‘I deserve a treat!’: Justifications for indulgence undermine the translation of intentions into...

British Journal of Social Psychology (2014), 53, 501–520

© 2013 The British Psychological Society

www.wileyonlinelibrary.com

‘I deserve a treat!’: Justifications for indulgenceundermine the translation of intentions into action

Cat Taylor*, Thomas L. Webb and Paschal SheeranUniversity of Sheffield, UK

The present research explores how justifications for indulgence influence the translation

of ‘good’ intentions into action. Three studies investigated the nature of such justifications

and their relation to indulgence. Study 1 identified six ways that people justify indulgence

to themselves – that they are deserving or curious, that the indulgence is an exception tothe norm or can be compensated for later, or that the tempting food is available or

irresistible. Study 2 showed that the use of justifications undermined participants’ strong

(but notweak) intentions to halve their consumption of a nominated high-fat food. Study 3

found that priming the use of justifications increased the amount of chocolate that

participants consumed in a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated, taste test. Again, justification

use had a greater effect on participants with strong intentions to limit indulgence. Taken

together, the studies suggest a new approach to understanding intention–behaviourdiscrepancies.

‘The only way to get rid of temptation is to yield to it. Resist it, and the soul grows sick with

longing for the things it has forbidden to itself.’ (Oscar Wilde, 2003, p. 61)

The need to impose self-control arises when the short- and long-term consequences of

actions are in conflict. Behaviours that offer short-term benefits (e.g., the pleasure ofconsuming chocolate), but long-term harm (e.g., poor health) are known as ‘vices’

(Wertenbroch, 1998). Conversely, behaviours that provide little short-term pleasure

(e.g., staying late in the office), but long-term advantage (e.g., progression up the

career ladder) are termed ‘virtues’. As the proverb suggests, however, ‘good’ intentions

(i.e., intentions to enact virtues and avoid vice) are not always translated into action

(‘the road to hell is paved with good intentions’). Reviews indicate that rates of

enactment of behavioural intentions are only about 50% (e.g., Sheeran, 2002) and a

substantial literature has developed on factors that might explain this intention–behaviour ‘gap’ (Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). To date, this research has

focused on the properties of behavioural intention (e.g., stability, activation,

elaboration; for a review, see Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005), or

contextual features (e.g., unexpected obstacles; DiBonaventura & Chapman, 2005)

that influence intention–behaviour relations. The idea is that, given the right intentions

and the right circumstances, people will exert self-control and successfully translate

their intentions into action. Very little research focuses on the alternative possibility –that there are instances when even well-intentioned people may knowingly and

*Correspondence should be addressed to Cat Taylor, Clinical Genetics, Sheffield Children’sHospital,Western Bank, Sheffield S102TT, UK (e-mail: [email protected]).

DOI:10.1111/bjso.12043

501

willingly give in to vice. In other words, although sometimes when people give in to

temptation they do so reluctantly, there may be other times when people do so

enthusiastically.

Accumulating evidence suggests that people often indulge themselves. Reviewing theliterature on self-regulatory failure, Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) concluded that

there is ‘significant evidence of deliberate, volitional participation by the individual in the

forbidden activity’ (p. 6). They argued that actions associated with indulgence (e.g.,

acquiring chocolate, putting it into one’s mouth, chewing, and swallowing it) are

voluntary behaviours to the extent that they could be avoided if, for example, one’s life

depended on it. Thus, in a sense, people cooperate in their indulgence.However, because

yielding to vice can be detrimental to the attainment of long-term goals, the thought of

doing so is likely to be associated with aversive feelings such as regret, guilt, or shame.Therefore, in this study we argue that, at the moment of acting, people are likely to be

motivated to resolve or eliminate the (anticipated) unpleasant state by justifying the

indulgence to themselves in some way (e.g., telling oneself that it is acceptable to

consume chocolate cake because it is a special occasion, or because one can ‘make up for

it’ in the gym tomorrow). Thus, the present research explores the idea that intention–behaviour discrepancies can arise, not merely because of weak intentions or adverse

circumstances but also because justifications permit indulgence. As such, we aim to

illustrate that the use of justifications plays an important role in permitting indulgenceamong people with good intentions.

Previous research on justifications, self-licensing, and self-forgiveness

A number of lines of research suggest that there are times when people justify

indulgence to themselves. For example, Wohl and Thompson (2011) found that self-

forgiveness reduced the likelihood that smokers would advance towards their quitting

goals. Fishbach and Dhar (2005) observed the tendency for perceived goal progress toact as a justification for subsequent goal-incongruent and indulgent behaviour.

Participants who perceived themselves as being closer to their weight-loss goal were

more likely to choose a tasty but fattening chocolate bar as a gift. Similarly, students

who perceived that they were closer to completing their academic tasks were more

likely to choose to socialize with friends – choices that are self-gratifying, but

inconsistent with the original focal goal. Similarly, Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009)

showed that participants who had previously restrained themselves from shopping

were subsequently more likely to choose a vice option, but only when the initial act ofrestraint was made salient. The idea is that, when initial restraint is salient and

interpreted positively (in the sense of being goal consistent), subsequent indulgence is

seen to be justified.

People can also justify indulgence to themselves in other ways. Kivetz and Simonson

(2002) found that increasing the amount of effort required to participate in a loyalty

programme increased choice of vices as a reward for loyalty (e.g., a pampering massage)

over virtues (e.g., credit towards grocery purchases). The researchers concluded that the

increased effort required to participate helped to justify the indulgence and neutralize anyassociated guilt. De Witt Huberts, Evers, and De Ridder (2012) similarly found that

perceiving oneself as having invested greater effort (here, to pilotwords for a dyslexia test)

increased snack intake. The literature on self-gifting provides additional support for the

idea that invested effort can lead people to feel entitled to – or deserving of – some sort of

reward. Specifically, evidence suggests that people are more likely to self-gift when they

502 Cat Taylor et al.

experience success and attribute this success to their own efforts (e.g., Mick & Demoss,

1990; Mick & Faure, 1998). Negative experiences can also lead people to feel entitled to

consume indulgent or unhealthy foods on the grounds of mood repair. For example,

Wahlich, Gardner, and McGowen (2013) quoted one participant as saying ‘I just think tomyself that I deserve [an indulgent food after a bad day], it is not that I need it; it’s just that I

want it… I kind of think, well, I have had a rubbish day, it was not very fun at work, so I

deserve it’.

Research on moral self-licensing also suggests that previous (moral) acts can serve to

justify subsequent (immoral) behaviour (for a review, see Merritt, Effron, & Monin,

2010). The idea is that people are motivated to be seen as fair and rational (Chance &

Norton, 2009) and so use justifications to rationalize behaviours that might appear to

violate these standards. For example, there is evidence that disagreeing with obviouslysexist or racist statements ‘permits’ the subsequent expression of sexist attitudes

(Monin & Miller, 2001) and racially insensitive decisions (Merritt et al., 2012). In

another domain, participants who established themselves to be environmentally

friendly (e.g., by choosing energy-efficient light bulbs over regular bulbs) were more

likely to make morally dubious and selfish decisions such as take more money than they

have legitimately won (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Such evidence relates to the idea that

positive behaviours can somehow compensate for more negative behaviours (Kakla-

manou, Jones, Webb, & Walker, in press; Kn€auper, Rabiau, Cohen, & Patriciu, 2004;Rabiau, Kn€auper, & Miquelon, 2006) and vice versa (Kronick & Kn€auper, 2010). Finally,there is evidence that committing to a virtuous act in a preceding choice, ‘licenses’ the

purchase of relative luxuries (Khan & Dhar, 2006). In sum, previous research points to

several ways in which people justify indulgence themselves; that it is licensed by

perceived goal progress, invested effort, negative affective experiences, moral, or pro-

social behaviours.

The present research

Despite accumulating research supporting a relationship between the use of justifications

and indulgence, two important questions remain unanswered. First, the range of

justifications that people use to rationalize indulgence is yet to be fully determined.

Studies to date have tended to focus on one or two predetermined types of justification in

isolation. Consequently, there is a need for an open-ended, exploratory approach to

identify the range of justifications that people use. Second, research typically assumes that

the self-indulgent acts that follow the use of justifications constitute a failure of self-regulation. However, research to date has not empirically measured whether or not the

self-indulgent behaviour runs counter to participant’s intentions. Only by so doing, can

the use of justifications be legitimately contextualized as a reason for intention–behaviourdiscrepancies.

The present research focuses on unhealthy eating to explore these issues. Unhealthy

foods (e.g., chocolate, pizza, and chips) represent temptations that are in conflict with

many people’s goals to have a healthy lifestyle or to watch their weight (Kroese, Evers, &

DeRidder, 2011). In contrast to other health behaviours (e.g., stopping smoking), eating isa matter of regulating consumption rather than complete abstinence. As such, the choice

to give in to (or to resist) temptation is one thatmust bemade over and over again, thereby

providing an interesting context within which to study self-regulation (e.g., Herman &

Polivy, 2004; Kroese et al., 2011).

Justifying indulgence 503

STUDY 1: EXPLORING THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR

INDULGENCE

Study 1 aimed to identify the conceptual structure of justifications for indulgence by

asking participants to rate how often they used a series of justifications and then using

factor analysis to identify coherent subsets. In addition, Study 1 measured participant’s

consumption of unhealthy food and explored the relationship between self-reported useof justifications and consumption.

Method

Pilot research

Pilot researchwith two focus groups (ns = 10 and 6) served to identify a range of potentialjustifications for unhealthy eating. Participants were asked to recall instances from the

previousmonthwhen they hadmade a deliberate decision to eat something unhealthy and

then to report what they had thought to themselves just before doing so. Responses were

used to generate a series of short sentences describing each justification (e.g., ‘I’ll do some

exercise later to make up for it’). A further group of participants (n = 15) then rated how

frequently they used each type of justification on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘never’ to

‘always’. The pilot research resulted in a list of 54 items reflecting a range of justifications

that were used at least ‘sometimes’ (the midpoint or above of the scale) to permitindulgence. These items were then used to measure justification use in the main study.

Participants

An email to a distribution list at a large UK university requested participants for an online

survey on ‘Thepsychology of unhealthy food choice and consumption’. Four hundred and

fifty-eight people responded, of which 87 (19.00%) had a body mass index (BMI) lower

than18or>30, andwere therefore excluded from further analyses.1 Thus, the final sampleconsisted of 371 participants (n = 102 men), whose ages ranged from 19 to 70 years

(M = 34.92, SD = 10.99). BMI ranged from 18.00 to 29.80 (M = 23.14, SD = 2.75), and

78 participants (21%) reported that they were dieting to lose weight at the time of the

study.

Procedure

Participants were asked to rate how often they thought each of the 54 justificationsdeveloped in the pilot research to themselves ‘just before eating something unhealthy’

using a 5-point ‘never’ to ‘always’ scale. Statements appeared in a random order and

included justifications such as ‘It smells delicious’; ‘Once in a while is OK’; and ‘I can eat

what I want as long as I do some exercise’ (see Table 1 for the full list of justifications).

Indulgent food consumption was measured by asking participants to report how many

units of 12 foods (cakes, cheese, chocolate products, fast food, fried food, meat products,

nuts, pastries, pizza, potato crisps, and sweets) they had consumed during the previous

1 The impact of justifications for indulgence was investigated throughout the present research using samples of people whose BMIwas>18, but<30. BMIs outside of this range are more likely to be associated with eating psychopathology or disturbances suchas anorexia nervosa and binge-eating disorder (Dalle Grave et al., 2009; Karpowicz, Sk€ars€ater, & Nevonen, 2009).


Table 1. Factor loadings for statements reflecting justifications for unhealthy food consumption

(Study 1)

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6

The food has been made for me, so I

should eat it

0.78

It’ll go to waste if I don’t eat it 0.75

It’s been made for me 0.71

I always finish what’s on my plate 0.61

If it’s there, I’ll eat it 0.56

It’s just there in front of me 0.54

It’s really moreish 0.45 0.38

It’s too easy to finish the whole

packet

0.38

I’ve gone to all the cost and effort to

make it

0.37

It’s too easy to keep getting things to

snack on

0.31

I’ll do some exercise later 0.88

I’ll do some exercise tomake up for it 0.88

I can burn it off later 0.82

I can make up for it some other time 0.72

I can eat what I want as long as I do

some exercise

0.66

I’ll watch what I eat tomorrow 0.67 0.32

I canmake up for eating it bywatching

what I eat for the next few days

0.64

I’ll be good tomorrow 0.60 0.42

I shouldn’t worry; I don’t eat

unhealthy things all the time

0.75

I’m normally healthy so it does not

matter

0.73

I’m quite a healthy person, this will

not hurt

0.72

I don’t often eat unhealthily 0.66

Once in a while is OK 0.64

A little bit of what you fancy does you

good

0.51

You have to have all things in

moderation

0.50

You have to have some of the things

that you fancy

0.43 0.33

I’m stressed out 0.84

I’ve had a rubbish week, I deserve it 0.84

I’ve had a hard day, I need a treat 0.83

I need cheering up 0.82

Eating this will perk me up 0.75

I usually eat unhealthy food when I’m

feeling down

0.73

I deserve a treat 0.71

I need a treat 0.70

Continued


7 days. A ‘unit’ was defined as a single packet of crisps, one standard chocolate bar, or a

single serving of a dessert (see Giner-Sorolla, 2001, for an equivalent measure). Finally,

total fat intakewasmeasured using the fat subscale of theDietary Instrument for Nutrition

Education (DINE; Roe, Strong, Whiteside, Neil, & Mant, 1994).

Results

Conceptual structure of justifications

Principal components analysis (PCA) was applied to responses to the 54 statements to

determine which justifications formed coherent subsets that were relatively independent

of one another and accounted for as much variance in the data as possible (Tabachnick &

Fidell, 1996). PCA was used rather than factor analysis because we wanted to explore

patterns in the data, but did not have theoretical ideas about the kinds of relationships that

might exist (Brown, 2009). We assumed that the components might be correlated and soused direct oblimin rotation. Six components with eigenvalues >1.0 were extracted that

together accounted for 61%of the variance in responses. The componentmatrix indicated

that rotation of the components was desirable to create a simple structure. Following

direct oblimin rotation, items typically loadedon a single factor (>0.30), although six items

Table 1. (Continued)

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6

I’ve been good all day, I deserve a

treat now

0.30 0.53

It’s a special occasion, I deserve a

treat

0.53

I deserve to let go a bit 0.47

I saw it on television 0.93

I saw a poster advertising it 0.90

It looks gorgeous on the advert 0.82

I saw it in a shop 0.72

The packet looks good 0.65

My friends/relatives told me about it 0.64

It’s new and I want to try it 0.55

It’s on special offer 0.42

It looks tasty 0.80

It looks yummy 0.77

It looks really good 0.74

It looks so appealing 0.70

It smells delicious 0.67

It’s too good to say ‘no’ to 0.57

It’s too tempting 0.47

Nobody could resist something this

good

0.32 0.43

I’ll have a starter or pudding, not both 0.30

Eigenvalue 18.99 5.05 3.36 2.01 1.94 1.80

Variance explained (%) 34.62 9.24 6.73 3.72 3.59 3.23

Note. Variables are ordered by size of loading to facilitate interpretation. Loadings < 0.30 are not

reported.


had small cross-loadings (0.30–0.42). Table 1 presents the items and their loadings on

respective components.

Factor 1 had loadings from justifications relating to the availability of unhealthy food

andwas labelled availability (e.g., ‘If it’s there, I’ll eat it’). Justifications reflecting the ideathat the negative consequences of unhealthy food can be made up for by compensatory

acts loaded on Factor 2, which was labelled compensatory behaviours (e.g., ‘I can make

up for eating this by doing some exercise later’). Factor 3 was labelled exceptions to the

norm due to high loadings from justifications concerning the atypicality of the current

consumption of unhealthy food (e.g., ‘Once in a while is OK’). Factor 4 was labelled

deservingness due to high loadings from justifications that reflected the idea that

unhealthy food was a reward or treat (e.g., ‘I’ve had a hard day, I deserve a treat’).

Justifications based on external, particularly media, influences loaded on Factor 5, whichwas labelled curiosity (e.g., ‘It looks gorgeous on the advert’). Finally, statements

reflecting the importance of the hedonic aspects of unhealthy food such as taste, smell,

and appearance loaded on Factor 6, which was labelled irresistibility (e.g., ‘It looks so

appealing’). Each factor proved internally consistent: availability (a = 0.87); compensa-

tory behaviours (a = 0.91); exceptions to the norm (a = 0.72); deservingness (a = 0.92);

curiosity (a = 0.86); and irresistibility (a = 0.74).

Relationship between the use of justifications and consumption

Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the six types of

justification and measures of consumption. Participants reported using justifications

relatively frequently (M = 2.76, SD = 0.90) before eating something unhealthy.

However, some types of justifications were used more frequently than others;

justifications based on the irresistible nature of unhealthy food (M = 4.31, SD = 2.29)

were used most frequently, whereas justifications based on curiosity (M = 1.62,

SD = 0.59) were used least frequently. Use of the different forms of justification was

Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between types of justification and measures of

consumption (Study 1)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Availability 1.00

2. Compensatory

behaviours

0.41* 1.00

3. Exceptions to the

norm

0.29* 0.47* 1.00

4. Deservingness 0.63* 0.56* 0.31* 1.00

5. Curiosity 0.68* 0.36* 0.27* 0.62* 1.00

6. Irresistibility 0.63* 0.29* 0.28* 0.48* 0.58* 1.00

7. Total justification

use

0.79* 0.55* 0.45* 0.80* 0.77* 0.86* 1.00

8. Total fat 0.17* �0.02 0.09 0.08 0.18* 0.15* 0.73* 1.00

9. Unhealthy foods 0.20* 0.10 0.04 0.21* 0.24* 0.20* 0.23* �0.02 1.00

M 2.33 2.08 3.30 2.47 1.62 4.31 2.76 9.90 23.30

SD 0.87 0.96 1.29 0.88 0.59 2.29 0.90 2.66 15.75

Note. *p < .001.


moderately correlated with one another (0.28 < rs < 0.68, df = 369), which suggests

that participants who used one type of justification were also likely to use other types.

Bivariate correlations also revealed significant positive relationships between the six

justifications and the measures of consumption. The use of justifications based onavailability, curiosity, and the irresistibility of food was positively correlated (r > 0.15,

df = 369) with total fat intake. All justifications except for compensatory behaviours and

exceptions to the norm correlated with the measure of unhealthy food consumption (all

rs > 0.20, df = 363). Thus, the correlations suggest that the use of justifications for

unhealthy eating tends to be associated with greater intake of unhealthy foods.

Discussion

Study 1 provided an initial insight into the different ways that people justify unhealthy

food choices to themselves. Six broad classes of justificationwere derived, some of which

are consistent with justifications that have been previously identified by the literature

(e.g., the intention to compensate for the indulgence at a later time and that unhealthy

food is, at times, deserved). However, Study 1 revealed a number of previously

unidentified justifications that people use to rationalize indulgence, including theavailability of unhealthy food, the indulgence being an exception to the norm, that

curiosity compels indulgence, and that the food is too appealing to resist. Study 1 also

found relationships between the use of (some types of) justifications and consumption of

unhealthy food. In particular, justifications reflecting compensatory behaviours were

associated with total fat intake, justifications based on deservingness were related to

unhealthy food consumption, and the use of justifications relating to the availability of

unhealthy food, curiosity, and the irresistible nature of some foods was associated with

bothmeasures of consumption. These findings suggest that the likelihood of indulgence isincreased if people are able to justify that indulgence to themselves in some way, such as

those identified here.

STUDY2:TESTINGTHEPREDICTIVEVALIDITYOF JUSTIFICATIONS

IN A LONGITUDINAL DESIGN

Study2aimedtoextendStudy1 intwokeyways.First, Study1didnotmeasureparticipants’

intentions to reduce their consumption of unhealthy foods, but rather assumed that

consumption of these foods reflected a failure of self-regulation. Study 2, therefore,

measured the strength of participants’ intentions to reduce their intake of a nominated

unhealthy snack food and investigated whether or not the use of justifications wouldundermine the realization of those intentions. Second, Study 2 employed a longitudinal

rather than a cross-sectional design, and measured participants’ consumption at baseline

andagain4 weeks later.Theuseof justifications for indulgenceatbaselinewasexpected to

be related to the consumption of nominated unhealthy snack foods at follow-up, but only

for participants with strong intentions to halve their consumption of such foods.

Method

Participants

Twohundred and forty-three staff and undergraduate students (n = 48men) completed a

baseline questionnaire on unhealthy snacking. Two hundred and six (84.77%) of the


original sample provided follow-up data. Forty-six participants (22.33%) with BMIs

outside of the required range of >18 and <30were excluded from further analysis; as were

61 participants (29.61%) with missing data. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 99

participants (n = 28 men), whose ages ranged between 18 and 73 years (M = 28.52,SD = 11.76), and BMI ranged between 18.03 and 29.76 (M = 22.58, SD = 2.66).

Procedure

Participants were recruited via an email sent to a University distribution list. Following

measures of gender, weight, height, and age, participants were asked to nominate one

unhealthy snack that they eat toomuch of and to record howmany units of this snack they

eat in a typical week. Units were defined as ‘a single standard chocolate bar, standardpacket of crisps, or a slice of cake’ to aid interpretation. Next, participants indicated how

often they used each of the 54 justifications (taken from Study 1) just before eating their

nominated unhealthy snack on a 5-point, ‘never’ to ‘always’ scale. Responses to the 54

statements were combined into subscales in accordance with Study 1. The justifications

showed internal consistency as a total scale (a = 0.95), and as individual scales:

availability (a = 0.77), compensatory behaviours (a = 0.76), exceptions to the norm

(a = 0.76), deservingness (a = 0.81), curiosity (a = 0.77), and irresistibility (a = 0.76).

Finally, three items measured the strength of participants’ intentions to halve theirconsumption of their nominated unhealthy snack for 1 month (e.g., ‘I intend to halve my

consumption of my nominated unhealthy food’; ‘I expect to halvemy consumption of my

nominated unhealthy food’ and ‘I will halve my consumption of my nominated unhealthy

food’, using a 7-point scale; ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, a = 0.76).

Follow-up Questionnaire

Four weeks later participants completed a follow-up questionnaire that measured howmany units of the nominated unhealthy snack food had been consumed over the previous

7 days.

Results

Descriptive statisticsParticipants reported using justifications relatively frequently (M = 2.41, SD = 0.59)

during the previous week to justify consumption of their nominated unhealthy snack.

Participants had moderately strong intentions to halve their consumption of their

nominated snack food (M = 4.39, SD = 1.74). Participants consumed significantly fewer

units of their nominated unhealthy snacks at follow-up (M = 2.55, SD = 1.94) than at

baseline (M = 3.49, SD = 2.89), t(98) = 2.76, p < .05.

Bivariate correlations

Significant positive correlations were found between all six types of justifications for

indulgence (0.66 < r < 0.94, df = 97; see Table 3). Therefore, greater use of one

type of justification was also associated with greater use of the other types of

justifications. The use of justifications for indulgence was positively correlated with

consumption of nominated unhealthy snack food at follow-up, r(97) = 0.27,


p = .001. Therefore, greater reported use of justifications for indulgence at baseline

was associated with a greater consumption of the nominated unhealthy snack

4 weeks later (see Table 3).

Does the use of justifications for indulgence undermine intentions to halve consumption

of nominated unhealthy snacks?

To investigate the hypothesis that the use of justifications undermines participants’intentions to halve their consumption of unhealthy snack foods, a hierarchical

regression analysis was conducted. Consumption of the nominated unhealthy snack

food at follow-up was the dependent variable. Baseline consumption, the strength of

intentions to halve consumption, and the use of justifications (measured at baseline)

were entered at Step 1. The interaction between intention strength and the use of

justifications was entered at Step 2. At Step 1, the model was not significant, F(3,

95) = 1.65, ns, and accounted for 6.10% of the variance in consumption at follow-up

consumption. Baseline consumption and intention strength were not significantpredictors; b = �0.01, t(98) = �0.03, ns, and b = �0.15, t(98) = �1.43, ns, respec-

tively. However, the use of justifications significantly predicted snack food consump-

tion at follow-up, b = 0.21, t(98) = 2.01, p < .05. At Step 2, the model as a whole was

significant, F(4, 94) = 3.43, p < .01, and accounted for 12.70% of the variance in

consumption at follow-up. The interaction between intention strength and the use of

justifications accounted for an additional 6.60% of the variance in consumption at

follow-up (ΔR2 = 0.08, ΔF = 8.39, b = 0.30, t(98) = 2.90, p < .01).

Simple slopes revealed that the effect of justifications on consumption at follow-upincreased in line with the strength of participants’ intentions to halve their

consumption of their nominated unhealthy snack food (see Figure 1). Specifically,

Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between types of justification and measures of

consumption (Study 2)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Availability 1.00

2. Compensatory

behaviours

0.83** 1.00

3. Exceptions to

the norm

0.81** 0.68** 1.00

4. Deservingness 0.76** 0.83** 0.79** 1.00

5. Curiosity 0.66** 0.84** 0.77** 0.86** 1.00

6. Irresistibility 0.82** 0.71** 0.85** 0.83** 0.79** 1.00

7. Total

justification

use

0.86** 0.87** 0.90** 0.94** 0.91** 0.92** 1.00

8. Baseline

consumption

0.11 0.13 0.10 0.19* 0.11 0.14 0.15 1.00

9. Follow-up

consumption

0.18 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.27** 0.27** 1.00

M 2.21 2.55 2.21 2.56 2.63 2.20 2.41 4.59 3.40

SD 0.65 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.66 0.59 4.83 2.79

Note. *p < .05; **p < .001.


using justifications had a significant effect on consumption of nominated unhealthy

snacks at follow-up among participants with strong intentions to reduce consumption,

b = 0.30, p < .01. In contrast, the effect of using justifications on consumption was not

significant among participants with weak intentions to reduce consumption,

b = �0.07, ns. Thus, participants with strong intentions to halve their consumption

of a nominated unhealthy snack were less likely to achieve this goal when they used

justifications.

Discussion

Study 2 tested whether the interaction between the use of justifications (measured at

baseline) and the strength of intentions (to reduce consumption) predicted consumption

of nominated unhealthy snacks at follow-up. In support of our hypotheses, the use of

justifications on subsequent indulgence was only significant among participants withstrong intentions to halve nominated snack consumption. In contrast, the use of

justifications did not influence consumption of nominated snacks among participants

withweak intentions. This finding suggests that justification usemoderates the intention–behaviour relation; themore people justified indulgence, themore snacks they consumed

despite holding strong intentions to avoid doing so.

STUDY 3: DOES PRIMING THE USE OF JUSTIFICATIONS PROMOTE

INDULGENCE?

Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the use of justifications might help to explain instances when

people appear to deliberately fail at self-regulation. However, it is not clear whethergreater use of justifications promotes greater indulgence (as hypothesized) or whether

greater indulgence promotes greater use of justifications as a post-hoc rationalization for

the indulgent act. To rule out the latter possibility, Study 3 manipulated justification use

via a priming task and assessed the impact of thismanipulation on chocolate consumption

in a subsequent taste test. In addition, Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 2 by

investigating whether the impact of justification use on indulgence is influenced by the

strength of participants’ intentions to reduce their intake. We predicted that, despite

intending to limit their intake of high-fat foods, participants who were primed to justify

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

Low justification use High justification use

Con

sum

ptio

n of

nom

inat

ed sn

ack

food

Weak intentions

Strong intentions

Figure 1. The effect of strength of intentions to limit self-indulgence on consumption of nominated

snack food as a function of justification use (Study 2).


indulgence would consume significantly more chocolate compared with participants

exposed to a neutral prime.

Method

Participants

Eighty-seven female undergraduate students were recruited for a study on product and

taste perception. Four (4.60%) participants were excluded from further analyses due to

having BMIs <18 or >30. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 83 females, whose ages

ranged between 18 and 24 years (M = 19.04, SD = 1.63) and BMI ranged between 18.25and 29.43 (M = 21.55, SD = 2.30). Participants were randomly allocated to experimental

(prime, n = 41) or control (no-prime, n = 42) conditions.

Procedure

Participants were informed that they would take part in two unrelated studies – a readingtask and a tasting task. Participants were seated at a desk with the papers for the

experiment. The first set of papers consisted of an information sheet, consent form, and anactivity sheet. The second set of papers pertained to a product and taste perception task. A

blindfoldwas placed on top of this booklet on the basis thatwewere ostensibly interested

in the perception of colour on taste. In addition to the papers, there were also six plastic

containers each containing 200 g of M&M’s chocolates (each tub contained a different

colour of M&M’s) and a 600-ml jug of water. To reinforce the cover story, the

experimenter appeared to ‘check the records’ to determine whether or not the

participantwas in the blindfold condition. In fact, all participantswere told that theywere

in the no-blindfold condition.

Manipulation of justification use

Prior to the taste perception task, all participants completed a reading task on relationship

dilemmas. The taskwas presented on an A3 sheet of paper with a typed passage at the top

and a large empty speech bubble below. To prime justifications for indulgence, the

experimental passage described a university student’s decision to holiday with friends

rather than with her boyfriend. Participants were asked to imagine themselves in thestudent’s position and towrite down asmany reasons as they could think of to justify their

decision to their boyfriend. The participant then ranked their justifications in the order in

which they believed that they should be used. Three example justificationswere provided

to get participants started; ‘I deserve a treat’, ‘I can make up for it some other time’, and

‘Just this once won’t hurt’. Examples of the justifications that participants generated

include: ‘I’ll make it up to [my boyfriend]’, ‘I deserve some time with my friends after all

our hard work’, and ‘After university I won’t see my friends as much’. These justifications

are consistent with the themes of compensatory behaviours, deservingness, and theavailability of an opportunity to self-indulge, respectively.

Participants in the control condition received an equivalent passage that also involved

a scenario in which a student was deciding whether or not to holiday with friends before

their final year at university. However, participants were simply asked to list and rank

possible holiday destinations. Thus, participants in the control condition did not generate

justifications.


Product taste test

Next, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated taste perception task. Participants

were given a booklet that began with a modified version of the affect–arousal scale(Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). The stem ‘Please tick the appropriate box to indicate howyou feel at the present moment’ was followed by six 7-point semantic differential scales

divided into mood valence: ‘bad – good’, ‘sad – happy’, and ‘displeased – pleased’

(Cronbach’s a = 0.72); andmood arousal: ‘calm – excited’, ‘tired – energetic’, and ‘sedate– aroused’ (Cronbach’s a = 0.73). This was followed by two items measuring hunger and

thirst that participants also responded to on a 7-point scale (‘not at all thirsty’ to ‘very

thirsty’ and ‘not at all hungry’ to ‘very hungry’).

The next part of the booklet asked participants to put on food hygiene gloves and to

begin the taste test bywriting down the colour of theM&M that theywere tasting and thento rate each colour on scales reflecting tastiness, naturalness, healthiness, sweetness, and

product look (on a 7-point ‘not a lot’ to ‘very much’ scale, adapted fromHofmann, Rauch,

& Gawronski, 2007). Participants were told that they were free to eat as many M&M’s as

they liked and that water had been provided should they need it. Participants’

consumption of chocolate and water was later determined by subtracting the amount

remaining from the 200 g pre-consumption weight of M&M’s in each tub and the 600 ml

starting volume of water, respectively. Participants also completed the 10-item restraint

subscale of the Dutch Eating Behaviour questionnaire (a = 0.84, van Strien, Herman,Engels, Larsen, & van Leeuwe, 2007) and the 13-item short form of the Self-Control Scale

(a = 0.76, Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Participants were divided into those

withweak intentions versus strong intentions on the basis of their commitment to limiting

their intake of things that are bad for them (i.e., those who scored below vs. above the

midpoint [4] on this item of the self-control scale were deemed to hold weak vs. strong

intentions, respectively).

Funnel debriefing

Participants were debriefed using the funnel debriefing procedure developed by

Chartrand and Bargh (1996). Participants were asked to write down what they thought

the purpose of the experiment had been and whether they thought that any of the tasks

had been related. Inspection of thewritten answers revealed that none of the participants

was aware of the true purpose of the experiment nor did they believe that the reading task

and subsequent taste test were related in any way.

Results

Randomization check

A 2 (condition: prime vs. no-prime) 9 2 (intention: strong vs. weak) multivariate analysis

of variance was performed to ensure that the conditions did not differ in time since last

meal, age, weight, height, BMI, mood valence, mood arousal, self-reported thirst, hunger,liking forM&M’s,water consumptionduring the experiment (ml), or dietary restraint. The

multivariate tests for condition, intention strength, and their interaction were all

non-significant, Fs(12, 59) = 1.51, 1.11, and 0.86, respectively. All univariate tests were

also non-significant, Fs < 1.08, <1.36, and <3.30, respectively.


Chocolate consumption

A 2 (condition: prime vs. no-prime) 9 2 (intention: strong vs. weak) analysis of variance

was conductedwithweight ofM&M’s consumed (g) as the dependent variable. The effect

of condition on consumption of M&M’s was non-significant, F(1, 79) = 0.63, ns,

g² = 0.01. Participants in the prime condition consumed an average of 28.90 g of M&M’s

(SE = 3.46). In comparison, participants in the no-prime condition consumed an average

of 24.90 g of M&M’s (SE = 3.64) during the taste test. The effect of intention strength on

consumption of M&M’s was also non-significant, F(1, 79) = 0.14, ns, g² = 0.01.Participants in the strong intention condition consumed an average of 25.93 g of

M&M’s (SE = 3.01) relative to an average of 27.83 g (SE = 4.02) in the weak intention

condition. As predicted, however, there was a significant interaction between

condition and intention strength on consumption of M&M’s, F(1, 79) = 6.63,

p < .01, g² = 0.08.

Simple main effects (see Figure 2) revealed that priming the use of justifications had a

significant impact on consumption of M&M’s only among participants with strong

intentions to limit their intake of bad things. Participants who had strong intentions andwere also primed to justify self-indulgence consumed significantly more M&M’s

(Ms = 35.38, SE = 4.45) than participants who had strong intentions, but were not

primed to justify self-indulgence (M = 17.48, SE = 4.05), F(1, 51) = 7.44, p < .001.

Priming justification use did not have a significant influence on consumption of M&M’s

among participants with weak intentions to limit their intake of bad things (Ms = 23.35

and 32.31, for prime vs. no-prime conditions, respectively, SEs = 5.29 and 6.05), F(1,

28) = 1.39, ns.

Discussion

The findings of Study 3 demonstrate that priming the use of justifications in one domain

influences participants’ indulgence in another unrelated domain (that of eating). The

implication is that justification use is causally related to indulgence, rather than simply

being a post-hoc rationalization or ‘excuse’ for the counter-intentional act. The findings

25

30

35

40

0

5

10

15

20

Strong inten onsWeak inten ons

Cons

umpt

ion

of M

&M

s (g

)

No Prime

Prime

Figure 2. The effect of priming justification use on consumption of M&M’s (g) as a function of the

strength of participants’ intentions to limit indulgence (Study 3).


suggest that priming the use of justifications to give into temptation undermines strong

intentions to limit the intake of things that are bad. As such, the use of justifications for

indulgence appears to be especially problematic for people who are trying to limit

indulgence.Our explanation of this effect is that the priming procedure increased the accessibility

of self-serving reasons for acting that were then used by respective participants to

rationalize their consumption of chocolate. However, we acknowledge that, similar to

most priming studies (for a review, see Bargh, 2006), the accessibility of the primed

construct (here, justifications)was not directlymeasured here. It is therefore possible that

other mechanisms might have accounted for the effect of our manipulation on

indulgence. Our findings rule out mood (there were no differences in mood valence or

arousal following exposure to the different scenarios) and De Witt Huberts et al. (2012)demonstrate that self-licensing on the basis of perceived effort does not lead to a decline in

self-control capacity. However, future researchmight usefully consider whether thinking

about a scenario in which the target was vacationing with friends rather than with her

boyfriendmight deplete self-regulatory resources to a greater extent than thinking about a

target who was simply vacationing.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research investigated the role of justifications for indulgence in explaining

the gap between intentions and action. Unhealthy eating provided a context for exploring

the nature of justifications for indulgence and the relationship between justification use

and counter-intentional behaviour. Study 1 identified six different types of justifications

that people use to rationalize their consumption of unhealthy foods; justifications based

on (1) the availability of unhealthy food, (2) intentions to compensate for the indulgenceat a later time, (3) the indulgence being an exception to the norm, (4) that unhealthy food

is deserved, (5) that curiosity compels indulgence, and (6) that the food is irresistible.

Study 1 also showed that greater use of justifications was associatedwith increased intake

of unhealthy foods.

Study 2 confirmed a relationship between justification use and indulgence and showed

that the use of justifications was especially problematic for participants with strong (vs.

weak) intentions to reduce consumption of snack foods. This finding suggests that

justification use moderates the intention–behaviour relation; the more people justifiedindulgence, the more snacks they consumed despite holding strong intentions to avoid

doing so. Finally, Study 3 showed that justifications are not merely post-hoc rationaliza-

tions or excuses. Priming justification use (via an ostensibly unrelated task on relationship

dilemmas) engendered greater consumption of chocolate in a subsequent taste test

compared with a neutral-prime condition. Thus, the availability of justifications at the

moment of indulgence has an important influence on whether or not counter-intentional

behaviour ensues. Study 3 also replicated the findings of Study 2by showing that the use of

justifications undermines intentions – justification use led to more marked indulgenceamong participantswith strong (vs. weak) intentions to limit indulgence. Taken together,

our findings provide an insight into the range of justifications used for indulgence and

support the idea that justification use plays an important role in promoting indulgence

and, thus, undermining the translation of good intentions into action.

The present findings add to a growing literature that demonstrates a link between the

use of justifications and the tendency to self-indulge. The present findings are, however,


the first to manipulate the use of justifications and examine the effects on counter-

intentional indulgence. Whereas existing studies that examine the processes that occur

between forming an intention and subsequent goal striving have focused on external

threats to intention realization such as unexpected situations (DiBonaventura &Chapman, 2005; Martijn et al., 2008) or social recognition (Gollwitzer, Sheeran,

Michalski, & Seifert, 2009), the present studies indicate that threats to intention

realization can originate within the person, in the form of justifications for indulgence.

Our findings provide insight into a particular type of self-talk (i.e., giving oneself reasons to

indulge) that can jeopardize the effective translation of intentions into action. Finally, the

present line of studies may also offer a valuable (but not mutually exclusive) alternative to

research that construes self-regulatory failure in terms of diminished self-control

resources (for a review, see Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Although additionalresearch is needed to rule out the possibility that the specificmanipulation of justification

use employed in Study 3 led to self-regulatory depletion,manipulations of perceived effort

have been shownnot to influencedepletion (DeWittHuberts et al., 2012). Therefore, our

findings indicate that failures to enact intentions can also accrue from justifications for

indulgence that allow theperson to relinquish self-control, or at least strive less intensively

for the goal.

Someof the justifications highlighted by the present research are similar to those found

previously. The idea that indulgence is, at times, deserved is consistentwith evidence thatpeople justify indulgence on the grounds of effort and entitlement (e.g., DeWitt Huberts

et al., 2012; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Wahlich et al., 2013), perceived goal progress

(e.g., Fishbach & Dhar, 2005), and previous restraint or good behaviour (e.g.,

Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009). Our findings also support research on compensatory

beliefs (e.g., Kaklamanou et al., in press; Kn€auper et al., 2004; Rabiau et al., 2006) by

showing that individuals believe that the negative consequences of their indulgence can

be compensated for, or neutralized, at a later point in time. In addition, our findings

suggest that people use curiosity to justify indulgence. For example, consistent withprevious research (e.g., Harris, Bargh, & Brownell, 2009), participants reported justifying

their consumption of unhealthy foods on the basis that they had ‘seen it on television’ and

so wanted to find out what the product was like.

Some of the justifications reported by participants in the present research have

received less research attention, however. For example, in the present research,

indulgence was, at times, rationalized as something that was ‘out of the ordinary’ or an

‘exception’ to normal eating habits. Wahlich et al. (2013) recently reported a similar

effect on young women’s use of nutrition labels, noting that ‘during special occasions,celebrations such as holidays, anniversaries, and birthdays, or simply during theweekend

… food was seen as a ‘treat’ and participants attributed less importance to monitoring

nutritional content’. The implicationhere is that, if someone is able to construe an event as

being unusual, then good intentions may be set aside. As such, future research might

usefully determine the number and type(s) of events that people label as unusual, and the

extent to which this behaviour is motivated by the desire to indulge. In addition, the

present research suggests that the mere availability of unhealthy food and its irresistibility

was enough for participants to licence their consumption. This finding speaks to the ideaof the ‘toxic environment’ (Wadden, Brownell, & Foster, 2002) with palatable but

unhealthy foods tending to be cheaper than their healthier counterparts. Justifications

based on the availability of food and its irresistibility support the notion that, rather than

being passive recipients of food saturated environments or victims of inaccurate

estimations of their capacity to control internal desires (e.g., Nordgren, van Harreveld, &


van der Pligt, 2009), people may actively seek out tempting foods, safe in the knowledge

that they can justify the indulgence to themselves.

The identification of new ways in which people justify indulgence can provide new

targets for dietary interventions – participants might be encouraged to think carefullybefore characterizing eating occasions as unusual or exceptional and instead to consider

how different occasions contribute to overall food intake. Similarly, it may be valuable for

people to learn that the availability of tasty foodstuffs can in itself promote indulgence –because justifications for consumption become activated. Study 3 showed that once

justifications were activated (even in an ostensibly unrelated domain), indulgence was

likely to ensue. In addition, future research might profitably be directed at breaking the

links between situational cues and justifications so that exceptional circumstances or

tempting stimuli no longer activate unwanted justifications for indulgence. It would alsobe interesting to investigate the contexts that promote versus inhibit justification use. For

example, internal states such as ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 2007) or feeling

deprived (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005) may promote justification use, whereas

heightened self-focus (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998) or contexts that promote

personal responsibility may inhibit justification use.

Limitations and future directionsTwo limitations of the present research warrant consideration, especially with respect to

the design of future research in this area. First, Studies 1 and 2 used self-report measures

of unhealthy food consumption that may be prone to recall, self-presentational, or social

desirability biases. Even though we used a well-validated measure of fat consumption in

Study 1 (the DINE; Roe et al., 1994), and Study 3 found a similar impact of justification

use on objectively measured consumption, further tests using non-reactive measures of

eating behaviour would be desirable. Second, the present research did not explicitly

consider the mechanisms underlying the use of justifications. Previous research hasobserved a tendency for people to experience negative psychological effects following

indulgence. For example, dieters who fail to stick to their diets experience dysphoria

(Roncolato & Huon, 1998), feelings of frustration and defeat (Sarwer & Wadden, 1999),

impaired self-esteem (Norcross, Ratzin, & Payne, 1989), and self-hatred (Kassirer &

Angell, 1998). The literature on cognitive dissonance suggests that such feelings are

important determinants of reparative efforts (Davis & Jones, 1960; Snyder & Higgins,

1988). It would therefore be valuable if future studies could determine which affective

states promote justification use and investigate the consequences of justification use onsubsequent affect. Finally, research would profit from determining whether justifications

are also used following indulgence. It may be that an initial act of indulgence that has

been permitted by the use of justifications engenders negative affect and, thus, further

justification use by way of repairing unpleasant emotions. Further research into when

and why justifications are used will improve our understanding of the intention–behaviour gap and, consequently, should improve interventions designed to bridge that

gap.

Acknowledgement

This research was supported by an ESRC award to the first author.


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Received 16 June 2011; revised version received 8 May 2013


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