Identity Politics

Political Economy of the Global SouthProf. Tyson Roberts

Surprise Pop Quiz

1. Did Goni win the presidential election?2. What vote share did Goni get? Morales?3. Who were the main supporters of Goni? Of

Morales?4. What happened after the election ended?5. Why did some voters vote for Goni?6. Why did some voters vote against Goni?

Finish Our Brand is Crisis

Surprise Pop Quiz

1. Did Goni win the presidential election?2. What vote share did Goni get? Morales?3. Who were the main supporters of Goni? Of

Morales?4. What happened after the election ended?5. Why did some voters vote for Goni?6. Why did some voters vote against Goni?

Surprise Pop Quiz

1. Did Goni win the presidential election? YES2. What vote share did Goni get? 22.5% Morales? 21%3. Who were the main supporters of Goni? Middle Class(?) Of

Morales? Indigenous/Campaneros4. What happened after the election ended? Continued

economic stagnation, income tax hike, protests, Goni resigned5. Why did some voters vote for Goni? Crisis management, past

successes (healthcare, etc.), plan6. Why did some voters vote against Goni? Sold gas wealth to

foreigners; didn’t deliver on job creation; insensitive to rural voters

Varieties of Identity Politics

Which identity groups were salient in Zaire? In Bolivia?• Zaire: Ethnic groups • Bolivia: Urban/rural, economic class, ethnicity

Varieties of Identity Politics/Cleavages

• Ethnolinguistic• Religious• Urban/rural• Economic class (e.g., capital vs. labor, or upper

vs. middle vs. lower)

Ethnic fractionalization & politics(Collier)

• In traditional societies, strong ethnic ties has benefits: insurance against moral hazard (effective monitoring)

• In contemporary states, many ethnic groups are brought together in one polity and are interdependent

• In this situation, strong ethnic ties can lead to dysfunctional government

Ethnic fractionalization & politics(Collier)

• In traditional societies, strong ethnic ties has benefits: insurance against moral hazard (effective monitoring)

• In contemporary states, many ethnic groups are brought together in one polity and are interdependent

• In this situation, strong ethnic ties can lead to dysfunctional government

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Polarized People (Easterly Chapter 13)

• Groups are not rational actors, even if they are made up of rational actors

• We think of the government as an actor that serves the people, or promotes growth for its own best interest

• However, when the state is weak & members of government are fractionalized, the government may pursue policies that are self-destructive

Example: Economic inequality

• Poor governments will want to redistribute from the rich to the poor, undermining investment incentives

• Rich governments will not want to provide education, thus limiting the positive effect of human capital on growth

Example: Urban vs. Rural

• Urban voters want – low food prices, taxes on agricultural exports to

finance manufacturing, urban housing, etc. – deters farmers from producing

• Rural voters want – high prices and no taxes for agriculture exports,

subsidies for agricultural inputs, rural infrastructure projects, etc.

– may create budget deficits

Example: Ethnic politics

• Every ethnic group wants policies that favor own group at expense of the nation as a whole

• A multi-ethnic coalition might delegate decisions – one group determines exchange rate policy, another interest rate policy, another trade policy– 1st group gets access to cheap dollars (hurts exports)– 2nd group gets access to cheap credit (hurts investment)– 3rd group gets monopoly on imports (raises prices)

Example of Urban-Rural/Ethnic policy conflict undermining growth: Economic policy in post-independence Ghana

• Cocoa Marketing Board– Originally answer to volatility– Became source of capital for

industrialization• Other boards created

– Exports: timber, etc.– Domestic markets: food, etc.

• Industrial projects included hydropower dam, aluminum smelter plant, coconut oil mill, sugar estates, tomato cannery, etc.

Fall of Nkrumah

• 1966: Low growth, etc. led to coup against Nkrumah

• 1969: Busia’s PP, with support traditionally from the Ashanti Region and North and new support from coastal Akan groups, wins election

• 1972: Busia overthrown in coup (led by another Akan)

Why does ethnic diversity hinder investment in public goods?

• Differences in preferences – where to put roads, language taught in schools,

where to put hospitals, etc.• Less willingness to spend on public services

perceived to aid other groups• Greater willingness to hurt economic growth

by taxing other ethnic groups for redistribution– Example: Indians in East Afric

Countries with low fractionalization and/or less inequality tend to do better

• More payoff from growing the pie than taking bigger share of the pie: middle class consensus

• Example: Botswana (of course)• Also, good institutions enable good policies, law

and order, etc. in spite of fractionalization

Source: Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999

Source: Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999

Source: Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999

The Ivoirien Miracle under the Old Man

• 1960s-1970s: Houphouet-Boigny continued colonial policy of welcoming immigrants to increase cocoa production – Nearly one third of the country are immigrants

descendants of immigrants from Mali & Burkina Faso

– Immigration patterns led to Muslims (39%), mostly in the North, outnumbering Christians (33%)

Under Houphouet-Boigny, high-level positions went to members of his Baoule ethnic group (e.g., President of the National Assembly

Bedie) and to Northerners (e.g., Prime Minister Ouatarra)

For a while all went well…

And “the Old Man” was able to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on favored projects, …

But the Ivoirien Miracle ended ~1979.By the time “the Old Man” died, income levels were falling

As the pie shrank, ethnic politics turned from inclusion to exclusion

• 1993: Hours before H-B died, Bedié announces self president

• 1995: Bedié changes constitution to prevent Ouattara from running (“sons of the soil” politics)

• 1999: Bedié overthrown in a coup• 2000: Gen. Guéi loses election to opposition leader

Gbagbo– Bedié & Ouatarra both banned from running

• 2002: Northerner soldiers mutiny• 2002-2008: Civil war; Gbagbo resists elections

Ethnic/Linguistic Map in Cote d’Ivoire

Ethnic/Linguistic Map & 2010 Election Returns (Round 1) in Cote d’Ivoire

Gbagbo comes from the Bete region (excluded from politics under H-B); Bedie comes from Baoule region, Ouatarra comes from the north

Ethnic/Linguistic Map & 2010 Election Returns (Round 2) in Cote d’Ivoire

(Bedié endorsed Ouattara)

Disputed 2010 results => renewed civil war

Laurent Gbagbo Alassane Ouattara

1st Round 38% 32%

2nd Round (CC) 51% 49%

2nd Round (IEC) 46% 54%

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Syria groups & proportion shares

• Alawi: 14%• Sunni-Arab: 62%• Kurds: 9%• Christians: 8%• Druze: 3%

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Hafez al-Assad

1946: Joined Baath party at age 161955: One of 1st Alawis to join AF1963: Participated in Baath coup, rose to CinC of AF1966: Participated in “Alawi coup,” became Min. of Def.1970: Led 3rd coup, placed Alawi loyalists throughout gov’t1982: Hama massacre (5-10k killed) to wipe out (mostly Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood2000: Died

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Bashar al-Assad

2000: Appointed leader of Baath party & army, elected (unopposed) president2011: Arab Spring protests began in Syria, over 100k protesters. Syrian army tanks storm several cities, including Hama

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Hama, August 2011

Does ethnic diversity always lead to low growth and conflict?

• No• Diversity may increase productivity in the

private sector – More points of view, different skills, etc.

• Diversity is less damaging at higher income levels

• Ethnic identities can be suppressed in favor of national identities

Ethnic diversity reduces primary school spending in Kenya but not Tanzania

(Miguel 2004)

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Another motive for identity politics may be group pride, or “psychic benefits”

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• Although ethnic diversity/fractionalization is blamed for many problems, it does not always lead to problems

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Given the number of cleavages in Africa, ethnic conflict is very rare

Type of communal violence

# of potential incidents, all countries & years

Actual # of incidences for all countries & all years

Ratio of actual to potential incidents

Rebellion 18,757 27 0.0014

Civil War 18,757 52 0.0028

Ethnic Violence 38,383 20 0.0005

Number of potential rebellions & civil wars between dominant group & insurgent group = # of ethnic groups in country less one (N – 1 ), summed across countries and years, for rebellion & civil war.

Number of potential ethnic violence incidents = N(N – 1)/2.

Source: Fearon & Laitin (1996)

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When does a particular identity become politically salient?

Demographic geography: Cleavages more likely to be politically salient if reinforcing/overlapping than if cross-cutting

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When does a particular identity become politically salient?

• Ethnicity most salient when two or more similar sized groups compete for power (Bates 2000, Collier 2001)– One dominant group with no major challengers =>

low ethnic salience– Many small ethnic groups => low ethnic salience

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Bolivia groups & population shares

• White: 14% • Mestizo: 29% (European/indigenous mix)• Aymara: 25% (Morales’s group)• Quechua: 30%• Lowland indigenous peoples: 2%

Source: Fearon 2003

Conclusions

• Ethnic diversity has a number of sources– Migration patterns– Pre-colonial conquest and state formation– Colonial state creation – Instrumental identity formation, voluntary and

coercive• Ethnic diversity is believed to create a number

of problems for Africa, both politically and economically

Conclusions

• However, the mechanism by which ethnic diversity creates problems remains under dispute– Ethnic diversity causes war, or causes poverty

which causes war?– Ethnic groups split by borders causes low

legitimacy and low growth, or grouped by borders causes commons problems, low public good formation, and low growth?