Illinois Security Lab Critical Infrastructure Protection for Power Carl A. Gunter University of...

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Illin ois Security Lab Critical Infrastructure Protection for Power Carl A. Gunter University of Illinois

Transcript of Illinois Security Lab Critical Infrastructure Protection for Power Carl A. Gunter University of...

Page 1: Illinois Security Lab Critical Infrastructure Protection for Power Carl A. Gunter University of Illinois.

IllinoisSecurity Lab

Critical Infrastructure Protectionfor Power

Carl A. Gunter

University of Illinois

Page 2: Illinois Security Lab Critical Infrastructure Protection for Power Carl A. Gunter University of Illinois.

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TCIP Center

• NSF/DHS/DOE CyberTrust Center scale activity: Trusted Cyber Infrastructure for Power (TCIP)

• Lead UIUC, other participants include Cornell, Dartmouth, and Washington State University

• C. A. Gunter, B. Sanders (PI), D. Bakken, A. Bose, R. Campbell, G. Gross, C. Hauser, H. Khurana, R. Iyer, Z. Kalbarczyk, K. Nahrstedt, D. Nicol , T. Overbye, P. Sauer, S. Smith, R. Thomas, V. Welch, M. Winslett

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Power Grid

• Features– Critical to many other

systems– Safety-critical real-time

control of energy– Multiple administrative

domains– Increasing

dependence on computer control

– Limited attention to security in legacy systems

• Similar systems– Oil and gas SCADA

systems– Air traffic control

system– International financial

system– Inter-domain routing

system (BGP)

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Present Infrastructure

ControlArea

Coordinator

- 1000’s of RTU/IEDs- Monitor and control generation and transmission equipment

10’s of control areas feed data to coordinator

- State estimator creates model from RTU/IED data

- Peer coordinators may exchange information for broad model- Degree of sharing may change over time

Photos courtesy of John D. McDonald, KEMA Inc.

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US Grid Infrastructure

Edison Electric Institute 03

CAISO

RTO WEST

ERCOT

MISO

TVA

GRID FLORIDA

GRID SOUTH

PJM

NYSO

ISO-NE

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Public/Private Internet

Control Center (EMS)

LAN

Control Center (EMS)

LAN

Dedicated Links M/W, Fiber, Dialup, Leased Lines, etc)

Dedicated Links M/W, Fiber, Dialup, Leased Lines, etc)

RTU

IEDs

Sensors

Dedicated Links M/W, Fiber, Dialup, Leased Lines, etc)

Dedicated Links M/W, Fiber, Dialup, Leased Lines, etc)

Level 0(Sensors and actuators)

Level 1(IED)

Level 2(Substation)

Level 3 (Enterprise)

Vendor Operator

Switched Ethernet LAN

Trust Negotiation

QoSMgnt

QoSMgnt

Secure and Timely Data Collection, Aggregation, and Monitoring

Secure TunableHardware

Secure InformationDistribution

AAA Control

Person Person

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Grid Communication Protocols

ISO A ISO B

CCA.A

CCA.B

CCB.A

CCB.B

SSA.A.A

SSA.A.B

SSA.A.C

SSA.B.A

SSA.B.B

SSA.B.C

IED#1

IED#2

SSB.A.A

SSB.A.B

SSB.A.C

SSB.B.A

SSB.B.B

SSB.B.C

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8

2

3 3

1: ISO, CC: ICCP2: ISO, ISO: ICCP3: CC, CC: ICCP4: CC, SS: DNP/61850/UCA5: ISO, SS: DNP/61850/UCA6: Seam tie line7: SS, IED: DNP/61850/UCA8: Tie line

ISO: Independent system operatorCC: Control centerSS: SubstationIED: Intelligent electronic device

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8IntelliGrid Environments

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Secure and ReliableComputing Base

Architecture

Technical challenges motivated by domain specific problems in

Ubiquitous exposed infrastructure

Real-time data monitoring and control

Wide area information coordination and information sharing

Must be addressed bydeveloping science in

Trustworthy infrastructure for data collection and control

Wide-Area Trustworthy Information Exchange

Quantitative Validation

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Sample Research Questions

• Should the power grid use the Internet?

• How can we unify power grid simulations and Internet simulations?

• What are the risks associated with new power grid elements such as networked meters?

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Pervasive Metering

• Advanced power meters on the brink of broad deployment

• No good threat assessments currently exist• Corrupt customers, energy service providers, terrorists,

and other external agents all highly motivated to attack pervasive meters– Terrorists: Remotely disconnect customers– Service providers: Profile customer loads with high resolution– Customers: Steal electricity

• Interesting characteristics: Ownership of the meter and its data shared between service provider and customer

• Potential security architectures applicable to other networked systems– Likely to make use of cutting-edge technologies like trusted

platform modules, virtualization, and remote attestation