While the rural infrastructure, services, andstandard of living were dramatically trans-formed in the first four decades of the Cubanrevolution, Cuban agriculture had not lost itstaste for producing, milling, and exportingsugar. The Cuban model—characterized bylarge state farms, mono-cropping, heavy useof mechanization and chemical inputs, cen-tralized planning, and dependence on import-ed agricultural supplies and importedfoodstuffs—was sustained only through highlygenerous terms of trade of Cuban sugar forSoviet oil. By not producing food for domes-tic consumption and by not addressing its

high input and low productivity problems,Cuban agriculture became very vulnerable to arupture with its Soviet and eastern bloc trad-ing partners.

Even before the economic crisis of the1990s, Cuban agriculture showed decline. Foryears assessments pointed to slipping produc-tivity and increasing investment costs. In1985 the Ministry of Agriculture promoted anew Programa Alimentario which proposed todiversify agriculture and to produce morefood for domestic consumption. Vested inter-ests in the old model, however, stalled theprogram before it was even implemented.8 Ittook the collapse of the Soviet Union and theeastern bloc for Cuban planners to radicallyrethink agricultural development. “Luckily—and I choose my words carefully—luckily theroof caved in for us in 1989,” said MavisAlvarez, a leader in the Cuban farmers move-

ment. “It made us pay attention to morerational methods.” (Sullivan, 2000).9

Now ten years later, the economy is slowlyreemerging. The GNP has grown every yearsince 1995, reaching 6.2% for 1999 and anestimated 4.6% for 2000. Employment is up, productivity is up, and exports are up.In agriculture, certain sectors, including pro-duction of fruits, vegetables, and tubers fordomestic consumption, have turned aroundcompletely. Caloric intake rebounded to2,473 and 51.6 grams per person—not greatcompared to the 1980s, but still a 33%increase compared to 1994.

Neither the World Bank nor the In t e r n a t i o n a lMo n e t a ry Fund nor other international lenderscame to Cu b a’s aid.1 0 The re c ove ry in agriculturecame from internal re o r g a n i z a t i o n — n ew policies,n ew actors, new systems. The goal, according toCuban Vice Minister of Agriculture Alfre d oGu t i é r rez, is that “Cuban agriculture has to standon its own two feet. We need to ove rcome themyth that agriculture must be subsidize d . ”( Gu t i é r rez interv i ew, May 2001) The ove r h a u lentailed major structural changes, such as:

• decentralization Cuban style, through the conversion of large state farms intothousands of smaller farmers cooperativesand leasing land in usufruct to thousands of private farmers;

• urban gardening and ecological agricul-

ture, which altered the topography of ruralCuba, introducing greater diversity andorganic practices and greening the citieswith thousands of micro farms;

• reforming distribution through intro-duction of markets, price incentives, andprofitability.

III. Reforming Cuban Agriculture

Luckily—and I choose my wo rds care f u l l y — l u c k i l y

the roof caved in for us in 1989,” said Mavis

A l va rez, a leader in the Cuban farmers movement.

These measures, taken as a whole, make upCuba’s “third agrarian reform,” every bit asprofound as the major land expropriationsand redistributions of the first two reforms of1959 and 1963.

D e c e n t ra l i z ation of Pro d u c t i o n

Co nve rsion of State Farms

i n to Co o p e rat i ves

In September 1993, the Cuban gove r n m e n tu n veiled a major reorganization in agriculture :re s t ructuring state farms as private cooperative s .As President Fidel Castro explained in the Cu b a nn ewspaper Gra n m a (12/29/93), “The state hasnot had success in large farm business.” De c re e142 affected most of the state holdings—a totalof 41.2% of the arable land in Cu b a1 1—and cre-ated 2,007 new cooperatives whose membershiptotaled 122,000 people.1 2 Called Basic Units ofC o o p e r a t i ve Production (UBPC), the coopera-t i ves now make up the largest sector in Cu b a na g r i c u l t u re. The new policy was based on the factthat smaller farms would be more easily managedand better able to take on sustainable agriculturepractices, which was now vital given the lack ofagricultural inputs.1 3 This was seen as a new for-mula promoting decentralized decision-makingabout production but allowing a centralized plan-ning so essential for planned biological dive r s i t y,pest control at a regional level, and water and

other re s o u rce management. Government plan-ners and farm leaders alike believed that coopera-t i ve members would be positive about the changeand be motivated to work. This assumption wasverified in an early study by a leading Americanre s e a rc h e r, Carmen Diana De e re .

Because they believe that they will be thebeneficiaries, cooperative members are alsow o rking longer hours and putting in muchg reater effort. Mo re ove r, it is apparent that asowners of the means of production, they takebetter care of their equipment and farm imple-ments. The members also feel empowe red to a certain degree, for they are now part i c i p a t i n gin production decisions for the first time andh a ve elected their own management, sometimesin contested elections—something quite new inthe Cuban political scene.

Unlike the large state farms, the UBPCsare smaller enterprises, member-owned andmember-managed. The cooperative, not thestate, owns the production, and the coopera-tive member earns based on his or her share ofthe cooperative’s income. The cooperativesalso own the buildings and farm equipmentpurchased from the government at discountedprices with long-term, low-interest loans (4%interest). The greatest structural differencebetween the UBPCs and other cooperatives isthat the state retains ownership of the landand leases the land on a long-term basis, rent-

andholding in Ru ral Cuba (19 92 and 19 97 )

BPC is a basic unit of cooperative production. CPA is an agricultral production cooperative. CCS is a credit and services cooperative .

19 92

CCSs 11 %

C PAs 10 %

U n a f f i l l i ated 3%

S tate 76 %

19 97

UBPCs 42 %

S tate 33 %

CCSs 12 %

C PAs 9%

U n a f f i l l i ated 4%

free, to the UBPC cooperative. Deere hascharacterized the transformation as “. . . thegigantic state farm sector was, in reality, priva-tized,” although Deere and others recognizethat the state reserves the right to “dissolvewhatever UBPC . . . on the basis of the socialor economic interest as determined by theGovernment” (Gaceta Oficial, 9/21/93).

Many expected that replacing state farms with“s o c i a l i ze d” private enterprise would unleashe n t re p reneurial energy and re verse the low pro-ductivity found on the state farms. And for someUBPCs, the reform did mean that. Ramon Pe r a ,the president of the cattle UBPC Ma rt i res deMoncada in Ciego de Avila province, spoke posi-t i vely about the conversion in a December 1999i n t e rv i ew (R. Pera, personal communication,December 15, 1999):

With less re s o u rces than before, we are bet-ter small businesses than under the statefarm system. T h e re is a sense of ow n e r s h i p,the farms are smaller and easier to manage.We are more autonomous. We make ourown production plans, and we are grow i n ge ve ry ye a r. We are producing better-qualitymilk and people earn more. As a statefarm, the business lost 12 million pesose ve ry ye a r. In 1992, for example, 1,200head of cattle died. Turning the farm intoa cooperative was well thought-out. Last

ye a r, for example, only 200 head of cattledied between ours and a neighboringUBPC. With less than we had before, wea re producing more than before .

Now eight years after the founding of theUBPCs, the track re c o rd of new cooperatives isnot as strong as was hoped. While no one callsfor a return to the state farm era, difficulties con-tinue to stymie their development. The UBPCsinherited a highly mechanized high-input agri-cultural model at a time when inputs are scarc eand costly (credit and extension services have alsobeen reduced). The cooperatives we re born notout of plenty, like the small farmers in the agrari-an reform thirty years earlier, but out of scarc i t y,and they lack the means of production. In addi-tion, UBPCs have shown difficulty in re t a i n i n gtheir work f o rce due to inadequate living condi-tions, working conditions, and pay. And withouta federation to unite the individual UBPCs, simi-lar to the ANAP cooperatives federation, theUBPC movement has been unable to art i c u l a t eits interests and bargain with the state as a sector(as opposed to as an individual cooperative).

Another issue concerns the new cooperative s’independence from the state. Although theUBPCs are legally autonomous, the state contin-ues to exe rcise considerable influence on theactivities of many of the cooperatives. The gov-ernment contracts with the UBPCs on what

Members of aUBPC coopera t i vein the Ha va n ap rovince work h a rder and arem o re committedthan before, butthe track re c o rd of the UBPCs has not been ass t rong as hoped.[ St e ve Ca g a n ]

c rops and how much land the cooperative shouldc u l t i vate and on that basis sells agricultural inputsto the UBPCs. UBPCs produce pre d o m i n a n t l ys u g a r. Mo re than thre e - q u a rters of all theUBPCs, for example, are given quotas for sugarp roduction, which seve rely limits any other cro p sthey might produce and sell in the agriculturalm a rkets, there by restricting their options andtheir income. An April 2000 visit by the authorsto six UBPC cooperatives in Ciego de Av i l are vealed different perspectives between theUBPCs and local officials with the Mi n i s t ry ofA g r i c u l t u re. The officials tended to relate to the UBPCs as if the co-ops we re still statefarms, while several UBPC leaders listed the needfor re l a t i ve autonomy in decision-making as akey factor inhibiting their pro g re s s .

Gi ven the state influence, some re s e a rc h e r sh a ve called the UBPCs “state cooperative s”1 4 o rp r i vate-state hybrids.1 5 Re g a rdless of the name,the state influence on the cooperatives affects“their consciousness as new cooperativists, whoa re owners and there f o re social actors in aneconomic context. . . . The minimal necessaryconditions for the development of self-manage-ment still has not been created and a culture ofcooperativism has not been extended” (Pe rez ,2000, p. 86).

Creating a consciousness of ow n e r s h i pamong former agricultural laborers cannot hap-pen overnight, unlike the passing of the decre ethat created the UBPCs, but at the same timewill re q u i re a more intentional hands-offa p p roach by local ministry officials who stillv i ew UBPCs as part of their domain. Tre n d sclearly point tow a rds greater autonomy for thec o o p e r a t i ves. In t e rv i ews on the ground andwith agricultural specialists confirm that localc o o p e r a t i ve leaders are demanding greater deci-sion-making authority and local officials withre l a t i vely few re s o u rces are increasingly cedinga u t h o r i t y. Non-sugar UBPCs have won more ofthe battle. One cooperative leader at the UBPCR i c a rd Re yes, a Ciego de Avila cooperativewhich raises cattle and re c e i ves training fro m

Oxfam, said, “No one decides for us. Be f o re wehad to do what the state farm director wanted.Now we have more support to make local deci-sions. It’s more dynamic” (R. Re yes, personalcommunication, December 15, 1999).

Linking Wo r ke rs to the Land

Within the UBPC cooperatives and the agricul-tural cooperatives (CPAs), a new practice of tyingan individual’s salary to his or her pro d u c t i v i t ymay be one of the most vital, yet unheralded,reforms. Traditionally members of cooperative sget paid based on the number of days they work( t h rough an advance and an end-of-year share ofthe earnings). This practice pays eve ryone equal-l y, no matter how hard, how long, or how pro-d u c t i vely one works in the day.

By linking workers to a specific plot of landon the cooperative, the cooperative compensatesmembers based on their pro d u c t i v i t y, not theirtimesheet. Members who clear more land in aday get paid more; individuals who pro d u c em o re on their area get paid more. This re p re s e n t sa move tow a rds decentralization and gre a t e ri n c e n t i ves within the cooperative, but still allow sfor the larger economies of scale, mechanization,and collectivist spirit which cooperatives offer.

L e asing Land to Private Fa r m e rs

The breakup of the large state farms has fre e denormous acreage for other types of land useand the government has turned over land to

Reynaldo Ga rcía, a farmer in Ciego de Avila, re c e i ve dhalf of his land fro mthe state on a longt e rm, re n t - f ree l e a s e .The micro - d a m,built with Ox f a mfunding, gives hima ye a r - round sourc eof irrigation for ve getable pro d u c t i o n .

farmers—nearly 170,000 hectares since 1989( E C LAC, 1999).1 6 The government retains titleto the land, but private farmers and agriculturalcooperatives (CPAs) can farm the land rent-free for an indefinite time period. The onlyqualification for farmers such as coffee farmersin the east, vegetable growers in the centralp rovinces, and tobacco farmers in the west is thatn e a r by land be available and that the farmerss h ow the potential to expand their production.

Gi ven the food crisis of the mid-1990s andthe current income-earning potential, manyCubans now view farming as an occupationve ry differently than they did in the 1980s.Thousands of families have left the cities andt owns to claim a farming stake and make theirl i velihood from the land. ANAP claims that itsmembership has increased by 35,000 over thepast three years and characterizes the new farm-ers as young families, many of whom are col-lege-educated; people who opted for earlyre t i rement; or workers who originally camef rom a farming backgro u n d .

S t rengthening Co o p e rat i ves

The credit and service cooperatives (CCSs),made up of small, independent farmers livingon their farms, have recently gained attentionand a greater share of re s o u rces. The CCS coop-e r a t i ves traditionally have been loosely organ-i zed, often providing little credit and fews e rvices to their membership. Despite that, the

small farmers have been the most pro d u c t i vesector in Cuban agriculture, outperforming theagricultural cooperatives (CPA s ) ,1 7 UBPC coop-e r a t i ves, and state farms. Recognizing that CCSfarmers produce more with less, the Na t i o n a lAssociation of Small Producers (ANAP) began ap rogram in 1998 to strengthen the business sideof the CCS co-ops. Regulations governing co-opswe re amended to allow CCS cooperatives toopen bank accounts, to hire administrators andm a rket re p re s e n t a t i ves, and to negotiate cre d i tand to “p l a n” collectively on behalf of its mem-b e r s h i p. After training and re s t ructuring, thec o o p e r a t i ves can be qualified as “s t re n g t h e n e d . ”A “s t re n g t h e n e d” cooperative gained ow n e r s h i pof machinery (often through subsidized sale ofused equipment from the state) which the co-op leases to its membership. A “s t re n g t h e n e d”c o o p e r a t i ve can also collectively market thegoods of its members, earning income for theco-op and greater profits for the members bycutting out the transport intermediaries. As ofApril 2000, approximately 991 of 2,556 CCSc o o p e r a t i ves we re considered “s t re n g t h e n e d”which meant among other things that those co-ops could tap new re s o u rces from the state.

Finances, obviously, play an important partin the health of a cooperative. According toANAP officials, 87% of the CPA cooperativesare profitmaking, though many just barely.However, among 149 coffee cooperatives, amuch higher percentage are losing money.Lack of fertilizers has affected coffee produc-tion particularly heavily, leading to higherdebt loads, greater difficulty in obtaining fur-ther credit, and problems in retaining mem-bership because of the low pay. In response,ANAP approved a debt-reduction plan for 63cooperatives, which progressively forgives theirdebt over three years (up to 50% of totaldebt) if the cooperative turns a profit duringeach of those years. Initial signs point to suc-cess of the offer, and ANAP officials say thatthe key has been the focus on cooperativescapable of becoming profitable.

Ne i g h b o rhood re s i-ents in San Mi g u e lel Pa d ron in Ha va n a

h a ve tra n s f o rmed aarbage dump into pro d u c t i ve urban

g a rden. The project supported by

Oxfam America andhe Cuban Council Churches.

U rban Agriculture

Spurred by extreme food shortages and sheeringenuity, Cuba has begun an impressiveexperiment with urban agriculture. Whatbegan as an ad hoc localized response to crisishas evolved into a highly developed and wide-spread experiment in urban farming. Todayhalf of the fresh produce consumed by twomillion Havana residents is grown by “nontra-ditional urban producers” in abandoned lotsand green spaces wedged into the crowdedtopography of the city.

In 1992 in the city of Holguin, unemploye dstate workers began a gardening plot as a sur-v i val response. About the same time a neighbor-hood group in Santa Fé, a community on the

western outskirts of Ha vana, started planting intheir backyards and in abandoned lots. Ne i t h e rg roup counted on re s o u rces, tools, or specialize dk n owledge. Since fert i l i zers and chemical inputswe re unavailable, by default the growers turnedto organic methods: composting, weeding, andmanual defense against insects. The move m e n tquickly spread through Ha vana and to theother provincial capitals.

Soon the Santa Fé neighborhood council,with help from Cuban and international non-g overnmental organizations (NGOs), began top rovide tools, seeds, and advice to other gard e n-ing groups. Though individual backyard plots (as well as chickens and an occasional pig) we rep a rt of the movement, what really flourishedwe re semi-organized horticultural groups basedon shared values: a self-help approach; sharingp roduce among the members and with vulnera-ble groups in schools, clinics, and seniors centers;and selling excess produce in the neighborhood.

In less than a decade, Cuban urban agriculturea rose from abandoned lots to become the largesturban agriculture movement in the Americas.This year Cuba may reach its goal of urban agri-c u l t u re supplying eve ry woman, man, and childin the cities with the FAO - recommended 300grams of vegetables per day.

Recognizing the potential of urban agricul-t u re, in 1994 the government created an urband e p a rtment of the Mi n i s t ry of Agriculture .Instead of imposing its authority on this nas-cent, diverse, and admittedly chaotic move-ment, the Urban Agriculture department wiselyhas looked to promote, support, and “re g u l a r-i ze” the practices, for example, by formalizingthe growe r s’ claim to community lots and legal-izing the growe r s’ right to sell their produce.

Thus far the state has been able to bring someo rder to the movement without stifling local ini-t i a t i ve. State resolutions re q u i re that all urbana g r i c u l t u re must be organic (in order to pro t e c tthe neighborhood residents) and that live s t o c k(the principal problem was pigs) cannot be raisedin urban areas. T h rough Resolution 527/97urban dwellers can re c e i ve up to one-third of ana c re for a personal lot in the periphery of themajor cities. T h rough December 1999 morethan 190,000 persons had re c e i ved small lots.T h rough a series of urban agricultural stores, thestate supplies organic inputs (principally organiccompost) and extension serv i c e s .

D i ve rse Forms of Urban Agriculture

Urban agriculture in Cuba is a collective term fora number of different ways food production iso r g a n i zed in cities and towns. The most com-mon, o r g a n ó p o n i c o s, use raised beds of organicmaterial. They generally combat pests using bio-logical methods and utilize organic fert i l i ze r, forexample, soil that has been processed using wormc u l t u res. The more advanced o r g a n ó p o n i c o s w i l lh a ve micro-jet irrigation and mesh shading.Yields are quite high—from 6 kilograms of pro-duce per square meter up to 30 kilograms (theg a rden La Constru c c i ó n in Ha vana prov i n c e ) .

n less than a decade, Cuban urban agriculture

a rose from abandoned lots to become the larg es t

rban agriculture movement in the Americas .

Some o r g a n o p o n i c o s a re actually small businesseswith hired workers, and managed by gove r n m e n tinstitutions affiliated with the Mi n i s t ry of Agri-c u l t u re and, in a few cases, the Mi n i s t ry ofArmed Fo rces. In c re a s i n g l y, o r g a n ó p o n i c o s a rebeing formed as small, self-managed coopera-t i ves, such as La Victoria in San Miguel delPadrón, an Oxfam America sponsored pro j e c t .Other urban agriculture is based more on a smallfarm model implemented by either individualfarmers or agricultural cooperatives on the out-s k i rts of the city.

Much of urban agriculture is quite modest.For example, hort i c u l t u re clubs are often madeup of re t i red people, some former farmers, whofarm land in usufruct patchworked all ove rcities. Ho rt i c u l t u re club members use the foodto augment their own diet, give food to familymembers and neighbors, or trade it for otherfoodstuffs as well as sell it. As part of the agre e-ment granting the club access to land, the clubdonates up to 10% of their produce to nearbyschools, old people’s homes, or maternity clin-ics. Community gard e n s a re organized by a com-munity gro u p, a workplace, a school, or culturalc e n t e r. A share of the produce goes to the com-munity entity, and the rest is shared by thosewho work in the garden. Thousands of peoplealso have individual gard e n s, either in their pri-vate yards or as separate gardens in a larger,community-based parc e l .

I m p a ct of Urban Agriculture

on Food Security

The production from urban agriculture is noth-ing short of phenomenal. As the accompanyingc h a rt indicates, production levels of ve g e t a b l e sh a ve doubled or tripled eve ry year since 1994.Urban gardens produce about 60% of all thevegetables consumed in Cuba (though 50% forHa vana; Pérez, 2000, p. 97).1 8 Without includ-ing figures for the small gardens and individualfarms, urban agriculture alone provided 215grams of vegetables per day per person thro u g h-out Cu b a — m o re than 70% of the grams re c o m-mended by the UN FAO. The plan for ye a r2000 calls for urban agriculture to reach 100%of the FAO re c o m m e n d a t i o n .

Though some have disparaged urban agri-culture—seen as running counter to modern-ization and urban progress—in truth, urbanagriculture has had an extraordinarily highsocial impact. People have been able to par-tially resolve one of their most pressing prob-lems through their own efforts. “We don’thave to wait for a paternalistic state to dothings for us. We can do it for ourselves,” saida retired schoolteacher in the urban garden in

P ro d u ction in Urban Agriculture (in to n s )

2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0

1 , 60 0 , 0 0 0

1 , 20 0 , 0 0 0

80 0 , 0 0 0

40 0 , 0 0 0

0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20 0 0

S o u rce: Ministry of Agriculture, Cuba

Amado Fe rn á n d e z ,82, buys lettuce for 2 pesos at anurban garden inHa vana. With apension of less than100 pesos per monAmado finds shop-ping at the farm e r sm a rket proves tooe x p e n s i ve .

Alamar. More than 28,000 retired people,nearly 20,000 women and 20,000 young peo-ple are involved in productive, healthy, andremunerative activities. The Oxfam-sponsoredorganopónico in Diezmero, San Miguel delPadrón converted a garbage dump into a cen-ter for community activity, an experience thathas been replicated throughout Cuba asneighbors work side by side in the gardens.

Urban gardening is good news for the con-sumer as well as the pro d u c e r. At the end of1999, 505 vegetable stands we re functioningwith prices generally at 30 to 50% of the leve lof farmers market prices. Oxfam’s 1997 surve yof buyers in several o r g a n o p ó n i c o s and agricul-tural clubs found that the majority of buye r swe re elderly and that nearly half (45%) spentone peso or less while 30% spent less than twopesos, which shows how guardedly the elderlyspent their few pesos. These are the people whocannot afford the agricultural market prices.Most urban producers come from families whoa verage a 250-peso-per-month salary per mem-b e r. The average state salary is 206 pesos amonth. The share of earnings from the urbana g r i c u l t u re production provides both food anda substantial increase in pesos to these house-hold economies. For people on a limitedincome, these additional funds are cru c i a l( Mu r p h y, 1999).

Without the food crisis of the mid-1990s,urban agriculture in Cuba most likely neve rwould have occurred. With local initiative andjudicious state support, possibly no other efforthas had as much impact socially, economically,and ecologically. In the past, nearly all the foodconsumed in the capital and the large cities wasp roduced in the rural areas of the surro u n d i n gp rovinces. The story of urban agriculture inCuba holds great promise for other metro p o l i-tan areas in developed and developing countriesalike that are seeking ways to lower the scale ofcities, extend the green areas, and tighten thesocial fabric of populated areas.

Ecological Pra c t i c es andS u s tainable Agriculture

Cuba initiated ecological agriculture on a largescale out of necessity—the country simplylacked fuel for machines, chemical fert i l i ze r s ,herbicides, and pesticides. Ecological agricultureis more than just an absence of chemicals infarming; it invo l ves bio-dive r s i t y, spatial con-t rols, soil and water management, green fert i l i z-ers and pest controls—altogether an active ,d i verse and integrated approach to farming.Organic agriculture is a central piece of ecologi-cal agriculture and Cuba may be the largestorganic experiment in the hemisphere. “I don’t

Training Fa r m e rs, Not Cre ating Dependence

As a response to the food crisis, in 1994 Oxfam Inte r n ational

p rovided free fertilizer to Cuban farmers in Guantánamo province.

The result? Agricultural production spiked up for three months—

and then collapsed again in the next harvest without the subsidy.

I n s tead of donating fertilizer during short term cyc l es, Oxfam now

looks to provide long term investment, which means support for the

t raining pro g ram of the National As s o c i ation of Small Pro d u c e rs

(ANAP). Over the last decade ANAP’s school has educated farmers

on ecological agriculture, pesticide control and cooperat i ve org a n i z a-

tion. In the provincial and municipal offices, ANAP works closely with

f a r m e rs to change high-input agriculture into alte r n at i ve pra c t i c es .

The strategy is working. An ANAP cooperat i ve pres i d e n t

re m e m b e rs that just before the economic crisis hit in 1991, his

c o o p e rat i ve used ro u g h ly one tra c tor for every four cooperat i ve

m e m b e rs. When the economic crisis hit full force and there was no

g asoline, the tra c to rs we re lite ra l ly stalled in the field. ANAP sought

out older farmers who re m e m b e red how to work oxen, set them up

in the training school, cas t rated thousands of bulls as oxen, and

began sending cooperat i ve members through the school in re l ays

to learn animal traction from the old peas a n ts. In little more than a

ye a r, most cooperat i ves had members trained in the use of animal

t raction. Cooperat i ves used scarce gasoline to run the tra c to rs to

do the initial plowing, following up with animal traction. Only a

s t rong org a n i z ation with access to their membership, equipped

with a training structure and res o u rc es and with a members h i p

familiar with training, could act with such agility to turn farming

te c h n i q u es around so quickly.

b e l i e ve many people know how big organicfarming in Cuba really is,” declared Juan Jo s éLeón Vega, director of international relations at the Mi n i s t ry of Agriculture. He estimated 1.5 million hectares of non-sugar farmland areorganic (Su l l i van, 2000). With Cuba pre s e n t l yi m p o rting one-sixth of the fert i l i zers they con-sumed in the pre-1989 Soviet era, and eve nf ewer chemical herbicides and pesticides, thelimited quantities are largely destined to high-priority crops, principally sugar and othere x p o rts. In Cienfuegos, a province held up as anational model for food self-sufficiency, the useof mineral fert i l i zer in 1996 was 12.3% of its1989 level, while pesticide use barely re a c h e d24%, the majority of which was in potato culti-vation. While low-input agriculture can befound in isolated pockets in the United St a t e sand among peasant farmers in many deve l o p i n gcountries, the mass conversion of Cuban agri-c u l t u re seems to be unparalleled.

The ecological movement began in cert a i nre s e a rch centers such as the Institute for Pe s tC o n t rol and the Institute for Biological Contro lin Citrus in the 1980s. The first national ecolo-gy conference occurred in 1981, and cert a i npractices, such as use of disease-re s i s t a n tseedlings, fungi for potassium, and nitrogen fix-ing, we re widely used before the special period.When the crisis hit, the centralized nature ofCuban re s e a rch and extension provided forquick dissemination of information to farmers.C e rtainly without regional re s e a rch institutes,training centers, and widespread extension serv-ices, the experiment would have been localize dand possibly short - l i ve d .

Cubans use two main techniques to contro linsect pests, one based upon the release of e n t omophagous insects, commonly known as“beneficials,” which parasitize the eggs of the pestspecies. Aggre s s i ve ants also help control pests ofs weet potato and plantain. The second techniquetakes advantage of natural bacteria and ento-mopathogens of certain pest species. Be t we e n

these two strategies, Cuban scientists have deve l-oped techniques to combat pests of almost alltheir major crops, including sugarcane, rice,yucca, sweet potato, plantain, cabbage, tomato,p e p p e r, tobacco, coffee, cucumber, and citru s .The techniques are extended throughout Cu b a’srural area by 222 Centers for the Re p ro d u c t i o nof Entomophages and (CREEs), many locatedon farms and cooperative s .i i

Soil Management

Although Cuba has a high ratio of arable landto population, with 30,260 square kilometersof the total area of the island, the arable land is not necessarily of the highest quality. A soils u rvey completed by the Mi n i s t ry of Agricul-t u re categorized 8% of the soils as highly pro-d u c t i ve and 26.2% as pro d u c t i ve, with the re s tfalling under the low and ve ry low pro d u c t i v i t yheadings. In addition, much of the soil experi-enced heavy abuse under the previous highlym e c h a n i zed chemical intensive production system, leaving 3,681 hectares affected by ero-sion, 1,133 with high acidity, and 3,000 withlittle organic matter. A 1996 survey classified60% of the soils as eroded and 25% of themfalling into the categories of seve rely and ve rys e ve rely eroded, a quantity that appears to beg rowing despite increased efforts to re c l a i mthem (Duran, 1998).

The Cubans have used an impre s s i ve va r i e t yof techniques in soil management. Or g a n i camendments and biofert i l i zers, along withg reen manures, have been applied on statefarms on a massive scale in an attempt tore c over exhausted soils and improve soils withl ow fert i l i t y. Reduced tillage using oxen insteadof tractors cuts down on soil erosion and aidsin weed control. Conve rting farm tractors to

ii The practice has been so successful that Oxfam Americahas brought specialists from Cuba to train Sa l va d o r a na g ronomists in biological pest control and to oversee anexperimental CREE station to benefit small farmers andc o o p e r a t i ves in El Sa l va d o r.

farm animals was a crowning moment forre t i red farmers who we re the only ones withexperience in animal traction. Fi n a l l y, the pro-duction of worm humus as a fert i l i zer has sky-rocketed from less than 10,000 metric tons in1987 to over 90,000 in 1992. As the heada g ronomist at one successful CPA told one ofthe authors, “If you don’t take care of your soil,yo u’ll end up with nothing.”

A key question concerning the organictransformation in Cuban agriculture is, as theCuban economy recovers and their ability toimport chemical inputs expands, will Cubastay organic? Cuban specialists say yes. “Evenif Cuba could get an unlimited supply ofcheap chemicals, we would still go ahead withbiological agriculture,” said Juan José LeónVega of the Ministry of Agriculture.20 ANAP,too, is deeply committed to ecological agricul-ture. But many farmers, who already tend tomix organic with inorganic methods, maywait and respond if a higher-end market fororganic goods develops.

D i ve rs i f i c ation

Cuban markets, land tenure, and producers arem o re decentralized, smaller in scale, and dive r s i-fied. Ac c o rding to Ro b e rto Caballeros, an agricul-tural specialist with the Institute Di m i t rova, therehas been a convergence between the economicnecessities to reduce the scale of agriculture andthe environmental suitability of smaller-scale,d i versified agriculture. “The tropical climate of anisland like Cuba,” he said, “is inherently unstable,and on a large-scale model, the farmer cannotreact in time to changes in climate.”

The high variation in soil, the intensity ofinsects and disease, and the fact that small farmstend to be more diversified are other factors thatmake small farms more pro d u c t i ve than largefarms. In t e rc ropping of corn and cassava, plan-tains and cassava, coffee and taro, and soy b e a nand sugarcane, among other crops, is a commonpractice. By planting multiple crops, rotating the

c rops, integrating animals and agriculture, manyfarmers have adapted to the new circ u m s t a n c e s .They are more re s p o n s i ve to the market, are lesssusceptible to major losses, make better use oftheir re s o u rces and engage in more environmentally sound practices.

Although before the economic crisis, mostc o o p e r a t i ves and state farms we re dedicatede xc l u s i vely to the production of a single cro p,today nearly all farms produce food alongsidetheir cash cro p. Producing food for their mem-bership and earning a greater income thro u g hd i versification in production have been persua-s i ve incentives for the leaders of cooperatives andstate enterprises. It is not unusual for a coopera-t i ve, like El Vaquerito in Mo ron, Ciego de Av i l a ,to earn more from its sideline of “a u t o - c o n s u m o”

than from its principal production of coffee orsugar or cattle. Jorge Luís He r n á n d ez, the pre s i-dent of El Vaquerito, believes in agriculturald i versification, mainly because his cooperativeused to be 100% dedicated to sugar.

“W h o e ver holds onto monoculture will sink,”He r n á n d ez said in an interv i ew. “The key isd i versification.” Without the agricultural inputs,the sugar yields are half of what the yields used tobe in the 1980s, yet the cooperative continues tomake a profit and hold onto its members becauseof diversification (J. L. He r n á n d ez, personalcommunication, December 2000).2 1 In additionto sugarcane, the cooperative plants 26 hectare s

Ha rva rd Un i ve r s i t yecologist RichardLevins, who hasw o rked with Cu b a nscientists for 35years, said, “Sm a l l e runits of pro d u c t i o ntend to create mosap a t t e rns of pro d u c-t i o n ,” which cre a t en a t u ral barriersagainst disease andinfestation. [Ju a nCa rlos Go n z á l e zLópez, Wo rld Fo o dPro g ra m ]

of fruits and vegetables and tubers, tends 5,000coffee trees and 1,000 cacao trees, and raises 400head of cattle and 150 pigs. They make theirown animal feed out of their honey, grains, theirc u l t i vated fish, and waste products of the sugar.“We’ve been able to keep the boat afloat,”re m a rked He r n á n d ez after seven years at thehelm of the cooperative. Profits, last ye a r, we re200,000 pesos among the 121 members (includ-ing 22 re t i red members).

Reforming food distribution

A g r i c u l t u ral Markets

On October 1, 1994, the government opened121 agricultural markets throughout the coun-t ry.2 2 For the first time in four decades (exc e p tfor a period from 1980 to1986) producers couldsell in an open market directly to consumerswithout the state serving as an intermediary.Immediately the black market for basic food-stuffs practically disappeared. Consumer pricesin the new open markets we re much lower thanthe former black markets (pork sold for 25 pesosper pound instead of 75 pesos per pound in theblack market and a pound of squash for 2 pesosinstead of 15 pesos, for example). Pre d i c t i o n sthat free markets would increase production aswell as spur higher quality and greater dive r s i t yof produce have borne out. Ac c o rding to a 2000

study by the Lexington Institute, “By 1999 thesales volume [of the markets] exceeded thre etimes the 1995 level, and the a g ro s we re generat-ing more than 5 million pesos in tax re ve n u e”( Peters, p. 5).

Cubans reacted positively to the opening ofmarkets because they increased access to food.“People love going to the agros,” said oneshopper. “The government would fall if theytried to close these down again.” (The govern-ment indeed did close the farmers marketsback in 1986 after experimenting with mar-kets for several years.)

Howe ve r, Cubans resent the high prices inthe agricultural markets resulting from supply-and-demand pricing. Compared to people’searnings today, goods are out of reach for many.23

Ac c o rding to an In t e r p ress re p o rt, food purc h a s e scan take up to 66% of the average Cuban salary

( Grogg, 2000). A consumer may pay as much as ten times the price for the same good soldt h rough the ration card. The rations, howe ve r,frequently last no more than ten to fourteendays of the month for basic items (rice, legumes,some protein, coffee, bread, sugar and rootc rops). Vegetable oil, meats and meat pro d u c t s ,cheese, fruits, and vegetables are seldom ava i l a b l et h rough the ration card and then in small quan-tities. The only fruit available through the rationc a rd might be cheap oranges, while in the mar-kets there are pineapples, watermelons, bananas,and tangerines, all for those who can pay. Ma n yin Cuba project that the l i b re t a will never re g a i nits earlier prominence and may disappear.

Some attribute the high prices of the agricul-tural markets to underproduction: more supplywill drive down the price, it has been said. T h a tmay be part of the problem—since their incep-tion in 1995 the ag markets have been handlingt h ree times the volume and prices have dro p p e d

g r i c u l t u ral mar-ets, begun in994, are now a

f i x t u re in mostn e i g h b o rh o o d s .He re Me rcedes, am a rket ve n d o r,

eighs cucumbersn a scale.

. . . food purchas es can ta ke up to 66% of the

a ve rage Cuban salary.

by one-third. Others place the blame on farmersfor charging high wholesale prices. While farm-ers unquestionably have gained because of them a rkets, “the market prices are inflated becauseof the intermediaries,” according to Juan Va l d é sPaz, a noted rural sociologist (J. Valdés Paz, per-sonal communication, September 29, 2000).The problem stems from transportation short-ages, which allow the re l a t i vely few individualswho own trucks to collude, paying producers lit-tle and charging high prices to vendors and con-sumers. A Mi n i s t ry of Agriculture officialsuggested that these shippers may collar as muchas 75% of the profit of a product sold. To com-bat the high prices, the Mi n i s t ry of Agricultureis turning over used trucks to private coopera-t i ves to encourage farmers to ship their ow ngoods or use their own marketing re p re s e n t a t i ve .In addition, new government policy has state

farms selling more of their produce at low pricesin state agricultural markets in an attempt tod r i ve down prices (V á s q u ez, 2000).2 4 As well, anumber of other types of alternative mark e t swith lower prices have emerged (see box p. 30).

While the opening of agricultural marketshas helped ameliorate the food crisis, trickyproblems persist. Consumers have choice andavailability but only those who can afford thehigh prices. By opening private markets, thegovernment recognizes that less state opera-tionality can be beneficial, but more govern-ment control against price gouging and pricecollusion is needed. Markets too, so far, haveoffered little consolation for the vulnerablepopulation unable to pay the high prices;while the ration card and lower-priced statemarkets may be part of the solution, a morecomprehensive solution is needed.

M a r keting Food Through Urban

G a rdens and Hort i c u l t u re Clubs

Although agricultural markets are more heraldedas a reform, the urban garden market-stands arefar more numerous, and their lower prices—about half of what is charged in the agriculturalm a rkets—make them far more accessible tomany Cubans. Agricultural clubs have even lowe rprices. Cu r re n t l y, the agricultural markets handleonly a re l a t i vely low 10% of the food distributedin Cuba. Cubans purchase much more food—a p p roximately 50% of the fruits and ve g e t a-b l e s — t h rough the nontraditional producers suchas urban gardens, organoponicos, agriculturalclubs, and food fairs.2 5 Cubans at the lower endof the income scale buy much more of their foodt h rough these systems than through the agricul-tural markets. While a head of lettuce in the agri-cultural market is 4 or 5 pesos, it is only 2 pesosin an urban garden and only 1 peso in an agri-cultural club. The disadvantage of both the urbang a rdens and agricultural clubs is that supplies andvariety are limited and, depending on the size ofthe urban garden, sporadic.

Free Market Food: Who Can Afford It?

A 2000 Lex i n g ton Institute study, “The Fa r m e rs Market: Cro s s-

roads of Cuba’s New Economy,” calculated how many days of earn-

ings different ty p es of wo r ke rs would have to devote in order to

b uy some goods of a food bas ket: one pound each of pork chops,

rice, and black beans; two pounds of to m ato es; three limes; and

one head of garlic.

While the ration card was the only means of obtaining food,

Cubans suffered the food shorta g es in a more or less equal man-

n e r. Now that food has become more accessible through distribu-

tion sys tems other than the ration card, people’s access to food

h as become sharply differe n t i ated depending on their income.

Ret i ree with pension 7.2 days

D ay care wo r ke r 5.8 days

Cuban earning ave rage national salary 4 days

Te a c h e r 2.7 days

D e p u ty dire c to r, state ente r p r i s e 1.9 days

E m e rgency room docto r 1.9 days

N i c kel wo r ker in joint ve n t u re 1.1 days

Cigar factory custo d i a n h o u rs

Fa r m e rs market meat ve n d o r 6 hours

P r i vate taxi in Hava n a 3.5 hours

[Calculations based on Ma rch 2000 prices in Ha vana farmers markets and salary leve l sre c o rded during the past two years.] (Peters, p9)]

Before 1995 the government was in charge

of nearly 100% of the food distribution,

principally through the libreta or ration card

and meals at the workplace. Highly subsidized

and plentiful food through the libreta was

one of the revolution’s chief social achieve-

ments. Since the onset of the economic

crisis, the monthly rations have been reduced

and now no longer last more than ten days

to two weeks. In response to the crippling

of the libreta, the agricultural markets and

the following other venues for buying food

have emerged.

La Libre : “ Free” markets are government sta n d s ,

o f ten outside of the ration sto res, which sell ve r y

c h e a p ly ove rs tocks and produce not included in

the l i b re ta ration card s .

Urban Gard e n s : Ve g etable stands that market

the fresh produce from a nearby urban agricul-

t u re plot. The upside is that produce is usually

o rganic, high quality and fresh daily, and prices

a re 40% to 50% of the agricultural markets .

The downside is that va r i ety is limited to what

the garden happens to pro d u c e .

Ferias: State farms ship in fruits, vegetables,

and small livestock for wholesale in state-

sponsored fairs. Prices are deeply discounted

(about 25% of the agricultural markets), but

the fairs are infrequent (only monthly) and

held in only a few points in the city, making

access difficult for most shoppers.

Topped Markets : Open markets favo red by

s tate pro d u c e rs, where the prices fluctuate with

s u p p ly and demand but have a limit. Prices are

g e n e ra l ly less than in the agricultural markets

and the quality is not as good.

Dollar Sto res : O r i g i n a l ly for diplomats and for-

e i g n e rs, dollar sto res cater to Cubans and non-

Cubans with imported and domestic canned

goods, drinks, packaged meats, ve g etable oil,

c h e es es, etc. Prices are high, somet i m es double

the cost of agricultural markets.

Peso Sto res : Opened in 1998 to parallel the

dollar stores, the stores carry the Cuban-

m a nu f a c t u red ve rsion of the imports. Prices are

in pesos, often at 75% the equivalent of the

dollar value in dollar sto res .

Mo re food is dis-tributed thro u g hother channelsthan through thel i b reta ra t i o n i n gsystem. He re themanager of a statefood store in Pl a y an e i g h b o rhood inHa vana re v i e w sher accounts.[ St e ve Ca g a n ]

A Guide to Food Shopping in Cuba

Price Incentives and Pro f i ts

All farmers continue to sell a percentage of theirp roduce to the state marketing board known asAC O PI O .2 6 While AC O PIO provides a guaran-teed market and a floor price, which the farmersf a vo r, AC O PI O ’s service has suffered from inflex-ibility and unre l i a b i l i t y. When AC O PIO was theonly legal buye r, farmers had little option but re s-ignation. Not only have the agricultural mark e t so f f e red an alternative buye r, but also the Mi n i s t ryof Agriculture recently has introduced a tiere dand more flexible pricing regime of AC O PIO inan attempt to increase production.

Farmers who contract a p l a n with the gov-ernment are now motivated to produce “ine xc e s s” of their p l a n. They can sell any foodp roduced over their quota in the agriculturalm a rkets or at “d i f f e rentiated prices,” often twicethe contracted price, to the government. Un d e rthis impetus, almost all farmers, it seems, havebeen able to produce “in excess,” and, in mostcases, double their p l a n, which triples orq u a d ruples their income. Hi s t o r i c a l l y, one ofthe biggest problems in stimulating pro d u c t i v i t yhas been that the government sets prices ve ryl ow, and farmers, under obligation to sell to thestate, feel little incentive to produce to capacity.

Farmers do respond to price changes. “I’l lg i ve you an example,” said Orlando Lu g oFontes, president of the National Association ofSmall Producers (ANAP): “Ma l a n g a [a tubersimilar to a potato] nearly disappeared from thefields, but when prices we re raised, there wasg reater interest in cultivating and production hasc l i m b e d” (Carrobello & Ji m e n ez, 2000). In1999 government-set prices for the p l a n in cassa-va, for example, increased from 7 pesos per 100lbs. to 20 pesos and other tubers from 8.50 to20 pesos. Prices paid for sugar have doubled ove rthe past seven years, including a 50% hike in1999. Prices paid for coffee in 2000 doubledover the previous ye a r, from 8.90 pesos per 25lbs. of beans to 16 pesos, if the farmers completetheir p l a n. As a result, production has incre a s e d .

Ex p o rt-oriented crops, e.g., sugar, coffee, and tobacco, have seen the greatest increases inprices paid, in part because the state wants toencourage production and in part because f o reign investment and loans can be tapped. In addition to the higher prices paid in pesos,farmers in sugar, coffee, and tobacco re c e i vep roduction incentives called e s t i m u l os, paid indollars for meeting production quotas. A tobaccofarmer earns $4 to $5 per 100 lbs. of tobaccop roduced, which makes for a considerable sumin rural Cuba. A sugar-producing cooperativere c e i ves $4.60 per 100 a r ro b a s (25 lbs.) of sugarsold. The e s t i m u l o s a re paid in cash, in the caseof individual tobacco farmers, or in credit at alocal “d o l l a r” store for coffee producers andmembers of cooperatives. The result has beeni m p re s s i ve production increases in tobacco andcoffee, though perhaps less so in sugar, as manyfactors other than prices affect the pro d u c t i o nl e vel of sugarcane.

With the state looking to reduce its importbill of $235 million for the tourist industry, anew government measure now allows co-opsto market high-quality produce to touristfacilities, granted that two state agencies(FINATUR and FRUTASELECTA) serve asintermediaries. The cops are paid with creditin dollars that can be redeemed at certain

Robustiano Do m í n g u e zBustillo, 69, has reason to celebrate.Last year he became a millionaire. Lease-free land from thestate and doubledprices for tomatoesearned him a millionpesos last year.Domínguez produced500 tons of tomatoesin 2000.

stores. In a year 2000 pilot project, two dozenANAP cooperatives were authorized to markettheir goods directly to hotels, and the farmerswere paid directly in dollars from hotel opera-tors. Part of the deal required these coopera-tives to give up state subsidies in agriculturalinputs and become entirely self-reliant. The

Ministry of Agriculture is gradually unrollingthese experiments in dollarization and withhigh success: the cooperatives produce moreand become more self-sufficient, the touristindustry gains access to fresh, local produce,and the state saves on foreign currency.

The Ye a rs of the Fat Cows

Price incentives are only part of a broader effort to create “business efficiency” or profitability.

During the golden years of the 1980s, called “the years of the fat cows,” farmers were compen-

sated on the basis of how much they produced—not how much it cost to produce. Subsidies

from the Soviet Union were passed along to government ministries and then to the farmers.

State farms regularly operated at a loss, and their produce often was underutilized or wasted.

A state-run cattle operation in Ciego de Avila is one such case. “We didn’t worry about the cost

of anything—we just produced milk no matter what the cost,” said the director of the state

farm. Heavily subsidized, the farm had high yields—13 million liters of milk per year; in fact, so

much milk that “we had to open the va l ves of the tanks to empty out the milk onto the gro u n d —

because more milk was coming in,” the director added. “But we were paid for it all.”

The subsidy ended with the coming of the special period. Said one farmer, “We got skinny—

just like the cows.” In 1994 the state farm was turned into three smaller farmer-cooperatives.

The cooperatives have become much more profit-motivated. According to the president of one

of the co-ops, the UBPC Simon Reyes, they produce significantly less than before but are more

efficient (for example, 13 administrative positions have been reduced to three). Last year, for

the first time in the farm’s history, by lowering costs they turned a profit, distributing 2,000

pesos at year’s end in dividends to each member.

The cattle industryis learning to“make do” with farf e wer inputs andbeginning to make pro f i t s .Production leve l s ,though, area round 50% ofl e vels before theeconomic crisis.[ St e ve Ca g a n ]