ADAIS 640 SovlgT-M I UNAN ELATIONS: RCET TUEND AM I I M TNEAR-TEN PWWSCTSIUI RAND COUP SANTA MOICA CAI 7UNLLAWIED£ PLAIT RN II 1-3316-AF F49M*0-CO F/0 C/ NI.

I ""IIIMEhi iiiimINmomIIIII

Ip

I'lINN1*25 114

I

04.CD

CDCD'-U

I

I

~1 -

I

4,~.,k--..., - ~ 4 -~ .-. ~.,.

-~ - - ~ A... ..

REPORT OMOJ TAT1O PAGE _________ 13__raw_U. PTNUUUU 2. GVT ACUUUON 2. ES IPIEN CATALOG 90104091

R-3316-AF 010466s __ _ _ __ _ _ _

14. ?eLg9(d SAN*) I Type or AWIPONY & 060100 COVER90Soviet-West European Relations: Recent Trends Interimand Near-Term Prospects PEPNI@Ous. RePT Nuum

T. AUThO(.j U CO4TACGT ON GRANT NuUIS(.O)

Alan PlattF49620-86-C-0008

9. P4WtUOm6 OVAANSZAIOI1 NANC £0 AOEU ** T AftThe Rand Corporation1700 Main StreetSanta Monica, CA 90406

11. csuvus..uueG 0,013 HABIG AND AD0333 Ia. MEPORT 0AISRequirements, Programs and Studies Group (AF/RDQM MT.h iwR6Of c, DSC/R&D and Acquisition 50 O "

NAME ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~a I 03EMUEEW CkEhO ~ I.SCumT CLASS (ad~ &Wee

UnclassifiedU&a mar UCAInOIDOIfGRADNG

WGT. mmTgION ITATEMUT (0eE 0 *6

pprovcd for Pu~blic Release; DietzibutioIi U.alimited

No Restrictions

SSR,Western Europe

East West Relations.

00FeW3 4~wu r I ov a so neft

9sCmTv cL.AMPIcAvToU oF T149s , n D.o o,.4

ThiSiCeport tiananEs key recentdevelopments and trends in Western Europe,with an emphasis on the past two years, asa backdrop tc an analysis of present andFrospective Soviet relations with the West.It identifiese five possible Soviet policyoptions toward Western Europe in the nearand the sedium tern: (1) continuation ofthe kind of wedge-driving policy it useddurinq such cf 1983; (2) a differentiatedpolicy of better relations with the UnitedStates, and cool relations with WesternEurope; (3) a policy of defiance toward theWest; (4) pursuit of a broad-basedneo-detente relationship with both WesternEurope and tte United States; and (5) apurposefully confrontational policy towardthe West. The author suggests that threeconsiderations will be central to the USSRin determining which policy it pursues:(1) the possibility of gaining newconcessions from the United States throughthe continued pursuit of its present policycourse; (2) the deqree of continuedAtlantic Alliance unity over defense andarms control policies; and (3) theelectoral prcspects of antinuclearopposition parties in Western Europe in thelate 1980s. In any case, the Soviet Unionwill not abandon its fundamental objectivesin Europe.-V.j, "A."

OFs

B

I

R-3316-AF

Soviet-West EuropeanRelations

Recent Trends andNear-Term Prospects

Alan Platt

March 1986

A Project AIR FORCE reportprepared for theUnited States Air Force

#1 *Rrned

1700 MAIN StRIETP0O D0X 21M

SANTA MONICA, CA 9OW02138

AIPROYED FOR PUIJUC RELEASE; DfSTRIOUTON UNLIMITED

PREFACE

This report examines key recent developments and trends inWestern Europe-with an emphasis on the past two years-as a back-drop to an analysis of present and prospective Soviet relations with theWest. Various possible Soviet policy options toward Western Europeare discussed in the context of both the near and the medium term.The concluding section focuses on the most likely course of futureSoviet foreign policy toward thp West and discusses some importantconsiderations that will determine the direction of that policy.

This study is part of a larger Rand project on "The Future of SovietPolicy toward Western Europe," undertaken for the National SecurityStrategies Program of Project AIR FORCE. It largely reflects informa-tion available as of August 1985.

orr

3

SUMMARY

Western Europe, where the Soviet Union has critical interests atstake, has traditionally been a dominant concern of that superpower.Throughout the postwar period, there has been a fundamentalcontinuity in what the Soviet Union has sought in WesternEurope-the transformation of the status quo in favor ofSoviet interests. In trying to bring about this long-term objective,the Soviets have sought to:

* Maintain a Soviet military advantage in the European theater* Ensure continued East European responsiveness to Soviet

interests* Secure widespread acknowledgment of the Soviet Union as a

superpower co-equal with the United States* Expand Soviet access to Western technology and credits* Loosen American political and military ties with Western

Europe* Transform West European political systems from within by aid-

ing "progressive" elements i

In the pursuit of these goals, the Soviet Union has pragmaticallyadopted over time a variety of tactics to further its interests. Duringmost of the 1970s, the Soviet Union pursued these objectives in Europein the context of its overall policies toward the West, with the UnitedStates and Western Europe taken together. In the late 1970s andearly 1980s, however, as U.S.-Soviet relations waned, Soviet thinkingbegan to change with respect to the utility of placing a greater degreeof emphasis on their dealings with the countries of Western Europe.Sensing substantial European interest in retaining certain vestiges ofd~tente and perceiving America to be at odds with much of Europe onthis, the Soviet Union increasingly began to pursue its objec-tives in Western Europe in the context of a policy of "differen-tiated d6tente". The focus of this Soviet policy was thus WesternEurope, rather than the United States, and in the early years of the1980s, the emphasis was on maintaining and expanding bilateral cor-mercial, political, and cultural ties with those governments in WesternEurope ready for cooperation. Arms control negotiations were contin-ued with the United States, but without much hope for a more full- -Cblown relationship.

L "- ,

vi

By the end of 1982, this early 1980s Soviet policy of dif-ferentiated d6tente had grown into a two-track Soviet strategyfor managing East-West relations. On one track were relationswith the United States, which consisted largely of arms control talks.The Soviet Union seemed to write off the United States as a near-termpartner across a range of economic, political, and cultural activities.On the second track were Soviet relations with the countries ofWestern Europe, which were viewed by Moscow as a channel throughwhich differences between the United States and its NATO allies couldbe widened and exploited.

By the winter of 1982-83, the Soviets seemed less interested inexploring the possibility of finding arms control compromises with theUnited States concerning intermediate-range forces (INF), for example,and more interested in pursuing the second track of its policy-preventing the deployment of these forces through the manipulation ofdisagreements within the Atlantic Alliance. In part, this emphasis inSoviet policy may have reflected a Soviet perception that U.S. conces-sions acceptable to the USSR were unlikely to be forthcoming atGeneva. In part, too, this thrust in Soviet policy was attributable toSoviet perceptions about the centrifugal tendencies and growingstrength of both the European peace movement and the antinuclearopposition parties in the five countries due to receive medium-rangemissiles. Moreover, such an approach offered the Soviet Union thenear-term prospect of possibly killing or deferring the deploymentswithout any commensurate Soviet concessions and the longer-termprospect of inflicting lasting damage upon American security relationswith its European allies.

There were, in essence, two parts to this Soviet effort to prevent thedeployment of new NATO INF missiles in Europe. One part was "acampaign from above," which consisted of a major propaganda andpolitical effort to convince the elites in Western Europe not to goahead with the planned NATO deployments. The second part of theSoviet effort was "a campaign from below," which was characterized byconcerted "active measures" that would exploit popular fears inWestern Europe in order to create mass opposition and prevent theforce deployments. The focus of these two "campaigns" was West Ger-many, Great Britain, and Italy, all of which had major national elec-tions during the first half of 1983. In all three countries, however, theSoviets' efforts failed. All three nations elected governments that werefirmly committed to going ahead with INF deployments on schedule.

Partly out of pique over this failure, partly because the Soviets didnot wish to aid Ronald Reagan's reelection chances, partly because ofinternal problems associated with the Soviet leadership succession, and

-Z 'i ........aL

Ivii

partly because of residual hopes to intimidate European parliamentsinto renouncing the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, the Soviet Unionwalked out of nuclear arms control talks with the United States inNovember 1983. During the ensuing period from the fall of 1983through the fall of 1984, the Soviet Union abandoned the two-track policy of differentiated detente and incrementally movedto a policy of defiance toward both Western Europe and theUnited States. During this period, not only were there no nucleararms control negotiations with the United States, but also there was agradual, perceptible hardening in Moscow's policies and attitudestoward Western Europe across a range of issues. This hardening wasmanifested in an isolationist, siege mentality that was eventuallyreflected in unusually harsh Soviet propaganda attacks on Westernleaders, especially President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl; the Soviet-orchestrated boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics; and a new degree ofemphasis in Moscow on military matters, political threats, and self-reliance. This policy stance, which by the late spring of 1984 hadbecome as harsh toward Western Europe as the United States, wasclearly intended to promote a war-scare hysteria and to increase popu-lar pressures on Western governments to modify their arms controland defense policies.

In the end, this policy course failed as the countries of the Weststood united; went forward with their respective defense modernizationprograms; and proceeded, with the exception of the Netherlands, todeploy medium-range missiles on schedule. By the summer of 1984-ironically, at the same time that Soviet pressures on the East Europe-ans to curtail contacts with Bonn were still growing-the SovietUnion gave the first signs of realization that a policy of uni-form defiance toward Western Europe and the United Stateswas not going to achieve its intended objectives. Fragmentaryhints of a future new Soviet approach toward the West began toemerge. This new, less inward-looking approach took concrete shapesoon after the 1984 American elections as the Soviets agreed to new"umbrella" talks in Geneva on limiting long-range, medium-range, andspace weapons and Soviet politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev paid amid-December 1984 visit to London.

Within a three-month period following the widely acclaimed Gor-bachev visit to Britain, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Romeand Madrid, politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky led a high-leveldelegation to Washington, and German Foreign Minister Genscherpaid a surprise visit to Moscow. On the occasion of all of these visits,the Soviets simultaneously sought to pursue possible avenues forcooperation and to criticize America's Strategic Defense Initiative

I 7-t.'

71.4ii

Viii

(SDI), arguing that it was likely to lead to a new destabilizing spiral inthe arms race. Soviet attention seemed to have shifted away from theINF deployments, although they continued to be a cause for sporadic

Soviet criticism, to America's strategic defense programs. From theSoviet point of view, America's SDI seemed to be not only ofgrowing military concern but of increasing political saliencyand vulnerability in the West.

In the summer of 1985, what can be said about the probable courseof near-term Soviet relations with Western Europe? Most likely, theSoviets will pursue the kind of differentiated d6tente policytoward the West that they pursued during most of 1983, beforethey opted for a policy of defiance. This differentiated detente pol-icy would, in essence, have two tracks, as was the case earlier. On onetrack would be relations with the United States. Here, arms controltalks wruld go forward with rhetorical support for a revived d6tenterelationship but with little prospect for success except on Soviet terms.For concrete progress to be achieved in arms control, there would haveto be, from Moscow's vantage point, new flexibility on the Americanside on "space strike weapons," testing of antisatellite weapons, nuclearweapons testing, and the deployment of intermediate-range and stra-tegic nuclear weapons.

Moreover, even in the absence of substantial concessions from theUnited States on these issues, it seems likely that Moscow will con-tinue in the near term to prospect in talks with the United States, hop-ing to gain new arms control or trade concessions from American offi-cials. This approach would have the added advantage of buying timefor the new Gorbachev regime to consolidate its position and at thesame time allow the Soviet Union to pursue most effectively the secondtrack of its differentiated d6tente policy-that of widening differencesbetween the United States and its European allies.

In the summer of 1985, there is growing evidence that theSoviet Union in the service of a wedge-driving effort haslaunched a peace offensive in Europe centered around criticismof America's strategic defense effort. Indeed, both the SovietUnion and the United States seem to be prospecting in and posturingabout arms control discussions and at the same time trying to convinceWest European parliaments and publics that it is serious about thosearms control negotiations. Curiously, it seems that each superpower ismore confident about its efforts to positively influence European opin-ion about its intentions than about the possibilities of achieving con-crete progress in the Geneva talks themselves.

In the absence of significant progress at the Reagan-Gorbachev sum-mit meeting in November, this wedge-driving, differentiated d6tente

7_7,

ix

policy will probably continue to be Soviet policy through at least thenext Soviet party congress, expected in February 1986. What mightfuture Soviet policy toward Western Europe be? There wouldseem to be at least five paths that the Soviet Union mightfollow-each with precedents in the recent past-although differencesin near-term Soviet policy may in practice be only a matter ofemphasis and Soviet foreign policy choices may be constrained due topreoccupation with internal matters. One policy alternative wouldbe to continue to pursue the kind of wedge-driving policy thatcharacterized Soviet policy during most of 1983, for example, and thathas as its hallmark a sharp differentiation in policy towardWestern Europe and the United States. With the United States,political and economic relations would be limited. And although armscontrol talks would go forward, no progress would be likely, except onSoviet terms. On the other hand, bilateral Soviet-West European rela-tions would go forward and there may well be a renewed Soviet peaceoffensive aimed at West European governments and publics. Such aSoviet effort would likely focus on preventing "the militarization ofspace," stopping all nuclear testing, achieving a nuclear freeze, gaininga no-first use of nuclear weapons pledge, and instituting a moratoriumon INF deployments.

A second policy alternative would be the converse of the firstoption, i.e., a differentiated Soviet policy that envisaged betterrelations with the United States and cool Soviet relations withWestern Europe. With the United States, the Soviets would pursuearms control agreements with new vigor and flexibility. Such a posi-t ive Soviet policy toward the United States would likely go beyondarms control to entail expanded trade relations and freer emigrationpolicies. Concerning Europe, this policy alternative would envisage thepurposeful continuation of limited political and economic relations.Under this alternative, a variant of which was pursued by Moscow dur-ing much of the 1960s, the Soviet Union might tighten the screws onits East European allies and prevent forward movement in their tieswith the West.

A third policy alternative would be for the Soviet Union toadopt the kind of policy of defiance toward the West that itimplemented during the fall 1983-late 1984 period. This policywould likely be characterized by: strained political relations betweenthe Soviet Union and the governments of Western Europe, a virtualfrozen silence in U.S.-Soviet political relations, and no nuclear armscontrol negotiations with the United States. Such a policy of defiancewould be directed at both the governments and publics of the West andwould be inspired by the thought of intimidating the U.S.-both

I

IXWI

directly and indirectly through West European pressure-into pursuingpolicies more favorable to Soviet interests.

A fourth policy alternative would involve an active Sovieteffort to pursue a broad-based neo-detente relationship withboth Western Europe and the United States. Such a Soviet policycourse, hoping to go beyond the d6tente era of the early 1970s, wouldlikely entail new Soviet flexibility concerning political, cultural, humanrights, and most importantly, arms control. This policy option wouldinevitably mean that the Soviet Union would have to modify its think-ing about a number of current arms control issues of contention,including the need for strategic defense and more stringent verificationmeasures.

A fifth policy alternative would be a purposefully confronta-tional policy toward the West, the opposite of the neo-d~tente alter-native. Under this option, resembling the Soviet policy course duringmost of the 1950s, East-West areas of difference would be directlyaddressed, not swept under the rug. Contentious issues such as Berlinmight be brought to the fore. Aggressiveness and interventionismwould be the hallmarks of this fifth Soviet policy alternative.

What will determine which alternative policy the Soviet Union willadopt toward the West in the near term? It seems likely that Sovietperceptions of the emerging evidence regarding at least three considera-tions will be of central significance:

" The possibility of gaining new concessions from the UnitedStates through the continued pursuit of its present policycourse

" The degree of continued Atlantic Alliance unity over defenseand arms control policies

" The electoral prospects of antinuclear opposition parties inWestern Europe in the late 1980s

Regardless of which of these policy lines the Soviet Union adopts, itis safe to assume that the Soviet Union will not abandon its fundamen-tal objectives in Europe-the transformation of the status quo inEurope in favor of Soviet interests and the ultimate creation of a pan-European security arrangement including the Soviet Union and exclud-ing the United States. Soviet tactics to achieve these objectives, how-ever, can and do change, depending on pragmatic judgments at anygiven time. Accordingly, it is in the West's interests to understand theforces that affect these judgments and to act in ways to try to inducethe Soviet Union to pursue policies that will be relatively more con-structive from a Western point of view.

- . . . . . . . . . .• ,. .

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Richard E. Darilek, Harry Gelman,A. Ross Johnson, and James C. Wendt for their comments on an ear-lier draft of this report, and Joan Allen for her typing assistance.Thanks are also due to a number of American and European officialsand scholars who discussed the report with the author.

zI

now",-

CONTENTS

PREFACE ....................................... iii

SUM M ARY ..................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................ xi

SectionI. INTRODUCTION ............................ 1

II. THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE ..... 3

III. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE,WINTER 1982-FALL 1983 ................... 7

The Campaigns From Above and Below ............ 9The Struggle in Germany ....................... 10The Struggle in Britain ........................ 14The Struggle in Italy ......................... 16Consequences of Soviet Failure .................. 18

IV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE,FALL 1983-FALL 1984 ..................... 21

V. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE,FALL 1984-PRESENT ..................... 25

VI. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE:POSSIBLE SHORT-TERM ALTERNATIVES ..... 30

VII. CONCLUSIONS .............................. 37

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY ......................... 43

4.

i

1. .

I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1985, there is hope but also uncertainties associ-ated with future Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Mikhail Gor-bachev, the new Soviet General Secretary, is a member of a youngergeneration of Soviet leaders whose public statements have frequentlyemphasized domestic priorities. Mr. Gorbachev personally has beendropping hints that Russia may now be considering an "alternativeforeign policy"-an attempt to detach Western Europe and Japan fromthe United States. At the same time, a changing politburo is issuingstatements professing support of d6tente with the United States. AndAmerican-Soviet arms control talks are under way in Geneva concern-ing strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons andweapons in space. Other talks are going forward with respect to suchregional issues as the Middle East as well as expanded Soviet commer-cial and cultural relations with the West. And Soviet officials-fromGeneral Secretary Gorbachev to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze toformer Foreign Minister and now President Gromyko-have recentlyvisited several countries in Western Europe to discuss issues of corn-mon concern.

What do these developments and activities portend for future Sovietpolicy toward Western Europe? It is, of course, impossible to saydefinitively, particularly given short-term political and economic uncer-tainties in the Soviet Union. It is safe to say, though, that Soviet rela-tions with Western Europe in the short term are likely to reflect a gooddeal of continuity with the past. Accordingly, one important way todiscern possible future directions in Soviet policy toward the West is toexamine recent Soviet relations with Western Europe. This study isintended to do just that. Its purpose is to review developments inSoviet relations with the West in 1983-84 as a background to analyzingpossible alternative Soviet policies toward Western Europe in 1985-86and beyond.

First, key recent events and trends in East-West relations are exam-ined, with the emphasis on developments in the last two years.

Second, the report examines several alternative policy options avail-able to the Soviet Union in the near and medium term. These arepresented as idealized, distinct variants, suggesting the range of Sovietchoices. In reality, differences among these alternatives may be a . Imatter of emphasis, and the range of options available to the Sovietleadership in the short term may be far more limited because of

1A J-

I,2

preoccupation with internal issues than this discussion suggests. Thisis particularly likely to be so at this time given the generally reactivecharacter of Soviet foreign policy and recent leadership changes in theSoviet Union.

Finally, the report draws conclusions about where Soviet policyseems to be heading over the near term in light of the salient trends inrecent Soviet policy and emerging trends in the most important Euro-pean states.

Two explanatory notes about the ensuing analysib. First, forsimplicity's sake, "Western Europe" is sometimes referred to in a col-lective sense. Of course, on most of the issues discussed there aredifferences among the various countries of Western Europe as well aswithin them. These differences, while alluded to in this paper, are notexamined here in great detail. Second, for the sake of analytical dis-cussion, artificial time-lines are often used, e.g., since December 1983or fall 1983-fall 1984. In reality, developments under discussion havetypically been gradual and evolutionary.

t4

I

C#

II. THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE

With Europe's central political, military, and economic importance,it is not surprising that in the postwar period the Soviet Union haspursued a multipronged policy toward Western Europe. This policyhas typically been designed to achieve simultaneously six objectives:

o To maintain a Soviet military advantage in the Europeantheater, so that the West Europeans continue to feel militarilyvulnerable vis-a'-vis the Soviet Union.

e To ensure continued East European responsiveness to Sovietinterests.

o To gain wide acknowledgment for the Soviet Union of co-equalsuperpower status with the United States.

o To expand Soviet access to Western technology and credits.o To loosen American political and military ties with Western

Europe.* To transform the pluralistic systems of Western Europe from

within by aiding "progressive" forces in these countries.1

During the first half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union pursued theseobjectives in Europe in the context of its overall policies toward theWest, with the United States and Western Europe taken together.Negotiations to clarify the status of West Berlin, to sanctify thepostwar division of Europe, to expand investment and trade with theWest, and to establish controls on conventional forces in CentralEurope were all pursued by the Soviets in an overall East-West con-text. This is not to suggest that any of these or other initiativesreflected Soviet abandonment of the above-noted objectives in WesternEurope. Rather, the Soviets, at the time, seemed pragmatically tojudge that these objectives in Europe, including the loosening of Euro-pean political and military ties with the United States, could best beachieved against a background of Soviet dealings with the UnitedStates.

Implicit in this approach was Soviet recognition of the fact that itwould be hard to further Soviet objectives in Western Europe withoutat least some modus vivendi with the United States. America appearedtoo central to the issues involved-or at least was seen to be by the

'For a more detied discusion of them postwar Soviet objective, an HannmAdomolt, Capitalet Coutradictom and Soviet Policy," Proebms of Communum, May-Jue 194, pp. 7-16.

3

ft

4

governments of Western Europe-for the Soviet Union to seek toattain its European objectives in any significant measure without sub-stantial American involvement. Put another way, for most of thisperiod, dealing bilaterally with the governments of Western Europe onthese and other issues was seen by the Soviet Union as either impossi-ble or likely to be unproductive in terms of furthering its objectives inEurope.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, as U.S.-Soviet relationswaned, Soviet thinking began to change with respect to the wisdomand efficacy of dealing directly with Western Europe. Sensing substan-tial European interest in retaining certain benefits of East-Westd6tente and perceiving America, especially since 1980, to be at oddswith much of Europe on East-West detente, the Soviet Unionincreasingly began to pursue its objectives in Western Europe in thecontext of a policy of "differentiated d6tente." The focus of this dif-ferentiated Soviet policy was Western Europe, rather than the UnitedStates, and in the early 1980s the emphasis was on maintaining andexpanding bilateral commercial, political, and cultural ties with thosegovernments of Western Europe that seemed ready for cooperation.

While important in their own right, these ties were valuable fromthe Soviet point of view as a way of "de-demonizing" the Soviet Unionin European eyes and of driving a wedge between European and Ameri-can interests across a range of political, military, and economic issues.Out of this expanding relationship, Moscow hoped that the SovietUnion would establish the basis for long-standing bilateral Soviet-European ties and at the same time erase the menacing image manyEuropeans had held of the Soviet Union during the postwar period.Further, it was hoped that in European eyes the United States wouldgradually replace the Soviet Union in this menacing role and in sodoing would accelerate the loosening of American-European politicaland military ties.

Despite the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition ofmartial law in Poland, and the growing Soviet deployment of SS-20missiles in Europe, this differentiated Soviet approach to the West didnot fall on completely deaf ears in Western Europe in the early 1980s. 4Indeed, many West Europeans inside and outside government circlesfelt that Europe had profited and could continue to profit fromd6tente-"by an increased feeling of security from the danger of war,by the profits of East-West trade, and by cultural exchange betweenEast and West."' Additionally, many West Europeans felt that limited

2William Griffith, "The Soviets and Western Europe: An Overview," in HerbertEllison, Soviet Policy toward Western Europe, University of Washington Press, Seattle,

;*.Jin-

5

East-West d6tente afforded Western Europe a desirable degree ofautonomy from an inconsistent and potentially threatening UnitedStates.

Finally, there were a considerable number of people in WesternEurope who took a fairly relaxed view of the immediacy or the magni-tude of the Soviet threat and were relatively optimistic about the possi-bility for eventual systematic transformation in the Soviet Union andin Eastern Europe. Believing that detente was not fully pursued by theUnited States in the 1970s, holders of this viewpoint believed thatWestern Europe should try to create new interdependencies with theSoviets that would make it unattractive for the Soviet Union to disrupta growing economic, political, and cultural relationship with the West.New interdependencies, it was believed, would bring with them overtime real possibilities for the development of more pluralistic societiesin the East, the basis for a lasting peace in Europe. Such views gavethe Soviet leadership further encouragement in its efforts to constructand consolidate a network of ties directly with the countries ofWestern Europe.

From the point of view of Soviet policy, the nature of this expandingnetwork of Soviet-European linkages in 1981-82 was varied andwidespread. In the economic area, the emphasis in Soviet policy wason energy and high-technology projects. Among the most importantand highly visible of the Soviet efforts was, of course, the Urengoinatural-gas pipeline. In part, this project was pursued by the Sovietsfor purely economic reasons, i.e., they wanted to secure a future sourceof hard-currency earnings and to channel Western capital and technol-ogy into Soviet energy programs. More importantly, however, thisproject was motivated by political considerations. In the view of Sovietcommentator Genrikh Trofimenko, for example, the pipeline was notintended to "serve purely selfish [i.e., Soviet economic] interests," butwas also "a symbol for freeing Western Europe in one way or anotherfrom subordination to U.S. economic policy." 3

Bilateral Soviet-European cooperative efforts in the early 1980s werenotable not only in the energy area but across a range of other activi-ties as well. In the commercial sphere, for example, the Soviet Unionsought and concluded a wide range of new bilateral agreements, signifi-cantly increasing the Soviet share of European markets ranging fromcut lumber to Lada cars. In quite a different area, in June 1982 aFrenchman, the first non-American, Western astronaut, was launchedinto earth orbit with two Soviet cosmonauts. He stayed in space for

1964, p. 21. See also David Andelman, "Struggle Over Western Europe," Foreign Policy,Winter 19624L3, pp. 37-51.

3Q Wtd in John Van Oudenaren, The Ureno Pipele: Proecta for Soviet Lever-op, The Rand Corporation, R-3207, December 1984, p. 11.

~ 4

nine days, docking his space capsule with a Soviet space station, andmaking an important mark in European-Soviet space cooperation. Inaddition, a host of new, expanded cultural programs was set upbetween the Soviet Union and various European countries. Theoverall, long-term impact of these and other early 1980s Soviet initia-tives cannot yet be evaluated. There is little question, though, thatthey signalled a new focus in Soviet dealings with the West, reflectingat least a temporary change in Moscow's thinking about how best toaccomplish its goals in Western Europe.

am(

i4!4

i "o i' ... ... .

I

III. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERNEUROPE, WINTER 1982-FALL 1983

By January 1983, this budding, early-1980s Soviet policy of differen-tiated ditente had matured into what Arnold Horelick has termed "afull-blown two-track Soviet strategy for managing East-West rela-tions."1 On one track was Soviet policy toward the United States; onthe other, Soviet policy toward the West more generally. These twotracks were being pursued simultaneously and were viewed by Moscowas complementary rather than conflicting in terms of furthering Sovietobjectives in Europe.

On the track concerning the United States, by late 1982 the focus ofSoviet policy was almost exclusively on arms control. Ideally, theSoviets would have liked to expand and transform the character of theSoviet-American relationship in the 1980s into a multifaceted web ofinterrelationships--economic, political, cultural-building on thoselinks begun in the early 1970s. Such a broad-based web of interrela-tionships, if properly set up from Moscow's point of view, would haveserved Soviet interests on a number of issues, including arms control,technology transfer, East-West trade, and third world interests, amongothers. However, given widespread American disillusionment with thekind of one-sided d6tente relationship that in the U.S. view character-ized American-Soviet relations in the early 1970s, this was not a realis-tic possibility for the Soviet leadership to try to develop. In fact, bythe winter of 1982-83, the Soviet Union seemed to write off the UnitedStates as a near-term partner across a range of economic, political, andcultural activities. This was not the case, though, in the area of armscontrol, an area in which Europeans were not yet in a position to nego-tiate directly in any case. Here, the Soviet Union seemed anxious todo business with the United States and accepted the initiation of talkson limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in late November1981 following President Reagan's zero-option proposal and talks onreducing strategic arms (START) which began in June 1982, soon after 4President Reagan's speech on strategic arms control delivered atEureka College.

At the same time that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy ofarms control without d6tente toward the United States, it was also

"WooW Respome to tw Peen Admisration Focs on INF," an unpulisedimmim p for the May 31, 196, meeting of the Council on Foroi RelatiomStab Grop on the Sovift Unk, p. 11.

72Er

8

pursuing another policy track. This track was aimed at "exploiting andwidening differences between the United States and its NATO alliesthat are rooted in their varying geographic circumstances, politicaltraditions, historical experiences, and economic and security interestsvis-A-vis the East."2 By the winter of 1982-83, the focus of this aspectof Soviet policy was on preventing the deployment of NATOintermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. As in the past, Sovietpolicy was aimed, among other things, at opportunistically exploitingdifferences within the Atlantic Alliance in order to weaken Europeanpolitical and military links with the United States while simultaneouslyundercutting popular support for national defense programs in WesternEurope. What distinguished Soviet policy toward the West during theperiod beginning in the winter of 1982 was thus not its underlyingobjective so much as the intensity with which it focused on the NATOintermediate-range nuclear force deployments.

It is true that virtually since December 1979, when NATO had pro-nounced its dual-track decision to deploy interlnediate-range nuclearforces in Europe in the absence of a new arms control agreement, theSoviet Union had given high priority to heading off the deployment ofthese medium-range forces. In 1981-82, at the same time that theSoviet Union was working to develop a range of bilateral links with thecountries of Western Europe, the USSR also was seeking to preventNATO INF deployments through a new arm's control agreement withthe United States. As Alexander Haig has noted in talking about thisperiod during which he was Secretary of State, concerning both theINF and START negotiations, "the Soviets were eager for an armscontrol (agreement) with the United States. Dobrynin never failed tomention it. The Soviets were willing to talk on almost any basis."3

By the time that the winter of 1982 arrived, however, the SovietUnion, while continuing to participate in the Geneva negotiations,seemed to have given up serious hope for an agreement on termsacceptable to Moscow. For by the end of 1982, the central features ofthe Soviet negotiating posture at the INF talks seemed set inconcrete-no NATO intermediate-range forces on any terms,4 and a

21bid., p. 12.3Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, Macmillan, New York, 1984, p. 228.41n mid-1982, there had seemed to be a brief possibility that Moscow might retreat on

this central demand as the so-called "walk-in-the-woods" initiative was informally dis-cussed by Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart at the INF talks, Yuli Kvitainsky. Thisinitiative would have had both sides reduce their total number of INF deployments. TheWest was to retain 75 cruise missile launchers with a total of 300 warheads and theSoviets would retain 75 SS-20o in Europe with a total of 225 warheads. As part of theproposed package, NATO would forgo any deployments of Pershing II ballistic missilesand the Soviet Union would drop its insistence on pegging Soviet INF deployments to

. ,

I

reduced SS-20 force only in exchange for a comparable limit on Britishand French nuclear forces. At the START talks, the Soviet positionwas comparably intransigent. At both sets of talks, the Soviet positionwas patently unacceptable to the United States and the Soviet govern-ment clearly knew this. Nevertheless, the Soviets persisted in reiterat-ing their positions in private and pressing in public their views con-cerning the respective negotiations.

In retrospect, by the winter of 1982 the Soviets appear to havebecome less interested in exploring the possibility of finding arms con-trol compromises and in attempting to prevent the deployment ofmedium-range forces through a negotiated agreement with the UnitedStates, and more determined to prevent these deployments through themanipulation of disagreements within the Atlantic Alliance. Putanother way, on INF, there was by early 1983 more of an emphasis inSoviet policy on exploiting differences within the Atlantic Alliance-the second track in its Western policy-than on the first track of prob-ing for a compromise with the United States to achieve a negotiatedagreement. In part, this change in emphasis in Soviet policy was attri-butable to a perception that concessions acceptable to the USSR wereunlikely to be obtained from the United States in Geneva. In otherpart, this change was also attributable to Soviet perceptions about thecentrifugal tendencies and growing strength of the peace movement onboth sides of the Atlantic; antinuclear church groups, especially innorthern Europe; and major opposition parties in the five countriesscheduled to receive medium-range missiles-the United Kingdom,Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium. Thus,such an approach offered the Soviet leadership the near-term prospectof possibly killing or deferring the deployments without any commen-surate Soviet concessions and the longer-term prospect of inflictinglasting damage upon U.S. security relations with its European allies.5

THE CAMPAIGNS FROM ABOVE AND BELOW

There were, in essence, two parts to this emerging, negative Sovieteffort to prevent the deployment of NATO intermediate-range nuclear

the level of British and French nuclear systems. For a detailed discussion of this initia-tive, which ultimately was rejected by both Moscow and Washington, see Strobe Talbott,Deadly Gambits, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1984, pp. 116-151. r-

"For more discussion of this evolving Soviet viewpoint, see William Bundy, "1983: APortentous Year," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1983, pp. 501-503. Also seePierre Hamner, "The Shifting Foundation," Foreign Policy, Vol. 48, Fall 1982, pp. 3-20.

10

forces by disagreements in the Atlantic Alliance. One part was "a cam-paign from above." This was a major, near-term political and pro-paganda effort to persuade the governments and elites in WesternEurope not to go forward with these deployments, i.e., to reverse the1979 dual-track decision "from above." The second part of the Sovieteffort was a "campaign from below," which was characterized by con-certed "active measures" th-. would exploit European fears andmisgivings in order to create a mass opposition able to prevent thedeployments and possibly to elect "progressive" forces inclined to stopdeployment. There was nothing particularly new about these Sovietcampaigns. Similar efforts supporting other Soviet interests had beenpursued in the past. They were now pursued with great ardor, and theSoviets clearly hoped that both parts of this campaign together wouldcreate an "island of peace" in Europe, an area in which NATOintermediate-range nuclear forces would not be welcome.6

During the first half of 1983, national elections were to take place inthe three most important European countries scheduled to receive thenew intermediate-range nuclear forces-the Federal Republic of Ger-many, the United Kingdom, and Italy. And in each of these countries,the emphasis of Soviet policy was on an effort "from above" and "frombelow" to prevent the planned NATO deployments. In each of thesecountries, there was a distinct possibility that the opposition mightgain power and cancel or defer the deployments. In each, there wasalso a definite possibility that the ruling party, if subjected to enoughdomestic political pressure, might be inclined to change the terms ofthe initial dual-track decision, e.g., by stretching out the deploymentschedule or possibly by reducing the number of missiles to be deployed.In any case, in each of these countries, the Soviet Union made a con-certed effort through the INF issue to shape current and future defensepolicy.

THE STRUGGLE IN GERMANY

Of the three major NATO countries scheduled to begin deployment 0of medium-range missiles at the end of 1983, the Federal Republic ofGermany was the centerpiece for the Soviet Union. From a Sovietpoint of view, West Germany was not only the most important deploy-ment country-it was the only country to receive Pershing IImissiles-but it also was the country in which opposition to the dual-

Vor a detailed diacumaion of this two-part Soviet campaign to stop INF deployment,w Alexander Alexiev, The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means, TheRand Corporation (forthcoming).

j " ' '" - - ",. : jti

11

track decision was potentially strongest. In October 1981, 250,000protestors had appeared in Bonn to denounce the dual-track decision.By 1982, there were more than 1.5 million signatures affixed to theKrefeld Appeal, a document drawn up in the town of Krefeld inNovember 1980 that called for no nuclear missiles in Europe. Andperhaps most importantly, there was a serious split within the SocialDemocratic Party on this issue, with the official position of the partyseemingly undecided.

In part because of growing differences in West Germany on the INFissue, the coalition of German Social Democrats and Free Democratsunder Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, which had governed the countrysince 1969, fell apart in the fall of 1982. A Christian Democrat-FreeDemocrat coalition under Chancellor Helmut Kohl acceded to power,with the Social Democrats in opposition. A new national election wasset for March 1983; looking toward that election, the Social Democratsheld a party congress in November 1982. For both political and per-sonal reasons, Schmidt chose not to serve as the party's candidate forchancellor in the next election and Hans-Jochen Vogel was chosen asSchmidt's successor. At the November party congress, Vogel, alongwith party chairman Willy Brandt, led the opposition to the plannedINF deployments. In the end, despite the opposition of Schmidt, theVogel position handily prevailed, with only 14 of 400 delegates backingSchmidt in supporting the NATO decision. Clearly the two majorpolitical parties in West Germany were now polarized over the INFissue. And these developments presented the Soviet Union with amajor target of opportunity to influence the outcome of the upcomingelection in favor of the opposition Social Democrats and in so doing,potentially to drive a major wedge between Europe and the UnitedStates on defense policy. Given the stakes, it is not surprising that theSoviet Union made a strenuous and in many ways unprecedented effortto exploit the situation.

In early January 1983, the Soviet Union invited Social DemocraticParty leader Vogel to visit Moscow in an obvious attempt to enhancehis image as an international statesman and hence to influence theGerman election. Once in the Soviet Union, Vogel was given audienceswith the highest officials in the government, including the new GeneralSecretary Yuri Andropov. In his talk with Vogel, Andropov hinted at avariety of inducements, including possible new concessions in armscontrol, commercial incentives, and potential new approaches to thelong-standing problem of divided German families, provided that theFederal Republic opted not to accept intermediate-range nuclear forceson its soil.

..-. , 'A

12

Similar themes were voiced during a visit by Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko to the Federal Republic later that January. On hisfour-day visit, Gromyko talked about the importance of creating a 90-mile-wide nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and the need for newEast-West arms control initiatives. Publicly saying that he had nofavorite candidate in the upcoming election, Gromyko indicated thatthe Soviet Union would be willing to reduce its SS-21, SS-22, andSS-23 deployments, if West Germany would be willing to defer INFdeployments. Sensing that a positive response would not likely beforthcoming from the Federal Republic if Chancellor Kohl were kept inpower, as the polls indicated was probable, Gromyko proceeded todisplay the Soviet proclivity for counterproductive heavy-handednessand publicly threatened the Federal Republic with dire political andmilitary consequences if INF deployments went ahead on schedule.

Both before and after Vogel's visit to Moscow and Gromyko's visitto Bonn, the Soviet Union made a concerted effort to influence theGerman election through an intensified propaganda campaign aimed atelite opinion in the Federal Republic. The focus of this campaign wasa "peace offensive," which stressed that the United States was to blamefor the seeming stalemate in the Geneva talks; that the Soviet Unionwas a "peace-loving," conciliatory security partner; and that worldpeace would be in jeopardy if Helmut Kohl were successful in theupcoming election, for the Christian Democrats would lead the FederalRepublic to the "nuclear gallows" by going ahead with INF deploy-ments.

As concrete proof of the Soviet Union's sincere interest in furtheringpeace in Europe, a bevy of arms control proposals and trial balloonswere put forward in German newspapers and through German-languagebroadcasts from Moscow. Coordinated and directed by the fairly newInternational Information Department of the Communist Party of theSoviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, this "peace offensive" effortfeatured the active involvement of such high-level Soviet officials asLeonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department;Valentin Falin, former Soviet Ambassador in Bonn; Vadim Zagladin,first deputy head of the CPSU International Department; and GeorgiArbatov, Director of the Institute on the USA and Canada. All of theSoviet proposals that they and others publicly and privately advocated,if implemented, had some elements in common: they all would havepreserved Soviet superiority in medium-range force deployments,

4 .I ::,

13

prevented any Western INF deployments, and seriously strained U.S.-European military and political ties.

Coincident with this Soviet political and propaganda campaignaimed at affecting West German governmental and elite opinion was a"campaign from below." Here, the Soviet Union attempted to stopINF deployments through gaining influence and leverage among politi-cally active groups and movements in the Federal Republic.Encouraged by its perceived success in the late 1970s in stopping theU.S. deployment in Europe of the enhanced radiation warhead (neu-tron bomb), the Soviet Union employed a variety of both overt andcovert measures designed to enhance the role and influence of anti-INFforces within the Federal Republic. This campaign involved the use ofseveral front organizations as agents of influence and disinformation,including the World Peace Council and the World Federation of TradeUnions; the German Communist Party (DKP); and such DKP-controlled organizations as the German Peace Union, which was aprime sponsor of the Krefeld Appeal, the Committee for Peace, Dis-armament and Cooperation, and others.

In addition, the "campaign from below" involved helping to organize,support, and manipulate the German peace movement so that it wouldmove in a fairly cohesive and effective way in directions congenial tothe Soviet Union. The Soviets clearly did not start or control thepeace movement or "progressive" elements in the labor or churchmovement in the Federal Republic. They did, however, make a majorattempt to influence its activities, orientation, and effectiveness andhoped to directly benefit from their political efforts. Zagladin impliedthis in a now-famous April 1983 interview on Hungarian televisionwhen he observed that, "we can expect sober forces once again to takethe upper hand. Or rather not so much that they will take the upperhand, but that political movements will push them into the forefront.We won't do the pushing; political movements there (in the West) willdo it."7 And several months later, L. Istyagin, a Soviet commentator,spoke directly to this point when he noted:

To the credit of the basic nucleus of the present antiwar movement,it has been able, surmounting its internal weaknesses and rejectingthe diversionary promptings of unbidden "well-wishers" to ascertainthe central, truly decisive element at this stage of the struggle toensure peace and security in Europe. This element, as the absolute

7Pravda, April 8, 1983.

A.

14

majority of anti-war organizations acknowledges, is prevention of thedeployment in Western Europe of new American nuclear weaponsand the conversion of Europe into a nuclear-free zone.'

In the end, the Soviets overplayed their hand in the 1983 electoralcampaign: their strenuous, overt attempts to influence the Germanelection seemed to be counterproductive. To his ultimate electoralbenefit, Chancellor Kohl, nine days before the election, termed Vogel"the candidate of the Soviet Union" and issued a popular, hard-ringingstatement, denouncing "the massive and hitherto unprecedentedmanner in which the Soviet Union is interfering in the election and theinternal politics of the Federal Republic of Germany."9 In any case,partly because of the INF issue and partly because of domesticeconomic issues, the Christian Democratic Party under ChancellorKohl won an overwhelming electoral victory, gaining 244 seats in the498-member Bundestag. The opposition Social Democrats, in a majorsetback, won only 193 seats, while the new Green Party won 27 seats.Despite the disruptive efforts of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republicof Germany in early 1983 was clearly committed to deploying INFforces beginning the following winter.

THE STRUGGLE IN BRITAIN

Their failure during the winter of 1983 to alter West German policy

on the INF issue did not deter the Soviets from trying to influencesubsequent national elections in both Great Britain and Italy. Britainwas seen by Moscow to be second in importance to the Federal Repub-lic of Germany in terms of INF deployments. In the Soviet view, how-ever, cruise missile deployments in Britain were important not only intheir own right but also in terms of their effect on other potentialdeployment countries. For if these deployments were repudiated oreven deferred in Britain, there might well be a ripple effect elsewhere,including possibly West Germany.

Early in the spring of 1983, British Prime Minister Thatcher optedto call for new national elections in June, 11 months before the end ofthe Conservatives' five-year term. Buoyed by favorable public opinionpolls, Mrs. Thatcher clearly wanted to reaffirm her mandate prior tothe actual arrival in Britain of ground-launched cruise missiles at theend of the year and before the economy worsened. Unlike the situation

Q uoted in Aleiev, p. 39. For more details about this Soviet *campaign from below,"we Aexiev, pp. 21-39. See also Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the European. ......Peae MoV'ement," Strategic Review, Winter 1983, pp. 9-18.

The New York Times, February 26, 1963, p. 1.

I15

in West Germany in early 1983, where the ruling party was new topower and the opposition Social Democratic Party was somewhat spliton the INF issue, in Britain the Conservatives had been in rower forfour years, the position of the Thatcher-led government was solidlysupportive of the NATO dual-track decision, and the oppositionLabour Party was solidly opposed to any NATO INF deployments.

Accordingly, the Soviets, perhaps learning from their mistakes in theGerman electoral campaign, opted to play a less strident, lower key rolein their efforts to help "progressive forces," i.e., the Labour Party,replace the Conservative Thatcher government. In the British elec-toral campaign, for example, the Soviet Union did not invite Labouropposition leader Michael Foot to visit Moscow as it had invited Ger-man Social Democratic leader Vogel earlier in the year. Nor did theSoviet leadership visit Britain during the campaign in an effort toboost the cause of "progressive forces" or openly try to propagandize infavor of Labour. Indeed, during the course of the 1983 British electoralcampaign, the Soviet Union publicly kept its distance from the LabourParty, its leaders, and other sympathetic British political leaders,despite its obvious electoral preferences.

What the Soviet Union did do was to give behind-the-scenesencouragement to political movements in Britain which, it was hoped,would push forces favorable to Soviet purposes to the forefront. Mostnotable of these in the 1983 electoral campaign was the Campaign forNuclear Disarmament (CND), a long-standing antinuclear movementthat worked closely with the Left within Labour. Founded in the late1950s, the CND advocated unilateral British nuclear disarmament aswell as withdrawal from NATO. It had reached the height of itsstrength in 1960-61, only to lose power over the next several years dueto internal squabbling and the atmospheric test ban treaty, amongother reasons.

After the 1979 NATO decision was announced, the CND had experi-enced a Phoenix-like rise that played upon growing fears in Britainabout the possibility of nuclear war. Led by Marxist historian E. P.Thompson, Monsignor Bruce Kent, Labour activist Tony Benn, andCommunist coal miner Arthur Scargill, the CND published severalpamphlets which depicted British and NATO nuclear policy as leadinginevitably to nuclear war. In its public efforts, the CND played a key 4role in organizing a number of mass demonstrations, including one thatinvolved egg-throwing at Defense Minister Michael Heseltine, who onthat occasion equated anti-INF CND activists with "communists." ° Inits intellectual efforts, the CND made a major move to persuade the

I9Se The Guardian, April 24, 1983.

U;;

.4,.

16

British people of the folly of both the NATO dual-track decision andthe British decision to procure Trident. In this, the CND succeeded ingaining new credibility in the public mind by its association with anumber of respected British thinkers, including former Army Chief ofStaff Lord Carver and former Chief Scientific Advisor Solly Zucker-man, who had personal doubts about the wisdom of these decisions.Finally, in its electoral efforts, the CND initiated, supported, andorchestrated a massive national drive to get voters to elect anti-INFcandidates to replace the "pro-nuclear" majority in the Parliament.

Although the CND did succeed in making the INF issue highly visi-ble in the June electoral campaign, it did not succeed in helping toelect an anti-INF majority in the House of Commons. Labour wassoundly defeated, with the Conservatives gaining a 140-seat majorityover its combined opposition in Parliament. The election representedLabour's worst defeat since 1922 and set Britain on a course to deploynew intermediate-range nuclear forces beginning in December 1983,despite the hopes and efforts of the Soviet Union and the Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament. The election campaign, did, however, leaveBritain, as it did West Germany, with a highly polarized political situa-tion and an opposition party vehemently anti-INF and antinuclear."

THE STRUGGLE IN ITALY a

While not so critically important as West Germany and Great Bri-tain in terms of INF deployments, Italy, in Soviet eyes, was still ofconsiderable significance. This was so not only because of the plannedcruise missile emplacements in Sicily but also because the FederalRepublic of Germany had insisted on the principle of nonsingularity,tying its deployment decision to the decision of at least one otherEuropean continental power to go ahead with INF deployments. Sincethe commitment of Belgium and the Netherlands to the dual-trackdecision was widely seen as fairly weak, Italy was of great importanceto Soviet interests, particularly for its possible effect on deployments inthe Federal Republic of Germany.

In April 1983, Socialist leader Bettino Craxi forced a new nationalelection in Italy by withdrawing his party's support from the ChristianDemocrat-led, four-party coalition government. Craxi's decision toforce new elections was not motivated as much by the INF issue-the

"1 For a more detailed discussion of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the1983 electoral campaign in Britain more generally, see Christopher Bowie and AlanPlatt, Brish Nuclr Podicymahin, The Rand Corporation, R-3085-AF, January 1984,pp. 68-70. _4_

I 111

17

Socialists (PSI) backed the Christian Democratic Party in supportingthe dual-track decision-as by differences over economic issues and hisown personal ambition. New national elections were set for June26-27, 1983.

Despite its interest in seeing the new Italian government repudiatethe planned deployment of new NATO missiles, the Soviet Union wasnot well situated to try to influence Italian policy directly on this issueduring the 1983 electoral campaign. The governmental coalition solidlysupported the INF deployment decision. Popular, antinuclear opposi-tion in Italy was not nearly so widespread as in West Germany andGreat Britain. And the Soviet image in Italy was not particularly posi-tive in the spring of 1983 given a pending, controversial espionage caseagainst an Aeroflot official and allegations of Soviet involvement in theplot to assassinate the Pope.

Nevertheless, with the encouragement of the Soviet Union, theItalian Communist Party (PCI) did try to make the INF issue of cen-tral concern to Italian voters in the campaign. Particularly after theWilliamsburg Conference in late May 1983, wherein the heads of theseven major Western industrial' democracies issued a strong statementregarding their common security interests, PCI leader Enrico Ber-linguer tried hard to pressure the governing parties in Italy intomodifying their support for NATO INF deployments. The major tar-get of Berlinguer's efforts was the PCI's erstwhile allies, the Socialists,and he repeatedly urged the PSI to use its weight to defer a decision todeploy intermediate-range nuclear forces, pending developments inGeneva. This was also the position that the PCI regularly espoused inits daily newspaper, L'Unita, during the campaign, and through itsother publication and propaganda efforts.

In this, the Communists were unsuccessful. Despite one veiled hintby Craxi that Italy might support an INF moratorium, the PSI, inessence, remained firm in its support of the NATO decision. INFdeployments did not become the kind of divisive political issue in Italythat they had become in West Germany and Great Britain.Widespread public apathy characterized the 1983 Italian electoral cam-paign.

In the election itself, Socialist leader Craxi emerged as the big twinner, becoming Italy's first Socialist prime minister in the postwarperiod. Both the Christian Democrats and the Communists sufferedsignificant losses at the polls, although they remained Italy's two larg-est parties. And the emergent multiparty government, led by Craxi,was firm on the INF issue, despite a highly publicized, post-election

, . .

18

letter from Soviet General Secretary Andropov to Craxi urging Italy toreconsider its position on INF deployments.12

CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET FAILURE

In their attempt to reverse the 1979 NATO dual-track decision byinfluencing the publics and political processes in the democracies ofWestern Europe, the Soviet Union had failed. It had badly miscalcu-lated the possibility of preventing INF deployments through a combi-nation of persuading governments and elites and aiding and using"progressive" political parties and movements in Western Europe. Theperiodic threats of dire consequences had been ineffective. The threemajor deployment countries in Europe-the Federal Republic of Ger-many, Great Britain, and Italy-all had new governments in place bythe end of the summer of 1983. Each of these governments was firmlycommitted to implementing the 1979 NATO decision on schedule.Given the central importance the Soviet Union attached to the goal ofpreventing the deployments, this situation had to be marked as a majorsetback for Soviet foreign policy.

Following these developments and after the further events of Sep-tember 1983, when Korean Air Lines #007 was shot down and theUnited States severely criticized the Soviets for "this horrifying act,"the Soviet leadership again seemed to shift its approach toward theWest. No longer would there be a two-track Soviet policy-one aimedat achieving negotiated arms control agreements with the Reaganadministration and the other aimed at exploiting differences withinEurope and between the United States and Europe in the hope ofpreventing INF deployments. For the two-track approach had failedon both tracks. Now, at least in the short term, there would be a pol-icy of intimidation toward the West in the hope of preventing thedeployments from going forward on schedule in the near term and inthe long term solidifying the Soviet position in Europe and disruptingEuropean political and military ties with the United States. The long-term goal of the Soviet Union was to remain the same; its near-termtactics were now to be different, to try to take advantage of anincreasingly polarized and potentially intimidated Western Europe.

On September 28, two days after a speech on the importance ofarms control delivered by President Reagan -t the United Nations,General Secretary Andropov issued a statement which clearly reflectedthis turn in Soviet thinking. Andropov questioned not the desirability

12M The New York Times, August 29, 1983, p. 1.

WI

$ L

'if

19

of better relations with the United States, but the possibility of accom-modation with Washington. Andropov observed that PresidentReagan's comments after the KAL incident and at the United Nations"finally dispelled any illusions" that the Soviet Union had about work-ing with the United States on arms control. 13

In retrospect, Andropov's statement clearly foretold a subsequentgeneral hardening of Soviet tactics, although the shift did not becomeapparent until December. For the next few months, during theremainder of the fall of 1983, the Soviet Union pursued essentially thesame policy course that it had pursued for most of that year, with INFand START talks taking place on schedule and with the Soviet Unionsimultaneously continuing to make a major, active effort to aid and use"progressive" forces within Western Europe to stop or defer INFdeployments. Indeed, aided and encouraged by the Soviet Union, anumber of record-size public demonstrations against the missile deploy-ment took place in several European capitals during that "hotautumn."

Meanwhile, on October 26, Andropov issued a statement that hintedat a range of possible concessions in Geneva, concessions that wereprivately discussed by Yuli Kvitsinsky, the chief Soviet delegate at theINF talks, in the so-called "walk-in-the park" initiative. In Andropov'sstatement and Kvitsinsky's private conversations with chief U.S. INFnegotiator Paul Nitze, the Soviets indicated that they were prepared tofreeze SS-20 deployments in Asia once an overall agreement was inforce. They also hinted at "additional flexibility" on the matter ofmedium-range nuclear-capable aircraft, suggesting that the SovietUnion might change its proposal so as not to impinge quite sostringently on conventionally armed NATO aircraft. Most impor-tantly, they raised the prospect of the Soviets' reducing their SS-20s inEurope from 243 to about 140, below the equivalent level (162) of Brit-ish and French ballistic-missile launchers. Also, Andropov's formula-tion seemed to suggest that the Soviet government had finally acceptedthe Reagan administration's notion of counting nuclear warheadsrather than only launchers. 14

Nevertheless, Andropov also declared that the arms talks would con-tinue only if the United States "renounced the deployment of its mis-siles in Europe within the announced deadlines." He thus made itclear that the Soviet leadership would no longer even discuss comprom-ise with the United States once the Soviet Union became certain thatthe deployments were in fact going to begin in December as scheduled.

"The New York Times, September 29, 1983, p. 1."Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, pp. 193-206.

now 7.-

20

This ultimately took place when the German Bundestag voted onNovember 22 to go ahead with the INF deployments. The next day,the Soviet delegation did walk out of the INF negotiations, and onDecember 8, 1983, the Soviets refused to set a date to resume START.The Soviets also refused to set a new date for the resumption of theMutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations inVienna. A new period in Soviet policy toward Western Europe hadbegun.

4

IA

IV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERNEUROPE, FALL 1983-FALL 1984

The new phase in Soviet policy toward the West was formallyushered in with the Soviet walkout of the INF and START talks inlate fall 1983 and their refusal to agree to a date for a resumption ofnegotiations without a return to the status quo ante. On the day afterthe walkout from the INF talks, Andropov publicly threatened theWest with stringent reprisals, saying that there would be countermea-sures in Europe of a "very serious character, specific and effective,"analogous to the threat that the new missiles posed to the SovietUnion. Letters spelling out this threat were then sent to Prime Minis-ter Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Craxi (althoughnot to President Reagan). In the conclusion of these letters, the Krem-lin made it clear that its response to Western INF deployments wouldbe "quick and substantial" and that Soviet bilateral relations withWestern Europe would be "seriously affected."1

Andropov's statement was followed soon thereafter by a December10, 1983, public statement by then-Soviet General Staff chief MarshalNikolai Ogarkov. Alluding to the recent American-made television filmThe Day After, Ogarkov emphasized that the threat of nuclear war wasindeed "real" and that the West's decision to deploy new missiles inEurope significantly increased this threat in Europe. Ogarkov con-cluded his statement by urging an end to this "nuclear madness," butobserving that the Soviet Union would take whatever countermeasuresit deemed necessary to protect its security.2

These and other highly threatening statements were typical of thisnext phase of Soviet policy, which lasted roughly from the fall 1983walkout from arms control talks until the fall of 1984. Soviet policytoward the West was characterized not only by public threats and theabsence of superpower nuclear arms control negotiations but also by aperceptible hardening in Moscow's policies and attitudes across a rangeof matters regarding the United States and Western Europe. Thishardening of policies and attitudes-almost an isolationist, siegementality-was manifested in unusually harsh Soviet-Western com-munications, the Soviet-orchestrated boycott of the 1984 Olympics in

'Walter Liqueur, "U.S.-Soviet Relations," Forein Affairs, America and the World19W, p. 56. Also, 'Russian Sends Cruise Protest to Thatcher," The Daily Telq r%,November 29, 19683, p. 1.

217 New York Thms#, December 11, 1983, p.1. 1.

21

22

Los Angeles, and a new degree of emphasis on military matters, politi-cal threats, and self-reliance. Certainly, the boviets had employedthreats and pursued a tough policy line toward the West before this inan effort to influence West European leaders and public opinion. Afterthe Soviet Union had failed to achieve its objective of stopping or post-poning INF deployments, these threats became more pronounced andbelligerent. And now, at least in the short term, there was nocorresponding effort either to negotiate with the United States inGeneva or to foster bilateral linkages with the countries of WesternEurope.

3

Soviet policy toward Western Europe during this winter 1983-fall1984 period was significantly colder, harsher, and more threateningthan it had been previously. When Italian Foreign Minister GiulioAndreotti visited Moscow in April, for example, he received anunusually chilly reception from the Soviet leadership. Indeed, hisSoviet hosts reminded him that the volcanic destruction of Pompeiipaled in comparison with a single nuclear warhead, and are reported tohave threatened that "we will turn Italy into a Pompeii" if Italy contin-ued with INF deployments on schedule.4 In the communique issued atthe conclusion of the Andreotti visit, bland lip service was paid to"satisfaction" with the two countries' ties in economic and otherspheres. Further, it was noted that "political dialogue" would be main-tained on the basis of the existing Soviet-Italian protocol on consulta-tions.

5

On a visit to Moscow later that spring, West German Foreign Minis-ter Hans-Dietrich Genscher also experienced a noticeable chilliness.Before Genscher's visit, on May 4, General Secretary Chernenko not sosubtly mirrored ongoing, anti-German Soviet media commentaries

31n the immediate aftermath of Andropov's death in February 1984, there was a noteof conciliation in some public statements coming out of Moscow. Soon after Andropov'sdeath, for example, General Secretary Chernenko suggested in a Supreme Soviet electionspeech on March 2, 1984, that there were possibilities for breaking the East-Westdeadlock. This speech, however, brought no concrete follow-up, and subsequent Sovietpolicy statements regarding the West closely resembled those issued prior to Andropov'spasing. And at the end of March, when President Reagan asked retired Lt. GeneralBrent Scowcroft to send a private message to Chernenko, the American initiative wasrebuffed by the Soviet leadership. For a discussion of Chernenko's speech, the Scowcroftinitiative, and possible Soviet conciliatory moves in the immediate aftermath ofAndropov's death, see Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Return of ArmsControl," Forein Affairs, America and the World 1984, pp. 518-20. See also StrobeTalbott, The Russians and Reagan, Vintage Books, New York, 1984, pp. 82-85.

'The New York Times, May 21, 1984."#Moscow's Stratey Toward West Europe Since November 1983," Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, FB 84-10046, July 16, 1984, p. 4.

.1_7

I

23

when he warned in a public speech about "revanchists of every ilk rear-ing their heads." When in Moscow, Genscher tried to explore new ave-nues of possible East-West cooperation, suggesting that all issues werenegotiable. The Soviet response was that no issues could be negotiateduntil INF deployments in Western Europe ceased and were removed. 6

Not discouraged by the treatment accorded to his fellow Europeanforeign ministers, British Foreign Secretary Howe went ahead with hisscheduled visit to the Soviet Union at the beginning of July 1984. Justbefore Howe's departure from London, British Prime MinisterThatcher issued a perceptibly conciliatory statement, declaring that thecurrent impasse in East-West relations could only be broken by dealing"with the Soviet Union not as one would like it, but as it is."7 TheSoviet leadership was not impressed, however. Howe's efforts toimprove the prevailing East-West climate and to restart superpowerarms control talks were totally rebuffed by Moscow and he was sub-jected to several vitriolic anti-Washington diatribes from Gromyko.British officials left Moscow, commenting that Gromyko had been"arid" and "disappointingly negative."8

It is noteworthy that during this period, Soviet treatment of "pro-gressive elements" outside the governments of Western Europe alsowas harsh. Several "friendly" European visitors to Moscow in thewinter-spring of 1984, including German Social Democratic Partyleader Vogel, who were accustomed to ingratiating cordiality, weretreated with unusual coolness. In these discussions, "progressive"European visitors repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to return to armscontrol negotiations, arguing that the Soviet stance was making RonaldReagan look conciliatory and the Soviet Union intransigent in Euro-pean eyes.9 In response, the Soviets typically talked about theimminence of nuclear war and how much 1984 resembled 1939. Theirintention was clear-to frighten the European Left into believing thatnuclear war was imminent, to convince them of a need to continuetheir fight against the deployment of new NATO missiles, and thus totry to increase pressure on the United States to change course.

At the same time, during the first half of 1984, the Soviets tookseveral initiatives in the military sphere, all of which were highly publi-cized, to complement this campaign of attempted intimidation. TheSoviets announced the suspension of the moratorium on SS-20

6The New York Times, May 23, 1984. Also, "Moscow's Strategy Toward West EuropeSince November 1983," p. 4.

7The Guardian, June 29,1984.OThe Times, July 3, 1984. See also Gorbachev's Visit to London and the Elusive

Arqlo-Soviet Thaw, Radio Liberty 449/84, November 26, 1984, pp. 2-4.'Confidential interviews.

V)

'.4 ,

24

deployment, which they said they had put into effect in March 1982.They also deployed a significant number of additional nuclear weaponsin Eastern Europe, justified as counters to Western deployments ofcruise missiles in Europe. The Soviets announced the stationing ofmore submarines closer to U.S. shores. They held unusually largenaval exercises in the North Atlantic. And, finally, there was minorharassment of Western airliners coming into and leaving Beriin. As aresult of a constriction of landing patterns permitted by the SovietUnion, this step was a not so subtle reminder to Bonn of the continuedvulnerability of Berlin's position.

4E4

I

V. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERNEUROPE, FALL 1984-PRESENT

As part of its effort to intimidate and promote a war scare hysteriain the West, the Soviet leadership opted not to participate in anynuclear arms control negotiations with the United States in the fall1983-fall 1984 period. Reflecting growing concern in Moscow overAmerica's Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet Union seemed tochange course on their path in late June 1984 when it came forwardwith a surprise proposal to begin talks in Vienna in September toprevent the militarization of space, including the continued develop-ment of antisatellite weapons. Soon thereafter, the Soviet governmentindicated that Foreign Minister Gromyko would be amenable to aprivate meeting with Secretary Shultz and President Reagan followinghis attendance at the proceedings opening the United Nations GeneralAssembly in September.

To the Soviets' surprise, the United States, under considerable pres-sure from Europe, responded positively: America was willing to discusspreventing weapons in space but in the context of overall missilereduction talks. This was not what the Soviet Union seemingly had inmind. And despite a meeting between Gromyko and Secretary Shultzin New York and a subsequent meeting in Washington between Gro-myko and President Reagan, no U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiationstook place during the fall of 1984.

Soviet relations with the countries of Western Europe were similarlyinconsistent and inconclusive during the summer and fall of 1984. Ofgreat interest to many Europeans-both West and East-was theplanned trip by East German leader Erich Honecker to the FederalRepublic of Germany in September 1984. This was set to follow WestGermany's earlier monetary loans to the GDR and East Germany'sdecision to allow a large number of its citizens to emigrate to theFederal Republic. For many in Europe, the Hone,.ker trip was of greatimportance not only in terms of its symbolic importance but also interms of its possibly leading to much intensified links between the twoGermanies. In the end, the Soviet leadership seemingly decided thatthe costs associated with a Honecker visit to Bonn, including a fearthat this visit might lead to significantly improved West German-EastGerman relations that Moscow could not control, outweighed the bene-fits. After a period of growing polemical warnings in the Soviet pressin July and August, Honecker abruptly cancelled his trip at the last

25

A' Fw"

I

26

moment. Bulgaria's Todor Zhikov, who was also scheduled to visitBonn in September, cancelled his trip as well.

The conclusion of the 1984 U.S. election campaign, culminating inRonald Reagan's reelection, seemed to set the stage in Moscow for thebeginning of a new phase in the Soviet posture toward the West; achange in Soviet policy regarding arms negotiations with the UnitedStates was immediately noticeable. Within 10 days of the Americanelection, General Secretary Chernenko had sent President Reagan aletter proposing new superpower arms control negotiations.Chernenko's letter led in turn to a joint announcement on November22, 1984, that Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Shultz wouldmeet in Geneva in January to hammer out an agenda for "umbrella"talks on arms control.

During December of 1984 and the first few months of 1985, therewere a number of other signs indicating that Soviet policy was enteringa new, less inward-looking phase follewing the American election. Inmid-December 1984, Soviet politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev paida highly publicized visit to Great Britain that was notable for a numberof reasons. Among these was the fact that Mr. Gorbachev was Kon-stantin Chernenko's heir apparent and the fact that Britain had beenrepeatedly rebuffed earlier in 1984 in its attempts to normalizeBritish-Soviet relations. During most of 1984, Great Britain had beenviewed in Moscow as a staunch American ally on the INF issue and theThatcher government was portrayed as having opted to reduce its rolein international affairs to that of "a junior and frequently mutepartner." In the Soviet view, London, by "backing up the U.S.administration's dangerous militarist policy and serving as its accom-plice" in 1983-84, had assumed much of the responsibility "for theconsequences of this short-sighted policy."' Now, with the Gorbachevvisit, the Soviet Union on the one hand implicitly seemed to acknowl-edge a more independent role for Great Britain and on the other handseemed to mark Britain as a possible focus for a new Soviet approachtoward the West. For if Great Britain, the staunch ally of the UnitedStates and the linchpin of NATO, could somehow be weaned away orsoftened as a result of improved Soviet relations with the West, thenthe entire NATO structure might be undercut.

The Gorbachev visit itself augured well for an expanded Soviet rela-tionship with the United Kingdom. In London, Gorbachev had a seriesof highly cordial meetings with the senior members of the Thatchergovernment as well as the top officials of the Labour Party. In these

'S. Volodin, quoted in Gorbachev's Visit to London and the Elusive Anglo-Soviet Thaw,p. 4.

A 4! %

27

talks, Gorbachev expressly called for a "new era of dstente" andexpressed strong Soviet support for "major arms control reductions."The Western media widely praised Mr. Gorbachev, hailing him as "aman of power, intelligence and self-confidence." And following hisweek of meetings, Mrs. Thatcher surprised many in the West when sheannounced that she could "do business" with Mr. Gorbachev.2

Less than a week after Gorbachev's visit to London, then SovietPremier Nikolai Tikhonov flew to Turkey. Troubled economically anda key element in NATO's southern flank, Turkey, in Soviet eyes, was aWest European country and neighbor with which it was important tomend fences and improve ties. In two days of meetings, Tikhonovexplored a number of areas for expanded Soviet-Turkish ties. In histalks in Ankara, Tikhonov also stressed Soviet support for "radicalsolutions" in the field of arms control. Before leaving Turkey, Tikho-nov concluded two agreements on economic and industrial relations.One of these involved a projected $6 billion in trade between the twocountries in the next five years and the other concerned the regulationof technical and scientific relations over the next 10 years. In addition,a near-term agreement was concluded whereby Turkey would buy $650million of natural gas from the Soviet Union and $60 million in electri-city in exchange for Turkish food and industrial goods. All of this wasagreed to in the spirit of ameliorating the "good neighborly relations"existing between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Ten days later, on January 7-8, 1985, former Foreign Minister Gro-myko and Secretary Shultz met in Geneva as planned. An "umbrella"framework for new arms control negotiations was in fact formallyestablished: negotiations were to be conducted by a single delegationon each side divided into three separate working groups to deal withlong-range arms, medium-range nuclear weapons, and space arms.Questions concerning all three types of weapons were to be "consideredand resolved in their interrelationship."

During the week prior to the beginning of the actual negotiations inGeneva, politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky led a large Soviet"parliamentary" delegation to Washington that was the highest-ranking delegation to visit the United States in more than 10 years.Although the Shcherbitsky group's talks in Washington ranged oversuch issues as trade, human rights, and regional problems, the focus ofthe Soviet presentations was on arms control. Here, their emphasiswas on the importance of concluding new arms control agreements

2The New York Times, December 23, 1984.3The New York Times, December 27, 1984. For more details about Tikhonov's visit

to Turkey and thesn concluded agreements, see "Report on Cooperation Pact withTurkey," Prouda, January 4, 1985.

I!

28

which would, among other things, halt testing of antisatellite weaponsand research on space-based defense systems. This was the centralthrust of Shcherbitsky's presentation to President Reagan and it wasthe focus of the delegation's discussions with members of Congress.

In much the same vein and also in anticipation of the opening of theGeneva talks, former Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Italy andSpain in late February 1985. On both stops, Gromyko professed a keenSoviet interest in arms control. On both stops, though, he indicatedthat if the West wanted to make progress in reducing strategic andintermediate-range arms, the United States would have to abandonplans to build a space-based missile defense system. On the Gorbachevvisit to London, on the Shcherbitsky visit to Washington, and on theGromyko visits to Rome and Madrid, Soviet attention clearly hadshifted away from the INF deployments to America's strategic defenseprograms and antisatellite weapons. For the Soviets, these were "notonly the subjects of growing strategic concern but were also morevulnerable political targets than U.S. missiles in Europe."4

Accordingly, it was not surprising that when German Foreign Minis-ter Genscher paid a surprise visit to Moscow in early March, spaceweapons were again the subject of Soviet concern. During this visit,which seemed to signal an end to West Germany's quarantine by theEast, Genscher was warned that if the Kohl government cooperatedwith the Reagan administration in developing space-based weapons, itwould become an "accomplice" in violating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis-sile (ABM) treaty. On the other hand, if the Kohl government voicedits disapproval of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initia-tive, then the Soviet Union might be in a position, Genscher was told,to help further West German relations with the countries of EasternEurope.6

Moreover, in late 1984-early 1985, Moscow was sending out some-what contradictory signals concerning future Soviet relations with theFederal Republic of Germany. On the one hand, commentaries in theSoviet media continued to attack Chancellor Kohl's government for"militarism" and "revanchism." These attacks, unusually vitriolic dur-ing 1984, continued to appear into mid-1985, along with criticisms of

West Germany's subservience to Washington.6 On the other hand, afew Soviet commentators, discussing such developments as the Flick

4Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms Control," ForeignAffairs, America and the World 1984, pp. 520-522.

5The Economist, March 9, 1985, p. 47.68s "German Militarists and Revanchists Become More Active," International .

Affairs, September 1984, pp. 84-92. See also "Moscow Views Kohl's Talks in Washing- ' -: - -

ton," Moscow Domestic Service, December 1, 1984. -

29

scandal, the decline of the Liberals and the growth of the Green Party,and Kohl's weakening domestic political position, observed elements of"realism" in West Germany's position on "key questions pertaining torelations with socialist countries." Writing in mid-February 1985,well-known Soviet commentator Nikolai Portugalov commented on this"realism" in Bonn and summarily noted that "the socialist countries'decisive struggle against the manifestation of revanchism in the FRG[has had] a definite positive impact on West German political life." 7

In this light, it is significant that the long-dormant Soviet-WestGerman trade commission met for two days in Bonn in January 1985,fueling speculation that Moscow was now on the threshold of ending apolicy of trying to isolate the Federal Republic. It is also noteworthythat Mikhail Zimyanin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, leda Soviet parliamentary delegation to Bonn in the spring of 1985. Inthe view of Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, thehigh rank of the delegation's leader was intended to underscore theimportance of West German-Soviet relations. Zimyanin's delegationwas the first Soviet parliamentary delegation to visit Bonn in nineyears.8 In addition, in mid-June, there were consultations in Bonnbetween the political directors of the West German and Soviet foreignministries. The consultations were called to discuss German-Sovietrelations in the context of East-West relations and to decide on cele-brations for the August anniversary of the 1970 USSR-FRG treaty andfor the September anniversary of the start of diplomatic relationsbetween the two countries.

7Izvestia, February 14, 1985, p. 4.8Foreign Broadcast Information Service, February 8, 1985, p. G-2.

4:

VI. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WESTERNEUROPE: POSSIBLE SHORT-TERM

ALTERNATIVES

Considering these developments in late 1984-early 1985, what possi-ble short-term alternatives do the Soviets have with respect to policytoward Western Europe? There seem to be at least five paths that theSoviet Union might follow after the November summit meeting, assum-ing that the Soviet leadership pursues an active foreign policy towardthe West and is not consumed by domestic problems. Although thesepolicy alternatives can be-and herein are-described as distinct fromone another, they would in practice undoubtedly overlap one another.They would also depend, in practice, to a significant extent on contem-porary political and economic conditions in the Soviet Union and onthe policies that the West opted to pursue toward the Soviet Union.Inevitably, any future Soviet policy line would not be so coherently for-mulated or implemented as this discussion would suggest.

One alternative that the Soviet Union might opt to pursue in theshort term would be a policy that sharply differentiated between thegovernments of Western Europe and that of the United States.Toward the United States, political relations would, in essence, remainstrained. Economic relations would be limited. And no progress wouldbe likely in the realm of new superpower arms control agreements,although talks would go forward and the Soviets would continue toprospect for major concessions.

West European governments would be treated quite differently.Indeed, a central thrust of this policy alternative would be a Sovieteffort to try to counter hostile U.S. policies by expanding cooperativerelationships with the different governments of Western Europe. Sucha policy course would be designed, in essence, to develop an expandedpolitical, arms control, and commercial relationship with WesternEurope. Despite public denials, this, it would be hoped, would drive aserious wedge between the countries of Western Europe and the UnitedStates on such issues as SDI and continuing INF deployments andwould increase pressure on the United States to follow policies onthese issues more to Moscow's liking. There would, of course, be cer-tain parallels between this Soviet policy alternative and a Western pol-icy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe.

This policy alternative would inevitably involve an acceleration ofthe Soviet "de-demonizing" effort of the early 1980s, which was

30

l -,.'': -

31

temporarily put aside by Moscow immediately after the beginning ofthe INF deployments. A purposeful resumption of this effort mightwell entail, for example, a widely ballyhooed peace offensive towardWestern Europe, featuring a range of both new and old arms controlproposals designed to attract support in the West. Such an effortwould undoubtedly include a call for the demilitarization of space, anuclear freeze, a chemical weapon ban in Europe, a ban on all nucleartesting, and a moratorium on further INF deployments in Europe. Itmight also include a call for the reduction of battlefield nuclearweapons in Europe and the ultimate establishment of nuclear-freezones in various regions of the European continent. Or it mightinvolve new declaratory and "military-technical" proposals concerningconfidence and security-building measures in Europe, proposals trans-parently at odds with current NATO thinking on such measures at theongoing Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Any or allof these arms control initiatives would be put forward in an effort toweaken European support for American arms control and defense posi-tions and programs; to encourage European perceptions that Europeansecurity interests should be decoupled from those of the United States,particularly given America's growing interest in strategic defense; tobroaden Soviet political and economic relations with the countries ofWestern Europe; and to encourage European indifference to aggressiveSoviet activities in the third world.

Supplemented by an active public diplomacy and propaganda effort,this Soviet policy toward Western Europe could serve both short-termand long-term Soviet interests. Perhaps most importantly, it couldincrease near-term pressure on the United States to modify the Strate-gic Defense Initiative and could have a critical impact on the fulldeployment of Western intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.These deployments, after all, only began at the end of 1983. It will be1988 before all 572 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles aredeployed. If short-term Soviet policy can separate European policyfrom American policy in the defense and arms control area, such a pol-icy would inherently hold out the hope of preventing the full imple-mentation of the 1979 dual-track decision, or preventing deploymentsbeyond the original 572 missiles, something the Soviets may fear in the

post-1988 period if they continue to deploy additional SS-20s.Further, in mid-1985, there is some reason for the Soviets to be

hopeful that this policy course may bring positive results regardingboth Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium, after the Martensgovernment finally opted in early 1985 to deploy 16 cruise missiles onschedule, the government was toppled in July, primarily for other rea-sons. New elections were held in October and Martens is again prime

lz

I

32

minister. But it is unclear how the new Belgian government will han-dle future cruise missile deployments. In the Netherlands, the situa-tion is even more unclear. After delaying INF deployments for twoyears-the only one of the five NATO countries to alter the 1979schedule-the Dutch government decided in November 1985 to acceptcruise missile deployments. However, the opposition Labour Party, fly-ing high in 1985 polls, has firmly ruled out any compromise with thecurrently governing parties over the stationing of cruise missiles atWoensdrecht. And it is unclear at this writing whether or not theDutch parliament in February 1986 will ratify the government's deci-sion on cruise missile deployment, or perhaps put it off until after thenext Dutch elections, scheduled for May 1986.

If a two-track policy were purposefully pursued by the Soviet Union,it is unclear exactly how the Federal Republic of Germany would betreated. One variant under this option would be to treat the West Ger-man government in a manner different from other governments inWestern Europe. Under this variant, as was the case during much of1984, the Federal Republic of Germany would be singled out for partic-ular blame among European countries for greatly increasing thechances of nuclear war in Europe by accepting intermediate-rangenuclear forces on its soil. The West German government would berepeatedly attacked in Soviet media commentaries, more so than any ofthe other West European leaders. And Chancellor Kohl would typi-cally be grouped with President Reagan as a leader of the global"imperialist" and "revanchist" forces seriously jeopardizing peace inEurope.

An alternative variant under this policy option would be for theSoviet Union to treat the West German government in a manner simi-lar to that of the other governments of Western Europe. Vitriolicattacks against the West German government and Chancellor Kohlpersonally would cease and cooperative bilateral relations in the politi-cal and economic areas would proceed, including Soviet encouragementof future West German approaches to the countries of Eastern Europe.Which variant regarding the Federal Republic of Germany the Soviet 10Union would choose under this differentiated policy option would turnon such things as Soviet thinking about domestic political conditions inWest Germany, Bonn's stance on strategic defense and an INF mora-torium, developments in Eastern Europe, and which policy course theSoviets felt would best advance their interests in these areas.

A second policy alternative would be the converse of the first, i.e., adifferentiated Soviet policy that envisaged improved relations with theUnited States and cool Soviet relations with the countries of WesternEurope. Under this policy option, the Soviet Union would pursue with

Z vi--_0

33

new vigor nuclear arms control agreements with the United States,including a possible new superpower agreement concerning space arms.Such a positive Soviet policy toward the United States would likely gobeyond arms control to entail, for example, freer emigration policies,significantly expanded trade and cultural relations between Moscowand Washington, and the establishment of some kind of superpowerco-management mechanism for the handling of international crises inkey regions of the world.

This policy alternative would call for the purposeful continuation oflimited relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on theone hand, and the countries of Western Europe on the other. HarshSoviet propaganda would commonly be aimed at West Europeans andWest Germans in particular, with the idea of increasing WestGerman-European tensions. And while expanded Soviet-Europeanbilateral commercial and cultural links might be possible under thispolicy option-if the terms were sufficiently favorable to Sovietinterests-intra-European d6tente would not go forward. Indeed, underthis option, the Soviet Union would likely tighten the screws on itsEast European allies and prevent forward movement in the develop-ment of West European-East European ties.

A third near-term policy alternative for the Soviet Union withrespect to Western Europe would be a policy course similar to the onethat was pursued during the fall of 1983-summer of 1984 period, analternative that might aptly be termed a policy of defiance toward theWest. If the Soviets were to opt to pursue such a policy course towardthe West, it would be a policy that did not sharply distinguish betweenthe governments of Western Europe and that of the United States. Incontrast to Soviet policy of early 1983 when there was a differentiateddetente approach, for example, this policy of defiance would likely becharacterized by: strained political relations between the Soviet Unionand the governments of Western Europe; a virtual frozen silence inU.S.-Soviet political relations; Soviet indifference to Western pleasabout aggressive Soviet activities in third areas, such as Afghanistanand Angola; and no nuclear arms control negotiations.

Such a policy of defiance would be directed, in part, at both thegovernments and the publics of the West and would be inspired by thethought of intimidating the countries of Western Europe into pursuingpolicies more favorable to Soviet interests. Frequent talk in Moscowabout the increasing possibility of nuclear war, how the 1980sincreasingly resembled the 1930s in Europe, and consistently linking"fascism" to American "militarism" and "imperialism" would all becentral to this policy line. Harsh public, verbal attacks on selected

I

34

European and American leaders would also be part of such a policycourse.

At the same time, sympathetic attention would be purposefully paidto "progressive" European opposition leaders-German Social Demo-crat Brandt or British Labourite Kinnock, for example-but this atten-tion, if proffered, would likely be extended more selectively and withlower expectations than existed during the late 1970s and early 1980s.Antinuclear political leaders in and out of government who favored"realistic" and "peaceful" policies would likely be high on the list ofEuropeans deserving special attention from Moscow.'

A fourth policy alternative that the Soviet Union might adopt in theshort term would involve an active Soviet effort to pursue a broad-based neo-d6tente relationship with both the United States andWestern Europe, a relationship that bore some resemblance to thed6tente relationship of the early 1970s. This policy alternative wouldbe premised on the Soviet realization that the United States and itsWest European allies could not be meaningfully separated as a resultof Soviet policy; that there was no escape in the near term from anessentially bipolar world; that the United States was too important in abipolar world to deal with except in a direct manner; that the SovietUnion would be well-advised to stabilize East-West competition withthe United States, particularly given America's burgeoning strategicdefense effort; that many of the countries of Eastern Europe wouldinexorably favor expanded political, economic, and cultural relationswith the countries of Western Europe and it was preferable for theSoviet Union to manage these relations by leading them; and that arespite from the currently high level of East-West tensions might pro-vide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to focus on internal prob-lems.

The exact nature of a near-term Soviet effort aimed at pursuing arelaxation of tensions under this policy option would depend to a largeextent on the character and tone of Western policies toward the SovietUnion. That is, a Soviet effort to try to pursue a broad-based neo-d6tente policy with the West could have a number of different variants,depending in important ways on the West's posture toward the SovietUnion. Such a Soviet policy course would likely involve, however, newinitiatives in the political, cultural, economic, human rights, andperhaps most centrally, the arms control area. Historically, for theSoviet Union a policy of d6tente with the West has typically had as akey component the reduction in the risk of nuclear war with the 9'

18se V. Mikhailov, "Western Europe: Time is Running Out," Interntioam Affairs,May 1083, pp. 110-117. .

i : :j:: -S -.

35

United States. East-West arms control negotiations and agreementshave been seen as critical to reducing this risk and would likely remainso, if a d6tente policy alternative were pursued.

Inevitably, if the Soviet Union were to opt to pursue a broad-baseddetente relationship with the West, it would mean that the Sovietswould have to concomitantly modify a number of their arms controlpositions. For example, it seems likely at a minimum that the Sovietgovernment would have to alter its notions about equal security inEurope, including the idea that Soviet nuclear forces in Europe mustbe equal to those of the United States, the United Kingdom, andFrance combined. It would also probably mean that the Soviet Unionwould have to modify its current objections to America's StrategicDefense Initiative and the deployment of at least some Pershing IImissiles in Europe. Further, it would also mean that the Soviet Unionwould have to seriously consider: (1) discussing strategically signifi-cant ballistic missile reductions in the START context; (2) addressingpast U.S. charges of arms control violations and (3) discussing Ameri-can proposals for the stringent verification of new arms control agree-ments, possibly including on-site inspection.

For the Soviet Union to opt to make such changes in its arms con-trol positions and in the short term to try to effect a neo-d~tente rela-tionship with the West might signify a major change in the way theSoviet Union sought to approach the United States and WesternEurope. Or, on the other hand, it might just signify a continued long-term effort to loosen ties within the Atlantic Alliance, but through thechoice of different short-term means to this end. If the Sovietapproach to the West under this option were in fact driven primarilyby Soviet interest in loosening European ties with the United States,then Soviet efforts to pursue this neo-d~tente policy option might, insome ways, resemble the differentiated policy called for under the ini-tial policy alternative described above. Under this fourth option, a pol-icy of broad-based neo-d6tente toward Western Europe and the UnitedStates would be pursued as a way to expand Western Europe's roomfor political and economic maneuver and, in so doing, inevitablyincrease tensions within the Western camp. As Michael Sodaro hasrecently noted, for many Soviet policymakers, "'a policy of confronta-tion' in Europe could only reinforce Western Europe's dependence onthe United States and encourage the unity of the Western allies,whereas 'if the threat relaxes the contradictions rending them may beaggravated.' 2

Michml Sodaro, "Soviet Studies of the Western Alliance," in Herbert Ellison, SovietPoiey towward Wetem Ewope, University of Wshington Press, Seattle, 193, p. 252.

rillW F

A4 I! l

36

A fifth short-term policy alternative for the Soviet Union would be aconfrontational policy toward the West, a policy the opposite of thed6tente policy alternative and which would resemble the Sovietapproach toward the West during the immediate postwar years. Thechoice of a confrontational policy alternative would be premised on aperception by the Soviet Union that d~tente with the West was a failedpolicy; that the West was relatively united and unremittingly hostile toSoviet interests in the near term; and, consequently, that dealing con-structively with either the Europeans or the Americans or bothtogether was not now possible. Under the policy of defiance that theSoviet Union pursued during roughly the first half of 1984, East-Westrelations were generally poor, but there was no direct U.S.-Soviet con-frontation. Nowhere, for example, were American and Soviet soldiersdirectly engaged in hostilities. Nor, for that matter, was there any oneregion of the world where American (or European) forces and Sovietforces seriously offered the prospect of a major direct confrontation.

If this fifth policy alternative were pursued by the Soviet Union, thissituation would likely change. East-West areas of difference would bedirectly addressed, not swept under the rug. There would be a con-certed effort not only to separate Europe from the United States but todivide Europe within itself. There would also be a stepped-up Sovietpolitical and military effort to intimidate Western governments andpublics. There might be, for example, a crisis over Berlin, such as theone that the Soviets brought on in 1961. There would certainly be anintensified effort to stop Western research on strategic defense, toprevent the next phase of NATO INF deployments, and to undercutthe support of growing segments of West European populaces for theirconservative governments. Finally, there might also be increasedSoviet and Soviet-inspired terrorist activity against West Europeanand American targets. The key point is that, unlike the situationunder a policy of defiance, under this confrontational policy alternativeSoviet policies and associated efforts at intimidation would be carriedout through assertive Soviet actions as well as Soviet words. Aggres-siveness and interventionism would be the hallmarks of the fifth Sovietpolicy alternative.

t4- W

MJ

I

VII. CCNCLUSIONS

In the summer of 1985, it is possible to draw some tentative conclu-sions about the character of near-term Soviet policy toward WesternEurope. These conclusions are much more easily drawn now than afew months ago. For the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Gen-eral Secretary Gorbachev, President Gromyko, and Foreign MinisterShevardnadze, has provided in recent weeks some clues about thedirection of its policy toward the West. On the basis of the clues pro-vided to date, it seems highly unlikely, for example, that the SovietUnion will adopt in the near term the second, third, fourth, or fifthpolicy alternatives described in Sec. VI. It does not seem likely thatthe Soviet Union will soon adopt a policy line toward the West similarto that in the 1960s that is designed to improve relations between thesuperpowers but to keep relations between the Soviet Union andWestern Europe much less cordial; or a policy of such defiance towardWestern Europe and the United States (like that of 1983-84) that noarms control negotiations would be possible; or a policy of broad-basedd6tente (as in the early 1970s) that is acceptable to both the East andthe West; or a policy (like the 1950s) that is purposefully confronta-tional toward the West. These policy alternatives might conceivablyprove to be realistic medium-term choices for the Soviet Union, butthey are not likely to characterize the thrust of Soviet policy towardthe West during 1985-86.

Rather, short-term Soviet policy, despite public denials, is likely toproceed along the path suggested by the first alternative-a differen-tiated d6tente policy that focuses on cultivating improved bilateral rela-tions with the countries of Western Europe and attempts to drive awedge between the United States and its NATO allies. Such a policywould reflect substantial continuity with the policy tack adopted byMoscow during the early 1980s, before the Soviet Union opted for apolicy of defiance toward the West in the fall 1983-fall 1984 period.This differentiated d6tente policy would, in essence, have two tracks, aswas the case earlier. On one track would be Soviet relations with theUnited States. The emphasis in Soviet policy would be on repeatedpublic calls for a revival of a d6tente relationship with the UnitedStates; arms control, at least rhetorically, would be accorded highestpriority. In practice, the Soviet Union would in the near term prospectin both the arms control and commercial fields, hoping for unexpectedAmerican concessions or at least a possible softening in America's

37, 2.k".

-4,. 0 f EWW

38

position. In arms control, this would probably mean some flexibilityon the American side concerning space weapons, testing of antisatelliteweapons, the development of cruise missiles, or limiting the deploy-ment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the com-mercial area, this would likely mean new trade concessions, amongother things. In short, there would be interest in improved relationswith the United States but on Soviet terms.

Even without substantial hope for such a turn of events in its deal-ings with the United States, it seems likely that Moscow would in thenear term continue prospecting in talks with American officials. Thisapproach would have the effect of buying time for the new Gorbachevregime to consider its stance and to consolidate its political positionwithout committing itself to a new policy line. Further, if there is oneimportant political lesson that the Soviet Union learned from its adop-tion of a policy of defiance earlier, it is that to further Soviet interestsin Europe and elsewhere around the globe it is necessary for Moscow toappear to favor detente and arms control with the United States.Refusal to participate in arms negotiations with the United States hasbeen tried and found to be a losing tactic. Should such participationinduce concessions, so much the better from a Soviet point of view. Inthe meantime, the Soviets would undoubtedly hope that such participa-tion would at least shore up the Soviet Union's "peace-loving" imageand at the same time have the effect of increasing allied pressure onthe United States to be more flexible in its arms control talks with theEast. Peter Carrington, the NATO Secretary General, recentlyobserved that such a Soviet approach would reflect continuity in theirpolicy, for "experience over the years has shown that the Soviet Uniondoesn't get down to business if it thinks that concessions are going tofall into its lap without it making any concessions on its side."

Of considerable importance as well, such an approach would allowthe Soviet Union to pursue most effectively the second track of a dif-ferentiated d6tente policy-that of expanding relations with the coun-tries of Western Europe at the same time as exacerbating differencesbetween those countries and the United States. As already noted, bymid-1985 there was growing evidence that the Soviet Union in the ser-vice of such a wedge-driving effort had decided to carrry on a peaceoffensive centered around crt+;cism of America's Strategic DefenseInitiative.2 Gorbachev's visits to Great Britain and France,

'The Washington Post, March 16, 1966, p. A28.18w Testimony of Richard Burt on "Developments in Europe, May 1986," Subcom-

mitse on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 22, 1985,Ninety-Ninth Congress, 1st Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,

.4-

NNW,_-

39

Shevardnadze's visits to Helsinki and New York, Gromyko's visits toRome and Madrid, Genscher's talks in Moscow, Tikhonov's visit toTurkey-these and several other diplomatic missions all involvedefforts by Moscow to simultaneously find new areas for cooperativebilateral agreements and to convince Europeans that it was unwise andpotentially dangerous to be allied with the United States, particularlyin support of America's Strategic Defense Initiative. This Americaneffort was widely portrayed as leading toward a destabilizing, expensivespiral in a new arms race in space. The mid-March 1985 public state-ments of General Secretary Gorbachev and chief Soviet arms controlnegotiator Viktor Karpov criticizing America's strategic defense pro-gram; continuing Soviet media commentaries that attack PresidentReagan for favoring "dangerous, militaristic policies"; current Sovietpronouncements about an INF moratorium, including offers of bilateralINF discussions with France, the United Kingdom, and the Nether-lands; and recent Soviet calls for a no-first-use pledge in theStockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe can all be inter-preted as part of an ongoing Soviet peace offensive designed to exploitand widen differences between the United States and its Europeanallies.

How long will the Soviet Union persist in pursuing this sort of two-tracked, wedge-driving, differentiated d6tente policy toward the West?It is, of course, difficult to answer this question with any certainty.Internal factors affecting Soviet policy decisions, for example, will pro-bably remain obscure and ambiguous. Soviet views about the evolutionof the correlation of forces will also likely be of critical importance butdifficult to assess with any certitude. It does seem likely, though, thatSoviet perceptions of the emerging evidence regarding at least four con-siderations will be of some significance. First, the Soviets will weighthe evidence as to the likelihood that they will succeed in extractingconcessions from the United States through the pursuit of this policy.If this differentiated detente approach induces or holds high promise toinduce the United States to make unexpected concessions in the armscontrol and commercial areas-concessions made under increasingpressure from Western Europe and a restive Congress-then it seemsreasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will persist in pursuingthis policy tack. Conversely, if this policy approach does not lead to orhold serious promise of leading to new concessions from the UnitedStates, Moscow may have a greater incentive to consider adopting anew policy line.

A second consideration that is likely to affect the future course ofSoviet policy toward the West will be Moscow's perception of AtlanticAlliance unity over defense and arms control policies. If the pursuit of

I €

40

a differentiated detente policy is perceived in Moscow as leading toserious divisions within NATO over the wisdom of such efforts asstrategic defense, continuing INF deployments, continued undergroundnuclear testing, a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge, or nationalforce modernization programs, then the Soviet Union is likely to con-tinue this policy course. On the other hand, if Soviet efforts toincrease intra-Alliance differences on these issues (especially SDI)prove to be counterproductive, have the effect of enhancing Alliancecohesion, and lead Moscow to reach a pessimistic assessment of thetrends in the East-West balance, Moscow will be more likely to rethinkits policy toward the West. For a variety of reasons, SDI is for now aless divisive issue in terms of intra-Alliance politics than INF. But thelonger-term impact of SDI on the functioning of the Atlantic Allianceis unclear, and the Soviets seem determined to use this issue as a cen-tral part of their current wedge-driving efforts.

A third consideration likely to have an important impact on futureSoviet policy toward the West relates to Soviet perceptions about theprospects for antinuclear opposition parties to gain power in the late1980s. If the West European Left is seen by Moscow as having a sub-stantial chance to accede to office in the next elections in countriessuch as Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example,then a policy of differentiated detente toward the West in the interimperiod may hold considerable appeal. If, on the other hand, this is notin prospect, there may well be increased incentives for Moscow toadopt a different policy line toward the West in the medium term.

Finally, the situation in Eastern Europe is a fourth considerationthat is likely to have a significant impact on future Soviet policytoward Western Europe. For Moscow, ensuring continued East Euro-pean responsiveness to Soviet interests is a sine qua non. If, for exam-ple, the pursuit of a broad-based d6tente policy toward the West wereperceived in Moscow as undercutting this responsiveness, the SovietUnion would be unlikely to follow this policy course. On the otherhand, if a given future policy approach toward Western Europe wereperceived as helpful to maintaining or enhancing Soviet interests inEastern Europe, then that approach would likely commend itself highlyto the Soviet Union.3 10

Perhaps at the time of the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress,scheduled for February 1986, the Gorbachev regime will formalize anew medium-term policy line. At present, both the Soviet Union and

3For a more detailed discussion of how East European considerations are likely to 9

affect future Soviet policy toward Western Europe, see A. Rose Johnson, The Future ofSoviet Policy toward Western Europe: East European Considerations, The Rand Corpora-taon (forthcoming).

'. t

as C

41

the United States are prospecting in and posturing about arms controldiscussions in Geneva while seeking to convince West European parlia-ments and publics that they are serious in those arms control negotia-tions. Curiously, it seems that each superpower is more confidentabout its efforts to positively influence European opinion about itsintentions than about the possibilities of achieving concrete progress inthe talks themselves. And this is likely to continue to be the case inthe near term.

Beyond the period from the present until the next party Congress, ifa decision is made in Moscow to move away from the kind of differen-tiated dtente policy described here and to move, for example, to amore broad-based detente relationship with the West, including theUnited States, then the evolution of Soviet behavior in three areas willbe good indicators of such a change. First, there are human rightsissues and emigration. If, for example, the Soviet Union were toadhere to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and to pursue thekind of open policy on Jewish emigration that naturally led to thedisappearance of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, thiswould be an important indicator of a changed Soviet approach towardthe West. Second, there is Soviet policy toward certain regional issues.If, for example, the Soviet Union were to adopt a more conciliatoryapproach toward the amicable resolution of outstanding differences inAfghanistan, Angola, or Central America, this would probably signifyan important change in Soviet policy toward the West. Third, andmost importantly, there is arms control, where there are a number ofways that the Soviet Union could boldly signal a change in theirapproach toward the West. Modifying objections to America's strategicdefense effort, agreeing to strategically significant reductions in thenumber, vulnerability, and throwweight of their ballistic missile war-heads, dropping an unrealistic insistence on no Western INF deploy-ments in Europe, changing its thinking about how to deal with Britishand French nuclear forces within the Geneva context, being willing toconsider more stringent verification measures, taking steps to addressAmerican allegations about the illegality of the Soviet Krasnoyarskradar site, negotiating seriously and confidentially in Geneva with aperceptible toning down of public propaganda attacks against the U.S.Strategic Defense Initiative-these are all steps that the Soviet Unioncould take which would point toward an evolution in their approach

toward the West.Regardless of the policy line that the Soviet Union opts to pursue

toward the West in the future, there is little question that the funda-mental continuity of long-term Soviet objectives toward its West Euro-pean neighbors will remain-the peaceful transformation of the

1 -

7.

1

42

dynamic political status quo in Western Europe in favor of the SovietUnion. As we have seen in the recent past, however, Soviet tactics toachieve this objective can and do change, depending on pragmatic judg-ments that are made at any given time. It is in the West's interest tounderstand the motivations and correlations of forces that affect thesepragmatic judgments. For only by doing so can it hope to induce theSoviet Union to pursue policies toward Western Europe that will beconstructive from an overall Western point of view.

,- -

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY

December 12, 1979 NATO ministers approve deployment of 108Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launchedcruise missiles in Europe; also request East-West talks on limiting these long-range theaternuclear forces (LRTNF)

December 27, 1979 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan

January 4, 1980 President Carter announces anti-Soviet mea-sures in the wake of the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan

October 2, 1980 British Labour Party backs unilateral dis-armament for the first time in 20 years

October 17, 1980 The United States and Soviet Union begin pre-liminary talks on limiting long-range theaternuclear forces

November 4, 1980 Ronald Reagan elected President of the UnitedStates

April 7, 1981 NATO Nuclear Planning Group reaffirms twingoals of LRTNF modernization and verifiablearms agreement

October 24, 1981 Large antinuclear public rallies in several Euro-pean capitals

November 18, 1981 President Reagan proposes "zero-option," whichwould cancel planned NATO intermediate-rangenuclear force (INF) deployments if the SovietUnion dismantles its medium-range SS-20,SS-4, and SS-5 missiles

November 30, 1981 U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting INF open inGeneva

December 13, 1981 Martial law declared in Poland; the UnitedStates ends all pending aid to Poland

February 2, 1982 The United States tables draft treaty in Genevaembodying "zero option" proposal - C

March 16, 1982 General Secretary Brezhnev announces that theSoviet Union is suspending deployment of newSS-20 missiles in European Russia

43

I

44

May 9, 1982 In speech at Eureka College (Illinois), PresidentReagan proposes one-third reduction in Ameri-can and Soviet land- and sea-based ballisticmissile warheads

June 18, 1982 The United States extends trade sanctions onmaterials for Soviet natural gas pipeline toinclude subsidiaries of U.S. companies; movesubsequently rejected by the United Kingdom,France, West Germany, and Italy

June 29, 1982 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks(START) begin in Geneva

July 16, 1982 U.S. and Soviet INF negotiators secretly discuss"walk-in-the-woods" initiative, which is subse-quently rejected in both Moscow and Washing-ton

September 29, 1982 Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet ForeignMinister Gromyko meet in New York but talksyield no new agreements

October 1, 1982 German Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, withFree Democratic Party support, is elected chan-cellor, ending 13-year Social Democrat-FreeDemocrat ruling partnership

November 10, 1982 Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev dies; formerKGB chief Yuri Andropov subsequently namedto replace him

November 22, 1982 German Social Democrats overwhelmingly voteto reject new NATO INF deployments

December 7, 1982 Danish Parliament freezes Denmark's contribu-tion to deployment of new NATO missiles inEurope

January 1, 1983 In major story, Pravda blames deadlocked armscontrol talks on American effort to achieve mili-tary superiority

January 4, 1983 German opposition SPD leader Hans-JochemVogel visits Moscow

February 25, 1983 German Chancellor Kohl publicly attacks SovietUnion for unprecedented meddling in Germanelectoral campaign

II

45

March 6, 1983 Christian Democrats in West Germany scoremajor electoral victory, winning 244 seats in498-member Bundestag; new Green Party wins27 seats and gains parliamentary representation

March 23, 1983 President Reagan, in national address, launchesthe Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), challeng-ing American scientists to develop effectiveantiballistic missile defense to counter Sovietnuclear threat

April 7, 1983 Soviet official Vadim Zagladin interviewed onHungarian television, openly praising andencouraging "progressive forces" in the West

June 9, 1983 Conservative Party under Prime MinisterThatcher wins majority of seats in British gen-eral elections

June 27, 1983 Christian Democrats and Communists sufferlosses in Italian national elections; SocialistBettino C.axi emerges as Prime Minister

August 28, 1983 Andropov sends letter to Craxi, urging delay inItalian INF deployments

September 1, 1983 Soviet Union shoots down Korean Air Liner#007 after it strays into Soviet airspace, killingall 269 persons aboard

September 26, 1983 President Reagan, in speech at United Nations,stresses the importance of arms control andannounces new U.S. INF proposal

September 28, 1983 In strongly worded statement, Andropovdenounces "militarist" course of Reagan admin-istration

October 22, 1983 Major anti-INF demonstrations in several Euro-pean capitals

October 26, 1983 Andropov offers new concessions in INF, whichthe United States dismisses as "vague"

November 22, 1983 West German Bundestag votes 286 to 226 to goforward with INF deployments

November 23, 1983 Soviets walk out of INF negotiations; refuse toset new date for resumption, and send threaten-ing letters to German Chancellor Kohl, British

r&:

4I,

,~~1

!

46

Prime Minister Thatcher, and Italian PrimeMinister Craxi

December 8, 1983 START session ends; Soviets refuse to set newdate for resumption of talks

December 10, 1983 Soviet Marshal Ogarkov issues statement on theincreasing threat of nuclear war as a result ofINF deployments

December 30, 1983 West Germany says the first nine of 108 Persh-ing II missiles to be deployed in that countryare now operational

January 16, 1984 President Reagan makes major, conciliatoryaddress on U.S.-Soviet relations

January 17, 1984 Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromykomeet in Stockholm on the occasion of the open-ing of the Conference on Disarmament inEurope; talks yield few results

February 9, 1984 Yuri Andropov dies; Konstantin Chernenko sub-sequently named to be General Secretary

March 2, 1984 Chernenko hints at possible new avenues tobreak U.S.-Soviet deadlock but hints come tonothing

March 11, 1984 West German Social Democratic leader Hans-Jochem Vogel in Moscow; receives cool recep-tion

March, 1984 Retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, in Moscowon private business, tries to deliver personalmessage from President Reagan to GeneralSecretary Chernenko but is unable to see anytop-ranking Soviet officials

April 23, 1984 Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti inMoscow; Gromyko threatens to turn Italy "intoa Pompeii"

May 7, 1984 Soviet Union announces decision to boycottOlympics

May 14, 1984 Soviet Union announces movement of subma-rines closer to U.S. shores

May 20, 1984 West German Foreign Minister Hans-DietrichGenscher receives cool reception in Moscow;

IF rr !l ! ! ; .

I

47

told that the Soviet Union will not resume armscontrol negotiations until all INF missiles arewithdrawn from Western Europe

May 31, 1984 NATO Foreign Ministers issue WashingtonDeclaration pledging Atlantic Alliance unity

June 13, 1984 Dutch Parliament approves plan that would per-mit delay in cruise missile deployments twoyears beyond scheduled 1986 deadline if there isprogress in U.S.- Soviet negotiations; decision tobe made on November 1, 1985

June 14, 1984 Chernenko attacks Western interest in arms {control as part of "a position-of-strength" strat-egy

June 21, 1984 French President Mitterand in Moscow;expresses agreement with President Reagan thatno new concessions should be made in order toresume superpower arms control talks

June 29, 1984 Surprise Soviet proposal to begin space armscontrol talks with the United States in Sep-tember; affirmative U.S. response not acceptedby the Soviet Union

July 3, 1984 British Foreign Minister Howe in Moscow; sub-jected to anti-Washington diatribe from Gro-myko

July 20, 1984 Soviets send delegation to nuclear disarmamentconference in Perugia, Italy; Soviet positionsattacked by several Western antinuclearactivists

September 1, 1984 Chernenko proposes arms control discussionsconcerning space weapons

September 4, 1984 East German leader Honecker announces post-ponement of trip to the Federal Republic ofGermany; Bulgarian leader Zhikov's trip alsopostponed

September 15, 1984 Italian Prime Minister Craxi releases letterfrom President Reagan expressing "deep Ameri-can commitment" to new arms control accord inan effort to deflect charges that the UnitedStates is not serious about arms control

i -- -

I

September 27, 1984 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Demo-cratic Presidential candidate Walter Mondalemeet in New York

September 28, 1984 President Reagan and Gromyko meet in Wash-ington

October 16, 1984 Chernenko interview with The Washington Postin which he lays out conditions for new armscontrol talks

October 27, 1984 Seven major West European nations assertEuropean "identity" in defense matters and sup-port reorganized Western European Union

November 6, 1984 Ronald Reagan reelected President of theUnited States

November 17, 1984 Chernenko letter to Reagan proposing futurearms control talks

November 22, 1984 Joint U.S.-Soviet announcement that a newround of arms control talks will begin; SecretaryShultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko to meetin Geneva in early January to develop agenda

November 26, 1984 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfrid Martens callsfor delay in deployment of cruise missiles inBelgium, pending developments in Geneva inJanuary 1985

December 22, 1984 Soviet leader Gorbachev ends week-long visit toLondon; Prime Minister Thatcher declares thatshe "can do business" with him

January 7-8, 1985 Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromykomeet in Geneva; set agenda for March negotia-tions on reducing strategic nuclear arms,medium-range weapons, and space arms

January 15, 1985 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfrid Martens inWashington; affirms Belgian support for dual-track decision but vague about timing ofscheduled cruise missile deployments in Belgium

February 22, 1985 British Prime Minister Thatcher in Washing-ton; declares that there are "no differences" .between the United States and the UnitedKingdom concerning strategic defense

4i_--4.:.s

49

February 26, 1985 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Rome;urges Italy to break with the United States andoppose Strategic Defense Initiative

March 3-4, 1985 German Foreign Minister Genscher unex-pectedly meets with Gromyko in Moscow to dis-cuss East-West relations

March 6, 1985 Italian Prime Minister Craxi in Washington;supports research on strategic defense butemphasizes central importance of arms control

March 8, 1985 Soviet politburo member Vladim-r Shcherbitskymeets with President Reagan in Washington;differences about strategic defense aired

March 11, 1985 Chernenko dies; Gorbachev named Soviet Gen-eral Secretary

March 12, 1985 U.S.-Soviet "umbrella" negotiations on armscontrol open in Geneva

March 14, 1985 General Secretary Gorbachev accepts invitationsto visit Bonn and Paris; gives vague response toU.S. proposal for a summit meeting

March 14, 1985 Belgian government announces decision to beginthe immediate deployment of cruise missiles asscheduled by NATO

March 15, 1985 British Foreign Secretary Howe expresses"serious questions" about America's StrategicDefense Initiative

March 20, 1985 Belgian government wins 116-93 vote of confi-dence on decision to deploy cruise missiles

April 7, 1985 Gorbachev announces Soviet moratorium onSS-20 deployments until November

April 26, 1985 Gorbachev tells Warsaw Pact meeting that theSoviet Union supports at least a 25 percentreduction in ICBM launchers

June 10, 1985 The United States indicates that it will notundercut SALT II

June 10, 1985 Italian voters reject a communist-backed eco-nomic proposal, strengthening the Craxi coali-tion's position

"4 " .,

I50

June 26, 1985 Gorbachev publicly accuses the United States of"wasting time" in Geneva; hints at possibleSoviet walkout

July 1, 1985 Gromyko named President of the Soviet Union;Shevardnadze named Foreign Minister

July 3, 1985 U.S.-Soviet summit announced for mid-Novem-ber

July 16, 1985 Belgian Prime Minister Martens' governmentfalls; new elections set for October

July 29, 1985 The United States and the Soviet Union pro-pose new nuclear test ban initiatives

July 31, 1985 Shultz and Shevardnadze meet in Helsinki tocelebrate the 10th anniversary of the HelsinkiFinal Act and to discuss the November summitmeeting

I

4 f

f

v- ., -,

IAT.

LM0