Ideology in the Foreign Relations Urss

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AUTHORITYMr. Ed Burgess, Archives Manager, U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.July 21, 1999.

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4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVEREDThe Role of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy: 13 June 1980The World Correlation of Forces 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

Van Gundy, Daniel F., MAJ, USA9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS . PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASKAREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

W Student at the U.S. Army Command and Genera].Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6602711. CONTROLLING OFFICEAIAME AN D AD ESS 12. REPORT DATEN~~~1 June~'1 80

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ISI. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESMaster of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partialfulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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This study proceeds from the assumption that ideology is an im-portant factor in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy. It attemptsto demonstrate that the Soviet concept,of the correlation of forcesis useful in gaining an understanding of the wholly different way aSoviet decision maker approaches a foreign policy question, how heperceives the problemi, what he sees as the issues, and what he thinksare desirable options for aolving the problem.

By showing the relationship of the concept of correlation .offorces to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ioeology, this investigation revealsthat 1) the concept of correlation of forces is fundamentally differ-ent from the.Western concept of "Balance of Power"; 2) the correlationof forces is not a simple formula for duplicating Soviet analysis anddetermining probable courses of action; 3) the concept of correlationof forces is a logical extension of that ideology which can enable theWestern observer to approach an international problem using what mightbe called a "cognitive map" fundamentally different from the mind setfrom which we in the West habitually interpret the nature of. historicalchange; 4) by comprehending the concept of correlation of forces andapproaching a foreign policy question from that point of view, a Westernanalyst is more likely to assess accurately Soviet goals and objectivesthan would be the case by applying Western modes of analysis to thequestion.

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THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY:THE WORLD"COR"ELATIONDF FORCES

. A thesis i"epented to.th4 ! I6OUJtyf t&441A. Army. ommand ad Generai'l t4f 'College j. pertial.. u-1fiment ofn tN# requirements,

MAJR, OF 141LI?"Av M4 SIWNE

byDA(VEL F. VAN GUN"Y, MA:j- -AU.A"niversity e An , 1975

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The Role of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy: The World Correlationof Fbrces,

C(Dnil /rmy Guand~y d J USAFl~U.S. Army Co-mand and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 ForS ... TABU.,a~nnunced Eju.1tification

.: ~~~Ditst ributi!on/_-----13 June 1980 AvailabilitY Codesi ........ !vail and/or

Dist Special

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the facultyof the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas 66027

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- -MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate Major Daniel F. Van GundyTitle of thesis The Role of Ideology in Soviet Foreign

Policy: The World Correlation of ForcesApproved by:

(2 1 Thesis Committee ChairmanLTC Rupert E. Pate, MAMember, Graduate Faculty

: 'Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this#* day of 1980 by J4 11 4SDirector, arduae Degree rograms.The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do no t necessarily represent theviews of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. (References to this studyshould include the foregoino statement.)


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ABSTRACTThis study proceeds from the assumption that ideology

is an important factor in the shaping of Soviet foreignpolicy. It attempts to demonstrate that the Soviet conceptof the correlation of forces is useful in gaining an under-standing of the wholly different way a Soviet decision-maker approaches a foreign policy question, how he per-ceives the problem, what he sees as the issues, and what hethinks are desirable options for solving the problem.

By showing the relationship of the concept of correla-tion of forces to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, thisinvestigation reveals that 1) the concept of correlation offorces is fundamentally different from the Western conceptof "Balance of Power"; 2) the correlation of forces is nota simple formula fo r duplicating Soviet analysis and deter-mining probable short-range courses of action; 3) the con-cept of correlation of forces is a logical extension ofthat ideology which can enable the Western observer to ap-proach an international problem using what might be calleda "cognitive map" fundamentally different from the mind setfrom which we in the West habitually Interpret the natureof historical change; 4) by comprehending theconcept ofcorrelation of forces and approaching a foreign policyquestion from that point of view, a Western analyst is morelikely to assess accurately Soviet goals and objectivesthan would be the case by applying Western modes of analy-sis to the question.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSChapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1II. IDEOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF CORRELATIONOF FORCES . . . . . . . .11The Soviet World View . ..... . ... 11Ideology and World Politics . . . . . . . . 16Correlation of Forces and Balance ofPower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Main Features of the Concept of

Correlation of Forces . . . . . . . . . . 24Toward a Definition of Correlationof Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

III. ANALYZING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES . . . . . 34Problems of Measurement . . . . . . . . . . 34An Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . 36Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

IV. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.Winston Churchill

"In its distant objectives," writes Edward Crankshaw, "theforeign policy of the Soviet Union Is less obscure and morecoherent then that of any other country," yet its immediateintentions and the motivations behind day-to-day diplomacyoften appear incoherent, capricious, and almost enigmatic.Vernon V. Aspaturian

Western scholarship has produced no consensually acceptedmodel of Soviet behavior that would identify key variablesor causative factors in the formation of Soviet foreignpolicy doctrine.Judson Mitchell

What motivates Soviet foreign policy? This questionand possible answers to it are the subject of countlessbooks and articles produced by Western1 scholarship.Yet, as the citations above suggest, we are unable toarrive at an answer or answers which fully explain Sovietmotivations.

Western assessments of Soviet goals and ohjectives inthe international arena are quite often expressed in termsof Interstate power competition. Frequently, little atten-tion is paid to the ideological aspects of Soviet interna-tional goals and objectives. Quite often the ideological

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2side of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements is received asdisingenuous rhetoric which masks the true reasons forSoviet behavior in the world. On the other hand, it iscommonplace to hear Soviet actions explained as being moti-vated by traditional Russian goals. Even so eminent aSovietologist as George F. Kennan, who in 1947 ably showedthe importance of the ideological aspect in shaping theSoviet-Russian view of the world, could comment Jn 1980that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was primarily anexpression of a desire for security. 3 Likewise, theSoviet occupation of Central Europe is often looked upon asa means of establishing a buffer between the Soviet Unionand the Western European powers who historically have takenadvantage of the absence of natural borders to invade theRussian heartland. In describing the motivations of theBolsheviks following Brest-Litovsk, and of Stalin both be-fore World War II and following it, Louis J. Halle wrote,"The old strategic imperatives now bore upon them as uponthe czars before them, and they saw the need of territorybeyond the Russian land proper if the Russian land properwas to be made secure." 4 Halle seemingly condluded thatideology had ceased to he a primary factor in Soviet for-eign policy, and stated, "This is the history of everyrevolutionary ideology that has ever come to power." 5

This tendency to depreciate or dismiss the ideologi-cal element in Soviet foreign policy is understandable.


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3Richard Pipes, the noted authority on Russia and the SovietUnion, has said:

All people tend to some extent to basetheir understanding of foreign civil izations onpersona]. experience and self-image and to assumethat underneath the cloak of even the most ex-otic exterior there thinks the same mind andbeats the same heart. But no one is more proneto work on this assumption than a person whoseoccupation is commerce and whose political creedis liberalism. 6Pipes suggests that the liberal, capitalist West is

compelled on the basis of its set of values to believe thatall the countries of the world have an interest in peaceand stability. 7 There is a belief that only understable, peaceful conditions can societies develop progres-sively toward the goals of economic prosperity and indi-vidual liberty. This belief leads Western observers toassume that Soviet actions which appear to be supportive ofthese values are evidence of Soviet subscription to them.Thus we see, for example, that In adopting the policy ofdetente, ". . . the proponents of detente justify it withoffhand allusions to the 'web of interests' that allegedlyenmeshes the Soviet Union with the rest of the world andgradually forces it to behave like any other r'esponsiblemember of the international community ....

This tendency to assume the universality of its basicvalues often leads the West to react with shocked surprisewhen Soviet actions diverge from the patterns of expectedbehavior, as fo r example, when the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan prompted widespread consternation in Western

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4societies. Western debate regarding the motivations forrecent Soviet behavior In the Horn of Africa reflects thedifficulty in explaining convincingly why the Soviet Unionhas pursued a particular course of action.

There is little consensus concerning wh y the SovietUnion came to the decision in 1977 to withdraw support fromits client, Somalia, and to begin providing military andeconomic support to Ethiopia. Some analysts believe thatthe Soviets hoped to gain future strategic advantage in theRed See-Gulf of Aden region by providing support toEthiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council(PMAC), or dera, which, in the aftermath of HalleSelassie's downfall, had assummed control of the state andhad launched Ethiopia on a path of socialist develop-ment;9 however, no explanation is given in this scenariofor why the Soviets would risk the loss of access to im -portant military facilities in Somalia. These facilitieswere important to the Soviet Union's growing Indian Oceannaval presence because of their weakness in carrier-basedair support, their reliance on shore-basing of air assets,and their severe lack of an extensive under-way shipreplenishment capability. Explaining the Soviet switch iseven more difficult considering the superiority of theexisting facilities in Somalia and the lack of certaintythat the Soviet Union would obtain replacement facilitiesin Ethiopia, especially in view of the tenuous ability ofthe jej to hold the country together.I


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5Others felt that the Soviets had simply blundered

badly in an attempt to establish a military balance betweenthe two neighboring states which Moscow presumably could

*control by dint of its influence as an arms supplier toboth, while at the same time eliminating United Statesinfluence in the region entirely. 0 In this scenario,the Soviets are seen as having severely underestimated boththe nationalistic fervor of the Somalis, and the centri-fugal forces of religious and ethnic separatism throughout11Ethiopia in general, and in Eritree in particular.

Neither of these explanations can be fully discountedor refuted; in fact, both of them may contain importantelements of truth. Something is missing from both of them,however, and its importance to Soviet calculations may havebeen as great as the traditional "power" aspects so clearlydistinguishable in the first two explanations.To the Western observer, the Soviets'seem compelledto phrase consistently foreign policy questions inMarxist-Leninist terms. Could it be that the dilemma ofthe Horn also was evaluated in an ideological framework inaddition to, or instead of, the the frameworks of variousnon-Marxist modes of analysis? How such an evaluation mayhave been made will be examined later; fo r now, suffice itto say that an analysis of the "correlation of forces" inthis instance could quite likely have resulted in or atleast supported the decision to back Ethiopia and abandonSomalia.


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Before suggesting how a position stressing theimportance of ideological considerations in influencingSoviet policy in the Horn is supportable, it is firstnecessary to make explicit the arguments this Inquiry willdevelop. The first of these is the assumption thatMarxist-Leninist ideology is important to Soviet decJsionmakers in arriving at foreign policy courses of action.This hypothesis Is not provable by the presentation ofdirect evidence, since we do not know - we cannot know -exactly what the Soviet leadership thought or is thinkingabout a specific foreign policy question. At best we canonly state, based upon the absence of any evidence to thecontrary, that the Soviet Union's ow n public explanationsof policy positions are invariably and firmly based uponideological considerations.

Without actual evidence that ideology is an importantfactor in shaping foreign policy, this stated hypothesismay not be proven; however, evidence is not available toprove the opposite, either. 1 2 On the other hand, thereis ample evidence that the Soviets consider the concept ofcorrelation of forces important enough to write a greatdeal about it. An American scholar has noted that theconcept of correlation of forces appears to be taken moreseriously by the Soviets than Westerners give credit for,based upon the attention the concept has received in morescholarly Soviet journals.13 There is emphasis on theneed to analyze accurately the present correlation of

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7forces in order for the Soviet leadership to decide uponthe adoption of the most advantageous policies for advanc-ing Soviet interests. Because correlation of forces is anideological concept, one may infer at least that ideologi-ca l considerations are indeed important to Soviet policymakers. It follows that if correlation of forces is aconcept useful to the Soviet leadership in making policychoices which advance the world situation toward theattainment of their goals, then an understanding of theconcept of correlation of forces may be useful, even essen-tial, to the Western observer in discerning what the Sovietposition is likely to be in a given situation.

This leads directly to the thesis of this study,i.e., that the correlation of forces may be a valid vehiclefor understanding the different way a Soviet Marxist-Leninist policy maker approaches a problem, how he per-ceives the situation, what he sees as the issues, and whathe is likely to think are attractive or logical options forsolving the problem.

Before turning to a discussion of this thesis, anexplanation first must be offered fo r wh y correlation offorces has not ye t been advanced or accepted by Westernscholarship as a means fo r better understanding Sovietforeign policy motivations. On e reason fo r this reluctanceto accept correlation of forces as a useful aid in under-standing is the tendency to ascribe Western, non-Marxistvalues to Soviet Marxist-Leninists. This point has already

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8been discussed in this chapter. Western observers arereluctant to accept the sincerity of a Soviet ideologicalposition. Rather, the tendency is to believe that, deepdown, the Soviets must look at things ultimately in thesame way that is done in the West (i.e., "realistically"),or at least in the same way that Russians historically havedone. 1 4 This tendency to "mirror-image" leads to theview that Soviet leaders are cynical in their subscriptionto their Ideology and merely mask conventional Western-style power goals in Marxist-Leninist jargon. A logicaloutgrowth of this prejudice may be the assumption thatcorrelation of forces is simply a jargonistic mirror imageof balance of power. For their part, Soviet theoreticianshave made clear the differences between the concepts of thecorrelation of forces and the traditional Western frame-work, balance of power, as will be shown in Chapter II.

Another reason fo r the seeming misunderstanding ofcorrelation of forces is hat translations of Sovietmaterials, both those translated by the Soviets for exportand those translated in the West, often blur the distinc-tion between correlation of forces and traditional non-Marxist concepts such as balance of power. Michael J.Deane makes this clear when he writes:

.the Russian term. .. sootnoshenye sil isvariously translated by U.S. translators as"correlation of forces," "alignment of forces,""ratio of forces," "relationship of forces," or"balance of power." Likewise, Soviet trans-lators of original Russian-language publica-tions generally fluctuate between "correlation

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9of forces," "alignment of forces," "ratio offorces," end less frequently "relationship offorces."l1Before beginning an examination of the correlation of

"forces, a word of caution is appropriate. Because thisinquiry focuses on a feature of Soviet ideoloov and to alarge degree ignores other elements affecting Sovietdecision-making, there is a real risk that a nearly exclu-sive concentration on correlation of forces will appear tobe an appeal to a single cause. There is even the tendencyin discussing a single factor like correlation of forces tobelittle other explanations of Soviet behavior or to sub-ordinate them to the aspect being examined here. If thisis a danger, it is not wholly intended; however, since afailure to grasp the importance of ideology to the mind-setof a Soviet decision maker may likely result in inaccurateassessmnents of Soviet policy, this study has concentratedon ideology, or rather one manifestation of it, in aneffort to prompt greater consideration of it by observersof Soviet affairs.

It would be presumptuous on the part of a Westernanalyst to claim that the Marxist-Leninist ideology of theSoviet Union is the exclusive guide for Soviet foreignpolicy, just as it would be to claim that Marxism-Leninismplays no part in establishing that policy. By stressingthe ideological aspect, the intention is to encourage theviewing of international situations in ways other than


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10those with which we are accustomed, to view Soviet inter-ests from the Soviet (not necessarily Russian) perspective.

Correlation of forces may be useful in this regardbecause it reflects the wholly different belief systemregarding the nature of man and society that is modernSoviet Marxism-Leninism. It brings into focus preciselythe values which are profoundly at odds with values whichare generally accepted as basic truths by the non-Marxist.


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CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGY AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCESThe Soviet World View

Soviet foreign policy is necessarily and invariablyframed in Marxist-Leninist terminology. Essential to

any concept which portrays some feature ofthat foreign policy, such as the rationale fo r decisionmaking or policy formulation, is a grasp of Marxist 1 6ideological underpinnings. As we shall see, the concept ofcorrelation of forces is a basic feature of a SovietWeltanschauung, which colors any Soviet discussion of worldaffairs. By briefly examining some of the precepts ofMarxism, the essence of that world view will become appar-ent. While this overview of Marxist philosophy is neces-sarily oversimplified (and perhaps even vulgar), fo r thepurpose of this study I have focused on only those termsand ideas which are essential as a backdrop fo r the conceptof correlation of forces.

Marxism is, among other things, a philosophy ofhistory; it purports to explain the progress of man and

iIsociety. Unlike some philosophies of history, Marxism alsodescribes the future and offers a means of arriving at that

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12future. Because Marxism is supposed to be based upon car-tasn objective laws which govern man's historical develop-ment, Marxism can be a political program and a guide foraction; by assuring that policy is in synchronization withthese laws, the Marxist can assist the unfolding of history.

Basic to Marx's interpretation of history is dialec-tical materialism. As regards the latter half of thisterm, materialism meant to Marx a belief that matter wasthe only reality. 1 7 George H. Sabine, an historian ofpolitical philosophy, states that Marx closely associatedthe word materialism with "scientific," since he believedthat social studies based on the theory of dialecticalmaterialism ". . . could be made [as] equally precise andcertain [as the study of physics]." 1 8

The first word in the term, dialectical materialism,is the qualifier which made Marxism so different from othermechanistic, cause-and-effect theories of history, and wasalso what gave It its appeal as a revolutionary guide foraction. The dialectic, which Marx adapted from Hegel, wasbelieved by him to have been "... a powerful logicalmethod uniquely capable of demonstrating a law of socialdevelopment . ... ,1 Dialectics explain change in termsof conflict resolution. The application of the dialecticto the history of the development of societies Is calledhistorical materialism. At each stage of society (which inthe terminology of Hegelian logic would be called in thisexample the thesis), there arises from contradictions with-


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13in the society an antithesis, a force diametrically opposedto the thesis. Th e antithesis eventually negates thethesis. Out of this conflict of opposites emerges a quali-tatively higher stage of societal development, the synthe-sis, or the negation of the negation. Although Hegel ap-plied the dialectic to the resolution of conflicts in therealm of ideas, the application of the system to historyand societies by Marx permitted him to demonstrate theinevitability, the necessity, of capitalism's demise.

R. N. Carew Hunt, in a passage which may shed somelight on the discussion of correlation of forces, had thisto say about dialectics:

As a revolutionary, Marx was naturally at-tracted to the dialectic because it representedeverything as being in the state of becomingsomething else, and to this day Communists aretaught that it constitutes a mode of reasoningwhich is somehow superior to that of formallogic, which is represented as conceiving ofeverything in fixed and unchangeable terms and asthus providing a convenient intellectual instru-ment for reactionaries. Thus Engels says thatthe dialectic transcends the narrow horizon offormal logic and contains the germ ?f a more com-Sprehensive view of the world. .. .A second major description of Marxism with..wthlh we

must deal is economic determinism. It is in an explaina-tion of this characterization of Marxism that the reasonfor Marx's desire to see capitalism replaced will becomeapparent. For Marx, man was different from other livinganimals by his "consciousness and purposiveness." 2 1 Manwas conscious of the potential hostility of his environment

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14and purposive in his "plans . . . to master his environmentand turn it from a hostile into a useful force." 2 2

Marxism refers to the application of con-sciousness and purpose (intelligence) aslb. The purpose of labor is to obtain fromthi-nvironment the means to preserve the lifeof the Individual and the species; hence, theentire struggle of man with his environment isa struggle for the appropriation of nature, andthis appropriation of nature Is what Marxismcalls production. 2 3Hunt points out, there are two factors in pro-

duction, the productive forces, and the productive rela-tions which derive from them." 2 4 The Productive forcesinclude "oroduction, commerce, and consumption." 2 5 Theproductive relations are the manner in which a society Isorganized to produce and distribute the results of labor,i.e., the division of labor. Thus, as A. G. Meyer ob-serves, "the definition of man as an animal which producesimplies that the struggle with the natural environment is the basic activity of man, of which the struggle with thesocial environment is only a derivative, a by-product." 2 6This is a key point in the Marxist interpretation of his-tory, since it makes all other aspects of society dependentupon this basic economic principle.

It is in the concept of Productive relations thatanother factor of critical importance to Marxism manifestsItself; that factor is the class struagle. As mentionedabove, various societal arrangements have existed which

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15organize the society's productive forces in ways which re-sult in fulfillment of the primary purpose of man. "Pro-duction is Q-ways a social, not an individual, activl-ty," 27 and as a result, social class is a key feature ofproductive relations. Because man's societal arrangementsfor production have resulted historically in a division oflabor in which one group or class has come to control themeans of production, while exploiting another class, con-flict has always arisen between the exploiting and exploit-ed classes. This conflict between classes gives rise toclass struggle and is resolved dialectically. The result-ing synthesis, over time, is always a higher form of socialorganization for production. Yet, this higher form oforganization has always led to a renewed class strugglewithin society due to control of the means of production byan element (class) in the society and exploitation ofanother element. For Marx, the class struggle will beresolved ultimately only when there ceases to be a divisionof labor, when the means of production are controlled bysociety as a whole. When this occurs, as Marx said it in-evitably and necessarily must because of the dialecticalprocess of progress, classes will disappear. The end toexploitation of one class by another will result in aclassless, i.e., non-exploitative, society.

This society is a socialist one, and it will comeabout through a revolutionary resolution of the classstruggle in capitalist society. The exploited laboringONwI


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16class will expropriate the capital ist class by means of thedictatorship of the proletariat. Under this dictatorship,the state, i.e., the governmental institutions and mecha-nisms of class control, oopression, and coercion will beturned on the capitalists in the interests of the workingclass. Th e destruction of the old exploiting class willcause the eventual disappearance of all class distinctionsand the withering away of the means of class control, thestate. This utopian society in which, as Marx said, eachcontributes his labor according to his abilities, and takesfrom the production of society according to his needs, willbe the highest and final stage of productive development,and is called communism.

Communism can only come about when exploitation iseliminated world-wide. Additionally, It will only comeabout when the world's toiling classes recognize theirclass interests and unite to bring about the destruction ofclass oppression. Hence, today's communists are committedto strengthening the international proletarian forces andweakening international capitalism's oppressive hold in theinterest of wold progress toward achieving socialism. Tospeak of foreign policy in these terms is to address theclass content of that policy.Ideology and World Politics

The leaders of the Soviet Union are interested inknowing their position in the world relative to that of

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17other powers. To that end they have devised means of meas-uring their relative position. Due to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, however, they reject as an anachronismthe framework which states have used in the past to assesstheir relative postion and to effect either a maintenanceof that position or to alter it favorably. By this frame-work is meant the balance of power concept prominent inWestern diplomatic circles since the nineteenth century.

Traditional models of international politics assumethe basic actors to be sovereign states, and most typi-cally, nation-states. Each state is concerned with pro-tecting its territorial integrity, furthering its economicwell-being, advancing its national goals; these interestsmay be pursued in concert with other nations in a way whichis mutually beneficial, or they may be advanced at the ex-pense of other states in cases where achievement of onestate's goals can only be accomplished at the expense ofone or several other states. Such roles have been attrib-uted to states in times of both peace and war fo r centu-ries. In this conceptualization of international rele-tions, the geographic location and configuration, the leveland extent of economic development, the natural and humanresources endowment, the political and social organizationand supporting institutions, and the national will of eachstate have determined its power in relation to other states.

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In the Marxist view, the relations between stateswere in actuality the relations between competing capital-ist groupings. These capitalist states were (and are)competing for markets and materials. In its most advancedstage, having achieved a level of internal development ineach state which prevented further growth, capitalismturned to the undeveloped areas of the world. Here, estab-lishing a colonial system, the capitalist nations temporar-ily overcome economic crisis at home by building ne wmarkets for their industries while exploiting new rawmaterials with which to produce the\roduct of those homeindustries. This imperialism was the stage that capitalismhad reached by the beginning of World War I, during whichthe first socialist state was born.

This new Soviet state posed a grave threat to therest of the capitalist-dominated states because it markedthe beginning of the world-wide movement to free theexploited classes by overthrowing the exploiting capitalistclass in each country. A significant change in inter-national relations had occurred. These relations were nowbetween the capitalist states and the one state which rep-resented the class interests of all the world's proletari-at. What had been the intre-class competition for marketsand resources had become inter-class conflict. As oneSoviet commentator has written, "The countries began toembody in the world arena not only a national but a social


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19quality; . . .the axis of conflict in the world moved evermore definitely in the class sphere." 2 8

Inherent in this conceptualization of interstate re-lations is its class nature, in a Marxist-Leninist sense.

j World politics had come to manifest the basic antagonismsof social classes and was locked in deadly dialecticalconflict. No longer meaningful, at least to them, was theclassical balance of power because the balance betweencapitalist states had been replaced by a more fundamentalbalance, the balance between capitalist-imp erialist statesand the first socialist state.

In the Soviet view, the attainment of power and theestablishment of a state by the Bolsheviks on behalf-ofinternational socialism marked what has been called a"fundamental restructuring of international rela-tions." 2 9 In essence the world was now composed of twoopposing parties, the remaining capitalist states on theone hand and a single proletarian state on the other.Hence, the bipolar concept, from a class view, was operantfrom the Soviet state's inception.

Only since the Second World War has bipolarity in thebalance of power been accepted in the West as a status quo,brought about by the relatively overwhelming strength ofthe Soviet Union and the United States. In the Sovietconception, however, bipolarity has been the status quosince the emergence of the Soviet state. For, to the Soviet


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20theoretician, the overthrow of the bourgeois regime inRussia heralded a qualitative change in the relationshipbetween nations in that no longer were the relationsbetween states only those between bourgeois states.

That the world had become bipolar is importantbecause it contains the essence of the concept of correla-tion of forces. It simply is not possible to substitutecorrelation of forces fo r balance of power and grasp thefull meaning of the former; while there are a number ofsimilar ties between the two, especially in the way ele-ments of the balance are measured, the similarity breaksdown on this single point: correlation of forces is firstand foremost a class concept.Correlation of Forces and Balance of Power

As nuced above, Soviet ideologists make a distinctionbetween correlation of world forces and balance of power.Correlation of forces Is the relative position of worldcapitalism vis-a-vis world socialism. Balance of power is,at once, a discredited means of maintaining peace betweencapitalist nations, especially prior to the emergence ofthe first Soviet state, and, particularly since then, acynical system by which the capitalist powers attempt topreserve and justify the status quo and prevent the revolu-tionary transformation of the world from captalism tosocialism. 30

On a number of points, balance of power is criticizedas an incomplete doctrine. The principal charge against it


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,N.,

! 21is that "it ignores the class nature of foreign poll-Scy.,31 The tendency of Western theorists is to conceiveu* the cotII0UiRL in Wh1 Wo LU * C;U,,,IPtJ.1tLau u=Lw==,, UUutries, ". . .to reduce practically the entire essence offoreign policy to playing on contradictions between states,blocs and groups of states." 3 2 As a result, balance ofpower is almost entirely a matter of the relative militaryand economic power of the states considered in the equation.

The most important feature of the concept of correla-tion of forces and an aspect which cannot be ignored if anunderstanding of the concept is to be gained is its classnature. This feature, which reflects the status of theclass struggle between socialism and capitalism at a giventime, is precisely that which differentiates "correlationof forces" from "balance of power." Correlation of forces,as a result, transcends national and territorial boundariesand homes in on what, for the Marxist, is the only signifi-cant division among men--their relationship to the means ofproduction. This frame of reference is fo r them the onlyacceptable one; this is exemplified in Lenin's words: "Theonly choice is--either bourgeois or socialist ideology.There is no middle course. . ..

Correlation of forces is, in fact, explicitly definedas a class concept. "Speaking of the correlation of forcesin the world, we refer, above all, to the correlation ofthe class forces and the struggle of classes both inindividual countries and on [sic) the international

* . . ...1 -~ 4 * . .. .- 4 X.- . .. . . .- . .. .. ... . . . -. ' ] ' , . ' .

S.. _ . . .. . .. ... . ,,... . ., . . , ,, . . .. . - -tt ' ::r"" 3 4i


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22arena ... ," This common denominator in world poli-tics, the class struggle, is seen as the only legitimatedistinction between competing entities. in the words ofMarx: "Any historical struggle--whether it takes place inthe political, religious, philosophical, or any other ideo-logical sphere--in reality is only a more or less clear

35expression of the struggle of social classes.Another major criticism of balance of power concep-

tions rests on what the Soviets refer to as its militarybasis. Because Western concepts of international affairsare essentially "governmental," i.e., between sovereignstates, in their approach, rather than based on concepts ofclass, the primary aim of Western states is their terri-torial security. 3 6 This security rests on military poweras its most basic element, and military strength Is viewedas the principal measure of a state's strength. On e Sovietwriter has added economic strength as a second major factorin bourgeois balance of power conceptions, stating that

".economic potential and military strength play atremendous role in international relations," and concludingthat "they make up the material basis of the policy ofstates, including the foreign sphere." 3 7 But he also wasquick to add that as "Lenin pointed ou t . . . domestic andforeign policies are determined by the economic interests,the economic positions of the ruling classes of astate."

Sq


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23In historical eras when the only states were capital-

is t or pre-captialist states, "the decisive criterion inassessing the ratio of forces in the international arenaremained military power." 3 9 With military strength asthe main factor in evaluating a state's power, and giventhe hostile internal contradictions characteristic of non-socialist societies, aggressive wars were the frequentresult of imbalances in this chiefly military calculus.

Since the advent of the first socialist state, andespecially since the emergence of the socialist communityof states, states which by Marxist-Leninist definition lackthe class contradictions which lead to aggressive wars,". .the axis of conflict in the world moved ever more

definitely into the class sphere." 4 0 The growing ".N..industrial, scientific and technical, and military potent-

* ial . . ." of states ".. . rejecting war as a means forachieving political objectives . . . (excluding just warsfor independence and national liberation)" has proved theimportance of the "class sphere" element in the correlationor balance of forces, the Soviet theoretician would main-tain.41 Thus, balance of power, based on military might,and framed in obsolescent "governmental" concepts isthought to be outmoded, useless, and even dangerous as ameans of accurately assessing the current balance in theworld.

- I


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24Main Features of the Concept of Correlation of Forces

Several aspects of the ideological content of corre-lation of forces are present here and deserve expansion.The first of these is bipolarity, and its constancy inSoviet interpretations of world politics. One Arricanpolitical scientist has stated that "... the concept ofpolarization, one of the the cardinal tenets of Marxism, isthe most essential analytical tool in the Soviet theoreti-cal approach to the restructuring of international poli-tics.,,42 Polarization, in the sense of a world polarizedbetween competing class forces, is indeed a constant themein the ideological conceptualization of the world ordersince the earliest days of the Soviet state. In its atti-tude toward the belligerents in the First World War, ir-respective of their various alliance postures; in itsgrouping into a single enemy the various forces which op-posed it during its civil war; and in its view of the prin-cipal capitalist states following the war, the Sovietleadership invariably ignored obvious differences anddivergent interests while it emphasized the only sim ilarityamong those groups--their class identity. 43

It is clear in the concept of "capitalist encircle-ment" that the Soviet view is one of polarity and conse-quent antagonism based solely on class differences; thatthe relations among the post-World War I nations of theWest were conflict-ridden is not significant. It is notsignificant because the differences and antagonisms among

, tv-*


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25those countries are seen as being symptomatic of the con-tradictions inherent in capitalism, and are seen merely asintra-class comoetition. The mnra bhsic conflict !s thatiwhich exists between "states with different social sys-tems," between capitalist and socialist states. By com-parison, there is no substantive difference between thevarious cap italist-imp erialist states when it comes to theclass conflict which exists between them and the SovietUnion.

In more recent times, the basically bipolar world ofthe post-World War II era has given way to a multipolarone, at least according to most Western observers.44 Thephenomenal economic recovery and growth of Europe andJapan, the emergence of the Third World (its very nameepitomizing polar changes), the schism in what seeminglyhad been the monolithic socialist community, the recentgrowth of a split between the richer and poorer countriesof the less developed world, all have led to the creationof a polycentric world community. These differences aremanifested in a growing number of political, economic, andsocial alignments and associations.

This weakening of the bipolar nature of the world Isrejected by Soviet Marxists on basic ideological grounds.Their position is clearly one that maintains and nurturesthe bipolar description of the world balance. Writing inthe New Times, Georgi Shakhnazarov, a Soviet historian,criticizes "Bourgeois commentators [who] talk a great deal


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!I26

about the two-pole world becoming a world with five or morepoles," and stresses that "...changes in the position ofstates, their relative strength, and their alliances aresecondary as compared with the main factor--the strugglebetween the two diametrically opposed social systems." 4 5

This bipolar interpretation of the world condition isfundamental to a Marxist, dialectical-materialistic expla-nation of human history. It is also essential to theSoviet claim as the leader of the international proletarianmovement. By focusing attention on economic class distinc-tions between the industrialized nations, especially theUnited States and the countries of the socialist community,i.e., between the countries which are (by Soviet-Marxistdefinition) exploiters of the laboring masses and the non-exploitative socialist states, the Soviet Union detractsattention from those features of its ow n relationship withmany countries which by some standards would also beclassed as exploitative.

This concentration on the bipolarity of the world hasbeen and is an effective tactic in creating or maintainingdistrust on the part of the non- or less-industrializedcountries toward the Western industrialized states. On theother hand, It has not been totally effective in auto-matically winning unbridled support from those same "ex-plolted" countries. In fact, the appeal of the Peking"Three Worlds" doctrine may rest on the feeling among manyof the non-aligned countries that the Soviet Union is as


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27exploitative in it s relations with them as are the "tradi-tional" imperialist states. "Hegemonism" has enough truthin it as a characterization of Soviet relations withsmaller states to cause increasing distrust of Soviet over-tures; the recent intervention in Afghanistan should dolittle to dispel this distrust. Partly because the Chinesehave touched a tender spot, the Soviets reserve consider-able space in various publications for articles (and alsowithin articles not written directly about China) whichfulminate against the Chinese ideological heresy whichserves the imperialist states and retards a more rapidshifting in.the correlation of forces to the socialistside. 4 6

A second aspect of ideological content inherent inthe correlation of forces, as it is conceptualized bySoviet ideologues, is the dynamism of the concept. Thisaspect is also a key feature which causes the rejection ofbalance of power as a viable interpretation of the rela-tions between states. This aspect reflects clearly thevalue attached to the Marxist dialectic to explain theresolution of conflict.

In the Soviet view, by the very fact that at its mostbasic level the world is divided between the forces ofcapitalist-imperialism and socialism, there exists betweenthe two forces a diametrical opposition which is activelyseeking ultimate resolution. Doctrinally, this oppositionwill be resolved inevitably by the triumph of socialism and

y~


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28the transformation at some point in the future to a com-munist world. Because the correlation of forces reflectsthe relative positions of strength and weakness of theoppos!ng world class forces, it Is an ever-changing,ever-shifting, i.e., dynamic, concept. It rejects theIdea that there is a status quo; except when taken as a"snapshot" of the dynamics of change, the correlation offorces is constantly shifting.Toward a Definition of Correlation of Forces

As mentioned Previously, correlation of forces is ameans of determining the current strengths and weaknessesof world class forces, reflecting the reciprocally relatedpositions of imperialism and International socialism. Butthere are other class forces which affect the correlationof the protagonists, and which must be considered in anyanalysis. In addition to the world socialist community andimperialist centers, there is the force of the internation-al laboring class itself in all countries (invariably ledby communist and workers' parties in capitalist states),national liberation movements, groupings of nonalignednations and pacifist-oriented movements, the social demo-cratic movement, and various forces of reaction: racism,Zionism, and Trotskyism, among others. 4 7 All of theseforces interact in the international arena and determinethe correlation of forces In the world.


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29The strengths and weaknesses of these various forces

are expressed in terms of political, economic, scientific-technological, military, and ideological development. Thecorrelative or reciprocal strength of the chief classforces in each of these areas determines the rate at whichthe dialectical progress will occur.

As the forces of international socialism achievestrength in these various areas of development, the social-ist position relative to the forces of world capitalismimproves and the conflict between these two forcessharpens. This sharpening of the class conflict on aninternational level results in an acceleration of dialecti-cal change in a progressive fashion. This Is so becausethe achievement of correlative strength by Internationalsocialism in one of these areas constitutes a negation ofthe strength of world capitalism in that area.

In elaboration of this feature, the evolution of U.S.strategy since World War II may be viewed as the result ofthe growing military strength of proletarian international-ism and conseouent dialectical change. If the policies of"containment" and "massive retaliation" may be'viewed asbeing derived from a U.S. nuclear monopoly, and later froma significant nuclear superiority, then the growth of theSoviet Union's nuclear strength to a level of essentialequivalence may be seen as the antithesis to that U.S.strength, and eventually the resulting synthesis describedas the era of peaceful coexistence and detente. Thus, a

JP T


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30shift in the correlation of military forces made possibledetente (and its outward manifestations, SALT, MBFR,CESC). This shift neutralized military power as a logicalmean: of resolving disputes; the struggle did not end, bu tinstead was shifted to other areas of competition and con-flict (economic, political, ideological). Whether or notsuch a formulation is true or not, it nonetheless hasvalidity as a Marxist explanation of the change.

The dialectical changes summarized above are precise-ly those given by the Soviets for the current correlationof forces and for the resultant status of relations betweenthe socialist and imperialist states, i.e., peaceful co-existence and detente. For example, one Soviet author haswritten:

It is of paramount importance that preciselyduring . . . [the late 1960's to early 1970's]the West had to admit the untenahility of allits illusions concerning military primacy.This had rather far-reaching consequences, forit has mostly been by force of arms that im-perialism has traditionally exercised its in-fluence on world development. It has alsogiven top priority to armed strength in oppos-ing socialism. The economic, scientific andtechnological capacities of the Soviet Unionhave, however, expanded sufficiently for it tooppose the imperialist countries with.an equi-valent military potential in every respect.That meant putting an end to the chimera ofWestern military superiority ungerpinning the'position-of-strength' policy. 40Soviet ideologists are adamant in their insistence on

their (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) Interpretation of detente andits causes in the face of Western, non-Marxist objectionsto placing detente in a Marxist ideological, as opposeo to

_7---- -~,---- ~- -tor-


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31a diplomatic, context. One such ideologist states:

To date, all the concepts of detente advancedby bourgeois scientists are no more than asearch for an explanation of the changes inworld politics that would suit imperialism andfor aporoaches that would put detente in theservice of imperialist foreign policy. Thissearch is naturally doomed to failure. 'Re-targeting' detente to suit the imperialists isno more possible than 'undoing' the chiefobjective factor that has brought forth deten-te , i.e., the steady change of the woWd bal-ance of forces in favor of socialism. "Explicit in the foregoing discussion of strengths and

weaknesses of various world forces and in the example ofchanging US-Soviet military strength Is the concept ofdialectical conflict. The class forces referred to areengaged in continuous struggle. For the Marxist, theconflict or struggle must eventually be resolved inaccordance with the laws of historical materialism.History is for him a zero-sum game with a predictableoutcome. The only uncertainty is the speed or rate atwhich the game proceeds. But the Marxist is not content tolet history take its own meandering, if inevitable, course;history can be assisted in its progress if the strengthsand weaknesses of the world class forces can be deter-mined. If the stage of historical development is revealedin terms of the relative strengths and weaknesses of theforces in the world, then policies can be developed whichwill accelerate historical development. Obviously, bene-fits will accrue to the nation acting in concert with suchobjective laws.

_M77*77TWO_-77F .


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32It is one thing to believe the world is developing

socially according to objective laws. It is another thingto know with certainty the stage of development the worldhas reached at any given point in time, and tocnow thatstage in terms of the military, political, economic,scientific-technological, and ideological strengths andweaknesses of the class forces active in the world.Because traditional concepts of gauging relative power"positions do not measure class forces, they are incompleteand necessarily obsolete for-Soviet purposes. As a resultthe concept which replaces the outmoded balance of power isthe world correlation of forces.

To understand the relationship of the concept ofcorrelation of forces to the Soviet world view, a simpleanalogy is helpful. In this analogy the objective realityof the world condition at a given time may be seen as asource emitting light. Because it enables one to interpretcorrectly the objective laws governing historical develop-ment, Marxism-Leninism may be seen as the lens which bringsinto focus the objective reality of the present world con-dition or stage of development. The role of the concept ofthe correlation of forces is that of a prism, whichrefracts this focused beam of light and reveals in thespectrum it produces the relative strengths and weak-nesses of world class forces.


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-. ... 4 . .... -,.

33SummAry

Correlation of forces is rooted in the Marxist viewof the world. It is not possible simply to equate theconcept with balance of power and other non-Marxist con-cepts for measuring relative international power posi-tions. Instead, the Western analyst needs to understandthat the essence of correlation of forces is the Marxistidea of class; the assessment of the correlation of forcesis a gauging of class forces, which are seen as constantlychanging.

Correlation of forces is intended to provide aglimpse of the relative class strengths of the tw o opposingsocial systems, international socialism and internationalimperialism, at a given point in time. As such, it aims atassessing the state of the dialectical progress of historytowards a known future, but a future whose time of arrivalis not known. The following chapter describes how thecorrelation of forces is (or may be) applied to arrive atan evaluation, and how it might have been used to analyzepolicy choices in a given situation.


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CHAPTER IIIANALYZING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES

Problems of MeasurementAt first glance it may appear that by applying the

concept of correlation of forces to specific situations itmight be possible to replicate the Soviet analyst's evalua-tion of what courses of action would be of greatest valuein advancing Soviet interests. It is to this task and tothe difficulties likely to be encountered that we now turnour attention. Thus far, this examination has dealt onlywith what the correlation of forces is and is not. It isnow necessary to attempt to describe how and upon whatbasis the analysis of the correlation is made.

In perhaps the most detailed treatment of correlationof forces by a Soviet author, Georgi Shakhnazarov listed alarge number of criteria which may be used to conduct ananalysis of the correlation.

In economics, usually we compare the grossnational product on a per capita basis, laborproductivity, dynamics of economic growt h(growth rate?], level of industrial output,particularly in the leading sectors, labortechnology, resources and manpower skills,number of specialists, and level of developmentof theoretical and applied science. In themilitary aspect, comparisons are being made ofthe quantity and quality of arms, fire power ofthe armed forces, combat and moral qualities ofthe soldiers, training of the command person-nel, forms of organization of the troops and

34

._.-____,-_-.:__.--..._........__ '_____'___'' '"--S.. .. ,. . ....... .. .... . . . . ..... . .. . . : , . . . . .... -


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35their experience in combat, nature of the mili-ta",- doctrine, and methods followed in strate-giL, operative, and tactical thinking. Interms of politics, we take into considerationthe breadth of the social base of the govern-system, its method of organization,constitutional procedures governing relationsbetween the government and the legislativeorgans, possibility to make operative deci-sions, and extent and nature of populationsupport of domestic and foreign policy. Fi-nally, if it is a question of assessing thestrength of one or another international move-ment, we take into consideration its quantita-tive composition, influence among the masses,position in the political life of the individu-al countries, principles and norms governingrelations among its constituent units, and theextent of their unity.50Some of these criteria easily lend themselves to

quantification, while others are only measurable afterdefining and weighting them in ways which must be consid-ered as predjudical toward the Marxist-Leninist view. Fur-ther, this listing merely provides a sampling of economic,military, and political variables which might be of use inan analysis, but gives no indication of the relativeimportance of one major category over another, of one cate-gorical discriminator over a second, etc. Given theseomissions, how is it possible to make an assessment in anyway similar to a Soviet assessment of the correlation offorces?

In a sense, it is not. Even in the Soviet analysisthe variables do not have a fixed importance; Shakhnazarovmakes this clear when he writes, "Some of them vary insignificance and could adopt an unpredictable behav-ior.''51 As has already been mentioned, these are not


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36even all the possible variables of significance which maybear upon an assessment of the overall correlation offorces. He writes that "the number of factors which parti-cipate in its formation is hard to estimate." 5 2 Indeedit must be; even in a regional analysis, which will onlyallow the Soviet analyst a ". . . short-term forecast

. .," these criteria only permit the determination of thecorrelation of forces "... with greater or lesser accur-acy . . .

Deane points out in examining this same article thatby so caveating the utility of an analysis, Shakhnazarov.". . .[stops] just short of saying that an overall assess-ment of the correlation of forces is impossible. . .54

The conclusion may be drawn from the foregoing thatas a model or formula capable of adaptation by an analystin the West for predicting specific Soviet courses ofaction, the correlation of forces has little value. If theSoviet analyst can assess the correlation only with"greater or lesser accuracy," then we in the West havelittle chance of arriving at his conclusions when attempt-ing to duplicate his analysis.An Analytical Framework

As stated above, since a sure formula fo r computingthe correlation of forces is not given nor possible toconstruct considering the charging values which may beassigned to the various variables examined in an analysis,


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'7'

37its use as a model is limited. In the sense of permittinga determination of Soviet short-term intentions with neatprecision, correlation of forces is of almost no value. Itdoes have some usefulness, however, in framing any partic-ular policy question in roughly the same way that it wouldbe done in Moscow; it forces the Western analyst to look ata problem from a Marxist viewpoint.

To show how this might be helpful, it may be usefulto return to the question introduced in Chapter I, themotivations fo r Soviet behavior in the Horn of Africa, andto speculate how the correlation of forces in this instancemight have been assessed.

Africa, like all of the less developed areas of theworld, has been viewed by the Soviets as a land of promisefrom the viewpoint of accelerating the decline of capital-ism and the rise of world socialism. 5 Particularly withthe successes of the independence movements in the late1950s and early 1960s, the Soviets hoped to see, and ifpossible to assist, the rapid degeneration and collapse ofthe industrialized capitalist states. It was expected thatthis would occur as the colonies broke the strangle hold ofimperialism. When the expected collapse failed to materi-alize, it was explained away as the result of the lack ofAfrican class consciousness, a deficiency which the SovietUnion sought to correct by support to progressive regimesin the hope of influencing shifts to socialist paths ofdevelopment.56

. ,, R k


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38tWhile not the most progressive new African state by

Soviet standards, Somalia at independence in 1961 was atleast a national democracy (i.e., an independent statecontrolled by the national bourgeoisie, and no longer acolony), which placed it politically at a more advancedstage than its neighbors at the time. Further, due to itsdesire for arms--a desire which the U.S. refused tosatisfy--Somalia presented an opportunity which could no tbe Dassed up. Although Soviet policy concerning generoussupport to even "revolutionary democrats" had changed inthe late 1960s, the earlier Soviet assistance efforts inSomalia bore fruit in 1969 with the military coup whichbrought the socialist-oriented government of PresidentMohammed Siad Barre to power.

Disenchanted with its lack of success in Africa, theSoviet Union in the late 1960's adopted a more forwardposture in the developing world. This posture had beenInitiated ". . . with the aim not just of winning politicalor ideological influence in the Third World, but ofstrengthening the Soviet bloc's economic base and reducingthe economic superiority of the West." 5 7 The new policy

"shifted emphasis from the use of economic aid as ameans of gaining politir.al influence to the use of politi-cal and economic influence as a means of securing privi-leged economic advantages for the Soviet Union and itsbloc." 5 8

0


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139

This phase of Soviet foreign policy in the ThirdWorld has been characterized as being exploitative since itrelied on counterposing to Western Imperialist power ".a 'stable division of labor' between the Soviet Union andits bloc on one side and the developing countries in theU.S.S.R.'s emerging zones of influence on the other." 5 9

Somalia offered little in the area of economic ad-vantage to Moscow, but It may have remained important foranother reason: the military factor. The emergence ofSoviet military power was mentioned earlier as having beenof great importance. The growth of International social-Ism's military strength has been credited with forcing theacceptance of peaceful coexistence by the West. Crowingnaval might was certainly one feature of this increasingmilitary strength, and It was in this connection thatSomalia continued to play an important role. Because ofcertain weakness in the U.S.S.R.'s naval capabilities (suchas reliance on shore-based air support and ship replenish-ment), the air and naval facilities in Somalia were vitalto a growing Soviet naval presence In the Indian Ocean.

While Soviet interests seemed to be well-served bythe relationship with Somalia, a seriet of events inEthiopia apparently caused the Soviet Union to undertake areappraisal of the situation In the Horn of Africa, andultimately led to a major change in its policy in theregion. The first of these events was the overthrow ofEmperor Haile Selassie in 1974. "As early as December,

S.~


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401974, the new government declared that it sought to trans-form the country into a socialist state with a one-partysystem, collective farms, and government control of all"productive property." 6 0 Initially, there were severalreasons the Soviet Union was slow to make any major over-tures to the new Ethiopian government. First, the g wasfactionalized (it was not until February, 1977, thatLieutenant Colonel Mengistu Halle Mariam emerged as theundisputed first figure).61 Second, in Ethiopia'sEritree Province, a guerrilla war was raging; the SovietUnion was providing support to the predominently MarxistEritrean liberation movements. 6 2 Third, the Soviet Unionwas already committed to military support of Somalia, whichin turn was committed to supporting the Western SomaliaLiberation Front (WSLF) In the Ogaden.

It was not until the Dergue unveiled its poli-tical program on April 21, 1976--a full 19months after Selassie was deposed--that theKremlin moved to improve Its relations with thene w Ethiopian government significantly. Afterthe publication of the Dergue's political pro-gram, the Soviet Union proclaimed that PMAC wasleading a "national democratic revolution" andhad become an "active participant In the ynti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle."63As has been mentioned, Ethiopia had clearly been mov-

ing since 1975 in a direction which could be considered"progressive" in the Soviet view. However, due toEthiopia's numerous internal disruptions--economic, politi-cal, social--it was not certain that even with massiveeconomic and military assistance Ethiopia would ever become


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IIa profitable enterprise in harmony with Moscow's new strat-egy. However, there were other factors which might haveinfluenced the U.S.S.R. to look favorably on prospects forsupporting Ethiopia.

That Ethiopia could be considered a politicallyimportant country in the region and on the continent needslittle elaboration; thus, on this point alone Moscow mayhave considered providing some support. Further, Somaliawas becoming somewhat of a problem fo r the Soviets. In th eaftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, pan-Islam wasbecoming a stronger force in the Middle Eastern region, andSomalia as an Arab League member was no doubt influenced in

/64a way which would be interpreted negatively by Moscow; 6 4.y contrast, it is a logical assumption that Ethiopia'srevolutionaries were committed to atheism in keeping withthe Marxist orientation they professed. Additionally,Somalia seemed to be on the verge of violating one aspectof the bilateral treaty it had with the Soviet Union byinvitIng the U.S. to make use of Somalian facilities, anof",. it hoped would prompt the granting of badly neededforeign aid. This certainly would have been receivedas a 7,anative signal by the Soviets.

.nother aspect likely to have been worrisome to theSoviet Union was the growing mood in the Red Sea region tolimit Soviet military activity. Prominent in the movementwere the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, bu t other littoral

_______________i~*"i.


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42states including Somalia were also involved. 6 6 OnlyEthiopia was not a party to the movement.

In December, 1976, the Ethiopian government reported-ly made a secret agreement with the Soviet Union for theProvision of perhaps as much as $100 million worth of mili-tary aid. 6 7 Shortly after this agreement, the U.S.

". .. decided to terminate military aid to Ethiopia al-together, officially because of gross violations of humanrights." 6 8 In April, the dera expelled the U.S. MAAG andforced the closing of the U.S. facility near Asmara. Theseactions suddenly presented the USSR with the prospect of apotential new Marxist-Leninist client in the Horn.69Summary

How can the concept of correlation of forces helpframe the questions confronting Soviet policy in theHorn? Based upon what we know about the concept, analystsin Moscow would have been viewing the developments in theHorn on a class basis, not on the basis of Somalia versusEthiopia. By re-examining some of the facts already pre-sented, it may be possible to see the problem as theSoviets conceived it.

At the time of Haile Selassie's overthrow, Ethiopiawas a semi-feudal, semi-capitalist state, and was clearlyan ally of imperialism: the U.S. provided economic andmilitary support to Ethiopia and maintained a military baseat Asmara. The coup which toppled Selassie's regimebrought more progressive forces to power. Although these


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43progressive forces were committed to launching Ethiopia ona course of socialist development, they were also facedwith considerable opposition from various forces of reac-tion, including world Imperialism.

The inchoate revolution in Ethiopia would be a posi-tive force contributing to the advance of the position ofsocialist internationalism only if it succeeded in crushingthe internal, indigenous sources of reaction. Imperialismhad lost its "suzeraignty" in Ethiopia, which might bereimposed if the ger2 failed to consolidate its position.

Somalia's military backing of the WSLF In the Front'sstruggle fo r national liberation of the Ogaden region ofEthiopia forced a decision by Moscow. In arriving at thatdecision an analysis of aspects of the regional and worldcorrelation of forces must have been made. The basic ques-tion must have been: providing support to which of the twoprogressive forces in the Horn most benefits the forces ofinternational socialism?

Although the Scviet Union believes itself to be jus-tified (even obligated) in aiding struggles fo r nationalliberation, the situation which existed in 1977 in the Hornwas not normal. Moscow was being forced to choose betweensupporting a war of national liberation on the one hand andnational democratic revolution on the other. Support tothe WSLF could mean the failure of Ethiopia's revolution,the ascension to power of reactionary forces, and th ereturn of imperialism to a position of influence.


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44Support to Ethiopia would insure the success of the

national democratic revolution and eliminate the influenceof the forces of imperialism. The Soviet Union may havethought it doubtful that Somalia would permit imperialistforces to rise to a position of influence similar to theposition they had held In Ethiopia; Somalia's actions hadbegun to appear somewhat reactionary, but the country mostprobably would remain a force in the non-aligned movementrather than fall completely under the influence of theforces of imperialism.

On a higher level, the forces of imperialism were notl ikely to actively support Somalia with military assist--ance. This conclusion could have been based upon statedU.S. policies on arms transfers to Africa. 7 0 In addi-tion, the positions of essential equivalence between theforces of socialism and the forces of imperialism, madepossible by Soviet military growth, would deter directmilitary action on the part of the U.S.

Perhaps because support to the forces of nationaldemocratic revolution would have the greatest adverseimpact on the world position of imperialism, the SovietUnion decided on following that course. While the provi-sion of support to Ethiopia would result in the loss ofSoviet basing in Somalia, this loss might be only tempo-rary. Forces of reaction which had encouraged the Somalianactions would be thoroughly discredited by the failure ofthe Somali military action, and such contradictions would


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________- - --.....

have been expected to resolve themselves dialectically inan historically progressive fashion. Although there is noconclusive evidence, the agreement to supply arms toEthiopia most probably would have been on the basis of anEthiopian ouid pr2 Quo, and is strongly suggested by thesubsequent development of Soviet ship repair facilities atan island near Massawa. 7 1 Finally, it must be rememberedthat even if this proposition failed, the liberation ele-ments in Eritrea were still quite active and might likelyhave accepted direct Soviet assistance in return forpromises of future priviledges.

It cannot be proven that the analysis of the correla-tion of forces just suggested is in any way similar to theanalysis the Soviets might have conducted. But this appli-cation of the concept of correlation of forces does allow aWestern observer to see the question from a Marxist view-point. It is in this way that an understanding of thecorrelation of forces can be useful to the analyst in theWest. If the use of the concept fails to produce thespecific courses of action ultimately adopted by Moscow, itat least allows what is probably a more accurate estimateof overall Soviet goals and objectives than do Westernframeworks which assign non-Marxist motives to a Marxistgovernment.

S9 .


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CHAPTER IVCONCLUSIONS

SummaryA basic assumption in this inquiry is that Marxist

ideology is important to a Soviet policy maker in formulat-ing options or arriving at decisions on foreign policyquestions. Acknowledging from the outset the impossibility"of proving this hypothesis, this study purports that theconcept of the correlation of forces can be shown to be avalid vehicle for understanding the manner in which apolicy maker approaches a problem.

This examination has suggested that too oftenanalysts in the West tend to minimize the ideological ele-ment of Soviet foreign policy. Because peace and stabilityare valued in the West as essential fo r prosperity andhuman development, it is difficult to accept Soviet ideo-logical pronouncements which reject these values and sub-stitute conflict as the essential ingredient fo r worlddevelopment, progress, and even peace. Consequently,Western assessments of Soviet intentions quite often assignmotives which are based on non-Marxist values. The resultis an inability to explain fully at times the causes forSoviet behavior in specific situations, or a failure todefine Soviet objectives in certain instances.

46

.I.


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47Yet, as was shown, a great deal has been written in

Soviet Publications addressing the Importance to foreignpolicy questions of accurately assessing the correlation offorces. Western analysts and scholars tend to ignore thismaterial fo r several reasons. First, correlation of forcesfrequently is obscured in English translations. Theanalyst unable to read Soviet source documents in Russianand forced to rely on translations may not recognize theconcept when reading these translations. Second, correla-tion of forces is often confused with non-Marxist modelsfo r measuring relative international positions. This con-fusion is a result both of the translation problems alreadymentioned, and of a tendency to believe that correlation offorces is merely a jargonistic disguise fo r balance ofpower. This latter tendency stems from the difficulty inaccepting the sincerity of a Marxist's belief in that creed.This study shows that not only is correlation offorces different from balance of power and other Westernmodels because of the class frame of reference it uses tocompare world forces, but it is also a natural extension ofa Marxist world view. Unlike balance of power, which hasas its purpose the maintenance of a stable balance betweennations, the correlation of forces is a concept of dynamicchange. The Soviet purpose in assessing the present corre-lation of class forces in the world is to discover thealignment of these forces (i.e., their reciprocal positionsin terms of political, economic, military, etc.), and to

* - M't. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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48adopt policies which will accelerate th e progress of his-tory. Despite Western reluctance to accept the validity ofsuch a concept or th e principles underlying it, correlationof forces accords well with th e fundamental tenets ofM arxist-Leninist doctrine.

Correlation of forces has been shown to be not aneasily quantifiable set of variables, but instead a mani-festation of a world view clearly at odds with Westernviews. The concept is a natural outgrowth of what might becalled a "cognitive map" fundamentally different from th emind set from which we in th e West interpret historicalchange and other phenomena. Observing the same historicalphenomena through th e lens of Marxism-Leninism, th e Sovietanalyst sees causes which would not be assigned by hisnon-Marxist counterpart. Operating from a belief thatcertain objective laws drive historical development, he isno more able to perceive of those events in a non-Marxistway than those who do not understand Marxism-Leninism areable to estimate Soviet intentions in dialectical material-ist terms.

As was just stated, th e Soviets tend to see th e U.S.through a Marxist glass darkly. In their analysis of th emotives for Western adherence to a balance of power conceptof international relations th e Soviets engage in their ownform of mirror-imaging. "How to explain this blindness,this adamant clinging to a long obsolete 'governmental'


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49approach to world politics?" asks G. Shakhnazarov, refer-ring to balance of power. 7 2 In answer to his own ques-tion he at first explains:

This is largely due to the conservatism ofbourgeois thought, to the inability, and to acertain measure of unwillingness to realizethat the world has changed qualitatively, andthat the facts and phenomena of the epoch ofthe socialist revolution cannot be explained onthe basis of a concept of international rela-tions which had done good service throughoutall previous history.

But the Marxism in his soul will not allow him to stop here;there must be another reason beyond this conservatism. Hisanswer is that balance of power continues to be embracedbecause it Is to the advantage of the imperialists "to promote the 'governmental' concept of internationalrelations."7 He explains:

This is done first of all because it is asthough this eliminates the basic differencebetween socialist and capitalist countries,making it possible to blame the rivalry among"countries" for various conflicts which havearisen as a result of imperialist aggression.Secondly, because this makes it possible toconceal the imperialist foreign policy and itsclass content.15Of course, Shakhnazazov is not alone in ascribing

motives to the West which are purely Marxitn. For example,Sh. Sanakoyev, writing of what he calls the "renovated,modernized variant of the 'balance of power'" as advaiicedby Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, maintains thatwe are no t witnessing merely "the adherence of some ideo-logists and politicians to 'classical diplomacy,'" but thatits adherants have a knowing class purpose; ". . . [balance


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50of power] is destoned to preserve the status Qgo not onlyin the international-political but, above a.ll, in th.esocial sphere, to maintain and strengthen reactionaryregimes, and is directed against revolutionary changes inthe life of the peoples. 76 While it is possible thatthese motives are ascribed to Western policy makers bythese and other'writers 7 7 for political or propagandisticreasons, it Is also quite possible that they have as greata difficulty thinking in non-Marxist terms as we have ofthinking in their frame of reference.

In a similar way, Soviet perceptions of the cause foracceptance of peaceful coexistence and detente by the Westare tied to a purely Marxist rationale. Because the corre-lation of world forces figures prominently in the Sovietexplanation, it may be that the concept serves to cloud thevision of Soviet analysts perceiving Western motivations inthe same way balance of power obscures the Western percep-tion of Soviet motivations.

If the Soviet rationale is to be believed, peacefulcoexistence has become the only logical relationshipbetween the two camps with different social systems. Forits part, the Soviet Union and the other countries of thesocialist community claim to be peace-loving states. 7 8They are peaceable because, as socialist states, they haveeliminated the class antagonisms which alone lead toaggressive wars. On the other hand, the capitalist states,while still prone to war as a means of settling political


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51comflicts, have become less inclined to engage in aggres-sicn to achieve their class interests. 7 9 According toSoviet interpretation, the imperialist camp has come torealize that peaceful coexistence is a necessity. 8 0 Thishas taken place because the correlation of forces hasshifted in favor of socialism. 81 If such a shift has oc-curred, on what basis, using what criteria, based upon whatcomparison of what variables was this determination made?

Most evidence in Soviet sources seems to indicatethat the military part of the equation has been the mostimportant, the most significant in causing the shift.Since by Marxist doctrine the military potential of a stateis dependent upon its economic and social development,these factors too must have contributed to the shift, butit is the increased military might of the socialist commun-Ity, and particularly of the Soviet Union, that is mostoften mentioned as being pivotal. For example, in discuss-ing the West's acceptance of detente and peaceful coexist-ence a Soviet writer had the following to say:

It is of paramount importance that preciselyduring. . .[the late 1960s and early 1970s] theWest had to admit the untenability of a3l itsillusions concerning military primacy. Thishad rather far-reaching consequences, fo r ithas mostly been by force of arms that imperial-ism has traditionally exercised its influenceon world development. It has also given toppriority to armed strength in opposing social-ism. The economic, scientific and technologi-cal capacities of the Soviet Union have, how-ever, expanded sufficiently fo r it to opposethe imperialist countries with an equivalentmilitary potential in every respect. That


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52meant putting an end to the chimera of Westernmilitary superiority underpinning the "posi-tion-of-strength" policy. 8 2

Other writers reinforce the perceived demise of Westernmilitary superiority:

Existing socialism's increasing might is makingit ever harder fo r the imperialists to usemilitary force in the attainment of their for-eign policy objectives. Detente is sharplyenhancing the role of diplomacy, of politicalrather than military solutions to internationalproblems.8 3To recognize the real correlation of forces inthe world means specifically to recognize theindisputable fact that the times of rude dicta-tion by one country over others are gone. Thisis, above all, a result of the steady growth inthe might of world socialism .... 8Only losing absolute military superiority andrealizing the limit beyond which the use ofmilitary force would no longer lead to theachievements of age-old political objectives,but could mean suicide, led the ruling circlesof the capitalist countries to begin to under-stand the inevitability of peaceful coexist-ence.85These quotations typify the Soviet interpretation of

the cause fo r and the result following the shift in thecorrelation of forces in favor of socialism. Clearly, itis the military might of the Soviet Union which is creditedwith bringing about the change. It would almost seem thatthe argument has come full circle from a refutation ofbalance of power as an obsolete m ilitaristic doctrine to anew formulation of the same doctrine dressed in red. Theonly difference seems to be that balance of power ignoresclass distinctions while correlation of forces ignoressovereign states. The inability of either side to see the

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53world through the eyes of the other leads both to discounteach-other's pronouncements as being perfidlvus. GeorgeKennan described this inability to communicate fully whenhe characterized the Soviet Union and the United States asbeing like "... two cross-eyed men who bumped into eachother on the street . . . . The one said: 'Why in helldon't you look where you're going?' To which the otherreplied: 'Why in hell don't you go where you arelooking?',86

The precarious nuclear balance which characterizesour world has become too dangerous to allow the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to bump into each other simplybecause they do not look at each other properly. To statethis imperative another way, it Is essential that we knowwhat Soviet planners are thinking, and to do this we mustknow how they think. Accurate estimates of Sovi

Ideology in the Foreign Relations Urss

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