HS1 (Section 2) Register of Infrastructure

HS1 Ltd HS1 (Section 2) Register of Infrastructure R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

Revision 01, Date 15 July 2009 of 90

HS1 (Section 2) Register of Infrastructure

(Southfleet Junction to St Pancras International)

Document Reference: [ R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

URS· Document History

Rev. Issue Date Descriotion Author Checked Keith Watson

Approved AA 31-0ct-2006 1st draft - URN review Ken Harvey AB 24-Nov-2006 2nd draft - NR(CTRL) review Ken Harvey Keith Watson AC 01-Mar-2007 3rd draft - NoSo review Ken Harvev Keith Watson 00 17-Aug-2007 First formal issue Ken Harvey Keith Watson Dave Pointon 01 15-July-2009 Second issue following

review Richard

Schofield Keith Watson Paul Chapman

Approval Signatures for Current Version: ~9For NR(CTRL) Ltd

(Infrastructure Manager)

Ilj~~S1 Ltd Safety &

Operations Advisor

~fr HS1 Ltd

Managing Director

- 1 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Table of Contents

Background 5 0.1. Ownership of the Register 6 0.2. General Information 6 0.3. Scope of Section 2 of the HS1 7 0.4. Format of the Register 8 0.5. References 8

Part 1: Characteristics of the Infrastructure Subsystem 10 1.1. Descriptive Map 10 1.2. Line of Route 10

1.2.1. Geographic Location of Crossovers and Junctions 11

1.2.2. Significant Noticeable Lineside Features 12

1.2.3. Road Access Points 13

1.2.4. Structures and Tunnels 13

1.3. Stations 16 1.4. Capacity and Performance Levels 18 1.5. Type of Electrification 18 1.6. Basic Parameters 18 1.7. Other Characteristics Relevant to Infrastructure TSI. 21

1.7.1. Loads on Structures 23

1.7.2. Hot Axle Box Detectors 24

1.7.3. Derailer Sleepers 24

Part 2: Characteristics of the Energy Subsystem 26 2.1. Voltage and Frequency 26 2.2. Contact Wire Characteristics 26 2.3. Environmental Conditions 27 2.4. Pantograph Characteristics 28 2.5. Phase Separations 30 2.6. System Separations 31 2.7. Category of Line 31 2.8. Regenerative Braking 31 2.9. Harmonic Characteristics 32 2.10. Power/Current Limitation 32 2.11. Electric Protection Coordination 32 2.12. Any Other Divergence from the TSI 32

Part 3: Characteristics of the Control-Command and Signalling Subsystem 33 3.1. Signalling System 34 3.2. ERTMS/ETCS Level of Application 35 3.3. Application of Class B System 35 3.4. ERTMS/ETCS Level 1: Rolling Stock Implementation Requirements 36 3.5. Switch Over Between Different Class B Systems 36

- 2R-SG-NC-DDDD2-17-HSO



3.5.1. Network Rail to HS1 37

3.5.2. HS1 to Network Rail 37

3.6. Switch Over between Different Radio System 37 3.7. Technical Degraded Modes 38 3.8. Speed Limits 38 3.9. Electromagnetic Compatibility 38 3.10. Climatic and Physical Conditions 39

Part 4: Operational Conditions 40 4.1. Effects of cross winds .40 4.2. Exceptions in the Case of Execution ofWorks .41

Part 5: Performance Requirements for Rolling Stock 43 5.1. Maximum Speed 43 5.2. Maximum Train Length 44 5.3. Maximum Axle Load 44 5.4. Minimum Acceptable Braking Rates .44

5.4.1. Maximum Service Braking .45

5.4.2. Emergency Braking .45

5.4.3. Values for Control Curve .46

5.4.4. Usual Service Braking .47

5.5. Special Requirements 47

Appendix 1 - HS1 Section 2 Line of Route Description 49

Appendix 2 - HS1 Section 2 Schematic Layout Alignment.. 51

Appendix 3 - HS1 Section 2 Station Layouts 55

Appendix 4 - HS1 Section 2 Tunnel Schematics 59

Appendix 5 - List of HS1 Section 2 Access Points: Emergency Services 64

Appendix 6 - Traction Power Feeding and Sectioning 71

Appendix 7 - HS1 Electrical Protection Arrangements 74

Appendix 8 - HS1 Traction Harmonic Reference Profile 83

Appendix 9 - Daily Notice 85

- 3R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

HS1 ltd HS1 (Section 2) Register of Infrastructure R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO


Glossary of Terms

AC Alternating Current ATP Automatic Train Protection AWS Advanced Warning System CCS Control-Command Signalling (TSI) CSR Cab Secure Radio CTRL Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now called HS1) DC Direct Current EC European Commission EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference EMU Electric Multiple Unit ENE Energy (TSI) ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System ET Eurotunnel ETCS European Train Control System GSM-R HS1 General Purpose Radio (GPR) HDR Hither Green - Dartford - Rochester (NR line at Springhead Junction) HS1 HS1. This is the new name for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. HS1

comprises both HS1 Sections 1 and 2 HS1 (Ltd) HS1 Limited, the owner of the HS1 asset INS Infrastructure (TSI) ITCS Interlocking and Train Control System ITL Intermittent Transmission Loop KVB System of Speed Control Utilising Beacons NGC National Grid Company NRIL Network Rail Infrastructure Limited NR(CTRL) Network Rail (CTRL) Limited OCS Overhead Catenary System OHLE Overhead Line Electrification RCC Rail Control Centre SNCF Societe Nationale des chemins de fer Francais SRA Strategic Rail Authority STM Special Transmission Module TD Train Describer TENS Trans-European High-Speed Rail Network TGV Train a Grande Vitesse TPWS Train Protection and Warning System TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability TVM Transmission Voie Machine UIC Union Internationale des chemins de fer URN Union Railways North - Client for HS1 Section 2 URS Union Railways South - Client for HS1 Section 1 VCB Vacuum Circuit Beaker

Note that certain document titles retain the previous name of the infrastructure, such as the CTRL Rule Book. They have not been changed in the Register to avoid possible confusion.

-4R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



HS1 (SECTION 2) REGISTER OF INFRASTRUCTURE

Background

HS1 is a new high-speed railway between London and the Channel Tunnel. The railway is part of the trans-European high-speed rail network (TENS) and completes the high-speed international route between London and Paris, and London and Brussels. Domestic passenger trains also use the railway (between Ashford / Ebbsfleet HL and St Pancras International), providing a much improved commuter service between London and Kent. The railway is capable of carrying freight traffic.

It was constructed in two phases:

Section 1: between the Channel Tunnel at Cheriton and Southfleet Junction; including connections to the existing Ashford International Passenger Station and a connection from Southfleet Junction to Fawkham Junction provided to allow international Eurostar services to access the existing Waterloo International Station (prior to the completion of Section 2 and the opening of St Pancras International Station),

Section 2: between Southfleet Junction and St Pancras International Station; including new International Stations at Ebbsfleet and Stratford, and with connections to the existing East Coast Main Line, North London Line, West Coast Main Line (via North London Line), North Kent Line, Ripple Lane freight yard and a new maintenance depot situated at Temple Mills.

The new railway is subject to the EC Directive 96/48/EC of 23rd July 2003 regarding the interoperability of the European TENS routes and the supporting Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSls). As a consequence it is mandatory under the Directive for the HS1 Infrastructure Manager (see §0.1) to provide a Register of Infrastructure (the Register) defining the main characteristics of the line.

A Register was originally prepared to consider Section 1 of the HS1, which was brought into commercial service on the 28th September 2003. This document represents the Register for the second phase of the railway, Section 2 of the HS1, being brought into commercial service on 14th November 2007.

Technical Files have been prepared relating to Section 2 of the HS1; these define the conformity of the new railway with the relevant TSls:

~ Infrastructure (INS) Subsystem (Reference 1)

~ Energy (ENE) Subsystem (Reference 2)

~ Control, Command and Signalling (CCS) Subsystem (Reference 3)

- 5R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



The Register makes reference to the Infrastructure, Energy, and Control-Command and Signalling TSls regarding which characteristics, basic provisions or other information should be included. Any derogation that may apply is described.

0.1. Ownership of the Register

The Register is compiled and owned by the Infrastructure Concession Holder of Section 2 of the HS1:

HS1 Ltd 73 Collier Street LONDON N19BE

It is however maintained and updated on behalf of the Infrastructure Owner by the Infrastructure Manager in accordance with a Railway Services Agreement.

The address of the Infrastructure Manager is:

Network Rail (CTRL) Ltd Singlewell Infrastructure Maintenance Depot (SIMD) Henhurst Road Cobham, Gravesend Kent DA123AN

The first issue (revision 00) is dated 1ih August 2007, being issued within days of "authorisation to place into service" on 31 st July 2007 by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). The date of commencement of commercial service was 14th November 2007. The Register will be reviewed annually from the issue date given on the document coversheet, and amended as, and if, appropriate. This is the first revision of the Register to take note of changes since opening of Section 2 of the railway.

0.2. General Information

As indicated in the TSls the Register shall allow:

~ the Member State responsible for granting authorisation to place the subsystems into service to have at hand a document describing, for each line of the trans-European rail system, the basic parameters on which operation of that line depends,

~ the Infrastructure Manager to have at hand a recapitulative document describing the lines concerned so that he can follow the subsequent evolutions in the implementation of the TSls,

~ the railway undertakings that operate or wish to operate services on the line to be informed of the line's particular features, when the parameters or some of the

- 6R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



interoperability specifications result from the choice made by the Infrastructure Manager.

In addition to the Register, general characteristics regarding the railway and its infrastructure are given in:

~ Technical File Infrastructure & Energy (Reference 4)

~ Technical File Control, Command & Signalling (Reference 5)

~ Asset Register (Reference 6)

~ Hazard Directory (Reference 7)

~ Network Statement (Reference 19)

Where relevant, cognisance should be taken of the infrastructure characteristics described in the Registerfor Section 1 of the HS1 (Reference 8).

0.3. Scope of Section 2 of the HS1

A descriptive map of the route of Section 2 of the HS1 is given in Appendix 1. For the purpose of the Register, the route comprises the 40 km stretch of railway from the connection to Section 1 of the HS1 at Southfleet Junction to St Pancras Station, and includes:

~ HS1 main line route for Section 2 (St Pancras to Southfleet Junction)

~ major connections with the North London Line, East Coast Main Line and a refurbished terminus station at St Pancras (and a non-electrified connection to the Midland Main Line via the maintenance siding)

~ significant tunnel sections under east London and the Thames river

~ international stations at Ebbsfleet and Stratford

~ train maintenance depot at Temple Mills

~ bi-directional single line connecting Stratford International Station and Temple Mills Depot

~ connection between the HS1 main line and the Ripple Lane freight yard

~ railways forming the connections between the HS1 main line and the North Kent Line at Springhead Junction

- 7R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Attached in Appendix 2 is the detailed Schematic Layout Alignment for the route of Section 2 of the HS1. Chainage (kilometre) locations given in subsequent sections of the Register are cross-referenced to these drawings.

0.4. Format of the Register

The Register is divided into five parts concerning the characteristics related to the railway infrastructure, the rolling stock intending to run on the railway and the relevant operational requirements:

Part 1 - Characteristics of the Infrastructure Subsystem

Part 2 - Characteristics of the Energy Subsystem

Part 3 - Characteristics of the Control, Command & Signalling Subsystem

Part 4 - Performance Requirements for Rolling Stock

Part 5 - Operational Conditions

0.5. References

1. Technical specification for interoperability relating to the infrastructure subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system referred to in Article 6(1) of Council Directive 96/48/EC, notified under document number C(2002) 1948, (2002/732/EC)

2. Technical specification for interoperability relating to the energy subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system referred to in Article 6(1) of Council Directive 96/48/EC, notified under document number C(2002) 1949, (2002/733/EC)

3. Technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signaling subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system referred to in Article 6(1) of Council Directive 96/48/EC, notified under document number C(2002) 1947, (2002/731/EC)

4 CTRL Section 2, Interoperability Regulations, Technical Files for the Infrastructure and Energy Subsystems (Volumes 1, 2 & 3), References Volume 1; Synopsis, 200156/216/03, Volume 2; Infrastructure Subsystem, 200156/217/03 and Volume 3; Energy Subsystem, 200156/218/03

5 CTRL Section 1 & Section 2, Interoperability Regulations, Control-Command and Signalling Technical File Addendum 1, R-SA-RI-00014-08-UNO, Revision 00

6. HS1 Asset Register (held by NR(CTRL)

7. C/02/0S/05/21 01 , CTRL Hazard Directory, CTRL Section 1 & 2

-8R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

19



8. Section 'I Infrastructure Register, R-SG-NC-00001-17-HSO, Revision 02,15 July 2009.

9. L-SA-SR-00002-08-UNO, Infrastructure TSI, Derogation clauses 4.3.3.6,4.3.3.13, and 4.3.3.14, Approved 20th February 2004

10. C/02/0S/05/1000, CTRL Rule Book

11. CTRL Sections 1 and 2 Systemwide Site Access Maps - reissued September 2007 (and subsequent revisions).

3rd12. L-SA-SR-00008-08-UNO, Energy TSI, Derogation clause 4.3.1.4, Approved August 2005

13. 525-RUE-RLEEE-00254, CTRL Section 2, Electrical Safety Case

14. L-SA-SR-00002-08-UNO, Control - Command and Signalling TSI, Derogation all of TSI Technical Requirements, Approved 20th February 2004

15. 556-RUG-SCSEE-00063, VHME (HBD/HWB) Rolling Stock Interface Requirements Specification

16. 556-RUE-RLEEK-00008, St Pancras CTRL Station KVB Requirements

17. 556-SN-SCSEE-20001, Signalling System Requirements Specification

18. 556-RUG-SCSEE-00063, VHME (HBD/HWB) Rolling Stock Interface Requirements Specification

HS1 Ltd, HS1 Network Statement June 2009

- 9R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Part 1: Characteristics of the Infrastructure Subsystem

The table below lists the approved derogations against the Infrastructure (INS) Subsystem TSI applicable to Section 2 of the HS1 (Reference 9).

Ref Description TSI Clauses Approval

L-SA-SR00002-08UNO (200156/20101/9.2.1.1 )

Works below ground level such as tunnels and cut and covers - tunnels are designed to limit the maximum pressure differential to 2.5kPa in 4 seconds

All of 4.3.3.6 Approved on 20th February 2004

L-SA-SR00002-08UNO (200156/20101/9.2.1.2)

Vertical loads on structures - current design is based on Notified National Technical Rules.


L-SA-SR00002-08UNO (200156/20101/9.2.1.3)

Transverse Horizontal Loads on Structures - current design is based on Notified National Technical Rules.


In all other respects Section 2 of the HS1 is compliant with the INS TSI. The characteristics required to appear in the Register are derived from Annex E of the current version of the Infrastructure Subsystem TSI (Reference 1) as are considered below.

1.1. Descriptive Map

A map of the route of Section 2 of the HS1 is given in Appendix 1; the following stations are open to interoperable high-speed rail traffic:

~ St Pancras (existing upgraded station) - platforms 5 to 10

~ Stratford (a new station) - platforms 1 and 4

~ Ebbsfleet (a new station) - platforms 1 and 4

1.2. Line of Route

Attached in Appendix 2 is the detailed Schematic Layout Alignment for the route of Section 2 of the HS1. This schematic gives the details and locations of:

~ main track infrastructure elements (turnouts, crossovers etc)

~ main civil structures (bridges, tunnels etc)

~ variation in vertical alignment (ie track gradient)

- 10R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



~ variation in horizontal alignment (ie curvature)

~ maximum permissible speeds at various locations

1.2.1. Geographic Location of Crossovers and Junctions The chainage1 locations of the key trackwork and infrastructure features are indicated in the table below.

Description Infrastructure Designation Chainage Location

• km point (Turnout number)

Crossovers ECML Bridge (one) Down Line: 1.414 (No 2045) Up Line: 1.079 (No 2046)

ECML Bridge (two) Down Line: 1.500 (No 2048) Up Line: 1.393 (No 2047)

Stratford Station (one) Down Line: 9.576 (No 2065) Up Line: 10.126 (No 2072)

Stratford Station (two) Down Line 10.129 (No 2074) Up Line: 9.563 (No 2067)

Wennington (west) Down Line: 25.858 (No 2096) Up Line: 25.584 (No 2095)

Wennington (east) Down Line: 26.020 (No 2097) Up Line: 26.294 (No 2098)

Ebbsfleet Station (one) Down line: 37.302 (No 2141) Up Line: 37.500 (No 2142)

Ebbsfleet Station (two) Down Line: 37.210 (No 2136) Up Line: 35.020 (No 2103)

Junctions Loco Siding Up Line: 0.652 (No 2014)

Midland Main Line Siding (non-electrified) Up Line: 0.658 (No 2017)

East Coast Main Line Connection Down Line: 0.789 (No 2027)

North London Line Connection

Down Line: 1.408 (No 2044) Up Line: 1.387 (No 2042) Silo Curve 0.113 (No 2031 )

Temple Mills Depot Connection Down Line: 9.097 (No 2051) Up Line: 9.094 (No 2053) Single Line: 9.445 (No 2058)

1 Chainages are cross-referenced to the Schematic Layout Alignment drawings in Appendix 2 with St Pancras International Station as the point of origin at O.OOOkm.

- 11 R-SG-NC-00002-17-H SO



Description Infrastructure Designation Chainage Location - km Doint cfumout number)

Ripple Lane freight yard Connection Down Line: 20.829 (No 2090) Up Line: 21.698 (No 2092)

North Kent Line Connection Down Line: 37.210 (No 2136) Up Line: 35.020 (No 2103)

Connection to Section 1 of the HS1 - Southfleet Junction

Down Line: 40.150 (No 2204) Up Line: 40.150 (No 2202)

1.2.2. Significant Noticeable Lineside Features Significant noticeable lineside features that may be useful for orientation purposes are summarised in the table below.

Feature Description Chalnage Location -km Doint

0.000

1.430

St Pancras Station The main HS1 London terminus with pedestrian links to conventional Network Rail and London Underground railways

ECML Bridge Fully enclosed bridge at the London tunnel 1 west portal which spans the East Coast Main Line

London tunnel 1 A 7.5 km long twin bore single track tunnel running from near St Pancras to Stratford Intemational station

1.540 to 9.077

9.077 to 10.149

9.721

10.149 to 20.278

Stratford Station

New station at Stratford located in a subsurface open box between the London 1 and London 2 tunnels. Provides pedestrian connections to Network Rail, Docklands and London Underground railwavs

Temple Mills depot connection viaduct

Bi-directional single line rising on a ramp viaduct from track level at the west end of the Stratford station box to connect to the Temple Mills Depot to the north of the station. The maximum track gradient on the ramp is 2.4%

London tunnel 2 A 10 km long twin bore single track tunnel running from Stratford Intemational station to Ripple Lane

Ripple Lane freight yard connection

Freight connection to Section 2 of the HS1 allowing freight traffic to access Ford Dagenham sidings, Hanson sidings and to interchange with the existing Network Rail London, Tilbury & Southend railway.

20.829 to 21.698

23.538 to 24.068 Rainham viaduct Approximately 500m long viaduct over Rainham Creek.

Wennington crossover

To allow trains to interchange between the Up & Down lines on Section 2 of the HS1

25.594 to 26.294

27.125 to 27.890 Aveley viaduct Approximately 750m long viaduct over Rainham Creek.

- 12 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Feature Description Chainage Location

-km point

30.549 to 31.596

32.362 to 34.875

35.953

36.000

38.325 to 38.745

Thurrock viaduct

Approximately 1km long viaduct on the western approach to the Thames tunnel and passing under the QE II Bridge - M25 motorway Thames river crossing

Thames tunnel A 3 km long twin bore single track tunnel running under the Thames river from Thurrock to Ebbsfleet

North Kent Line connection

New connection linking the HS1 Section 2 to the existing NR Hither Green - Dartford - Rochester (HDR) line at Springhead Junction

Ebbsfleet Station New international and domestic station serving HS1 Section 2 and also the new North Kent Line connection

Pepper Hill tunnel A 400m long single bore twin track tunnel beneath the major A2 trunk road

Southfleet junction

Where Section 2 of the HS1 joins Section 1 and there is a connection to the existing Network Rail Chatham main line, to the west of Longfield, (this is called the Waterloo Connection).

40.150

1.2.3. Road Access Points

A continuous Iineside walkway is provided on each side of the HS1 formation that normally has sufficient clearances for the aerodynamic protection of personnel. Areas of restricted clearance are clearly identified in accordance with Module G Section 2 of the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10); these are generally the HS1 tunnels and other "retained cutting" structures.

Access to Section 2 of the HS1 for maintenance and evacuation purposes is nominally provided at 1.5km intervals for foot access (excluding long tunnels) and 3km intervals for road access, as defined in HS1 Sections 1 and 2 Systemwide Site Access Maps - reissued September 2007 (and subsequent revisions). (Reference 11). These access points are listed in Appendix 5 for information, however should be confirmed with the Infrastructure Manager who retains the list of agreed access points.

1.2.4. Structures and Tunnels

The detailed description, identification and location of all structures and tunnels on Section 2 of the HS1 are given in the HS1 Asset Register (Reference 6). A list of the main structures and tunnels is summarised in the Schematic Layout Alignment drawings in Appendix 2.

The structures and tunnels that require special arrangements for the evacuation of passengers are identified below. However, the detailed procedures regarding the evacuation of passengers at different locations on Section 2 of the HS1 are given in Module M6, and specific to the long tunnels in Module LT of the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10) and the

- 13 R-SG-NC-00002-17-H so



Sectional Appendix to the CTRL Rule Book. The CTRL Rule Book should be the principal source for this information.

1.2.4.1. Structures

From an evacuation viewpoint it is the railway bridges over highways, watercourses or other railways that require particular attention. All such bridges comprise a ballast retaining wall that separates the tracks from the adjacent lineside walkway. On top of the ballast wall either acoustic barriers or safety fences are provided to segregate staff that may be legitimately on the walkway from running trains. Where acoustic barriers are required, gates are installed at 30m intervals to enable evacuees to reach the Iineside walkway. Similar gaps in the safety fences are provided at 30m intervals, however these are without gates.

Special arrangements may be required during the evacuation of trains from the long bridges and viaducts listed below. Details of these emergency evacuation arrangements are given in the CTRL Rule Book Module M6 and the Sectional Appendix to the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10). In the main, evacuation on long viaducts is carried out by deploying the onboard evacuation ladders (such as those carried on the Eurostar and Class 395 trains) into the HS1 "6 foot", and after ensuring with the HS1 Signaller that trains are stopped on the adjacent track.

The relevant viaducts are identified in the table below.

BridgeMaduct Special Arrangements Chainage Location (km point)

Rainham Viaduct Owing to its length and height over water 23.538 to 24.068

Aveley Viaduct Owing to its length 27.125 to 27.890

Thurrock Viaduct Owing to its length, height and proximity to QE II Bridge and the Thames tunnel 30.549 to 31.596

1.2.4.2. Tunnels

There is a 400m single bore twin track tunnel at Pepper Hill passing under the A2 major trunk road. This tunnel has 700mm wide walkways on each side of the tunnel bore at track level, which require trains to be stopped for aerodynamic protection before personnel can have access. The special arrangements for evacuation are as considered for HS1 railway bridges above and in Module M6 and the Sectional Appendix of the CTRL Rule Book.

Owing to their long length, special arrangements are required for evacuation of the London tunnels 1 and 2, and the Thames tunnel on Section 2 of the HS1. The details of the emergency procedures for evacuation in tunnels are given in the CTRL Rule Book Module LT and Sectional Appendix to the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10). Each tunnel is equipped with facilities to assist passengers in event of an emergency evacuation:

- 14R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



~ 760mm high-level, 850mm wide evacuation walkway with handrail on the wall closest to the adjacent bore of the tunnel

~ 550mm high-level, 700mm wide maintenance walkway on the opposite wall of the tunnel bore

~ Emergency Response Locations (where it is preferable to stop a train in an emergency) at approximately 3km intervals and with dedicated cross-passages linking both tunnel bores

~ Intermediate cross-passages linking both tunnel bores at approximately 660m intervals between Emergency Response Locations (for use where is not possible to control the stopping of a train at an Emergency Response Location)

~ Automated smoke control ventilation directing fire combustion gases in the direction of travel of the incident train when stationary, and also providing pressurised safe haven in the adjacent tunnel bore (reached through the cross-passages)

~ Emergency lighting operated locally within the tunnel, remotely from the HS1 control centre or automatically on loss of traction power

~ Emergency lineside telephones located outside each cross-passage door

~ Illuminated self-evacuation signage at each cross-passage2

~ Reflective self-evacuation signs at 50m intervals

~ Passenger "muster" areas at each tunnel portal

Count-down signalling markers are provided in advance of each Emergency Response Location to advise the driver of the correct position to stop the train. These markers are not provided for intermediate cross-passages, however all cross-passages have permanent illumination (see above).

Longitudinal drawings of London 1 & 2 tunnels and the Thames tunnel, showing the position of Emergency Response Locations and cross-passages, are given in Appendix 4.

2 There is a permanent illuminated low level light above each cross-passage to indicate the position to help the train driver to stop at the correct place. When the evacuation lighting is turned on there are two green lights located about knee height which also come on (either side of the cross passage) to aid evacuation.

With regard to mid way between the cross-passages, where the distance between these is greater than 400m, there are permanent illuminated pushbuttons to turn on the tunnel emergency lighting.

- 15R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



For the purpose of evacuation the ECML (enclosed) bridge is an extension to the London tunnel 1 at the west portal.

1.3. Stations

As listed in §1.1 there are three stations located on the new route of Section 2 of the HS1 open to both international high-speed and conventional domestic rail traffic. Schematic arrangements of the stations are given in Appendix 3. Platform details regarding each of these stations are summarised in the table below.

Station Description Platform Parameters

St Pancras Station Main HS1 London terminus Platforms 1 to 4 Network Rail Platforms:

~ Not accessible from the HS1

Platforms 5 to 10- Intemational Platforms:

~ Running gauge: UIC GC ~ Line speed: max 40 km/h ~ Structural clearance to dynamic

gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance from track centre:

1670mm ~ Height above rail level: 760mm ~ Physical usable length: 408m ~ Maximum train length: 400m

Platforms 11 to 13 - HS1 Domestic Platforms:

~ Running gauge: UK (W6) ~ Line speed: max 40 km/h ~ Structural clearance to dynamic

gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance to track centre: 1447mm ~ Height above rail level: 915mm ~ Physical usable length: 290m ~ Maximum train lenoth: 276m

- 16R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Station Description Platform Parameters

Stratford Station Located in 1km long Stratford Box between London tunnel 1 and London tunnel 2.

Provides rail connection to the Temple Mills Depot from within the Stratford Box via a bi-directions connecting line on a ramp viaduct.

Platforms 1 & 4 - Intemational Platforms:


gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance to track centre: 1670mm ~ Height above rail level: 760mm ~ Physical usable length: 410m ~ Maximum train length: 400m

Platforms 2 & 3 - HS1 Domestic Platforms:


gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance to track centre: 1447mm ~ Height above rail level: 915mm ~ Physical usable length: 289m ~ Maximum train length: 276m

Platforms 1 & 4 - Intemational Platforms:


gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance to track centre: 1670mm ~ Height above rail level: 760mm ~ Physical usable length: 41 Om ~ Maximum train length: 400m

Platforms 2 & 3 - HS1 Domestic Platforms:


gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance to track centre: 1447mm ~ Height above rail level: 915mm ~ Physical useable length: 289m ~ Maximum train length: 276m

Platforms 5 & 6 - NKLC Domestic Platforms:


gauge: 50mm (-Omm, +20mm) ~ Distance to track centre: 1447mm ~ Height above rail level: 915mm ~ Physical useable length: 289m ~ Maximum train length: 276m

Ebbsfleet Station Located close to the Thames tunnel south portal.

Provides rail connection to existing Hither Green - Dartford - Rochester (HDR) line at Springhead Junction via the high-level platforms 5 & 6).

-17 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



If required, specific information regarding these stations should be sought from the relevant Station Operator. For example, to consider the compatibility of the arrangements to facilitate embarkation and disembarkation of disabled passengers from trains using the mobile ramps provided at each of the stations.

1.4. Capacity and Performance Levels

Section 2 of the HS1 is a mixed traffic railway carrying both interoperable and noninteroperable passenger trains, and in the future freight.

Relevant rolling stock capacity and speed performance characteristics for Section 2 of the HS1 are listed in the table below (see also Part 5.0):

Requirement Description Perfonnance

Number of train paths Maximum number of trains per hour operating on Section 2 of the HS1 interoperable route.

8 international passenger and 8 domestic passenger trains in each direction Freight traffic yet to be advised

Maximum allowable speed

Maximum speed of any (interoperable or otherwise) operating on Section 2 of the HS1

Passenger 230km/h Freight 140km/h

1.5. Type of Electrification

The basic type of electrification provided on Section 2 of the HS1 main line and connecting railways is summarised in the table below.

Route Description

Main Line HS1 25-0-25 kV AC (auto transformer) Overhead Catenary System (OCS) - 12kA fault current

St Pancras connecting line

Conventional 25-0 kV AC Network Rail Mark IIIB Overhead Line Electrification (OLE) - 6kA fault current

Detailed requirements of the electrification system are given in Part 2.0 of the Register.

1.6. Basic Parameters

The basic infrastructure parameters reqUired to be included in the Register are listed in the table below.

Requirement Description Parameter

- 18R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Requirement Description Parameter

Structure Gauge Main HS1 interoperable route (Southfleet Junction to St

I Pancras Station)

Connection to Midland Main Line maintenance siding

UICGC

UK3

Connection to North London Line. UK3

Connection to East Coast Main Line. UK3

Connection to Temple Mills Depot UIC GB+

Geometric Characteristics (HS1 main high-speed line)

Connection to Ripple Lane freight yard

Connection to NR HDR line

Minimum horizontal radius of curvature on plain line

Minimum horizontal track radius in sidings (ie freight loops)

Maximum horizontal radius of curvature on plain line

UICGC

UK3

2300m

250m

10000m

Maximum cant 160mm

Normal cant deficiency 110mm

Exceptional cant deficiency 130mm

Normal cant excess 90mm

Exceptional cant excess 110mm

Minimum radius of vertical circular curve 10000m

Track Gauge

Minimum length of platforms

Characteristics related to access by disabled persons

Transient tunnel pressures

Exceptional minimum radius of vertical circular curve

Maximum gradient and length on line

Distance between rails HS1 main line Distance between rails connecting lines

Minimum distance between track centres - HS1 main high-speed line

See §1.3

See §1.3

Maximum pressure change in tunnels - comfort limit for Section 2 HS1 tunnels

8000m

2.5% (1 :40) ~2000m length

1435mm 1432mm

4.2m

International 400m Domestic 240m

Mobile ramps on platform

2.5kPa in 4 secs

3 Where UK gauge corresponds to W6NV6A.

- 19R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



The oes (see Part 2.0) has been designed to take into account the kinematic envelope of the train which is an envelope within which no oes equipment can infringe under any circumstances.

On the Section 2 of the HS1 there are two distinct gauges applied, one is the nominal gauge on open route and the second one is the adjusted gauge for the Thames and London tunnels. Both gauges conform to the requirements of the Infrastructure TSI (see below).

Nominal positionin9 as ~er UIC leaflet 505-4 To determine the p::.sition of strLetures which must be sepcrated from the roiling stOCi(, by as small CI distance cs

poesible

MQd1'un po&ltronng of &tn.dLre lr, tunnel, ¥rhate'l'llr the CJVe. ---- uc ac ogau9'l'

for rt'KIximum PQIIitionir·o In

8 Curves - General

I

case

,®1973 1973

--,----------r---------, I ,Me I \ ~---------, \ ,I I \

r-I I I I

:@I I I I I I I I

81 !;I

1 0

:~

I

I I \,.., I

19~:3

_---.1'!!:"-----l I

I

"'*de 01 Q..I'Vft I C\lteide or cur¥t$ I

I

I

I

I

I

I lB3~ '832

I

I

g I

I

I

RlInni1g ~ PIaM

~

C QMln CUM, rwfer to otto;hlt<l tOtMell qMnl;j ttl. ~ointe A. B. C end D

Streight trock

1901 '901

r---------,----------r- 4 --1" I4 1540 I \ I I

I I 1

~---------"1 \ I

I \I I I I \ I

1940 1940

_~_J.~~____ ~

'813

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1813

R\Ilnin~!p1tr1e

Nominal structure gauge - Open route

- 20R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1

01 ~ ~I

1

~ 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 1 1 1 1



t.AoJ)oi""'Ln" oOE-tbnirg QE per ue eof et 50~-4

To be: ",I:lcd for Th'Jlt<::3 Tu,t'c:o ~n-:l L,rdor tunrrd-3 only TL delerrnine 1I e pO.::li'.iun uf ::tlrud ... r~b ,....hidl TI:J~l be ~I-'ar ded fl'Ln U e 1.)1 ir'Y ;:,toc.... by u:. :)oIlJII 0 ci~tLrue J~

~o!tsl[)le

- - - - - Lie (<: ~<Il.l1Je P'"Jr Hu~lf1 UI I JC..lll.>n;r.~ ill (J y-'''''l o.;L.flo'li. l ..h.1 lu .glluct~(j t",Utillii 'iI"-'I'"Y Uti JX.l!Ui .... e. -; \1(,1:1 D

~tralqht tree-.: I

I

I

._-GL L~C I

J!=J( '--~-r------------------' f--~::---r----~6:'---~~---T ~ I ~ 1l!'4c- \ I ~--------- I ~--------~ I I I I I

I I \rI I \B J J

I 1>701@r-,\.-+-_-_-_-"":'-"~-_-_-_-_~_.-------" ..""•.=---~\;--t!~ I

I I I I

~ ~: : §Ii I '"'I I I I

I I

11'1!II'0I!! of C:U...,., Out.idl! oer c:U'Ws I I

_ 11~

I :••.:g[ i

i R.Jnnil!il plane

____ :l'!1! ~

I I

l I

I

I

I

I I

I

)7Jl I ILl1

T

Runrinl; Iphn• I

~

~: ~' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Reduced structure gauge - London and Thames tunnel

1.7. Other Characteristics Relevant to Infrastructure TSI

A summary of other relevant characteristics of the Infrastructure Subsystem is given in the table below.

Characteristic Description Comment

Requirements for non-wheel-railadhesion braking

This type of braking (eg Eddy Current Braking) is currently prohibited on the Section 2 of the HS1.

Cant deficiency on switches and crossings

85mm at 300km/h n/a

Effects of crosswinds

There are no areas of particular concern regarding effects of cross-winds on Section 2 of the HS1

Sectional Appendix to the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10) applies regarding precautions to be taken in event of high winds (see Part 6.5).

- 21 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Characteristic Description Comment

The safe cess (aerodynamic protection by distance) is located 3468mm from the track centre line or >2.75m from the running rail

Lateral space (for Width of cess (Iineside walkway) on open line is (nominally behind the line of lineside walkway)4 minimum 700mm catenary masts) at rail level. At

certain locations the 2.75m distance is reduced. See the CTRL Rule Book Section G7 for details of these locations and distances.

The safe cess is located 2718mm from the track centre line or >2.00m

Width of cess (Iineside walkway) on bridges and viaducts is minimum 700mm

from the running rail at bridge deck level. Aerodynamic protection is provided by safety fence or low-level acoustic barrier on ballast retaining wall.

Ground level evacuation walkways are provided located 2300mm from

Width of cess (Iineside walkway) in Pepper Hill the track centre line. The safe cess tunnel is minimum 700mm - single bore twin track requires trains to be stopped on the tunnel adjacent line for aerodynamic

protection to persons on the walkway.

Raised 760mm high-level evacuation walkways are provided on the "internal" tunnel wall adjacent to other tunnel bore. Both

Width of cess (lineside evacuation walkway) in London 1 & 2, and Thames tunnels is minimum 850 mm - twin bore single track tunnels

bores of the tunnel are connected by cross-passages. The safe cess requires trains to be stopped for aerodynamic protection. At tunnel portals the evacuation walkway crosses the track from the "internal" tunnel wall to the outer wall or cess.

Raised (850mm wide) but segregated high-level evacuation

Width of cess (Iineside evacuation walkway) on ECML bridge - London Tunnel 1 west portal.

walkways on either side of the bridge in the cess. These are a continuation of the evacuation walkways for the London tunnel 1(see above).

4 Any areas of restricted clearance are locally signed in accordance with the CTRL Rule Book and are listed in the CTRL Hazard Directory (Reference 7).

- 22R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



1.7.1. Loads on Structures

As indicated in §1.1, the HS1 has been granted derogation against the clause 4.3.3.13 "Vertical Loads on Structure" and clause 4.3.3.14 "Transverse Horizontal Loads on Structures" where National Rules have been applied.

In practice, all new structures are designed to the HS1 Standard 00087 "Loading and Particular Criteria for HS1 Railway Bridges", Revision 06, which includes a requirement to comply with the loading profile of UIC71 modified for 225kN axle loads. The exception to this being the existing structure of the Barlow shed at St Pancras station which was not allowed to be significantly altered owing to a preservation order on the historic building. As a consequence there are a number of operational restrictions on the train configurations that are allowed in some platforms as are described below.

All international platforms 5 to 10 are designed to a UIC71 loading envelope equivalent to an interoperable passenger train having axle loading of 18 tonnes and without restriction.

However, a train with a loading profile within the loading envelope of UIC71, modified for 225kN axle loads, may be brought into tracks within the Barlow shed under the following conditions:

~ Track 10 - allowed, provided platforms 9 & 10 are cleared of appreciable live loading

~ Track 9 - allowed, provided track 8 is cleared of trains and platforms 9 & 10 are cleared of appreciable live loading



~ Track 6 - allowed, provided track 7 is cleared of trains and platforms 5 &6 are cleared of appreciable live loading

~ Track 5 - trains with a loading profile exceeding that equivalent of a Eurostar should not be brought into track 5 of the Barlow shed

In this context, appreciable live loading means that the relevant platforms are cleared of waiting passengers, however train reception personnel, platform trolleys, mobility impaired electric traction passenger carrying vehicles or similar may remain.

These arrangements are interpreted in the Sectional Appendix to the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10), in terms of instructions to drivers and signalmen. For further information the Infrastructure Manager should be consulted.

- 23R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



1.7.2. Hot Axle Box Detectors

Clause 4.3.3.24 of the Infrastructure TSI relates to the compatibility of rolling stock with hot axle box detectors (HBD) which are installed on a high-speed line. The arrangements for the assurance of compatibility on Section 2 of the HS1 are detailed in the relevant Interface Requirements Specification (Reference 15).

The figure below shows the schematic of the installation of HBD equipment on Section 2 of the HS1 in relation to the location of the track.

The means of temperature measurement of the HBD is via a single infrared beam with a cross-section 10mm by 11 mm. As indicated above the point of measurement is at a vertical distance 360mm from the inner edge of the rail.

The axle boxes of rolling stock operating on Section 2 of the HS1 should be compatible with this requirement. If there is any doubt then tests should be carried out to confirm this via sighting simulation using a dummy laser sensor as explained in Reference 15.

There is one location of hot axle box detector on Section 2 of the HS1 situated at Wennington as follows:

~ Down HS1 chainage 29.723 at AF850 marker level

~ Up HS1 chainage 29.839 at AF750/AF849 marker level

The HBD equipment is designed to function at train speeds between 3km/h and 300km/h.

Although not mandated by the high-speed TSls, other Vehicle Health Monitoring Equipment such as Hot Wheel Detectors and Wheel Impact Detectors are provided on the HS1. Train Operators should consult with the Infrastructure manger regarding rolling stock compatibility with this equipment.

1.7.3. Derailer Sleepers

- 24R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



As a safety precaution during construction derailers were installed at the interface between Section 1 and Section 2 of the HS1. On completion of Section 2 the derailers were permanently removed however the bearers remain in place. The derailers were installed on model SATU403 AIG bearers, which although not certified as Interoperability Constituents were assessed in the Infrastructure Subsystem Technical File (Reference 4) as consistent with interoperability requirements. A commitment is given by the HS1 Infrastructure Manager that when these bearers require to be replaced that this will be done using VAX U41 V bearers as are installed elsewhere on the HS1 open route.

- 25R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Part 2: Characteristics of the Energy Subsystem

The table below lists the approved derogations against the Energy Subsystem TSI applicable to Section 2 of the HS1 (References 12).


L-SA-SR00008-08UNO

Regenerative Braking - not installed on Section 2 of the HS1

All of 4.3.1 .4 Approved on 3'd August 2005

In all other respects Section 2 of the HS1 is compliant with the TSI. The characteristics required to appear in the Register are derived from Annex D of the current version of the Energy SUbsystem TSI (Reference 2) as are considered below.

The traction power feeding and sectioning arrangements are given in Appendix 6.

2.1. Voltage and Frequency

The principal characteristics of the traction power supply system (as per EN 50163) are given in the table below:

Description Performance

Nominal voltage 25kV

Maximum voltage (continuous) 27.5kV

Minimum voltage (continuous) 19kV

Nominal frequency 50Hz

Maximum fault current 12kA (HS1 OCS) & 6kA (St Pancras connecting line Mklll OLE)

Switch rating (feeder) 1250A

In addition, the maximum fault clearing time on the HS1 is specified at 200ms.

2.2. Contact Wire Characteristics

The principal contact wire characteristics (dimensions, material, tension etc.) for the HS1 main line and connecting lines are given in the tables below.

- 26R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Characteristics of OCS on HS1 Main Line

Electrification Catenary

Wire· Cross Section

Catenary Wire-

Tension

Contact Wire Cross

Section

Contact Wire·

Tension

Height Above Rail

Allowable Uplift

HS10CS 65.4 mm2

bronze 14 kN 150 mm2

copper 20 kN

5.08 m to 5.10 m

400mm ( Eurostar

height stop allows only 200mm.)

Characteristics of OCS in HS1 Tunnels


Wire • Cross Section

Catenary Wire·

Tension

Contact Wire Cross

Section

Contact Wire-

Tension

Height Above Rail

Allowable Uplift

HS10CS 65.4 mm2

bronze 14 kN 150 mm2

copper 20 kN 5.08 m to

5.10 m

230mm ( Eurostar height stop allows only 200mm.)

Ch ct· fara ens ICS 0 f Mark III OLE St Pancras Connecfmg L·me


Wire- Cross Section

Catenary Wire-

Tension

Contact Wire Cross

Section

Contact Wire·

Tension

Height Above Rail

Allowable Uplift

Mk III OHLE 5/2/3.95mm2

AWAC 11 kN 107mm2 11 kN 5.08 m to 5.10 m

200mm (for 160 km/h

max)

All contact wire listed in the tables above conforms to EN50149.

2.3. Environmental Conditions

The design anticipated environmental conditions applicable to the HS1 are summarised in the table below.

Description Parameter

Temperature design maximum - open track 60°C

Temperature design mean average - open track 15°C

Temperature design minimum - open track -20°C

Temperature design maximum - in tunnel 50°C

Temperature design mean average - in tunnel 15°C

- 27R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Description Parameter

Temperature design minimum - in tunnel OoC

Mean hourly wind speed (50 year return cycle) 26 m/s

Maximum 3 second gust (50 year return cycle) 38.5 m/s

Maximum design crosswind speed 50 m/s

Relative humidity design maximum 100%

The OCS in tunnels on Section 2 of the HS1 is designed for a mean hourly wind speed of 40 m/s.

2.4. Pantograph Characteristics

As the DCS design on Section 2 of the HS1 has to be compatible with different types of pantographs (BR high speed, SNCF, SNCB) the pantograph envelope is a combined envelope of these three pantographs. This is described in drawings 570-DME-SAMSP10014 "pantograph envelope for cant < 66mm" and 570-DME-SAMSP-10015 "pantograph envelope for cant> 66mm" and summarised in the figures below.

The pantograph envelope has two boundaries -"The Mechanical Envelope" and the "Electrical Envelope".

The electrical envelope is to exclude any item of equipment that is not of the same electrical potential as the contact and catenary wire (25kV). Items makil1g up the cantilever will exist within this envelope and are separated by the cantilever insulators.

The mechanical envelope excludes any physical item that would possibly contact the pantograph. The exception here is the Steady Arm that sets the stagger for the contact wire as the "head" of this is attached to the contact wire and is designed to move in conjunction with the pantograph.

2174

- 28R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Combined pantograph envelope (Cant < 66 mm)

INIUIATBl HORHS

Combined pantograph envelope for cant >66mm

The HS1 pantograph envelope complies with the Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI) regarding interoperable pantographs. The compatible pantograph configuration is as indicated in Annexe H of the Energy TSI. Pantographs on Section 2 of the HS1 must therefore comply with EN 50206. Some of the key features being:

~ The pantograph shall be able to work between contact wire heights of 4800mm to 6400mm.

~ Pantographs shall be fitted with a device that drops the pantograph in case of failure.

~ The collector headS shall be made from carbon or carbon impregnated with additive material (eg metalised carbon).

~ A device should be fitted in the pantograph collector head that will detect failure of the contact strip and automatically drop the pantograph.

The principal dimensions of the pantograph should be as specified in the table below.

Description Dimension

Width of pantograph 1600mm

Working width of pantograph 1200mm

Electrical width of pantograph 650mm

Length of contact strips ~800mm

SWhere trains are also required to run on Network Rail Infrastructure it may be necessary to provide insulated horns. This should be confirmed with the Network Rail Infrastructure Manager.

- 29R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



The pantograph dynamic characteristics are as indicated in Annexe Q of the Energy TSI, the key features are summarised in the table below.

Description Force

Static force - adjustable between 40-70N

Mean target aerodynamic force at BO km/h BON

Mean target aerodynamic force at 160 km/h 95N



2.5. Phase Separations

There is a single phase separation on the Section 2 of the HS1 at the Corsica Street neutral section located in the London tunnel 1 at Ch 2.950 km on both the Up and Down line.

The phase separation section comprises two lengths of 4.0m long PTFE (Teflon) insulator sections (with a spacer between the two lengths) making the total phase separation section 10m in length. This has been employed to take account of the limited space in the tunnel. A secondary consideration is that, although the line forms part of the high-speed system, it is on the connecting line to St Pancras which has a line speed of less than 160kph. The line speed through the neutral section is 120 km/h.

Owing to this configuration, the interface with the rolling stock subsystem requires that the distance between two consecutive pantographs6 must be ~5m or ~1 Om.

Trains operating through the neutral section are required to automatically open the on-board circuit breaker to isolate traction power during the transition. To facilitate this the signalling system is installed with the following Intermittent Transmission Loops:

~ "Cut Current" announce ITL - WNS (Warning for Neutral Section)

~ "Cut Current" execute ITL - OCB (Open Circuit Breaker)

The driver is required to manually re-close the circuit breaker after making the transition. Open and Close signs are provided each side of the axis of the neutral section. These arrangements are explained in the Scheme Plan 556-DNN-SCSEE-10010.

6 Where a spacing of less than 47m is used then the two pantographs running at maximum speed must not cause unacceptable mechanical forces or oscillation in the catenary. This must be demonstrated by means of modeling or testing.

- 30R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



2.6. System Separations

There are no system separations on the route of Section 2 of the HSl (main high-speed line) within the scope of this Register. However, there are system separations at the connections with adjacent conventional railways as follows:

~ East Coast Main Line Connection: - consult with adjacent Infrastructure Manager, Network Rail Infrastructure Limited

~ North London Line Connection: - consult with adjacent Infrastructure Manager, Network Rail Infrastructure Limited

~ Ripple Lane Connection: HS1 25kV AC OCS (12kA fault current) power supply system employing pantographs to NRIL supplied 25kV AC OLE (6kA fault current) employing pantographs but with a lower contact wire height 4.8m. The AC/AC electrical interface is made with short neutral section as described in §2.5 whilst the physical interface is made with insulated overlaps between the adjacent overhead power systems.

~ North Kent Line Connection: HS1 25kV AC OCS (12kA fault current) power supply system employing panto~raphs to Network Rail supplied third rail 750V DC system employing contact shoes. The AC/DC electrical interface is made with two isolation transformers (A & B) connected across Section Insulators located in the OCS and forming a "floating" section between the adjacent systems. The isolation transformers are provided to prevent stray DC entering the HS1 AC infrastructure. There is no physical interface of the electrical systems except for an overlapping section of dual OCS and third rail electrification.

2.7. Category of Line

The Declaration of Performance for Section 2 of the HS1 is as follows:

~ connecting line from St Pancras Station buffer stops (O.OOkm) to Corsica Street neutral section (2.950km) - Category of line type Vlb

~ high-speed line from Corsica Street neutral section (2.950km) to HS1 Section 1 interface at Southfleet Junction (39.907km) - Category of line type IIIb

2.8. Regenerative Braking

This is prohibited on Section 2 of the HS1, and where trains operating on the railway have this function there must be provision to isolate the regenerative braking on each train.

7 There are no provisions specified within the TSI with regard to system separation sections employing third rail power via a contact shoe. Trainsets required to operate beyond the HS1 on Network Rail infrastructure third rail 750V DC traction power systems should be equipped with compatible AC to DC power changeover systems.

- 31 R-5G-NC-00002-17-H so



2.9. Harmonic Characteristics

Section 2 of the HS1 conforms to National Standards regarding the power system.

2.10. Power/Current Limitation

The maximum allowable train current is 1250A; where necessary, power/current limitation devices should be provided in accordance with Annexe 0 of the Energy TSI.

2.11. Electric Protection Coordination

The electrical protection arrangements for Section 2 of the HS1 are as summarised by the power supplier (EDFE) in Appendix 7. Demonstration of the adequacy of these arrangements is considered in the Electrical Safety Case for Section 2 of the HS1 (Reference 13).

The requirement of Energy TSI clause 4.2.2.8 "Electrical Protection Coordination" relates to the coordination of circuit breaker capacity (rating) onboard rolling stock with the capacity of the circuit breakers serving the traction power supply in the feeder substation. With reference to Appendix 7, onboard circuit breakers with a lower breaking capacity than the feeder station would be unable to break contact on short circuits greater than their rating hence it would be expected that the feeder substation circuit breakers would need to remove the traction supplies.

Coordination of circuit breakers therefore requires rolling stock to have an onboard circuit breaker capacity equal to or greater than the maximum traction power fault current of Section 2 of the HS1

In event of an internal fault on a train at the HS1 maximum short circuit of 12kA, the onboard breakers would clear the fault on the train before the operation of the feeder substation circuit breakers, although the tripping process of the feeder substation breakers would have commenced in order to provide a secondary back-up (ie to coordinate the electrical protection arrangements).

2.12. Any Other Divergence from the TSI

No other divergence from the Energy TSI is noted for Section 2 of the HS1.

- 32R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Part 3: Characteristics of the Control-Command and Signalling Subsystem

The table below lists the approved derogations against the Control, Command and Signalling Subsystem (CCS) TSI applicable to Section 2 of the HS1 (References14).


L-SA-SR00002-08UNO (200156/20201: 9.2.1.1)

Derogation for the Control Command & Signalling TSI.

All ofTSI technical requirements

Approved on 20th February 2004

A global derogation has been granted against the Control, Command and Signalling TSI.

The signalling system of Section 2 of the HS1 is compatible with TVM 430, which is also fitted on lines in Belgium and France. TVM 430 is listed under Annexe B of the CCS TSI and is therefore considered a Class B system. Interoperability can be achieved over Class B systems where trains are fitted with the Class B system or by using a specific transmission module (STM), which allows the ERTMS/ETCS onboard to communicate with the national trackside equipment. The ERTMS/ETCS on the train would operate in Level STM mode SN.

The KVB system with line side signaling is installed on the St Pancras connecting line which is also a Class B system.

Rolling stock required to operate on Section 2 of the HS1 shall be fitted with one of the following train control systems:

~ TVM 430, or

~ ERTMS/ETCS with relevant STM

And with:

~ KVB (except for Class 92 locomotives where special arrangements will apply)

~ ERTMS/ETCS with relevant STM

GSM-R is installed on the Section 2 of the HS1 however currently only used as a General Purpose Radio. The derogation against the TSI allows the use of Cab Secure Radio system on the HS1 which is a Class B system.

Until such time that GSM-R is implemented in full compliance with the relevant parts of the High-Speed CCS TSI on the HS1, all rolling stock required to operate on the HS1 must be fitted with Cab Secure Radio.

- 33R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



The CSR fitted to trains must comply with BR 1845 Issue H (including amendment Oct 1995) and BR 1989.

The characteristics required to appear in the Register are derived from Annex C of the current version of the Control, Command and Signalling Subsystem TSI (Reference 3) as are considered below.

3.1. Signalling System

The principal requirements for compatibility with the HS1 signalling system are summarised in the table below.

System Description Requirement

Signalling System Used Main HS1 interoperable high-speed

route

ITCS (Interlocking and Train Control System). This utilises TVM 430 track to train transmission with in-cab signalling and onboard Automatic Train Protection (ATP).

St Pancras interoperable connecting line KVBB with Conventional Lineside Signalling

Network Rail Connections at Springhead Junction, Ripple Lane, North London Line, and East Coast Main Line

Conventional Lineside Signalling - Track Circuit Block - Solid State Interlocking -with AWSfTPWS

Temple Mills Depot (maintenance of trains)

Conventional Lineside Signalling - Track Circuit Block - Solid State Interlocking

Special Transmission Modules Required.

Trains operating on main HS1 interoperable route and St Pancras connecting line

KVB9 in-cab signalling in addition to TVM 430.

Trains intended to also operate over Network Rail controlled infrastructure

Train Protection and Warning System compliant with subsystem requirements of the relevant Notified National Technical Rule

Interoperable trains fitted with ERTMS/ETCS

STM required to interface with TVM 430 and KVB

8 Except Class 92 electric locos where special arrangements will apply. ie Class 92 not allowed into St Pancras and only from York Way South Junction to the NLL.

9 Except Class 92 electric locos where special arrangements will apply (as 8 above).

- 34R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



3.2. ERTMS/ETCS Level of Application

The relevant application levels for ERTMS/ETCS on Section 2 of the HS1 are in the table below.

System ERTMSIETCS Level Application

Signalling ERTMS/ETCS Level Not presently available

ERTMS/ETCS Optional Functions Not presently available

ERTMS/ETCS Version Not presently available

ERTMS/ETCS placing into service date At the next major upgrade of the HS1 signalling system

Radio ERTMS/GSM-R optional functions HS1 Section 2 - Not yet in use

ERTMS/GSM-R Version HS1 Section 2 - Version in use as General Purpose Radio (GPR)

ERTMS/GSM-R placing into service date

System will be updated to full compliance with relevant parts of CCS TSI at some time in the future as part of the UK National Implementation Programme

3.3. Application of Class B System

The Class B system specification for the implemented application is given in the table below.

System Class B Requirement Application

Signalling Class B Systems ITCS - TVM 430 and KVB

Class B System Version Variation number of software10

Class B system period of validity - for current software revision

Until next major upgrade of the HS1 signalling system

Requirement for multiple Class B systems active at once

KVB11 - simultaneous operation with TVM

430 on HS1 Section 2

Interface with other Class B systems on adjacent infrastructure.

TPWS - Network Rail interface

10 The most recent version should be confirmed with the Infrastructure Manager.

11 Except Class 92 electric locos where special arrangements will apply.

·35 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



System Class B Requirement Application

Radio Class B System Cab Secure Radio

Class B System Version BR 1845 Issue H (including amendment Oct 1995) and BR 1989 and BR1661 Issue A (for rolling stock)

Class B system period of validity To be updated to full compliance with relevant parts of CCS TSI as part of the UK National Implementation Programme

Requirement for multiple Class B systems active at once

System will be updated to full compliance with relevant parts of CCS TSI at some time in the future as part of the UK National Implementation Programme

3.4. ERTMS/ETCS Level 1: Rolling Stock Implementation Requirements

Not required for Section 2 of the HS1.

3.5. Switch Over Between Different Class B Systems

Switch over between adjacent Class B systems is made at the following locations:

~ North London Line (via Silo Curve and HS1/NLL connection) - HS1 KVB with Iineside signalling to NRIL conventionallineside signalling with AWSfTPWS

~ East Coast Main Line - HS1 KVB with lineside signalling to NRIL conventional lineside signalling with AWSfTPWS

~ St Pancras connecting line - HS1 TVM 430 with cab signalling to HS1 KVB with Iineside signalling

~ Temple Mills Depot connection - HS1 TVM 430 with cab signalling to NRIL conventional Iineside signalling with AWSfTPWS

~ Ripple Lane connections - HS1 TVM 430 with cab signalling to NRIL conventional lineside signalling with AWSfTPWS

~ NKL connection - HS1 TVM 430 with cab signalling to NRIL conventional lineside signalling with AWSrrpWs

The general sequence of arming and disarming Class B systems at interfaces between HS1 TVM 430 and NRIL: AWSrrpWS utilises various beacons and loops as indicated in the tables below (shown for the Eurostar and Class 92 by way of example).

- 36R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



3.5.1. Network Rail to HS1

C373 Eurostar : Class 395 AWS + TVM + KVB DGV

C92 Freight train: AWS + TVM + APC-DGV magnet

1 :AR

Intermittent Transmission loop (ITl) (arming)

TVM Cab Signalling arming TVM Cab Signalling arming

2 : DGV beacon Cab signalling permanent monitoring of cab signal arming.

Emergency braking is applied in case of non TVM arming or TVM disarming

Not applicable

3:APC-DGV

(automatic power control magnet)

Not applicable

Cab signalling permanent monitoring of cab signal arming. Emergency braking is applied in case of non TVM arming or TVM disarming

4 : DAWS beacon

(AWS disarming) AWS disarming (no control associated) AWS disarming (no control associated)

3.5.2. HS1 to Network Rail

C373 Eurostar : Class 395 AWS + TVM + KVB DGV

C92 Freight train: AWS + TVM + APC-DGV magnet

1: FGV+ EAWS

(AWS arming beacons)

AWS arming (no on-board control associated)

AWS arming (no control associated)

Monitoring deactivation of cab signalling arming.

2:FGV Monitoring deactivation of cab signal arming Not applicable

3: DE+DE

(disarming loop)

TVM cab signalling disarming: twice for redundancy purpose

Emergency braking if speed check or cab signalling not disarmed when entering non TVM track circuit.

TVM cab signalling disarming: twice for redundancy purpose

Emergency braking if speed check or cab signalling not disarmed when entering non TVM track circuit.

Railway Undertakings should consult with the HS1 Infrastructure Manager regarding these transitions.

3.6. Switch Over between Different Radio System

The general principle for Cab Secure Radio is that drivers shall be in contact with the signaller controlling the next signal or marker, which the train is approaching (consistent with

- 37R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



current UK practice). The automatic sWitching of Cab Secure Radio from one system to another is triggered by the stepping of the TD berths using the occupation of track circuits as a train passes from one control area to another.

Interface Location Signal Berth Control Centre

HS1 Section 2 main line AF marker I signal Ashford AFC - HS1 Section 2

Camden Road Junction Signalling Centre -Network Rail

Kings Cross Signalling Centre - Network Rail

West Hampstead Signalling Centre -Network Rail

Upminster Signalling Centre - Network Rail

Ashford IECC North Kent Signalling Centre -Network Rail

St Pancras CR signal

K signal

WH signal

Ripple Lane UR signal

Springhead Junction (connection to NR HDR line)

NK signal

Railway Undertakings should consult with the HS1 Infrastructure Manager regarding these transitions.

3.7. Technical Degraded Modes

The technical degraded modes for HS1 Section 2 control, command and communication systems are specified in the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10) and this should be the principal source for this information.

3.8. Speed Limits

The relevant operating Iinespeed for the Section 2 of the HS1 are as indicated in Appendix 2 and account for the maximum gradients and train braking performance indicated in Part 5.0. There are currently no speed limit restrictions other than those imposed on the different type of rolling stock described in Part 5.0. The HS1 Infrastructure Manager has a process to notify details of temporary speed restrictions, and should be consulted for information (see Part 4.0)

3.9. Electromagnetic Compatibility

Appendix 8 represents the HS1 current harmonic reference profile. This is given per unit harmonic current on 50Hz current base where unity is equivalent to 650A (ie 1 on the x axis = 650A). The levels of EMI generated by any train (including when operating in any reasonably foreseeable degraded mode) shall be less than those predicted by the HS1 reference profile.

- 38R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



In circumstances where this is not possible then it shall be demonstrated by other means (eg EMI/EMC modeling and testing) that the rolling stock has no adverse impact on the HS1 infrastructure, adjacent railway infrastructure and other third parties who may be affected by train EMI effects.

As part of the route compatibility process, the measured traction harmonic profile of rolling stock is to be provided by the Railway Undertaking to the HS1 Infrastructure Manager

3.10. Climatic and Physical Conditions

For climatic and physical conditions considered in the design see Part 2. Section 2.3 above.

- 39R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Part 4: Operational Conditions

The operational conditions relevant to Section 2 of the HS1 are as specified in the CTRLRule Book and the Sectional Appendix to the CTRL Rule Book (Reference 10), which should be the principal source for this information.

The operational language is English.

The key operational requirements arising from the relevant high-speed TSls (References 1, 2 & 3) are described below.

4.1. Effects of cross winds

The requirements for design of interoperable infrastructure regarding cross winds are given in the Infrastructure TSI as:

"4.3.3.23 Effects of cross winds"

"Interoperable vehicles are designed to ensure that their overturning or derailment safety criteria remain valid when the vehicles are subjected to cross winds of a maximum speed designed by the applicable European specifications or CEN standards.

Each Member State shall define for each interoperable line the rules to be applied to both vehicles and infrastructure to guarantee the stability of vehicles subjected to cross winds. These rules shall be published in the Infrastructure Register for the interoperable line concerned.

If local points along the infrastructure covered by the TSI are at risk from high wind speeds, either due to their geographic situation or to local specific features of the line (such as altitude above surrounding ground level), the Infrastructure Manager must take the necessary measures to maintain the level of traffic safety, by:

~ locally reducing train speeds, possible temporarily during periods at risk from storms,

~ installing equipment to protect the track section concerned from cross winds,

~ or taking the necessary steps to prevent vehicle overturning or derailment, by means of appropriate devices. "

The Rolling Stock TSI contains information relating to the maximum wind speed to which an interoperable train may be subjected. The information is contained in Section 4.2.14 "Effect of cross winds" which states:

- 40R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



"This item is still an open question (further studies underway). The transitional situation is described in the infrastructure TSI, Section 4.3.3.23."

In the absence of any specific TSI requirement regarding allowable wind speed of interoperable trains the HS1 has adopted the best practice applied on European high-speed railways such as SNCF which utilises similar rolling stock, and on existing UK conventional infrastructure operated by Network Rail. This involves setting a threshold wind speed at which operational measures would be implemented to reduce train speed so as to minimise any possible risk. The HS1 instructions to this effect are contained in Section 6 of the CTRL Rule Book Sectional Appendix (Reference 10) and require the following:

6.5 High winds

If the weather forecast indicates wind speeds, either mean or gusting, in excess of 160 km/h (100 mph) anywhere on the route, then the signaller must apply a speed restriction of 230 km/h over the whole of the route.

If the signaller becomes aware of wind speeds reaching the above level without being forecast, i.e. by the remote monitoring equipment, then they must immediately apply the speed restriction as detailed above.

The signaller must advise the HS1 shift manager and EMMIS controller whenever speed restrictions are imposed as a result of high wind speeds.

With regard to the third paragraph of Section 4.3.3.23 of the Infrastructure TSI there are no local points along the route of HS1 section 2 which are considered at risk from higher wind speed. The vast majority of the infrastructure of HS1 section 2 is either in tunnel, or is in locations not exposed to high cross winds. However, the wording of the HS1 Sectional Appendix given above is fully consistent with the requirement of the first bullet point of the aforementioned third paragraph of the TSI.

4.2. Exceptions in the Case of Execution of Works

This requirement relates to the following clauses of the TSls:

~ Infrastructure TSI - clause 4.2.3.2.3

~ Energy TSI - clause 4.2.3.4

And states:

The specifications for the energy subsystem and its interoperability constituents defined in Chapters 4 and 5 of the TSI are applicable to lines in normal functioning conditions or in the case of unexpected malfunctions which require the application of the maintenance plan.

Under some situations where works have been programmed in advance, it may not be possible to conform to these provisions whilst executing modifications to the Energy subsystem.

- 41 • R-SG-NC-00002-17-H SO



These temporary exceptions to the TSI rules shall be defined by the adjudicating entity of the line concerned, who shall be careful that no risks for the safety of passing trains will result therefrom, by applying the following general provisions:

~ the exceptions allowed shall be temporary and planned for a specific time period,

~ railway undertakings operating on the line shall be given notice of these temporary exceptions, of their geographic situation, of their nature and of their particular signalling, by means of written notices describing the case being the type of specific signals used. A model of such notice shall be joined to the register of infrastructure defined in Annex 0 to this TSI of the line,

~ any exception shall induce complementary safety measures, so as to ensure that the safety level requirement stays fulfilled. These complementary measures may in particular consist of:

o . particular survey provisions of the works concerned, o . temporary speed restrictions on the line section as taken by the

adjudicating entity.

This requirement is discharged by the HS1 Infrastructure Manager via a written "Daily Notice" which is issued to all affected parties including Train Operators on Section 2 of the HS1. A copy of the "Daily Notice" proforma is attached in Appendix 9.

- 42R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Part 5: Performance Requirements for Rolling Stock

The requirements for the compatibility of rolling stock with the infrastructure are not defined by this Register and should be obtained in consultation with the HS1 Section 2 Infrastructure Manager, NR(CTRL) Ltd.

In general, rolling stock performance requirements are to be consistent with the applicable TSls except where derogations are granted or there are other divergences as are considered in the relevant sections of the Register.

A significant factor affecting the performance requirement of rolling stock is the global derogation against the CCS TSI (see Part 3.0) and the specification of the TVM 430 and KVB Class B systems. The compatibility of the rolling stock with these signaling systems is defined in the documents:

556-RUE-RLEEK-00008 St Pancras CTRL station KVB requirements (Reference 16)

556-SN-SCSEE-20001 Signalling System Requirements Specification (Reference 17)

With regard to the block sectioning there are a number of requirements as regards train performance as are explained in:

556-RUG-SCSEE-00063 VHME (HBD/HWB) Rolling Stock Interface Requirements Specification (Reference 18)

These should be the principal reference documents however the key performances are summarized below for information.

5.1. Maximum Speed

Maximum permitted speeds for rolling stock that will operate on the Section 2 of the HS1 are as indicated in the table below.

Roiling Stock Maximum Speed

Passenger Trains 230km/h

Freight Trains (& engineering trains)12 140km/h

12 Includes locomotives assisting a passenger train.

- 43R-SG-NC-00002-17-Hso



Where freight trains are proposed in excess of 140km/h it shall be demonstrated that the braking performance is consistent with the HS1 Section 2 signalling requirements (ie block sectioning).

5.2. Maximum Train Length

Maximum lengths permitted for rolling stock that will operate on Section 2 of the HS1 are as indicated in the table below.

Rolling Stock Overall Length

Intemational Passenger Trains 400m

Domestic Passenger Trains 276m

Freight Trains (& engineering trains) 175m (including locomotives)13

5.3. Maximum Axle Load

Maximum axle load permitted for rolling stock that will operate on Section 2 of the HS1 are as indicated in the table below.

Train Type Operating Speed Maximum static load Po

Passenger Trains 230km/h Po<17 tlaxle

Freight Trains (& engineering trains) 140km/h Po<22.5 tlaxle

5.4. Minimum Acceptable Braking Rates

The minimum acceptable braking rates applied to the different types of rolling stock and conditions on Section 2 of the HS1 are considered in the tables below.

13 Freight trains length 775m (including locomotives); local length restrictions below this figure may apply in the St Pancras area and will be confirmed at a later date.

- 44R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



5.4.1. Maximum Service Braking

At 1.5 bar depression in the air brake pipe.

1. Passenger Trains (maximum speed 230 km/h)

Speed (5) 220>5>200 km/h 200>5>0 km/h

deceleration 0.65 to 0.85 m/52 0.85 m/52

tb 35 35

Where tb = train brakes response time In seconds.

2. Freight/Engineering Trains (maximum speed 140 km/h)

Speed (5) 140>5>0 kmlh

deceleration 0.54 m/52

tb 12.65

Where tb = train brakes response time in seconds.

If freight trains are proposed in excess of 140km/h it shall be demonstrated that the braking performance is consistent with the HS1 Section 2 signalling requirements (ie block sectioning).

5.4.2. Emergency Braking Related to distance for overrun calculations.

1. Passenger Trains - example distances comprising response time of braking different start speed for measurement and are on level track.

Start Speed (km/h) Target Speed (kmIh) Stopping Distance (m)

210 0 2737

180 0 2094

90 0 681

35 0 147

- 45R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Emergency braking response times

i Speed (S) 220>S>200 kmlh 200>S>0 kmlh

2.5 to 3 s 3s

2. Freight IEngineering Trains

Maximum length 175m

Maximum weight 1600 t14

Guaranteed deceleration rate (Including dispersal and train resistance coeff1clents)

0.72 m/s2

Guaranteed brake response time 12.16 s

Maximum speed 140 km/h

Where freight trains are proposed in excess of 140km/h it shall be demonstrated that the braking performance is consistent with the HS1 Section 2 signalling requirements (ie block sectioning).

5.4.3. Values for Control Curve The control speed at the exit from the previous block section must be maintained for 2.2s within the current block section before the control curve is implemented.

1. Passenger Trains

Sequences Controlled speed (km/h) Control deceleration (m/s2 )

230-200 240-210 0.53

200-160 210-170 0.85

160-100 170-110 0.85

100-0 110-0 0.85

RRR 35 0

14 Due to maximum gradient of 2.5%, trains composed of vehicles fitted with standard UIC 85t couplings will be limited to a maximum trailing load of 11 00t.

- 46R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO




Controlled deceleration within the range from 0.72 to 0.91 m/s2•

The controlled deceleration given is the full service (or emergency) at 1.5 bar depression. Otherwise it is 0.54m/s2 (with a 12.71second propagation time).

5.4.4. Usual Service Braking At 1.0 bar depression in the air brake pipe.

In addition to the minimum braking characteristics specified above the trains shall comply with the following average decelerations in service.

1. Passenger Trains

Speed (5) 230-5-0 kmlh


tb 2.35

Where tb =train brakes response time in seconds.


Speed (5) 140-5-0 kmlh


tb 13.75

Where tb =train brakes response time In seconds.

5.5. Special Requirements

Rolling stock should have a high level of fire resistance compatible with operation in tunnels (underground) and comply with the relevant fire protection standards. The maximum fire onboard a passenger train should be demonstrated to be equal to or less than the design base fire of 7MW.

Passenger trains should demonstrate a minimum 30 minutes fire and smoke protection between adjacent carriages.

Freight should comply with the requirements regarding the carriage of hazardous goods stipulated for operation through the Channel Tunnel, or other restrictions set by the HS1 Infrastructure Manager, NR(CTRL).

- 47R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



All trains shall be designed to be able to continue to drive out of all HS1 Section 2 tunnels in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances (eg fire onboard). Critical equipment should be adequately fire protected such that the train is not immobilised within a minimum period of 15 minutes. It may however be necessary under certain circumstance to be able to drive a train out of a tunnel in the reverse direction.

Fire suppression shall be provided for equipment that is susceptible to causing fire, such as power cars, locomotives or traction motors.

- 48R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 1 . H51 Section 2 Line of Route Description

~ Figures A1: HS1 Section 2 Route Alignment

- 49 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 2 - HS1 Section 2 Schematic Layout Alignment

> Drawing Number: 104-DLA-00000-86550-06, Section 2 Contract 104 St Pancras Track Layout Speeds and Turnout Details

> Drawing Number: 576-DLA-SACTS-00003-Z0, Schematic Alignment of Section 2

> Drawing Number: 576-DLE-SACTS-00104-Z0, Section 1/Section 2 Interface Track

- 51 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 3 - HS1 Section 2 Station Layouts

~ Drawing Number: 100-T99-00000-50414-AB, St Pancras International Platforms Lengths and Clearances

~ Drawing Number: 232-DHA-00961-50150-04, Section 2 - Contract 232 - Stratford International Platform Layout General Arrangement

~ Drawing Number: 340-DHA-03650-50150-04, Contract 340 - Ebbsfleet International Platform Layout General Arrangement

- 55 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 4 - HS1 Section 2 Tunnel Schematics

Drawing Number: 588-DPX-RDRAK-30109-AF, FICP Panel general Arrangement:

>- Sheet 1 of 4 - Revision Sheet

>- Sheet 2 of 4 - Thames Tunnel

>- Sheet 3 of 4 - London Tunnel 1

>- Sheet 4 of 4 - London Tunnel 2

- 59R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 5 - List of HS1 Section 2 Access Points: Emergency Services (extracted from document "CTRL Sections 1 &2 Systemwide Access Maps").

The following tables give the locations of HS1 Section 1 access points showing the following information:

~ The approximate HS 1 "chainage" location of the access point

~ The name of the public highway "address" from which access can be gained

~ Description of access at each location.

- 64R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



,,3 Section 2 - HS1

HS1 Oh", i I·", , .... I,

. ' IAddtes8' Iw: D::.<·i,:!jl.:li ......... Description

(On line) I: ".

, .'."

.CD

0+ 400 St. Pancras Platforms 5 to 10 Pedestrian Access at end of platforms

0+520 St. Pancras Platforms 11 to 13 Pedestrian access to end of platforms

0+500 Cam ley Street Vehicle access to HS1 Relief from Cam ley Street

0+640 Cam ley Street Bridge Pedestrian access to HS1 from Camley St Bridge (Maintenance areas at the end of platforms 4&5 and platforms 9&10)

0+800 Regen~CanalBridge Pedestrian access to the HS1 relief and up lines from Regents Canal Bridge

0+900 Kings Cross Central Pedestrian access to HS1 relief line trackside layout area Ch. 0+890 to Ch. 1+110

1+000 Castle Road (off Development Access Road) Vehicle access to HS1 Maintenance Siding

1+300 London West Portal BUilding (off York Way) Pedestrian access to maintenance area alongside HS1 Up line. Vehicle Parking area alongside.

1+340 Caledonian Road Pedestrian access to both lines at the tunnel portal.

3+050/3+110 Corsica Street Emergency access to both lines at the Corsica Street Vent Shaft. Vehicle access to the emergency hard standing area with pedestrian access through the vent shaft to the tracks.

5+910/5+972 Graham Road Emergency access to both lines at the Graham Road Vent Shaft. Vehicle access to the emergency hard standing area with pedestrian access through the vent shaft to the tracks.

9+090 Stratford Station Maintenance Access Stairs Pedestrian access to track level outer and inner Iineside walkways at Stratford Box Westt Portal

9+425 Stratford Station Emergency Access Footbridge Emergency access to all lines at Stratford Station West Emergency Access Bridge

9+850 Stratford Station Emergency Access Footbridge Emergency access to all lines at Stratford Station East Emergency Access Bridge

10+120 Stratford Station Maintenance Access Stairs Pedestrian access to track level outer and inner lineside walkways at Stratford Box East Portal

- 65R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

~ FLUOR DANIEL,. 1 FLUOR


Revision 01, Date 15 JUly 2009 of 90

Section 2 • HS1

HS1 Ch

(On line)

'Addtess'I>

Woodgrange Road

,

Description;:; \,' , ',,'ii"',

Emergency access to both lines at the Woodgrange Road Vent Shaft. Vehicle access to the emergency hard standing area with pedestrian access through the vent shaft to the tracks. 11 +913

14+796 Barrington Road Emergency access to both lines at the Barrington Road Vent Shaft. Vehicle access to the emergency hard standing area with pedestrian access through the vent shaft to the tracks.

17+784 A13 Alfred's Way Emergency access to both lines at the Wayside Vent Shaft. Vehicle access to the emergency hard standing area with pedestrian access through the vent shaft to the tracks.

20+130 Choats Road Emergency access to both lines Ripple Lane Portal

21+168 Chequers Lane

Creekside Access (off Ferry Lane)

Pedestrian access to the up connecting line only

22+842 Vehicle access to the down line

Vehicle access to the down line 23+170

23+400 Vehicle access to the down line (Rainham Viaduct)

23+680 Pedestrian access to the down line

Vehicle access to the up line23+260 Manor Way

Lamson Road 23+841 Vehicle access to the up line

24+265 Ferry Lane (South) Vehicle access to the up line (Rainham Viaduct)

- 66R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

~ FLUOR DANIEL",



;;,;;". .....•...<)';,:; ':;,/.~:~ 'M·.!I.9.';'~"c. .,,'.7 .....H"I",'.b .' :,:;;,' /'" . '.',,< .,.,', •··.•• ..M;;' ).;;;',:.:"

,';;" \:::i 'i;,:" .... .. ," ":, ",:, ;" ,'\1.. :","':"....:"HS1 Ch Descriptioni',:.,: .. ' ": " (On line)





25+780 Vehicle access to the down line at trackside layout area Ch. 25+740 to Ch. 25+920 Ferry Lane (North)


26+000 Pedestrian access to both lines (Wennington Footbridge)



27+210 Pedestrian access to both lines (Aveley Viaduct)

27+870 Juliette Way Pedestrian access to both lines (Aveley Viaduct)

28+430 Tank Hill Road Pedestrian access to the down line

29+130 Tank Lane (Botany Way Bridge) Pedestrian access to the up line

29+120 A1306 Arterial Road Purfleet Pedestrian access to the down line

30+470 Purfleet Bypass Vehicle access to the down line. Pedestrian access to the up line. (Thurrock Viaduct)

31+576 Pedestrian access beneath Thurrock Viaduct

31+577

Oliver Close

Vehicle access to the down line. Pedestrian access to both lines. (Thurrock Viaduct)

32+222

Realigned Oliver Road

Emergency access to both lines at the Thames Tunnel London Portal Vent Building Oliver Road Diversion

- 67R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

~ FLUOR DANIEL



iy: Section 2 • HS1 .. : :' . ...: .

:y(y' . ,.; " ...... HiHS1.Ch: t ;;1:';)); .i.: 1Ada,..s' Description

. .... ..:; .. " . :< ":"(On I;~:)" .......; I:: .........•....;.':",:;:: ...•. X

. "

34+905 Emergency access to both lines at the Thames Tunnel Country Portal Vent Building

35+675

Manor Way (extension)

Continuous vehicle access to up line from Ch.35+680 to 35+840 (at trackside layout area).

Continuous vehicle access to down line from Ch.35+700 to 35+850 (at trackside layout area).Access

Rifle Range Access Road

Galley Hill Road (A226) 35+770 from Network Rail North Kent Line only.

Pedestrian access to the up line. Steps to the NKL overbridge NO.3590. Access from Network Rail 35+910 NKL Overbridge 3590

North Kent Line only.

36+000 Pedestrian access to the down line. Steps to the NKL overbridge NO.3590.

36+125

NKL Overbridge 3590

Pedestrian access to the down line from R.E.C. sub-station.

36+345

STDR4 (roundabout)

Pedestrian access to all inside lines via Ebbsfleet Station Subway North.

36+358/

Car Park A

Pedestrian access to all HS1 lines via platform ends, London end of Ebbsfleet Station. (Note: Access to Ebbsfleet Platforms

the HS1 Down line is by crossing the HS1 Down International (stopping) line.)

36+773

36+479

Pedestrian access to all HS1 lines, via platform ends, Country end of Ebbsfleet Station.

37+190

Ebbsfleet Platforms

Continuous vehicle access to the down line between Ch.37+190 to 37+360 (trackside layout area)

37+275

A2 STDR4 Link Road

Continuous vehicle access to the up line between Ch.37+250 to 37+420 (trackside layout area)

37+620

A2 STDR4 Link Road

Ebbsfleet River Footpath Landscaping access only.

Vehicle access to up line. Lineside access is via auto transformer compound at the Pepper Hill tunnel portal, London end

38+060 Pepperhill Link Road Pedestrian access to the down line. Steps to lineside are via PROW NU15 & 16 at the Pepper Hill tunnel portal, London end.

38+770 A2 London-bound on & off slip (existing) Pedestrian access to both lines. Access steps to lineside at the Pepper Hill Tunnel Portal, Country end.

- 68R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

51 FLUOR DANIEL .. '. FlldJR



Section 2- Midland Mainline

MMLCh 'Address' ...

Shorebase Access Road

I DescriptionI···· ) •• .o]Y

Pedestrian Access to Down Line (end of platform 1) 0+540

0+660 Cam ley Street

Regents Canal

Pedestrian access to EWS Sidings and MML Down and Up Fast from Camley Street Bridge

0+800 Pedestrian access to EWS Sidings and MML Down Fast from Regents Canal Street Bridge

Section 2 - HS1 Connections at Kings Cross Lands

'Address' Description

Maiden Lane (off Cedar Way) Vehicle access to WCML viaduct & EWS Siding (MML)

Development Access Road Pedestrian access to the Silo Curve

Belle Isle (off York Way) Pedestrian access to North London Incline

.. ...... ... Section 2 - North Kent L1r1e

NKLCh 'Address'

Car Park A

Ebbsfleet Station Drop -off area

I ..... ..

Description

Pedestrian access to NKLC downline lineside

Pedestrian access to NKLC upline lineside

Pedestrian access to both connecting lines, via platforms Country end.

0+800

0+810

0+970 Ebbsfleet High Level Station

- 69R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

~ FLUOR DANIEL. lFlUOR



Section. 2 - North' Kent Line .....

NKLCh . 1+ .' ~Addre88' .

DescriptIon

1+110 Car Park C I Station Approach Road East Pedestrian access to NKLC upline lineside

1+270 STDR4 Pedestrian access to the down connecting line. Access steps to Iineside, via PROW NU14 and Blue Lake access track.

1+360 STDR4 Pedestrian access to the up connecting line. Access steps to lineside, via PROW NU14 and Blue Lake access track.

1+460 Blue Lake Access track Pedestrian access to down connecting line.

1+620 Church Path Pit Pedestrian access to NKLC downline lineside , from Church Path Pit Access Track turning head

1+920 Church Path Pit Perimeter Access Track (off Blue Lake Access Track)

Landscaping gate

1+940 Blue Lake Access Track Vehicular access to Church Path Pit Sidings

- 70R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

~ FLUOR DANIEL, ,'FlU(lR c'



Appendix 6 - Traction Power Feeding and Sectioning

~ Drawing Number: 104-DMB-00000-50021-03, Section 2 - Contract 104 - St Pancras Scheme Design Isolation Diagram

~ Drawing Number: 576-DMB-SWOOO-00001-AJ, OCS Feeding and Sectioning Diagram Section 2 ch 1.676km to 39.508km

- 71 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 7 - HS1 Electrical Protection Arrangements

- 74R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Electrical Protection System - HS1 Section 2

The Protection system is designed such that the operation of the protection system for a given fault results in the disconnection of the minimum amount of plant in the fastest possible time. Each protection scheme operates into one of the two circuit breaker trip circuits and has reliable battery backed-up DC supply. Operation of any protection relay also sends a signal to start a two-stage breaker fail protection scheme. If the breaker fails to operate, stage 1 of the breaker fail protection scheme will send a trip signal to both trip coils of the breaker and generate an alarm. If it still fails to operate, stage 2 of the breaker fail protection scheme will send a trip signal to the upstream circuit breaker.

All relays are designed, manufactured and tested to IEC 60255. All relevant protection alarm and trip indications are made available at the protection panel, the EDFE supervisory system at Singlewell maintenance base and at the ECR via EMMIS system.

In order to determine fault conditions on the high voltage system, protection relays have to measure voltages and currents on the high voltage side. Primary voltage and current values are too high to be measured by protection relays directly so they are transformed to lesser values proportional to primary values; this is done using voltage and current transformers. The ratios of voltage transformers are such that secondary values measured by relays have 110Volts for a nominal primary voltage value, 27.5kV. The ratios of current transformers depend on the primary current, fault current and required secondary current and are determined on case by case basis. All current transformer ratios are shown on the relevant Single Line diagrams.

The 25-0-25kVand 25kV traction power systems are protected with 25 kV and 400 kV circuit breakers utilising the following types of protection schemes:

Impedance Protection Relays

Impedance Protection Relays are used on the 25kV Choats Road traction feeder breakers, the Stratford AT station catenary connection breakers, St. Pancras AT station traction feeder breakers and Temple Mills Depot (TMD) traction feeder breakers. Impedance protection trips the relevant circuit breakers in case of short circuits or abnormal traction load conditions on the various feeding sections of the HS1. This ensures that a fault (in the St Pancras area, for example) does not impact on the operation of the main HS1 or TMD.

Over Current Protection

Over-current protection relays are used to trip 25 kV and 400 kV breakers in order to: provide backup protection with Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) Characteristics to trip the breakers in the advent the distance protection fails to operate correctly. protect the traction transformers, autotransformers, filters, reactors and other electrical plant from short circuits and overload and subsequent heating and damage of the plant and transformers.

Under Voltage Protection

-75 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Under voltage protection is used on the AT and depot breakers to trip the breakers on loss of voltage to enable the Traction Power system to have sequenced automatic re-energisation after tripping on distance protection or over-current of the feeder station breakers.

System faults are cleared by main and backup system protection, which causes a loss of voltage to the affected section of the power system. Under voltage protection is used on the autotransformer circuit breakers to trip the breakers on loss of voltage to enable the Traction Power system to have sequenced automatic re-energisation after tripping due to main or backup protection operation. Autotransformer station under voltage protection is delayed up to 1 second to eliminate spurious trips due to voltage dips and transients. Once the fault detected by the main or backup station protection is cleared and voltage on the system reinstated, autotransformer circuit breakers that tripped on under voltage sequentially close on detection of catenary voltage with a time delay of several seconds.

Traction supplies through London tunnels are normally configured such that one tunnel cable supplies Stratford autotransformer station and the other supplies St Pancras autotransformer station ensuring that these two cable supplies are not paralleled. Stratford and St Pancras autotransformer stations utilise under voltage protection as part of the automatic changeover of tunnel cable supplies. In case of a fault on one cable, the supplies are automatically switched so the remaining healthy cable is used to supply all required loads.

Under voltage protection is also used on other circuit breakers to ensure correct sequence of manual re-closure following a fault on any item of plant.

25kV Traction Supplies Protection Co-ordination

The protection system is fully co-ordinated throughout and with NGC. All faults on the OCS system including faults on trains are disconnected in minimum possible time but always within 200ms.

The protection will be set in such way that it operates on all OCS faults but does not operate on traction load. EDFE will only integrate protection as far as the furthest point of supply by HS1 25kV OCS system. However no facilities will exist to permit the extension of the HS1 25kV system into the wider Network Rail infrastructure. The HS1 is divided in to a number of separate protections zones in order to allow sections of the railway to continue to operate in the event of a protection system trip in a traction adjacent zone. The 25kV protection zones are illustrated in figure 1.1 below:

-76 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



IT Station

Ebbsfleet

CTRL High Speed Line

- Protection from Stratford AT Station Protection from St Pancras AT

- ~HI\iI't\;on from Choats Road Feeder Station (6kA area)

- Protection from Choats Road Feeder Station Protection by Network Rall/NR (CTRL)

Figure 1.1 25kV Protection Zones

Feeder station distance protection (Choats Road and Singlewell) has to be delayed by 100ms in order to ensure that in case of a fault at Temple Mills Depot or at St Pancras only the affected section trips and the remaining traction supplies for the rest of the system remain uninterrupted.

Distance protection at all stations is provided with auto-reclose function which re-closes traction circuit breakers after a fault has been cleared by circuit breaker opening.

Protection of the traction transformer and cable feeders to the feeder station

The traction transformer has duplicate protection schemes with separate HV winding, LV winding, ampere-turn balance, high-set and IDMT overcurrent protection.

In accordance with the National Grid Code, all 400 kV faults are cleared in less than BOrns. This applies to faults detected by either the HV winding, LV winding or ampere-turn balance protection of the traction transformer. The traction transformer is also protected by Bucholz protection, pressure relief protection, oil and winding temperature protection.

The 400kV circuit breaker is shared with National Grid Transco 400/275kV transformer. In the case of a fault on either the traction transformer or its banked partner the common 400kV circuit breaker will open, followed by the automatic opening of the disconnector associated with the faulted transformer and delayed auto reclosure of the 400kV circuit breaker in order to re-energise the healthy transformer.

Unit protection is provided for the 25kV cables to the feeder station, for both catenary and feeder connection. In the event of a fault on any interconnecting cable, the 25kV circuit breakers at both ends of the cable open simultaneously.

The unit protection scheme uses dual fibre optic cable link which is continuously monitored. In the case of a fibre optic cable link failure, an alarm shall be raised at the local control panel, feeder station MMI, and ECR but without a protection trip. Cable protection in this eventuality is provided by the IDMT overcurrent protection which acts as backup protection device.

Feeder Station Protection

-77 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Feeder station consists of two sets of busbars, main and reserve. The busbars are used to connect the incoming supply from NGC with two SVCs (one catenary and one feeder), traction supplies and London Tunnel cables. Each of these circuits can be selected to be supplied wither from the main busbar of from the reserve busbar via busbar disconnectors. The busbars can be connected together using bus coupler circuit breaker.

Overcurrent protection is provided at the incoming circuit breaker from NGC for protection of switchyard equipment. Overcurrent protection is also provided on the bus coupler. Each SVC is protected by overall differential protection backed up by overcurrent protection. Each of the three filter legs on each SVC is protected by current balance protection which detects faults in capacitor banks and is backed up with overcurrent protection.

OCS Protection - automated sequences

At Choats Road there are a total of four traction feeder circuit breakers. Two of the traction feeders that feed towards the open country section are two pole, feeder and catenary connections to the OCS. These are protected by duplicate distance impedance protection relays. Overcurrent protection is provided to act as back-up to the duplicated distance (impedance) protection.

The two traction feeders feeding the OCS system in tunnels are single pole connections to the catenary only. These are taken off the associated tunnel cable circuit but are protected separately from tunnel cables. These feeders are also protected by duplicate distance protection relays backed up by overcurrent protection.

As most catenary faults are expected to be transient, an automatic "one shot" re-close scheme is provided for whenever the 25kV circuit breakers trip on impedance protection. If the fault has cleared, the circuit breaker remains closed after re-closure. If after the reclose sequence the fault has not cleared, the 25kV feeder circuit breaker shall trip again. In this event, the auto-reclose facility is locked out.

During the period when the auto-reclose sequence is timing out the power to the catenary system is lost. All autotransformer stations connected to the effected section detect this loss of voltage and trip their breakers. Any trains that may be in the section will also detect this loss of voltage and the locomotive circuit breakers will also trip. The auto-reclose sequence recloses the traction circuit breakers after 6 seconds. If the protection does not see the fault any more and the circuit breakers remain closed Le. the fault was transient, the autotransformer stations will detect this and will automatically close their circuit breakers in predefined sequence. If only one track successfully re-closes, the sequence will be the same as above for that track. The other track will be tripped again and will remain de-energised and associated circuit breakers at autotransformer stations will remain open. The locomotives will detect the catenary voltage and train circuit breakers can be closed. If the loss of catenary power is for longer than 10 seconds, the train breaks are automatically applied, the signalling system blocks the section and the train pantograph is lowered.

Because the UP and DOWN tracks are paralleled in normal configuration by circuit breakers at AT stations, it is necessary to ensure that both traction circuit breakers feeding the same section trip at the same time, there is a direct intertrip between two associated traction

-78 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



breakers. In case the protection on any of the two associated circuit breakers detects a fault, both traction breakers will open.

Protection of Stratford Autotransformer station

Stratford autotransformer station consists of two identical compact autotransformer modules. Each module connects an autotransformer, incoming cable from feeder station, cable feeder to St Pancras, two traction feeders and one feeder to Temple Mills Depot to common busbars.

Autotransformer and busbar protection is provided by high impedance differential protection, which ensures that all circuit breakers supplying the fault trip and lock out. In this case, all loads are automatically transferred to the healthy cable and traction supplies are reestablished, apart from the TMD feeder which has to be manually reconfigured. The transformers are also protected by Bucholz protection, pressure relief protection, oil and winding temperature protection.

The protection of TMD feeders supplied from Stratford AT busbars is by dual distance protection backed up by overcurrent protection. In case of the fault inside the depot, traction breakers at Choats Road feeder station will see the same fault, but their tripping is delayed by 100ms. This time delay ensures that breakers feeding TMD detect and clear the fault within TMD first and Choats Road circuit breakers remain closed. Only in case the fault is not cleared by TMD breakers will Choats Road traction circuit breakers trip.

Automatic breaker re-close is also provided for Temple Mills Depot feeder because majority of depot faults are expected to be transient in nature. Temple Mills feeder breakers open with no deliberate time delay.

The protection of each individual traction circuit supplying HS1 OCS in tunnels is by dual distance protection backed up by overcurrent protection. In case of the catenary fault, traction breakers at Stratford AT station will se the fault and will trip the associated circuit breakers. Choats Road feeder station will see the same fault, but the tripping of Choats Road breakers is delayed by 100ms. Once the fault is cleared, automatic reclosure of traction circuit breakers at Choats Road re-establishes the supplies to the OCS. Following this auto reclose, Stratford AT traction circuit breakers will close on detection of catenary voltage. Overcurrent and earth fault protection is provided at the incoming circuit breaker for protection of switchyard equipment.

Protection of St Pancras Autotransformer station

St Pancras autotransformer station consists of two identical compact autotransformer modules. Each module connects an autotransformer, incoming cable from Stratford AT station and three single phase circuit breakers providing traction supplies. Traction feeders of each traction feeding section are coupled together via disconnectors, thus providing supplies from either one of the two tunnel cables. Traction circuit breakers can be seen as dual supplies with one in service and the other on "hot standby" and cannot be closed at the same time.

-79 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

--



Autotransformer protection is provided by high impedance differential protection, which ensures that all circuit breakers supplying the fault trip, followed by auto-changeover of supplies and manual closure of traction breakers. The transformers are also protected by Bucholz protection, pressure relief protection, oil and winding temperature protection.

The protection of each individual traction feeder is by dual distance protection backed up by overcurrent protection. In case of the catenary fault traction breakers will open. Distance protection will operate with no deliberate time delay. An automatic reclose scheme similar to that at Choats Road feeder station is implemented to ensure minimum disruption of power. Operational Configuration of London Tunnel Cables

Normal feeding

catenary feeder

---neutral

earth

., ui .. ~ l'l

a. .~

o <.)ui #-------.,-- ----~-#-----+-----

---------p - _.-- ._----- :/,/

__ . __ . .1~?o;gmm

400sqmm

~._ 400sqmm. __ _1!l.5sqm~_

- 185S<1mm

Figure 1.2 Normal mode of operation for London Tunnel supplies

Under normal operation one 25kV cable from the Choats Road feeder station will be connected to one autotransformer at Stratford AT station and one autotransformer at St Pancras station and it will be connected to the catenary system at Stratford. The second 25kV cable from the feeder station will be connected to other autotransformer at Stratford AT station and the other autotransformer at St Pancras station and it will be connected to the catenary system at St Pancras AT station. In the event of any cable fault the automatic sequence will reconfigure the supplies such that both Stratford and St Pancras AT stations are supplied from the remaining healthy cable. The supplies will therefore be arranged in an alternative feeding arrangement.

- 80R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Alternative feeding

catenary feeder

-- neutral

earth

ff--------~--

------# --_._._--- ------------ ---# .

_1~5sgmm

_..!85s.'l.'T1IT1 _

Figure 1.3 Degraded mode of operation for London Tunnel supplies

However, cable faults will be seen by both the cable protection and catenary distance protection. The cable faults are normally cleared by fast differential protection and feeder station circuit breakers will remain closed. Stratford and St Pancras stations will go through the auto changeover process and may need operator intervention to re-establish all supplies. In this respect, the cable fault is similar to permanent fault on the catenary system. This way, all of the high voltage equipment is on "hot standby".

Protection of London Tunnel Cables

In order to ensure fast and selective protection in case of a tunnel cable fault, cable differential protection is implemented. The cable differential protection operates on circulating current principle and it requires pilot cables. Pilot cables have 12 cores, some of which are used for 25kV cable protection and some are used for 11 kV cable differential protection. In case of the failure of the cable differential protection, cables are protected by overcurrent protection. However, in case of the cable differential protection failure, associated cables will be taken out of service at the earliest opportunity.

Open Route Autotransformer Protection

Autotransformer protection is provided by high impedance differential protection, which ensures that all circuit breakers supplying the fault trip, followed by opening of the autotransformer disconnector. Once the autotransformer disconnector is open, circuit breakers will recluse thus re-establishing the paralleling of the two tracks. The transformers are also protected by Bucholz protection, pressure relief protection, oil and winding temperature protection.

- 81 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



In case the catenary voltage is lost, the AT circuit breakers will open. Once the voltage is detected, the breakers will automatically close after a preset time delay which is different for every AT station. This ensures minimum inrush current on restoration of catenary voltage.

Degraded Mode Operation Protection

In case the Choats Road feeder station needs to be disconnected from the catenary system, the tunnel catenary system will be supplied from Singlewell feeder station. In case of a major fault inside the feeder station or loss of National Grid connection at Barking, this connection will be done through Choats Road feeder station busbars as the first emergency arrangement. In this case distance protection at Choats Road and at Singlewell will see the same catenary system fault and will open at the same time, both with 100ms time delay. Automatic reclosure will re-establish the supplies. If the fault is not seen by the Choats Road protection, the breakers will open on under voltage and will have to be manually re-closed. EDF Energy will investigate possibilities for further improvement of the scheme in order to reduce or eliminate requirement for operator action. This could be done by delaying under voltage trip of the traction and cable breakers at Choats road by sufficient time that will allow auto-reclose to take place and re-establish the supplies to the tunnel OCS and cables. This may be possible only if the UP and DOWN tracks are not connected to the same busbars at Choats Road, which will have to be re-arranged by the operator such that UP line is connected to the main busbar and the DOWN line is connected to the reserve busbar.

During planned maintenance at Choats Road feeder station this will be done by closing bypass disconnectors provided at Choats Road feeder station. These disconnectors are manual with no remote control and directly connect open route catenary system to catenary system of the tunnels and tunnel cables. In this case, catenary system between Singlewell and Stratford is protected by Singlewell feeder station distance protection. Cable differential protection of London Tunnel cables between Choats Road and Stratford will be disabled and cables will also be protected by distance protection of Sil1glewell feeder station. In case of a tunnel cable fault between Choats Road and Stratford, the sequence of protection operation will be the same as for permanent fault on the catenary system.

- 82R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 8 - HS1 Traction Harmonic Reference Profile

- 83R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



.,;

':. ,. ~'

...~ ~t .

v· ;. L,,;f· i;' ,-'. :r' :.:f: '1

"j• ';, , , ,.. ,, .'t .~ ,'I

......~ ,..., ..;: .;:~::'.~ ..- ~ : .. ,;l" _~J:.~ 1~;,..,;'.y.""",..__.. :"::'''Ir ;_:: '__:;.~,> .;;.; .;..'r...,... :}..,;' ......' ;;.:..,....::1..: A." ~,

i c'

«I £'" t' i'.' <

~.•. ~, ., :i. ','; •1!'" ,. I ... :t lQ-: ':.j, J; ·f,;

I

!i:::'.._ , .,;:=!' "f; ·-f":,

,.

.~ .'

, .

,.

- 84R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO



Appendix 9 - Daily Notice

- 85 R-SG-NC-00002-17-HSO

HS1 (Section 2) Register of Infrastructure

Documents

Transcript of HS1 (Section 2) Register of Infrastructure