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Katharine ParkesSchool of Psychology, UWA

8 June 2009 Engineers Australia / SPE

High reliability organizations (HRO’s)• Nuclear power stations, commercial aviation, nuclear

submarines, air traffic control

• Potentially hazardous, highly complex systems

Design and manufacture of complex equipment for which failure is expensive and/or hazardous• Deepwater subsea equipment, space

exploration, satellite deployment

• Also, medical equipment, software design, electronics, automobile engineering.

“Reliability is the probability that a device, system, or process will perform its prescribed duty without failure for a given time when operated correctly in a specifiedtime when operated correctly in a specified environment”

Organizational cultureOrganizational structureO i i l l iOrganizational learningCapability of companies to meet reliability requirements (CMM models)Reliability-oriented HR policies

“The beliefs, values, attitudes, assumptions, norms, and behaviours, which are widely shared throughout the organization, and are expressed through rules, structures, decision-making processes, and reward mechanisms”

• Culture defines how an organization operates internally, and how it adapts and interacts with customers, suppliers, regulatory bodies, and other external organizations• Strong vs. weak cultures

• Defensive vs. constructive cultural styles

Organizational culture is shaped by the philosophy, values, skills and leadership qualities of the top management personnel. To build and support a high reliability culture, managers need to -, g• develop a clear vision and provide a coherent sense

of direction.• make a strong and consistent commitment to

reliability, and ensure adequate resources• identify and communicate reliability goals

throughout the company and its suppliers in a way that engages and inspires employees

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• High levels of communication foster trust and good working relationships, the sharing of information, and the opportunity to develop new skills.

• Constraints on communication: remote sites; language barriers; engineers as ‘smart people who don’t talk’

• The means of communication influences its effectiveness . . .

Face-to-face Video conferenceTelephoneE-mail

Decreasingrichness

LetterMemoNumerical computer printout

The right information must be conveyed to the right personat the right time, to communicate all necessary implications and consequences without overloading the recipient

• Encourage and reward reporting of errors; treat errors as learning opportunities; avoid a ‘blame’ culture.

• Fear of a blame culture and possible financial penalties may affect the honesty and transparency of feedback through the supply chain (Roberts, Strutt et al, 2001)

• In the organization as a whole, high levels of alertness and vigilance are directed at identifying possibledirected at identifying possible problems and errors, and using experience to anticipate future problems.

Refers to the way responsibility and authority is distributed within the organization: the number of hierarchical levels, reporting lines, and how work tasks are allocated among employees.

Better company performance is associated with:Better company performance is associated with:• Fewer layers in the organizational hierarchy• Decentralizing decisions to the lowest possible level• Allowing authority to flow to those with relevant

expertise• Frequent and open communication within and across

work groups

Reliability Management Framework

1. Leadership and direction • Setting goals and objectives• Corporate Project Processes

• Vertical alignment of goals/ processes

2. Consistency

• Allocation of goals and requirements

3. Coherence

• Alignment of goals across disciplines

4. Feedback

• Common processes and practices

• How the organization learns, andcommunicates its experience inprojects and operations

Strutt and Brookes (2007)

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“The way firms build, supplement, and organize knowledge and routines around their activities and within their cultures, and adapt and develop organizational efficiency by improving the skills of their workforce”

• Organizational learning depends on sharing knowledge and experience

• Facilitated by a ‘constructive’ organizational culture which places high value on participation and co-operation

Capturing individual knowledge (e.g. lessons learned, root cause analyses)◦ Systematically storing and organizing knowledge ◦ Regularly updating recordsTransferring knowledge◦ Information needs to be widely disseminatedy◦ Readily accessible to potential users; ‘user-friendly’◦ Shared among individuals and groupsMobilizing knowledge; integrating information from different sources◦ to create new knowledge, and to solve problems◦ to prevent the recurrence of past errors

(Garvin et al. 2008)

Provide a means of assessing the level of maturity of the practices within organizations that contribute to reliability, safety, and effective risk management.

CMM models have been applied in software development, electronics, offshore oil/gas industry, subsea engineering, maintenance activities, marine construction, and water services.

5

4

Optimized

Managed

Proactive

3

2

1

Defined

Repeatable

Ad hoc Reactive

Level Maturity Description Characterized as

1 UncontrolledLack of written procedures. No realunderstanding of reliability or how to achieve it.

Ad hoc,solely reactive

2 RepeatableCan consistently repeat what it has done before, but does not address or control reliability

Prescriptive

3 DefinedUnderstands reliability and the factors that influence it Written Measured3 Defined factors that influence it. Written design procedures. Limited feedback of lessons from failures.

Measured, open-loop

4 ManagedCan meet reliability targets; products are adapted and reliability improved in response to feedback from observed failures.

Single-loop learning

5 Optimized‘Best practice’. Uses experience and testing not only to correct product problems but also to change the way it operates.

Adaptive processes,

double-loop learning

4

1

2

3

41

2

3

411

12

13

Feedback and organizational learning

Verification, validation and bench-marking

Setting and allocating reliability requirements

Risk and reliability analysis in design.

Reliability assuranceEducation and training in risk and reliability

Research and development in risk and reliability

Mean capability scores of subsea supplier companies on 13 CMM dimensions (Williams et al, 2003)

0

5

6

78

9

10

g g

Project risk management.

Management of changeand life-cycle transitions

Reliability improvement andrisk reduction in design

g

Reliability setting in design and development

Failure reporting, tracking and analysis.Supply chain management.

Subsea equipment suppliers were at a level of 2.2 – 2.75 (c.f. aeronauticaland automotive industry, 4 – 4.5)

2

3

4

Setting reliability requirements

Training and development

Reliability improvements

0

1

Reliability analysis

Reliability testing

Supply chain management

Failure data tracking and analysis

Verification and validation Customer

Tiku et al (2007)

2

3

4

Setting reliability requirements

Training and development

Reliability improvements

0

1

Reliability analysis

Reliability testing

Supply chain management

Failure data tracking and analysis

Verification and validation

Supplier

Customer

Tiku et al (2007)

Implement policies that serve to create a stable workforce, and reinforce and support employee engagement and commitment (e.g. provision of training, good pay, job security)

Develop selection procedures that successfully identify, recruit, and promote people whose personal characteristics predispose them to conscientious, vigilant and consistent performance.

Ensure that all communications reinforce some aspect of reliabilityReward reliability over and above productivity or efficiencyCreate clear lines of responsibility; instil

t bilitaccountabilitySelect and promote people on the basis of their adherence to organizational valuesFacilitate development, provide trainingEncourage employment security; reduce turnover

Individual characteristics that promote team work, positive interaction, co-operation, communication, sharing of information, and learning among employees

• e g Emotional stability extraversion and emotional• e.g. Emotional stability, extraversion, and emotional intelligence

‣ Diligence: conscientious, purposeful, attentive, and vigilant behaviourAbility to respond effectively to unexpected problems and events, and to anticipate possible future difficulties

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Reliability-enhancing HR strategies

Reliability-orientedReliability oriented employee behaviours

Organizational reliability

‘Tryingconditions’

Ericksen & Dyer (2005)

Leadership and a strong commitment to reliability from senior managersAn organizational culture that encourages frequent and open communication throughout the company and its supply chainD l i d i i ki t l t iblDevolving decision-making to lowest possible levelsPositive error management cultureEncouraging organizational learningUse of CMM models to assess capabilityImplementing reliability-oriented HR policies

Melinda Hodkiewitz, School of Dave Morrison, School of PsychologyJohn Cordery, UWA Business School

Gledden Trust, UWA

Obstacles to communication caused by hierarchy and consequent power that managers wielded over engineers, stifling their input to critical decisions . . Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices; organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; A flawed decision-making process – managers tended to solve problems internally not forwarding them to all hierarchical levelsThe evolution of an informal chain of command of decision-making that goperated outside the organization’s rules‘NASA’s organizational culture had as much to do with this accident (the Columbia disaster) as foam did’. . . The hierarchical, protocol-oriented management culture that failed to decentralize and defer to engineering expertise after the foam hit. Cultural belief that the problems were not a threat to flight safety – a belief reinforced by the safe return of each mission. Flying with these flaws became normal and acceptable, not deviant.