IB Higher Level History Mr. Blackmon Argentina: A Brief ......IB Higher Level History Mr. Blackmon...

IB Higher Level History Mr. Blackmon

Argentina: A Brief Overview of Modern History: From Skidmore and Smith pp. 68-113

All citations are from Skidmore and Smith unless otherwise noted.

I. Introduction to the Organization of the OutlineA. Time periods are shamelessly taken from a Change Over Time Chart found in

Skidmore and Smith p. 62B. Phase I (Roughly 1880-1900), characterized by

1. Political- Oligarchic democracy or integrating dictatorship. 2. Economic ---Initiation of import-export growth3. Social–Modernization of the elites, appearance of a commercial sector and

new professionalsC. Phase II (Roughly 1900-1930)

1. Political– Co-optativae democracy2. Economic --Export-Import expansion3. Social–Appearance of middle strata, beginnings of a proletariat

D. Phase III (Roughly 1930-1960s)1. Political– Populism or Co-optitative democracy2. Economic --Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI)3. Social–Formation of entrepreneurial elite; strengthening of working class

E. Phase IV (Roughly 1960s-early 1980s)1. Political- Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes.2. Economic --Stagnation in import-substituting growth; some export-

oriented growth in the 1970s3. Social–Sharpening of conflict, often class conflict

F. Phase V (Roughly 1980s- Present)1. Political- Incomplete electoral democracy (with military veto)2. Economic --Scarcity of foreign exchange (worsened by foreign debt)

leading to stagnation or recession3. Social–Increased mobilization of middle and lower class groups

II. Phase I (1880-1900)A. Political Developments

1. Dominant liberal politicians drawn from the landowning class, andmonopolized instruments of power, including the army and elections (viavote fraud),

2. Controlled only party, Partido Autonomista Nacional) PAN 3. Key decisions made by informal agreement, or acuerdo

B. Economic Developments1. Argentina produces beef and grain for the growing European market.

They are aided by steam ships and refrigeration..2. Argentina lacks capital and labor. The British invest in railroads, docks,

packing houses and utilities3. Industry involved processing agricultural products.

IB Higher Level History Mr. BlackmonArgentina Study Sheet

4. Integration into the world economy exposed Argentina to sharpfluctuations in world prices of agricultural products, which meant that thefate of its economy was decided outside its borders.

5. Foreign capital was so prevalent that it becomes a target for thenationalists.

C. Social Developments1. From 1857-1930, Argentina receives 3.5 million immigrants, 46% from

Italy and 32 % from Spain. African and native American populations arevery small.

2. This labor force is very fluid, esp. from rural to urban.3. Italians and Spaniards become coloinists, tenant farmers, laborers,

transport workers, processing plant workers, and service industry workers4. Buenos Aires remains much more prosperous than the interior.5. Rural estancieros prospered, tenant farmers struggled. Urban growth

creates large discrepancies in income.6. Ricardo Rojas rebels against European emphasis by pointing to native

Americans and the soil– Martín Fiero, a poem about the gauchos --andEzequiel Martínez’ X-Ray of the Pampas also objects to Europeandominance.

7. Working class culture produces a Spanish-Italian dialect, lunfardo, and thetango.

8. Argentina never developed a peasantry; land in the pampas was nevergiven to small families, unlike the US in the Great Plains.

9. Wage laborers were numerous in cities, development of parliamentarySocialist party, the anarchists (Federación Obrera Regional ArgentinaFORA). a. In response to FORA strikes, government passes La Ley de

Residencia, allowing deportation of agitators. La Ley de DefensaSocial made it easier to arrest labor leaders.

III. .Phase II (1900-1930)

A. Political Developments1. Radical Party emerges from three discontented groups:

a. (1) newly prosperous landowners, b. (2) old aristocratic families from interior who did not benefit from

export growth c. (3) middle classes who are cut off from power.

2. They are led by Hipólito Yrigoyen; a. they are committed to the same basic economic policies–they just

want to share power.3. Sáenz Peña Law extended vote to middle classes,

a. Provided for universal and compulsory male suffrageb. Secret ballot (Snow 77)


c. The Conservative oligarchs did not expect that this law would turnthem out of power, just co-opt the Radicals.

d. They were wrong. Hipólito Yrigoyen was elected President in1916

4. Electorate is enlarged again, including all 18 year old males. 5. Increased political participation made parties more important, whose

vehicle is the Congress. Reforms help the middle-classes since fewimmigrants became naturalized.

6. The Radicals employ machine politics to dominant the country; 7. Conservatives are disillusioned at limited democracy.

B. Social Developments1. Organized labor emerges as a genuine force. Post-War strikes wrack the

nation 1918-19 over wartime inflation..2. The syndicalists called for a general strike, which led to the ultra-rightist

Líga Patriótica Argentina. 3. Strikes which mobilized uper- and middle-class fear of the proletariat:

class warfare. Labor is suppressed violently.4. The Confederición General del Trabajo (CGT) is founded in 1930 5. Evolution of the military: The liberals of 1852 wanted a professional

military that could crush the caudillos. Professional schools wereestablished in the 1870's, and in 1899, German officers were brought in toteach the new technology. By 1910, promotion was by merit and masteryof the technology. This opened up careers to middle-class officers, whoidentified themselves closely with the honor and autonomy of the militaryand who were often suspicious and scornful of the civilian leadership,whom they regarded as corrupt and inefficient. The military could seeitself as apolitical and as an agent of modernization.

IV. Phase III (1930-1960s)A. Economic Developments

1. The Great Depression: Argentina’s export earnings fell 34% in 1932,aggregate output fell 14% between 1929 and 1932, and immigrationceased. (Rock 220) a. Nevertheless, Argentina was not hit as badly as many other Latin

American countries. 2. Justo’s initial response was quite orthodox: cut public spending, devalue

the peso (1933) to ease pressure on foreign debt payments; increase tariffsto reduce imports, exchange controls.

3. Loss of income from imports meant a fiscal revolution was necessary:Justo passed an income tax. Justo then sought price supports for farmers(a policy similar to Brazil and the U.S.) a. “Supports were administered by regulatory boards (juntas), which

were created for grains, meat, cotton, wines, milk and other goods.


Throughout the 1930s these boards performed like theircounterparts in such countries as Brazil and the United States:financing production, purchasing surpluses, and seeking topromote price stability.” (Rock 223)

4. Finance Minister Federico Pinedo establishes a Central Bank in 1934,which pursued “quasi-Keynesian functions” and controlled the moneysupply by buying and selling securities, rediscounting, and changing thereserve requirements. (Rock 223)

5. Roca-Runciman Agreement 1932: Great Britain, responding to the crisisand pressure from the Empire, agrees to give preference to theCommonwealth in trading. a. This threatened Argentine exports to Great Britain. b. Roca-Runciman protected the level of Argentine beef exports to

Great Britain, but on terms that gave most advantages to the Britishwith preferential treatment in other areas.

c. Roca-Runciman thus became very unpopular with nationalists. B. Social Developments

1. Gradually, the working class in Buenos Aires changed into one that wasprimarily native Argentine, literate, and mobile.a. During World War I, the urban worker was typically an immigrant

who was not naturalized, hence, could not vote.b. The next few decades saw very heavy immigration to the cities,

(20% of all rural dwellers) especially Buenos Aires (about 33 % ofthe nation’s population) (Snow 73, 79)

c. Their sense of class consciousness rose greatly. d. These worker felt shut out from the political system that existed

since all parties, including the Radicals and even the Socialists,were geared toward an electorate created by Sáenz-Peña, wherehalf the adult population could not vote.

e. Therefore, none of the parties had a legitimate working class base.C. Political Developments

1. “In 1930, Yrigoyen was eighty years old and senile, unable to keep hisown aides from raiding the Argentine treasury” (Adams)

2. Yrigoyen is overthrown by the military, who are not, however, united. a. Gen. Agustin Justo led a faction that wanted to return to pre-

Sáenz Peña oligarchy; b. Gen. José Uriburu led a faction that “wanted a hierarchical order

based on social function . . . . Uriburu envisioned a ‘functionaldemocracy’ where the elected legislators would representfunctional (or ‘corporate’) interests, such as ranchers, workers,merchants, and industrialists.” (Skidmore 84-85)

c. This “corporatist model” is heavily influenced by Mussolini


d. “Argentine elites--like many of their counterparts in Brazil,Paraguay, and several other Latin American countries--sawtotalitarian government, with its parallel excitement and control ofthe masses, as the answer for Argentina’s future.” (Adams)

3. Justo emerged as a winner in 1932, and sought “to form a broad, nationalgovernment that would give him the authority to respond to thesocioeconomic effect of the world depression.” (Skidmore 85)

4. He fails because a. (1) the working class made continuous demands through strikes

and b. (2) political professionals remained committed to partisan interests.

c. An example was his successor, Roberto Ortiz, who stopped votefraud and thereby allowed the Radicals to gain control of Congressin 1937.

d. Ortiz’ successor, however, Ramón Castillo, a conservative,returned to vote fraud, but only convinced everyone that thegovernment was illegitimate.

V. World War IIA. Economic Developments

1. The war led to the disruption of normal trading patterns–the continent wascut off by blockade, and the British redirected all resources into the wareffort rather than trade.

2. This led to Import-Substituting Industrialization. ISI attempts topromote the growth of consumer industry to replace manufacturedproducts previously imported from abroad, such as textiles. a. Typically, this involves higher import tariffs to protect local

industry, direct investment in companies, government companies,and favoritism to local companies.. (Skidmore 54)

b. Among ISI’s weaknesses is the fact that the machinery needed toproduce the consumer goods must still be imported (thus alteringbut not eliminating the dependency) and the fact that consumerdemand will eventually hit a limit unless a more general prosperityincreases the buying power of the bulk of the population

B. Social DevelopmentsC. Political Developments

1.VI. The Rise of Juan Domingo Perón

A. When IB refers to Populist leaders or parties, the two most prominent Populistsare Juan Domingo Perón and Getúlio Vargas

B. “Rising labor unrest and political protests against the domination of the oligarchyset the stage for another military intervention to restore order and ‘save the


nation.’ On June 4, 1943, General Arturo Rawson and 13 colonels of the GOU(Group of United Officers [Grupo Obra de Unificación], founded in 1941) threwout the Conservatives and set up a new ‘revolutionary’ military government. Much of the leadership was Fascist. It proscribed political parties, jailed itsopponents, banned Jewish and leftist newspapers, outlawed organized labor’sMarxist-dominated CGT, and packed labor leaders into concentration caps. Itrestricted strikes, cutting their number to a paltry 27 in all of 1944.” (Cockcroft)

C. Rawson lasted only 3 days, and was replaced by “ General Pedro Ramirez, whovowed to keep Argentina neutral during World War II” (Cockcroft)1. “Washington responded by freezing Argentine gold reserves in the United

States, recalling the American ambassador, and restricting shipping toArgentine ports. By early 1944 the U.S. pressure worked. Argentinabroke relations with the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) andRamirez resigned.” (Cockcroft)

D. Congress was dissolved in 1943 and all political parties by 1944.E. “Ramirez reaffirmed the embrace between reactionaries and the Catholic Church,

rescinding nineteenth-century prohibitions against Church teaching in publicschools. Also during the Ramirez months, political parties were outlawed; leaderswho signed a petition calling for the return of constitutional government lost theirjobs. The internment of labor union leaders was continued. Finally, however,when U.S. and British agents presented evidence of Ramirez’ continuingcollaboration with Axis agents, the general had to go. “

F. The new military leader is Edelmiro Farrell, who is Juan Domingo Perón’smentor.

G. Juan Domingo Perón, a member of GOU, becomes Secretary of Labor in1943, from which position he sought a base of popular support among theworking classes1. He is named administrative head of the war ministry

a. He cultivated junior officers and enlisted men with better pay andconditions (Fagg)

2. “He asked for and got directorship of the Argentine Department of Laborand Social Welfare (a sub-cabinet position newly created and thought to bepowerless), then led the department into independence from theDepartment of Interior. That meant Perón was able to create his ownbureaucracy by virtue of which he got cabinet rank. He also got theundivided attention of workers.” (Adams)

3. By 1943, he had become Minister of War, Secretary of Labor andSocial Welfare, and Vice President.

4. “The organized labor unions had seen their support among politicianswither. Disaffected, they saw in Perón an unprecedented chance foralliance, popular numbers added to military strength, held together byArgentina?s fierce nationalism. The combination proved a heady one.


Using Perón’s rhetorical power for recruitment, the metal workers? union,as one example, grew from a nascent 1,500 members split off from otherunions to 300,000 in 1943 to 5 million during Perón’s presidency.”(Adams)

5. ‘Collective bargaining was carried out under Perón’s auspices. Wagedemands were satisfied, and workers were kept on the job. Should a unionchoose to take matters into its own hands, picket lines were dispersed andworkers replaced. For this sacrifice of independence, unions won wageand salary increases in virtually all segments of the economy, includingwhite-collar, agricultural, and maritime. Perón’s most dramatic devicewas the ‘thirteenth month’ of wages, a Christmas bonus.” (Adams)

6. “ Real wages among unskilled workers jumped by 17 percent between1943 and 1945.” (Cockcroft)

7. In 1943, he appropriated 500,000,000 pesos for low income housing, atabout he time her first met Evita.

8. He is assisted in this effort by his mistress, later wife, Eva Duarte PerónWorking as a radio commentator, she publicized Perón’s reforms.

H. “On October 9, 1945, Peron’s rivals in the military and his civilian opponents,including Socialists, Radicals, and oligarchs, mounted a coup, arrested Peron, andjailed him in a military hospital. During the next week tens of thousands of thedescamisados took over Buenos Aires, facing down police and defying soldiers. Judging from recent scholarship, their spontaneous protest had little coordinatedleadership from Peronist leaders.” (Cockcroft)

I. “Both his supporters and her audience saved Perón’s career when opponents madetheir move in 1945. On October 10, amid increasing demands for a return tocivilian government--and even calls for Perón to be executed--Perón was forced tostep down from all three of the posts he had acquired or created. . . . Perón’spower, it was clear to many, far outstripped that of the president, his benefactor,who was indecisive and politically weak next to this master puppeteer of themasses. On the night of October 11, with his enemies calling for his head eitherfiguratively or literally, Perón resigned. He did so, however, on a national radiohookup orchestrated by Eva”. (Adams) [note that Cockcroft suggests that Eva hadlittle to do with the demonstrations, while Adams take the more commonposition)1. Eva organized massive street demonstrations while Perón was imprisoned.

2. When newspapers called the demonstrators, descamisados, Perónembraced the term.

3. The demonstrations reach such proportions that the government caved inon October 17 and released Perón, restoring him to his offices.

4. The stage was set for Perón’s election as President in 19465. “On the eve of 1946 elections the U.S. State Department published a ‘Blue


Book’ charging Peron with pro-Nazi activities.” (Cockcroft)6. “The blue book is credited to Spruille Braden, a former ambassador to

Argentina who had been promoted to assistant secretary of state. Bradenjoined that long line of U.S. envoys, official and amateur, whooverestimated their expertise in Latin American affairs.” (Adams)

7. “ Peron countered with a’ Blue and White Book ‘(Argentina’s nationalcolors) critical of ‘Yankee imperialism.’ his campaign slogan was‘Braden or Peron? Argentines answered by electing Peron president bythe commanding margin of 300,000 votes.” (Cockcroft)

8. “Of more the 2.7 million votes cast, Perón won 56 percent; in the electoralcollege, his margin was 304 to 72; his supporters won overwhelminglymajorities in both houses of the national assembly.” (Adams)a. “ Braden went on to serve as United Fruit’s public relations

director and pointman for attacking the democratically electedreformist government of Arbenz in Guatemala. he also became afounder of the ultrarightist John Birch Society in the UnitedStates.” (Cockcroft)

9. “During the presidential campaign, the Church sought to conserve itspower with a pastoral letter that warned Catholics to beware of candidateswho would separate secular from sacred education. Perón cast himself asthe logical extension of the conservative, God-fearing, militarygovernment that preceded him. Although some Catholic leaders rejectedPerón’s vision of a ‘new Argentina,’ other fell in line. Perón placed thelatter on policy-making councils” (Adams)

VII. The Presidency of Juan Domingo PerónA. Political Developments

1. “Peronists in control of Congress impeached four of the five supremecourt justices, and the chief justice resigned. Throughout the country,lawyers willing to assure safety of Peronist programs took over thecourts.” (Adams)

2. “Congressmen who were not Peronistas were intimidated, expelled, andfrequently imprisoned under a law punishing desacato (disrespect), whichcould be interpreted to include sharp questioning or any type of criticismeven on the floor of the legislative body.” (Fagg)

3. “all officialdom was ‘purified’; state or local rulers were dislodged bymeans of the familiar right of intervention unless they were ardentPeronistas.” (Fagg)

4. “Restaffing the administration from top to bottom was a conventionalpractice, even in democratic countries. To control the officers ofgovernment through a party dictatorship was less customary, thoughYrigoyen and the Radicals had gone almost as far as Peron in earlier days. However, Peron utilized many refinements which almost extinguished the


republican spirit and the democratic tradition. His informal militia, thedescamisados, were most useful in breaking the heads and shattering theoffices and ships of men suspected of being opponents. A critic of Peronmight at any time lose his health, dignity, livelihood, or freedom at thehands of these hoodlums, whom the police never chastised. The secretpolice conducted searches, pilfered the mails, and made arrests withoutregard for the niceties of civil liberties. Torture was a common practice inpolice stations. Argentines learned to look over their shoulders beforethey spoke, to expect invasions of their homes and offices, and to informforeign visitors in a special language of the doings of some characterknown as John Sunday (Juan Domingo-Peron). Argentina?s excellentpress and her great publishing establishment, in both cases the finest inLatin America, had learned something of censorship since 1930. Nowthey acquired much more familiarity with this practice. An impertinenteditorial or an inconvenient news story might be followed by a strike, asharp rise in the tax rate, the arrest or beating of the offending writer, acurious unobtainability of paper or ink, or one of the dreaded“spontaneous” incursions of descamisado gangs who would wreck thepremises. Managers of publishing houses learned what not to print, andbook dealers what not to display, if they wished to remain in business.”(Fagg)

5. “The army, without whose support no Latin American president lasts afortnight, was held in line by Peron. Those officers who had taken part inthe coup against Peron in October, 1945, were eliminated. Most officersfound it profitable to serve their strong-arm president, and many wererewarded with political posts. The pay of all officers, from secondlieutenants to generals, was repeatedly increased until by 1950 they werereceiving more, grade for grade, than their counterparts in the UnitedStates. The budgets for the army and the navy increased handsomely,accounting for about one-quarter of all national expenditures in 1950.”(Hering)

6. Perón begins by implementing corporatist principles.7. The term “Justicialismo” is coined (1948) to describe Perón’s philosophy.

a. The term comes from the words “justice” and “social” (Crassweller227) It was thought of as a philosophy harmonizing the claims ofthe individual with those of society and of spiritual values withmaterial values. (227)

b. It proved to be a very flexible concept8. The crisis of 1949 not only brought stabilization but a toughening of

political control. The constitution was amended to allow him to be re-elected, and women were granted the vote. He is re-elected in 1951, withEvita mobilizing women for him. He becomes more authoritarian with the


expropriation of La Prensa.9. In 1951, Evita fell with cancer;

a. although she fought the disease fiercely, she finally succumbed in1952.

10. The anticlerical crusade leads to a coup by the military in 1954: Perón isforced to resign and leave the country

11. Perón was gone but Peronismo was not defeated.B. Economic Developments

1. State-directed Economic Policy: a. Perón benefitted greatly from the fact that, under wartime

conditions, Argentine beef and grain were in high demand inEurope. Argentina could demand premium prices.(1) Argentina was acquiring very large amounts of blocked

British pounds sterling.(2) This surplus provided the money for Perón’s investments

b. A Five Year Economic Plan is begun, and he creates the InstitutoArgentino de Promoción del Intercambio or IAPI, which is givena monopoly over the export of agricultural products

c. IAPI bought agricultural products at low prices, then sold themabroad to fund industrialization.

d. Perón’s bureaucracy, unfortunately, was extremely corrupt, whichundermines everything he hopes to accomplish.

e. “This nationalization of exports failed to function as efficiently asPeron promised. IAPI often paid lower prices to ranchers andfarmers, who were orphans under the regime in any event, thanforeign concerns once had; yet sold their products abroad atexceedingly high rates. The explanation of the discrepancy was thevenality of the officials who managed IAPI. In the long run IAPIdefeated the purpose for which it was supposedly created. Argentine agriculture and stockraising suffered and declined, whileforeign customers stopped buying from IAPI as soon as othersuppliers made themselves available.” (Fagg)

2. Perón begins to reduce foreign business interests, as promised, a. reorganizing the Central Bank, b. nationalizing the British owned railroads, c. nationalizing the telephones (from ITT) and d. French owned docks. He paid off the entire national debt in 1947.

3. 1949 marks the beginning of crisis. a. With European agricultural production returning to normal, prices

for Argentina’s exports drop, b. inflation increases sharply, and c. drought hurts the export sector.


d. Prices for imports rose. e. IAPI’s policies had been intended to keep food prices in the cities

low, but had also discouraged production. (1) Farmers planted less(2) Ranchers thinned out their herds(3) The fatal weakness of Perón’s policies is that the Argentine

economy was predicated upon agriculture. He killed thegoose that laid the golden egg.

f. By 1952, Perón was urging “meatless days” on a population with avery high per capita meat consumption.

g. Perón responds by orthodox stabilization policies: “tight credit,reduced government expenditures, and tough limits on wage andprice increases.” (90)

h. ““Whatever one may think of Peron’s economics, the fact remainsthat he solved none of the country’s major economic problems. The main roadblocks remained. Transportation continued to beinadequate and obsolete, and a scarcity of electric power stood inthe way of industrial modernization. Argentina did not produceenough fuel to meet domestic needs, and this created an enormousdrain on the balance of payments. The nation?s industry remainedlimited for the most part to import-substitution light industry. Despite his anti-imperialist rhetoric, Peron did not nationalize suchkey foreign-owned industries as meat packing and sugar refining. Most serious of all, Peron did nothing to break the hold of thelatifundio on the land. As a result, agriculture was marked byinefficient land use, which impeded long range development.” (Keen)

C. Social Developments1. Perón’s central core of support was similar to Uriburu’s, except that labor

is a full partner to the military and the industrial managers.2. Strikes were encouraged, which Perón settled in workers’ favor; real

wages rise sharply, labor’s share of national wealth goes up 25%, and thestandard of living goes up (88) Owners of capital and esp. landowners paythe cost, since IAPI bought their products at artificially low prices.

3. “ schools adopted curricula that extolled the virtues of militarism, thefatherland, and Perón and Eva. Higher education was governed by its ownset of rules, but the rectors of the six campuses of the national universitywere appointed by Perón.” (Adams)a. “Nine-tenths of the faculty in the six universities lost their

positions. Students were expelled by the hundreds, their limitedrights to self-government under the reform of 1918 being floutedwith contempt. Peron showed no mercy in denying outspoken


students their degrees, which often meant they could never enterthe professions for which they had trained. Students also learnedthat hoodlum mobs were available to break their bodies and time apublic meeting or demonstration took on an anti-Peron character. Meanwhile, Peron spoke glowingly about destroying thearistocratic university system and replacing it with one moreHdemocratic,F where vocational training would supplant thehistoric disciplines and there would be no fees. “ (Fagg)

4. Evitaa. Evita creates the Eva Perón Foundation from whence she

distributed benefits to the descamisados personally. b. Eva was also given control of the labor movement, and of the

national press.c. .”Eva was head of a ministry of health that initiated relatively

effective campaigns against tuberculosis and malaria, both ofwhich were lethal diseases in Argentina because health care outsideBuenos Aires was still rudimentary. Finally, the same plan thatpromoted electrification also called for female suffrage, andwomen helped reelect Perón to his second term.” (Adams)

d. Eva organizes the Partido Peronista Femenino (Women’s PeronistParty).

e. She was instrumental in gaining suffrage for women andmobilizing them to support her husband. (See above)

f. Her death in 1952 is a blow from which Perón never recovered.(1) “Hundreds of thousands of Argentine working-class people

thronged to see her lying in state; hundreds were trampled,eight of them to death. Her autobiography, My Mission inLife, was made compulsory reading for schoolchildren. Streets and schools were named for her. “ (Adams)

(2) Descamisados lobbied for her canonization.5. Following Evita’s death, he became more reliant on his secret police. In

April, 1953, he seems to have diverted attention by staging an explosion inthe midst of a speech at the Casa Rosada. Perón then incited the crowd toa riot, where they looted the Jockey Club, which symbolized the traditionaloligarchy.

6. In 1954:,” however, Peron committed a folly which defies comprehension, . . . . This was his assault on the Catholic Church. Most students ofPeronism had long, and perhaps, not always justly, counted he hierarchy ofthe clergy as a silent partner of the regime. Certainly the Church enjoyed aprivileged position under Peron which the republic had denied it before. While the Argentine people were not conspicuously devout or clerical,they were overwhelmingly Catholic, and there seemed no reason for Peron


to make any changes whatever in the situation, especially now that he wascourting the conservatives. he apparently became alarmed at a Christiansocialist movement among the lower clergy that was kindling aconsiderable response among the masses. In November 1954 he spokemenacingly about Church ‘meddling’ in student and labor groups andwarned of ‘intrigues’ on the part of various unnamed prelates. Suddenly,he announced an intention to legalize divorce and to restore licensedprostitution, thus reopening issues which had long been settled to thesatisfaction of the Church. A modest outburst of protest following thisannouncement led to the dismissal of a number of priests, particularlythose tainted with Christian socialism, who had been teaching in the publicschools. In reply to this astonishing attack, the clergy rather stiffly madeknown its opposition to the proposal to insist on the canonization of ‘St.’Eva Peron. Demonstrations by the faithful in front of cathedrals resultedin severe police measures. Peron was clearly aggravating matters, forreasons never determined. Congress did his bidding in permitting divorceand prostitution, and the remaining priests were ordered out of theschools. Religious holidays were no longer to be respected. In May 1955Peron commanded congress to desestablish the Catholic Church,destroying a position it had held since 1853. On June 11 a massivedemonstration in Buenos Aires by 100,000 of the devout pushed Peron tothe most extreme measures. He at once deported two major Churchofficials and set the police and the descamisados to caking the residencesof priests and to submitting them and well-known clericals to indignities. On June 16 Pope Pius XII excommunicated all government authorities inArgentina who used violence against the Church, presumably, though thepoint is debated, including President Peron himself.

7. “This sudden war of Church and state was a bewildering g developmentand one that was altogether senseless for Peron. He doubtless arousedmuch of the country, including a large proportion of the female populationand the conservatives he had recently been wooing. Now his other enemieshad a popular issue, and conspiracies developed for the first time since1945 in an atmosphere of hope. “ (Fagg)

8. This is a serious mistake–there is much too little to gain by attacking theChurch, and it helps form a rallying point for Perón’s enenies in themilitary.

D. Foreign Policy1. Perón espoused an aggressive nationalism.2. He welcomed Nazi war criminals.3. He recognized the Soviet Union and allowed the Communist Party to

operate.4. Evita went on a tour of Spain, France, and Italy in 1947.


5. “Peron’s friendliness with the Communist world was a useful lever to winfavors from the United States, a device other national leaders were notabove using. After the few months’ experience with Ambassador SpruilleBraden in 1945, the Americans reverted to the role of a long-sufferingGood Neighbor who refused to be provoked. As the Cold War intensified,Peron exploited Washingto’s dilemma by insulting and threatening theyanqui, to the delight of many Argentines and other Latin Americans. This abuse did not arouse a hostile reaction from the United States, at leastofficially. On the contrary, it made the government all the more eager toplease Peron, as witnessed by the loan in 1950 that probably saved hisregime from a financial debacle. The forbearance of Tio Sam was basedon the fundamental realities that lay beneath the shower of vocal offencesfrom Buenos Aires. Argentina had no military might whatever in the starknew world of power politics after 1945. Her large and showy army andher minute air force and navy were insignificant factors in an age ofintercontinental bombers and nuclear weapons. The only way Peron couldharm the United States was by granting bases to the Russians. This he wasunlikely to do for many reasons, chief among which was Argentina?surgent need for American machinery and other capital goods. This needwas not reciprocal; Argentina produced nothing the United States couldnot obtain elsewhere. Although the Americans were in some yearsArgentin’s prime customers, they could easily turn to other suppliers. Inignoring or placating the strident dictator the State Department was notbeing pusillanimous. Rather, the American policy grew out of theconviction that an inter-American solidarity and long-range relations withthe people of Argentina were worth the price of enduring the provocationsof a tyrant.” (Fagg)

E. Fall of Perón1. Economic failures, Evita’s death, and his attack on the Church had given

popular issues to his opponents.a. Industrialists recognized the economic failure and determined to do

something about it.b. Farmers were the orphans in the regimec. The military also became restive, and also concerned over the

economy. (Hering)2. “The generals conferred at army maneuvers near Cordoba. Officers of the

navy and air force, who had always been tepid in their Peronism, cameinto contact with the army conspirators. On September 16 a military revoltbroke out simultaneously in several provinces, all army-led. FromCordoba, where the radio station was seized, broadcasts went out to raisethe entire country. Naval units steamed toward Buenos Aires, threateningby radio to bombard the city unless Peron resigned. Airplanes flew over


the capital in ominous waves. Against such forces the street-fighters werehelpless. In truth, the descamisados exhibited little spirit to die for JuanPeron. On September 21 the garrison near Buenos Aires announcedadherence to the rebellion and occupied the city, the only bloodshedoccurring when they overcame a group of die-hard Peronistas who hadbarricaded themselves in an office building. Deserted on all sides Peronslipped away on a rainy night from the Casa Rosada to the legation ofParaguay, and then to a gunboat of that nation anchored in the harbor..”(Fagg)

3. Benjamen Keen writes: “After his reelection in 1952 and in response to theeconomic crisis of the early 1950s, Peron formulated a new plan (theSecond Five-Year Plan, 1953-1957) that, to a great extent, reversed hisprevious strategy. He tried to expand agricultural production by payinghigher prices to farmers for their produce and by buying capital equipmentfor this sector (tractors and reapers). He sought to increase the agriculturalproduction available for export by means of a wage freeze, which hehoped would restrict domestic consumption. Although real wagesdeclined, workers did not suffer proportionately more than other groups. But the industrial bourgeoisie was unhappy, for labor productivity declinedwhile the regime?s prolabor policies propped up wages. Theindustrialists, supported by a considerable portion of the army, wantedderegulation of the economy so hey could push down wages. But themajor problem of the industrial sector was lack of capital, since theagricultural sector no longer generated a large surplus.

4. “In order to solve the capital shortage, Peron abandoned his previouslyultranationalistic stand and actively solicited foreign investment. In 1953the government reached an agreement with a North American company,the Standard Oil Company of California, for exploration, drilling, refining,and distribution rights in Argentina. Peron hoped thereby to reduce theadverse effect oil purchases abroad had on the balance of payments. Thefollowing year, the government entered into a partnership with H.J. Kaiser,an American businessman, to produce automobiles. Argentina?s aviationindustry, a pet project of the military, was converted to auto production. Foreign capital used the most modern technology and machines, whichrequired fewer workers and, therefore, tended to create unemployment inthe affected industrial sectors.

5. “In order to maintain government expenditures and a bloated bureaucracyin the face of declining revenues, Peron printed more money. The amountin circulation increased from 6 to 45 billion pesos during his two terms. By 1954 he had had some success in stabilizing he economy; he achieveda balance of payments surplus, and capital accumulation showed anupward curve. But his new economic strategy had alienated key elements


of his coalition of workers, industrialists, and the armed forces. Peronthen sought to divert attention from economic issues with disastrousresults.

6. “Peron adopted two new strategies. First, he attempted to enhance hismoral and ideological appeal. Second, he began to employ greatercoercion to suppress a growing opposition. The vehicle for his ideologicaland moral appeal was justcialismo, Peron ideal of justice for all--a thirdroute to development that was neither communist nor capitalist.

7. “Peron’s strategy included attacking the church. Starting in 1951, the newregime grew more repressive. The government suppressed and took overArgentina?s most famous newspaper, La Prensa (1951). Further, Peronused his National Liberating Alliance, a private army of thugs, and thethirty-five-thousand-man federal police force to intimidate the politicalopposition. Torture, imprisonment, censorship, purges, and exile becamethe order of the day. After 1954, even the General Confederation of Laborbecame a coercive force, whose prime function seemed to be to suppressopposition within the labor movement.

8. “Peron’s reluctance to go along with the industrialists? desire to pushdown wages and increase productivity alienated that group; the industrialbourgeoisie then joined forces with the agrarian interests, which had longand bitterly opposed Peron. This desertion ended Peron?s once highlysuccessful coalition. Inevitably, Peron’s hold on the working classloosened as the wage freeze and inflation reduced the value of their wages. The death of Eva Peron in 1952 contributed to the deterioration in therelations between Peron and the working class. She had served as herhusband’s ambassador to the workers. With Evita (little Eva) no longer atthe head of the Social Aid Foundation, a vast philanthropic organizationthat distributed food, clothing, and money to the needy, Peron?s relationswith labor did not go so smoothly.

9. “Despite economic adversity, Peon could not have been overthrown hadnot the military abandoned him. For the better part of a decade, he hadmasterfully balanced, divided, and bribed the military. Most of the seniorofficers owed his both their rank and their prosperity. The army washeavily involved in industrial production, and this provided an excellentmeans to become rich. In addition, to win its allegiance, Peron hadshowered the military with expensive military hardware and excellentwages. however, his relations with the armed forces began to disintegratewhen he altered his economic policy to lessen emphasis onindustrialization and self-sufficiency. On this score, his concession toStandard Oil in 1953 was the last straw for the nationalist military. Themilitary was also affronted by the dictator?s personal behavior (he had anaffair with a teenage girl), and it objected to his virulent attacks on the


Catholic church, a pillar of traditionalism, during 1954 and 1955. It alsoresented Peron’s efforts to indoctrinate the military in the tenets ofjusticialismo.

10. “Thus, in struggling to extricate the nation from an economic quagmire,Peron undermined the multi-class coalition that da brought him to powerand sustained him there. When the final successful revolt took place inSeptember 1955, after a failure in June, enough of the working class wasalienated to assure the military?s success. Peron briefly threatened to armhis working class supporters, the descamisados (the shirtless ones), butinstead fled into exile.”

F. Legacy1. “Peronismo, with its shifting allegiances, its inclination toward mobs, its

tendency toward complaints rather than consensus, remains deeplyentrenched in Argentine politics. There are the old crowds and the sonsand daughters of the old crowds, the old roughnecks, the old images. Peronismo might still represent as much as one-third of the Argentineelectorate, a third with which the military and the oligarchs and the Churchwould rather not have to contend, a third that remembers that for all thecorruption and confusion, working-class wages and self-esteem increaseddramatically. It was a third that prevailed in 1989 to elect Peronist CarlosMenem president of the republic after too many dark years under the bootof the military.” (Adams)

G. Carlos Fayt analyzes Peronismo as follows:1. “The stubborn vitality of Peronismo is not to be explained by the

charismatic appeal of the aging Peron or the totalitarian elements in hisregimes. Its popularity derives rather from what was positive in Peron?sprogram, especially its call for economic independence and social justice;and from the memory of the material and psychological gains--howeverpartial or subjective--made by the Argentine masses during the Peron era.

2. “Peronismo is a form of authoritarian based on the power of the masses,and, in this sense, it offers no analogy or similarity with any other type oftotalitarianism and is an original type, identical only with itself.

3. “It is an enemy of liberalism by virtue of the individualist conception onwhich the liberal system of ideas rests, and of socialism because itsconception of class struggle contradicts the organismic idea of modernnationalism. To class syndicalism it opposed a corporative syndicalism,articulated as an instrument of political power and a transmission beltbetween the leader and the masses. To the dictatorship, identifying notonly the State with the Nation, but the Nation with the Peronistamovement, seeking to impose upon it a single doctrine and a singlesupreme leader. It conception of the State is expressed in terms of will tomastery and power, demanding unity of action and thought and


coordination of efforts. 4. “As a norm of conduct it demanded that every Peronista work for the

movement, without regarding himself as higher or lower than what he was,always remembering that for a Peronista there was nothing better thananother Peronista. As principles for political action it established a scaleof values to which every Peronista was subordinated: first, the Fatherland;second, the movement; third, men, with politics regarded as a means ofserving the Fatherland, achieving national greatness, and securing thehappiness of one?s children. The two arms of Peronismo were socialjustice (Peron) and social assistance (Eva Peron),

5. “Peronismo could not have existed without the help of the army, theChurch, and the working class. Nor could it have existed were it not forthe social and cultural neglect of the Argentine masses and the social andeconomic conditions that existed in the moment of its appearance.

6. “Peronismo has much resemblance to fascism. In addition to theprecedence of action over doctrine and the similar rejection of liberalismand socialism, the negation of the class struggle and exaltation ofcorporativism, . . . Nor is there any difference in the matter of consideringon’s countrymen traitors if they reject the political objectives of thenational dictatorship. Other common traits are the promotion of mysticalintoxication in the multitudes, of veneration and rapture, . . . The samemay be said of the use of massive means of communication for the ends ofagitation and the propaganda and the requirement of surrender in terms ofvoluntary sacrifice, using the techniques of persuasion. The massmeetings, the singing of hymns, the display of banners and posters, thedeliberate delay and dramatization of the appearances of the leader, thepreparation of a mystical atmosphere, are elements of common use by bothtypes of authoritarianism. Similar, too, are the promotion of servility andadulation.

7. “Peronismo also resembles Bonapartism insofar as it is a personaldictatorship, conferred by the people in conformity with constitutionalrules, and that claims its power derives exclusively from the masses”(Fayt)

VIII. Phase IV Frondizi 1958-1962A. [Stagnation in import-substituting growth; some export-oriented growth in the

1970s]B. Political Developments

1. A hard-line anti-Peronist government under Gen. Pedro Aramburuemerges. a. La Prensa is restored, there is a crack down on unions. b. The Peronistas retaliate, and the government executes Peronist

leaders.


c. 1957 saw more violence and repression2. Civilian government returns with the election of Arturo Frondizi 1958,

an economics professor and leader of one wing of the Radical Party. a. In order to win, he had to cut a deal with the Peronists. b. Perón ordered his followers to vote for him in exchange for the

legalization of the Perónist party.3. Politically, as economically, Frondizi faced contradictions.

a. He took power only with the help of the Peronists, but the militaryforced him to put Alvaro Alsogaray as finance minister, whoseposition involved “dogmatic free enterprise” and rigid” IMF-stylemonetarism (Skidmore 95)

4. In 1962, the Peronists win 35% of the vote, causing the military to annulthe vote.

5. But the Radicals quarrel among themselves. 6. The military intervenes again and Arturo Illia is elected President

a. The Peronists are barred from the elections.. b. He is unable to achieve much, the Peronists grow in power.

C. Economic Developments1. The Frondizi Government 1958-1962 wanted to “accelerate

industrialization while also stimulating agricultural production, therebyboosting export earnings.” (Skidmore 94) a. This would require a shift from consumption to investments

2. Frondizi signed oil exploration and production contracts with foreigncompanies in order to reduce Argentina’s dependency on imported oil (andthereby use the revenue for other investment), but this angers thenationalists.

3. However, Frondizi also faced a severe balance of payments crisis, andturned to the International Monetary Fund for (IMF) help.

4. The IMF demanded “a huge devaluation, stiff controls on credit, cuts inpublic spending, tough wage limits, elimination of subsides on publicservices, and dismissal of redundant public employees.” (Skidmore 94) a. This is a typical IMF approach to a balance of payments crisis.

5. One cannot pursue economic development while retrenching in the face offoreign investors

6. Slow growth returns in 1961 and inflation slows. 7. A steel complex is built in 1960 and oil self sufficiency is achieved.8. Arturo Illia’s policies: are a failure;

a. by 1965, inflation,b. a large government deficit, c. low investor confidence, and d. opposition by labor left him in poor shape.

D. Social Change


1. Consequences of Frondizi’s “shock treatment” [please read politics andeconomics first!] a. Real income for workers drops, b. real income for agriculture rose: justicialismo in reverse.

2. Workers reject Frondizi. a. Small businessmen are hurt by the credit controlsb. (larger firms involved directly in export are happy). c. Farmers do not expand production as Frondizi hoped

3. In response to Illia, the CGT and the Peronists “drew up a “battle plan”(plan de lucha) which included strikes and workplace takeovers.”(Skidmore 97)

IX. Phase IV Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Rule 1966A. Political Developments

1. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía leads a coup and sets up a Bureaucratic -Authoritarian regime. a. The military is motivated by two civilian regimes which failed to

deal with (1) the Peronist “problem”(2) and satisfactory economic growth. (Snow 81)

b. Politicians are dismissed, and alliances formed with technocratsand foreign investors.

2. The Peronists split into two wings, along generational linesa. “A hard line syndicalist group centered in Buenos Aires and its

industrial suburbsand b. “A soft line or neo-Peronist group whose strength was

concentrated in several of the interior provinces.” (Snow 88)c. However, a second and more significant split occurred between the

“working class sector” of the party, and the” radical youth sector.”(Snow 88)(1) The youth wing constituted the Montoneros, whose

activities included bombings, kidnapings, andassassinations.

3. 1969: The army fires on strikers in Cordoba. 4. Political Violence:

a. The ERP and the Montoneros (see below on Social developments)begin a guerrilla terror campaign.

b. the Revolutionary Left resorted to “kidnaping and assassination.” c. In 1970, former president Aramburu was kidnaped and murdered

by Montoneros d. The military strikes back. “Subversion” is defined as any protest

against authority. e. There is civil war.


f. The military indulged in “clandestine torture and execution,” g. The number of los desaparecidos (the disappeared ones) increases.h. The Dirty War has begun

B. Economic Developments1. The root of Argentina’s economic problem is an agricultural sector which

cannot satisfy both domestic demand and export demand. 2. A two year wage freeze is announced in 1967 while a gradual program was

implemented. a. The plan breaks down in 1969 due to labor opposition.

3. The civil war is compounded by rising inflation in the early 1970s4. Proposed economic plan:

a. (1) one time wage increase b. (2) price freeze c. (3) two year wage freeze d. (4) policies to improve workers’ real incomes

C. Social Developments1. The Revolutionary Left developed as a force, with the goal of traumatizing

the nation as a prelude to revolution.2. One organization is the Trotskyite (later Guevarist) People’s

Revolutionary Party, or ERP, which saw itself as an internationalmovement aimed at American imperialism.

3. Another organization is the originally Peronist Montoneros, which wasmore Eastern and urban based.

4. “The ideologies of these two groups were extremely eclectic. That of heMontoneros was a curious blend of Marxism, Catholicism, and Peronism. The ERP claimed to have taken from Lenin its ideas about the vanguardparty, from Trotsky the concept of permanent revolution, from Mao theidea of a party army, and from Che Guevara the belief that the objectiveconditions for evolution can be created.” (Snow 101)a. The two were completely unable to coordinate their activities.

5. Membership was overwhelmingly student or young professionals, middle-class, with a high proportion of women. (Rock 353-4)a. The military, police, and foreign executives are seen as the enemy.

6. The Montoneros attack union leadership in 1973. Both groups financethemselves by kidnapings and bank robberies (one kidnaping netted $14million) (Rock 363)

X. Phase IV Perón redivivusA. Political Developments

1. 1973 saw a return of Juan Domingo Perón, who the military saw asessentially conservative and who they hoped could end the civil war.a. Perón was 77 years of age.

2. The revolutionary left rejected Perón,


3. violence continues to be very high,4. Perón outlawed the ERP

a. The Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) is formed, actingas a right-wing terror organization against the Montoneros and theERP.

b. After the coup in 1976, the army took over where AAA left off.(Snow 101)

5. Perón died in 1973, and Isabel Perón (a former night club dancer)becomes president.

B. Economic Developments1. By 1973, progress was being made, with agricultural prices high.

a. The OPEC price hike hurt, but not critically since Argentina waslargely self sufficient.

b. But Perón approved a bonus at the end of 1973 which underminedhis policies.

c. He then died in 1974.2. The president now becomes Isabel Perón. 3. Her advisers urge her on to a crack down on the left, leading to strikes. 4. Inflation reached 335% in 1975.

C. Social Developments1. Isabel Perón’s policies do nothing to stop the civil war.

XI. Phase IV The Military redivivusA. Political Developments

1. Bureaucratic - Authoritarian coup d’etat in 1976:a. First governments led by Gen. Jorge Videla (1976-81) andb. Gen. Roberto Viola 3/81-12/81)

2. Their objective was to stimulate economic recovery and to crushsubversives.

3. The Dirty War: a. The military sets out to destroy the Left, which is rather broadly

defined. b. “A retired general, often assumed to be the spokesman for the

extreme sector of the armed forces, was reported to have said,‘First, we will kill all the subversives, then we will kill theircollaborators, then their sympathizers, then those who areindifferent, and finally we will kill all those who are timid.’ “(Snow 83)

c. The guerrillas had failed to expand their popular base as well. d. The number of desaparecidos reaches 10,000 to 20,000. e. Due process is abandoned, hit squads roam the country. f. By 1978, the guerrillas have been crushed.

4. Economic problems leads the generals into foreign adventure.


a. The military had always “imposed its power and silenced internaldivisiveness by the primitive tactic of threatening or waging war,first against domestic ‘subversives,’ then against Chile [over theBeagle Channel] and now against Britain [over the FalklandsIslands]. . . . . By 1982 the maneuver had gained a . . . status as the. . . Doctrine of Permanent War. Repression, persecution, terror,and war itself ahd become ‘legitimate’ tools of policy. Thisauthoritarian, virulently anti-communist, chauvinistic mentalityhad its roots in early twentieth-century conservative clericalismand conservative nationalism.” (Rock 376)

B. Economic Developments1. Economics Minister José Martínez de Hoz is a firm believer in

neoliberal market economics (cf the Chicago Boys in Chile)2. CGT is abolished, strikes banned, taxes indexed, industry denationalized,

tariffs reduced, internal subsidies dropped, foreign investment sought. 3. Winners would be agriculture , banks and financial institutions, the losers

urban labor and small businessmen. 4. The weakness of his policy is that he overvalued the peso in order to

attract investment (dollars invested into pesos, then reconverted to dollarsat an overvalued rate). a. The exchange rate of the peso to the dollar in 1976 was 80 : $1; by

1982 it was 260,000 : $1b. The national debt soared to $ 43,000,000,000 (Snow 83)c. This attracted investment but disrupted foreign trade (Rock 373) d. Export revenues fall, but any hint of devaluation would bring

investment crashing to a halt. e. Beginning 1980-81, that is exactly what happened–a crash

C. Social DevelopmentsXII. Phase IV End of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Rule regime

A. Political Developments1. Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri chooses to go to war over the Falkland Islands /

Malvinas Islands. a. He believed that the British were not committed to defending the

islands and that victory would be swift and cheap,b. he believed that he would have the support of the U.S. since he

had warm relations with the Reagan Administration, and that theinvasion would be very popular at home.

c. The invasion was popular. But for the British public, the issue wasthe right of the Falklanders to choose democracy over autocracy(the issue was very timely for the Thatcher government, which wasunpopular).

d. Reagan proved to be warmer towards Thatcher than Galtieri (we


speak the same language, after all).e. The British sink the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, lose the Sheffield

to an Exocet missile, land on the islands, and there theirprofessional, well-led forces rout the conscript defenders. 7,500Argentines surrender at Port Stanley.

f. The war completely discredits the military, especially since onlythe Air Force fought well. (1) The generals are exposed. (2) Public support turns to rage and disillusionment. (3) Galtieri resigns and elections are scheduled.

g. Raúl Alfonsin, a Radical, emerges as the President in 1983B. Economic Developments

1. Losing the Falklands War did not make the economy any better. 2. Inflation rose 200%,3. real income dropped 25%. 4. Anti-government protests increase.

C. Social DevelopmentsXIII. Phase V (1980s- Present)

A. Political Developments1. Alfonsín’s greatest problems are curbing his military and trying to deal

with the unions in the face of massive economic problems. a. Ultimately, he cannot overcome them.

2. Election of 1989 brought the Peronist Carlos Saúl Menem presidenta. Concerned over restlessness among the military, Menem issued

sweeping pardons.b. The constitution was revised in 1994, changing the term to 4 years

and allowing one reelection. Menem was reelected in 1995.c. He promotes a “Common Market of the South,” MERCOSUR,

involving Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguayd. Menem also aligns his foreign policy with the US

B. Economic Developments1. In order to meet payments on $50 billion in debt, President Raúl Alfonsín

is forced to seek loans from the IMF, which requires austerity programs. a. Inflation soared to 627% in 1984 and 700% in 1985 anyway.b. He turns to the Austral Plan which established a wage-price freeze

that created a new currency. c. In 1985, CGT called for strikes to protest the Austral Plan. d. By 1989, prices would reach 100% inflation per month, output

plummeted, GDP shranke. Per capita real income declined 25 %. (Skidmore 109)f. Inability to control the economy dooms Alfonsín.

2. Menem’s policies:


a. Menem’s Economics Minister, Antonio Ermán González, whoimposes a draconian austerity program.

b. He lifts price controls, allows the exchange rate to float, slashedexport and import taxes, removed restrictions on foreign trade, andtransferred all bank accounts into 10 year bonds, which effectivelyconfiscated the savings of the middle classes. (Skidmore 110)

c. He sold off $ 10 billion in government assets, such as AerolinasArgentinas

d. He cut 64,000 government jobs (Snow 85)e. This triggers a recession which ends the hyperinflation. f. The next step was to break from Peronist traditions and privatize

companies like Aerolíneas Argentinas. 3. Inflation dropped from 4900% in 1989 to 4% in 1994, and growth reached

6% by that date. a. But the cost is impoverishment of the middle classes, and

unemployment.C. Social Developments

1. Alfonsín attempts to bring his military to justice.a. Groups and individuals who fought for justice included the

Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Adolfo Pérez de Esquivel (whoreceived the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize) and Jácopo Timerman.

2. Mass graves were found, and interviews with men like Gen. RamónCamps who said that he was proud of his role, that “On the orders of thehighest military leadership, no one told the truth so as not to affectinternational economic aid.” (Rock 385) a. A later interview admitted responsiblility for the kidnap and death

of 5,000. b. He claimed that they were not “persons, but subversives.” (Rock

393-4)3. The military’s Documento Final was unrepentant, avoiding the issue of

why those arrested were not brought to trial. a. “Implicitly condoning the torture and the mass executions, the

paper was little more than an apologia for the terrorist state.” (Rock386)

4. A national commission published Nunca Mas, which showed that “thevictims, a third of whom were women, had belonged to all social classesand many were plainly innocent of any substantive links with guerrillaorganizations. . . . .[T]he repression and massacres had been calculatedpolicy and in many cases a source of personal gain, since the homes of thedetainees were frequently looted.” (Rock 395) a. Videla was given a life sentence, Viola 17 years.


Works Cited

Robert Alexander - “The Peron Era: An Interpretation.” Latin American Civilization: TheNational Era Vol. II p. 300-304. [Text available on your CD]

Cockcroft, James. Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America. New York: Harper Collins, 1989. p.502-507. [Text available on your CD]

Fagg, John. Latin America: A General History . New York: MacMillan, 1977 p. 704-720.[Text available on your CD]

Carlos Fayt - “Peronismo Revisited.” Latin American Civilization: The National Era Vol. II p.304-307. [Text available on your CD]

Herring, Hubert. A History of Latin America . New York: McGraw Hill, 1968 p. 677-691. [Textavailable on your CD]

Benjamin Keen - A Short History of Latin America. New York: Houghton Mifflin, p. 307-313.[Text available on your CD]

Pendle, George. A History of Latin America. New York: Penguin Books, 1963. p. 206-209[Text available on your CD]

Rock, David. Argentina: 1516 1987. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Skidmore, Thomas E. and Smith, Peter H. Modern Latin America. 4th Edition. New York:Oxford University Press, 1997.

Snow, Peter G.. "Argentina: Politics in a Conflict Society." Latin American Politics and Development.Ed.Howard JWiardaandHarveyF.Kline. NewYork:Westview


Press,1996.71-108.

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