Hsiao Back to War

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South Sudan and Sudan Back to War?A View from Juba

Amanda Hsiao May 2012

www.enoughproject.org


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South Sudan and Sudan

Back to War?

A View from Juba

Amanda Hsiao May 2012

COVER: r-nmn ps nln nPn sly by Sn am Fs


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1 The Enough Project www.enoughproject.org | South Sudan and Sudan Back to War? A View from Juba

Introduction

Te recen volailiy o he Sudan-Souh Sudan relaionship raises imporan quesions

abou why peace and sabiliy beween he wo counries is so enuous. From inerviews

conduced in Juba, Souh Sudans leaders appear open o coninued alks and o heesablishmen o improved relaions wih Kharoum, especially in response o iner-

naional pressure o do so. Bu here is a percepible shi wihin he leadership in Juba

oward disengagemen wih Sudan.

Te dominance o hardliners in Kharoum poliics, a long hisory o broken agree-

mens wih Kharoum, Jubas doubs abou he inernaional communiys abiliy o

airly mediae beween Souh Sudan and Sudan, and a pos-independence senimen

ha Souh Sudan mus asser is sovereigny in response o coninued Norhern

aggression have all conribued o a growing eeling ha negoiaions wih Kharoum

may no be he bes means o achieving Jubas sraegic ineress. Bu Jubas reacionso Kharoum remain sensiive o cues rom he inernaional communiy, a legacy o

inernaional acors deep involvemen in he negoiaion o he Comprehensive Peace

Agreemen and suppor or he successul independence o Souh Sudan. Mainaining

a posiive image beore he inernaional communiy is sill criically imporan o

Souh Sudans leaders.

Negoiaions remain he bes means or he wo paries o setle heir dierences and or

Souh Sudan o resolve is prioriy concernserriorial- and securiy-relaedwih

Sudan. o rebuild Jubas condence in he negoiaion process, inernaional acors

wih he leverage o move he paries oward an agreemen and he resources o help

implemen i mus hrow heir weigh in a concered manner behind he Arican Union

High-Level Implemenaion Panel, or AUHIP. Te coordinaed inuence o he Unied

Saes and China, possibly wihin a orum o key inernaional sakeholders, coupled

wih coninued atenion by he U.N. Securiy Council and he Arican Union Peace and

Securiy Council, is crucial o his end.


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Peace beween he Sudans depends on wo parallel peace processes. Firs, a process ha

leads o a comprehensive Norh-Souh agreemen on issues relaed o he border, Abyei,

and a ransiional nancial package ha includes an oil arrangemen. Second, a broad-

based, inclusive process ha addresses he cener-periphery issues ha underlie conicswihin Sudan. Wihou progress on his second ron, any agreemens made beween

Sudan and Souh Sudan will be unenable.

Recent developments

In mid-March, Sudanese and Souh Sudanese negoiaors concluded a round o alks in

Addis Ababa, Ehiopia, ha brough he counries o he verge o a breakhrough in heir

salled peace process. Te negoiaors iniialed wo agreemensone on ciizenship and

he oher on border demarcaionand made commimens o hold a presidenial summi.

In addiion, new energy was generaed over discussions ino how Souh Sudan migh assis

Sudan wih is economic gap, which includes he wo saes oil relaionship.1

Tis diplomaic shi, hough, was conradiced by movemens on he ground, where

he Sudan Peoples Liberaion Army-Norh, or SPLA-Nhe miliary wing o he rebel

Sudan Peoples Liberaion Movemen-Norh, or SPLM-Nhad made signican gains.

NeNad MariNkovic / eNough Proj

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Te SPLA-N had a major presence in Souh Kordoan, Sudancapuring ess, Buram,

Dar, aroge, and Jau by lae Februaryin coordinaion wih he Daruri group Jusice

and Equaliy Movemen, or JEM, and possibly wih he Sudan Peoples Liberaion

Army, or SPLASouh Sudans army.2 Since independence, Souh Sudan has provided

maerial and logisical suppor o he SPLA-N, alhough i is unclear a wha scale.3

Among Kharoums leadership, hese gains likely helped o propel securiy concerns o

he oreron o oher unresolved issues wih Souh Sudan. o add o he raily o herenewed commimen o cooperae, Norhern negoiaors came under inense poliical

re on heir reurn o Kharoum or iniialing an agreemen ha would exend consider-

able righs o Souherners residing in Sudan.4

In Souh Sudan he move oward cooperaion was suppored by he leadership, and

a high-level delegaion was dispached o Kharoum o ormally invie Sudanese

Presiden Omar al-Bashir o atend a summi wih Souh Sudanese Presiden Salva

Kiir in Juba in early April.5 Members o he delegaion reurned o Juba opimisic

aer receiving a posiive response and warm recepion in Kharoum, including a

meeing wih Presiden Bashir. According o Souhern ofcials, he meeing ceneredon Kharoums securiy concerns, paricularly he Souh Sudans suppor o he

SPLA-N and JEM. In he meeing, Souhern ofcials say, Bashir hined a poenial

concessions ha could be made in alks going orward should Kharoums securiy

concerns be addressed. Noably, he Souhern delegaion was also asked o speak

wih he heads o Sudans securiy organs o promoe he shi oward cooperaion

among he more hardline elemens in Kharoum.6 Upon he delegaions reurn

preparaions or he summi began in earnes, and a general eeling ha hings were

now improving pervaded among Souhern leaders.7

Te poliical commimens made by boh sides, however, were undermined by miliarymovemens on he ground. According o Souhern ofcials, a Sudan armyor SAF

atack on SPLA posiions a ishwin on March 26 provoked a sponaneous decision

by Souhern commanders in he eld o realiae in sel-deense. Te couneratack,

Souhern ofcials say, was never inended o go as ar norh as Heglig, and he SPLA

quickly wihdrew rom he dispued area o heir original posiions.8

Te implicaions were signican. Poliicians in Sudan quickly pivoed away rom

reconciliaion, announcing ha he presidenial summi in Juba would no ake place as

planned. Te ollowing day, Souhern ofcials repored Sudanese bombings o Souhern

oil elds.9 Despie he shi in Kharoum, according o Souh Sudanese Vice Presiden

Riek Machar, he Souhern leadership sill hoped a ha juncure ha he summi could

ake place. As such, Juba aced wih resrain o srenghen and give space o hose in

Kharoum leaning in avor o a reurn o alks, he said.10

Securiy alks beween he paries in April in Addis Ababa became he main orum or

he inernaional communiy o press or a ceasere. Troughou he alks, ghing


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coninued in Souh Kordoan beween he SPLA-N and he SAF in he sraegic own

o alodi. A he same ime, Juba and Kharoum accused he oher o iniiaing ghing

along oher pars o he border, bolsering eelings on boh sides ha he oher was no

negoiaing in good aih or ineresed in peace.

For Kharoum, he embarrassmen o he Souhs incursion ino Heglig and he deep

divisions over he move oward cooperaion in he rs place mean ha i was neces-sary or he negoiaors o make ew concessions in he securiy negoiaions. Teir

goal was o neuralize he hrea o he SPLA-N and JEM, which would require an

unambiguous saemen by Souh Sudan ha i was supporing hose rebel groups and

ha i would disarm hem.11

For is par, he Souh Sudanese delegaion would no, publicly or privaely, admi o

providing any suppor o he SPLA-N and JEM, nor did i agree o disarm he wo

rebel groups. According o Souhern ofcials, Sudans negoiaors oered o disarm he

miliias Kharoum suppors in Souh Sudan in exchange, including miliias under he

command o Johnson Olonyi, Bapiny Moniuel, and David Yauyau.12

Tese miliias haveno recenly posed a signican securiy challenge o Souh Sudan. From he perspecive

o he Souh, Kharoums disarmamen reques was unrealisic in ha i would require

he SPLA o orcibly disarmor ghhe SPLA-N and JEM. More imporan, he

Souh was no ready o end assisance or he SPLA-N unil Kharoum began o address

he unimplemened pieces o he Comprehensive Peace Agreemen aimed a resolving

he poliical grievances o populaions in Souh Kordoan and Blue Nile.13

Te ull range o reasons or Souh Sudans coninued suppor o he SPLA-N in Souh

Kordoan and Blue Nile can only be le o conjecure, bu hose reasons appear o be

deeper han a convenien alliance o ineress o weaken he Kharoum regime. Teseacors include years o ghing ogeher during he civil war, he personal ies o

SPLM-N leaders Abdelaziz al-Hilu and Malik Agar o he Juba leadership, he SPLMs

poliical solidariy wih he SPLM-N, he moral imperaive o proec civilians agains

indiscriminae atacks, and securiy concerns over he Souhs longes and mos vulner-

able border. As a resul, Juba will likely coninue o resis inernaional pressure o end

suppor o he SPLA-N unil negoiaions beween he SPLM-N and Kharoum resume.

I is unclear wha level o suppor he Souh is providing o JEMsighings o he

Daruri group in Uniy sae are requen, and he suppor provided is likely an exen-

sion o suppor or he SPLA-N, which has allied wih JEM in he rebel coaliion known

as he Sudan Revoluionary Fron, or SRF.14

Te Souhs negoiaors ulimaely agreed o he dra proposal abled by he AUHIP

ha did no explicily commi he Souh o sop supporing he SPLA-N and JEM.15 Te

Norhs negoiaors reurned o Sudan, wihou agreeing o he proposal, o consul wih

decision makers in he capial.


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For he Souh, he iniial delay in Kharoums deploymen o is lead represenaives o

he alks, ollowed by he abrup deparure o he negoiaors beore signing he agree-

men, were indicaions ha Sudan did no wan he alks o succeed. A second SAF

atack on he Souhern posiions o Panakuac, ishwin, and Hora ook place on April4, shorly aer he conclusion o he Addis Ababa alks. Te SPLA realiaed, advanc-

ing o a sie beween Heglig and ishwin beore wihdrawing back o is original posi-

ions.16 Te Sudanese hardliners were deermined o sar res and creae problems,

said one Souhern ofcial.17

On April 10, a which poin Sudan sill had no commited o he ceasere proposal pu

down by he AUHIP, a hird SAF atack on Souhern posiions a ishwin promped

he leadership in Juba o order he SPLAs advance ino Heglig. Tis ime he SPLA

advanced o a poin slighly urher norh han he dispued area.18 During he SPLAs

hold on Heglig, he army shu down he oil elds producion, worh abou hal o

Sudans oal oil oupu. Te decision o say in Heglig was made wihin he Souh

Sudanese Naional Securiy Council, generally comprising he presiden, vice presiden,

deense miniser, inerior miniser, oreign aairs miniser, nance miniser, army chie,

head o miliary inelligence, and inspecor general o he police.19

Te inernaional communiy srongly condemned Souh Sudans acions. Jubas narraive

or saying in Heglig swung beween sel-deense and he argumen ha he Souh had


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a righ o ake back is erriory. Days laer, Presiden Kiir announced ha Souh Sudan

would say in he area as a means o ensuring ha he SAF could no coninue o use he

area as a rear base or atacking Souhern erriory and unil an inernaional orce was pu

ino place. His speech underscored a new level o Souhern rusraion wih he iner-

naional communiycomparing he now-mued inernaional response o he SAFs

coninued presence in Abyei o he uproar over he SPLAs presence in Heglig.

A U.N. Securiy Council meeing ha convened abou he cr isis concluded wih he

message ha sancions on boh paries were under consideraion. Te level o con-

demnaion was incomprehensible and unbelievable o he leadership in Juba, who

are used o being considered he beter-behaved pary in Norh-Souh relaions. In

addiion, Souh Sudans claim on Heglig has been made clear since he Permanen

Cour o Arbiraion ruling in 2009 ha decided Abyeis boundaries and has been

resaed in he Norh-Souh alks.20 While he Souhern leadership knew wha o

expec rom Kharoum in response o heir decision, he inernaional communiys

response came as a surprise.

During he 10 days when he SPLA held Heglig, Kharoum inensely bombed he

dispued area and sraegic sies in he Souh wih he aim o cuting o supply lines.

Fighing beween he wo armies spread along he enire border, in and around a leas

hree oher dispued border sies. Te ashpoin border region o Abyei experienced an

inux o boh SPLA soldiers and miliias ha have hisorically been suppored by he

Sudanese governmen. Diplomaic acion by he U.N. peacekeeping mission here led

o he wihdrawal o boh paries.21 Mobilizaion o he populaion began on boh sides,

and bellicose rheoricespecially rom Kharoumheighened.

Te unied inernaional response, including considerable pressures rom he U.S., wassignican or he calculaions o he Juba governmen, or which Souh Sudans image

on he inernaional sage and coninued inernaional assisance and suppor remain

imporan. Te leadership could no aord or Souh Sudan o become isolaed.22

Furher, many ofcials were o he belie ha Souh Sudan had more o lose i boh

saes were sancioned, given ha Kharoum is already under U.S. and U.N. sancions. In

conversaions wih U.S. diplomas, Souh Sudanese ofcials made clear ha should hey

wihdraw rom Heglig, hey would expec he U.S. and ohers in he inernaional com-

muniy o pressure Kharoum o end is aggression.23

Conversaions over a wihdrawal ook place quiely over a number o days in Juba

among members o he Naional Securiy Council unil a consensus was buil behind

an uncondiional wihdrawal.24 On April 20 he decision was announced o he Council

o Minisers and he public aer wihdrawal had already begun, promping signican

debae. Some minisers expressed concern ha an uncondiional wihdrawal would be

a demonsraion o weakness. Ohers argued ha cerain condiions should be me in

reurn or a wihdrawal, while ohers argued ha saying in he Souhern erriory was


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legiimae.25 On he ron lines, members o he miliary quesioned he loss o lives

resuling rom he decision o say, only o pull ou days laer.26

Following he SPLAs wihdrawal rom Heglig, Sudans atacks on Souh Sudan did no

auomaically abae, wih Uniy sae coninuing o be bombed.27 As a means o inensi-

ying pressure on Kharoum o end is bombings and o srenghening he negoiaion

process, he Arican Union Peace and Securiy Council issued a robus communiqu onApril 24 imposing deadlines on a ceasere, a reurn o alks, and an agreemen beween

he wo paries on all remaining unresolved issues, among oher decisions. A U.N.

Securiy Council resoluion passed on May 2 backed he Arican Union deadlines wih

he poenial hrea o sancions in he even o noncompliance. Te resoluion speci-

cally calls or a comprehensive agreemen o be reached, or he Inergovernmenal

Auhoriy on Developmen, or IGAD, o suppor AUHIP aciliaion eors going

orward, and or he U.N. secreary general, in consulaion wih he chair o IGAD, he

chair o he Arican Union Commission, and he AUHIP, o able proposals on ou-

sanding issues ha remain unresolved in hree monhs.

Souh Sudans leaders have since moved o rebuild is sanding wih he inernaional

communiy, responding posiively o he Arican Union communiqu and he Securiy

Council resoluion, and wihdrawing Souhern police rom Abyei.

Motivating factors

Since independence, he Juba leadership has increasingly moved away rom he prem-

ise ha a special relaionship wih Kharoumas a resul o he wo counries unique

shared hisory, culural linkages, long border, and economic symbiosisis in SouhSudans long-erm ineress. Te exen o which Souh Sudans leaders il oward

disengagemen wih Sudan and he atraciveness o coninued negoiaions wih

Kharoum depend on a number o key acors. One difcul-o-quaniy acor is he

economic consequence o Souh Sudans oil shudown. Many in he leadership appear

conden ha Souh Sudans economic siuaion will be emporary and poliically

manageable, and ha heir populaion will prevail despie alarming predicions by

inernaional insiuions o he impending collapse in currency and he subsequen

humaniarian impacin paricular, widespread ood insecuriy. Inernaional donors

have coupled hese gloomy predicions wih he warning ha aid programs currenly

in place may no be susained. Te exen o which hese warnings shi he leader-

ships hinking and wheher exernal nancial assisance is ound will play ino Jubas

posiioning oward Kharoum going orward. A s o now, oil and economic alks wih

Sudan appear o be o secondary imporance or Souh Sudan, as compared wih he

prioriy issues o border demarcaion, border dispues, and securiy.


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Its time to flex our muscles: Hardline sentiments on the rise

For he Souh, independence should have ended he colonial dynamic ha has domi-

naed Souh Sudan and Sudans long hisory. Bu as one member o Souh Sudansnegoiaing eam pu i, Kharoum sill sees us as inerior o hema percepion

exacerbaed by Kharoums negoiaing posiions and consisen aerial bombardmen

o Souh Sudanese erriory since independence. Te exorbian oil ransi ees pro-

posed by Sudans negoiaors and Kharoums conscaion o Souhern oil in lae 2011,

or example, are seen by many Souherners as proo o Kharoums coninued sense o

enilemen o Souhern resources. Said one Souhern ofcial, I someone akes your

purse, will you jus sand here and do nohing?

Bu July 9, 2011Souh Sudans independence daydid shi he balance o power

beween he wo paries, i only because he atainmen o independence mean

Kharoum los is main piece o leverage over Juba. Troughou he peace imple-

menaion period, Souhern leaders saw more o gain rom appeasing Kharoum and

he inernaional communiy or he sake o holding is reerendum and achieving

independence. Te shi in dynamic pos-independence has resuled in increased

resisance on he par o he Souh o compromise wih he Norh, which is eviden in

some o he posiions aken by Souhern negoiaors in Addis Ababa. A negoiaing


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rounds in November 2011 and January 2012, Souh Sudanese negoiaors rejeced

AUHIP proposals ha oered emporary soluions o he brewing oil cr isis. A boh

meeings, Souh Sudans leaders walked away on he grounds ha agreemen o he

proposals would require ha he Souh oer concessions wihou guaranees o good

aih rom Kharoum or he possibiliy o a air, permanen soluion going orward.

Te quesion Souhern negoiaors oen asked was, W hy are we always asked o

give or he sake o peace, when Kharoum won? Following independence, Jubaspaience wih Kharoum has nally run ou.

Te Sudanese armys atacks in March and April on Souh Sudanese posiions, in he

wake o opporuniies o resolve issues hrough dialogue, were parially seen in Juba

as he laes provocaion by elemens in he Sudanese regime coninuing o presume

ha Juba will bow o is srong-arm acics. Te decision by Souh Sudan o hold he

dispued erriory and o shu down is oil oupu was in par o make a poin o

convince [Kharoum] ha we can mach hem, said one ofcial, adding, I you con-

inue o aggress (sic) us, we can bea you back. Te abiliy o ake and hold Heglig in

he ace o SAF atacks was a concree afrmaion o Souhern leaders o Jubas equalooing wih Kharoum.

In he aermah o he decision o occupy Heglig, he naional mood in Souh Sudan

grew increasingly inransigen. I is our righ o reake erriories along he border ha

belong o us, was a commonly heard argumen. Te reexive desire o asser Souh

Sudans equaliy and righs vis--vis Kharoumgiven Souh Sudans long, painul

hisory wih Sudanhas he poenial o encourage he Souhern leadership o ake

more aggressive sances in he uure, especially i Kharoum coninues o ac in a

provocaive manner and he inernaional communiy is seen as ineecive a deending

Souh Sudans sovereigny.

Negotiating with a volatile Khartoum regime

Te unreliabiliy o Kharoums signaure on recen and pas agreemens has made he

regime a bes an unpredicable negoiaion and implemenaion parner or Juba and a

wors a compleely disingenuous one. Mos recenly, he Sudanese governmens reusal

o implemen he securiy elemens o he Abyei agreemen signed in June 2011, he

rejecion o he wo Areas agreemen signed in June 2011, and he poliical urnabou

ollowing he rs clashes in Heglig on March 26 all raise legiimae quesions in he

minds o Souh Sudanese ofcials o wheher any negoiaions or agreemen signed wih

Kharoum will be honoredand wheher hose making decisions in Kharoum have

calculaed ha he bes means o heir poliical survival is hrough coninued warare.

Te oubreak o ghing in Heglig, ollowing high expecaions or a presidenial summi

and securiy alks in Addis Ababa, renewed our convicion ha he Norh will never


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deal wih us in an hones way, said one Souhern ofcial. Te racured naure o he

Kharoum regime is undersood well by Souhern ofcials, who disinguish beween

hose camps leaning oward dialogue and hose leaning oward coninued war.28 When

acions aken by Kharoum sugges ha hose pushing or miliary conronaion wih

he Souh have prevailed, he opinion in Juba also ils oward he use o orce vis--

vis Kharoum. Following he rs clashes in Heglig, i appeared Souhern leaders had

calculaed ha moderae voices in Kharoum sill had a chance o prevail. Bu ollow-ing he ailed Addis Ababa alks in April and wo oher SAF atacks on Souh Sudan,

he domesic poliical cos o nonresponse became oo high. You canno coninue o

ake casualies o srenghen he hands o he so-called moderaes [in Kharoum], said

Depuy Deense Miniser Majak DAgoo o he decision o advance back o and hold

Heglig. Aer hree atacks on Souhern posiions, he said, i was clear ha Bashir had

iled oward he hardliners.

Te monopoly ha hardliners appear o have over decision-making in Kharoum have

creaed deep doubs among Souh Sudans leaders abou wheher coninued alks will

deliver a soluion ha will hold beween he wo sides and wheher improved relaionsbeween he wo curren regimes is a easible goal. Tis analysis o Kharoum is in par

why Souhern negoiaors have held he posiion ha border dispues beween he wo

saes should be arbiraed, raher han negoiaed; binding inernaional arbiraion

provides a imely soluion backed by inernaional legal guaranees ha negoiaions and

a signed piece o paper wih he Kharoum would no. Te decision o shu down oil in

January is anoher example ha Souh Sudans pledge o cooperaion wih Kharoum,

already raugh wih skepicism, ends when Jubas domesic ineress are harmed and no

redress is in sigh. Seps can be aken by he inernaional communiysee belowo

help address hese concerns. Te curren poliical ray in Kharoum, hough, suggess

ha a summi beween Presidens Kiir and Bashirone ha can momenarily isolaeboh leaders rom he poliical pressures in each capialmay ulimaely be necessary o

arrive a a Norh-Souh agreemen ha is susainable.

Inability of the international community to hold Khartoum accountable

Souh Sudans calculaions are highly sensiive o he responses o he inernaional com-

muniy o Juba and Kharoum, respecively, in any given Sudan-Souh Sudan inciden.

Some o he bolder decisions aken by he Juba leadership, including he shudown o

oil and he decision o say in Heglig, are parially in response o he absence oas he

Juba leadership sees ian eecive inernaional mechanism o end Kharoums rans-

gressions, o push Sudans negoiaors oward compromise a he able, or o guaranee

he implemenaion o agreemens.

Par o Jubas rusraion wih he inernaional communiy is aimed a he AUHIP-

aciliaed negoiaions beween he Sudans. Te negoiaions, which have produced ew


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agreemensnone o which have been ully implemenedare increasingly viewed

by Souhern ofcials as an endless series o meeings ha will never yield a susained,

comprehensive resoluion o Norh-Souh issues. Te Souhs negoiaors believe ha

he aciliaion has allowed Kharoum o coninue o assume exreme posiions, walk

away rom alks, and even pressure he aciliaion isel o change is approach o he

negoiaions.29 Te declining condence in he aciliaion is also a resul o he percep-

ion among some Souhern ofcials ha he Tabo Mbeki-led Arican Union panel isbiased in avor o Sudan.30

Te belie ha he inernaional communiy is no doing enough o suppor he peace

process underscores he ac ha Souh Sudan is sill learning how o engage wih he

inernaional communiy as an independen sae, including elding an eecive diplo-

maic corps. Te expecaion on he par o he leadership in Juba ha he inernaional

communiy will consisenly police Kharoums behavior or mandae anoher peace-

keeping mission, or example, is deached rom he poliics o he Securiy Council and

overesimaes he level o inernaional atenion on he Sudan-Souh Sudan conic.

Te criicism also does no go ar enough in acknowledging he Souhs role in uel-ing inernaional ambivalencesuch as supporing proxies in Sudanor he ac ha

Mbekis panel has been incapable o compelling eiher Kharoum or Juba o accep

compromise when opporuniies arise.

Te core o he Souhern argumen, hough, is rue: Te inernaional communiy has

largely been unable o sem Kharoums aggressions wih is rheorical condemnaions

or o guaranee any agreemens Sudan has signed. Tis underscores he limiaions,

in general, o inernaional inuence over Sudan. In he lead-up o he laes crisis in

Heglig, Juba migh no have responded as i did had inernaional inervenion been able

o preven coninued atacks by Kharoum, o compel he regime in Sudan o say on hepah o cooperaion, or o press he regime o sign a ceasere deal.

Te pervasive belie among Souherners ha he inernaional communiy will noor

cannoac o check Kharoums behavior has a imes bolsered he convicion among

Souh Sudans leadership ha he governmen canno aord o wai or inernaional

suppor or mediaion bu mus insead ake maters ino is own hands. In he absence o

a negoiaion srucure ha can produce resuls, Souh Sudans leaders will a various junc-

ures see less reason o reurn o he able and will insead negoiae via oher means.

In he absence o eecive inernaional inuence over Kharoum, so he Souhern argu-

men goes, he onus has consisenly been placed on Souh Sudan o make he necessary

compromises or peace. In his laes crisis, his rend has coninued: Juba made he rs

move o reconcile agains overwhelming domesic opinion. Beween Kharoum and

Juba, he later has consisenly been he easier pary o sway wih inernaional opinion,

bu his dynamic canno be aken or graned.


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Wheher he inernaional communiy is able o deliver a susained cessaion o hosili-

ies, ull Sudanese wihdrawal rom dispued areasincluding Abyeiand a viable

negoiaion process will be a key es o Jubas reading o he worlds eeciveness in

airly mediaing Norh-Souh issues going or ward. Clearly, disenchanmen wih heinernaional communiy does no ye mach Souh Sudans concern wih mainaining

a avorable image on he world sage. Bu jus as Juba is working o rebuild is sanding

beore he inernaional communiy, harmed by Souh Sudans advance ino Heglig, he

inernaional communiy needs o rebuild is credibiliy wih Juba. Te decisions issued

by he Arican Union Peace and Securiy Council on April 24 and he Unied Naions

Securiy Council on May 2 were large srides o ha end.

Going forward

Te inernaional communiy, especially key allies o Souh Sudan, canand mus

play an imporan role in helping o change he Souhern leaderships calculus going

orward. A sronger aciliaion model is necessary o rebuild Souhern condence in

alks on securiy, border issues, oil, ciizenship, and Abyei and o creae space or moder-

aes in Juba o argue or saying a he able and coninuing o engage wih Kharoum.

Te Arican Union Peace and Securiy Council communiqu and U.N. Securiy Council


SPLa sls n hsnn b

Sn amFs


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resoluion 2046 are robus seps ha creae some o he necessary leverage ha he A.U.

panel currenly lacks, including bringing in he IGAD as a supporing parner o he

AUHIP and imposing deadlines backed by credible pressures. Bu he panel mus also

be bolsered by he susained diplomaic eors o a coordinaed Friends o Sudans

body comprising key inernaional acors in he vein o he model behind he success-

ul negoiaion o he Comprehensive Peace Agreemen, during which IGADs media-

ion was suppored by he roika and Friends o IGAD. Te Friends o Sudans bodyshould be led by he coordinaed inuence and leverage o China and he U.S. and

should comprise oher acors who can 1) apply he necessary leverage o push boh

sides oward an agreemen and 2) guaranee he implemenaion o any evenual agree-

men. Tis group would also need o include hose acors who can provide Sudan wih

economic assisance.31

A comprehensive Norh-Souh agreemen is needed, one ha addresses he prioriy

issues or boh sidesSudans securiy and economic needs and Souh Sudans errio-

rial and securiy concerns. Key o such an agreemen is a parallel Norh-Norh poliical

process ha holisically addresses he grievances o marginalized populaions, includinghose rom Blue Nile, Souh Kordoan, and Darur. Wihou a leas some progress on an

inclusive, broad-based Norhern process, suppor o proxies by boh Sudan and Souh

Sudan will likely coninue, poisoning he amosphere around uure negoiaions and

jeopardizing any Norh-Souh deal ha is sruck. For he Souh, a deal would have o

include securiy guaranees, demarcaion o he agreed-upon areas o he border, a clear

process oror decision onhe dispued border areas, and a process or deciding he

nal saus o Abyei. For Kharoum, securiy guaranees, including an end o Souhern

assisance o rebel groups in he Norh, and a ransiional nancial package ha would

help ll Sudans nancial gap, are paramoun.


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Endnotes

1 in n-n-n mn, l ns, PnAmum and Idris Mohamed Abd al-Gadir, agreed on two keyassumptions: that Sudan would be the one to determine sz fnnl p y xpn S-n sssn, n S Sn l nly fll pnof the gap and would not be expected to shoulder thewhole bill. Prior to this tacit agreement, South Sudan wasusing the IMF-calculated gure of 7.6 billion, while Sudancited b 10 blln n 15 blln f, l bn

iMF-ll f Sns bln--pymnsgap. Agreeing to these assumptions ensured that SouthSudan would not be economically exploited for the viability Sn b ls p ssns Sn South Sudan would politically cooperate to resolve theireconomic troubles.

2 B SPLa n SrF ss smns lmn SaF j n Fby 26, 2012, ssn was some level of coordination. See: Bonifacio Taban Kuich,S Sn amy n Fll cnl j hy F-ing with SAF Ocial,Sudan Tribune, Fby 26, 2012,available at http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-my-n-ll-nl,41728; Sn rlny Fs,t fs vy SrF Fs ns Nnlcnss Py (NcP) Fs n Mls n bl j

The Destruction of Two NCP brigades and the seizure of 140Vehicles and 300 Dushkas, Press statement, February 26,2012.

3 Phone interviews and meetings with international diplo-ms, nnnl ss, n S Sns ls,Nmb 2011 apl 2012; Smll ams Sy,Reaching for the gun: Arms ows and holdings in SouthSudan (2012), available at http://www.smallarmssurvey-sudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-19-Arms-ows-and-holdings-South-Sudan.pdf.

4 Magdi El Gizouli, The NCPs sobbing negotiators, StillSudan blog, March 18, 2012, available at http://stillsudan.blogspot.de/2012/03/ncps-sobbing-negotiators.html.

5 Interviews with South Sudan ocials, April 2012, Juba,South Sudan.

6 South Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar, interview withthe author, April 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

7 Interview with South Sudan ocial, April 2012, Juba, SouthSudan.

8 Interview with South Sudan government and military of-cials, April 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

9 Hereward Holland and Ulf Laessing, S. Sudan oil eldbombed, Sudan says hopes to avert war, Reuters, March 27,2012, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews/idAFL6E8ER2EP20120327?sp=true.

10 South Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar, April 2012.

11 Interviews with international diplomats, April 2012, Juba,South Sudan.


13 Ibid.

14 Interviews with international diplomats, April 2012, Juba,South Sudan.

15 an n an unn h Ll implmnnPnl pss smn, ppsl nl sx ms:mm mplmnn ll ps jPSM -mns n sns; n n n m ppnby both sides; immediate cessation of hostilities betweenthe two states; the withdrawal of the armed forces of eachs my b n y s; s-blsmn fn mnsms, nln jnBorder Verication and Monitoring Mission, which is to be

supported by the U.N. Interim Security Force for Abyei (UN-iSFa); n ppns plnn psnl smmmeeting. See: African Union High Level ImplementationPanel, Negotiations on Reducing Tensions between Sudanand South Sudan, Press statement, April 4, 2012.

16 Deputy Defense Minister Majak DAgoot, interview with theauthor, May 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

17 Ibid.

18 dn SPLa pn hl, SPLa M gnlMac Paul told media that the army was 30 miles north ofHeglig. See: Tristan McConnell, Sudans return to war?,Global Post, April 20, 2012, available at http://www.salon.com/2012/04/20/sudans_return_to_war/.


20 F m n sy hls ss, s: dlsJohnson, Note on Panthou/Heglig, Sudan Tribune, My 2,2012, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/Note-on-Pn-hl-by-dls,42490; e rs, W sHeglig? International confusion and ignorance in answerings qsn b Sns py s bm n s s p, n nns -quired for peace to be sustained, Sudanreeves.org, April 14,2012, available at http://w ww.sudanreeves.org/2012/04/14/where-is-heglig/.

21 U.N. reports seen by the Enough Project.


23 Interview with U.S. diplomat, April 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

24 Deputy Defense Minister Majak DAgoot, May 2012.

25 Interviews with South Sudan ocials and international

advisor, April 2012, Juba, South Sudan.


27 Nenad Marinkovic, From the Frontline: Fighting betweenthe Two Sudans Continue as SAF Launches attack againstSPLA in Unity State, Enough Project blog, April 30, 2012,available at http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/frontline-ghting-between-two-sudans-continues-saf-launches-attack-against-spla-unity-state.


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ps ls n n np nn-

nl mmny flln pn kms nmgap following South Sudans independence.


17/17

Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against

humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, South Sudan, eastern

Congo, and areas affected by the Lords Resistance Army. Enough conducts intensive field

research, develops practical policies to address these crises, and shares sensible tools to

empower citizens and groups working for change. To learn more about Enough and what

you can do to help, go to www.enoughproject.org.

Hsiao Back to War

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