Identity Interest and Emergent Rationality

IDENTITY, INTEREST AND EMERGENT

RATIONALITY:

AN EVOLUTIONARY SYNTHESIS*

Michael W. Macy

ABSTRACT

Identity and interest paradigms provide rival explanatory frameworks:One portrays group solidarity as the affirmation of cognitive categories,while the other looks for the incentives that motivate collective actionamong rational egoists. Neither is fully adequate. Identity theoryemphasizes the cohesive effects of similarity but overlooks the causalimportance of self-interest in a collective good. Interest theory emphasizesthe solidary effects of interdependence but struggles to explainenthusiastic self-sacrifice and moral righteousness. I propose a syntheticreformulation of identity and interest, based on two correspondingstrategies in the evolution of cooperation: kin and reciprocal altruism.This evolutionary approach, however, entails a fundamental rethinking ofbasic concepts in rational choice theory – a shift from “purposive” to“emergent” rationality.

KEY WORDS: altruism, evolution, identity, learning, rationality

Introduction

During the American Revolution, General Washington pondered themotives that might lead a struggling band of poorly equipped farmers totake up arms against the most powerful empire in human history:

I do not mean to exclude altogether the Idea of Patriotism. I knowit exists, and I know it has done much in the present Contest. But Iwill venture to assert, that a great and lasting War can never besupported on this principle alone. It must be aided by a prospectof Interest or some reward.1

Since the time of the Sophists, social and political theorists have debatedwhether “public spirit” or “self-interest” is the more secure foundation for

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a viable community. During the great philosophical and religious debatesof the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, conservatives saw communityas a divine representation of the Universal, while liberals countered thatenlightened self-interest was more reliable and less ill-tempered than wereappeals to the passions.2 Pragmatic eclectics, like Washington, believedthat the strongest mortar contains some mix of the two ingredients.

Among contemporary social scientists, the debate has been stripped ofits philosophical wrappings and reduced to two contrasting approaches tothe social psychology of group solidarity, one based on shared identity,the other on mutual self-interest. The identity paradigm is all about thecohesive effects of similarity, while the interest paradigm seesinterdependence as the motive for cooperation and exchange. This paperwill briefly recapitulate the arguments, then point out complementarylimitations in each approach that suggest the need to transcend the oldidentity-interest divide. Finally, I will propose an evolutionary synthesiscentered on a theory of “emergent rationality.”

Shared Identity and Expressive Collective Action

Oberschall and Kim define identity as the answer to

the basic existential questions, ‘Who am I?’ and ‘With whom do Ibelong?’ The categorization of a ‘we’ and a ‘they’ is afundamental social psychological manifestation of humansociality. ‘We’ and ‘they’ are experienced and socially validatedwith we-feeling, approval seeking, attachment and conformity togroup attitudes and norms, and a corresponding tendency todistancing, negative affect, and stereotyping of other groups andsocial categories, the ‘they’ (1996: 64).

These ideas were first enunciated by Heider (1958) and Sherif et al.(1961), refined in Tajfal’s (1982) “social identity theory,” and elaboratedfurther by Hogg and Turner (1987). The basic behavioral assumption isthat individuals order the social world by carving out cognitive categoriesthrough interaction with others, an idea that is grounded in the pragmatistepistemology of James (1981), Peirce (1955), and Mead (1934).3 In orderto navigate these interactions, we seek coherence, predictability, and thecoordination of expectations. Without the ability to predict how otherswill respond to a situation, and to know what responses others expect,social life would be unbearably capricious, random, and incoherent. Toavoid this, individuals anchor themselves socially by exaggerating

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similarities among those they categorize together with themselves, and byexaggerating differences with those in groups that provide a clear contrast.

Heider’s (1958) balance theory, for example, posits a need for cognitiveconsistency in our orientations toward others. If Adam likes Bonnie andBonnie likes Charlie, then upon meeting Charlie, Adam will bepredisposed to accept Charlie into his circle. Homophily (Homans, 1951;McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987) also contributes to structural balance.If Adam and Charlie share many salient attributes (religion, class,friendship with Bonnie, etc.), then they will be more likely to interact withone another and to develop positive interpersonal attraction.

These tendencies toward categorization, stereotyping, in-groupfavoritism, and out-group prejudice can enhance the capacity ofinteractants to act collectively in pursuit of common interests. However,most identity theorists follow Heider in explicitly rejecting aninstrumental basis for group cohesion (interpersonal attraction) andsolidarity (compliance with group norms). For identity theorists, “interestsare only the surface of things. What is beneath the surface is a strongemotion, a feeling of a group of people that they are alike and belongtogether” (Collins, 1992:28). This shared identity transforms interests intothe objects of expressive behavior. “The interests become moral rightsand become surrounded with a kind of symbolic halo of righteousness”(1992:29).

Others see both interests and identity playing a part, but not in the samegroups. Instrumental models of collective action may be applicable to“interest groups” but cannot explain the expressive content of enthusiasticsocial movement mobilizations. Turner (1996), for example,acknowledges “the contribution of self-interest as...a strong undercurrentin all human motivation,” but warns against the reduction of expressivecollective action to the instrumental pursuit of shared interests:

Mere interest groups may devote tremendous energy andresources and follow sophisticated rational strategies in promotingtheir collective interest, but without the sense of missioncharacteristic of social movements. Cognitively, what is requiredis a conviction that others in society, or even the whole society,will benefit from the reforms being promoted, that those whostand to gain are more noble than self-interested, and that thosewho lose deserve to lose because of their evil motives andschemes. The latter conviction is enshrined in the ubiquitousidentification of villains in the ideologies of social movements(1996:8).

The polarization of the noble self and the evil other is the signature ofidentity-based symbolic collective action. Dependence on others for

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affirmation of self means that the social interactions that confer “a senseof reality and identity” (Berger, 1966:21) are highly charged withemotion. These affirmations are “a shield against terror” in the face of“the innate precariousness of all social worlds” (1966: 23).

The emotional energy invested in identity is most evident whenmembers of the group are confronted with deviance. Transgression andtrespass of social boundaries can trigger virulent expressions ofindignation that illuminate the borders of the group. This is the basic ideain Durkheim’s contention that crime is “normal.” For Durkheim, “crime isnot simply the disruption even of serious interests,” it is an “expiation” for“an act that offends strong and defined states of the collective conscience”(1960:80). It is this indignation that makes an act criminal. “We must notsay that an action shocks the common conscience because it is criminal,but rather, that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience”(1960:81). This offensiveness, or repugnance, induces “a passionatereaction” that is “instinctive and unreflected” (1960:85). Hence, forDurkheim, public punishment is not a deterrent but an “expiation,” anemotionally charged collective affirmation of identification with andcommitment to the group.

Following Durkheim, identity theorists stress internalized compliancewith collective obligations and expressive demarcation of groupmembership. Social control, from this viewpoint, does not promote orderby creating incentives that motivate instrumental compliance. Rather, itmobilizes the emotional energy that solidifies attachment to the group.The effect is not to suppress deviance but to reveal it, and thereby topatrol, clarify, and affirm the normative boundaries that define the group.

Erikson’s wayward Puritans (1966) and Gusfield’s Temperanceactivists (1963) are two classic case studies of the mobilization ofsolidarity in an enthusiastic social movement. Erikson showed how atheory of repression as a deterrent to deviance misspecifies the causalrelationship between punishment and crime. Despite the terrible penaltiesinflicted on hapless victims, the campaigns against witches and Quakerscaused the rate of deviance to rapidly escalate. These “crime waves” werethe consequence of repressive campaigns, not the cause.

According to Gusfield (1963), the Temperance struggle was not reallyabout the evils of alcohol, but rather, the evils of ethnic immigration thatthreatened to redefine what it means to be an American. FollowingGusfield, Luker (1984) has argued that the contemporary abortioncontroversy is not about the point at which life begins, it is “a referendumon motherhood.” Participation in these zealous movements can beexplained as an expressive response to challenges to the social status of


middle-class Protestants in the Gusfield case and traditional homemakersin Luker’s. This strong aversive response parallels the curiously violentindignation of Puritans to the refusal of Quakers to doff their caps to theauthorities.

To sum up the identity paradigm, identities determine who we careabout, and who cares about us. They emerge as actors sort themselves intocategories that affirm members’ expectations of others, and through that,their sense of a shared reality. Identities are not acquired passively but areactively negotiated through the demarcation of group boundaries. Socialand moral boundaries are defined by identifying and punishing deviants.Compliance with conventions is motivated not by instrumental calculationof the risk of punishment but by an emotional investment in the identitythese conventions delineate. Violent punishment is not calibrated to deterdeviance; rather, it is unleashed as an expression of indignation at theviolation of normative boundaries. Social movements are mobilized asexpressive responses to real or imagined incursions across the borders ofthe group. The collective action in turn affirms the shared identities thatanimate participation.

Mutual Interests and Purposive Collective Action

In striking contrast to the identity approach, the point of departure for theinterest paradigm is not similarity but complementarity. Groups are heldtogether not by shared definitions but by shared interests in cooperationamong interdependent individuals (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978).Interdependence means that the optimal outcome for a given choice iscontingent on the choices of other decision-makers, and vice versa. Gametheorists have formalized the problem using mixed-motive games, mostnotably, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport and Chammah, 1966). In thesegames, the optimal choice for each individual is “defection” (or “free-riding”). However, if everyone defects, all suffer the collectively worstpossible outcome. This tension between individual and collective interestsis the defining problem in collective action theory (Macy 1993).Collective action obtains not through subordination of individual wills toa shared consciousness, but through overlapping interests that motivatepurposive actors. The emphasis is not on emotional attachment to thegroup but on instrumental compliance with collective obligations andsocial control centered on deterrence of free-riding.

The social exchange theories of Homans (1961), Emerson (1962), andBlau (1964) explain cohesion and cooperation in small groups

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characterized by face-to-face interaction. Exchange theories posit self-interested actors who cooperate because the gains outweigh the costs. Therewards provided by the group, especially social approval, reinforcemembers’ commitment and generate affective ties (“liking”). Emotionalattachments are thus the consequence of group solidarity and cohesion,not the cause.

Contemporary elaborations focus on network structure, status, power,and justice in social exchange. These include Cook and Yamagishi’s(1983) “equidependence theory,” Markovsky’s (1992) “network exchangetheory” (Markovsky, et al., 1993), Bienenstock and Bonacich’s (1992)“core theory,” Willer’s “elementary theory” (Willer and Anderson, 1981),Friedkin’s (1992) “expected value theory,” Berger’s “expectation statestheory” (Berger et al., 1974), Gray and Tallman’s (1984) “satisfactionbalance theory,” and Jasso’s (1980) theory of distributive justice. Lawlerand Yoon (1996) revisited the problem of cohesiveness that concernedearly exchange theorists, but with a new twist. They incorporatedemotional attachment as both cause and consequence of repeatedexchange.

Nee and Ingram (forthcoming) extend the exchange-theoretic approachfrom networks to institutions. The core idea is that institutions arepermeated with informal sanctioning mechanisms, embedded in localnetworks and interpersonal relationships. They also see Ellickson (1991)and Ostrom (1990) as important contributors to theories of informal socialcontrol based on face-to-face interaction in small groups, and argue thatthese ideas may also be usefully applied to institutional norms. Ellicksonshowed how informal arrangements, “beyond the shadow of the law,” arenot only less costly but also more flexible in allowing smalltransgressions, so long as the books are balanced in the long run. Ostrompointed to ongoing interactions within a community as an alternative toreliance on central enforcement of environmental regulations. Nee andIngram see these informal controls as “the missing link” betweennetworks and institutions as structures that constrain opportunism in socialexchange.

The interest paradigm also informs studies of large-scale collectiveaction. Hechter’s (1987) theory of solidarity points to the capacity of thegroup to monitor and sanction individual compliance with the obligationsof membership. Formal sanctions, including expulsion, deter deviantbehavior that compromises the collective good.

This neo-Hobbesian solution to the problem of social order poses whatOliver (1980) has called “a second-order free rider problem.” How can


formal social control explain individual contributions to collective actionif the provision of inducements is itself a public good? Members of aninterest group know they will benefit from enforcement of memberobligations even if they let others bear the cost of the Leviathan. From thisangle, neo-Hobbesian theories would appear to have it backwards:Collective action does not depend on the institutional capacity for socialcontrol; rather, it is the other way around.

Heckathorn (1989) has advanced a novel rational-choice solution to thesecond-order free-rider problem. He argues that enforcement can be muchmore cost-effective than compliance. Hence, rational deviants may bewilling to enforce the very norms they violate. He points to the exampleof corrupt sheriffs in the Old West who nevertheless “increased the levelof order” (1989:97).

Other interest theories emphasize mobilization rather than sanctioning.Fireman and Gamson (1979), as well as Marwell and Oliver (1993),downplay the free-rider problem and focus instead on the problem ofefficacy, the ability to “make a difference.” More formally, the collectiveaction problem is a game of “Stag Hunt,” not “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Mybest payoff may be to cooperate, but only if you (or enough others)choose to cooperate as well. Mobilization of participation in collectiveaction thus requires a critical mass of vanguard contributors who cantrigger a chain-reaction as the prospects for success begin to snowball.Chong’s (1991) case study of the civil rights movement is an importantempirical application of the “Stag Hunt” (or “Assurance”) game.

Fawning Zealots and Rotten Parents

The interest and identity paradigms have complementary strengths andweaknesses. Identity theorists show how solidarity can emerge frominterpersonal attraction and cohesion, regardless of instrumental interest inthe production or exchange of valued resources. This emotionalattachment provides a handle on the effects of righteousness and moraloutrage in many groups, but it misses what should be the starting point ofan explanation, the power of collective action to satisfy individual needs.The assumption that behavior is largely expressive, and not directedtoward the efficient attainment of a goal, precludes the attribution ofpurpose as an explanation for action. Without an account of the source ofthe compulsion, expressive behavior appears capricious and arbitrary.Hence, the literature on enthusiastic social movements tends toward case-

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specific (and often ad hoc) interpretation and description over systematictheoretical integration.

In contrast, a key strength of the interest approach is the theoreticalrigor and abstraction of rational choice theory, as noted by Oberschall andKim in proposing a purposive model of identity. “We are using ‘rationalchoice’ for no other purpose than making testable deductions fromassumptions and propositions that are explicitly stated, and which aremore difficult to make systematically and unambiguously without formaltheory” (1996:66). Oberschall and Kim propose an “identity-action”model of ethnic conflict that reduces identity to purposive choice.According to the authors, actors have multiple and competing sources ofidentity, such as ethnicity or community. This generates “social pressuresto conform to contradictory expectations” (1996:70). Actors selectivelyconform so as to maximize approval, and their choices in turn producepositive and negative externalities that strengthen or weaken the pressureson each individual. In short, the relative salience of competing identitiesshapes the interests that guide action, and collective action, in turn,defines the salient boundaries for the enforcement of identity. Identity isboth subject and object of the interests of an actor.

The impetus for this approach comes from Coleman. Identification, heargued, is a process in which “one actor has adopted, or taken up, theother’s interest” (1990:158). He offered the examples of parental bonding,patriotism, and “communal euphoria” which he attributed to theinstrumental pursuit of a shared interest in emotional gratification(1990:161).

The search for incentives that motivate expressive behavior confronts aZen-like antilogy. Euphoric gratification is likely to elude those whopursue it deliberately. The feeling is more readily attained as theunintended byproduct of participation in righteous or enthusiasticcollective action. Or consider the paradox of the “fawning zealot.”Groups unified by a shared political or spiritual mission may withholdapproval from those whose sacrifices appear to be motivated by anobsequious desire to gain personal status and approbation, rather than theadvancement of a higher cause. Hence, aspiring martyrs must be carefulnot to appear overly eager.

Similar problems arise on the enforcement side. Expiating punishmentis often meted out even when its effects on compliance arecounterproductive, as when an angry and abusive parent reactsinappropriately to a temper tantrum by a “rotten kid,” to borrow acharacter from Becker’s (1991) theorem. The rotten parent wants to endthe child’s intemperate violation of familial norms but cannot suppress the


urge to vent excessive frustration, even though this only aggravates thesource of the parent’s displeasure. When confronted, the parent mightjustify the behavior as the need to “teach the child a lesson.” This squareswith a deterrence theory of social control, but only as an account ofrationalization, not rational action.

In sum, it is obviously prudent to comply with the rules of the group,and compliance is often instrumentally motivated (and thus notoriouslyunreliable). Nevertheless, there remains a large residual that defiesreduction to purposive self-interest. This includes unthinking, compulsive,and fervid compliance with internalized, self-enforced norms, as well asangry and vengeful enforcement. In addition, there is the problem ofparticipation in enthusiastic groups where social approval and emotionalgratification are attained more efficiently when not directly pursued. Inthese groups, it becomes difficult to know just what advice to give aperfectly rational actor, except perhaps, to stop acting rationally. Such arethe logical traps that await the effort to discover ulterior motives for theaffirmation of identity.

This, then, is our dilemma: On the one hand, rational choice theoryobtains its analytical power from the use of expected outcomes (orutilities) to explain the actions that produce them. On the other hand, thisconsequentialist mode of explanation is difficult to apply to expressivebehavior and enthusiastic collective action without badly distorting themotivational state of the actors.

Evolution and Emergent Rationality

The way out of the dilemma is the explanatory power of the unintendedconsequences of action. Consequentialist explanations pose a teleologicalquandary: how can the future influence the past? In rational choice theory,the link to the future is intention: Action is explained as the effort tomaximize the expected return on competing investments. By “rationalchoice,” I refer to theories that posit the analytical ability of purposiveactors to accurately predict the outcomes of alternative choices based onknowledge of causal processes. In these models, unintended outcomes mayconstrain future choices, and even influence future preferences,4 but theyhave no explanatory power as incentives for action.

Evolutionary and learning-theoretic models, in contrast, posit iteration,not intention, as the link to the future (Macy, 1993, 1996b). Outcomesattract action via gradient search, without the need for a map of theevolutionary landscape. The outcomes that matter are those that have

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already occurred, not those that an analytical actor might expect to obtainin the future. The consequences of recurrent decisions can select for efficientaction by adaptive actors, whether or not anticipated benefits motivate theassociated choices. By extending the interest paradigm to include bothintended and unintended rationality, the evolutionary approach promises toprovide an integrated account of both identity and interest as motives ofcollective action.

Iterative search also relaxes the highly restrictive cognitive assumptionsin rational choice theory. Behaviorists charge that the calculus of expectedutility is at best a prescriptive model of how choices ought to be made,one that bears little resemblance to actual decision-making (Simon, 1992).Indeed, many economists now concede that utility-maximizing behaviordescribes the end result of market exchange but not the process by whichit obtains (Winter, 1986).

Results from two decades of laboratory research led Orbell and Dawes(1991) to reject subjective expected utility as a descriptive model ofhuman behavior, preferring instead a “set of heuristics, or rules of thumb,that can be explained (and perhaps justified) insofar as they economize oncognitive effort” (1991:517). Economists, including Hayek (1967), Simon(1992), and Vanberg (1994), have also concluded that economic behavioris based on rules, not choices. Routine decisions, especially those byinstitutional actors, are more often rule-governed than analytical. Rulesare embedded in heuristic conventions and habits, symbolic andceremonial rituals, moral codes, social customs and protocols, andinstitutional norms and routines. In game-theoretic evolutionary models,rules encode “strategies,” like the widely acclaimed “Tit for Tat”popularized by Axelrod (1984). These strategies are formalized as input-output functions, where the input is a set of conditions of varyingcomplexity and the output is an action.

Although behavioral economists contend that rule-based behavior ismandated by cognitive limitations and the costs of information, socialpsychologists point to a much broader and more basic requirement: thepossibility of social life (Berger, 1966). Among social species, we areunique in our plasticity. Unlike social insects, we have very little geneticprogramming for collective behavior. Were we not creatures of habit,routine, and heuristic devices, effective coordination would be impossible– a cacophony of inappropriate responses to unexpected reactions fromothers. The argument thus builds on and extends the “cognitivecategories” model in social identity theory. Rules make behaviorpredictable, or at least, enough so that interdependent individuals caninfluence one another in response to the influence they receive, thereby


carving out locally stable patterns of interaction. In short, rules are notsimply analytic shortcuts that lower the cognitive costs of decision-making. They are the language of social life.

Of course, our species is also unique in its analytical capabilities; hence,an obvious objection to the behavioral “rational action” model is theportrayal of intelligent thinkers as robotic simpletons. Clearly, rule-basedbehavior would be hopelessly inefficient were it not for the fact thatstimulus-response patterns can improve (and become more sophisticated)over time. The key behavioral assumption is that the consequences of anaction, which may or may not have been consciously anticipated, modifythe probability that the action will be repeated the next time the sameinput conditions are met. Repeated exposure to a problem recycles thelessons of the past, allowing the consequences of alternative courses ofaction to be iteratively explored.

Human intelligence is not the issue. Our cognitive capacity for languagedoes not obviate the evolution of words and signs, or our need to learn theirmeaning through practice. The same pragmatist epistemology also applies toproblem-solving behavior and implies that rationality is grounded in action,not calculation. Rationality does not spring from the heads of the actors;rather, it emerges from their hands and feet – from problem-solving, trial-and-error, and other processes of gradient search.

This “emergent rationality” obtains through two types of experientialfeedback, reproduction, which alters the frequency distribution ofindividuals with various rules in a given population, and reinforcement,which alters the probability distribution of rules competing for attention ina given individual. In biological reproduction, rules are geneticallyencoded and transmitted. In cultural evolution, reproduction occursthrough role modeling, occupational training, social influence, imitation,and vicarious reinforcement.

Most expected-utility models assume instantaneous calculation andglobal optimization. In contrast, reproduction and reinforcement aredynamic processes that generate emergent solutions through adaptiveresponses that improve over time. Because these improvements arepiecemeal, emergent rationality is meliorizing, not optimizing.Melioration is highly path dependent and not very good at backing out ofcul de sacs on the evolutionary landscape. Both reinforcement andreproduction are biased toward better strategies, but they carry noguarantee of finding the best of all possible solutions. Hill-climbing thusviolates the optimality assumption in rational choice theory -- the actorscannot be assumed to attain the highest peak, however relentless thesearch. Even so, the highest achievements of natural selection far surpass

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anything created by the intellect of an engineer, causing skeptics tosuspect the unseen intervention of some higher intelligence.

Consider, for example, an economic model of emergent rationality. Afirm’s problem-solving strategies improve over time through exposure torecurrent choices, under the relentless selection pressure of marketcompetition. Sub-optimal routines are removed from the repertoires ofactors by learning and imitation, and any residuals are removed from thepopulation by bankruptcy and takeover. The outcomes may not beoptimal, but we are often left with well-crafted routines that make theirbearers look much smarter than they really are (or need to be), like aveteran outfielder who catches a fly ball as if she had calculated itstrajectory.

We thus arrive at the possibility that rationality can emerge from behindthe backs of the actors and can target both the intended and unintendedconsequences of action. If the link to the future is repetition, notcalculation, then actions can be attracted by unintended outcomes thatalter the probability that the associated behavior will be repeated.

Unintended consequences may account for the persistence of expressiveand righteous behavior that lacks any instrumental (or ulterior) motive.For example, Frank’s (1988) evolutionary model of trust and commitmentformalizes the emergent rationality of emotions like vengeance andsympathy. An angry or frightened actor may not be capable of deliberatepursuit of self-interest, yet the response to the stimulus has consequencesfor the individual, and these in turn can modify the probability that thebehavior will be repeated, through reinforcement, imitation, or somecombination of learning and reproduction.

Kin and Reciprocal Altruism

Still, the rationality of emotion is not the most radical departure from theconventional portrayal of self-interested optimizing. Not only may actorsbe unaware that their actions are self-serving, it is not even necessary, inan evolutionary model, to assume any benefit whatsoever to theindividual. This is admittedly a tentative argument, one that requires morerigorous specification and empirical testing. However, if valid, it meansthat emergent rationality is applicable not only to expressive behavior butalso to behavior that is genuinely altruistic. Altruism entails more than aprudent detour in the pursuit of self-interest (e.g., a well-publicizedcharitable donation). By definition, altruistic behavior requires sacrifice –not just an investment that pays back with a compensating benefit, but a


net loss, an outcome that is inferior to an available alternative. How canthis be rational?

With purposive rationality, the outcomes that motivate actioncorrespond, necessarily, to the interests of the actor, thereby precludinggenuine altruism. In contrast, the outcomes that attract emergentrationality need not always correspond to the interests of the individual.An earlier generation of evolutionists posited the interests of the group asthe target of selection pressures that favored altruistic behavior (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). This group-selectionist theory has now been largelydiscredited. Many ethologists and theoretical biologists now believe thatthe proper specification of the unit of selection is neither the individualorganism nor the group. The evolutionary game theorist Maynard Smith(1976) has proposed a provocative alternative: the underlying strategy(whether a genetic or heuristic rule).

This rule-centered approach can be applied to an explanation of “kinaltruism” in nature, the strategy to sacrifice for the benefit of close geneticrelatives (Ruse and Wilson, 1986; Alexander, 1987; Hamilton, 1964).From a “rule’s-eye” view of the problem, the altruist serves the interests –not of the beneficiary – but of the “selfish gene” that controls its behavior(Dawkins, 1976). A gene for kin altruism can improve its viability bydirecting a transfer of vital resources from its agent to another organismthat carries the same gene.

Allison (1992) has used formal models to extend the kin altruism modelto benevolence based on cultural relatedness, such as geographicalproximity or a shared cultural marker. The social equivalent of Dawkin’s“selfish gene” is a cultural rule, encoded in an aphorism, norm, heuristic,routine, protocol, ritual, or strategy. Dawkins (1976) call these “memes,”which he defines as “ideas” that can jump from one brain to another viaimitation. However, ideas are poor candidates for evolution, due toblending and mutation. In contrast, rules are patterned behavioralresponses to stimuli, carved out through repetition, stored in neuralpathways, and continually checked against error in local interaction.

For convenience, we can define the “self-interest” of a rule as itsevolutionary stake in the outcomes of the actions it instructs, insofar asthese outcomes influence the odds that the rule will flourish in the face ofcompetitive selection pressures.5 However, as illustrated with kinaltruism, a “self-interested rule” need not imply a program that instructsegoistic behavior by its agent. Suppose a rule could propagate faster byordering its carrier to export life-chances, as might happen when thebeneficiary carries the same rule. Then the rule could be said to have a“self-interest” in the altruistic behavior of its agent.

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The logic of kin altruism might explain why cultural evolution seems tofavor a tendency to associate with those who are similar, to differentiatefrom others, and to defend the identified group against social trespass withthe emotional ferocity of parents defending their offspring. Solidaryexpressions of identity can thus be reduced to rational self-interest, but itis the evolutionary interest of the rule, not the interest of its agent, that isthe effective cause.

We thus arrive at a key difference between purposive and emergentrationality. Purposive rationality applies to the individual as the unit ofanalysis, and therefore entails the axiom of self-interested behavior.Emergent rationality applies to rules (or strategies) as the units ofanalysis, as well as to the individuals who act on these rules. This meansthat the behavior the rules instruct need not necessarily advance theinterests of the individual agent. Self-interested behavior can then bemodeled as empirically variable, not axiomatic.

It must be stressed, however, that the self-interested individual is clearlynot precluded by emergent rationality, quite the contrary. Kin altruism isonly one of two highly robust helping strategies that have been identifiedby theoretical biologists and evolutionary game theorists, the other beingreciprocal altruism. The latter refers to the trading of favors without anenforceable quid pro quo. Reciprocal altruism is therefore fullycompatible with individual self-interest and not a form of genuinealtruism. Rather, it is “a straightforward illustration of prudent behavior,”Frank concludes, “enlightened prudence, to be sure, but self-interestedbehavior all the same” (1988:34-5). An enlightened egoist may transferresources to another under the expectation that this behavior is likely totrigger sufficient compensation. Thus, Becker’s (1991) theory of parentalbenevolence (including the “rotten kid theorem” referenced above) isactually an example of reciprocal, not kin altruism – the exchange ofsupport between care-givers and their dependents at different ends of thelife-cycle.

Although reciprocal altruism can be modeled using the individual as theunit of analysis, it may nevertheless be instructive to consider a rule-selectionist formulation. Again taking a “rule’s-eye” view of the problem,the manifestations of self-interested rules can be altruistic, so long as thebenefits ultimately convey relief from the relentless pressure of selection.When these benefits to the rule obtain immediately from the behavior, weclassify the behavior as self-interested. When the programmatic benefitsare separated from the behavior in time and space, we classify thebehavior as altruistic. With reciprocal altruism, the benefit is temporallyremoved in that the rule has learned how to export life-chances as a way


to trigger a later return on the investment.6 With kin altruism, the benefitis spatially removed, in that the rule has learned how to export life-chances from one of its agents to another, such that the “inclusive fitness”(Hamilton, 1964) of all its carriers is greater than before. Given that spaceand time are alternative measures of distance, it seems reasonable toclassify both reciprocity and kin-benevolence as altruistic behaviors (orphenotypes) that provide indirect benefits to the self-interested rules (orgenotypes) in which these behaviors are encoded. The only difference iswhether the benefits must leap over time or space to make their way backto the rules that generated them.

It is noteworthy how closely these two cooperative mechanisms parallelthe sociological distinction between identity and interest as motives forcollective action. Kin altruism is triggered by similarity, while reciprocalaltruism explains cooperation among interdependent egoists. Reciprocalaltruism requires on-going relations, as might be found in instrumentallymotivated interest groups. Kin altruism requires densely clustered socialties among tightly knit “in-groups” and explains the importance of groupboundaries around close cultural relatives, as well as the need for culturalmarkers that signify membership.

To sum up, emergent and purposive rationality share theconsequentialist assumption that the outcomes of action satisfy a set ofrelevant interests. However, emergent rationality differs on severalimportant points:

1. Outcomes attract efficient behavior via iteration, not intention;hence models are dynamic rather than static.

2. Emergent rationality is meliorizing, not optimizing.3. Behavior is based on rules, not choices.4. Intended and unintended consequences have comparable

explanatory power; hence rational self-interest can account forexpressive solidarity in highly enthusiastic groups.

5. The self-interests that select behaviors are not necessarily thoseof individuals but can also be those of the rules that controlaction. Hence, emergent rationality can account for individualself-sacrifice in groups that provide no compensation.

6. Two rules for cooperation, kin and reciprocal altruism, illustratethe evolutionary logic that underlies both identity andinterdependence as sources of group solidarity.

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Formal Models of Emergent Rationality

Emergent rationality lends itself to formalisms that can be implementedanalytically and by computer simulation. The latter is often mandated bythe nonlinearity of gradient climbing on an evolutionary landscape.Recent contributions include Axelrod (1984), Allison (1992), Frank(1988), Kollock (1993), Heckathorn (1996), and Lomborg (1996). (For anoverview, see Bainbridge et al., 1994 and Macy and Flache, 1995.) Thesestudies show how formal models of kin and reciprocal altruism might beused to study the solidary effects of cultural markers and strategicinterdependence. This approach is relatively new, and much work remainsto be done, especially on direct applications of kin altruism to theevolution of collective identity.

In recent papers, I have used simulation experiments to exploreproblems that relate to the emergent rationality of identity-drivencollective action. Following Frank (1988), Macy and Skvoretz (1995)modeled the evolution of trust among agents who must learn to readtelltale signs of character. In this experiment, cooperation in a Prisoner’sDilemma required the coordination of shared meanings of symbolic cues.Conventions were created by an adaptive process tied to the outcomes ofcompliance, while the consequences of compliance depended on theemergence of a consensus about the meaning of the telltale signs.

In another experiment, Flache and Macy (1996) modeled performanceof group-rewarded work teams whose members used social approval todiscourage free-riding in a multiplex Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the absenceof outside sources of social support, dependence on the team for approvalmight be expected to improve compliance with production norms, aspredicted by Homans (1951). However, the simulations showed howdependence can instead cause performance to suffer. With informalcontrols, peer pressure can trap work teams in badly sub-optimalequilibria. Although dependence makes team members more responsive tosocial sanctions, it also makes them less likely to risk friendships bysanctioning those who give them approval. Social approval then flowsinto the maintenance of dyadic relations rather than enforcement ofcompliance with collective obligations.

In a follow-up experiment (Macy, Kitts, and Flache, 1997), we used aHopfield device (a type of artificial neural network) to model the effectsof homophily on cooperation in these same work teams. Homophily refersto the tendency for “likes to attract.” Attraction in turn determines thevalue placed on approval and the propensity to imitate. Conversely, we


assume that “unlikes repel” and that repulsion, in turn, motivates efforts atdifferentiation. Simulations showed how groups then tend to split intocliques of “workers” and “shirkers.” As in the earlier experiment withdyadic friendships, we found that dependence on the group for socialapproval did not prevent the formation of an oppositional clique.

Another recent experiment used genetic algorithms to study theevolution of reciprocal altruism (Macy, 1996a; see also Nowak andSigmund, 1993). The simplest and best-known implementation ofreciprocal altruism is “Tit for Tat” or TFT. This rule never takesadvantage of others but retaliates swiftly if provoked. However, TFT hastwo serious weaknesses. First, because TFT refuses to exploit, apopulation of reciprocal altruists can be invaded by naive (unconditional)cooperators who then invite the return of more aggressive and predatoryrules (Axelrod, 1984). Second, TFT is vulnerable to random miscues thattrigger cycles of recrimination when interacting with other reciprocators(Bendor, 1993; Kollock, 1995). The earlier example of the abusive parentof a rotten kid illustrates this “echo effect,” or self-reinforcing sub-optimalequilibrium.

Simulated evolution showed that reciprocal altruism is more robustwhen based on a rule for conditional reciprocity. The program, known as“PAVLOV” (or “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift”), is as simple as TFT: “Favoractions whose outcomes are satisfactory and avoid those that are not.”Conceptually, TFT and PAVLOV are complements: TFT teaches,PAVLOV learns. TFT rewards cooperation and punishes defection, as iftrying to modify the partner’s behavior. Conversely, PAVLOV modifiesits own behavior by repeating choices whose outcomes are satisfactoryand avoiding those that are not.

PAVLOV avoids the pitfalls of TFT by occasionally testing to see if thepartner uses conditional or unconditional rules. To avoid blood feuds,PAVLOV stops retaliating if it appears that a noncooperative partner isacting defensively rather than aggressively. Unlike TFT, PAVLOVperiodically extends an olive branch, but then quickly retracts it if thepeace gesture is rebuffed. Although this makes PAVLOV vulnerable tounconditional aggressors, the risk is mitigated by a complementary trait:PAVLOV has no remorse about exploiting naive altruists who unwittinglyinvite invasion by predators. Hence, PAVLOV stops reciprocatingcooperation if it appears that a cooperative partner can be exploited. Thisaggressiveness is clearly not altruistic. Unlike TFT, which never seeks toexploit, PAVLOV reciprocates cooperation only when crime appears notto pay.

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Conclusion

The interest-identity distinction turns on the relative explanatory power ofthe consequences and meaning of participation in collective action.Consequences include the costs of contribution, value of the public goods,and access to selective incentives. The meaning of participation refers tothe symbolic affirmation of shared social classifications and normativeprotocols that regulate interaction and structure social life. Yet symbolicbehavior entails consequences, even if these are unintended by the actors.Evolutionary theory can tap the explanatory power of the unintendedconsequences of symbolically meaningful and expressive collectiveaction.

Evolution is used here to refer to an iterative and stochastic learningprocess that alters the probability distribution of rules in an ecologycharacterized by finite resources that constrain propagation. Evolutionarymodels make interest explanations applicable to expressive as well aspurposive behavior, but the interests that matter are those of theunderlying rules, and not of the agents whose behavior the rules control.This points to the possibility for a more general theory of group solidarityand social order, encompassing both identity and interdependence, andgrounded in self-interested rationality, properly understood.

Nevertheless, a final note of caution is in order. Unlike genes,behavioral rules lack any physiological equivalent of a transferablenucleic acid that might preclude blending, replication error, or theinheritance of acquired traits. There is no social equivalent of the “centraldogma” in molecular genetics that makes the gene plausible as the unit ofselection. Hence, much more theoretical research is needed before we canknow if rule-selection can be rigorously applied to social and culturalevolution. The point of this paper is only to suggest that the effort may bewarranted by the potential for important breakthroughs in empiricalknowledge if rule-selectionist theoretical models can be made to work.

NOTES

This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, #SBR95-11461. I wish to thank Victor Nee and the editors for their comments andsuggestions.1. Washington, in a 1778 letter to John Bannister, cited in Mansbridge, 1990: 26.2. For an insightful survey of the history of self-interest in political theory, see

Mansbridge, 1990.3. In a related paper (Macy, 1996b), I compare pragmatism and rationalism as the

philosophical foundations for evolutionary and analytical game theory, respectively.


That paper also advances a distinction between forward-looking theories of “rationalchoice” and a pragmatist alternative I call “rational action.”

4. For example, “A major use of the concept of social capital depends on its being a by-product of activities engaged in for other purposes” (Coleman 1990, p. 312).

5. Care must be taken not to read purpose or intent into this characterization. Bydefinition, rules instruct actions by individuals (and organizations) that have adoptedthe rule, and these actions have consequences that may alter the viability of the rule.Hence, like organizations, rules have interests, even though they are not purposiveand do not pursue interests in the way that a purposive individual might. A rule-centered approach is thus incompatible with assumptions of purposive action and isstrictly limited to applications where iteration, not intention, is the link betweenoutcome and action.

6. Some readers may be bothered by the claims that can learn how to spread moreeffectively, as if they were intelligent viral entities that infect and manipulatehumans for their own nefarious purposes. That might make interesting sciencefiction, but the point here is only to introduce a “rule’s-eye” view of social life, sothat our attention is directed to the evolutionary consequences of behavior, not forthe agent, but for the rule that instructs the agent. Evolutionary game theorists oftenwrite about the fortunes of competing “strategies” using similar animating language.

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MICHAEL MACY is Professor of Sociology at Cornell University. Hestudies cooperation in social dilemmas using computer simulation andlaboratory experiments with human subjects. His recent papers are availableon his website at www. people.cornell.edu/pages/mwm14.

Identity Interest and Emergent Rationality

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