'Humanitarian', Preemptive, Punitiveand Political Intervention and State

Sovereignty: Varying Political, Moral

and Legal Standpoints

Edited by:Naveed Ahmad Tahir

ASCEAREA STUDY

CENTRE FDR

EUROPEUNIVERSITYOF KARACHI

Area Study Centre for EuropeUniversity of Karachi

in collaboration withHanns SeidelFoundatJonIslamabad

The Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad

© All rights reserved June 2010. No part of this book may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, inany form or by any means electronic, mechanical,photocopied, recorded or otherwise without priorpermission of the publisher.

The views expressed in this book are those of theauthors and do not purport to reflect the position of theCentre.

This book is based on the proceedings of the International Seminaron 'Humanitarian " Preemptive, Punitive and PoliticalIntervention and State Sovereignty: Varying Political, Moral andLegal Standpoints held jointly by the Area Study Centre forEurope, University of Karachi and the Hanns Seidel Foundation,Islamabad on December 9-10, 2009.

ISBN No.

Price:

ProofReading:

Composed by:

Printed at:

978-969-8551-20-9

Rs.300/­US $ 15

Munazza Nargis Kazmi

Muhammad Ali Raza

B.C.C. & T. Press,University of Karachi

CONTENTS

Introduction

Address by Prof. Dr. Naveed Ahmad Tahir,Director, Area Study Centre for Europe,University of Karachi

Keynote Address by Mr. Shamshad AhmadFom1er Pakistan Foreign Secretary

Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations

- TheoryJakob Rosel

Humanitarian and Military Intervention and the Roleof the United Nations: The 'Responsibility to Protect'Ijaz Khan

Current Politics in Iraq; the Role of the US andOther Powers

Tariq Fatemi

The Arab-Israeli Issue and Lebanon's Dilemma of

Sovereignty: The Role of Regional andExtra-Regional PowersTasneem Sultana

The Kurdish Question: A Challenge to the Sovereigntyand Integrity of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and SyriaIshtiaq Ahmad

Page

I-XIV

XV-XXlll

..XXIV-XXXI

1-11

12-23

24-45

46-64

65-80

'1I1I11I0l1itaria11" Preempth'c, Punitive lInd Politicollntervcntion oud State SO\'creigllt)'

The Kurdish Question: A Challenge to the Sovereigntyand Integrity of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria

Ishtiaq Ahmad

The nearly 30 million Kurds in the world may claim to be adistinct nation deserving a state, but the dilemma they confront isunique: They live in four Middle Eastem countries, namelyTurkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. With the exception of north em Iraq,where the Kurdish minority has been able to create self-goveminginstitutions since the 1991 Gulf War, the other three countriesjealously guard their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.The Kurdish claim of being a persecuted minority in the above­mentioned Middle I~astem states which emerged in their currentfonn after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, may be justified.Yet when it COP..1esto granting the Kurds the right to statehood,with the exception of northern Iraq, the international communitycannot do anything except hope and urge Turkey, Iran and Syria tobecome more liberal and democratic and, consequently, absorb andassimilate their respective Kurdish popula,tions. This chapter buildsupon the near consensus among scholars on the Kurdish issue,insofar as its comparison with other regional conflicts or theacademic debate on the issue of intemational humanitarian

intervention is concemed. Besides offering additional arguments inthis regard, it offers a comprehensive bibliographical reference tothe Kurdish question.

While discussing future possibilities of solving the Kurdishproblem, the paper attempts to answer why the intemationalpreference for preserving the territorial integrity of the four MiddleEastern countries has become a major factor impeding the Kurdishquest for independence. The study also highlights the intemalsocial and political divisions among the Kurds in the hostcountries, which have caused violent conflicts among them,resulting in their failure to produce a charismatic national leader

65

'1Iumollilorinll', Preemplh'c, Plillili,,'£' and Polili('alllllC'fTelllioll ant! .S·lnle SOl'ercigll~r

capable of uniting a disparate population living across regionalstate frontiers. After critically reviewing other national, regionaland international factors that seriously impinge upon the Kurdishright to freedom, the paper concludes by arguing that guaranteeingnational sovereignty and preserving territorial integrity of severalMiddle Eastern states, with some exception regarding northernIraq, is far more crucial an international goal than realizing theKurdish right to statehood.

Social and demographic profileOften described as the "world's largest nation without a state," theKurds are a predominantly Sunni Muslim and ethnically non­Arabic people, with their peculiar linguistic, social and culturalcharacteristics that differentiate them from the people who are in amajority in the countries they inhabit. The Kurdish society istraditionally organized on the basis of clans, whose influence hasweakened owing to urbanization and modernization. Yet clanidentity continues to play an important role in Kurdish societies inthe Middle Eastern states - with significant political implicationsfor each one of them. Among the Kurds, there is religious,linguistic, and tribal di\;ersity. The majority of Kurds are SunniMuslims, although there is a Shiite minority living mostly in Iranand Iraq. Other Kurds follow syncretic religions, such as the Alevisin Turkey and the Yazidis in northern Iraq. Language is perhapsthe higgest factor dividing the Kurds. Kurdish is an Indo-Iranianlanguage similar to the Persian spoken in Iran. It has numerousdialects, not all of which are mutually intelligible. I

Of the world's approximately 30 million Kurds, around 27 millionlive in a swath of mostly mountainous terrain covering parts ofTurkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The rest reside in Armenia, wherethey constitute a tiny minority, and in the forn1 of a diaspora, living

I For a comprehensive analysis of the diversified nature of Kurdish identity, thehistory of Kurdish nationalism and Its current manifestation in Middle Easternpolitics, see Michael Rubin, "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?" Social Research70, no. ] (Spring 20(3): 295-332.

66

'Humanitarian " Preemptive, Plillith'c alld Political/men'clltion and Statc Sovereign(v

mostly in European countries such as Gennany. The highestconcentration of Kurds is in Turkey, where they are estimated tonumber around 15 million - approximately 20 percent of thecountry's total population of 75 million. The majority of TurkishKurds live in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, which is also themost underdeveloped region of the country. In recent years, manyhave migrated to' the cities of west em Turkey. For example, around3-4 million of Istanbul's total population of 14 million is estimatedto be of Kurdish origin, the highest concentration of Kurds in anycity in the world. There arc estimated to be approximately 5.5million Kurds constituting around 8 percent of the total populationof Iran, living mostly in the mountainous northwest of the country.The number of Kurds in Iraq is disputed, but is probably around 5to 5.5 million, or nearly 20 percent of the total population. Most ofthem live in the north of the country, where they constitute themajority in several provinces. There are also believed to be over1.5 million Kurds in Syria, where they account for at least 8percent of the total population. However, unlike most of the otherKurds in the region, those in Syria reside in three separate areasalong the country's northern border.2

Evolution of Kurdish nationalism

Gareth Jenkins3 offers perhaps the best account of how Kurdishnationalism evolved during the course of the 20th century.According to him, with the exception of a strip of land along Iran'snorthwestern border, all of the telTitory with a substantial Kurdishpopulation today was once part of the Ottoman Empire. In theOttoman Empire identity was based on religion. Throughout theOttoman period, there was little central control over the Kurdishtribes. As long as the Kurdish tribal chieftains continued to pledgetheir nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, they enjoyed aconsiderable degree of de facto autonomy in what were, in mostcases, inaccessible mountainous areas. Even when the Ottoman

~ Gareth Jenkins, 'Turkey and Iraq: An Overview", Occasional Paper(Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, February 2008).

J Ibid.

67

'Humanitarian', Preemptive, PUllitin! olld Politi(,lllll1terl'el1lioJJ alld Stale Sovereiguly

Empire collapsed following its defeat in the First World War, thevast majority of both Turks and Kurds still identified themselvesprimarily through religion, clan, family and locale rather than theconcept of "nation."

According to .Jenkins, in 1920, the victorious Allies and theOttoman government signed the Treaty of Sevres, which not onlystripped the Ottoman Empire of its Arab provinces - which were tobecome mandates of the AUied powers - but also partitionedAnatolia. By the time the treaty was signed, the Muslims ofAnatolia had already risen in revolt under the leadership ofMustafa Kemal Ataturk. Even though the Treaty of Sevres hadenvisaged the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Anatolia,the Kurds fought alongside the Turks in Ataturk's resistanceforces. After the resistance triumphed, the Treaty of Serves wasreplaced by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which resulted in theformer Kurdish subjects of the Ottoman Empire becomingminorities in what were to become three nation-states: namely

Turkey, Syria and Iraq. It was at this point that Kurdishnationalism began to gradually emerge as a political force.However, in most cases, loyalty to tribe and family still tookprecedence over "national consciousness."

.Jenkins has pointed out, that since Kurdish nationalism emergedonly after the Kurds had been divided between four states itbecame localized from the outset. Even though some Kurdishnationalists aspired for a pan-Kurdish state, in practice theyfocused on opposition to the government of the state in which theylived. The result was the development of what were effectivelymultiple Kurdish nationalisms rather than a single nationalistmovement. The fragmentation was exacerbated by differences oflanguage, religion and, above aU, tribal aUcgiance. Indeed, rivalKurdish nationalist groups within the same country often appearedmore of a threat to each other than to the central government.

68

'J{ulllnl1irariau '. Pree11lfJlh·e. PUl1ili\'(~ aud Political hllC1TC1l1;OIl amI Smtc SorCl'eigllly

According to Jenkins, the Kurdish tribes had always been restive.During the 20th century, Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran allrebelled against the central govel1lment. In most cases, therebellions were primarily local in origin, such as resistance to acentral govel1lment's attempts to impose its control over aparticular region or tribe. However, Kurdish opposition to therespective central governments began to be increasingly inspiredby Kurdish nationalism. Thus there was stubborn resistance by theKurds to attempts by the governments of Syria and Iraq to suppressminority cultures, as part of campaigns of Arabization and theTurkish government's attempt not only to obliterate Kurdishlanguage and culture but even to deny that either had ever existed.Although IZurdish nationalist groups in Syria and Iran enjoyed a

measure of short-lived success, in each case they were suppressedby their respective govel1lments, relatively easily in the case ofSyria, less so in the case of Iran. By the late 20th century, Kurdishnationalism rallied around the Kurds of northel1l Traq and theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. Improvements intelecommunications, transportation and access to the media meantthat not only was it now easier for Kurdish rebel groups tocommunicate with each other, but a much larger number of Kurds

were becoming exposed to nationalistic ideas and news of theexploits of Kurdish nationalist groups in neighbouring countries.Even if their initial goals were confined to their countries of originthey had become active. The Iraqi Kurds and the PKK were alsoanxious to project themselves to the region's Kurds and theinternational community as the pivotal force of Kurdishnationalism.

Why the quest for a Kurdish state is unrealisticBefore we discuss the recent challenges faced by the Kurds inTurkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, or the current challenges thegovel1lments of these countries face from their respective Kurdish

minority, it may be pertinent to mention the main reasons why aseparate state for the Kurds is neither feasible nor possible. They

69

'111//1/allifarhl11', PI"f'r.!11IjJlh'c, PlIllilh'c and Polili('all"fe"l"(~nfiOfI and Slalc SO\'creignfy

are five in number.4 First, the Kurdish population is containedwithin the already cxisting states - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.The crcation of an independent Kurdistan would threaten theteITitorial integrity of these four states. None of them would bercady to give up chunks of their territory. The only political causethat is shared by Turkey, Syria, lraq and Iran since the 1920s (with

the exception of post-Sad dam Iraq) has been their opposition to theformation of a Kurdish state. Many a timc these countriesconsulted each other about the Kurdish question, pledging toprevent the creation of a Kurdish state. These states weredetennined not to accept the Kurdish claim to an independent state,as the corollary of this would be ceding part of their owntCITitories.

Second, the international community has been generally averse toany redrawing of the map made during the process ofdecolonization. There are no more empires to collapse andaccordingly very few possibilities for further state creation today.Betwecn lccland' s achievement of freedom from Denmark in 1944

and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, only threesecessionist movements have been successful. Singapore soughtand gained a peaceful divorce from Malaysia in 1965, EastPakistan became Bangladesh in 1971 and after a long civil warEri trea managed to break away from Ethiopia in 1991. Thesecession of East Timor from Indonesia can be considered as a

belated consequence of the process of Portuguese decolonization.The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of

,1 A numher of scholars have written about these difficulties. See, for instance,

Michael M. Gunter, "Why Kurdish Statehood Is Unlikely," Middle EastPolicy 11, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 106; Henry 1. Barkey, Preventing Conflictol'er KlIrdistan (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, 2(09); and Shane Donovan, "Kurdistan: The Elusive Quest forSovcreignty," !la/'\'ard Illtemotional Review 28, issue 3 (Fall 2006): 8. Thefirst thrce rcasons in this section arc articulated by the above-mentionedauthors. The last two arc based upon my understanding of the Kurdishqucstion, espccially in comparison with other conflicts and with reference tothe fundamcntal qucstion of statehood.

70

'l!uflUII/;r(/riulI', P"(,(.'1JIjJfin.', Pllni,iI'(' (/11(1Polifh'u/llI{cY!'\'cllfiol1 and S'fnfe So\'(:rcigflfy

Yugoslavia did, indeed, result in the establishment of severalindependent states that had earlier enjoyed formal autonomy invarying degrees. This also applies to Kosovo. The division ofCzechoslovakia into two states was a result of politicalnegotiations. None of these cases can be considered comparable tothe Kurdish question. A Kurdish state can only emerge if therewere a major collapse of the existing state system in the MiddleEast. With the exception of Iraq, thi.s is highly unlikely to happen.Although the Gulf War in 1991 did result in a de facto Kurdishstate in northern Iraq, only a total break down of the internationalorder that might follow another world war could lead to thecreation of an independent Kurdistan. Unless such a highly

unlikely scenario emerges many actually fear for the long-temlsurvival of the Kurdish people as a distinct entity, for the stateswhere they live would assimilate them.

Third, the Kurdish claim of being one nation itself is questionable.Far from being a homogenous nation, the Kurds are divided on thebasis of tribe, clan, language and locality. :; There is no monolithicor overarching Kurdish identity that could crase the regional,

linguistic, religious and other ditTerences among the Kurdishpeople living in four Middle Eastern states. This explains why theKurds have not been able to produce a single charismatic leader

) Muhammad S. Megalommatis oflcrs a simple analysis of why the Kurds cannothave a homeland. Kurds, to him, are not one people, they do not speak onelanguage, or use the same script, they do not adhere to a single religion. theyhave no common culture and lifestyle, and they have varied perspectives andgoals. Such dilkrences among the Kurds, Megalommatis argues, lead toinsurmountable challenges when it comes to the Kurdistan issue. For instance,"who will say what the official language of this so-called Kurdistan will be?Who will spccify the official writing system of the language accepted as officialin 'Kurdistan") Who will decide about the official religion of the impossible tot(mn country? Who will prevent one 'Kurd' from killing another in the eff(.H1toimpose one language over another, one writing system over another, or onereligion over another'?" So on and so f011h.See Muhammad S. Megalommatis,"There Cannot be an Independent Kurdistan," Americall Chrollicle, 9 May2007.

71

'1IIII1/(/II;tO";(/I/', j)I'CClJ1/lfi!'/,;!, f'/Il/ifi\'1.! af/(I Pu/;t;('(//IIlfCITCllf;OIl and Stare Sorcrr.!igl/fJ'

who could unite them in achieving their goal of a nation state. JalalTalabani, Massoud Barzani and Abdullah Ocalan---the three mainKurdish leaders in the past quarter century - have fought eachother as much as they have fought against the states that denyKurdish sclf-detemlination. Each one of them can at best beclassified as a clan or tribal leader rather than a national leader. A

united Kurdistan would bring together diverse groups that havebeen living separately in four different states for more than 90years. Their cultures, national awareness and strategies for politicalmobil ization have developed in di fferent directions and thus therisk or an internal power struggle in such a state would beenormous. The contentious questions would include even suchbasic matters as which one or which of the languages would haveorficial status and which alphabet would be used. The latentantagonisms arc of more serious nature.

The attacks against other Kurdish groups by the PKK in Turkey,the recurring armed clashes between Barzani's KurdistanDemocratic Party (KOP) and Talabani's Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK) in northern Iraq, and the hostility between thetwo rival Kurdish factions in Iran should not be forgotten. In fact,Turkey has successfully exploited the various Kurdish groups andtheir connicting interests and played them off against each other. 6

The long and bloody war in the southern and southeastern Turkeywas not only a war between the PKK and the Turkish army butalso a Kurdish civil war between the PKK and the so-called villageguards. The Kurdish tendency to fight amongst themselves allowsthe host states to adopt divide-and-rule tactics against them. In theIran-Iraq War (1980-88), for example, each side used the other'sKurds as a fifth column. Since the 1990s, Turkey has deftly playedthe Iraqi Kurds off against its own rebellious Kurds and supported

<> For a detailed analysis of the intra-Kurdish divide, also see Martin vanBl1Iinessen, AgIUl. Shaikh al/d State: The Social a/l(1 Political Structures of

Kurdi.l'tall (London: Zed Books, 1992).

72

'!lllll/ani/arial/', /'}'cellll}tire, PI/IIi/ire nlld Political /utf/Ten/ioll amI Staff So\'ereigl1/y

one Iraqi Kurdish group against another.7 Given such a situation, itis difficult to envision a united Kurdistan.

A fourth important factor militating against the formation ofKurdistan is that the international frontiers which have been drawn

as part of the decolonization process in the 20th century or whichhave existed since colonial times, such as the long and porousPakistan-Afghanistan border cannot be re-drawn. In most suchinstances, the same ethnic community, such as the Pashtuns in thecase of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border live across state frontiers.If the international community takes it upon itself to redraw theworld map, then not only the Middle East and South Asia, even themap of Europe should logically undergo radical changes. Forinstance, would Italy agree to sUlTender its border regionsinhabited by ethnic Germans to Gern1any? The list of suchexamples, from the Tamil community living in India and Sri Lankato the Russians living in the Caucasus and Central Asia, goes on.

A final point with regard to separatism is the complications arisingfrom both unitary and highly centralized federal systems. Withinthe prevalent systems, secession would be easy only in aconfederation. The Chechen bid for independence from theRussian federation is questionable for the same reason. Whenregional conflicts such as the ones on Kashmir and Palestine, onwhich the UN Security Council has passed several resolutions,have not been resolved even after the passage of several decades,how can it be expected that the international community, the UN tobe precise, would be amenable to opening up a Pandora's box thatcould threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of not justone member-state but several of them. If solving one problemmeans creating four more problems, then it is better not to seek aradical solution such as an independent state for the Kurds.

I Gunter, "Why Kurdish Statehood".

73

'Humllnitarian', jJrcc!1Il'th'e, Punitive and Politicol flltcrl'Clltiol1 (llld Sfnte Sovcrcigl/~V

What to speak of carving a Kurdish state out of the sovereigncountries of Turkey, Syria and Iran, even the establishment of anindependent Kurdistan in northern Iraq faces a host of practicaldifficulties. Nihat Ozcan mentions five of them.s The first of these

difficulties arises from the fact that Kurdish leaders have a strongtendency to devote their energies to running local governmentsrather than seriously pursuing the goal of an independent state.Neither Talabani nor Barzani represent the most populous Kurdishtribes in their region; they are simply the leaders of the alliances ofthe best-organized tribes.

According to Ozcan, the second difficulty with regard to theestablishment of a Kurdish state would be controversy over itsborders. In particular, the Mosul and Kirkuk regions would presentserious problems, for this region is not only home to rich oil fields,but also to various ethnic communities. Arabs and Kurds would

likely be concerned about the Arabs and Turkomans residing in aKurdish state. It would be natural for the Kurds to be apprehensiveabout the possibility that the Arab population of an independentKurdish state would try to forn1 alliances with the Arabs to theSouth and West and the Turkoman community of 700,000-2.3million would lean towards Turkey. On the other hand, the Kurdswould likely try to expel the Arabs and the Turkomans from theirregion in parallel with their effort to establish their state.Therefore, there would be an acute danger of armed conflict andethnic cleansing.

The third difficulty, points out Ozcan, is that the states where theKurds reside would be alarmed by the possibility of the formationof a Kurdish state. Such a state might create serious securityproblems for the region. The fourth reason, according to Ozcan, isthat an independent Kurdish state would be a landlocked one.Under the conditions of failure to integrate with the world

S Nihat Ali Ozcan, "Could a Kurdish State be Set up in Iraq?" Middle East Policy11, no. 1 (Spring 2(04): 119-123.

74

'f!uma"itari"" " Preemptt"\'e, PUllith'c and Politicalll1ten'elltiolllllld State So\'(:rcigl1ty

economy and territorial entrapment, an independent Kurdish statecould be sustainable only if an outside power such as the UnitedStates offered supp0l1 and protection, or a special relationship wereestablished with a strong neighbouring country. Thc fifthdifficulty, as pointed out by Ozcan, relates to cost. Would theAmericans be willing to pay for the process of changing politicalboundaries in the Middle East? To what extent would such a

situation serve US global interests? Neither the wider Arabcommunity nor Turkey and Iran would be willing to cooperatewith the United States if the latter helped the Kurds establish theirstate against the wishes of the regional powers. Seen in thisbackdrop, the Kurdish quest for an independent homeland carvedout of Turkey, Syria, Iran and northel11 Iraq is at best an utopiandream.

The future of the KurdsIf all of the above-mentioned factors create a rational context

whereby the establishment of Kurdistan is neither politicallyfeasible nor legally or morally justified, then the main question thatarises is the direction Kurdish nationalism, in whatever form itcurrently exists in the four countries having Kurdish minorities,will take in future. The answer rests upon the policies thegovel11ments concel11ed adopt vis-a-vis their respective Kurdishminority. If these policies are grounded in democratic principlesand are sincerely meant to provide the Kurds a greaterparticipatory role in govel11ance and an equitable share of thebenefits of development, then eventually nationalist and separatistfeelings among the Kurds will diminish. On the other hand, if thegovel11ments concel11ed adopt policies aimed at politicallysuppressing the Kurdish minority and denying it due share ineconomic development, then nationalist or separatist trends amongthe Kurds will grow. There is likely to be greater emigration of theKurds from their original places of abode to urban areas with moreeconomic opp0l1unities, and countries closer to Europe. Therewould also be the danger of traditional ethnic nationalism of theKurds transfo1111ing into a more menacing Kurdish religious

75

'!lu1I/(11li!aria1/', Preempt/I'c. !)/fllitive (/l1d Poliricallllten'cf/tioll alld State SO\'creigllty

radicalism. Likewise, the demand for a separate homeland by theKurdish diaspora in Europe could become more vociferous. Thisdiaspora has been the main voice for Kurdish separatism.

For the Kurdish people living outside the Middle East, the issue of

securing the due political and economi,c rights of their brethren inhome countries, short of freedom or independence is a positiveoption. In recent years, in Turkey as well as rest of the MiddleEast, ethnic nationalism has receded, and people are reverting tothe sub-national identities which were once typical of the Ottomansociety, with its tolerance of people with different cultural andreligious backgrounds. The Kurdish diasporas can either capitalizeupon the democratic trend in the Middle East or continue to adhere

to a romanticized and retrospective vision of the Kurdish question.To try to create a greater Kurdish national state by taking up annswould be a futile exercise, bringing about more misfortunes for analready suffering peop!c. Just to reiterate the argument madeearlier, the very fact that the biggest hurdle to the realization of theKurdish peop!c's right to self-determination is their physicallocation in four different long-established members of theinternational community, means that their future is inextricablytied to the countries where they reside, Any effort by the Kurds toresort to force would be neither allowed by the states concerned,nor will it be welcomed by the international community. Unlikethe Kurdish issue, the case for international humanitarianintervention vis-a-vis Kosovo or Bosnia is less controversial,because they were part 0 f a single entity - the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia whose break-up in the early 1990s led to ethnic­cleansing of a minority Muslim population by the Serbianmajority.

Whi Ie the Kurds maintain their cultural and linguistic ties, themultiplicity of experience among various Kurdish groups has astrong impact upon their current situation and contributessignificantly to the inability of the Kurds to form a cohesive whole.The Kurds appear destined to pennanently remain a minority in

76

'/-11111/(11/;/([,.;([1/', PI'CClI/IJ/h'c, PI/I/;t;FC find Po/;t;cfI/lnteJTcJ/tiol1 ({JIll 5,'((ftc ,)'OV('J'eigll/)'

others' lands, although their status varies in the four host countries.Does this make them a pariah minority? Not necessarily.Independence is not the only antidote for oppression, nor is it aviable solution, given the geopolitical realities. Simple remediesfor the Kurdish issue do not exist, for the problems are as diverseas the Kurds and the countries in which they live. 9

Therefore, the main issue for the Kurds today is to secure basichuman and civic rights in the states they are living in at present. Itis only in Iraq that they are recognized as an ethnic minority. InSyria, some 2,50,000 Kurds are stateless, as their citizenship wasrevoked, and in all states except Iraq they face a number ofrestrictions as far as their cultural rights, free access to media, andschooling in their own mother tongue is concerned. The only hopetor the Kurds in Syria is to secure their rights as a minority withinthe Syrian state, as it reforms gradually under the leadership ofPresident Bashar al-Asad.1O And the only hope for Iran's Kurdishminority is the loosening of the hold of the authoritarian Islamistregime and the democratization of the country.

Turkey has indeed experienced the worst militancy at the hands ofthe Kurds as compared to Iran, Iraq and Syria. Until recently, thePKK waged a terrorist campaign in and beyond the predominantlyKurdish populated south-eastern regions of the country. However,the Turkish Army has gradually succeeded in subduing PKKterrorism. In February 1999, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan wasarrested, and has been in prison since then. The Turkish judiciaryawarded him the death penalty. However, when the Turkish courtverdict was challenged in the European Court of Human Rights,()calan's death sentence had to be rescinded as part of Turkey's

') Kubin, "Are Kurds a Pariah".

10 Ismct C. Vanly, "The Opprcssion of the Kurdish People in Syria," inMohammcd M.A. Ahmcd & Michael M. Gunter, eds, Kurdish Eyodus: FromInternal Displacement to Diaspora (Sharon, MA: Ahmed Foundation forKurdish Studics, 2(02), 49-62.

77

'l!wlIaJ/illirian " Preempli\'c, !'uIJiti\,(' and Pvlili{,l1!/lIleITenliol1 am! Slale So\'erf..'igIJly

European Union accession process. II ()calan' s atTest was a bigblow to PKK's militant campaign.12 Since then, the organizationhas abandoned the quest for a separate state, changed its name toKurdistan Peoples' Congress and worked to secure greater Kurdishrights within the prevailing democratic structure in Turkey. Thefact that as many as GO per cent of Turkey's Kurds now live west ofAnkara, that is, outside of their historic homeland in the southeastof Turkey, makes Kurdish independence from Turkey even moreimpractical. Why would these ethnic Kurds, many of whom are atleast partially assimilated anyway, want to give up their moreprosperous lives in the west to return to an uncertain future in thecast? 13

Turkey has to meet the standards of democracy and minority rightsas enumerated in the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership. Ittherefore has to grant the Kurdish minority the due cultural,educational, social and political rights. In August 2002, the Turkishparliament took the first step in this direction by passing acomprehensive reform package that guarantees some of theserights. The debate in Turkey since then has been on reinforcing thedemocratic refonll process in the country, commensurate with therequirements of EU accession. Besides, Turkey has begundeveloping the country's largely rural south-eastern region throughmega irrigation projects, such as the GAP, which will ensure thatits hitherto disenchanted Kurdish population perceives livingwithin the Turkish state a better option rather than pursuingeconomic and political aspirations beyond it.

In addition to the various steps being taken to politically andeconomically integrate the minority Kurdish population with theTurkish society, Turkey's Justice and Development Party, which has

II Michael M. Gunter, "The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Ocalan'sCapture," Third World Quarterly 21 (October 2000): 849-69.

12 Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Ocalan's Capture Bodes Well for Turkey," The Nation, 28February 1999.

13 Gunter, "Why Kurdish Statehood Is Unlikely", 107.

78

'fIlflllflll;lariftf/', Prcc/1/fJli\'c, PIII/;I;I'C and Po/ilirallntel"l'Cllliol1 and Stale S'u\'(?rei~l/ly

been ruling since November 2002, has "forged a new relationshipwith Iraq's central government, both to curb Iranian influence andto cement the Kurdistan federal region more finnly into Iraq;mounted limited cross-border military operations against the PKK,designed more to mobilize Washington and Baghdad than tocrush the Kurdish movement; and staged fresh overtures towardthe Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which have beenreciprocated. Crucially, if Turkey can make this relationshipattractive to the Kurds, the KRG might be more responsive to itsdemands to crack down on the PKK, a far more effective way ofdealing with the problem than Turkish military might".14

As compared to other Kurdish minorities in the region, the Iraqi

Kurds have been living in a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraqsince 1991, when the US-led coalition liberated Kuwait from Iraqioccupation and the United States established a no-fly zone in theregion.IS From 1994 to 1998, northern Iraq's two main Kurdishparties-- Barzani's KDP and Talabani's PUK-fought a bloodycivil war. Over the years, however, they have evolved a democratic

culture in what is still a de facto state. The preference of theinternational community is to ensure Kurdish autonomy within a

federal Iraq. Turkey is against an independent Kurdish state innorthern Iraq, since such a development will fuel the secessionistambitions of its own Kurdish population concentrated in areasbordering northern Iraq. The United States, despite being a keyfacilitator in the emergence of the de facto Kurdish state in

northern Iraq, opposes the establishment of an independentKurdish state there, because of the instability it would create in theMiddle East. 16 Even Iraqi Kurdish leaders have thus far preferredto work within the confines of the Iraqi federation, with Jalal

II International Crisis Group, 'Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?",Middle East Report, No. 81 (Istanbul/Brussels: ICG, November 2008),21.

IS For details, see Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: APolitical Analysis (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).

16 See Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf(Boulder, Col: Westview, 1984).

79

'1f/l1uGllilorlaJ/', I-'rC'(,/J1fJli\'e, PI/IIi/ire Gild Polili('o/lulen'Clllian (llId ,')'Iale SO\'C'rcign/)'

Talabani acting as Iraqi President since July 2005. However, thepolitical clites of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria may have to takemomentous steps for the future of these peoples they control and

claim to represent. If they opt to distance themselves from thetyranny of the past, they can actively influence, if not direct, theforces of change, that take social, political, religious and regionaldiversities as a source of strength to improve living standards,grant more freedom, and consolidate social peace. 17

The practical difficulties regarding the creation of an independenthomeland for the Kurds aside, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria cannotignore the political aspirations of their respective Kurdishminorities, even though none of these countries will ever be readyto cede territory for the sake of Kurdistan. The Kurds too cannotgain their rights through anned struggle. Therefore, dialogue is thebest solution to the Kurdish question in the Middle East. TheKurds, separated by diaspora and mostly disenfranchised, haveonly limited ability to bring about a change in their own situation.The international community must not allow the terrorist tactics ofthe PKK or its subsidiaries be the Kurds' best option forinfluencing those who oppress them. It has to simultaneouslyencourage, and, in the case of Iran and Syria, pressure them todemocratize and ensure the human rights of their respectiveminority Kurdish populations, so that the latter develop a stake inthe future of these countries rather than aspiring for a solution totheir problems beyond the existing state system.

17 Khaled Salih, "What Future for the Kurds?" MERIA Journal 9, no. 1 (March2005). Available tram http://meria.idc.ac.il/iournal/2005/isslle 1/iv9no 1a7 .html,accessed on February 10, 2010.

80