndélé as well as strengthen the technical capacity. Under the project, two offices were rehabilitated (see
photographs in Annex 4). They were equipped with adequate working equipment (computers, furniture,
office supplies, motorcycles, etc.), however utilization of offices was low given security problems. Four
training workshops for MINTP managers were held on (i) procurement; (ii) management of infrastructure
projects; (iii) management of safety, health, environment, and social aspects; and (iv) road maintenance.
g. The reopening of the road has stimulated activity along the road, including access to markets and other
social services. In contrast to project initiation, when activity along the road was limited, according to data
collected at project closure, there are 12 markets on the road section, of which 9 are currently functional. Of
the 49 schools along the road section, 44 are currently in operation, consisting of 88 school buildings and 177
classrooms, serving 16,053 pupils, 6,212 of which are girls. 23 of the 26 health facilities are operational,
serving an average of 5,077 patients per month.
23. Despite the challenges faced, the project substantially achieved its overall outcome of reestablishing connectivity
with the Northeast region in an emergency context. This was primarily achieved with the completion of the
construction of Bamingui Bridge, the project’s main activity, and a critical point on the RN8 between Kaga-Bandoro
and Ndélé. Looking forward and given the emergency nature of the intervention, the results achieved under the
project would need to be consolidated by follow-on operations to ensure the sustainability of investments and to
ensure all-weather access on the entire stretch of road.
2.3 Efficiency
Rating: Substantial
24. No cost-benefit analysis or estimate of the economic rate of return was undertaken during preparation, given the
emergency nature of the project and the general lack of recent data for most of the territory. The project design
was based on cost effectiveness, i.e. maximizing the Bank’s added value and minimizing costs without forfeiting the
quality of outputs.
25. From the outset, it was recognized that a business-as-usual approach would not work in the given context. Private
companies possessing the necessary equipment, machinery and skills were hard to come by, and were unlikely to go
beyond the capital without security ensured, resulting in a high-risk premium. This would impact value-for-money
and imply procurement challenges. UNOPS was already engaged in the scale-up of activities in CAR, and had the
capacity and means to implement the project swiftly. Overall project costs were not known as part of the works were
undertaken by MINUSCA through force account. Therefore, standard models (e.g. Road Economic Decision (RED)
model) do not apply.13 Moreover, as experienced under the LONDO Project (P152512), the use of labor-based method
was proven to be a cost-effective alternative to equipment-based methods for road maintenance.
13 Project Paper, March 2016
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26. The project faced some shortcomings during project implementation due to competing priorities of MINUSCA and
the worsening security situation. Mechanized works under the project were to be carried out by MINUSCA, however
they were hampered due to the low quality of work and lack of alignment with MINUSCA’s schedule and itinerary.
MINUSCA was unable to complete the full 333 km because of the worsening security situation and diversion of
resources, and therefore UNOPS had to find an alternative solution to complete the works. Since mechanized works
needed to be done upstream, this impacted other project activities such as the LIPW and the installation of the rain
barriers. The completion of the construction of Bamingui Bridge was prioritized.
27. The change in the design of the Bamingui Bridge was the primary reason for the escalation in project costs.
Following the completion of technical studies (hydraulic, geotechnical, topographical, structural, environmental, and
economic), the design of the bridge was amended from 23m to 45m in length and included a pedestrian walkway.
This new and more robust design of the bridge was validated by the project’s technical committee. The financial
impact was an increase of $400,000 (US$1.6 million versus US$1.2 million). A project restructuring was undertaken
so primarily the project’s budget contingencies could be used to cover the additional costs.
28. The overall rationale for the project of improving connectivity and development in the region remains valid. At the
time of project closure, traffic remains extremely limited on the road. However, as mentioned earlier, activity is
picking up along the road including the operation of markets, schools, and health facilities. The main socio-economic
benefits include reduced transport costs, improved access to services such as schools, markets, and health clinics,
employment creation through construction activities, and greater state presence. Despite the lack of data, anecdotal
evidence collected through interviews with beneficiaries point to the broader social and economic impacts of the
project, which go beyond the individual to stimulate the recovery of communities. According to one beneficiary
interviewed, “We the people of Bamingui had never seen such a project in the area. The bridge will really benefit the
whole community.”14 In addition, the project enabled greater state presence thanks to the rehabilitation and the re-
equipment of the MINTP offices in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé.
29. The substantial rating is justified as even with a relatively small amount ($4.9 million), the project was able to have
a large impact. Despites its challenges, without the project it is likely the Northeast region would continue to be
isolated from the rest of the country. The construction of Bamingui Bridge has transformed the region, and
improvements along the road has reduced travel times, benefiting approximately 37,000 beneficiaries. Without the
project, it would have remained unpassable during part of the year particularly during the rainy season.
2.4 Overall Outcome Rating
30. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The project achieved substantial efficacy, substantial
efficiency, and remained highly relevant throughout its duration.
14 UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019
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2.5 Other Outcomes and Impacts
31. The LCEP supported the mobilization of additional funding and strengthened the dialogue with the Government
and donors. The pilot led to the preparation of a larger project, the $45 million IDA-financed Rural Connectivity Project
(RCP). This project was designed to further strengthen the results achieved under the emergency grant in the
Northeast basin, and incorporate the lessons learned. Replicable best practices and implementation arrangements
had been developed under the grant which facilitated preparation of the new operation. The project served as a pilot
for other projects and reflects how operations should be envisioned in such contexts – simple design, flexible and
pragmatic execution, adaptable in high-risk environment, with a satisfactory result. The team engaged on the project
were closely involved in the policy dialogue with the Government and contributed to the preparation of Development
Policy Financing (DPF), the SCD, CPF, and the RCPCA for CAR. Moreover, the WB team has played a critical role as
convener in coordinating with other donors in the transport sector to ensure alignment and to develop a broader
road sector program for the country (under RCP). Sectoral engagement, implemented in parallel to the project,
complemented the project and contributed in further strengthening institutional capacity.
32. The LIPW has helped affected populations to reduce their vulnerability and contributed to the reconciliation
process. Amid the crisis, the works was an effective way to stabilize critical areas by providing a source of
employment, where security and government presence was weak. The public lottery method ensured equal
treatment with a view of empowering vulnerable groups. Women were encouraged to submit their nominations.
Although women’s participation was generally low due to the scarcity of women working in infrastructure (27 percent
share of man-days created for women versus a target of 33 percent), opportunities were given to women to work on
sites, for example in food preparation, as part of the overall strategy to encourage women’s involvement in the
project.
33. The project intervention area is highly exposed to Gender-Based Violence (GBV), and the project incorporated best
practices in implementation. Due to the remoteness of the area and the general security context, there was already
a high incidence of GBV. UNOPS, who was already well advanced on the matter, implemented specific provisions
based on their own internal practices and on the recommendations of the WB’s Good Practice Note for Addressing
GBV in Investment Projects Involving Major Civil Works (June 2018), as well as the CAR’s legal framework, the national
strategy to combat GBV developed by the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Family, and Protection of Children,
with the involvement of other departments such as the Ministries of Justice, Health, and Education, in partnership
with other UN agencies. During implementation, attention was paid to both GBV and compliance with Occupational
Health and Safety, which was included in the subcontract provisions. There were no incidents of GBV reported during
implementation of the project.
34. With a project component dedicated for institutional strengthening, the intervention has contributed to enhancing
the longer-term development of CAR’s capacity and institutions. Specifically, the rehabilitation and reequipment of
MINTP offices in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé, the training of the Chefs de Service, and the redeployment of MINTP staff
to conduct proper supervision of the project will enhance the Government’s ability to manage and supervise such
projects in the future. In addition, UNOPS’ On-Track approach was executed during project implementation, whereby
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hands-on technical assistance and inclusion of the government counterpart were part of the execution and
monitoring of the project. This would also ensure the sustainability of project investments.
3. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
35. The project was prepared under challenging circumstances amid civil unrest and growing tension. The
project aimed to mitigate the geographic divide between the isolated Northeast part of CAR by reopening the
strategic RN8 between Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé. This was intended to prevent the de facto partition of the
country and to re-establish state presence and security, ultimately contributing to reconciliation and
stabilization efforts. Humanitarian relief had been largely confined to stable areas, thereby reinforcing the
disparity. The project’s intervention area and targeted beneficiaries were therefore considered appropriate.
36. The team overcame multiple challenges during preparation. The crisis and insecurity prevailing in the project
area meant there was a general lack of data obtained from the Government. Key pieces of information, such
as an updated map of access constraints in the country, were obtained by expanding consultations to UN
agencies and NGOs. A map of the project intervention is included in Annex 6. Furthermore, the joint
WB/UNOPS/MINUSCA survey of the Kaga-Bandoro to Ndélé road during preparation15 allowed the team to fill
core gaps including the need for the construction of the Bamingui Bridge and the overall costing of the project.
Partnerships and synergies between the Government, UNOPS, MINUSCA, and the World Bank were
formalized during the implementation through Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs).
37. The lack of state presence shaped the project’s design and activities. At the time of preparation, many
regional representatives of the MINTP were based in Bangui due to security concerns as well as the lack of
proper facilities and equipment to work in the field. This added to the challenge of supervising projects
financed by the Government in those regions. This was the key rationale for the capacity building activities
financed under Component 3 of the project.
38. Given the low capacity of the Government, it was agreed to use the Fiduciary Principles Accord (FPA) which
enables a UN agency to implement the project on behalf of the Government. Under the FPA, the WB
contracted UNOPS to implement the project according to UN fiduciary, procurement, and environmental and
social safeguards policies, as stipulated in the FPA. UNOPS was selected as the implementer of the project due
to (i) the general lack of state presence in the targeted area; (ii) the availability of UN facilities and resources;
(iii) the capacity of UNOPS for rapid deployment in the area; (iv) UNOPS’ expertise in conflict areas and
infrastructure, as the UN agency mandated in this field of expertise. Having UNOPS carry out these works was
beneficial also for security reasons because the road passes through territory under control of different armed
groups. A MoU was signed between the Government, MINUSCA, and the WB on August 4, 2016. This
arrangement was designed to enable UNOPS to leverage MINUSCA’s presence and security support to
implement the project in a highly volatile context. MINUSCA would also undertake the mechanized works for
the project using their equipment. MINUSCA was assessed as the most optimal and available option that could
15 The preparation mission took place from February 2 to 10, 2016.
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provide a balance of expertise, machinery, and security necessary to carry out the force account works under
the project’s budget constraints, and in an extremely volatile security environment of the project. Reopening
the same road was also identified as a priority for MINUSCA following the 2016 rainy season.
39. Considering the urgent needs in CAR, the project was prepared under emergency procedures (Operational
Policy (OP) 2.30 Development Cooperation and Conflict, OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies,
and OP 10.00 Paragraph 12 Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance. From initiation to effectiveness, the
total project preparation time was only four months, and the first disbursement followed two months later.
The project benefited from an expedited and simplified approval process which shortened the overall
preparation time.
40. Key lessons from other WB engagements in CAR were considered during preparation. Given the successful
implementation of the LONDO Project, which provides temporary employment through LIPW throughout the
country, the project utilized the same approach. This provided the opportunity to revive the local economy,
engage with local stakeholders, and foster community ownership. The project also incorporated lessons from
existing WBG activities in CAR including the Emergency Public Services Response Project, the Emergency
Urban Infrastructure Project, and the CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Project.16
41. The project was recognized as a high-risk intervention at the outset. Three of the main risks identified at
preparation eventually materialized during implementation: (i) technical issues emerging from the
construction of Bamingui Bridge; (ii) stakeholder risk and the need to coordinate closely among civil and
military actors, notably with MINUSCA for the provision of military escort and mechanized works; and (iii) the
volatile security environment.
42. With these risks in mind, an appropriate set of stakeholders (WB, MINTP, MINUSCA, UNOPS) were engaged
during preparation and implementation of the project, underscoring the importance of collaboration in a
fluid environment. The project’s technical coordination and steering committees ensured information sharing
among the main actors and provided a platform for issues to be identified and resolved swiftly. Following the
first MoU between the WB, MINUSCA, and the Government on August 4, 2016 to frame a common
understanding of the collaboration required during implementation, a second MoU was signed between
UNOPS and MINUSCA on December 22, 2016 to outline the technical description and quality of tasks to be
completed by each party.
43. During implementation the country experienced an upsurge in clashes between armed groups competing
for territory and access to resources. Each episode of violence brought more casualties and displacement,
overstretching MINUSCA’s resources across the country, to the detriment of the project timeline and delivery.
In practice, the MoU did not work well and MINUSCA was unable to fulfill its obligations. The mechanized
works and the treatment of critical points undertaken by MINUSCA was incomplete and accounted for only
70 percent, or 230km of the road, with the quality standards below those agreed with UNOPS and referred to
in the MoU. Furthermore, MINUSCA deviated from the agreed itinerary on RN8 and carried out works on the
16 Project Paper, March 2016
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Kaga-Bandoro-Balakete/Azene-Bamingui- Ndélé route, isolating the locality of Mbrès. Given the security
situation, the costs of the mechanized works that was proposed by local companies to complete the works
significantly exceeded the available budget set aside for the work. Given the burden fell on UNOPS, it was
decided to concentrate efforts on finalizing the major works (e.g. Bamingui Bridge and the two large concrete
box culverts in Mbrès) which would still achieve the project objective of restoring connectivity. The rains have
also damaged sections of the road where there had been no mechanized works. In view of the lack of financial
resources and the emergency nature of the interventions, this project will be followed by a consolidation
phase along the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Ndélé section under the currently ongoing WB Rural Connectivity
Project (P160500, RCP).
44. High insecurity hindered project execution and results. Dozens of armed groups operated in the Kaga
Bandoro – Ndélé, making works even more challenging, and prevented the full operation of the rain barriers
along the entire road.17 For example, the construction of the large concrete box culverts in Mbrès involved
multiple unsuccessful call for tenders due to the deteriorating security situation in the work area. The contract
was finally signed with a local company in June 2018 but works began only in December 2018. The project
financed the rehabilitation and re-equipment of offices in both Kaga-Bandoro and Ndélé, and training on
maintenance and management of rain barriers. However, the Chef de Service position in Kaga-Bandoro
remained vacant for extended periods of time, despite promises made by the Ministry, and the Ndélé position
was never filled. Reports indicate armed groups have reportedly taken control of some offices.18 These
examples highlight the unique challenges of operating in FCV.
4. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
4.1 Bank Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
45. The Bank played a major role in facilitating preparation and recovery during the post-conflict transition. The
preparation time of just four months from initiation to approval was highly compressed. Despite the tight
timeframe, the quality at entry was considered adequate for an emergency operation with a focus on simple
design and objectives. The Bank brought sound technical design and expertise and recognized the capacity
challenges on the ground, engaging an appropriate set of stakeholders.
46. Supervision was effectively undertaken from the World Bank side. On average, two supervision missions
were undertaken a year. The Aide Memoires and Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) present clear
recommendations for project implementation. Task Team Leader (TTL) turn-over was low, with the same TTL
in charge for the project lifetime which helped ensure continuity, particularly as the UNOPS team leader in
CAR changed three times over the course of the project. The Bank also took advantage to participate in
sessions of the steering committee when they coincided with the missions.
17 UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019 18 Ibid.
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47. Field visits remained a challenge as basic logistics and planning took a lot of coordination and planning with
UNOPS and MINUSCA. Kaga-Bandoro and Birao are considered to be hotspots of violence. Most areas require
the use of armed escorts, lodging on the MINUSCA base and the use of armored vehicles. In addition, the
timing of field missions was almost always dependent on the UN and/or MINUSCA flight schedules and
availability, which changed frequently. Supervision remains costly and challenging given the security
constraints.
4.2 Compliance Issues
48. Environmental and social safeguards, and fiduciary responsibilities were transferred to UNOPS under the
FPA. An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan
(ESMP) and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) were prepared for the project. A team of experts from MINTP
carried out monthly monitoring and missions to ensure mitigation measures were effectively being
implemented according to the reports. General reporting, including on environmental/social safeguards
compliance, was generally satisfactory, and provided essential required information, although it was succinct
and would have benefited from being more exhaustive.
49. The compensation of Project-Affected Persons (PAPs) took time to implement, particularly as a re-
evaluation of the PAPs was carried out to take into account the new design of Bamingui Bridge. The span
increased from 22m to 45m, generating new loss of assets by the local populations. The ESMP and RAP were
updated to reflect this change. Financing for compensation, to be borne by the Government, finally came from
the Fonds d’Entretien Routier (FER), the road fund.
50. To facilitate implementation, the project put in place a robust communication and community mobilization
plan. Information and community awareness raising covered complaint mechanisms, dangers on the road,
HIV/AIDS prevention, sensitization on the need to install rain barriers and prevent the deterioration of the
road, and explanation on the criteria for selection for the LIPW and the equipment made available. These
mechanisms helped to ensure trust was built among community and between the community and project
stakeholders. (See photographs in Annex 4).
4.3 Quality of Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)
M&E Rating: Modest
51. Design. The PDO was too ambitious in its wording: “reconnect the rural population of the Northeast part of
the Central African Republic to urban centers and local markets”. The project seemed to concentrate on
connectivity to urban areas even though one of the PDO objectives was to also increase connectivity to
markets. The PDO indicators were not well-developed vis-a-vis the objectives as there were no PDO indicators
for market connectivity. In addition, the PDO was not constructed well enough to incorporate the institutional
support and capacity building aspect of the project.
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52. Implementation. One of the main weaknesses in the M&E system was the challenging circumstances to collect
data on-the-ground. As noted during preparation, the main risk identified for the M&E framework was limited
resources as data needed to be collected in the field and would require monitoring on a large scale of territory
(e.g. number of beneficiaries). The security situation in the project area limited the collection of detailed
information such as the socio-economic impacts of the project and indicators were not reported on regularly.
53. Utilization. The project was not able to demonstrate improved market connectivity, access to social services,
or the capacity building activities as this information was not captured in the PDO indicators. Assessment of
the project relies heavily on limited data, physical completion of works (e.g. the bridge) and anecdotal
evidence, given the shortcomings in the M&E framework. In addition, there was no comprehensive post-
project impact assessment. The project would have benefited from more systematic beneficiary surveys to
capture the wider socio-economic benefits, as well as the use of remote monitoring tools.
4.3 Risk to Development Outcome
54. The overall risk to development outcomes is rated High. The project closed against a backdrop of sporadic
and uneven improvement in the security situation in the country. The recurrence of large-scale outbreaks of
violence, if this were to happen, are likely to affect project investments. About 75 percent of the country’s
territory remain under control of rebel groups. The social contract remains weak with no or little state
presence in a large part of the country. Although the project funded capacity building activities, attacks are
constantly being reported, included some targeting civil servants, presenting problems for staff retention. The
probability that results will be maintained also depend on the ability of the Government to maintain the road
and sustain LIPW. The lack of history of maintenance, the limited devoted funding, and a constrained macro-
economic context presents an overall risk. However, through its engagement in the DPF and the RCP (which
is preparing an additional financing), the WB is supporting CAR to improve its maintenance practices.
Improved maintenance would be required to fully support the continued flow of benefits from the
rehabilitated roads in the longer term. The project was not necessarily designed for sustainability of
outcomes, given the emergency nature and the rapid response intended, but the project sought to assure it,
where possible, by emphasizing a hands-on approach and technical assistance for counterparts.
5. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
55. A pilot project, such as this one, is an effective method to scale up small, targeted investments to
incrementally build a larger portfolio. This $4.9 million investment led to the preparation of the $45 million
IDA-financed RCP. The project design was developed based on this pilot, and the same team was involved in
the preparation both on the government and WB side, therefore leveraging efficient use of resources and
carrying forth institutional knowledge and key lessons learned.
56. A simple, flexible, and focused project design works best in fragile and evolving contexts. In an emergency
context with low capacity in-country, even simple, concrete interventions can have a substantial impact on
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the population. The project also benefited from the shortened processing timeline and simplified procedures,
with overall positive development outcomes, despite the small dollar amount. Flexible project arrangements
are important in achieving results. It is with this modular perspective in mind that the new RCP was designed
to include two different geographies, involving both UNOPS and the Government as implementing partners.
The use of contingency funds to account of the design changes on the Bamingui Bridge highlights the
importance of allocating and maintaining a contingency budget from the beginning, particularly for projects
operating in volatile and data-scarce contexts such as CAR.
57. Collaboration across Global Practices (GPs) and institutions is important, particularly early in the
preparation and design stages. Important cross-GP collaboration and field missions during preparation
allowed the team to (i) tailor interventions based on specific criteria (e.g. security situation and prospects,
accessibility to sites, costing within budget); (ii) find, link and select key partners for the project (MINTP,
MINUSCA, UNOPS), and (iii) address the data gap with consultations with UN agencies and NGOs, as well as
the carrying out of a field mission facilitated by UN peacekeeping logistics and security. On this project, the
Governance and Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience (SURR) GPs as well as the FCV Cross-Cutting Solutions
Areas added value in both the design and the implementation of the project, thanks to their respective
knowledge and lessons learnt of (i) CAR environment of Civil Society Organizations/NGOs; (ii) the LONDO
Project (including LIPW); and (iii) UN system, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and
security requirements to operate in such environment.
58. Institutional strengthening and capacity building take time to realize benefits. The project had a capacity
building component, yet for the initial investment to pay off requires long-term engagement to ensure that
institutional support is secured over more than one short project lifecycle. The RCP provides a good platform
to continue institutional strengthening and building the capacity with the same set of stakeholders. There is
a balance between realization of activities in a short amount of time and investment on capacity building for
sustainability. Keeping this in mind, projects should consider how capacity can be transferred to national
authorities following closing so that governments can decrease reliance on external assistance over time. This
would also ensure greater ownership within the government.
59. The Bank has an important role to play as a convener and in coordinating donor efforts. This is key
particularly when a large amount of funds is flowing in from multiple donors as the country emerges from
conflict. The Bank is playing a vital role in CAR in the transport sector. At a strategic level, the WB continues
to participate in donor’s conferences (e.g. the Brussels Conference which took place on November 17, 2016
US$2.06 billion was pledged for CAR). At an operational level, the follow-on RCP is financing a study to develop
a road sector investment program which will be relevant for other donors in the sector to ensure
complementary and efficiency in investments.
60. The security constraints in FCV settings require innovation in monitoring and supervision, as well as during
the design stage. When circumstances make it difficult for TTLs to undertake supervision in certain areas,
other WB projects have contracted out third-party monitoring firms, however this remains a very costly
option. Given the challenges of organizing and conducting field visits, teams operating in fragile and conflict
settings can consider innovations such as the WB’s Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision
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(GEMS) and integrating its remote supervision capacities into the M&E framework. This would also help
ensure improvement of M&E usefulness and accuracy. It could also help to administer perception/beneficiary
surveys and help capture results on intangible outcomes such as social cohesion. In addition, the absence of
project team staff in-country also presented challenges both in high supervision costs and monitoring of
project progress. Recognizing the constraints, the transport team has since filled a full-time staff member
based in Bangui. Moreover, security problems hampered the road project and therefore needs to be
thoroughly assessed and considered during project design. Most of the failures in this project result from the
security conditions which did not allow smooth project implementation or the attainment of the objectives in
terms of traffic, state redeployment, and road rehabilitation.
61. In a difficult and unstable environment and context, road infrastructure projects should focus on essential
works including spot improvement or building critical bridges to restore connectivity, instead of trying to
reopen/rehabilitate a maximum road length. The main achievement of this project was the construction of
Bamingui Bridge. The target of improving 333 km of road was not reached. This is not the only road project
which at the end shifted from road spot improvement to bridge construction because of difficult
circumstances. In addition, bridges are considered more sustainable since they often require less frequent
maintenance compared to earth roads.
62. A stronger partnership with peacekeeping forces (e.g. MINUSCA) is needed to fully embed them in the
project design. The WB did not have enough leverage to alter MINUSCA’s itinerary and work program to fulfill
its obligations as agreed during preparation. MINUSCA’s responsibilities, as spelled out in the MoU, was not
fully fulfilled. This had a detrimental impact on the project and required alternative solutions to complete the
project objectives. Despite the signed MoU and several meetings with high-level officers, including the Chief
Commander, it was difficult to gain leverage for project implementation as the incentives and strategic
priorities of MINUSCA were not aligned perfectly with the WB. The lack of institutional knowledge and
leverage with the DPKO refrained the implementation team in being more effective.
.
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: The PDO is to reconnect the population of the Northeast CAR to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro –Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 37000.00 37000.00 37000.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was fully achieved.
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Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Average daily traffic (all types of vehicle included) (vehicle per day)
Number 3.00 120.00 120.00 20.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was not fully achieved. Security conditions in the region is a major factor for the limited number of vehicles travelling on the corridor. Generally, vehicle ownership in CAR remains very low and consists primarily of intermediate means of transport (bicycles, animal carts, motorcycles), especially in remote and isolated areas. The number of registered vehicles and transport permits and overall traffic levels have declined dramatically because of looting and insecurity. This has discouraged transport firms from operating in CAR. In addition, overloading of vehicles has increased.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of man-days created through the Labor Intensive Public Works activities (including share of man-days created for women)
Number 0.00 75000.00 75000.00 100830.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Share of man-days created for women
Percentage 0.00 33.00 33.00 27.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets):
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The target was exceeded. However, the sub-indicator for share of man-days created for women was only partially achieved despite measures taken including awareness raising, sensitization, and lotteries for employment.
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Component 1: Drainage Improvement
Component 2: Road Protection and Maintenance
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of bridges rehabilitated
Number 0.00 13.00 13.00 12.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was largely met.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of bridges constructed Number 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets):
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The target was fully achieved.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of culverts rehabilitated
Number 0.00 49.00 49.00 25.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was only partially met (~50%) due to the diversion of MINUSCA's resources and the prioritization of the construction of Bamingui Bridge.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of culverts constructed
Number 0.00 57.00 57.00 57.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was fully achieved.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
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Number of ditches constructed
Meter(m) 0.00 200000.00 200000.00 63000.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was only partially met due to the diversion of MINUSCA's resources and the prioritization of the construction of Bamingui Bridge.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of rain barriers constructed
Number 0.00 14.00 14.00 12.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was largely achieved.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of functioning rain barriers
Number 0.00 14.00 14.00 12.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets):
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The target was largely achieved.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of kilometers of road maintained under the project
Kilometers 0.00 333.00 333.00 333.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was essentially met as even though only 234km of the road was subject to mechanized works (due to the diversion of MINUSCA's resources), the full length of the road (333km) was manually maintained by UNOPS and community-based maintenance schemes.
Component: Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of MINTP offices rehabilitated and re-equipped
Number 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 30-Sep-2019 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was fully met.
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Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of technical assistance workshops delivered to MINTP
Number 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
01-Mar-2016 01-Mar-2016 30-Sep-2019 12-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): The target was fully achieved.
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B. ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PDO
Objective/Outcome 1 The PDO is to reconnect the population of the Northeast CAR to urban centers and local markets by rehabilitating the Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé road.
Outcome Indicators
1. Direct project beneficiaries (including women) 2. Average daily traffic 3. Number of man-days created through the Labor-Intensive Public Works activities (including share of man-days for women)
Intermediate Results Indicators
1. Number of bridges rehabilitated 2. Number of bridges constructed 3. Number of culverts rehabilitated 4. Number of culverts constructed 5. Number of ditches constructed 6. Number of rain barriers constructed 7. Number of functioning rain barriers 8. Number of km of road maintained under the project 9. Number of MINTP offices rehabilitated and re-equipped 10. Number of technical assistance workshops delivered to MINTP
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)
Component 1 and 2: 1. Km of roads rehabilitated/maintained 2. Number of bridges constructed/rehabilitated 3. Number of culverts, ditches, rain barriers constructed/rehabilitated 4. Number of man-days created (temporary jobs) Component 3: 5. Number of MINTP offices rehabilitated and re-equipped 6. Number of workshops delivered to MINTP
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. .
ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Component Name Amount at Approval (US$M)
Actual at Project Closing (US$M)
Component 1: Drainage Improvement 2.80 3.37
Component 2: Road Protection and Maintenance
0.50 0.46
Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building
0.40 0.37
Project Management and Contingency Fund
0.86 0.36
UNOPS General Management Support 0.34 0.34
Total Project Cost 4.90 4.90
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ANNEX 3. RECIPIENT, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
UNOPS: A draft of the ICR was shared with UNOPS. Minor comments were provided in track changes and were incorporated in the document. Government: A draft of the ICR was shared with Government. The following comments were received:
Bonjour Madame le Chargé de Projet, Nous avons bien pris connaissance du rapport d'achèvement du Projet d'Urgence de Connectivité Locale et nous apprécions hautement la qualité du rapport qui retrace les points forts et les faibles du dispositif ayant permis le déploiement des activités programmées. Nous souhaitons vivement que les enseignements tirés et les recommandations faites de la réalisation de ce projet puissent être capitalisés et bénéficiés au nouveau projet de connectivité qui se met résolument en oeuvre dans la même zone et dans les mêmes circonstances. Au nom du Coordonnateur Intérimaire, nous approuvons ce rapport et demandons que sa version finale approuvée nous soit communiquée pour toutes fins utiles. Bien cordialement, Bigué-Kola Reginald Expert Principal en Passation des Marchés English Translation: Good Morning Project Manager, We have taken note of the completion report of the Local Connectivity Emergency Project and we highly appreciate the quality of the report, which describes the strengths and weaknesses of the system that enabled the deployment of the planned activities. We sincerely hope that the lessons learned, and the recommendations made during the implementation of this project can be capitalized and benefit the new connectivity project which is being resolutely implemented in the same area and under the same circumstances. On behalf of the Interim Coordinator, we endorse this report and request that its final approved version be communicated to us for all purposes. Yours sincerely Bigué-Kola Reginald Senior Procurement Expert
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ANNEX 4. PHOTOGRAPHS
Old Bamingui Bridge prior to Construction:
Bamingui Bridge during Construction:
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Completed Bamingui Bridge:
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Labor-Intensive Public Works:
Community mobilization/awareness-raising and public lottery activities:
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Old and Rehabilitated Office in Kaga-Bandoro:
One of the Constructed Rain Barriers:
Training Workshops:
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ANNEX 5. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
• UNOPS, Rapport Narratif Final, September 30, 2019 (UNOPS Completion Report) available at:
http://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b0876e745f • Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for the Central African Republic, Report No. 125268-CF, June 19, 2019
• Local Connectivity Emergency Project, Project Paper, Report No. PP1759, March 2016
• Country Engagement Note for the CAR FY 2016-2017, Report No. 96209-CF, July 13, 2015
• Rural Connectivity Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. PAD2199, June 2017
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ANNEX 6. MAP OF PROJECT INTERVENTION
Kaga-Bandoro – Mbrès – Bamingui – Ndélé Road and Drainage Status (February 2016)
Source: Local Connectivity Emergency Project, Project Paper, Report No. PP1759, March 2016