How Vladimir Putin Maintains his Electoral Authoritarianism

Vladimir Putin was catapulted into the Russian presidency fifteen years ago by the

voluntary resignation of the blundering Boris Yeltsin and has held it, officially, and unofficially,

ever since. Though he runs an obvious democratic façade, his electoral authoritarianism has not

been largely contested by his citizens and he retains a high domestic approval rating. There are

four reasons for this: his continuation of Russia’s legacy of patrimonial rule with his steadfast

and unrelenting personality, the state’s subordination to Putin’s party, the media’s subordination

to the state, and the oil-reliant economy’s current profitability. The first factor will not change;

the second will not unless the third and fourth do. Consequently, Putin’s future support will

depend directly on how efficiently he can stamp out media-based dissent and manage the slowly-

depleting oil reserves.

Russia has never experienced true democracy on a large scale. Before any lasting

political institutions had been established, the combination of poor soil, cold weather, and rugged

terrain inhibited crop growth and transportation of. The immense land area and large quantity of

borders inhibited the security of ethnic Russians, who struggled to subsist in primitive conditions

(Lynch 1/15). There was an inherent need for a powerful autocrat to look after the well-being of

the people, and the Mongol occupation of Kievan Rus from 1240 to 1500 set this precedent

(Urbanovich 1/27). The following lineage of tsars, general-secretaries, and Boris Yeltsin

successfully consolidated patrimonialism, the “fusing” of sovereignty and property and set the

stage for the rise of Putin.

Putin brought patrimonialism into the twenty-first century with ruthless efficiency

through shows of force, both abroad and at home. When named prime minister by Yeltsin four

months before becoming president, he “promised to ‘kick the shit out of’ Chechen terrorists

[and] instantly won the heart of Russia” (Shevtsova 36). After attacks like the September 1999

explosions in the Moscow apartment buildings, he ignored his advisors’ advice for slow military

escalation and leaped into total war by launching devastating air strikes over Chechnya (Lynch

3/31) followed by a swift land invasion that resulted in the occupation of large cities and

“innumerable human rights violations” (White et al. 120). Rather than condemn these actions, the

Russian population has commended them. They see Putin as their protector from external threats,

and seem relieved that he has reacted with such vigor. This is a pattern that is destined to

continue based on Putin’s annexation of Crimea, which caused his approval rating to skyrocket

to eighty-six percent (Lynch 4/28).

Putin has not seen quite such dramatic challenges to his authority in domestic affairs,

though he meets any that do arise with the same resilience. World-renowned chess grandmaster

Gary Kasparov challenged Putin by creating the “openly oppositional ‘Other Russia’ coalition”

(White et al. 68). Putin responded by blaring “screeching noise” over a speech that Kasparov

planned in November 2007, then arresting him and his followers. The “anti-corruption blogger”

Alexei Navalny also defied Putin; he referred to United Russia “as the ‘Party of Crooks and

Thieves’” and was swiftly arrested on three apparent embezzlement charges and sentenced to

five years in prison (127-8). Finally, the “feminist art collective” Pussy Riot put on a provocative

performance in the Moscow Cathedral of Christ the Savior and was sentenced to two years

behind bars. Though all three dissenters received some level of popular support, mainstream

public opinion was centered squarely behind Putin and the sentiment that the punishments were

deserved. This is reflected in recent surveys which “reveal that a majority of Russians think that

maintaining law and order is more important than protecting human rights” (153). This popular

sentiment, that remaining on good terms with the government matters more than personal liberty,

is a stark divergence from liberal Western ideology. The fact that United Russia can manage this

repression so efficiently reflects its stranglehold on political institutions, and the fact that it can

retain public support for institutionalized repression reflects its omnipotence within the media.

The Russian Federation was never destined to be a liberal democracy. “The dignified

parts of the constitution were subjugated to the efficient parts”, thereby sacrificing legitimate

political contestation for an unimpeded presidency (Lynch 3/26). The result is “a ‘political gray

zone’ between democracy and dictatorship” (Shevtsova 49). This is a careful balancing act:

Russia’s leaders want to appear closely aligned with the positive connotations associated with

the former system, while in reality maintaining the uncontested power associated with the latter.

Therefore, they employ the “deliberate use of democratic and liberal institutions in order to

conceal traditional power arrangements” (50). Putin should have stepped down from the

presidency when he finished his constitutionally-mandated second and final term in 2008;

instead he “castled” with his prime minister Dmitry Medvedev and unofficially continued his

patrimonial rule from the number-two seat in government (Lynch 4/2). No one doubted who was

really in charge. After Medvedev’s four-year term, they reversed back to the previous

arrangement by taking advantage of the law which specifically prohibited more than two

“consecutive” terms (Vasilyeva).

Putin also created fake opposition parties (while repressing the real ones) in order to

maintain the façade of electoral legitimacy and render himself the only suitable candidate in the

2012 election. Vladimir Zhirinovsky was the “fake extremist, attention-grabbing nationalist”

leader of the Liberal Democrat (in name only) Party and was there entirely for show (Lynch 4/7).

Sergei Mironov led an “opposition” party that was actually pro-Putin. The business mogul and

Brooklyn Nets owner Mikhail Prokhorov was “listed on the ballot last-minute” and found to

have a “pro-Putin website”. The only true electoral opponent to Putin was the Communist

Gennady Zyuganov, who received less than 20% of the vote. Putin only allowed Zyuganov to

contest the election because he knew he would not be a threat. The competition actually helped

Putin, since running against a Communist candidate gave him symbolic legitimacy through an

anti-Communist image.

Putin complemented the facilitation of fake political contestation by blocking real

contestation through the institutions he controlled. In 2007 he raised the threshold for

representation in the Duma from five to seven percent and banned party blocs in order to prevent

coalitions while making it “impossible to create parties without the Kremlin’s consent”

(Shevtsova 48). This meant that a liberal party that desired political recognition had to be vetted

by the illiberal United Russia. If by some miracle it passed inspection, it would still need to

receive seven percent of the vote to gain any representation. In addition, Putin removed the

option to cast an “against all” ballot in any election, which until then could be used by citizens to

express their disillusionment with the political system (Lynch 4/7). Any unforeseen problems

could be stifled by his presidential control of the Electoral Commission and courts which

oversaw election disputes.

Putin’s institutional takeover resulted in a “system based on personal connections to

[him] and his entourage” (Lynch 4/28). Any local leader wishing to advance his career knows

that he can only do so by aligning himself with United Russia. Thus, while in the West, political

parties are held accountable by the state, in Russia it is the other way around. Consequently,

Transparency International, a non-governmental organization that measures corruption, lowered

Russia’s ranking from 46th in 1996 to 154th in 2010.

Another of Putin’s vital tools for maintaining electoral authoritarianism is his tight

control over the media, through which he both manipulates public opinion and censors

dissenters. Recognizing that “an authoritarian government does not retain support

automatically”, United Russia has maintained a complete monopoly over televised political news

since 2000 (Lynch 4/28). It has utilized this to force-feed a plethora of pro-Putin propaganda to

the populace. While in most countries “the power of the media to inform and mobilize

citizens…serve[s] as a key component in democracy”, “Russia has used the media as a weapon

against democratization” (White et al. 143, 130). The “communications paradox” regarding the

abundance of freely available information and the dearth of true democracy can be reconciled by

acknowledging that the purpose of the propagated information is to bolster Putin’s pretense of

legitimacy.

Putin combines the promotion of fake media with the repression of real media in the

same way that he treats real and fake political opposition. Though United Russia controls large

mediums like television and daily newspapers, it cannot silence smaller, private news and

opinion sources proliferated by the internet. However, it does try to do so. It is no accident that in

Russia, “the law has tended to work against the interests of free speech” (White et al. 136). The

government stifles deviant news sources such as the Media-Most group for arbitrary reasons

such as violations of obscure financial laws, and “in 2002, a law that banned ‘extremism’ in

media coverage was passed”. The definition of “extremism” was left open to interpretation by

the government, allowing the law to be used “as a weapon against journalists”. In addition, local

politicians often target anti-Putin media that has escaped national attention with their own laws

and arbitrary measures, often with the intention of improving their relationship with United

Russia. Finally, when government actions do not muffle the most outspoken journalists, they are

attacked physically. Reporters Without Borders has named Russia “one of the deadliest countries

in the world for journalists” and the Committee to Protect Journalists “has estimated that 56

journalists…have been killed since 1992” (137). The government largely ignores this

phenomenon, as witnessed by Putin’s verbal dismissal of the infamous Anna Politkovskaya

assassination in 2006. Though cold-hearted, this type of reaction is not surprising given that each

reporter’s death means one less problem for United Russia.

The amount of popular support for Putin’s regime in the future will depend heavily on

how well it manages public opinion through the media. Though propagating its own messages

through large public networks is relatively straightforward, stifling criticism is much more

complex. United Russia must tread the fine line between silencing critics enough to weaken their

message, but not so much that it destroys the illusion of free speech.

The final factor supporting Putin’s electoral authoritarianism is the economy. Though

well-off at the moment, it is in a precarious position due to its heavy reliance on raw materials,

the profitability of which depends directly on world market prices. There is no doubt that “the

conditions that allowed the rise and stabilization of Putin’s regime are very tightly tied to the

price of oil” (Lynch 4/28). Data from 2002 to 2011 has shown the percent change in Russia’s

GDP to align very closely to the percent change in the global oil price (4/16). It has recently

benefitted from an all-time high of $110 per barrel in 2013 as well as high Chinese demand. Oil

revenue is taken by the state through methods such as export tariffs and extreme domestic price

ceilings, which are illegal in the West (4/28) as well as direct government intervention in large

companies like Gazprom (4/7).

This economic system naturally involves high-level corruption and a heavy reliance on

continuing the ongoing lucky streak. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, there were no

incentives in place to transition to a Western advanced industrialized economy when one could

grow rich from siphoning raw materials out of the ground. However, the future does not look

quite as bright. Oil fields are not bottomless and are in fact steadily depleting, making the

process of finding new ones imperative (Lynch 4/16). In addition, the oil price and consumer

demand are unlikely to remain as high as they currently are indefinitely. Finally, the annexation

of Crimea that won so much domestic support did not amuse the West, which has levied

sanctions and boycotted Russian oil. Therefore, the economic pillar of support for Putin’s regime

has a very shaky foundation: Russia has no control over oil’s world market price, consumer

demand, or sanctions imposed by Western Europe and the United States. It only has moderate

control over increasing its dwindling supply.

Vladimir Putin’s electoral authoritarian regime has consolidated and retained support

with the aid of Russia’s historically-based attraction to patrimonialism and its tight control over

the state, media, and economy. Whether it can continue to do so in the future will depend on how

efficiently it can stifle dissent through free speech and prop up the waning oil-reliant economy.

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