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Failed States and Connections to Terrorist Activity*

Chelli Plummer

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

North Carolina State University

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*The author thanks RV Rikard for editing and feedback on previous versions of this

manuscript. The author also thanks the journal editor and anonymous reviewers for

providing insightful feedback. Any and all mistakes are solely the responsibility of theauthor. Please address all for correspondence to Chelli Plummer, Department of Sociology

and Anthropology, Campus Box 8107, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC

27695-8107, Email: [email protected], Phone: 919-513-9023

Abstract

A strong connection has been drawn between failed and/or failing states and terrorism. Notall failed/failing states promote equal amounts of terrorism. This paper compares failed

states that promote high degrees of terrorism with those that promote low degrees of

terrorism by using a twofold approach. First, OLS regression is used to examine aspects of

state failure in relation to terrorism, and second, a comparison is drawn between failedstates that promote high degrees of terrorism with those that promote low degrees of

terrorism in a case study analysis of Somalia and the Ivory Coast . The results suggest thatthe relationship between state failure and terrorism is more complex than a simple linear causal process and that examination of the processes involved in state failure are integral in

understanding why some states experience high levels of terrorist activity while others do

not.

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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Introduction

In the current geopolitical structure, asymmetrical warfare or terrorism, has

increased in lethality. Moreover, current research suggests that this trend will continue

(Hoffman 1998, Ellis 2003)and have wide spread consequences for a great number of

people. The new age of religiously motivated terrorism (Hoffman 1998, Ellis 2003,

Winkler 2008, Bergesen and Lizardo 2004), we aresociety is faced with a highly complex

new phenomenon. Terrorists’ goals have become more vague and ambiguous (Bergesen

and Lizardo 2004) while weapons have become more sophisticated (Hoffman 1998, Ellis

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2003) and targets exceedingly indiscriminate (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004). Terrorism is

financially draining on the state under attack, as well as destabilizing for its communities

(Schneider, Bruck and Meierrieks 2010).

Prior research on terrorism in relation to state failure focuses on the relationshipthe

relationship between political (Thomas 2003, Piazza 2008), economic (Moron 2004,

Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks, and Schneider 2009, Schneider, Bruck and Meierrieks 2010,),

and social factors (Burgoon 2006) independently of each other andother and terrorism.

Moreover, there is limited empirical research on the connections, relying heavily on case

studies or theory building. The Failed States Index (Fund for Peace 2009) has been used in

its aggregate form to test for connections between state failure and terrorist

activity,activity; however, little research examines the variables that make up the index.

The present research employs quantitative and qualitative analyses to a two-step approach

to the examine the relationship between terrorist activity and failed states?examination of

terrorism: First, regression analysis is utilized to ascertain which of the variables of social,

economic and political fragility are most closely associated with terrorist activity. , while

sSecond, two case , case studies of, Somalia and the Ivory Coast, to explore the

relationship between fragility and terrorism.

The majority of prior research focuses primarily on the economic factors that foster

terrorism. Therefore, examining the multifaceted components of state failure may shed

light on the interdependency of economic factors on social and political forces. Research

has been separated along political, economic and social lines with little synthesis of the

three. A broader view of terrorism’s roots may lead to a better understanding of the

qualities of states at risk for fostering terrorist activity. Through deeper exploration of state

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fragility, theory, theory may emerge to help counter-terrorism policies transnationally.

This study is driven by the theoretical position that 1) state failure is intimately connected

to terrorist activity, however it strives to go beyond the superficiality of state failure and

delve into the components of such failure and 2) state failure is a root cause of terrorist

activity, while striving to go beyond the superficiality of state failure and delve into the

process of such failure.

Literature Review

The first step in conducting a study on terrorism is defining it. what terrorism is.

The most comprehensive definition of terrorism is that put forth by Schmid and Jongman

(1988, 2005). The authors analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism and found that 83.5%

included aspects of violence, 65% political goals, 51% inflict fear, 21% indiscriminate

targets, and 17.5% civilian and/or noncombatant targets. They note that terrorism is the use

of violence for political objectives, with the intention to sew fear. For this study, the

definition by the data collection source, The present research employs the Global

Terrorism Database (GTD) definition:, is: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and

violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal

through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. (GTD 2007)". Furthermore, the GTD includes

acts that meet two of the three following criteria:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal;

2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some

other message to a larger audience other than the immediate victims; and

3. The violent act was outside the precepts of international Humanitarian Law.

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Social Welfare

Burgoon’s (2006) study of social welfare policies indicates that countries that put

less effort into social welfare have more connections to transnational terrorism as well as

terrorist incidents on their own land. Such policies as social security, unemployment and

health and education spending are said to discourage terrorism. Social welfare policies

serve to reduce poverty, inequality and insecurity (Burgoon 2006, Schneider, Bruck, and

Meierrieks 2010). Social welfare reduces economic insecurity, inequality, poverty and

religious extremism, which in turn reduces the likely hood of terrorism (Burgoon 2006).

Alesina and Perotti (1993) agree with Piazza (2006) in that as populations increase the

likelihood of terrorism increases. However, they demonstrated that as democracy and

social welfare increase, terrorism decreases.

Not all empirical research supports the social welfare argument (Krueger and

Maleckova 2003, Krueger 2008, Sageman 2008, and Freytag, Kruger and Meierrieks

2010). Terrorists predominately come from well educated, higher socio-economic status,

making motivations more political than economic (Hoffman 1998, Ellis 2003, Winkler

2008, Bergesen and Lizardo 2004). Freytag, Kruger and Meierrieks (2010) demonstrate

empirically that while terrorists themselves may be economically and educationally

advantaged, the society that they come from is not. This environment, aspects of state

failure, also fosters a large pool of economically disadvantaged and disenfranchised youth

from which to pull potential recruits. Further, economic disparity between countries also

causes grievances against the current economic order and the disadvantage certain failing

states experience (Bloomber, Hess and Weerapana 2004, Harrison 2006, Freytag, Kruger

and Meierrieks 2010). While social welfare is not part of the current study, its relationship

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to economic inequality is intimate and deserves mention here.

The presence of particular ethnic or religious communities with legacies of persecution

or repression may also create black holes. According to Korteweg (2)008), terrorist groups

can plug into the particular grievances of these local communities, gaining the advantage of

popular support. Through community support, terrorists can hide, gain new recruits, and

possibly have access to new resources. Important here is the fact that in tribal communities

a sense of duty and honor are paramount and as such, obligations to help terrorists may be

part of the moral code (Simmons and Tucker 2007, Kittner 2007, Freytag, Kruger,

Meierrieks, and Schneider 2009). Divisions within the state, tribe, or clan can serve as safe

havens for terrorists (Green 2008). Ethnic divides and grievances along group lines also

foster communities where terrorist activity thrives (Piazza 2008).

Taking into consideration the research that has come before, and in particular, Piazza

(2008), more exploration into aspects of state failure and their connections to terrorism is

demanded. Through a comparison of case studies, this paper examines just what are the

differences in how a state fails and how these differences contribute to fostering terrorism.

Economic

Economic under-development can be a catalyst to terrorist creation. Korteweg

(2008) states that economic under-development (e.g., areas of high poverty) may be

advantageous for terrorist recruitment. Young men might have no other opportunities for

employment other than terrorist groups. Further, poverty is cited repeatedly as a main

catalyst in the creation of terrorist group formation (formation (Schneider et.al, 2010, Li

and Schaub 2004, Burgoon 2006, Piazza 2008, Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks, and Schneider

2009). Even so, it may be the unequal distribution of wealth creating the conditions that

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spawn terrorism, many factors contribute to the creation of a terrorist. Krueger and

Maleckova (2003) found that although poor countries spawn terrorism, when controlled for

civil liberties the relationship disappears. While poverty may not breed terrorists, Freytag,

Kruger, Meierrieks and Schneider (2009), found that under-development in the Middle

East, as well as other countries, seems to be the bed from which terrorist do arise.

Economic under-development (e.g., areas of high poverty) may be advantageous

for terrorist recruitment. Young men might have no other opportunities for employment

than terrorist groups (Korteweg 2008). Poverty is cited repeatedly as a main catalyst in the

creation of terrorists. (Schneider, Bruck and Meierrieks 2010, Li and Schaub 2004,

Burgoon 2006, Piazza 2008, Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks, and Schneider 2009) However,

the unequal distribution of wealth may create the conditions to spawn terrorist

organizations (Sageman 2008). Unequal wealth distribution is frequently touted as a

reason for the spawning of terrorist activity (Li and Schaub 2004, Burgoon 2006, Piazza

2008).

Political

Terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare; military powers differ significantly

between groups. As such the targets, while not necessarily states themselves, are

politically motivated and key to the analysis. Weber (1948) viewed the state as the

legitimate source of force and as such, states have a monopoly on the use of force. This is

furthered by the states’ ability to tax in support of a standing army (Weber 1948). States

are organized around legitimate use of force. Legitimacy is paramount to state formation in

that people must believe in the legitimacy of the state to exercise force in order to be

compliant. Legitimacy allows the government the right to govern. Another aspect of the

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state is a particular geographical location, or the right to property. This is the basis of

unequal distribution of resources, and as such the basis for conflict (Giddens 1999).

Weber (1948) states three resources where conflict can arise: economic, power and

status (cultural). Collins’ (1975) provides) provides an important perspective to examine

the historical aspects of terrorism in light of Weber’s (1948) three resources. According to

Collins, economic resources are those of material conditions. Power resources are those of

social position within networks. Status or cultural resources are those that exert control

over rituals that produce solidarity (Collins 1975). Resources become important when

groups mobilize in reaction to unequal distribution. Groups may mobilize in two ways:

emotionally or materially (Collins 1975). Emotional mobilization is important for terrorist

groups because members must have a strong sense of group identity. The sense of group

identity permits terrorist members to perceive their beliefs as morally right and to make

sacrifices for the cause. Material mobilization is also important for terrorist groups in that

it encompasses communication and transportation as well as material and monetary

supplies to sustain the conflict (Collins 1975).

Crenshaw (1981) viewed terrorism as being directed against governments with the

goal of political change. Acts are premeditated and symbolic (Crenshaw 1981). She

furthers the definition of terrorism as a part of secular modern politics, with increases in

terrorism stemming from nationalism, anarchism and revolutionary socialism (Crenshaw

1981). In the late 20th and early 21st century, Western states experience high levels of

terrorism. From 1971-1980 the United States ranked highest in number of terrorist

campaigns (Crenshaw 1981). Terrorism morphed in the 1960’s vision of urban guerrilla

warfare in Latin America to what is known today. The purpose of most terrorist activity is

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to gain recognition (Crenshaw 1981) as well as disrupt and discredit the government.

Relying on Weber’s (1948) definition of the state as legitimate use of force, the purpose of

terrorism is twofold: first to discredit the legitimacy of the state and second to create

legitimacy for the terrorist organization.

In opposition to the argument that failed states foster terrorism; Simmons and

Tucker (2007), Sageman (2008), Bilgin and Morton (2004), as well as Patrick (2006) argue

that the connection is tenuous at best. Failed states are too chaotic to promote terrorism,

and there needs to be a degree of functioning, which will allow the bare infrastructure to be

in place so that terrorists can operate successfully (Patrick 2006). Logistically, Simmons

and Tucker (2007) argue that failed states are a nightmare for reliable operations.

Simmons and Tucker (2007) propose that while people in failed states do gain skills that

would be well utilized by terrorist organizations, the need for their skills locally is more

critical. Simmons and Tucker (2007) posit that few failed states are utilized as training

camps (with the exception of Afghanistan). This could be because terrorists are now

receiving on the job training in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Simmons and Tucker

2007). Simmons and Tucker (2007) further argue that complete state failure may not be

optimal for fostering terrorist activity.

Korteweg (2008) cites seven aspects of comparative advantage that lead to the

creation of “black holes” or spaces in which terrorism may grow. The most important of

these aspects are remote areas of countries where the governments of those countries have

little ability to control what goes on in the area. It is physically impossible to govern such

areas; as a result, the areas may be forgotten regions of no man’s land. These are

challenges to the state’s ruling authority that erodes the confidence in the ability of the state

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to assert its control (Zartman 1995). These are non-transparent areas where the central

government has questionable legitimacy and groups are free to operate unnoticed, that

Piazza (2008) terms stateless regions.

In failing states, there is challenge to governmental authority as well as lack of

confidence in the state to control the territory (Zartman 1995, Borberg 2003, Piazza 2008).

Hehir (2007) posits that failed and/or failing states suffer administrative incapacity, where

the government is unable to provide basic services that are expected from such an entity.

This includes the provision of security, economic stability and functioning bureaucratic

institutions that ensure the population’s wellbeing (Hehir 2007, Rotberg 2002). Lambach

(2004) notes that there is not a clear threshold of failure and that there are distinctions

between weak states that may still function in some aspects and collapsed states which

have no ability to effectively govern. Failed states may retain the appearance of

sovereignty (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). This type of functioning may best suit terrorist

organizations in that outward manifestation of sovereignty limits outside intervention

(Piazza 2008). Failed states portraying outward signs of sovereignty tend to have

government officials that are more subject to corruption. Corrupt officials provide

opportunity for terrorists to access passports, visas or political support (Piazza 2008).

Failed states have been seen as the locations from which terrorist organizations can

operate (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, Piazza 2008, Walsh and Piazza 2009).

Hypotheses

This study is meant to examine the connections between failed states and terrorist

activity. While the aggregate failed states score is statistically significant and linearly

associated with terrorist activity, a deeper examination needs to be conducted of the

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individual components.

Hypothesis One: Based on a review of the literature and theoretical understanding,

hypothesis one is that while the Failed States Index aggregate score has been

significantly related to terrorist activity, a better model of prediction would be one

that contains all twelve variables that comprise the failed states index.

Hypothesis Two: The second hypothesis is that by adding the score of the Global

Peace Index as an independent variable, with the previous twelve variables in

hypothesis one, the predictive power of the model will be improved.

Past research has focused on the linear relationship between state failure and terrorist

activity, however it may be a nonlinear relationship. By examining this, the levels of

failure necessary for the promotion of terrorism may emerge. There may be a midrange of

state failure, which is most optimal for terrorist activities. This opinion is informed by

prior research (Mair 2008, Li and Schaub 2004), although in conflict with the most recent

empirical findings (Piazza 2008). The independent variable will be the failed states total

score squared.

Hypothesis Three: The third hypothesis is that along the continuum of failed states,

there exists a range that fosters the most terrorist activity. While it has been put

forth that the relationship between the total state failure score and terrorist activity

is linear (Piazza 2008), completely failed states are not hospitable to terrorism. Nor

are states that experience the least amount of state failure are immune from such

activity. There is a midrange of the total state failure scores that will be most

strongly related to terrorist activity and that a squared term of the overall Failed

States score will be a better predictor of terrorist activity.

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Quantitative Methods

Data

The data for these analyses came from the National consortium for the Study of

Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START. START is based at the University of

Maryland, College Park and is an open source. In conjunction with START, the Global

Terrorism Database (GTD), also open source, encompasses terrorist activities throughout

the world from 1970 through 2008, with over 87,000 cases. The Global Peace Index (GPI)

measures relative position of nations’ peacefulness, created in 2007 by the Institute for

Economics and Peace, with data from the Economist Intelligence Unit. It consists of 149

countries and examines a set of twenty-three internal as well as external violence factors

(See Appendix B for list of indicators). Also utilized for this study is the Failed States

Index of 184 countries measured on twelve variables, and is an open source database.

Sample

The focus of this study is 2008, consisting of 187 countries, comprising 4861

attacks and 104 terrorist organizations. The data were collapsed so that there is one entry

for each country and the variable number of attacks was generated for each country. Once

countries that had no information were eliminated, the total number of cases was 179.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the calculated rate of terrorist attacks within a country

per 100,000 of the population.

Independent Variables

The independent variables for hypothesis one are the twelve indicators of the Failed

States Index, and the global peace index. The Failed States Index includes four social

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indicators, two economic indicators and six political indicators.

Social

The Failed States index uses measures of demographic pressure. These include the

following: pressures from high population density relative to food supply, settlement

patterns, border disputes, land ownership and controls of religious or historical sites. The

second social measure is massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples.

A legacy of vengeance seeking group grievances is a measure of atrocities committed

against groups in forms of persecution, repression or political exclusion. Chronic and

sustained human flight, such as the “brain drain”, is used to measure the emigration of the

middle class as well as growth of exiled communities (Fund for Peace 2009).

Economic

Uneven economic development along group lines is determined by: group based

inequality in jobs, education and economic status, poverty levels, infant mortality rates and

education levels. Sharp and/or severe economic decline is a measurement of the society as

a whole relying on per capita income, GNP, debt, and business failures. Indicative of this

variable is a collapse or severe devaluation of the national currency and increase in hidden

economies (Fund for Peace 2009).

Political

Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state is an indicator for government

corruption with a lack of transparency, accountability and political representation.

Progressive deterioration of public services measures the disappearance of basic state

services and protection of citizens. Widespread violation of human rights is a measure of

the emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule, along with large numbers of

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political prisoners. Security apparatus as a ‘state within a state’ is the surfacing of private

militias, which terrorizes opponents. The rise of factionalized elites demonstrates a

fragmentation of ruling elites along group lines. Finally, intervention of other states or

external factors indicates risk to the state’s sovereignty (Fund for Peace 2009).

For hypothesis one, an OLS regression model with the twelve indicators of the

failed states index was run with the dependent variable of rate of terrorist activity. This

allows for comparison of the effects of the twelve variables on the dependent variable and

comparison to the model with only the total failed states score. Both standardized and

unstandardized coefficients were generated.

For hypothesis two, the independent variables were the total Failed States score and

the Global Peace score. It is necessary to run nested models, with the full model of the

Failed States score, along with the Global Peace Index, and a restricted model, excluding

the Global Peace Index, so that a comparison can be made between the two, using

appropriate statistical significance tests. For hypothesis three, the total failed states index

score were be squared to test my hypothesis that this is not a linear relationship, and

compared to the model with the linear term.

Control Variables

Control variables for demographics are the population size and the median age of

the country. Because crime in general is most heavily represented in the age group 15-35

(Ehrlich and Liu 2002), controlling for the age structure of the country is important. The

third control variable is a religious diversity measure, constructed based on the Herfindahl-

Hirschmann Index. While developed for the study of economics, Bossert (2005) et.al,

employed the HHI in the construction of their ethno linguistic fractionalization index,

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which leads to the belief that this is the proper formula for the construction of the religious

diversity measure.

Results

[Table one about here]

Table one presents the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values

for all the variables in the model. For the dependent variable, rate of terrorist attacks per

100,000 of the population (activity) the mean is .0982, with a minimum of zero, a

maximum of 3.111 and a standard deviation of .324. The Failed States total score mean is

70.305. 109 cases in the study have scores above this level, meaning a higher degree of

state failure. The lowest score in the study is Norway, at 16.8, while the highest is Somalia

at 114.2. The standard deviation for this variable is 23.56. The Global Peace score has a

mean of 2.05 and 60 of the cases in the set have a score greater than this. The minimum

score, which is Iceland, is 1.176, while the maximum score, Iraq, is 3.154. The standard

deviation is .486.

[Table two about here]

For hypothesis one an OLS regression model was generated with the twelve

variables of the failed states index (Model 2) and compared to the model for the total Failed

States score (Model 1), using the control variables population, median age and religious

diversity. The results are in table two. Both of these models were statistically significant

to the .05 α level. For hypothesis one, that the twelve indices of the Failed States Index

make a better predictive model than the total score model

For hypothesis two, which included the Global Peace Index with the Failed States

scores, it is predicted that adding the GPI will improve the predictive power of the model

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of the twelve failed state scores (Model 3), while controlling for religious diversity,

population and median age. When examining the models for hypothesis two, which added

the GPI to the Failed States scores, nested models with the full Model 3 and the restricted

Model 2 are compared. By adding the GPI the model improves its predictive ability.

Finally, to test the hypothesis that the original relationship between the total Failed

States score and rates of terrorist activity is not linear, a power polynomial to the second

power was generated (Model 4). Model 4 has stronger predictive power than model 1.

In this study, by disaggregating the Failed States index an improved model of

prediction could be constructed. On the surface, this supports hypothesis one that a better

model of prediction contains all twelve variables that comprise the failed states index.

However, the items are strongly correlated, and their individual slopes are not significant,

except for the slopes for uneven economic development and external intervention, both

having negative slopes, which intuitively does not seem right. While the model does seem

to predict better than the original, this discrepancy leads me to believe that one must go

deeper into this relationship. While it is important to look at the separate components that

make up the Failed States Index, a deeper exploration into the variables involved in their

individual construction may provide more explanation. This is a first step in to a deeper

understanding of how the factors of state failure influence terrorist activity. This also may

be indicative of a non-linear relationship for the two statistically significant variables and

will be explored in future research.

The findings supported hypothesis two, that adding the score of the Global Peace

Index the model would be improved. Not only is the adjusted larger, but the

incremental F test demonstrates that the improvement is statistically significant. In this

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model, however, only uneven economic development and the GPI were statistically

significant. Because this addition seemed to enhance the overall model, the GPI seems to

be important in improving the model.

Hypothesis three, that a regression equation with a squared term would have better

predictive value than the original Model 1, was supported by the findings.

Both independent variables were statistically significant to the .05 alpha, as was also the

control variable for religious diversity. This is important because debate within the

literature has demonstrated that the research has not been settled on whether it is a linear or

non-linear relationship; however, the findings support a non-linear relationship.

Qualitative Data & Methods: Choice of Cases

Choice of countries was based on the total failed states score, focusing on finding

two failed states, one with high levels of terrorist activity, and one without. The scores on

the twelve indices were very similar, as were their global peace score, median age,

population density, and governance score. In focusing on the ten most failed states, two

states, Somalia and the Ivory Coast, most closely aligned on the independent variables,

while still differing on the level of terrorist activity. OLS regression, with standardized

coefficients, was used along with factor analysis, to determine which of the failed states

variables were most pertinent to look at for each country.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the calculated rate of terrorist attacks within a country,

which is my unit of analysis, as was the prior section.

Independent Variables

Diversity

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Because of long histories of colonial oppression and ethnic conflict, it is imperative

to investigate the differences in population diversity. The two measures used were one of

ethno linguistic fractionalization (ELF), and religious diversity. The religious diversity

measure was constructed based on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. While developed for

the study of economics, Bossert et.al (2005), employed the HHI in the construction of their

ethno linguistic fractionalization index, which leads me to believe this is the proper formula

for construction of the religious diversity measure. These two measures indicate that

Somalia is a quite homogenous country, scoring .082 on the ELF and .03 on the religious

diversity measure, indicating little diversity. In terms of religion, 97% of the population is

Sunni Muslim. The Ivory Coast, by contrast, has an ELF score of .82 and a religious

diversity score of .701, indicating a greater amount of diversity. Approximately a third is

Muslim, a third Christian, with the remaining one third comprised of indigenous religions

or no religion. While both countries have similar histories, their diversity scores are very

different.

Governance

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) were analyzed for both countries.

The overall score for Somalia was -1.9 (scale is from -2.5-2.5), while the Ivory Coast’s

score was -1.5. The WGI examines the following measures: voice and accountability,

political stability and government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control

of corruption.

Colonization

This was simply a measure as to whether the country had been a colony or not and who the

colonizer was.

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Discussion

Age distribution in both countries is very similar, although the Ivory Coast is

slightly older, having a median age of 19.6 years to Somalia’s 17.6. Birth and death rates

are also slightly higher in Somalia as well. Literacy rates mirror these other differences,

with Somalis faring slightly worse than Ivoirians. Somalia has over one million internally

displaced people while the Ivory Coast has slightly less than one million (IDMC 2010).

The percent of the population of Somalia living in urban areas is 37, while the Ivory Coast

is 49. However, Somalia is seeing a growth in urbanization of 1 ½ times that of the Ivory

Coast. Both countries have very young populations, which general research on violence

finds more likely to commit violent acts.

Arable land is scarce in Somalia, which sees only 1.6% of its land usable. Struggle

over land has fueled conflict within the country. Pastoralists have regularly crossed

Kenyan and Ethiopian borders, while land scarcity fuels inter-clan rivalries (Dehez 2009).

The privileging of some clans to government resources, while disadvantaging others further

exacerbates this inter-clan conflict. Traditionally, clan elders handled such conflicts over

land. However with the government of Siyad Barre introducing land registration laws, that

placed all land as state property until legal registration was completed, the privileging of

some clans over others reinforced the conflict over land (Dehez 2009). The land reform

was meant to regulate agricultural economy, as well as legalize inheritance claims through

the registration process. Most small farmers who held inherited farms could not afford the

bureaucratic process involved in registering claims. Pastoralists, who largely were not

linked to government officials in a privileged manner, suffered difficulty in finding places

to move herds.

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The Ivory Coast’s political crisis also had roots in land tenure. While the Ivory

Coast has a much greater percentage of arable land (8.8%), legal access to land has

privileged some groups over others. In particular, migrants’ citizenship and land rights

were pivotal to the civil conflict. The economic crisis of the 1980’s fueled the

discrimination of migrants and their rights to land, leading to the revocation of voting

rights. The 1998 Rural land law (Bassett 2009) was geared toward recognizing and

formalizing customary land rights by procedurally setting out conditions to title land. This

only served to highlight tensions between native Ivoirians and migrants because only

citizens (native Ivoirians) could own land, while others could have long-term leases. Only

2% of the rural land was legally registered with most transactions informal prior to this.

Land in protected forests served to further marginalize internally displaced persons in that

forests were deemed publicly held so those migrants who derived their livelihood in these

areas could no longer use them. Further, the land reform threatened the mobility of

pastoralists (Bassett 2009).

On first look, economic factors of state failure seam least informative of what

differences are attributed to fostering terrorism because their economic histories are very

similar. Both are poor countries that experienced severe economic decline prior to civil

wars (Dehez 2009, Bassett 2009), and there is a heavy reliance on the informal sector

(Aboygue 1989, Guichaoua 2007) in both countries. However, as the quantitative analysis

indicates, uneven economic development is predictive of terrorist activity. Since there is a

significant difference between the two countries, the model would predict a difference in

terrorist activity.

Somalia and the Ivory Coast have very similar indicators on the failed states index;

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however, the most striking differences are in the areas of politics. This is perhaps

predictable because Somalia has functioned without a government for a longer period than

the Ivory Coast. However, also operating in Somalia is the clan structure that pits groups

against each other in very distinct separations. The warlord atmosphere is Somalia’s state

within a state, and the ad hoc administration of law by whoever has the most power at the

time leads to this instability. This is not as much of a problem in the Ivory Coast, mostly

because of outside intervention from France and the UN. However, because of the Ivory

Coast’s highly diverse population, there is not a clan structure in place to operate like there

is in Somalia.

Progressive deterioration of public services gives the starkest difference between

the two countries, with Somalia scoring 10 out of 10 and the Ivory Coast scoring 7.8. The

ability of the Ivory Coast to continue to provide public services is heavily reliant on French

intervention (Advameg 2010), while Somalia has no such intervention. The other strong

disparity worth noting is the rise of factionalized elites. Here the success of marginalized

persons, and forced recognition of migrants by outside forces, helps the Ivory Coast’s

score. Through long-term external intervention and forced inclusion of minorities

(Advameg 2010), the Ivory Coast has less factionalized elites than the clan driven, warlord

country of Somalia.

The potentiality for economic development is also important for a state’s stability.

As the difference in governance scores demonstrated, the Ivory Coast’s perceived ability to

promote private economic investment allows its people to accept its governance more

readily. Somalia again suffers from its lack of central government in that even if a

company wanted to do business in Somalia there is no clear group with which to negotiate.

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This is related to foreign capital penetration and dependency theory. Dependency theory

states that foreign capital penetration into less developed states provides short-term

economic benefits, however, in the long-term it is detrimental. This is demonstrated in the

Ivory Coast in that while France’s involvement has provided stability in times of chaos, the

Ivory Coast is highly dependent on France and a French pullout would leave the country

unable to provide basic utilities. However, this lends itself to the perceived ability of the

government to foster private economic development, leading Ivoirians to have more faith

in their government. Conversely, Somalia’s lack of any government apparatus prevents it

from having any ability to promote economic development. Also related to dependency is

the concept of debt. The Ivory Coast’s debt load is much higher than Somalia’s. This

increases its connections to the world polity. By engaging with the World Bank and other

global structures, the Ivory Coast is better situated in the world than Somalia. Further,

while the Gini Index for the Ivory Coast is higher than Somalia’s, indicating greater

economic inequality, there is a greater amount of poverty in Somalia. It is not difficult for

a country to have more equal distribution of wealth when there is little wealth. Somalia has

no ability to provide the needed infrastructure and services its people need, while the Ivory

Coast has benefited from outside intervention in these areas. Much as Amartya Sen

advocates development as freedom, development may promote peace. The five essential

freedoms for Sen are political, economic, social opportunity, transparency guarantee, and

protective security. Development is an expansion of individual freedoms and as such may

lead to a more stable state. If development is success, it is obvious where Somalia and the

Ivory Coast are failing.

While ethnic diversity is very low in Somalia, conflicts are along clan lines. This is

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in part a reflection of the privileging of some clans by the government. Further, Somalis

tend to be apprehensive of outsiders, having experienced such a violent and chaotic

colonial history (Advameg 2010). Contrasted with the Ivory Coast, which has over sixty

different ethnic groups, Somalia would seem more capable of forging a national identity.

However, the legacy of colonialism has only furthered divisions along clan lineage (Hayes

and Robinson 2010). The clan structure lead to a massive power struggle between scores

of rebel groups and subsequent civil wars (Homer-Dixon 1999). The disenfranchisement

of migrants in the Ivory Coast, in contrast, fueled civil wars between indigenous Ivoirians

and non-Ivoirians. This disenfranchisement was in not only voting rights and land holding,

it furthered class divisions by excluding some from economic opportunities, such as

bureaucratic jobs. Religious diversity is similar to ethnic diversity in the two countries.

97% of Somalis are Sunni Muslim, where as the Ivory Coast is only 1/3 Muslim, 1/3

Christian, and approximately 20% espousing no religion, while the remainder practice

indigenous religions (CIA Factbook). Calculating diversity measures, I found that the

Ivory Coast is very diverse when compared to Somalia. This could be important in why

Somali has fostered greater amounts of terrorism than the Ivory Coast. More diversity may

lead to more tolerance within a country.

Worldwide governance indicators were analyzed for both countries. The overall

score for Somalia was -1.9 (scale -2.5-2.5), while the Ivory Coast’s was -1.5. In looking at

the components of governance examined, voice and accountability, which captures

perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their

government, exercising freedom of expression and association, and free media, the Ivory

Coast, while still in the lowest 20th percent, is much better than Somalia, which ranks in the

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lowest 2% worldwide. Democracy may decrease terrorism in that it affords those with

grievances other avenues of redress (Schneider et. al 2010). Components of political

stability and government effectiveness have both countries in the lowest 10th percentile.

These are measures of government stability and quality of public services, as well as the

government’s credibility. With Somalia operating for over twenty years with no central

recognized government, and the Ivory Coast being in a state of transition for the last

decade, with its interim government continuously putting off elections, it is not difficult to

understand these low scores.

Somalia scores -2.56 (on a scale of -2.5-2.5), the Ivory Coast scores just under the

20th percentile with a score of -.97 on the measure of regulatory quality. This measures the

perception that the government has some ability/control to promote economic, private

development. Because there is some sort of government in the Ivory Coast that is

recognized by the international world, and the French have continued their economic

involvement, the Ivory Coast has weathered its civil wars and sharp economic decline

much better than Somalia. Further, with France supplying many aspects of infrastructure,

there is less pressure for these basics on the state. Somalia, with no internationally

recognizable government and little economic trade, has little hope of developing (Herblist

2009). Also preventing quality of life in Somalia is the fact that without a recognizable

government international aid organizations have no coordination. This makes such

agencies hesitant to provide aid to Somalia. For the measures of rule of law and control of

corruption, both countries fell into the bottom 10 th percentile. (World Bank 2010). Again,

these scores are predictable because of the lack of governance each country has

experienced.

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Both the British and French colonized much of Africa; however, their methods of

colonization were very different. The French emphasized cultural assimilation, replacing

traditional African leadership with French bureaucracy (Hayes and Robinson 2010). This

left newly created postcolonial states with no governmental structure to rely on. The

British, in contrast, relied on local elites to administer British rule. This created class

divisions and a bureaucratic class in place when independence was obtained. These crucial

structural differences left nation-states with very different abilities for self-governing.

Coupled with this is the haphazard way in which European powers created these nation-

states, many times piecing together antagonistic groups in to one state (Cocodia 2008).

This is most clearly demonstrated in the case of Somalia, where independence left three

million Somalis living in Kenya and Ethiopia once the lines were drawn. While neither

Somalia nor the Ivory Coast was fully under British control, their colonial experiences

were quite distinct. The French, which left them a weak government apparatus once

independence was attained in 1960, ruled the Ivory Coast; however, the French continued

to maintain economic and military involvement through utilities and telecommunications as

well as a strong military presence (ICEM 2010). The British in the North, the French in the

coastal region that is now Djibouti and Italy in the South dominated Somalia. During

World War II, Somalia was a hotbed for conflict between the British and Italians,

extending the European based war into the Horn of Africa. This speaks to McMichael’s

belief that how states pursue development have far reaching effects on social, economic,

and political development and vice versa. Somalia was in play during the cold war and

because of the power plays by the United States and the Soviet Union much of its policy

was externally influenced, while the Ivory Coast avoided this situation. Further, at the end

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of the cold war, Somalia saw an abrupt change in external intervention, as it was no longer

key in the fight between capitalism and communism. Complicating Somalia’s state

formation even more is that when independence was achieved and Northern and Southern

Somalia were united, two distinctly separate states were brought together, having no

common bureaucratic functions (Advameg 2010). Further distinction between the two

countries’ experiences is that while the Ivory Coast still experiences intense French

involvement, Somalia has not enjoyed the stabilizing effect of continuous outside

intervention.

Colonial influence when these countries gained their independence reflects how the

struggle between three countries for control of Somalia left it much less equipped for self-

governing than the Ivory Coast. Further differences in the histories of the two countries

indicate that the continued presence of the French in the Ivory Coast may serve as a

stabilizing factor in the rebuilding of the country. While the Ivory Coast experienced

French colonialism, which overall left countries less adept at self-rule post-colonially, and

may be a source for its overall high state failure score, continued involvement has made

critical contributions to its disaggregated scores being lower in some areas than Somalia.

Somalia not only was brutally colonized by three different empires, it continued to

experience violent struggles between two of these countries until the end of World War II.

The form that colonialism took, along with the structure of the government it leaves

behind, are important in creating an environment for state success.

Conclusion

There is no current theory that definitively explains the connections between failed

states and terrorism. Asymmetrical or fourth generation warfare is a very real threat

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globally today. Prior research has focused on political, economic, and social factors

independently of each other and the effects on terrorist activity. The focus of this paper, in

examining state failure in detail for Somalia and the Ivory Coast, has worked to move away

from looking at these factors (political, economic and social) independently, and tries to

view the overall processes involved in state failure in regard to terrorism. While Somalia

and the Ivory Coast have very similar scores on most components of the failed states index,

noticeable differences were found on political indicators of the ability of the state to

provide public services and the rise of factionalized elites. In exploring diversity, both

measures show a significant difference between Somalia and the Ivory Coast, with Somalia

showing virtually no diversity, while the Ivory Coast is moderately diverse. In terms of

governance, differences in voice and the perceived ability of the government to foster

economic, private development show much difference between the countries. The history

of colonialism has been explored and clear distinctions made between Somalia and the

Ivory Coast’s experiences. The study has been theoretically driven by the position that it is

the process of state failure that is intimately connected to terrorism. In examining the

twelve indices of state failure, along with diversity, governance and colonial history, a

clearer picture has emerged as to why Somalia and the Ivory Coast have experienced

differences in terrorist activity.

Further research should strive to look beyond failed states and perhaps a four by

four study; adding two non-failed states, one with high levels of terrorism and one with

none, would add a greater understanding of the processes involved. Also not addressed in

this paper are the different components of the global peace index. By taking the index

apart into its 23 components, further comparison of the processes involved could be done

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and a clearer picture of the operations involved would emerge.

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Table 1: Univariate Statistics for all variables (N=179)_______________ Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum

Peace Score

(GPI)

2.050 .486 1.176 3.514

Demographic Pressures 6.390 1.987 1.000 9.800

Refugees/IDPs 4.971 2.372 .900 9.800

Group Grievance 5.896 2.043 1.000 10.000

Human Flight 5.606 2.077 1.000 10.000

Uneven Development 6.753 1.823 1.900 9.600

Economic Decline 5.503 2.077 1.200 10.000

Delegitimization of the

State

6.382 2.424 .900 10.000

Public Services 5.689 2.315 1.200 10.000

Human Rights 5.943 2.260 1.400 9.900

Security Apparatus 5.555 2.561 .700 10.000

Factionalized Elites 5.921 2.561 .700 10.000

External Intervention 5.697 2.202 .900 10.000

Total Failed States score 70.305 23.560 16.800 114.200

Rate of terrorist activity .0982 .324 0 3.111

Variable Model One Model Two Model Three Model Four

Adjusted .0588 .1385 .2234 .1851

Model F 3.16* 2.48* 3.48* 7.27*

Constant -.516 .009 -.323 .149

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(.245)* (.314) (.310) (.269)

Demographic

Pressure

-.034

(.046)

-.031

(.044)

Refugees/IDPs .026

(.019)

.009

(.018)

Group Grievance .059

(.031)

.040

(.030)

Human Flight .025

(.024)

.033

(.023)

Uneven Development -.078

(.032)*

-.071

(.031)*

Economic Decline -.036

(.028)

-.008

(.028)

Delegitimization of the

State

-.033

(.040)

-.049

(.038)

Public Services .025

(.042)

-.014

(.041)

Human Rights .014

(.038)

.026

(.037)

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Security Apparatus .028

(.030)

.012

(.029)

Factionalized Elites -.032

(.032)

-.019

(.030)

External Intervention -.057

(.006)*

.041

(.027)

FS Total Score .004

(.002)*

.021

(.005)*

FS Total Squared .0002

(.00004)*

GPI Score .327

(.086)*

Religious Diversity .25

(.119)*

.21

(.12)

.203

(.113)

.266

(.111)*

Population -1.17E-10

(1.85E-10)

7.37E-11

(2.13E-10)

3.98E-11

(2.02E-10)

-5.58E-11

(1.73E-10)

Median Age .007

(.004)

-.0003

(.006)

-.002

(.006)

.006

(.005)

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