IEE MANAGEMENT & DESIGN DIVISION: CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

Some art, some science anda lot of feedback

R.N.G. Burbridge. O.B.E.. C.Eng.. F.I.E.E.Indexing terms: Power systems and plant, Project engineering, Engineering management

Abstract: The paper examines the methods adopted for the management of major projects. It concentrates onthe management of the design and construction of conventional power stations by the CEGB in the UK. Theroles of the owner, the engineer and the contractor are discussed together with the process of setting up a giantproject. Project definition, contract strategy, the design, the construction, commissioning and taking overphases are discussed in terms of project management and the controls associated with time and money aredescribed. Reference is made to the last three decades of construction and to the analogies of the very differentproblems arising in each decade. Examples are quoted using the Grain and Drax completion power stationprojects to emphasise some of the lessons of the 1970s. A few examples of feedback of operating problems todesigners are given with the solutions to these problems leading to the high availability and flexible operation ofthe 500/660 MW sized units now achieved.

1 Introduction

It is my intention to describe my personal experiences inthe management of major projects and indicate the choicesavailable for establishing the project strategy and point outsome possible pitfalls. It will not surprise you that I shallrefer on many occasions to my experience in the construc-tion of large modern conventional power stations, showingthe relationships of the parties involved, and make myjudgements against that background. The relationships forconstruction of nuclear power station projects are notincluded in the paper.

In the simplest of projects there are three principal par-ticipants: the owner, the engineer and the contractor; anideal definition of interests which can easily be controlled.However, when we consider an actual major project,although these three principals remain, the involvedparties increase in number to include many additionalpartners; these will include financial sponsors, consortiapartners, architect engineers, Government, lawyers,insurers, multicontractors, trade associations,environmental and local pressure groups, and manyothers, and the control becomes more difficult.

2 Partners

2.1 The ownerIt is the owner's task to make the decision to build a newproject, to make sure that the means of achieving thelowest overall costs are identified and that sufficientfinance is available to make the project viable. The deci-sion requires the owner to make judgements in the follow-ing areas:

(i) to identify the need and define the project(ii) to evaluate the technical feasibility including

environmental and safety requirements(iii) to establish the capital costs of the plant and the

financial viability of the project on a lifetime basis(iv) to analyse the business and technical risks, and

ensure that these are taken into account in decidingwhether to proceed

(v) to establish the management and secure resources(vi) to propose the design standards and specifications.

Paper 2713A, delivered before the IEE Management & Design Division on the 8thNovember 1983Mr. Burbridge is Director of Projects with the CEGB Generation Development andConstruction Division, Barnett Way, Barnwood, Gloucester GL4 7RS, England

The evaluation process is not merely a technical appre-ciation; it includes all of the risks, which are identified,weighed and economically balanced against the overalloperational regime. It includes the market need, the fore-cast load factor, the programme for construction, any devi-ations of those requirements, possible problems in thepay-back period and analysis of environmental, planningand legal requirements associated with the site and necess-ary to launch the overall project.

2.2 The engineerThe engineer is responsible for achieving the task withinthe brief provided by the owner, the defined evaluationrules and the finance allocated. This role is similar to thatof the architect on domestic or commercial building pro-jects, and hence the term architect/engineer is commonlyused for the role on major process plant projects.

It is a paramount requirement that one individualshould be nominated to act as the engineer and to providea focal point for all interfaces.

Therefore on large or complex projects a projectmanager is appointed by the owner to act as the engineer.He is given responsibility for managing the project and co-ordinating the relationship between owner, engineer andcontractors. Although a sound knowledge of design pro-cedures, construction economics and plant operation isneeded, the background and initial training of a projectmanager are of less importance than his managementexpertise, decision-making ability and leadership qualities.

Stress must be placed on the requirements for multidis-ciplined financial and planning control, which suggeststhat project management could be recognised as a disci-pline suitable for specialisation at a mid-career point. Pro-fessional bodies, now recognising the importance of therole, encourage and acknowledge the function of projectmanagement and, in fact, the M3 (Management ofengineering) Executive Committee in the IEE Management& Design Division, has this as a high-priority subject.

A project manager's role involves the integration ofactivities of the individuals concerned with the project, sothat each individual member of the group strives toachieve his individual objectives in a manner consistentwith the overall interests of the project, without hinderingthe efforts of his fellow members. The project manager'srole also involves ascertaining that each individual contri-bution has the appropriate balance of interest, both tech-nically and economically, and that the responsibility and

24 IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

authority of each of the constituent members are defined.It is he who has the control of the budget, for which he isaccountable to the owner. One of his prime skills must bein delegating sections of his accountability to others (eitherby contract, by agreement or by direct employment), whileretaining overall accountability himself. In the process,objectives are established and his task is to co-ordinateand manage these objectives.

This then is the project management task with whichthe project manager and his team are charged. Projectmanagement is defined as the overall planning, control andco-ordination of a project from inception to completion inorder to meet the owner's requirements and to ensurecompletion on time, within budget and to required qualitystandards.

2.3 The contractorIt is the contractor's task to examine the owner/engineer'srequirements and specifications, to quantify his risks andcosts, to tender for the work and, if selected, to completethe work within the terms of the contract.

In the tendering and pre-contract stage, estimating hasto be undertaken to establish a cost and commercialreturn. In particular the contractor will evaluate risksassociated with the contract in terms of

(a) technical uncertainties(b) availability of technical, management, production

and financial resources to secure the programme required(c) contractual liabilities in the event of failure to

achieve the contract requirements(d) ensuring that the full extent of supply is identified

and taken into account.

He then has to prepare a fully detailed offer which willstand the test of operating the contract over a period ofseveral years. To do this he must

(i) where necessary seek clarification of the tender docu-ments from the owner via the engineer

(ii) establish and secure the manufacturing programme(iii) obtain quotations for bought out items or subcon-

tracted work(iv) estimate direct costs and overheads(v) assess the levels of contingency sums and profit to be

included in the pricing and any tender qualifications(vi) detail the management structure.

He must then participate in the settlement of the contractin a form suitable to all parties.

Once the contract is accepted and work enters the con-tract stage, the contractor is responsible for completing theworks in accordance with the contract documents and theEngineer's requirements.

The following are the main areas of activity:(i) establishing effective management control and

liaison/reporting with the owner and/or the engineer(ii) completing the design and complying with require-

ments for submission of drawings, programmes etc., forapproval by the owner/engineer

(iii) organising labour and other resources and enteringinto subcontracts to ensure timely progress and com-pletion to the programme

(iv) ensuring that his responsibilities for the quality ofthe manufactured product are met

(v) ensuring that the plant or equipment is manufac-tured and erected to programme

(vi) planning the method of working and compliancewith safety and other legislation

(vii) notifying the owner/engineer promptly of thecauses of delay and of the efforts being made in rectifica-

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

tion, and submitting and substantiating any claims forextensions of time or additional costs

(viii) participating in any multicontractor site com-mitees on safety, welfare, industrial relations, paymentsystems, commissioning etc.

(ix) setting the plant or equipment to work(x) guaranteeing performance and reliability.

Following handing over of the works to the owner, thecontractor has the residual liability for remedying defectsfor the period specified in the contract.

3 Evaluation process

It is often stated that thinking time is very cheap, but it iswell known that many schemes spend between 5 and 10%of the project cost in a full evaluation process. In recenttimes, high interest rates and short payback periods havemeant that many projects viable in concept have beeneliminated when adjustments have been made to cover allrisk areas. This matter is further complicated when there ismore than one direct participant in the project, and manyof the major projects financed by private capital can haveup to 30 direct participants each making their own assess-ments in quantifying the risks. Every participant adds tothe number of interfaces and every interface is an addedpotential contribution to delay, to disharmony and,perhaps, to disintegration. Similar problems occur inpublic sector projects official where Government policyand public sanctions by means of inquiries must be takeninto account. In these projects it is essential to ensure thatevery committee, political or otherwise, is fully justified.

Many major projects fail to be launched because duringthe evaluation phase the roles of the owner and of thesponsors are confused from the outset. Too many interests,each as an independent element (often with its own objec-tives, interests and rules), reduce the entrepreneurial flairwith too cautious an approach to risk taking. The manage-ment of this phase is very complex, requiring the analysisof a multidiscipline activity based on historical experienceand assessments of likely future commercial, technical andeconomic parameters. The team advising the owner maywell have been brought together for the first time, andthere will be many social and self-interest considerations toresolve if the group is to work effectively. It is essential toensure that the participants are compatible, are all able tobear the risks involved, and are minimised in number.

Many projects have been discarded because the owneris not identified as a single management unit. The variousparticipants do not delegate to a single team leader fullauthority for the evaluation process by seconding into thatteam the range of expertise which is necessary to make thecorrect sound judgements and evaluations. Major businessprojects can be unpopular with ambitious managersbecause the outcomes of the projects are unpredictable andsubject to severe delays, so that those involved frequentlycannot use their best skills fully. Further, the difficultiesthat cause these frustrating delays are often mainly orentirely outside the control of the senior managersinvolved.

In the evaluation and subsequent completion stages of aproject, the matters which are most demanding are theidentification of the owner's interests and the maintainingof his confidence through all phases of activity, particularlywhen things go wrong. A project evaluation must becarried out for its whole working life, i.e. total projectmanagement to maintain control through every phase ofactivity. The evaluation must take account of previous

25

publicaffairs legal finance CEGB executive secretary operations computer

service

corporatestrategy

CentralGovernment

localauthorities

police

local groups

media

fine artcommission

tradeassociations

CPCG

NEDO

I finance GDCD directors

istation design!

CEGBheafthsafety

region

HSE

NAECI TUC trade unionsplant contractors

(over 100)waterauthority

fireofficer ITPIA

Fig. 1 Project relationships

operating and construction experience, using provendesign concepts together with the best costing and prog-ramming information that can be obtained, so that themost satisfactory lifetime benefit is achieved by the project.

There are many consulting companies capable of under-taking the evaluation task for potential owners. In theCEGB this problem is simplified as the CEGB Executivemaintains its functional advisers on a permanent basis toevaluate and prepare plans for executive authorisation.The Corporate Strategy Department is responsible for theestimation of demand and has to assess, over manydecades ahead, the possible scenarios of plant mix to caterfor all strategic and system requirements. In view of theprotracted planning process a number of sites have to beinvestigated to give the security required. Power stationshave exacting demands for transport, for fuel, for coolingwater, for connection to the grid system and for access andstability during the construction stage. The planning andevaluation stage of a major project of this nature will takeat least four years, which is about the norm for the UKand other European countries. The current inquiry intothe Sizewell B PWR indicates the depth of investigationand discussion that can be required in the introduction ofa new development. An inquiry of this nature covers allaspects of the business; the need, the economic case, thedesign, the safety, the environmental impact, therebyrequiring considerable design detail, past experience andinformation to satisfy the inquiry.

For the construction of the Dinorwig pumped-storageproject, a private Act of Parliament was necessary to allowthe project to proceed.

26

Fig. 1 identifies some of the departments and organis-ations involved in a CEGB project. The owner, the CEGBExecutive, and the owner's team are shown at the top ofFig. 1, the engineer/project manager and his support are inthe middle, and the contractors (over 100 in number) arerepresented at the bottom. The owner's operator, who hasthe task of accepting and running the plant and earningthe revenue, is shown on the right.

The map of the UK in Fig. 2 shows how some of thesemajor contractors are dispersed in the case of the Draxproject.

When a decision is made to proceed with a specificproject, station particulars are issued to the GenerationDevelopment & Construction Division (GD&CD) of theCEGB with an authority to proceed to meet the CorporateStrategy Department's technical particulars within abudget and programme to which GDCD has been party.

4 The project stage

4.1 The organisationFirst there are considerations of the alternative organis-ational arrangements. These are too detailed to debatehere, but Fig. 3 gives a few of the many alternatives.Depending on the owner's in-house capability, variousoptions are available.

The high cost of ownership and the requirement to havein-house research and design expertise to secure efficientand economical operation are important features inmaking this decision.

1EE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

The CEGB has constructed a large number of conven-tional power station projects and has therefore developedthe necessary experience and skills to use its own in-houseengineering organisation, as shown in Fig. 3 (direct ownerresponsibility).

4.2 The project teamIn the CEGB, the Director-General of the GenerationDevelopment & Construction Division at Barnwood,Gloucestershire, appoints a project manager for eachproject, responsible for the management of all aspects ofthe project design, procurement, construction and commis-sioning, and serviced by specialist design engineers in func-tional branches, by draughtsmen, planners, and

Map of Britain showing dispersion of contractors for the DraxFig. 2project

1 Babcock Power, Renfrew2 Arrol Findlay, Motherwell3 NEI-Parsons, Newcastle upon Tyne4 NEI-Parsons Automation, and NEI Clarke Chapman, Gateshead5 North East Region HQ, Harrogate6 N.G. Bailey, Bradford7 J. Howden, NEI-Reyrolle and Sulzers, Leeds8 Drax9 EMMCO, Scarborough

10 Wads worth, Bolton11 Mather & Platt, Manchester12 Balfour Beatty, Liverpool13 Sir Alfred McAlpine, Wirral14 Aiton, Derby15 Adamson Butterley, Telford16 Tarmac Construction and NEI John Thompson Kennicott, Wolverhampton17 Lawrence Scott, Norwich18 GEC, Rugby19 GD and CD, Barnwood20 Bierrum & Partners, Dunstable21 Mowlem, Brentwood22 CEGB Headquarters, Babcock Power, Sturtevant, Hawker Siddeley PowerTransmission, London, and W.S. Atkins, Epsom23 Solartron, Farnborough

commercial, financial and administrative staff, who are sec-onded into or available to his team. At peak the projectteams for conventional stations would comprise 120 staffwith a similar number of staff at the construction site. Theproject manager is also required to co-operate and liaisewith the owner's operating region throughout the designand contract phase and to work with them in the commis-sioning and plant acceptance phases. The operating regionaccepts the commissioned plant and is then responsible forthe achievement of the pay-back to meet the owner'srequirements over the project's life.

In these circumstances the CEGB project manager, aswell as dealing with consultants and contractors, has theresponsibility of dealing with the various departments ofthe CEGB with an interest in the development of newpower stations. These often conflicting 'in-house' require-ments can impose additional demands and ingenuity onthe project manager in diplomatically resolving situationsto his own employer's overall best interest.

The first key task of management is for the projectmanager to establish with all concerned the project strat-egy and the associated contract strategy, assess the finan-cial viability of his brief, assure the budget and appraisethe risks. In this respect further specialist development andinvestigations into the design, site conditions, manufac-turing and construction plans are necessary to satisfyhimself and enable him to accept the task. He will alsoneed to establish his team's mechanism for reportingthrough his directorate to the owner. The frequency anddetail of the reports have to be agreed, covering the prog-ramme security and cost to completion, together withevaluation of any known or potential risks as they areidentified.

It is therefore essential that the project team is providedwith staff from all disciplines, not only those engineeringdisciplines of civil engineering, mechanical engineering,electrical engineering, control and instrumentation, but ofaccountancy, of contract management, of programming,site construction and industrial relations; and these skillsneed to be blended into a cohesive team.

The team comprises not only those who work directlyin the employing organisation but also those who work inthe consultants' and contractors' organisations and thosewho work in other branches of the same organisation, whotogether are committed to the successful achievement ofthe overall project. Attainment of the common goal iscomplex as the objectives of the individual members of theteam may not be common. The management's role is toclarify and promote the desired overall objectives in a waythat commands the maximum commitment from teammembers.

All conventional power station projects involve wellover 100 major contracts, and each of these major con-tracts is a project managed in its own right. These majorcontracts are further subcontracted, so that it is notuncommon for 1000 suppliers to be providing plant andequipment for one project. In addition to the control ofdesign, manufacturing and construction requirements, it isimportant that the site itself is properly and adequatelymanaged. During the last decade, problems have beenidentified in all phases of the project, right from initialauthorisation. It is a major task to obtain security andhigh quality of manufacture, delivery by the correct dates,and timely and correct erection and commissioning,coupled with subsequent high availability. To construct aproject employing 3000 people, gathered together for thefirst time, requiring initial training on project awareness, isdifficult. The construction industry expects that people will

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. I, JANUARY 1984 11

quickly come together on site and match performances forfactory and office work which have only been obtained inyears of stable working at a single location. The site pro-blems associated with catering, cleaning, accommodation,office communications, ablutions, stores, access and safetyare complex. These are all operated in a dynamic situationagainst a controlled time schedule and budget. To be asuccess it is essential to ensure that the time schedules arewell understood and that a corporate team of experts arewelded together by a common project plan in which theyall have confidence, each contributing and refining hisrequirements to ensure compliance with the plan.

4.3 Project and contract strategiesThe project and contract strategies are interrelated andrepresent the key decisions to be made and implementedwhen the project is authorised. The directorate at Barn-wood are responsible for preparing these and for seekingthe CEGB Executive's agreement (as in Fig. 1).

4.3.1 Contract strategy: This must include decisions madeby the owner and the engineer on the following aspects,which are necessary for the execution of the project:

(a) number of contracts(b) form of the contracts

traditional

owner

designer generalcontractor

subcontractors own forces

(c) commercial risks involved between the parties(d) form of payments(e) contract conditions(/) contract control and damages.

4.4 DesignThe design process starts with the consideration of anumber of proposed site layouts and, by the process ofelimination, arriving at the optimum. The careful design ofthe cooling-water system and optimisation of the powerstation level can make the difference of many millions ofpounds sterling in running costs during the life of thestation.

The site itself partly determines the costs of civil foun-dations, rail and road access etc.

Nowadays, with only two turbine generator and twoboiler suppliers, the number of preliminary layouts for coaland oil fired plant is reduced.

The greatest care is necessary to ensure that the plant isconstructible, accessible, reliable and maintainable over itsfull operating life.

The design of the individual items of plant is under-taken by the suppliers and is assessed by the engineer'sdesign specialists who feed in the experience gained fromoperating stations. The station design department with theproject manager's team carry out the overall design of theinterconnecting systems and plant layout, which entailscombining a large number of independent items ofequipment into reliable working systems which are fullycompatible. It is essential that firm designs are preparedand drawings are available before contracts are placed. Inthis respect the CEGB places design contracts for majorplant, and the hardware contracts are only placed afteragreement of design particulars including electrical andcontrol requirements.

design-construct

direct owner responsibility

owner engineercontractor

in-housepro. management(+ consultants?)

in-housedesign +construction

contractorsdesign

acting asgeneral contractor

in-houseconstructionmanagement subcontractors own forces

independentcontractors

design -manage

owner

contracted project management

owner

contractedproject andconstructionmanagement

contracted orowner design

independentcontractors

engineermanagementcontractor

managementcontractorsdesign

managementcontractorsconstructionmanager

subcontractorsor independentcontractors

Fig. 3 Alternative organisational arrangements

28 1EE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

When selecting the plant, the project manager and histeam have many things to consider. Whatever the system,be it water, fuel, gas or electricity, he has to ensure that itcan be erected, that it has safe and ready access for oper-ation and that it is protected from fire, while keeping themain object of production in mind. These objectives are toachieve high availability and high thermal efficiencycoupled with higher productivity by reducing operators'activity and committing more reliance to automaticcontrol.

In addition to this all the welfare facilities for the mana-gers and operators have to be provided.

4.5 Contract managementThe role of the engineer in the conditions of contract isvital to the successful management of contracts. The primetask of the engineer appointed by the owner/purchaser isto ensure that the contractor supplies the specified goodsand services to the budget and programme. Large con-tracts usually involve the management of variation ofdesign, extensions of time for matters outside the controlof the contractor, instructions to accelerate, and the settle-ment of financial claims for risks which the purchaser/owner accepts under the conditions of contract.

The conditions of contract agreed by the major institu-tions for use in the UK and overseas cover the proceduresfor many of these actions. For mechanical and electricalengineering there are two major committees who prepare,agree and issue the conditions. They are

(i) the joint IMechE/IEE Committee on Model Formsof General Conditions of Contract

(ii) the IEE Committee on Model Forms of GeneralConditions of Contract (Electrical).

The committees consist of members and nonmembers ofthe Councils of the Institutions. Some nonmembers areappointed by Council and others are appointed by Councilafter nomination by kindred organisations. The ESI hasfour representatives.

Model general conditions seek to be equitable betweenthe parties and, as they are well known to industry, facili-tate expeditious tendering.

The engineer's duties are largely the same under theIMechE/IEE and ICE conditions. The main differencebetween the plant and the civil conditions is that, underthe plant conditions the design responsibility rests with thecontractor, whereas, under the civil conditions, the designresponsibility usually rests with the engineer. Two otherdifferences in operations are

(a) that the engineer assesses claims for extra cost underplant contracts whereas this duty only falls on the engineerunder the civil contracts if the contractor and purchaserfail to agree such costs

(b) that where a dispute arises between the purchaser/owner and the contractor under the civil conditions, theengineer is required to adjudicate and make a decision onthe matter which either party may then, if dissatisfied,require to be referred to arbitration. This intermediate roleof the engineer does not exist in the plant conditions wheresuch disputes may be referred by either party (contractoror owner) directly for arbitration.

However, where the Engineer makes a decision withwhich the purchaser/owner disagrees, the purchaser/owneris not normally entitled to refer the matter to arbitration.The engineer (for civil or plant contracts) is required to actimpartially and independently in exercising duties such asin considering applications for extensions of time, certifica-tion of value of work completed, and completion by thecontractor of particular stages, e.g. taking-over certificates.

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pi. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

The purchaser's/owner's direct powers under these con-ditions relate to such miscellaneous matters as approval ofassignment, bonds and termination for default or bank-ruptcy etc., and the obligation to make payment againstthe engineer's certificates.

The engineer, fulfilling the contract role, has to main-tain a clarity of understanding of events and faithfullyrecord decisions. In giving such decisions he is required toconsider the just interests of both the owner and the con-tractor. This is a difficult task and one that needs experi-ence, judgement and confidence rather than educationalone. The success of contract management depends onhow this role is achieved and how the engineer and thepurchaser/owner respond to the pressures. A poorrelationship at contractor/engineer level can ruin a suc-cessful project and it is important to ensure that there iscompatibility as well as propriety.

For CEGB contracts, the roles of the purchaser andengineer are delegated to the Director of Projects, who inturn delegates most of the powers of the engineer to theproject manager. The Director of Projects retains thepowers under the contract relating to the settlement ofclaims, extensions of time and arbitration on receipt of arecommendation from the project manager.

4.6 Project programmeIt is essential that fully detailed programmes are preparedfor every stage of the execution of the project and that theyare properly related. These programmes will provide thedetail for the tender inquiry document and will cover theinvestment appraisal programme, the design programme,the manufacturing programme, the construction prog-ramme and the commissioning programme.

Many interrelated programmes are used to plan,organise and control the design, procurement and con-struction. Some programmes are in bar-line form, othersare networks, and many are schedules of requirements anddates. The more important programmes normally used fora single power station project are indicated in simplifiedform in Fig. 4. Three of these programmes are used toestablish overall project timescales and are referred to as:

(a) the project investment programme(b) the executive's target programme(c) the project manager's target programme, which is

often referred to as the project master target programme,and is usually in network form.

The project investment programme is drawn up in the for-mative stages of a project and its purpose is to indicate theconstruction duration on which capital investment com-parisons are calculated, and investment decisions made bythe CEGB executive.

It is in the consumer's interest that construction dura-tion should be as short as is economically attainable. Thus,when a project has been selected for construction, hasreceived the necessary consents and is presented to theBoard for formal financial sanction and release for con-struction, the overall project programme is established bythe project manager and agreed with the executive. This isreferred to as the executive's target programme and isinvariably shorter in duration than the programme used inthe derivation of estimates for investment decision.

The project manager sets himself a target programme afew months shorter in duration than the executive target,and it is to his target programme that the project managerplaces contracts and to which each contractor is com-mitted by his own contract programme which will fallwithin the project manager's overall target. The project

29

manager's programme also has to make provision for co-ordination between contract programmes.

losses of thousands of pounds each day. He will changeitems if it is agreed that they affect safety, but he will reject

projectinvestmentprogramme

design commitmentprogrammes fordesign manager's

i

executive'stargetprogramme

design logicdiagrams andschedules

contract planningbar charts

schedules ofdesign intentmemoranda

specificationprogrammes

tenderprogrammes

Fig. 4 Project programmes

project managerstarget programme

project master targetprogramme

contract key eventsand basic logic

area constructionprogrammes

contractprogrammes

project key events

site licence safetysubmissionprogrammes

consents andauthorisationschedules

research anddevelopmentprogrammes

systemcommissioningprogrammes

4.7 Financial controlThe programmes will be optimised for minimal costs, andthe spend rates will be identified in each contract let. Verydetailed work surveys are necessary to evaluate payments,and these will give one measure of work completed.

The other aspects of financial control are related to thebudget and control of variations. Even very minor changescan involve high penalties in both time and cost. The rulesfor controlling these must be well established if success isto be attained.

The judgement of whether to allow design changesduring the construction period is a difficult skill to acquire.Many proposed changes can be proved to be economicallyviable is when considered against the operating life of theplant or to improve it in some way but, if not weighedagainst the current situation, could cause delays in con-struction and wreck the overall economic appraisal of thetotal project.

It is in this field that the project manager has to be athis most decisive, as lack of timely decisions can involve

30

most optional schemes if they are likely to affect his prog-ramme. The in-house project manager acting as architect/engineer for the complete process often finds himself atodds with other parts of his own organisation on thesematters.

Most of his time and effort is concerned with motivat-ing, through contractors and other bodies, resources notunder the management control or discipline of his ownorganisation. This, together with the role of 'engineer' asmentioned before will require him at times to make deci-sions which later have to be justified to the executive butmay not be proved for some years.

There must be confidence in the planning process,which must have parameters for measuring achievement asthis will determine the progress payments made to the con-tractors. The measurements must be seen to be fair so thatthe contractor can satisfy those to whom he is accountablein addition to the owner being satisfied that he is onlypaying for actual achievement.

In difficult times, when the project is deviating from its

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

original plan, it is essential to make these assessments con-sidering all business and project aspects and to introducesafeguards for both parties so that they can proceed withconfidence.

The project manager must be alert to the pressures andfactors influencing contractors' management and the reac-tions of the workforce in order to make the best judge-ments in controlling the overall project to time and cost.

The effect on projects of deteriorating industrial rela-tions on large sites over the last decade has been severe intime and cost. Local negotiations, withdrawal of labour,unjustified bonus payments and general disruption havehad disastrous results.

5 Development of current strategies

5.1 HistoryThe current project strategy for conventional power sta-tions has developed from the experience of earlier projects.

year

Fig. 5 Graph of conventional plant

4x 500 Ferrybridge t ' ™ n t h S t o f i r s t u " i t synchronising4x500West Burton^\start i . s u 1UU

4 x 500 Eggborough4 x 5 0 0 Fawley-2x500 Ironbridge4x500 Fiddlers Ferry-4x500Ratcliffe-3x500 Aberthaw'B'4x500 Kingsnorth4 x 500 Cottam —2x500 Rugeley'B'4x 500 Didcot4x500 Pembroke

3x660Drax

-1-9-64'

-1965-

1966

5x 660 Grain-

2x 500 lnce'B'_

19 67

1968

1969

1970

-1971-

1972

3x660 Littlebrook'D-

1973

1974

0 50 100

Fig. 6 Fossil-fired stations: time to first unit synchronising

1EE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

A look at CEGB history is important, and Figs. 5 and 6show, first, the orders placed in the last 30 years and, sec-ondly, those units of 500 MW and above authorised forconstruction from 1961 to 1973 giving their timetableachievements.

Fig. 5 also shows the plant capacity increasing by afactor of 5 over 25 years. Fig. 7 illustrates that the decadescan be roughly categorised as follows:

Size ofunits(MW)

3060

100120

200275

1950-1960

Numberof units

678

18140J

3

Numberof sites

120

16

4

1960-1970

Number Numberof units of sites

1970-1980

Number Numberof units of sites

300350375

500550660

47

314

Fig. 7 Unit sizes

(i) 1950 to 1960: the decade in which manufacturingproblems were paramount. Industry was recovering fromthe Second World War with a vast production prog-ramme. Because of the national shortage of electricalenergy, the programme was based on conservative designswith very short commissioning times. This was successfullyachieved.

(ii) 1960 to 1970: the decade of accelerated technologi-cal advance, bringing with it many novel problems tosolve. This did not only occur in the power industry, assimilar technological advances were made at that time inprocess industries, aircraft and building with equally disap-pointing results.

The unit sizes moved up quickly from 60 MW through120 MW, 200 MW to 300 MW and then to the building ofthe first 500 MW and 660 MW single units in the UnitedKingdom.

This sudden advance in technology was made with theflush of success from earlier achievements on much smallerwell developed plants and the attempt to build advancedplants to similar construction programme durations. Theadditional requirement for large plant with flexible oper-ation on a two shift basis, together with the advancedautomation, was a tremendous task.

Late deliveries were caused by the overload on industrydue to the ordering of over forty 500 M W units on a shorttime scale, there was a shortage of skilled labour accen-tuated by the proliferation of large sites, and this increasedconstruction times on some sites by up to 70%.

(iii) 1970 to 1980: the decade of poor industrial rela-tions. This had a disastrous effect on all the large majorproject sites.

It must be recognised that over this period the thermalefficiency of the power stations in operation has risen from25.5 to 34.1%. This is due to the closure of older, less effi-cient stations following the commissioning of the larger,newer units and Figs. 8-11 give some of the statistics of theindustry.

31

1957/58 1962/63 1967/68 1972/73 1977/78 1982/83

Fig. 8 Manpower: up, and now falling

1957/58 1962/63 1967/68 1972/73 1977/78 1982/83

Fig. 9 Output: up, and now steady

1957/58 1962/63 1967/68 1972/73 1977/78 1982/83

Fig. 10 Costs: rising more slowly

1957/58 1962/63 1967/68 1972/73 1977/78 1982/83

Fig. 11 Availability: a hard fight

32

By coincidence, CEGB staff numbers have hardlychanged in the first quarter century. In 1958, and in 1983,the CEGB employed almost 53 000 people. But as thegraph above shows, a lot happened between those dates. Inthe first ten years, staff numbers jumped by 17 000. Thencame the pay and productivity scheme, financed by staffreductions. The number of staff dropped rapidly, to be fol-lowed by a slower decline reflecting station closures andimproved manpower utilisation.

The impact of the 1973 energy crisis can be seen onlytoo clearly from Fig. 9, which shows sales of electricity inthousands of millions of units a year. For the CEGB's first15 years, sales were soaring, from 79000 million units in1957/58 to 203 000 million in 1972/73. Then came the oilcrisis, and in the next five years sales increased by only6000 million units. Then came the recession; last year,sales were virtually unchanged from ten years earlier. Butsales were 2\ times those of 1957/58 while staff numberswere virtually unchanged.

The 1973 oil crisis had its impact, too, on the CEGB'scosts - as Fig. 10, which shows cost per unit of electricity,demonstrates. For the first 15 years, CEGB costs hardlyincreased, indeed after making allowance for inflation thereal cost declined. Then came the oil embargo and th priceof fuel, both oil and coal, helped push up costs faster thaninflation. But in real terms, costs last year were less than in1980/81. Wages also have changed over the past 25 years;in 1957/58 the average industrial wage was £12.58, and in1982 it was £137.

Availability has slipped slightly over the past quarter ofa century. But Fig. 11, which shows winter peak avail-ability in per cent, .conceals a complex story. In its earlyyears the CEGB was operating many 30 MW and 60 MWsets, which were very reliable but of low efficiency. Systemthermal efficiency improved as bigger sets came on to thesystem, but the availability of the newer units was, not sur-prisingly, lower. In particular the 500 MW units posedproblems, but slowly they have been overcome.

5.2 Developments in contract strategyBearing in mind these statistics, and the effect of delays inthe late 1960s in all industries, triggered a series of investi-gations into project shortfalls, and recommendations forchange.

During the 1960s, the CEGB's strategy involved placinglump sum or remeasure contracts for separate items ofplant and civil works, each embracing total design, supplyand erection requirements. The result was that, for atypical construction project, up to 100 contracts with50-60 different main contractors could be engaged on site,together with a substantial number of subcontractors.Considerable delays in completing these projects occurredowing to several factors including overordering and rapidtechnological advances.

As a result, in the 1970s, the CEGB followed the rec-ommendations of the 1969 report of the inquiry into delaysin commissioning CEGB power stations (Chairman SirAlan Wilson), known as the 'Wilson report', and the 1970NEDO Large Industrial Sites report.

The items for consideration were as follows:Wilson and NEDO reports

(i) project management(ii) improved planning and communication(iii) improved quality control(iv) causes of delay(v) industrial relations.

At that time, late delivery of materials was a problem, butover the last decade materials for conventional projects

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

have generally arrived at site on time. The problem hasbeen the failure to erect and commission the project withinthe allowed time.

One of the causes of delays was that late changes werenecessary owing to the feedback of faults and deficienciesfrom existing plant.

Many of the industrial-relations problems arose fromsmall subcontractors employing labour on a hire and firebasis rather than using permanent skilled direct employees.These led to trade union difficulties on site and poor workquality. At that time there was a shortage of skilled labour,which delayed the programme by lack of resources, andalso faulty workmanship requiring much of the work to becorrected. There was also work which had to be redone tocorrect faulty materials found by testing when they arrivedat the site. Only a small amount of faulty work is neededto throw the site work programme and planning in chaos.Unequal site facilities and site safety were used by theoperatives to manipulate negotiations so as to makeemployment last, or to squeeze higher wages.

It was felt that industrial-relations problems should behandled by the full involvement of line management inmaking a positive approach to bringing the separate con-tractors together, to try and encourage them to adopt aproject objective rather than individual contract orienta-tion. The 1970 NEDO advice for CEGB to take a positiveattitude in bringing contractors together towards a siteagreement and site code of practice was accepted but con-sidered impossible on the timescale. However, the recom-mended discussions between the CEGB, the union and thecontractor at the onset of a job did take place, and someelementary understandings were achieved, although it wasimpossible to harmonise over 15 different sets of employ-ment conditions. However, there were some successes, andfrom the experience the NAECI agreement has developed.

6 Strategies for Grain and Drax

6.1 Grain power stationIn order to achieve 'co-ordinated management of thewhole erection process on site, and ensure a rationalised

approach on labour relations, thereby minimising delaysand industrial unrest', a new strategy was implemented ontwo projects at Grain and Ince B in the early 1970s locatedin areas of recognised labour management problems. Two-stage design and manufacture contacts were let, togetherwith separate supply-only contracts for plant with provi-sion for liquidated damages for late site delivery thatdelayed erection. Only five main erection contractorstogether with a service contractor were appointed, with thesuppliers providing technical supervision of the erection.The mechanical site erection contractors were employedon cost-plus reimbursable conrtracts, which allowed for alump-sum management fee subject to contract priceadjustment and reimbursement of all other direct costs.

In the field of design and procurement, the CEGBretained freedom of market choice with the intention ofhaving the maximum competition among contractors. 122supply contracts were let, made up of 37 civil, 53 mechani-cal and 32 electrical contracts, representing in total abouthalf of the 1970 estimate for the total original project.

Five erection contracts were chosen in the spirit of the1970 NEDO recommendations, and Fig. 12 identifies thedistribution of work.

The design and manufacturing phases operated satisfac-torily, but the site work was much more difficult to controlas the schedule of delays in Fig. 13 shows.

The delays were analysed as follows:

Cause

PaymentNational StrikeSafety and cateringPoliticalSuspended for 'go slow'Sympathy with othersOfficial picket lineBabcock & Wilcox picket line

Proportion of totaltime lost, %

22.210.08.57.01.50.75.8

44.3

Total 100.0

design and procurement. Generation Development and Construction Division contract management

122 supply contracts (37civil, 53 mechanical, 32 electrical) £123m

direction of site activities. Generation Development and Construction Division

5 erection contracts

civilJ LaingConstructionLtd.

SteelworkRDL

mechanical I(boilers)Babcock &Wilcox

erectioncosts£i9.7m

materialscosts£i9m

erectioncosts£3.8m

materialscosts£9.8m

mechanical H(turbines)GEC

£i8m

electricalNG Bailey

catering andaccommodationBatemansCateringOrganisation

£6merectioncosts£6.5 m

materialcosts£2m

£L75m

£56 m

Fig. 12 Grain contract management

1EE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

original estimate-total | £210m |

33

The above statistics apply to the period between 1972 and1979.

In 1972, for example, there was a national civil engi-neering site strike which caused a complete stoppage atGrain, followed by ripples of lost time, when picket linescomprising a few operatives would shut the whole site.Where people did cross the picket line they were oftenunable to work because of the lack of materials, as deliverydrivers showed the solidarity of the period and would notdeliver through the picket line. In some cases this evenaffected the canteen and those staying in the camp.

Because reimbursable contracts enabled us to examineperformance and completion dates in much greater detail,it became evident in 1975/76 that the work achieved forbonus payments made was not commensurate with thefinal cost. Contract discipline was enforced and a wholesite strike occurred - the now famous 'overalls strike' -which was the culmination of very difficult industrial pro-blems affecting all contractors. The employers had about50 different 'failures to agree' at the time, but the oper-atives chose to force the health and safety issue. The con-tractors found it impossible to work in any normal wayand it was agreed to shut down the Grain project for sixmonths.

The site was restarted with eight instead of five contrac-tors, since it was thought right to bring in specialist pipe-work, scaffolding and lagging contractors to allow themajor contractors to concentrate on their traditional work.In effect, the peak labour force of 2600 was reduced toabout 2000, and since then increased levels of productivityas much as a factor of 2.5 times the previous level havebeen achieved. Contractors were only getting 2 h prod-uctive work a day from a man prior to the dispute, and soeven this increase did not return the site to normal expec-tations.

It is ironic that whereas earlier plants, built moreclosely to the programme, took up to two years to workup to full output, those like Grain and Littlebrook came

on to full load within only eight days, exceeding theirplanned 660 MW output to 690 MW normal running, andcapable of running as high as 740 MW. They were,however, just as late as previous plants owing to the indus-trial relations delays. CEGB are proud of the plants andtheir flexibility, having built and operated them suc-cessfully.

6.2 Drax completion power stationThis power station is the completion of the existing suc-cessful coal-fired power station built ten years ago. Thecompletion project comprises 3 x 660 MW units of thesame design and layout as the first half of the station.

As a result of problems at Grain and Ince B, a revisedproject strategy was developed, which can be describedunder the following headings:

(a) Vendor assessment(b) Contract strategy(c) Design - phase contracts(d) Status reports(e) Key date procedures(/) Management group(g) Study group(h) Site agreements(i) Bonus payments(j) Shiftwork.(i) Vendor assessment involved a much more detailed

investigation of the management capabilities and quality ofproduct from each prospective supplier before approvingthem as a suitable tenderer.

(ii) Contract strategy: The significant difficulties experi-enced in constructing most of the projects let on reimburs-able or part reimbursable arrangements in the last decade,led to a return to a lump-sum contract strategy but incor-porating those refinements which had proved effective onprojects implemented since 1970.

(iii) Design-phase contracts were introduced to allow thefreezing of design and system parameters at an early date,

National civilpayment strike

100r

90

£ 80c

overallsdispute

70

ZG0

* 70a

30

20

10

time lost

•start main steelwork

start boiler erection

1972 ' 1973 1974

Fig. 13 Time lost at Grain

34

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979ffTrn

1980i in II 111 II inf?1981 1982

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984

thereby avoiding the serious cost and programme implica-tions of design developments and changes during the con-struction phase.

(iv) Project status reports detailing progress and pro-blems are prepared and discussed with the executive atpredetermined points in the programme.

(v) Key date procedures: To re-establish a financialincentive towards effective and timely completion, a keydate procedure was introduced for major supply and erec-tion contracts, which ties progress payments to satisfactorycompletion of programmed work by certain specifieddates. Where progress is behind programme, the purchaserhas the right to withhold payments due at a key date untilall the outstanding work has been completed. The aim isto encourage the contractor to improve the quality andeffectiveness of his management, both in the manufacturingand erection phases, by stimulating a positive response atthe time when it can be most effective. The success of thismechanism also ensures the involvement of both the pur-chaser's and the contractor's senior management wheredeficiencies arise.

(vi) Management group: The CEGB sought to avoidpast problems associated with site labour relations byestablishing a management group comprising all majorcontractors on site and employers' federation represent-atives. All tenderers were required to confirm their will-ingness, as a contractual commitment, to comply with thedecisions of this management group. The objective was toachieve harmony in payment structures and site pro-cedures across the whole project. The existing separatenational labour agreements were allowed to continue, anda site agreement was not introduced, although this posi-tion was remedied for mechanical and allied contractorswith the creation of the national agreement for the engi-neering construction industry in 1981.

(vii) Study group: A study group of contractors, tradeunion national officers, and officials of employers' federa-tions meet with the CEGB at six-monthly intervals to con-sider progress and problems associated with the wholeproject.

(viii) Site agreements: NAECI provides for individualproject joint councils, acting within the framework estab-lished by the National Joint Council, to reach supplemen-tary project agreements governing site-related paymentconditions.

(ix) Bonus payments: Auditing ensures that bonus pay-ments are related to labour productivity.

(x) Shiftwork: With the unions opposed to overtime

working, it became apparent that power stations could notbe built economically in the time programmed.

Overtime was often unproductive and increasing thenumber of men at the workface had been shown not onlyto reduce productivity, but also to make industrial unrestmore likely. A solution to the problems was to introduceshift working.

It was decided that two-shift day working would be themost efficient and most acceptable to the work force; i.e.five consecutive morning and afternoon shifts fromMonday to Friday giving a theoretical time at the work-face of 78 hours (39 hour week) instead of an average of 52hours under the overtime arrangements. An added benefitis the reduction of the work force on site at any one timeand an increased utilisation of the site assets such ascranes, vehicles and amenities. To the unions, shiftworking has the attraction of increasing employmentopportunities during a period of recession.

Target programme for the completion ofDraxBecause of the actions taken to stabilise a deterioratingsituation, as at Grain, followed by the initiatives discussedabove, it was considered appropriate by the executive, atthe time the completion of Drax was sanctioned, to set atarget programme of 72 months from the placing of mainplant contracts to first unit commissioning. Fig. 14 showsthe executive's adopted target, which included four monthsfrom placing main plant contracts to start of main founda-tions, 63 months from then to synchronisation and fivemonths thereafter to commission. This target programmewas recognised to be shorter than the achievements onsites current at the time but a measure of improvementwas believed justified.

In the event, the project manager set himself a target toconstruct the station to synchronise five months earlierthan the executive's target programme, and it is to his owntarget programme that he has placed contracts and is cur-rently managing the project. The project manager's targetprogramme is also set out in simplified bar-line form belowthe executive's adopted target. In October 1983 the projecthad been running for 56 months from the start of mainfoundations, and the project manager estimates that hewill meet his own target, which will be within the timescaleof the formal target programme agreed with the executive.

The experience to date in operating this contract strat-egy is therefore highly encouraging. The use of lump-sumcontracts with a key date procedure has successfully re-established incentives for contractors to complete to time.

startmain plant maincontracts foundations(6Nov1978) (1 Mar 1979)

i startmain plant maincontracts foundations(6 Nov 1978) (1 Mar 1979)

I

- 63 months -68 months-72 months-

synchronisefirst unit(Uun1984)

synchronisefirst unit(1 Jan 1984)

commissionfirst unit(1 Nov 1984)

CEGB (executive)«•- target

programme

commissionfirst unit(1 Jun 1984)/ I

4 "

1978

;

l i l t

791 1 1 1 1

80

-58 months-63 months

81. . . . .

82 83

5m*"

5 Im

1984

projectmanager^

•targetprogramme

Fig. 14 Drax completion programmes

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1984 35

The management group concept is also proving effective,supported by the framework for better industrial relationsprovided by the NAECI in the mechanical and relatedsectors. (See Fig. 15.)

50

o 30

20

10

start mainfoundations

1978

start mainsteelwork

start boilererection

1979

7.2 Coal grinding millAs an example of the increase in plant size used in CEGBpower stations over the past 30 years, in the mid-1950s, aBabcock type 50 vertical spindle ball mill had a through-

1980 1981

Fig. 15 Time lost at Drax

1982

7 The importance of feedback

If the engineering of plant is to be secured, it is essentialthat a detailed analysis of all problems is made and thisexperience is fed back into the new designs and manage-ment systems. There is a continuous feedback of modifi-cations to plant from the construction and operatingphases, and this has improved the trend to better per-formance in a gradual way. The analysis of major failurescan bring more dramatic changes and valuable learningplatforms for all involved.

Too often in the past, the problems of power stationconstruction have been publicised but little has been saidabout our successes in solving them. The examples quotedin respect of project management shows the importance ofthe processes in the management field. In addition thereare a number of examples of the scale of plant size escala-tion, resolutions of past problems, current work and inno-vation, some of which are as follows:

7.1 Sizing of oil and coal-fired boilersA boiler designed specifically for oil firing can be signifi-cantly smaller than one of similar steam capacity firingcoal. The furnace of a coal-fired boiler has to provide suffi-cient residence time to ensure that combustion of thelargest coal particles is complete before the combustiongases enter the close-packed heater banks, and the gas atentry to this surface has to be below the temperature atwhich ash particles are still molten, otherwise heavy slag-ging can occur. Neither of these limitations applies to anoil-fired furnace. In addition, because of the very low levelsof ash in oil, erosion is significantly lower, so that highergas velocities can be employed over the heat-exchangesurface downstream of the furnace, with a consequentfurther reduction in volume.

The relative sizes of the Drax 660 MW boiler and theGrain 660 MW boiler made it impossible to convert fromoil to coal firing at a similar capacity, and very difficulteven at the maximum reduced capacity of one third.

put of 7 tonnes/h. But the Babcock 10E mill used incurrent coal fired power stations has a throughput of 40tonnes/h.

7.3 DinorwigThe pumped storage power station at Dinorwig builtinside the mountain is the largest of its type in the UK.

Apart from the turbogenerator, specially developed toachieve frequent stops and starts, it is possible for thisplant to be synchronised and at virtual full load on thesystem in 10 s when spinning at synchronous speed.

The development would not have been possible withoutSF6 switchgear and its small physical size.

7.4 Registered design policy for 800 MVA generatortransformersThe control and registration of the design of these trans-formers has ensured a higher availability of this essentialitem, and considerably assisted in the improvement of theavailability of the system.

7.5 Cooling towersCEGB investigations into the collapse of three completednatural draught, hyperbolic cooling towers at Ferrybridge'C power station in 1965 revealed fundamental weaknessesin design and load assessment. Expertise gained from theseinvestigations led the Board to decide to undertake thedesign of all future towers in-house; a decision that hasbeen adhered to on all subsequent CEGB towers andwhich has caused many overseas and other UK utilities touse the Board's tower design consultancy services.

7.6 Experience of steam turbine disc crackingThis problem has been resolved by the feedback of infor-mation from the disc failure at Hinkley Point 'A' in 1968.The problems arising from such a failure are indicated onthe slide. Current designs eliminate the disc problems bythe use of monobloc LP turbine rotors with assured frac-ture toughness.

36 1EE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pi. A, No. L JANUARY 1984

7.7 Design of cable installations to deal with fire riskIn the 1960s a series of very damaging power-station firesoccurred involving PVC cable installations. In each case arelatively minor fire incident led to very extensive plantdamage and loss of generating capacity for many monthsdue to the spread of fire by the cable installation. AtMethil in Scotland, two 30 MW units were out of servicefor about nine months. Other incidents included thedestruction of large parts of the Ratcliffe coal plant and,more recently, the loss of four units at Tilbury.

In CEGB power stations under construction, non-flame-propagating cables are used and are laid in segre-gated routes so that any one cable fire will not affect morethan one unit or, in many cases, standby equipment on thesame unit.

The cables are protected by a quick-acting water-spraysystem triggered by a heat sensitive cable which is laid inthe actual cable rack, thereby sensing a prospective firebefore major damage has time to occur.

7.8 General trend of dust emissionsThere has been an increase in the efficiency of generation.Whereas in 1950 the standard unit was 30 MW, from 1979it has been 600 MW. There has also been an increase inthe efficiency of gas-cleaning equipment, which has risenfrom 98 to 99.5%, a reduction in emission from 2 to 0.5%.

The above changes reduced the emission from 1460 g/h/MW to 310 g/h/MW when based on a 20%-ash coal.

On Drax completion (2000 MW), the ash from a typical20% ash coal would amount to 152.8 tonnes/h and theemissions from the chimney 0.62 tonnes/h which is finedust and widely dispersed.

If the efficiency of power generation and the standard ofgas cleaning were the same as in 1950, then for Drax com-pletion the emission of dust would have been 2.93 tonnes/hinstead of 0.62 tonnes/h.

7.9 Flexible modes of operationAn unsung success story of modern conventional powerstations is their ability to readily meet the significantlyfluctuating load demands of modern society. The oil-firedstations such as Grain and Littlebrook 'D' are capable ofoperating in a four-shift regime; i.e. meeting the breakfasttime peak load after an all-night shut-down, being againtaken out of service and then meeting the tea-time peak;the modern coal fired stations are capable of two-shifting,i.e. operating during the day but being shut down at night.

7.10 Drax power station heat conservationThe greenhouse at Drax power station, near Selby inYorkshire, was set up by the CEGB and the Express DairyCompany Limited as an experimental project for growingtomato crops. The purpose of the scheme was 'to evaluatethe commercial possibilities of a large-scale horticulturaloperation using generating-station cooling-water rejectheat.' The CEGB/Rank, Hovis, MacDougall eel farm isanother energy conservation project installed at Drax.

In addition to the above, the new stores building isheated using cooling water reject heat and there are tap-pings on the steam turbine available for a district heatingscheme if required.

8 Conclusion

In conclusion I would like to stress that I see the relation-ship between the principal parties involved in the construc-tion of large capital projects as being in the nature of atrue partnership. In the CEGB we believe that our con-tract strategies and project management strategies havenow created the correct attitudes and necessary institu-tions to maintain such a partnership. The role of the ownerin such a relationship remains important and significant.

As the owner, CEGB must always justify to its cus-tomers the cost effectiveness of installing new plant forelectricity generation. To that end the organisationalability to feedback the results of operating experience intothe design and construction process is essential to this costeffectiveness exercise. It is equally important that the con-tracting industries also achieve success in constructing newplant in this partnership, as it is for an owner to purchasenew plant of the most effective design and at an optimumcost, and I believe that we have all achieved this objective.

9 References

1 SYKES, A.: 'Reducing neglected risks on giant projects'2 The Institute of Building: 'Occasional paper 20', 19793 LOMER, D.R.: 'Will Drax give back to the construction industry its

credibility on large projects', May 19834 PYLE, B.C., and BURBRIDGE, R.N.: 'Power station project compa-

rative project management' IMechE Feb. 19795 KALDERON, D.: 'Steam turbine failure at Hinkley Point A', Proc.

IMechE., 1972, 186, pp. 341-3776 GRAY, J.L.: 'Investigation into the consequences of the failure of a

turbine generator at Hinkley Point A', Ibid., 1972, 186, pp. 379-3907 HODGE, J.M, and MOGFORD, I.L.: 'UK experience of stress corro-

sion cracking in steam turbine discs', Ibid., 1979, 193, pp. 93-109

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 131, Pt. A, No. I, JANUARY 1984 37