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Immigrant generation, religiosityand civic engagement in BritainSiobhan McAndrew & David VoasPublished online: 23 Jul 2013.

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Immigrant generation, religiosity and civic

engagement in Britain

Siobhan McAndrew and David Voas

(First submission March 2012; First published July 2013)

AbstractImmigrant integration appears to be generational in the USA, andfurther facilitated by religious involvement. We examine whether similarpatterns exist in Britain. We find evidence for secularization across ethnicminority groups, measured by private religious practice and religioussalience. Communal religious practice appears robust to generationaldecline. Ethnic minority members of the second generation exhibit lowersocial trust; for the 1.5 generation, being more religious is associatedwith lower trust. However, members of the 1.5 and second generationare more civically involved than the first and religiosity further increasescivic involvement. While anecdotal accounts suggest that religiosity has aparticularly dissociative effect on the second generation, we find noevidence for this. In sum, successive generations of ethnic minorityrespondents appear to be secularizing; successive generations are morecivically involved than the arriving generation, although less trusting; andimmigrant religiosity promotes civic integration.

Keywords: civic engagement; ethnic minorities; generations; integration; religiosity;

trust.

Introduction

International migration has altered British society over the past half-century, increasing its ethnic and religious diversity, and raising interestin immigrant incorporation. The literature on immigrant adaptationhas identified generational processes as the means by which immigrantsintegrate (Rumbaut 2004). Religion is thought to play an additionaland important role in immigrant integration in the USA, providingnewcomers with group identity and practical support. Places ofworship are important repositories of social capital in the USA

Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2014Vol. 37, No. 1, 99�119, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.808755

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(Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen 2003, p. 120) and may serve a similarrole in Britain.

However, religion may also hinder integration into wider social andcivic life. Religions promote particular basic values; govern time use;and regulate food and alcohol consumption, dress, dating and familyformation. Immigrants’ social networks may foster a reactive religios-ity reducing ‘bridging’ social capital. Further, religious norms mayshape some sociopolitical attitudes and behaviours directly, forexample regarding the obligation to civic engagement.

Our purposes are twofold: examination of immigrant religiosity, andits effects. First, we examine how religiosity varies by generationamong different immigrant groups. Reactive religiosity is thought tobe apparent among second-generation South Asians in particular, anda cause of, as well as reaction to, failure to integrate. Second, weexamine how generational and ethnic status and religiosity affectsocial trust, civic engagement and volunteering. We also investigatewhether religiosity acts differently for different generations � namely,whether it moderates generational effects.

How religion integrates and differentiates

Religion may integrate migrants in three ways: through providing acultural identity consonant with a new national identity; in enablingsocio-economic participation; and by reinforcing values promotingsocial order. Hirschman (2004, p. 1228) summarizes the social functionof religion for immigrants as ‘the search for refuge, respect andresources’. In the USA, ‘immigrants and their children becameAmericans . . . by settling in neighborhoods, joining associations, andacquiring identities of ethnic Americans defined more by religion thanby country of origin’ (Hirschman 2004, p. 1209). The impliedmechanism is the substitution of religious for national difference.Religious involvement is associated with higher educational achieve-ment and occupational prestige, and negatively related to ‘downwardassimilation’ (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, p. 323).

However, Britain is notably secular: religious belief is non-existentor fuzzy (Voas and Ling 2010). Religious decline has occurred viagenerational change. Forty-six per cent of children with two parentsbelonging to the same denomination inherit their parents’ religiousaffiliation; 22 per cent of children with one religious parent do so;while 91 per cent of children of parents without a religious affiliationfollow them (Voas and Crockett 2005, p. 21). A high proportion ofBritons report a religious affiliation on official surveys and thedecennial census (68 per cent of England and Wales in the 2011census); often, though, this is to indicate cultural or ethnic heritage,and responses are affected by question wording (Voas and Bruce

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2004). Reported practice is also low. Only 8.4 per cent of whiterespondents to the 2009 British Social Attitudes survey reported atleast weekly attendance, compared with 31.1 per cent of ethnicminority or mixed respondents.

Beyond attendance, which has particular social functions, ethnicminority respondents to surveys are also more religious. This may bebecause the sending society is more religious, or because immigrationencourages religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Figure 1 isindicative. Putnam and Campbell (2010, p. 18) calculated a religiosityindex using the US Faith Matters survey; we use a similar approachusing its British replication via the 2008 British Social Attitudes survey.We then compare the religiosity of ethnic minority and mixedrespondents with whites. Non-white respondents comprise 10.3 percent of the sample. We use similar items: importance of religion in dailylife; importance of religion to the respondent’s sense of who they are;frequency of church attendance; frequency of prayer; and strength ofbelief in God (Putnam and Campbell included a sixth item unavailablein the British sample). Non-white respondents comprise 0.4 per cent ofthe lowest decile of religiosity, but 38.7 per cent of the highest.

While the ‘ethnic majority’ exhibits low and declining religiosity,anecdotal evidence suggests that succeeding generations of some ethnicminority groups, particularly South Asian Muslims, are more religiousthan their parents. Urban Britain may provide more opportunities forreligious expression than the sending society; religious fundamentalismmay also express a reaction against modernization. Finally, migration

Figure 1. Percentage of each religiosity decile by ethnicity

Source: National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey2008.Note: Design weight applied. Unweighted N�1,944.

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often implies a move from being close to the norm to being unusual,whether as a member of a religious minority, or as highly religious atall. Such migrants must take active measures to transmit religiosity totheir children, rather than relying on wider society (Kelley and deGraaf 1997).

There may also be a phenomenon of ‘reactive religiosity’, anextension of the concept of ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Portes and Rumbaut2001). Much of the British population report dislike of the highlyreligious; for Muslims in particular, hostility to Islam has increasedover the past three decades, reaching back to the Rushdie affair of1989, and especially following the 2001 and 2005 terrorist attacks.Religion, moreover, often reflects and reinforces ethnic heritage(Putnam and Campbell 2010, pp. 316�17). While Islam is a globalreligion, mosques in Britain are often differentiated along ethno-national lines (Naqshbandi 2006).

It is also possible that immigrant religiosity is fostered by discrimi-nation and disadvantage. Migrants may take this into account whenmaking the migration decision, but their children, educated in Britain,are more likely to assess their relative position according to host-country norms. The second generation and the better educated amongTurks and Moroccans in Europe report higher levels of discriminationthan the first generation and the less well educated (Fleischmann,Phalet and Klein 2011, p. 644). Educational credentialization and self-employment provide strategies to overcome this; another is accessingthe psychological and often material security provided by religiousinvolvement. Finally, qualitative studies suggest that religiosity isharnessed by women pursuing education and employment:

Girls felt that their parents were concerned if they saw Asiangirls wearing western dress to college. Traditional Asian dresssignified that a girl subscribed to the values and codes ofbehaviour of their community. It thus provided an assurance toparents and could be used in negotiating permission to attendcollege. (Dale et al. 2002, p. 957)

Immigrant religiosity and civic life

Religion may serve further social ends. Researchers have had aparticular interest in its role in civic life for host and arrivingpopulations alike, as a source of social capital (Wuthnow and Hackett2003). Churches are ‘an important incubator’ for civic skills andcommunity interests (Putnam 2000, p. 66). Conversely, popularaccounts in Britain cite religion as a source of disengagement, withconcerns that South Asians in particular ‘live in impoverished ethnicghettos, participate in non-mainstream religions, and politically

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organise via ethnically and religiously motivated networks’ (Maxwell2006, p. 736, citing media sources). Putnam and Campbell (2010,pp. 456�69) find that in the USA social trust increases with religiousattendance and that more religious Americans are more civicallyactive.

Whether the relationship holds equally for immigrants is less clear.A separate US study found that social trust correlated with ethnicityand education, but not minority religious affiliation, with someevidence of political alienation for religious minority respondents,especially non-black Muslims (Wuthnow and Hackett 2003, p. 665).Similar results were found in Canada, with non-white migrants slowerto integrate. The effect of religiosity reflected ethno-religious attach-ment rather than the content of religious norms, with no differentialeffect across different faiths (Reitz et al. 2009, pp. 721�2).

The question remains: does immigrant religiosity further social andcivic integration? Various findings suggest so. In Britain, ethnicminority status is related to having a smaller range of social contacts;having a religious affiliation is associated with a larger range. Ethnicityand religious affiliation predict engagement in religious (but not other)organizations; this in turn predicts higher social trust. The down-wardly mobile also have higher engagement in religious organizations,compensating for decline in social status (Li, Savage and Warde 2008,p. 401). Maxwell found South Asians to exhibit higher trust than whiterespondents to the Citizenship Survey, and significant differencesbetween South Asians and black Caribbeans in positive nationalidentification and social and political trust (Maxwell 2008, pp. 395,403). He cites a community worker comparing the young black Britishwith British Asians: ‘They have no ‘‘Caribbean’’ culture to identifywith the way the Asian kids have their religion’ (Maxwell 2008, p. 399).These findings corroborated his earlier research suggesting that‘Muslims and South Asians have actively built integrated networks,have trust in mainstream political institutions, and are committed tobeing a part of the larger British community’ (Maxwell 2006, p. 736).

Overall, religion may segregate but also mobilize: South Asiansexhibit both high levels of trust and electoral participation rates (Cuttset al. 2007). It is plausible that second-generation immigrants feelmore disengaged: their reference group is the host society, so thatethnic and religious penalties feel particularly unjust; further, the host-country norm for younger cohorts is relative disengagement (withregard to electoral turnout, see Russell et al. 2002). In addition, thestudies cited above do not control for religiosity. Religious affiliation,the usual control, may capture attachment to the ethno-religiousgroup rather than the effects of religiosity � a distinction notedelsewhere and where effects work in countervailing directions (Storm

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2011). Finally, religiosity may moderate generational effects on trustand engagement � questions we shall next consider.

Data and methods

To test for generational effects in religiosity, and the effect of religiosityon trust and engagement, we look in closer detail at the 2010 EthnicMinority British Election Study (EMBES). It allows us to examineethnic minority members of South Asian, African and Afro-Caribbeanorigin in detail. For further details, see the article by Heath andDemireva in this volume.

We first examine how religious affiliation and religiosity differ bygenerational status and ethnicity. Rumbaut’s 2004 typology is astandard: those arriving between the ages of thirteen and seventeenare considered the 1.25 generation, between six and twelve the 1.5generation, between birth and five the 1.75 generation, and those bornin the host country the second generation. However, secondaryeducation ends earlier in Britain; we therefore considered thosearriving before the age of sixteen as the 1.5 generation because theyshould have received some formal education in Britain. Those arrivinglater are considered first generation; their migration was probably atleast partly voluntary. Of those providing the requisite information oncountry of birth and age of arrival in Britain, 46.5 per cent are first-generation, 17.4 per cent 1.5 generation, and 36.1 per cent members ofsubsequent generations (unweighted N�2,665).

We investigated how religiosity varies by generational status andethnic category, first via exploratory analysis, then using multivariateregression analysis. We interpreted the effects of generation and ethnicgroup by conducting pairwise contrasts of predictions generated bythe model results (predictive margins), and then assessed the specificeffect of generational status within ethnic group (conditional marginaleffects). Finally, we used probit regression analysis to assess the effectsof religiosity and generational status on three measures of civic health:social trust, civic engagement and volunteering. Descriptive statistics,variable codes and question wordings for the variables of interest aregiven in Appendix 1.

Measuring religiosity

Reported religious affiliation can serve as a minimal indicator ofreligiosity. The survey asked ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging toany particular religion?’, to which 90.2 per cent agreed. For the firstgeneration, affiliation rates are high across the five ethnic groups; only4.6 per cent comprise religious ‘nones’. For the succeeding generations,there is high retention among Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis,

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but generational decline for black Caribbeans and black Africans(Table 1).

We then investigated how religiosity varies by generational statusand ethnicity. Those respondents indicating a religious affiliation wereasked ‘How important is your religion to you?’, which we interpret asreligious salience. Response options ranged from ‘not important at all’to ‘extremely important’, which we scored from 1 to 5; mean scores arepresented in Figure 2. For all except black Africans, the 1.5 generationappears more religious than the first; for all except Pakistanis, thesecond generation is less religious than the first and 1.5 generations.We next investigate how far these differences are significant, control-ling for confounding factors such as education.

To measure generational change, we would ideally create areligiosity index valid across ethnic categories. What constitutes ahigh level of religious practice and strength of religious attachment

Table 1. Percentage of ethnic group belonging to a religion (%)

Generation AllBlack

CaribbeanBlack

African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi

First 95.4 80.1 96.5 95.4 99.7 99.01.5 90.7 71.4 92.4 92.3 94.6 98.9Second 82.8 58.6 80.0 91.2 95.5 97.3

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

Note: Proportions based on weighted counts.

Figure 2. Religious salience by ethnicity and generation

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study (http://bes.utdallas.edu).Note: Proportions based on weighted counts (using weight devised to analyseeach group separately).

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differs by faith, however. Among Christians, denominations havedifferent requirements regarding church attendance. The Five Pillarsof Islam include prayer five times a day, but communal prayer at amosque is not formally required, and many mosques are not accessibleto women: 54 per cent in a 2008 survey (Hart Dyke 2009, p. 20). TheEMBES survey offers two further indicators besides that for religioussalience: frequency of communal religious practice, and of privatereligious practice (see Appendix 1).

Exploratory factor analysis suggests that the three measures loadonto a single factor capturing 40 per cent of their variance,interpretable as ‘generalized religiosity’.1 The standardized item ais 0.66, respectable for a three-item index, but shy of the usual 0.70threshold. We estimated a single-factor measurement model to testwhether the three items captured the same construct of latentreligiosity by ethnic group; while the model fit looked acceptablewhen not differentiating by ethnic group, we could not establishmetric invariance across groups. This creates a dilemma. It would besimpler to have a single indicator of religiosity to explain itsgenerational change and social and civic effects. However, whatconstitutes religiosity differs just enough by ethnicity to raisequestions about the validity of a single scale. We therefore examineeach indicator of religiosity separately; but when explaining theeffects of religiosity, we use an index created via common factoranalysis, for parsimony and because we are at that point interestedin the effects of religiosity rather than its structure. This followsReitz et al.’s (2009) approach when investigating religiosity andintegration.

Immigrant generation, ethnicity and religiosity

We examine generational decline and how it varies with ethnicity viamultivariate regression, with our three indicators of religiosity as jointdependent variables.2 We investigate the effects of ethnic and genera-tional status on the three indicators setting first-generation Pakistanisas the base.

Because the regression results for generational status and ethnicityare conditional on the interaction terms, we interpret their overalleffect by comparing predicted outcomes, but note the following fromTable 2. The correlation of residuals confirms that the three religiousindicators are related, most likely to a latent religiosity. The highestcorrelation is between that for religious salience and private practice,perhaps because of the sample’s high proportion of Muslims. Beingfemale is associated with higher religious salience, lower communalpractice, and higher private practice. Being married is significant andpositive in all three equations. Being older, or a full-time student, is

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associated with greater communal practice, while working full-time isassociated with significantly less private practice. Full-time education,surprisingly, has no significant effect, perhaps because educationpromotes secularity for some but higher religiosity for others.

It is difficult to gauge the net effects of the main and interactionterms for ethnicity and generational status from the model results. Wetherefore use the results to predict the three outcomes for arepresentative individual: one who is male, married, working full-time, aged thirty-nine and with fourteen years of full-time education

Table 2. Multivariate regression of religious salience, communal religiouspractice and private religious practice (parameter estimates)

Religioussalience

Communalpractice

Privatepractice

Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient

Constant 4.415** 3.697** 4.742**Female 0.079* �0.413** 0.399**Married 0.095* 0.127� 0.192**Age �0.002 0.007* 0.004Employed �0.035 0.093 �0.118�Full-time student 0.014 0.279* 0.150Years of education �0.001 0.007 �0.0031.5 generation 0.021 0.261 �0.2142nd generation �0.021 0.091 �0.376**Black Caribbean �0.224* 0.037 �1.001**Black African �0.045 0.450** �0.262*Indian �0.433** �0.259* �0.741**Bangladeshi 0.066 0.048 0.276�Black Caribbean*1.5

generation�0.137 �0.358 0.351

Black Caribbean*2ndgeneration

�0.516** �0.526* 0.061

Black African*1.5generation

�0.027 �0.292 0.209

Black African*2ndgeneration

�0.235� �0.322 �0.161

Indian*1.5 generation �0.066 �0.438 �0.257Indian*2 generation �0.153 �0.296 �0.409*Bangladeshi*1.5 generation �0.054 �0.385 �0.104Bangladeshi*2nd generation �0.192 �0.265 �0.487*N 2,197 2,197 2,197R2 0.121 0.065 0.154F (20, 2176) 15.032 7.527 19.796

�pB0.1, *pB.05, **pB.01.

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study: authors’ analysis.

Note: Base category is Pakistani, first-generation, male, unmarried, not full-time employed,

and not in full-time education in all three models.

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(the latter two being sample means).3 We then compare the predictedscores for each group in turn to Pakistanis averaging over generations;then the 1.5 and second generations with the first, averaging overethnic groups. We finally compare scores for the 1.5 and secondgenerations with those for the first generation within each ethnicgroup.4 Table 3 reports the contrasts.

Across the three measures of religiosity, black Caribbeans, blackAfricans and Indians are significantly less religious than Pakistanis,while Bangladeshis are not. The exceptions are in communal practice:black Caribbeans do not practise significantly less than Pakistanis;

Table 3. Predicted religious salience, communal practice and private religiouspractice: pairwise comparisons

Pairwise contrasts of predictive margins atrepresentative values

Overall effectsReligioussalience

Communalpractice

Privatepractice

Black Caribbean vs Pakistani �0.418** �0.161 �0.944**Black African vs Pakistani �0.120* 0.309** �0.283**Indian vs Pakistani �0.493** �0.435** �0.937**Bangladeshi vs Pakistani �0.022 �0.100 0.0981.5 generation vs first generation �0.027 �0.028 �0.176*Second generation vs first

generation�0.213* �0.189* �0.544**

Within-group effects1.5*black Caribbean vs first

generation�0.111 �0.158 0.165

Second-generation blackCaribbean vs first generation

�0.529** �0.499** �0.286�

1.5 generation black African vsfirst generation

�0.015 �0.053 �0.010

Second-generation Black Africanvs first generation

�0.265* �0.254 �0.543**

1.5 generation Indian vs firstgeneration

�0.038 �0.170 �0.454*

Second-generation Indian vs firstgeneration

�0.161* �0.197 �0.763**

1.5 generation Pakistani vs firstgeneration

0.016 0.246 �0.238

Second-generation Pakistani vsfirst generation

�0.021 0.077 �0.397**

1.5 generation Bangladeshi vs firstgeneration

0.001 �0.144 �0.334�

Second-generation Bangladeshi vsfirst generation

�0.177 �0.191 �0.876**

�pB0.1, *pB.05, **pB.01.

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study: authors’ analysis.

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black Africans practise more frequently. Being a member of the 1.5generation rather than the first has a significant negative effect onprivate religious practice, although the results within ethnic groupsuggest that this is driven by Indian respondents. Being secondgeneration has a significant negative effect on all three measures.

The effect of generation within each ethnic group provides specificevidence for generational decline. It is clearest for private practice,perhaps the most stringent test of religious commitment, holdingacross all five ethnic groups. For religious salience, there is evidence ofgenerational decline for black Caribbeans, black Africans and Indians,while second-generation Pakistanis and Bangladeshis appear as likelyas those of the first generation to report that religion is important tothem. Communal religious practice, perhaps because of its socialfunction, is not affected for groups other than black Caribbeans,suggesting resilience of public worship in the host country.

The attention devoted to the religiosity and integration of SouthAsian Muslims in Britain motivates closer examination of this group.Tables 2 and 3 show that the generational effects for Pakistanis andBangladeshis are not large; however, they may have additionally loststatistical significance for two reasons. First, the number of controls inthe model is relatively large, so that we lose statistical power. Wetherefore repeated the multivariate regression analysis for Pakistanisand Bangladeshis only. Given the lack of significant differencesbetween Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the earlier analyses, weremoved the control for ethnicity and associated interaction terms.The second generation then exhibited significantly lower religioussalience than the first at the .05 level of significance, while second-generation communal practice remained at similar levels to the first.

A further feature of the survey was that the religious salience andpractice items were only posed to those indicating a religiousaffiliation; however, it would be useful to take account of those whohave secularized to the extent of rejecting a religious affiliation. Wetherefore imputed scores for religious salience, communal practice andprivate practice, assuming that they would report that religion is ‘notat all’ important to them and that they do not practise communally orprivately. In these models, the contrast between the second generationand first in terms of religious salience is found at the .01 level ofsignificance. These additional analyses suggest that secularizationprocesses are in operation for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis just as withthe other ethnic groups, even if the generational effects are substan-tively more modest.

The results overall find a consistent drift away from private religiouspractice and religious salience. Its extent is conditional on ethnic groupmembership, and takes a full generation to progress. There is no suchchange in communal practice for groups other than black Caribbeans.

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We particularly note the following. It has hitherto been unclearwhether second-generation Muslims in Britain are on average more orless religious than their parents. There is no evidence here to suggestthat they are significantly more religious, although many individualsundoubtedly are. While religion remains avowedly important toPakistanis and Bangladeshis of the 1.5 and second generations, thereis nevertheless some evidence of decline for the second. Privatepractice exhibits clearer slippage. Younger generations may have tobe more pragmatic about maintaining prayer alongside study andwork commitments, practising less often but no less meaningfully.Alternatively, consistent private practice may simply be a moreexacting measure of religiosity than religious salience or communalpractice.

The civic effects of religiosity and generational status

So far we have reported the correlates of ethnic minority religiosity,with a focus on immigrant generation and ethnic group membership.We now turn to the impact of religiosity and immigrant generationfor social and civic health, using three measures. The EMBES includesthe standard Generalized Social Trust Question (GST), which aims toforce a binary choice between reporting whether or not most peoplecan be trusted (see Appendix 1, Table A1). We group those replyingspontaneously to the trust question that ‘it depends’ with thosereplying ‘you can’t be too careful’, to distinguish the most highlytrusting. We examine civic and social engagement using, first, ameasure of political and community involvement: ‘Over the past fewyears, have you volunteered to get involved in politics or communityaffairs?’ This has a binary response. Volunteering is captured via thefollowing question: ‘Over the past few years, how active have you beenin a voluntary organization, like a local community association, acharity, or a sports club?’ Respondents can reply ‘very’, ‘somewhat’,‘a little’ or ‘not at all’. We distinguish here between those replying ‘alittle’ or more versus those not at all active, to create a binary measureof involvement.

We then apply probit regression analysis to the three indicators,controlling for religiosity, and retain generational and ethnic terms. Toinvestigate whether religiosity is particularly associated with engage-ment for the younger generations, we interact generational status withreligiosity. To gain coverage of the unreligious, we impute a religiosityfactor score for those without a religious affiliation, who were notposed further questions regarding religion, assuming that they wouldreport the lowest levels of salience and practice. Table 4 provides theresults.

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The coefficients report the change in the probit index for a one-unitchange in each predictor. For civic engagement and volunteering, theeffect of being 1.5 generation rather than first, or second rather thanfirst, appears positive. Religiosity also has positive effects in thesemodels, although just shy of significance in the case of social trust. Theinteraction terms are not significant, except for the trust equationwhere that for the 1.5 generation is negative. This might arise becausethose experiencing culture shock during youth take refuge in religion,with causality therefore running from lower trust to greater religiosity.

The effect of each term is, however, conditional on the value ofthe others and its own value. We therefore use the model results tocalculate predicted probabilities, to interpret the net effects ofreligiosity and generation. Our representative case is again male, firstgeneration, Pakistani, married, working full-time, and of mean ageand years of education. Looking first at trust, the net effect can bemore easily understood by graphing the results for each decile ofreligiosity for each generation (see Figure 3). For our representativefigure, to be more religious and first generational is to be more likelyto report that most people can be trusted. Being a member of the 1.5generation rather than the first has a positive effect at low levels of

Table 4. Probit regression of generalized trust, civic engagement and voluntaryactivity (parameter estimates)

Trust Civic engagement Volunteering

Constant �1.000** �2.304** �1.573**Female �0.186** �0.094 �0.087�Married 0.123� �0.055 �0.037Age (years) 0.004 0.009** 0.003Employed 0.101 0.101 0.060In full-time education 0.163 0.097 0.192Full-time education received (years) 0.008 0.038** 0.044*Black Caribbean �0.088 0.023 0.360**Black African �0.194* 0.227* 0.451**Indian �0.049 �0.077 0.272**Bangladeshi �0.077 �0.049 �0.020**1.5 generation �0.077 0.329** 0.350**Second generation �0.156* 0.357** 0.463**Religiosity 0.088 0.197** 0.184**Religiosity*1.5 generation �0.229* �0.129 �0.117Religiosity*Second generation �0.079 �0.013 0.022N 2,568 2,629 2,629Pseudo R2 0.021 0.040 0.055

�pB0.1, *pB.05, **pB.01.

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study: authors’ analysis.

Note: Base category is Pakistani, first-generation, male, unmarried, not full-time employed,

and not in full-time education.

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religiosity; the gap declines as religiosity increases. The secondgeneration looks like the first at low levels of religiosity, but thereligiosity gradient is apparently flat. However, the confidence inter-vals for each generation’s results (available on request) are wide andheavily overlap; further, the main effect of religiosity is insignificantwith results for the interaction terms ambiguous. We thereforeconsider that generational effects are more important here than thosearising from religiosity.

Figure 4 depicts the predicted probability of having volunteered in anon-political organization. For the first generation, moving from the

Figure 3. Effect of religiosity on generalized trust by generation

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

Figure 4. Effect of religiosity on volunteering by generation

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

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first centile of religiosity to the last is associated with a doubling (17 to34 per cent) in the predicted probability of having volunteered for ourrepresentative case. For the second, it is associated with an increasefrom 30 to 53 per cent. Results are similar for the political volunteeringmeasure (available on request).

We now briefly turn to the question of whether ethnic minoritymembers in Britain are becoming more like or unlike whites in theirtrust and civic engagement with each generation. The main 2010British Election Study offers a social trust question with differentresponse options (a 0�10 scale), which does not allow a directcomparison with EMBES respondents. However, the 2010�11 Citizen-ship Survey posed the GST to a population sample with a large ethnicbooster, further asking respondents their own and parental countriesof birth, allowing us to distinguish immigrants.5 For civic andvoluntary organization participation, we compare EMBES respon-dents with white respondents to the 2010 British Election Study.

Whites appear more trusting than ethnic minority members; andrates fall for whites and first-generation ethnic minority immigrants bysuccessive cohort (see Figure 5).6 For the earlier cohorts, the secondgeneration is generally less trusting than the first, excepting first-generation black immigrants born in the 1990s (which has a higherproportion of Africans and forced migrants than earlier cohorts).However, trust rises with cohort for the second generation, suggestinga movement to a host-country norm. For the youngest cohort,differences between whites and Asians of both generational groupsare not statistically significant; those between whites and blacks remainso. As shown in Figure 6, participation in volunteering rises forsuccessive cohorts of ethnic minority and white respondents alike, andamong the youngest cohort, whites are overtaken by ethnic minorityrespondents. Turning to civic engagement, whites do not clearly leadamong any cohort, and among the post-1989 cohort, first-generationethnic minority immigrants participate most, followed by the secondgeneration, then whites. We cannot be conclusive regarding whetherdifferences here are driven by cohort or age effects, and note that we donot control for education or other socio-demographic factors. We cansay, however, that for each successive cohort, differences betweenethnic minorities and the white majority are declining in terms of socialtrust and volunteering. Where cohort differences are apparentlyemerging for civic engagement, these are arguably beneficial.

The results overall show that successive generations are moreinvolved, and religion does appear to school immigrants into civiclife. The attenuation of generalized trust for the second generationraises some concern; it may, however, be that the second generation isintegrating into host-country levels, a finding noted for political trust(Maxwell 2010). The failure of religiosity to foster generalized trust is

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of some surprise given the call to altruism of many religious teachings.Further investigation of the relationship between perceived discrimi-nation and trust for this sample would be insightful, as would a closercomparison of immigrants and the host community taking socio-demographic differences into account.

Figure 5. Generalized social trust by ethnicity and birth cohort

Source: DCLG and Ipsos MORI, Citizenship Survey 2010�11.Notes: Survey weight applied. Unweighted N�15,531.

Figure 6. Participation in civic and other volunteering by ethnicity and birthcohort

Source: British Election Study 2010 (post-election in-person survey) andEthnic Minority British Election Study (http://bes.utdallas.edu).Notes: Survey weights applied. Unweighted N�1,396 (BES data); 2,769(EMBES, civic participation): 2,775 (EMBES, other volunteering).

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Conclusion

Scholars have found that successive generations of migrants to theUSA become more like Americans of less recent immigrant origin.Complementary work suggests that religious institutions integratemigrants into American society. We examined whether these proposi-tions hold for Britain, which is more secular than the USA, andwhere national identity is less associated with a shared immigrantexperience.

We assessed whether succeeding generations of ethnic minorities inBritain exhibit reactive religiosity or lower levels of religiosity than thefirst generation, and find a secularization pattern, contingent uponethnicity and the type of religiosity under investigation. Communalreligious practice, however, has not changed substantially from onegeneration to the next.

We then examined how generational status and religiosity fostersocial and political engagement. Religiosity is associated with greatercivic engagement and volunteering, while effects on generalized trustare insignificant (and for the 1.5 generation, negative). Generationaleffects appear to be away from trust for successive generations, buttowards greater civic involvement and volunteering. There is noevidence that the religiosity of the 1.5 and second generations inparticular has unwelcome effects on social and civic life.

Overall, religious involvement appears beneficial for civic life insecular Britain as in the more religious USA. Further, secularizationprocesses appear underway for ethnic minority communities. Whatremains unclear from this analysis is how far religious involvement is achosen route to the securing of group resources and maintenance ofethnic identity, or whether it is more akin to a basic value precedingmaterial and political concerns. This will matter for the future ofethnic minorities in Britain. If religion is ebbing away because of valueshifts, those experiencing disadvantage in future may lose the capacityto mobilize social and political resources. If religious life is largely ameans to a more earthly end, the trend away from religion will signalthat it has served those purposes, at least for those who have chosen toleave it behind.

Notes

1. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is acceptable at 0.643 and Bartlett test of sphericity

significant (pB.001); we accordingly reject the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is

an identity matrix.

2. Simultaneous estimation of the three outcomes via multivariate regression, taking into

account the full covariance structure, allows efficient estimates of model coefficients and

standard errors.

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3. It is also possible to calculate predicted values for an ‘average individual’ (e.g. one who

is 47 per cent male and 53 per cent married) or by averaging over individuals in the sample.

We chose to calculate marginal effects at representative values.

4. We use the ‘margins’ suite in Stata 11.0 to calculate pairwise comparisons of predictive

margins for the separate effects of generational and ethnic status; then the conditional

marginal effect of generation for each ethnic group in turn. We thus minimize the ‘multiple

comparisons problem’ by restricting the number conducted. While we do not correct the

p values for the multiple comparisons, a significant omnibus F test of the joint significance of

the interaction terms (not reported here) protects against an inflated type I error.

5. The majority of the analysis conducted here uses the Ethnic Minority British Election

Survey 2010. However, responses to the trust question (‘most people can be trusted’, ‘you

can’t be too careful’ and unprompted responses of ‘it depends’) were not directly

commensurate with that for the main British Election Study, which used a 0�10 scale.

Accordingly, the Citizenship Survey 2010�11 was chosen to allow a comparison with whites.

6. We suspect differential item functioning between whites and ethnic minority

respondents for the option ‘it depends’, where response rates are considerably higher for

the latter. Accordingly, we group those replying ‘most people can be trusted’ with those

replying ‘it depends’. To simplify the graph we group the 1.5 with the second generation.

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Appendix 1

Table A1. Question wording and variable codes for EMBES measures

Variablecode Measure Question wording

bq106_1 Religious affiliation Do you regard yourself as belonging to anyparticular religion? yes / no

eq4 Religious salience How important is your religion to you?extremely important / very important /somewhat important / not very important / notimportant at all

bq106_4 Communal religiouspractice

In the past 12 months, how often did youparticipate in religious activities or attendreligious services or meetings with otherpeople, other than for events such as weddingsand funerals? at least once a day / at least oncea week / at least once a month / occasionally(but less than once a month) / only on festivals/ not at all

bq106_5 Private religiouspractice

In the past 12 months, how often did you doreligious activities on your own? This mayinclude prayer, meditation and other forms ofworship taking place at home or in any otherlocation. five times a day / at least once a day /at least once a week / at least once a month /only on festivals / not at all

eq15 Social trust Generally speaking, would you say that mostpeople can be trusted or that you can’t be toocareful in dealing with people? people can betrusted / you can’t be too careful / it depends(spontaneous response)

bq54_2 Politicalvolunteering

Over the past few years, have you volunteeredto get involved in politics or communityaffairs? yes / no

bq54_3 Other volunteering Over the past few years, how active have youbeen in a voluntary organization, like a localcommunity association, a charity, or a sportsclub? very active / somewhat active / a littleactive / not at all active

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Table A2. Descriptive statistics

Percentage (%)or mean score

n (unweighted base orcount); or standard

deviation Min. Max.

Female 50.5 2,787 0 1Married or with partner 58.3 2,782 0 1Employed 48.7 2,693 0 1Full-time student 10.0 2,693 0 1Black Caribbean 15.4 668 0 1Black African 19.2 579 0 1Indian 35.4 593 0 1Pakistani 21.5 673 0 1Bangladeshi 8.6 274 0 1Age 39.1 15.0 18 97Years of full-time

education14.4 5.3 0 25

Belongs to a religion 90.1 2,773 0 1Religious salience 4.2 0.8 1 5Communal religious

practice4.0 1.5 1 6

Private religious practice 4.5 1.4 1 6Social trust: reporting

‘most people can betrusted’

21.7 2,711 0 1

Civic engagement:reporting political/community involvement

16.0 2,787 0 1

Volunteering: reporting atleast some activity

44.1 2,787 0 1

Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study.

Note: Proportions and means based on weighted data (using weight devised to analyse all

ethnic groups together).

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