How Long to 2020, IAEA Bulletin September 2008

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYIAEA BULLETIN

The Mindset of Nuclear Safety • Kenya’s Drylands • Great Expectations

How Long to 2020?

September 2008 | 50-1 | www.iaea.org/bulletin

IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 1

How Long to 2020?The world’s nuclear order is stronger on many fronts. But is it strong enough for the 21st century?

This year 18 highly distinguished men and women from different countries were asked to take a long hard look at the IAEA and its future.* The timeline took them to 2020, and a decade beyond.

The Commission of Eminent Persons, as they are known, sees a world of rising stakes, and inter-related threats and opportunities: “A bold agenda is required,” they emphasize. “In fact, to satisfy energy demands to mitigate the threat of climate change — two of the 21st century’s greatest challenges — there are major opportunities for expansion of nuclear energy…But those opportunities also pose complex and broad-ranging safety and security questions that must be addressed effectively.”

Apart from more money (nearly double as much), the 18 men and women agreed that the IAEA needs additional authority, notably for nuclear safeguards, safety and security, and more targeted investment in people and technology over the next decade. Highlights of their views are featured in this edition of the IAEA Bulletin. Other articles take a closer look at topics, trends and developments influencing the future global nuclear order and the IAEA’s place in it.

In many respects, 2020 is just around the bend.

Twenty-two years ago, a major US think-tank issued warnings about the shaky nuclear order and what was needed to strengthen it in a cold-war world.** The IAEA then was regarded as a “rock” on which to build, but one “in trouble” because of factious political, technical and financial issues confronting it. Added urgency came from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster that blackened nuclear safety and shook public confidence about what the IAEA was doing, and could do, to prevent a repeat somewhere else.

Largely hidden at the time were deep-rooted future troubles of nuclear disarmament, clandestine proliferation, (un)sustainable development, and global politics. They emerged more fully a decade later. States responded to strengthen nuclear cooperation and the IAEA by the turn of the century.

But not enough, as the 2008 Commission reports. Real and potential 21st century risks mandate more collective action on multiple nuclear fronts. The report’s final six words — “Now is the time to choose.”— echo the need for urgency.

— Lothar Wedekind, Editor-in-Chief

* ’Reinforcing the Global Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond,’

report prepared by an independent Commission at the request of the Director General of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, May 2008. The report has been submitted to the IAEA Board

of Governors for consideration, along with the IAEA background report 20/20, ‘Vision for the Future.’

www.iaea.org

** ’The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order,’ Lawrence Scheinman,

published by Resources for the Future, 1987. www.rff.org

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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYIAEA BULLETIN

The Mindset of Nuclear Safety • Kenya’s Drylands • Great Expectations

How Long to 2020?

September 2008 | 50-1 | www.iaea.org/bulletin

Harvesting timesFeed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow p17Qu Liang and Katherine Long highlights achievements of the IAEA’s partnership with the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization.

Sidebars: A Partnership for Food Security

The UN Response to the Global Food Crisis

The Science of Plant Breeding

Nuclear Partners

Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands p23Rodolfo Quevenco reports on how the IAEA is helping deliver hardier, healthier wheat.

No Love for Mosquitoes p26Scientists fighting malaria zero in on the sexual lives of mosquitoes, writes FeiFei Jiang.

tHe energy FileGreat Expectations p28Projections of nuclear power around the world show an upward trend according to Alan McDonald.

Nuclear Acceptance p32Steve Kidd explains how the nuclear industry can achieve a more favourable public image.

A Nuclear Divide p34Familiarity with nuclear power can make a difference in public opinion, the latest Eurobarometer report suggests.

Did You Say Yes? p36Robert Knight provides an insight into the British attitude to nuclear power.

Tackling the Global Energy Crisis p39Mohamed ElBaradei explains why a global energy organization is needed.

tHe rOaD aHeaDAchieving the Vision p6Ernesto Zedillo outlines a distinguished commission’s vision for the IAEA to 2020 and beyond.

Sidebar: 20/20

The Next 40 Years p9If past is prologue, new roles will remerge.

A Date to Remember p12How the IAEA Bulletin covered the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 40 years ago.

Sidebar: Leaders of the Day

Nuclear Peace p15Robert J. Berg explains why the world needs citizen activism to get rid of nuclear weapons.

Sidebar: Blix on the Campus Trail

“When composing the team, the correct balance

between behavioural scientists and technical specialists is

essential for the implementation of the approach as well

as for the outcomes. ” —Anne Kerhoas and Marin Ignatov, p47

CONTENTS IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008

Snapshots p4Facts, figures and images from a nuclear world.

Security at the olympics, p41

Feed the Hungry, today and tomorrow, p17

golden wheat “greens” Kenya’s Drylands, p23

Earth, wind and Fire, p50

saFe anD secureSecurity at the Olympics p41Petr Pavlicek and Dana Sacchetti show how the IAEA helped the Chinese authorities keep the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games safe and secure.

The Mindset of Nuclear Safety p47Anne Kerhoas and Marin Ignatov describe a new IAEA service that looks at nuclear safety culture.

PrePare FOr tHe WOrstEarth, Wind and Fire p50Dana Sacchetti looks at nature’s threats to nuclear power plants.

Sidebar: Steady Lessons from Shaky Events

43-Hour Global Drill p54Rafael Martincic and Lisa Obrentz report on a fake nuclear emergency testing the world’s readiness to respond.

Sidebar: Practice Makes Perfect

PrOgress tHrOugH tecHnOlOgyNuclear Forensics p56Giovanni Verlini speaks with Klaus Mayer, a world expert on nuclear forensics.

Sidebar: European Nuclear Science Lab

mOre tHan WOrDsRisk Communication p58David Ropeik unveils the mechanisms of risk communication.

Expert Imagination p62New trends in science communication are illustrated by Giovanni Carrada.

Sidebar: Science y Tapas

“Regaining control over material that has been diverted or stolen

requires significantly higher efforts. Nuclear forensics provides clues

on the history and on the origin of nuclear material. ” —Klaus Meyer, p56

4 | IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008

Nuclear educators and experts from across Europe came together at an IAEA workshop devoted to teach-ing English language methodology to nuclear pro-

fessionals. The course called Making Knowledge Work — Nuclear English for University Teachers took place at the Kaunas University of Technology in Kaunas, Lithuania in June this year. The workshop was held as part of an IAEA technical cooperation project entitled Strengthening Capabilities of Nuclear Knowledge Preservations. The primary audience were university teachers working in advanced sciences whose students can speak English well but aim to boost their comprehension of nuclear terminology.

75000

from our image bank

In a continent already facing water scarcity, phenomena such as climate change and rapid population growth are expected to force local populations to increase their reliance on groundwater resources to meet domestic, agricultural and industrial water demands.

A conference held in Uganda this year brought together water and climate scientists to understand the impact of climate and development on groundwater resources in Africa. As a conference sponsor, the IAEA Water Resources Programme is promoting isotope hydrology tools to improve the management of groundwater resources.

Photo: IAEA

atomic abcpeople die of cancer each year in Vietnam. Through the PACT alliance, the IAEA aims to help save lives.

2008

africa’s water

marks the 40th anniversary of the World’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

USAPakistan

JapanIran

FranceFinland

ArgentinaUkraineBulgaria

Rep. of KoreaIndia

ChinaRussia 7

66

322

1111111

35* nuclear plants are being built in 13 countries, mostly in Asia.

*The world total includes 2 reactors under construction in Taiwan, China.Source: Power Reactor Information System (PRIS), www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html (28 September 2008)

Number Of Reactors Under Construction Worldwide

IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 5

Pictures from an exhibition of paintings by school children from Kiev on the Chernobyl Disaster.

For more information and photos visit the IAEA website at www.iaea.org

The 7.9-magnitude earthquake of 12 May this year devastated China’s mountainous Sichuan Province, killing an estimated 69,000 people and causing extensive property damage. Among the many danger-ous materials buried in the rubble lay a hidden enemy — stray radioac-tive sources that could complicate relief efforts or cause contamination. Source recovery is important to ensure safety of local populations and safeguard against unintended contact with stray radioactive sources.

In early 2007, staff from Chinese national authorities were trained by the IAEA on how to search for “lost” sources, and to then control and dispose of them safely. In addition to this training, which was held under an IAEA Technical Cooperation Project, the IAEA contributed nearly $100,000 worth of radiation detection and search equipment.

After the Sichuan earthquake, Chinese authorities were able to uti-lize IAEA training and donated equipment in their recovery efforts. The recovery teams used radiation detection equipment to pinpoint the location of 50 sources and safely recover all of them.

(Photo: Beijing Nuclear Safety Centre)

2008

3000helping China

crop varieties from more than 170 different plant

species have been introduced since modern plant breeding began over 80 years ago.africa’s water

The UAE has pledged $10 million towards a fuel bank proposal originally launched by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in 2006. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei receives the UAE’s fuel bank funding letter, presented on 1 August by Mr. Hamad Al Kaabi, UAE Special Representative for International Nuclear Cooperation.

(Photo: D.Calma/IAEA)

$10 million for Fuel Bank

future trends

20/20 6 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008

T he Commission of Eminent Persons was asked to reflect on how the nuclear future might evolve to 2020 and beyond, what

the world is likely to demand of the IAEA, and what steps need to be taken to allow the IAEA to fill those needs.

We produced a document entitled ‘Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond’.

The national and professional backgrounds of the Commission members are quite diverse.* This cir-cumstance provided for a wide range of perspec-tives on nuclear and related issues throughout our discussions and drafting of the Report. It is remarka-ble that notwithstanding our different, and in some cases opposing, views on several important top-ics tackled in our work, the Commissioners unani-mously believe that the IAEA must be strengthened by its member states with additional authority, resources, personnel and technology.

We believe that a stronger IAEA is warranted by a robust demand for those crucial services of the Agency that in all likelihood will increase and prevail in the foreseeable future.

Consider that the spiraling cost of fossil fuels and the impending threat of climate change, against which nuclear power is recognized as an important miti-gating option, may make a renaissance of nuclear energy likely in the near future.

International cooperation should be strengthened immediately to ensure that any possible expansion of nuclear energy will be safe and secure and will not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. The IAEA should help newcomer states put in place the necessary infrastructure needed to develop nuclear energy safely, securely and peacefully. It should work with member states to coordinate research to design reactors that are economical, safe and prolif-eration-resistant.

It must expand its efforts to help states establish safe and sustainable approaches to managing nuclear waste, and to build public and international support

for implementing them. The Agency will also be required to develop international nuclear safety standards and to promote the harmonization of cer-tification processes for new reactor models. Shared regional nuclear plants, mechanisms for the assured supply of nuclear fuel, including international banks of enriched uranium, multinational management of the entire fuel cycle, estimation of global resources of uranium and research and development of thor-ium fuel cycles are among the endeavors that may result in additional responsibilities for the IAEA.

It should also be taken into account that safeguards will continue to be a central part of the Agency’s work. In fact, the IAEA’s safeguards responsibilities have been expanding rapidly. From 1984 to 2007 the amount of nuclear material under safeguards increased more than tenfold. Many are calling on the Agency to implement the Additional Protocol as well as to pursue a country-level, information-driven approach to safeguards that requires the Agency to examine a broad range of additional and more sophisticated types of information.

The IAEA’s existing authorities should be interpreted to give the Agency the responsibility to inspect for indicators of nuclear weaponization activities. As has become clear from recent events, sometimes trans-parency going well beyond the measures called for in the Additional Protocol is needed to provide confidence that a state’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

The IAEA should work closely with member states developing new fuel cycle processes, so that effec-tive safeguards, nonproliferation, and physical pro-tection measures can be designed into such new systems from the outset. Clearly, further increases for safeguards work will be needed if nuclear energy grows and other circumstances change in the future.

Though nuclear security is fundamentally the responsibility of individual states, the IAEA has an important role to play in addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is the only global body with rele-vant competence and expertise relied on by a wide range of countries.

Achieving the VisionA distinguished panel was asked to come up with recommendations for the future of the IAEA. This is what they had to say.

20/20 IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 7

for implementing them. The Agency will also be required to develop international nuclear safety standards and to promote the harmonization of cer-tification processes for new reactor models. Shared regional nuclear plants, mechanisms for the assured supply of nuclear fuel, including international banks of enriched uranium, multinational management of the entire fuel cycle, estimation of global resources of uranium and research and development of thor-ium fuel cycles are among the endeavors that may result in additional responsibilities for the IAEA.

It should also be taken into account that safeguards will continue to be a central part of the Agency’s work. In fact, the IAEA’s safeguards responsibilities have been expanding rapidly. From 1984 to 2007 the amount of nuclear material under safeguards increased more than tenfold. Many are calling on the Agency to implement the Additional Protocol as well as to pursue a country-level, information-driven approach to safeguards that requires the Agency to examine a broad range of additional and more sophisticated types of information.

The IAEA’s existing authorities should be interpreted to give the Agency the responsibility to inspect for indicators of nuclear weaponization activities. As has become clear from recent events, sometimes trans-parency going well beyond the measures called for in the Additional Protocol is needed to provide confidence that a state’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

The IAEA should work closely with member states developing new fuel cycle processes, so that effec-tive safeguards, nonproliferation, and physical pro-tection measures can be designed into such new systems from the outset. Clearly, further increases for safeguards work will be needed if nuclear energy grows and other circumstances change in the future.

Though nuclear security is fundamentally the responsibility of individual states, the IAEA has an important role to play in addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is the only global body with rele-vant competence and expertise relied on by a wide range of countries.

by Ernesto ZedilloAchieving the VisionStates should negotiate binding agreements that set effective global nuclear security standards. They should agree to give the IAEA an important role in developing those binding standards and assisting in and confirming their implementation. The IAEA should develop model legislation that will help states fulfill their United-Nations-Security Council-Resolution-1540 obligations to enact effective national laws prohibiting acts related to nuclear ter-rorism and nuclear smuggling.

The IAEA should expand its efforts to ensure effec-tive security for the most dangerous radiological sources worldwide and increase the priority it gives to preventing nuclear smuggling. And it should con-tinue its efforts to help states prepare to cope with the consequences of a radiological dispersal.

Although nuclear safety has improved enormously in recent decades, the risk of an accident at any given reactor must continue to be reduced. The IAEA’s role in persistently improving the global safety regime is critical and must be reinforced. The Agency should lead an international effort to establish a global nuclear safety network, and ensure that critical safety knowledge, experience, and lessons learned are broadly exchanged.

Over time, with the IAEA’s involvement, states should enter into binding agreements to adhere to effective global safety standards and to be subject to international nuclear safety peer reviews.

Member states and the IAEA should strengthen their critically important efforts to ensure that countries embarking on nuclear power programs develop sound safety infrastructures, including effective and independent regulatory bodies. The Agency should expand its efforts to assist states in assessing and strengthening the nuclear safety culture.

The IAEA’s technical assistance in developing coun-tries for nuclear applications in health, agriculture, industry, environment, hydrology and biological and physical research is important both for its direct contribution to human well-being and because it helps to build broad support for the Agency itself and its larger energy, safety, security, and non-prolif-eration missions.

Consequently, the Agency’s technical coopera-tion program needs to be expanded and diver-sified to ensure it keeps pace with the growth in the Agency’s other activities. Demand for techni-cal assistance will always exceed the resources allo-cated for it, but developing countries’ expectations for such support from the IAEA need to be better satisfied in the future.

The Commission believes that to enable the IAEA to properly accomplish these and other duties, its mem-bers should allocate it considerably larger resources. We suggest an immediate one-time increase in the IAEA’s budget in an amount sufficient for, at least, refurbishing the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and for adequate funding of the Agency’s Incident and Emergency Response Center.

We also propose annual increases in the regular budget to underpin the expansion of the Agency’s security and safety work, other activities in support of newcomer states embarking on nuclear pro-grams, and an expansion of work in nuclear applica-tions and technology transfer.

In the longer time frame, the regular budget will need to continue increasing in order to meet the growing demands for IAEA services. A substantially bigger regular budget – by 2020 perhaps twice as large as the present one – would allow the needed expansion of work on nuclear reactors and the fuel cycle, security and safety, and support for meeting basic human needs through nuclear applications and technical cooperation.

The large majority of the Commissioners also believe that progress toward disarmament, or the lack of it, will deeply affect the success of the IAEA’s nonprolif-eration mission. Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) legally obligates the nuclear weapons state parties to nego-tiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, and at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, they agreed that the treaty represented an “unequivocal under-taking” to “accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

This commitment is an integral part of the NPT bar-gain. The need for the NPT to become universal can-not be stressed enough. States must recommit to

20/20IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei tasked the Agency’s Secretariat with conducting a detailed review of the nature and scope of the IAEA’s programme in the next decade and what resources would be needed to fund these activi-ties. The study was given the name “20/20”, reflect-ing the effort to look ahead to the year 2020 and beyond with the clearest possible vision.

According to the report’s findings, the major chal-lenges likely to face the IAEA in the 2020 timeframe are:

• growth in the use of nuclear power, brought on by the demand for clean energy;

• greater demand for the use of nuclear applications in health, food and the environment;

• increased emphasis on maintaining a high level of safety;

• combating the threat of nuclear terrorism; and

• strengthening of the safeguards system to ensure its effectiveness, credibil-ity and independence.

The “20/20 Vision for the Future” report, can be found at: www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/20-20vision_220208.pdf

Vision for the Future20/20

Background Report by the

Director General for the

Commission of Eminent Persons

February 2008

Atoms for Peace

The Road Ahead | Achieving the Vision

8 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008

the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and take firmer steps in that direction.

Needless to say, a world free of nuclear weapons will not be achieved quickly, and will require action by many actors in the international system, going far beyond the mandate and capabilities of the IAEA.

What is needed is an ambitious reinvigoration of the grand bargain that was struck 40 years ago in the NPT. The renewed grand bargain will need to combine steps that can be taken immediately with a vision for the longer term, and to draw in states that are not parties to the NPT.

New approaches to verifying compliance with treaty obligations, to providing security for states in the absence of nuclear weapons, and to punish-ing states that violate the regime will certainly be required, and new methods to control the sensi-tive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle will likely be needed as well.

What the IAEA’s precise future role in disarmament might be remains to be determined. But interna-tional nuclear verification will certainly be essen-tial as disarmament proceeds, and the IAEA’s exist-ing capabilities and experience make it well suited to play a central role in that endeavor. It would also be logical for states to give the Agency a central role in monitoring the huge stockpiles of fissile mate-rial that would be freed from nuclear weapons pro-grams. These activities would also justify additional resources for the Agency.

The international community has auspicious opportunities and significant challenges to tackle as the world moves into its seventh nuclear dec-ade. Expanded use of nuclear technologies offers immense potential to meet important develop-ment needs. But it also poses complex and broad-ranging safety and security challenges that must be addressed effectively. Consequently, to reduce risks while allowing rapidly growing contributions to human well being from nuclear technologies, our report calls for a reinforced global nuclear order.

A stronger nuclear order will emerge as a product of increased collective action and partnership, expanded transparency, increasingly effective standards for safety and security worldwide, new nonproliferation measures, and progressive steps to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. If it can be created, this strengthened nuclear order could ultimately produce an era of Atoms for Peace and Prosperity, as was the hope when the IAEA was conceived in 1953. Of course, this is a task that goes well beyond the IAEA’s mandate and capabilities, but reinforcing the IAEA will be one of the most cru-cial and fundamental steps toward that goal.

Ernesto Zedillo is the Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and former President of Mexico.

*Members of the Commission were: Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria), Lajos Bokros (Hungary), Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram and DAE-Homi Bhabha Professor (India), Senator Lamberto Dini (Italy), Gareth Evans (Australia), Louise Fréchette (Canada), Anne Lauvergeon (France), Kishore Mahbubani (Singapore), Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg (Brazil), Ambassador Pius Yasebasi Ng’Wandu (Tanzania), Senator Sam Nunn (United States), Ambassador Karl Theodor Paschke (Germany), Dr. Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria), Academician Evgeny Velikhov (Russia), Professor Wang Dazhong (China), Dr. Hiroyuki Yoshikawa (Japan), Ernesto Zedillo, Chair (Mexico).

40 IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 9

Four decades have elapsed since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in July 1968.

Since then, the NPT has become the world’s most adhered to multilateral nuclear non-prolifera-tion, arms control and disarmament treaty. The International Atomic Energy IAEA (IAEA), in which the States Party to the NPT and all nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have vested the requisite verifi-cation authority, passed its fifty-year mark in 2007. Together, these treaties and the IAEA are the most important components of the nuclear non-prolifer-ation regime and serve as vital tools for the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The NPT consists of three equally important pil-lars — nuclear non-proliferation; peaceful nuclear cooperation; and nuclear disarmament — and the premise that progress in any one pillar strengthens the integrity of the whole.

The activities of the IAEA are also based on three pillars. Through its work on nuclear verification, nuclear safety and security, and nuclear technol-ogy, the IAEA continues to play a key role as a cat-alyst for sustainable development and as a corner-stone for nuclear safety and security and verification of nuclear non-proliferation.

Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation CommitmentsThe 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document recognized that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear confidence, cooperation and disarma-ment. The NPT Parties also reaffirmed that the IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for ver-ifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and the IAEA’s safeguards system, compliance with States’ obligations under Article III.l of the Treaty. The 2000 NPT Conference also expressed its convic-tion that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard.

Comprehensive Safeguards AgreementsThere still remain 30 NPT States without the required safeguards agreements in force. Out of these 30 States, 11 have already signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) (yet to be brought into force), five have a CSA approved by the Board (still to be signed), and 14 States have still to initiate negotiations with the IAEA.

Current Safeguards System Under NPT safeguards agreements, the IAEA has the right and the obligation to ensure that all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of the State is subject to safeguards.

The IAEA’s obligation is thus not limited to nuclear material actually declared by a State; it also extends to that which is required to be declared. However, given the limitations of the verification tools pro-vided to the IAEA by CSAs, in practice it is only in respect of States which have both a CSA and an additional protocol in force that the IAEA will be able to provide credible assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. As the additional protocol is a cru-cially important tool for effective verification by the IAEA of compliance with non-proliferation obliga-tions, adherence by all States is essential. Since May 2007, seven States have concluded additional pro-tocols and nine have brought additional protocols into force — bringing the total to 125 States with additional protocols concluded and 88 with addi-tional protocols in force. Among these, four of the five nuclear-weapon States have brought their addi-tional protocols into force.

Concluding additional protocols and bringing them into force at the earliest possible date will enable the IAEA to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in a more comprehensive manner. In order to facili-tate this process, since the 2007 PrepCom, the IAEA has organized outreach events on strengthened safeguards in Gaborone, Geneva, Hanoi, New York, Santo Domingo, Sydney and Vienna.

The Next 40 YearsFor four decades, the IAEA has played a crucial role in nuclear non-proliferation. Now foundations are being laid for the future.

next40years

The Road Ahead | The Next 40 Years


Another major focus of such outreach was the amendment of small quantities protocols (SQPs) to CSAs with a view to facilitating the implemen-tation of the IAEA Board of Governors’ September 2005 decisions on SQPs which would allow for the application of more safeguards measures in States with limited nuclear activities. As of August 2008, there were 99 States with SQPs to their safeguards agreements. Of these, 27 had accepted the revised SQP text either by amending their existing SQP or by signing a CSA with an SQP based on the new standardized text. Moreover, two States have so far rescinded their non-operational SQPs.

Financing of the safeguards system Effective implementation of safeguards is also dependent on the availability of the necessary financial resources. The IAEA currently safeguards nearly 950 facilities in more than 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately 110 mil-lion euros per year.

It is clear that if the IAEA is to continue providing credible verification assurances, and strengthen-ing its safeguards system, the complexity of its ver-ification mission must be matched by the required resources.

Safeguards ImplementationThe Secretariat’s findings and conclusions, which are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the IAEA in exercising its rights and ful-filling its obligations, are published annually in the Safeguards Implementation Report. The report for 2007 covers 82 States that have both CSAs and addi-tional protocols in force; 72 States with CSAs in force, but without additional protocols; four out of five NPT nuclear-weapon-States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements; and three States that have concluded item-specific safeguards agreements.

Nuclear Safety and SecurityThe IAEA’s activities in the field of nuclear safety are organized in three broad programmes: nuclear installation safety; nuclear safety coordination; and radiation and waste safety.

Safety and security are primarily national respon-sibilities but failure can have far reaching conse-quences beyond national borders. In 2007, the nuclear industry continued to demonstrate a high level of safety and security worldwide. There was a strong consensus on the need for maintaining con-tinuing vigilance in both areas. With renewed inter-est in nuclear power generation, comparable atten-tion and commitment must be given to an equally

ambitious enhancement of global safety and secu-rity, including adequate planning for sustainable safety infrastructure.

The threat of nuclear terrorism continues as a mat-ter of concern to the international community. In response, an international nuclear security frame-work has emerged through the development and approval of a series of legally binding and non-bind-ing international instruments. However, progress on entry into force of these instruments, particularly the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, remains slow.

New impetus to this process is expected by the progress achieved by bringing into force the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.

Ensuring the Nuclear Security of Major Public EventsThe IAEA continued to assist States in ensuring nuclear security at major public events, and estab-lished projects with the governments of Brazil and China for the 2007 Pan American Games and the 2008 Olympic Games, respectively. The IAEA’s coop-eration included supplying radiation detection equipment, providing up-to-date information, and conducting national workshops and training pro-grammes.

Illicit Nuclear Trafficking In November 2007, the IAEA’s International Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking held in the UK, reviewed the global experience in combating illicit trafficking and considered international meas-ures on prevention, detection and response. The conference concluded that illicit nuclear trafficking remained an international concern, and that efforts must continue to establish effective systems, tech-nical and administrative, to control movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and to pre-vent and detect their uncontrolled and unauthor-ized movement.

Established in 1995, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database programme now benefits from the vol-untary participation of nearly 100 States. As of April 2008, ITDB Participating States had reported or oth-erwise confirmed 1,416 incidents including 322 inci-dents involving the seizure of nuclear material or radioactive sources.

4th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety Nuclear safety officials from all the world’s nuclear power countries convened in Vienna on 14 April to

40years

The Road Ahead | The Next 40 Years

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 11

review the state of nuclear safety worldwide. The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) aims to pro-mote nuclear safety, safety culture, safety man-agement and knowledge sharing among current and future nuclear power States. As of June 2008, there are 65 signatories to the Convention and 61 Contracting Parties. Notably, all countries with oper-ating nuclear power plants are now parties to the Convention.

Technical Cooperation The 2000 Final Document called for an expanded use of the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme. For more than four decades, this programme devel-ops human capacity and supports the building of infrastructure to ensure the use of nuclear technol-ogy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner.

The overall resources of the TC programme reached around $100 million in 2007, for projects in 122 coun-tries. One hundred and sixty training courses were arranged for 2287 participants, 3546 expert mis-sions were organized, 1661 fellows and scientific vis-itors were trained, and $47 million worth of equip-ment and supplies were provided.

Nuclear Technology The IAEA’s activities in nuclear technology range from the generation of electricity in nuclear power plants, to the eradication of pests through irradiation, the use of isotopic techniques in nutrition and water development programmes and food irradiation.

To date, the use of nuclear power has been concen-trated in industrialized countries. In terms of new construction, however, the pattern is different; 17 of the 35 reactors now being built are in develop-ing countries, and most of the recent expansion has been centred in Asia and Eastern Europe. But it is not only these two regions where we are wit-nessing a resurgence of interest in nuclear power. A number of countries, e.g., in the Middle East, are seriously considering the introduction of nuclear power programmes. And a large number of coun-tries with existing nuclear programmes are working to expand their nuclear generation capacity either by new reactors or by extending the lifetime of existing ones. It is vital that the expected increase in the use of nuclear power is managed properly, tak-ing into account all economic, safety, security and non-proliferation requirements.

It is, of course, for States to decide how to respond to the challenges posed by the growth in the use of nuclear energy, especially the questions associated

with the fuel cycle. So far, 12 proposals have been made to the IAEA Secretariat on different ways of assuring supply of nuclear fuel. The proposals cover a broad spectrum, from establishing an IAEA-controlled last resort reserve of low enriched uranium to providing backup assurance of supply and setting up international uranium enrichment centres.

ConclusionFor fifty years the IAEA has worked to bring the ben-efits of nuclear technology to humankind, while minimizing its risks. It is well known that during the past decade the cornerstone of the non-prolifera-tion regime — the NPT — has been beset by con-cerns about compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and growing tension between its non-prolif-eration and disarmament related aspects. However, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing, and the IAEA will be well posi-tioned for the advancement of both and ready to contribute to strengthening the regime during this crucial time.

Although the IAEA’s primary role is the verification of the non-proliferation commitments of States under the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, its Statute provides for a possible role in assisting States in the verification of nuclear disarmament.

Indeed the IAEA Statute directs the IAEA to con-duct its activities “in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safe-guarded worldwide disarmament”.

Safety and security both require continued vigi-lance and should always be considered as works in progress. For example, gaps exist today in the cov-erage of international conventions and codes of conduct and in the development and application of the normative infrastructure. And the number of countries that have subscribed to the international instruments needs to increase. These gaps need to be filled as a matter of high priority. As the expecta-tions and demands of States for the increased uses of nuclear energy increase, so will the need for the IAEA to help promote more effective and integrated approaches towards enhancing nuclear safety and security.

This article is taken from an official IAEA statement de-livered at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting held in Geneva, Switzerland, on 28 April 2008. For a full ver-sion of the statement, please visit www.iaea.org.


In 1964 the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva took up the question and fours years of detailed nego-tiations culminated on 1 July 1968, in the signing by many nations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), aimed at preventing the increase in the number of countries possess-ing nuclear weapons and ensuring to non-nuclear-weapon countries access to all peaceful uses of atomic energy. . .

Ever since the end of World War II, var-ious plans have been considered for the global control of nuclear energy. National and regional systems of control have been created to assure that nuclear material destined for peaceful uses is not diverted to mili-tary purposes. The first such controls were national safeguards systems developed by the major nuclear States. In some cases safeguards were also applied, through bilateral agreements, when nuclear material or equipment was exported to other countries.

However effective some of these national, bilateral and regional sys-tems may be, they are limited in their credibility for countries outside the system. To inspire confidence in the world community, a complete and truly international system of verifica-tion is required. This role was envis-aged for the IAEA by its founders. . .

One of the principal statutory objec-tives of the IAEA is to assure, so far as it is able, that assistance given to pro-mote peaceful uses of atomic energy is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. The Statute

also directs the IAEA to carry out its activities in conformity with poli-cies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safe-guarded world-wide disarmament and in con-formity with any international agree-ments entered into pursuant to such policies.

The IAEA has, therefore, the statutory competence to carry out the control functions now envisaged for it under the NPT. It was natural, then, that the negotiators of the NPT chose the IAEA as the organ to verify the fulfil-ment of the Treaty obligations.

The IAEA has had several years of practical experience in building up and administering a safeguards sys-tem on an international basis. The countries which will conclude agree-ments with the IAEA are assured that they will be entering into a system which has been tried and tested and accepted over the years . . .

It is a common belief that “safeguard-ing” means “inspecting.” While on-the-spot inspections are an impor-tant element of the application of safeguards, they are only a part of the system. Also necessary for an effec-tive Safeguards System are design review and materials accounting on the basis of records and reports which are required on the use and location of nuclear material and the operation of facilities containing such material.

There are three ways in which the IAEA assumes the responsibility to apply safeguards in a country:

❖ When a State receives special fis-sionable and other materials, serv-

ices, equipment or facilities, through the IAEA.

❖ When the IAEA is requested to safeguard any bilateral or multilateral arrangement.

❖ When a State submits any of its nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.

With one recent exception, safe-guards agreements have so far been confined to specified installations, or materials in given countries. Under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty each signatory non-nuclear weapon State is required to conclude individually or together with other States, a safeguard agreement with the IAEA covering all their peace-ful nuclear activities. Thus there may well be an appreciable extension of the safeguards activities of the IAEA. . .

Thirty-nine safeguards agree-ments are now in force or have been approved by the Board. Of these, twenty-nine are transfer agreements whereby the administration of bilat-eral safeguards has been entrusted to the IAEA. The total number of prin-cipal nuclear facilities, research and development facilities and other sep-arate accountability areas covered by these agreements is now more that 100. . .

The IAEA is closely following and fos-tering the exchange of information on development of techniques and devices to improve the credibility and facilitate the execution of safe-guards. Several Member States are doing research and development work, and the IAEA itself has con-

A Date to Remember40 years ago the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) steered the IAEA in a new direction. This is how the IAEA Bulletin covered the signing of the treaty at the time.

Harold Wilson


The Road Ahead | A Date to Remember

A Date to Remembercluded research contracts. In order to carry out efficiently the considerable increase in work, the IAEA will take advantage of sim-plified and mechanized procedures as they are developed. . .

As the countries of the world are assured that nuclear energy will not be diverted to nuclear weapons, the exchange of infor-mation, material, equipment and technical aid should increase. According to Article IV of the Treaty, “Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. . .”

As the first objective set forth in the Statute is to “seek to accelerate and enlarge the con-tribution of atomic energy to pace, health and prosperity throughout the world,” the IAEA, with its international membership, is well qualified to foster the further devel-opment of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. . .

In October 1967, Mr. Jan Neumann, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission, who was President of the Eleventh Session of the General Conference, expressed the IAEA’s readi-ness to undertake its tasks under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to make such preparations as it might be necessary to discharge the wider responsibilities which would devolve upon it. . .

Until now, the IAEA’s role has been prima-rily of a scientific and technological nature. The effect of the enforcement of the Treaty will be to give the IAEA responsibilities of considerable political significance.

Excerpts from “The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA.” IAEA Bulletin Vol. 10, Issue 4. To read the full article, visit the IAEA Bulletin archives at: www.iaea.org/bulletin

Leaders of the DayOn the day of the historic signing of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), the leaders of the treaty’s depositary governments commented on the event in their own words.

Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the UK:

“This is an historic occasion. I have no hesitation in describing this Treaty, which is being signed today in Moscow and Washington as well as here in London, as the most important measure of arms con-trol and disarmament on which agreement has yet been reached.”

“Your Excellencies, this not a Treaty for which just two or three coun-tries are responsible. It exists because it reflects and enshrines man-kind’s universal and fundamental desire for peace and security. Every Government whose representatives supported the Treaty in the United Nations General Assemble and who voted for the resolution can feel that it has contributed to the Treaty we are signing today . . .”

A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:“The conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a major contribution to peace. Ever since nuclear weapons appeared the Soviet Union has firmly and consistently made efforts to remove the nuclear threat from mankind. The Treaty is an important step towards this objec-tive since it constitutes a barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and in doing so decreases the danger of nuclear war breaking out.”

“The participation by a large number of States today in signing the Treaty is convincing proof that mutually acceptable ways and means can be found by States for solving difficult inter-national problems of vital importance for mankind as a whole.”

Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the USA:“As the moment is reassuring, so it is, even more, hopeful and heartening. For this Treaty is evidence that amid the tensions, the strife, the struggle and sorrow for these years, men of many nations have not lost the way—or the will—toward peace. The conclusion of this Treaty encourages hope that other steps may be taken toward a peaceful world.”

“The march of mankind is toward the summit—not the chasm. We must not, we shall not allow that march to be interrupted.”

“I know the stubborn, patient persistence it has required to get this far. I know the difficul-ties that lie ahead. I know the fears, suspicions, and anxieties we shall have to overcome. But I believe that the same spirit of accommodation shown in the negotiation of the present treaty can bring us to a good result.

Man can still shape his destiny in the nuclear age—and learn to live as brothers.”

“Heads of States Welcome NPT.” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 10, Issue 4.

A. Kosygin (left) and Lyndon B. Johnson


Peacemakers around the world have a weak reputation. Many people in power think of them as peaceniks, flower children just one step removed from well-intentioned

Hare Krishnas who through chants and a vegan diet will somehow bring about peace.

This is far from what is actually happening.

The serious front lines work on peace-making around the world is now done by people who are trained and experienced for the real world tasks they face. It is these kind of people who have stud-ied the negotiations process, who know the case histories of how societies break down and where the entry points are for holding back the break-downs; who know militaries (their ranks, their pro-tocols, their strengths as potential peacekeepers) so that they can talk as experts with military offic-ers. They know about post-conflict reconstruction, what sequences are needed, how do you organize the military for reconstruction, how to foster civil-ian resumption of leaderships, how to draw upon the strengths of international assistance. The best of these peace-makers are often found in the United Nations (UN), or as advisors to the UN, or work in col-laboration with the UN.

I am a board member of the Alliance of Peace-building, a coalition of 50 major academic and civil society groups like the Carter Center, Search for Common Ground and the Harvard Negotiations Project. In Switzerland, there are numerous groups like Swisspeace.

What I am saying is that making peace is now an established profession. Those of you who want to enter this profession can now see a path ahead on how to do it, with whom you should study, and what a career in making peace can be….

Nuclear disarmament discussions have been dif-ficult, prolonged beyond human comprehension

and immensely frustrating… The fact is that over the last three decades we have far too little to show for the efforts at global nuclear disarmament. But there are other signs of progress.

In fact the trends in inter and intra-state violence have declined sharply since the end of the Cold War and this is due to three reasons.

First, a recognition that the UN and regional group-ings of States need to be at the center of peacemak-ing. Look at the terrific rise in the number of UN peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War.

Second, in the last two decades literally hundreds of millions of people have entered into the emerging middle class and above. Employment has broad-ened significantly. This means that a much higher proportion of humanity has a stake in stable soci-eties.

And third, is the increasingly effective work of the profession of peace-making and peacebuilding. So the general trend is clearly for a more peaceful world. If anything, nuclear disarmament has lagged the general trend…

The World Academy of Art and Science believes that breakthroughs are possible from other sources that might help set a climate of pressure on the biggest powers to get to work on disarmament more seri-ously…

Will we have the imagination and the courage to think about a future where inter-state military adven-tures are a thing of the past, where multilateral secu-rity replaces national militaries, where there is new promise for human development because new forces of creativity are unleashed?

The imagination for peace lives in the Academy.

by Robert J. Berg

are students shaping a more peaceful world?

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The Road Ahead | Nuclear Peace


But it is not enough. The role of experts like those found in the World Academy is almost by defini-tion limited. Yes we can generate ideas. And we can work with inner cores of activists, like the World Federation of United Nations Associations, disarma-ment non-governmental organizations, and various levels of the UN.

But while necessary, these inner cores have not been sufficient. I believe that the lesson of political change is that we require citizen activism, and the further lesson is that citizen activism is particularly effective when it can mobilize unexpected friends.

Unexpected friends are the key prize in activism. What if, for example, a large number of the world’s military leaders could be enlisted in this cause on the basis of the obsolescence of nuclear weapons?

History is on our side. Peace is prevailing over vio-lence. There are new political figures coming on to the scene of great promise, and leaders in most countries are feeling the need to be more respon-sive to their publics. Our challenge is to put the problem of nuclear disarmament into the main-stream moving towards a more peaceful, progress-ing world.

Robert J. Berg is Trustee, World Academy of Art and Science, and Senior Advisor, World Federation of United Nations Associations. This article is based on his address to the Conference of Students for a Nuclear Weapons Free World, held in Geneva, Switzerland, in July 2008. E-mail: [email protected].

World Academy on the Web:http://worldacademy.org/

Students are thinking good things for, and about, former IAEA Director General Hans Blix. Hundreds took part in 2008 in a global initia-

tive for peace and nuclear disarmament.

“The best way to avoid nuclear weapons is to make governments feel that they don’t need them,” says Dr. Blix, who launched the initiative through Students for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World.

After leading the IAEA and UN weapons inspec-tors for more than two decades, Dr. Blix today is President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations. Earlier this year, he launched a global competition to engage students from around the world and from a diversity of disciplines to write an essay, design a poster or make a video to express their ideas on how to free the world of nuclear weapons.

The 15 winning students are from Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, China, Colombia, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, and the United States.

Inspired and committed, students decided in July 2008 to create a mass movement of youth against nuclear weapons. “We want to solve the problems before we inherit them,” says Catriona Standfield, a student from Australia. The students talked about

both strategy and substance during a three-day conference in Geneva.

The students are working on a statement that they will send to the heads of nuclear weapons States, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and US Presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama.

The student conference was backed by the UN and governments. Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, the Director General of the UN in Geneva, and Mr. Sergio Duarte, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, both sent messages to the students. The conference programme included sessions with the Ambassadors of Canada, Pakistan, Iraq and Sweden and meetings with Alyn Ware from Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, renowned investigative journalist, Phillip Knightley, and civil society activists, Susi Snyder and Colin Archer.

Students for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World has over 30 partner organizations, and is co-sponsored by the World Academy of Art and Science. To learn more, visit the website at www.disarmamenthub.org.

Dr. Hans Blix served as Chairman of the 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission report. For an over-view, see IAEA Bulletin article, “Wake Up Call”, by Manne Wängborg at www.iaea.org/bulletin

Blix on the Campus TrailFormer IAEA Head Hans Blix Still Inspires Students

Through the Joint FAO/IAEA Division, nuclear technology and related biotechnologies contributed to food security for over 40 years.

feed the hungry

today and tomorrowby Qu Liang and Katherine Long

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Harvesting Times | Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow


Soaring global food prices, their effects on the world’s economy and the widespread social unrest that followed, have brought to the fore the issue of poor investments made in agriculture and food production

over the last three decades.

As a result of decreasing investments, farmers are not only subject to rising costs of inputs, but also to high transportation costs and poor infrastructure. At the same time, natural resources such as soil, water and plants are coming increasingly under pressure from conflicting demands from agriculture, popula-tion growth and other sectors of the economy.

Dwindling food stocks combined with low crop pro-ductivity and the increase in costs for inputs such as fertilizer and seeds, has led to an overall decrease in food availability and a consequent rise in prices. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index rose, on average, by an annual 12 per cent in 2006, and further accelerated to 24 per cent in 2007. According to FAO, the price of food commodities, currently 30 per cent above 2007 levels, will con-tinue to increase through 2017. The impact of ris-ing food and fuel prices is having dramatic conse-quences, especially for those living in developing countries where food security is already precarious.

Other factors contributing to the current global food crisis include climate change, the increase in transboundary pests and diseases (e.g., UG99, also known as ‘wheat rust’) and the change in land use and water distribution.

Increased demand for biofuel is also putting pres-sure on agriculture and will continue to do so in coming decades due to rising fossil energy prices.

Another factor related to rising food prices is the increasing number of people moving away from starchy foods towards meat and dairy products, a trend that is intensifying demand for feed grains.

Our WorkThe IAEA has been working together with other UN and international organizations to find solutions to the problems set before us by the global food cri-sis. The strategies adopted have been necessarily divided into short, medium and long term.

In the short term, the World Food Programme (WFP) has sought to dramatically increase food aid with additional funding of US$755 million, while FAO has been distributing seeds, fertilizer, animal feed and

A Partnership for Food SecurityOn 1 October 1964, FAO and its partner in the UN system, the IAEA created the Joint FAO/

IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. The aim of setting up the Joint Division was to use the talents and resources of both organizations for broadening coop-eration between their Member Countries in applying nuclear technology and related biotech-nologies for developing improved strategies for sustainable food security.*

Its uniqueness stems from the nature of the technology itself and the fact that all its activities are conceived, planned and executed only after the scrutiny and approval of the IAEA and FAO Governing Bodies.

The Joint Division is a successful example of inter-agency cooperation and coordination in the UN and a precursor for UN-wide reforms being undertaken. The UN and the governments of its Member States continually stress the need for more cooperation among UN agencies, for less overlapping and duplication and for more harmony in their approach towards building a pros-perous and peaceful world.

Earlier this year, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei cited plans by the FAO to end the partnership as part of its reform process. “I believe that termination of the current arrangements would have significantly negative consequences for developing Member States in areas such as animal disease and insect pest eradication, land and water management, plant breeding, food safety and trade,” Dr. ElBaradei said. He urged countries to maintain the partnership.

* Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.©FAO/M. Roest



other farming tools and supplies to smallholder farmers through its Initiative on Soaring Food Prices (ISFP). The IAEA, through its Joint FAO/IAEA Programme, is active with an integrated medium and long term approach to the global food security crisis. The sustainable intensification of agricultural production, including enhanced food quality and safety, and the integrated use of nuclear technolo-gies and related biotechnologies is its field of action. This falls under three categories: monitoring; adop-tion of appropriate technology; and intervention.

MonitoringMonitoring refers to the selection and assessment of options for the prevention or mitigation of prob-lems. In this sense, a typical monitoring effort is the tracking of land degradation and pollutants in soil through the use of stable isotopes that pose no environmental threat and do not change the chem-istry or biology of the target organism or system.

Soil monitoring through the use of isotopesAgricultural production may be improved through the development and use of integrated land and water management. Isotopic and nuclear tech-niques play an important role in identifying the source of pollutants from different land use prac-tices and farming activities.

Both stable isotopes and fallout radionuclides (FRN) in soil, water or sediment samples can help to accu-rately pinpoint the sources of these agricultural pollutants. FRN such as caesium-137, lead-210 and beryllium-7, airborne radioactive debris originating from man-made activities such as nuclear weapon testing and nuclear power plant accidents as well as from the natural collision of cosmic rays, are attached to soil particles and can therefore be used as fingerprints to track their movement.

In addition, fertilizers, farmyard manure, pesticides and animal excreta deposited by grazing animals in an agricultural catchment carry distinct stable iso-topic signatures — e.g., carbon-13 and nitrogen-15. Thus specific areas within a catchment may have distinctly different stable isotopic signatures (natu-ral biomarkers) because of varying agricultural uses and animal grazing patterns. The different signa-tures offer a ‘forensic tool’ in environmental soil sci-ence to verify the origin of a range of pollutants such as nitrate, phosphate, and pesticides in waterways.

Soil studies using stable isotopic signatures also assist in the understanding of climate change.

Isotopes such as carbon-13 and nitogen-15 can be used as fingerprints to investigate how soil acts as a sink for greenhouse gases. Changes in soil carbon and nitrogen isotopes are expected to reflect the shift in soil organic matter as influenced by varia-tions in the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmos-phere and land use activities.

Adoption of Appropriate TechnologyAppropriate technology is identified and adopted to intensify production systems in a sustainable manner. The development of new plant varieties through mutation induction is one of the foremost examples of this process.

This technology goes beyond conventional plant breeding to address challenges such as the devel-opment of new traits, adaptability to harsh environ-ments, climate change and enhancement of bio-mass productivity.

The UN Response to the Global Food Crisis

The timeliness of FAO’s High Level Conference on World Food Security held in June 2008 in Rome, Italy, was widely acknowl-edged by participants and countries alike. During the conference,

participants agreed that the issues of food, energy and climate change are all closely linked.

While many analyses were presented, there was general agreement on the fact that agriculture would once again play a prominent role in the international agenda, and that increased agricultural investment and enhanced agricultural productivity would be crucial for the future. Short, medium and long term responses were identified.

On 28 April, 2008, the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban-Ki Moon, estab-lished a Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis composed of the heads of the UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes, Bretton Woods institutions and relevant parts of the UN Secretariat. The Task Force is chaired by the UN Secretary-General, with FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf as Vice-Chairman. The primary aim of the Task Force is to promote a unified response to the global food price challenge. The pro-posed framework for action is to:

❶ address the current threats and opportunities resulting from food price rises;❷ create policy changes to avoid future food crises; and❸ contribute to country, regional and global food and nutritional security.



Mutant barley varieties filling the food bowl in the Peruvian Andes

Planted in areas above 3,000 m of altitude, where adverse climatic conditions do not allow other crops to be grown, barley is the main food security com-ponent for the 3 million native Peruvians living off subsistence agriculture in the Peruvian Andes. In an effort initiated in the 1970s, the National Agrarian University of La Molina, together with the Joint Division and the Backus Foundation, developed nine improved varieties of barley through muta-tion induction and crosses that now cover 90% of the barley producing area in Peru. The last released mutant variety of barley has the potential to produce

5,500Kg/ha representing a six-fold increase in pro-ductivity of the original barley grown in 1978. Led by Prof. Luz Gomes Pando, the socio-economic impact of the improved barley varieties was awarded the 2006 Prize of Good Governmental Practices.

InterventionIntervention refers to products and processes adopted to optimize efficiency, reduce vulnerability and improve the quality and safety of food.

Pre- and post- harvest problems account for 30-50 per cent of crops lost due to insects and adverse storage conditions. The Joint FAO/IAEA Division has been working to remove key constraints to agricul-tural production, not only to increase production, but also to improve food quality in relation to insect pests of plants and animals, animal diseases and food control measures.

Diagnosis: identify and characterize constraints and risksThe IAEA has been actively involved in the validation of kits to measure antibodies against non-structural proteins of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV). The tests can distinguish between infected and vac-cinated livestock and are of utmost importance in assessing countries as free from foot and mouth dis-ease (FMD). The use of such assays in well planned serological surveys is vital to declaring countries or zones as free from FMD and therefore has huge trade implications.

Sterile insect technique to generate export marketsFruit flies cause major losses, and their presence in a country can pose a significant barrier to trade in fresh fruits and vegetables. The sterile insect tech-nique (SIT) has been used in many parts of the world against insect pests, such as the Mediterranean fruit fly in Chile, Mexico and California, and the New World screwworm in Libya, Central and North America.

The technique is a form of biological pest control, an alternative to pesticides which can have serious impacts on human health and the environment. It involves the mass breeding of huge quantities of target insects and the sterilization of the males by exposing them to low doses of radiation. These ster-ile male flies are then released by air over infested areas where they mate with wild females. As they produce no offspring, a gradual suppression or elim-ination of the pest is eventually achieved.

The Science of Plant Breeding

Agriculture is synonymous to plant domestication and trait selection. However, scientific research applied to the screening, selection and devel-opment of plant varieties has grown immensely over the last few decades. But not all techniques used in this endeavor are the same.

Mutation breeding refers to the development of plant strains using mutagens, including the irradiation of seeds. Quite simply, through this procedure the natural process of evolution of the plant’s DNA is speeded up. New varieties of crops can be chosen with characteristics tailored to a particular environment, such as grains with higher yield, better nutritional value, tolerance to salty soil or resistance to a specific disease.

Smart breeding, which makes use of marker assisted selection, refers to a process whereby a marker is used for indirect selection of a genetic trait of interest. This is a similar process to traditional breeding, although it involves a far more precise knowledge, i.e., at a genetic level, of species’ traits.

Genetically modified plant varieties, on the other hand, have had their genetic material altered using genetic engineering techniques. With this technology, DNA from the original plant and other sources are com-bined into one molecule to create a new set of genes. This DNA is then transferred into the plant, causing it to acquire modified or novel traits.

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Nuclear Partnersby Louise Potterton

James Butler, Deputy Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), talks about the importance of nuclear techniques in agricultural and livestock production.

Question: When we look at the global food crisis, how important is the contribution from nuclear science?

James Butler: It is very important in the medium and long term. When we stabilise food production and we are able to move from the immediate needs to the next level, then we will see the impact. It could be the improved seed, or the plant that has been developed that has genetic resistance to insects or salt conditions. Or it could be techniques that allow animals to be utilised in production practices in Africa, for example – the tsetse fly has been reduced in number through sterilization technique, allowing animals to be utilised in previously hostile areas. There are many uses of nuclear tech-nology that will have a medium and long term impact on agriculture and livestock production.

Q: I understand that you have applied these technologies in your field of work. Can you tell me about this experience?

JB: I am from the US and have spent most of my career in production agri-culture. In my youth the screw worm was very prevalent in the US, Mexico and Central America. One of the earliest uses of technology was the steriliza-tion of the fly. As I increased in age and went through the distribution of ster-ile flies, the cases of screw worms we were dealing with in our own ranching operation decreased significantly and then were removed all together.

This is a success model often cited as a proper use of technology in agricul-ture and livestock production.

Q: According to UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, to meet glo-bal food demand production will have to increase by 50 per cent by 2030. Is this realistic?

JB: Yes it is. We have the crops; we can utilize some improved varieties, improve yields, and reduce losses during the production phase. If we increase production by 1-2 per cent a year we can raise production to meet this chal-lenge.

Q: Do we need to invest more in science and technology?

JB: Yes. International financial institutions and individual country donors have stated that they are willing to invest in agriculture and many of the needs are medium and long term, and I do believe that this is where the col-laboration with the IAEA applying nuclear techniques will have benefits into the future.

Louise Potterton is a Consultant at the IAEA Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]



An example of this work is the eradication of Medflies from the Patagonia region of Argentina, which represents the culmination of ten years of technical support provided by the IAEA and FAO. Crucially, this achievement—which was officially recognized by the USA—will allow Patagonia to export fresh fruits and vegetables to the USA without any quarantine treatments, represent-ing annual savings of millions of dollars.

Food SafetyFood and feed products (and the water used for their production, processing and preparation) are likely vectors of many microbiological, (bio)chemical and environmental hazards.

The Joint FAO/IAEA Division promotes the estab-lishment of food control and quality assurance systems compatible with international stand-ards, with a focus on Codex food standards and the reduction of the incidence of food trade detentions and rejections from contaminants and residue violations.

ConclusionNuclear and isotopic techniques can help address the issues of food security and safety facing the world today. They are economically sound and highly competitive in relation to non-nuclear technologies and can be used to achieve a better understanding of and adaptation to new challenges in agriculture.

The Joint FAO/IAEA Division provides an inte-grated approach to address these challenges throughout the food chain. At a time when soaring food prices, combined with popula-tion growth and continued stress on the envi-ronment due to climate change, is becoming a problem for millions of people in the world, it is time to make the necessary investments that will ensure the sustainable production of food for generations to come, so that crisis such as the present one will never happen again.

Qu Liang is Director of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. E-mail: [email protected].

Katherine Long is Programme Support Officer of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Sciences and Applications. E-mail: [email protected]


Hot and barren, Kenya s dry lands have long been unfit for agriculture, at best merely a grazing area for wild animals and live-

stock.

Today, the landscape is more picturesque and pro-ductive, lined with golden stalks of wheat yielding precious grain for Kenya s farms and families. The wheat is a new variety, one that is high yielding and resistant to drought. As a result, small farming fam-ilies are realizing harvests on farmlands once con-sidered too poor to cultivate, to the country s social and economic benefit.

The progress is life-saving at a time when wheat crops in Kenya and other African countries are

plagued by a virulent new strain of fungus called “wheat rust” that threatens the region s farmlands.

“The progress is crucial. This wheat is literally Kenya s bread of life,” says Martin Dyre, whose family owns one of Kenya s largest wheat plantations. “The diet of this country is changing more and more towards wheat-based products, so the demand for wheat is growing.”

Scientists and crop researchers at Kenya s Agri-cultural Research Institute (KARI) developed the new wheat seeds over the past decade. Through a process called “mutation plant breeding”, they applied radiation-based techniques to mod-ify crop characteristics and traits. Kenya worked

Through IAEA partnerships, scientists and farmers pioneer hardier, healthier wheat.

Kenya’s DrylandsRodolfo Quevenco

Golden Wheat “Greens”

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Harvesting Times | Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands


closely with the IAEA, through its technical cooper-ation arm and a regional programme called AFRA (African Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology). In August 2008, through its Joint Division with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the IAEA hosted an International Conference on Plant Breeding to take stock of the latest developments in Kenya and other countries.

KARI is the country’s premier institution for agricultural research and technology transfer. Its plant breeders successfully released their first mutant wheat variety in 2001. Called Njoro-BW1, it was bred to be tolerant to drought and use limited rainfall efficiently. Key side benefits include a moderate susceptability to wheat rust; high yields, with grains valued for flour production of good baking quality.

Njoro-BW1 today is cultivated on more than 10,000 hectares in Narok, Nalvasha, Katumani and Mogotio. Its popularity among Kenyan wheat farmers is increasing steadily, so much so that KARI’s seed unit can barely keep up with farmer s demand.

Professor Miriam Kinyua, now an Associate Professor at Moi University and KARI s former Chief Plant Breeder and Center Director, is largely credited for developing Kenya s mutant wheat varieties.

“Njoro-BW1 came out as a hit variety”, she recalls. “The farmers liked it from the start. In dry areas, they can expect to harvest up to 20 bags an acre. It is now our most popular wheat variety for the drylands”.

Peter Njau, KARI s chief plant breeder, says Njoro-BW1 s value goes beyond drylands.

“Although we developed the Njoro-BW1 variety for dry lowlands, it is being widely adapted in other areas”, he says. Farmers have reported successfully growing the wheat in the highlands and even in the acidic soils of the northern rift, where it is outper-forming other wheat varieties developed for those conditions.

Kenya s plant breeders soon will release a sec-ond mutant wheat variety, code-named DH4, which shares most of the same good qualities of Njoro-BW1.

“DH4 is high-yielding, and has a high grain quality. It is also hard and red, qualities that farmers ask for because of its high market value,” Professor Kinyua explains. Hard red grains distinguish as some of the world s best wheat, high in protein and valued for making flour used for baking high-quality breads.

All Bread Does Not Bake EqualOne of KARI s objectives is to develop good qual-ity wheat bread for the country s consumers, says Mr. Njau. The institute has conducted a comparison study of the different wheat varieties available in Kenya for their quality of bread, including Njoro-BW1 and the new DH4 variety.

Among varieties tested, Njoro-BW1 came out on top in flour extraction. DH4 also scored high in bread quality overall.

“You can tell the quality of bread just by pressing it”, Mr. Njau illustrates. “If you press good bread, it just swells back. If it s bad, it just sinks.”

The tests showed that mutant wheat varieties pro-duce better bread, outperforming even the parent strain in quality and yield.

Multiplying the SeedWith every new crop variety comes the challenge of stocking up on seed to meet expected demand. For KARI, the biggest issue most often is availabil-ity of land. KARI has its own fields but they are not large enough to meet farming needs, especially for a high-demand variety like Njoro-BW1.

Fortunately, for Kenya s plant breeders, the country s Cereal Growers Association (CGA), has provided needed land and support particularly in the area of seed multiplication. In the highlands of Timau, by the northern slopes of Mount Kenya, several hec-tares of prime wheat land are being dedicated for field trials for future plantings of DH4.

In November 2007, DH4 was being grown on a small scale in trials on some 40 hectares of farmland.

“These are the straw qualities wheat farmers are looking for”, says Martin Dyre as he cuts a length of leaf from one of the plants. His family owns the vast Kisima Farm in Timau, Kenya; and he occupies a seat on the CGA Board. Kisima Farms has provided land and logistical support to Professor Kinyua and her team at KARI, particularly in times when resources were scarce to help ensure continuity of research and trials.

“We are happy to continue to support plant breed-ing activities of this kind,” he says. “Good wheat is, in the end, good for all of us.”

Lower down the valley at the Wangu Embori Farm, Crop Supervisor Steven Irungu points to 70

Harvesting Times | Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands


hectares being planted with the Njoro-BW1 seeds. He is impressed about the variety s high yield and plans to increase the acreage. The Wangu Embori Farm is another farm contracted by KARI for seed multiplication.

Wheat for Food SecurityWheat is the second most important cereal crop in Kenya, after maize. But the country produces just a third and has to import two-thirds of its annual wheat demand, now at vastly higher prices. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that as of January 2008, the global prices of wheat were 83% higher than they were a year ago.

Alongside market forces stands the wheat rust plague that threatens Kenya and other countries. New crop varieties, such as wheat that is more resist-ant to drought conditions or to the rust fungus, are vital for Kenya s food security.

Professor Miriam Kinyua believes mutation tech-niques are among the best options for Kenya to develop better wheat varieties and other vegeta-tively propagated crops.

“The fact that we can link up with the IAEA is a plus both for Kenya and for African scientific research,” she says.

Worldwide, issues of food supply and availability are intensifying in their urgency, says IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.

“Food security is among the most challenging prob-lems facing poor countries,” he says. “Boosting agri-cultural production requires enhanced crop varie-ties, effective pest control measures, increased soil fertility and better soil and water management.”

Under national and regional projects, the IAEA helps local scientists and farmers with nuclear techniques that support each of these goals, working through channels of technical cooperation as well as scien-tific research of the Vienna-based Joint FAO/IAEA Division. In the past five years, in Africa alone, six new varieties of crops have been officially released — plants with higher yield, improved nutrition, and more hardy characteristics for harsh environments. This includes new varieties of sesame in Egypt, cas-sava in Ghana, wheat in Kenya, banana in Sudan and finger millet and cotton in Zambia.

The idea is not only to boost food production, Dr. ElBaradei says, but also to sustain it through greener, more productive fields.

Rodolfo Quevenco, IAEA Division of Public Information. E-mail: [email protected]

“You can tell the quality of bread just by pressing it”, Mr. Njau illustrates. “If you press good bread, it just swells back. If it s bad, it just sinks.”

The tests showed that mutant wheat varieties produce better bread, outperforming even the parent strain in quality and yield.

Rodolfo Quevenco


In steamy sites ranging from Sudan to Tahiti, Mozambique to the United States, researchers are studying the sex life of the male mosquito — in

order to halt reproduction. Why? Mosquitoes can be deadly carriers of disease, including malaria and yel-low fever.

In July 2008 in Vienna, the world s leading scientists in mosquito research met to compare notes and map strategies for thwarting the mating of mosqui-toes in the wild. The results, down the line, stand to be an important component in arresting the spread of malaria and other insect-borne diseases.

Genetic Science Opens OpportunitiesThe male mosquito is growing in significance as a target of scientific research due to developments in genetic control techniques. They include the method known as Sterile Insect Technique (SIT), used to control unwanted populations of insect pests. It has been successfully applied against var-ious insects, including the screwworm threatening livestock and fruit flies threatening crops.

The mosquito can become a vector for diseases such as yellow fever, dengue, and malaria — illnesses that are fatal to over 2 million people per year worldwide. The Anopheles mosquito, in particular, carries and spreads the deadly malaria parasite, one of the main foci of the IAEA scientific meeting.

Other techniques such as indoor spraying, insecti-cide-treated bed nets, and larval treatment are all being used in the war against these tiny harbin-gers of disease and devastation. SIT, however, may prove to be one of the more effective weapons in

the arsenal, with the potential of being able to elimi-nate entire mosquito vectors in specific regions. The radiation technique sterilises millions of male mos-quitoes in the lab and releases them into the wild to mate with female mosquitoes. The goal is to con-trol and eventually eliminate the targeted mosquito population.

“In a nutshell, SIT is birth control for insects,” says Mark Benedict of the IAEA s research laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria.

The researchers are conscious of the potential human impact of their work. Scientists Jacques Charlwood, currently working in Mozambique, and Alexander Yawson of Ghana have both helped start clinics to treat malaria in the regions in which they work. Says Yawson, “Malaria is the primary cause of death in children under five. Malaria... accounts for 45% of all our patients.”

Targeting MalesIt is only the female mosquito who feeds on blood, picks up a virus or a parasite, and spreads the dis-ease. Why, then, the recent interest in the male mos-quito?

Explains Bart Knols, a Dutch scientist: “The females are responsible for passing on the pathogen between humans... The males, however, play a very important role because they are involved in repro-duction and population growth in the field, so if you can control the males... then you can define ways to control that population.”

If scientists can successfully control the reproduc-tive process through the males, then the entire mos-quito population, including the female disease vec-tors, may thus be eliminated. One female mosquito

No Loveby FeiFei Jiang

for MosquitoesIn the fight against malaria and other insect-borne diseases, scientists take aim at sixteen seconds of mosquito mating.

Harvesting Times | No Love for Mosquitoes


lays hundreds of eggs in her lifetime, but what most do not know is that all of these eggs result from a single mating.

In Search of Sixteen SecondsScientists know the basics about how mosquitoes mate, but crucial questions remain.

Typically, the male mosquitoes emerge at sun-set and form swarms at a specific location, usually over a visual marker such as a bush or a small tree. The swarm performs what looks like a complicated, interlocked dance — much like a swarm of locusts — but that is based on three simple mathematical principles: keep one’s distance, maintain a constant speed, and move towards the centre.

“The swarm is more or less like a disco,” Dr. Charlwood describes, gesticulating animatedly. “The males are all dancing around, as if to shout, ´Look at me! Look at me! ”

Scientists are not sure what draws females into the swarm. Some think that the females, when young, act like pseudo-males, instinctively flying to cer-tain attractive visual markers. Others believe that the female mosquitoes are drawn to the swarm by their sense of smell, or perhaps some kind of chem-ical cue.

When a female enters the swarm, the males can sense her with the aid of her wingbeat frequency, which is lower than that of the males. Once a male has sensed a female, his wingbeat frequency slows to match that of the female. The male then uses his large front claws to snatch the female by the back legs, using the female s legs like a trapeze bar to swing under her abdomen. In less than one second, the male s terminalia attach to the female s abdo-men. The connected pair then slowly flies out of the swarm while mating in mid-air. The entire mating process takes less than 16 seconds.

Once mating is over, the female mosquito s eggs are fertilised; all of the eggs that the female lays in her lifetime will result from this one mating. Thus, if a SIT-sterilised male mates with a wild female, the female s unfertilised eggs will never hatch.

Plotting the ResearchStill, questions remain. Is mating a selective proc-ess? If so, what is it that makes a male attractive?

Though the even ratio of males-to-females, and the fact that a female only mates once during her life-time, dictate that on average, each male mates only once a lifetime, the reality may not conform to the math. Perhaps some male mosquitoes mate multi-ple times, and some are left without any mates at the end of the day.

So what is it that might make some males more suc-cessful than others in the mating game? Researchers are currently striving to answer this question, which may help make the lab-grown sterile males com-petitive as mates when released in the wild.

Mozambique s Dr. Charlwood is working with a grant from the IAEA to record the swarms mating in high-definition video format in order to better understand the process. Perhaps, he says, the larger male mosquitoes are the most successful ones, or maybe it is the most symmetrical mosquitoes, or the most agile. At present, there is no consensus. Or perhaps it is as the math suggests, and mating is completely anonymous. These are the questions that have inspired last week s meeting to discuss male mosquitoes and mating processes - and their answers may be the key to the success of many SIT programs.

Interestingly, says Dr. Knols, the SIT is a very “green technology”. “You re releasing an insect that will specifically go out in the environment and look for your target insects, unlike chemical pesticides, for instance,” he explains. That helps to make it efficient and environmentally friendly.

Much Work Still NeededEarly results from very preliminary studies of SIT on mosquitoes show great promise. The research file goes back as far as the 1970s in El Salvador, says the IAEA s Mark Benedict. They focused on one partic-ular malaria vector. “Even though their techniques were very crude, they eliminated an isolated popu-lation within one season,” he says.

One target area today is an isolated region of Sudan, where a planned SIT facility looks to be up and run-ning by 2010.

“Hopefully, we´ll introduce a novel way for control-ling mosquitoes that transmit disease,” Dr. Benedict says.

FeiFei Jiang served in an internship in 2008 in the IAEA Division of Public Information.


Great Expectations

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Projections of nuclear power around the world show an upward trend.

Historical growth in regional nuclear power capacity and estimates of future growth according to the IAEA’s low and high projections (N.B.: scales vary. source: IAEA)

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A Mixed Picture

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by Alan McDonald, Hans-Holger Rogner and Andrii Gritsevskyi

Projections of nuclear power around the world show an upward trend.

Historical growth in regional nuclear power capacity and estimates of future growth according to the IAEA’s low and high projections (N.B.: scales vary. source: IAEA)

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The Energy File | Great Expectations


In its 2008 edition of Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period to 2030, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has again revised its pro-

jections for nuclear power upwards. At the same time, it reports that nuclear power’s share of global electricity generation dropped another percentage point in 2007, to 14%. This compares to the nearly steady share of 16 to 17% that nuclear power main-tained for almost two decades, from 1986 through 2005.

Rising ExpectationsEvery year since 1981 the IAEA has published two updated projections for the world’s nuclear power generating capacity, a low projection and a high projection.

The low projection is a down to earth, business-as-usual projection. It assumes that nuclear investment projects currently underway or firmly in the pipeline are implemented, but not much more; that existing plants are retired as scheduled unless license exten-sions have been granted or applied for; and that current policies are unchanged, such as the German and Belgian phase-outs of nuclear power.

The high projection takes into account govern-ment and corporate announcements about longer-term plans for nuclear investments as well as poten-tial new national policies, e.g., to combat climate change.

The results for the 2008 projections are shown in Figure 1. In the low projection, the projected nuclear power capacity in 2030 in 473 GW(e), some 27% higher than today’s 372 GW(e). In the high projec-tion, nuclear capacity in 2030 is 748 GW(e), double today’s capacity.

Figures 2 and 3 respectively show how the low and high projections have changed since 2003 — the blue bars on the left are history.

Figure 3 shows that in every year since 2003 the high projection has been revised upwards. The low pro-jection has also gone up, but less consistently. It has also gone up by a smaller amount than has the high projection, meaning the gap between the two, or the uncertainty about nuclear power’s future that is reflected in the two projections, has also increased.

Why have projections gone up in the last five years? First is the current performance record. The world now has accumulated more than 13,000 reactor-years of experience. Performance has improved greatly since the 1980s, and the safety record of the types of reactors on the market today is excellent.

Second, although nuclear capacity additions since 1986 fell behind the growth of total electricity gen-eration, nuclear power’s market share held steady due to increases in the average load factor of the global reactor fleet from 67% in 1990 to more than 80% since early 2000.

Third, energy demand projections keep showing persistent long-term growth. The world is going to need a lot more energy, so more people are think-ing about nuclear power being an important part of the mix.

Fourth is energy supply security. In the 1970s con-cerns about supply security, triggered by the oil price shocks, were a major cause of nuclear expan-sion in Finland; France; Germany; Japan; Taiwan, China; Sweden and other countries. Similar con-cerns may also prove important today.

Fifth are major expansion plans in key countries like China and India and new policies and interest in nuclear power in countries like the UK and USA.

Sixth are new environmental constraints like entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol and the European carbon trading scheme (ETS). These mean there is now a real financial benefit to avoiding GHG emis-sions, which increases the attractiveness of low-car-bon electricity generation, including nuclear power and renewables.

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The Energy File | Great Expectations


Seventh, the costs of the dominant alternatives to nuclear power are going up, particularly natural gas and coal.

A Declining ShareBut while projections for nuclear power’s future rose, its share of the world’s electricity generation today dropped from 15% in 2006 to 14% in 2007. The reason is that while total global electricity genera-tion rose 4.8% from 2007 to 2008, nuclear electricity actually dropped slightly.

The main reason that nuclear generation dropped was an earthquake in western Japan on 16 July 2007, which shut down all seven reactors at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant. The seven units total 8.2 GW(e), almost one sixth of Japan’s nuclear capacity. There were also several other unusual outages and reductions in 2007, including the relicensing and consequent outage of a reac-tor in the Republic of Korea, the coincidence of a number of reactor outage schedules for refueling, and reduced generation at some German reactors in order to extend their operating life while meet-ing the generation limits imposed by the German phase-out.

Finally, it appears that the increases referred to above in the load factor for the current fleet of reactors have plateaued. Although some future increases can be expected as new plants with higher load factors replace old reactors, even these increases will eventually level off since the load factor can

never exceed 100%. Thus the impact of load fac-tor improvements, which allowed past nuclear elec-tricity production to grow at the same pace as total electricity output, has already begun to diminish.

What does the IAEA’s 2008 update project for the nuclear share of electricity generation in the future? In the high projection, growth in nuclear generation matches the 3.2% per year growth in overall gen-eration, and nuclear power’s share therefore holds steady at 14%. In the low projection, overall electric-ity growth is lower, but nuclear power’s growth is lower still, and by 2030 nuclear power’s share of glo-bal electricity is projected to drop to about 12.5%.

ConclusionThe overall message from the IAEA’s 2008 edition of Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period to 2030 is that global electricity use will grow significantly, that nuclear power will have to expand more rapidly than it has done recently in order to maintain its share, and that expectations are that nuclear power will meet the challenge.

Alan McDonald is a senior analyst at the IAEA Department of Nuclear Energy. E-mail: [email protected]

Hans-Holger Rogner is Head of the IAEA’s Nuclear Energy Planning and Economic Studies Section, where Andrii Gritsevskyi is Energy Systems Analyst. E-mails: [email protected]; [email protected]

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nuclear industry people often rest under the illusion that their business is the only one under attack by strong opponents,

engendering a feeling of isolation and supreme defensiveness. Far from it — these days no industrial sector gets an easy ride with public opinion. Under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility (CSR), all industrial sectors must justify their activities in terms of their environmental and social impact. The presumption today is essentially “guilty until proved innocent”. But are things really so bad and the efforts made to sway both national and international pub-lic opinion really worthwhile? The answers are prob-ably no.

If we look at the United States, it is clear that the vastly improved public perception of nuclear power has its roots in the superb operating performance of the 104 plants in recent years. Producing large quantities of electricity cheaply, safely and with due regard for the environment is far more effective than any fancy communication strategies. It is only when things start to go wrong at the operational level that the public becomes interested. The incidents at two German plants and the earthquake in Japan in 2007 demonstrate the need for good management of public opinion and “crisis management”.

Indeed until recently, the general public has shown little interest in energy matters. It’s only when there’s a looming crisis, such as a threat of the lights going out or huge price escalation and queues at the gasoline pumps, that people get highly upset and put pressure on industry and the politicians. The 1980s and 1990s were a relatively quiet period for energy, so most people today haven’t many strong and well-developed opinions about particular fuels or national strategy. Yet it’s probably the relation-ship between energy use and the environment which has begun to touch the general public’s con-sciousness most deeply. Climate change and poten-tial global warming have been a gift to the environ-mental movement, as they present a more credible apocalypse scenario. Most sensible people recog-nise that the other fears they have stirred up are largely groundless, as economic progress generally leads to a cleaner environment.

Putting nuclear power into this perspective, there are clearly concerns in the public mind about the weapons link, over proliferation coming from the civil side of the industry and a general fear about possible radiation releases from operations. We can put much of this down to an irrational evalua-tion of low risk but high consequence events, but this is something the industry has to live with. The number of people who have a hardened belief against nuclear and are difficult to sway are fortu-nately relatively few. That many people haven’t had to think hard about energy matters for some time also suggests that opinion can easily be influenced one way or another.

Unfortunately we cannot rely on politicians to dem-onstrate much leadership in nuclear matters. We know from bitter experience that they prefer to “sit on the fence” when it comes to issues which can excite even a very small part of their electorate, as losing these committed votes could be crucial in a tight election. So they rely on focus groups and tend to be led by the public rather than vice versa, argu-ably the opposite of what they’re supposed to do. Climate change, however, provides an ideal oppor-tunity for nuclear to be seen in a new light by those who have some general, but not deep-seated, con-cerns about it. Presenting it as a green and friendly technology is going to take time, but the message that nuclear emits few greenhouse gases seems to be slowly getting across.

Many of the problems the industry has with pub-lic opinion can be blamed on the sins of the past. Arrogant spokespeople, talking down to their audi-ence and not being open with important informa-tion is a legacy the industry has taken a long time to shake off. Society itself has now changed substan-tially and nuclear must fit in with this. The 1940s to the late 1960s were characterised by state provision, deference and a belief that the application of sci-ence could bring the greatest good to the greatest number. But from the 1970s onwards, self-reliance, distrust of science and assertion of individual rights irrespective of the common good have become prominent. Nuclear power doesn’t sit easily with this, as it relies on a degree of state involvement (at the

nuclearacceptanceby Steve Kidd

The Energy File | Nuclear Acceptance


nuclear very least in setting a framework for its operations in licensing, regulation and waste management) but is at last learning to exist within a climate of competi-tive power markets and private ownership.

The best examples of winning over people in today’s world come from specific examples of planning new facilities, rather than attempts at general persua-sion. In essence, public opinion is local and has to be handled in that way. The siting of the waste reposi-tory in Sweden and the 5th Finnish reactor serve to demonstrate that careful work with local people can bring huge dividends. The need for the new facility must first be shown convincingly, and then the pub-lic brought into the full process with the provision of clear information and opportunities for consulta-tion. Local people must be respected as the experts in local matters and should ultimately have the final veto on the project. The companies concerned must be seen to be interested in more than profits and be seen to have the interests of the local area and the wider country at heart. Indeed, nuclear facili-ties offer well-paid and secure jobs for many years in the future and have widespread economic impacts beyond the immediate capital investment.

The provision of clear and accurate information about nuclear power has been identified as an important weapon in winning the public over. Whilst knowledge is clearly better than ignorance, this approach has some limitations and cannot be expected to achieve very much in the shorter term, particularly in the shorter term. An obvious observa-tion is that some of the strongest critics of the indus-try are actually very well-informed. Indeed, the best website on uranium mining throughout the world is run by WISE, an anti-nuclear organisation. So there must be a lot more to it than the facts. Beliefs and values are arguably even more important than solid information.

If you’ve taken in an argument by emotional appeal (e.g. nuclear power is evil), you’re unlikely be swayed by facts that counter that belief — indeed, the opposite may in fact be the case. It will take a lot of time and effort to overcome an anti-nuclear message entrenched in minds for many years. The messenger and the way the message is deliv-ered are clearly also very important considerations, hence the search for credible third party advocates. Industries are seen as essentially self-interested by a cynical public — “they would say that, wouldn’t they” — but prominent environmentalists such as James Lovelock and Patrick Moore are worth their weight in gold when they speak up in support of nuclear’s importance. But it’s still an uphill battle and some people will never be persuaded. Indeed,

nuclear power embodies all that some groups hate about the modern world — the application of sci-ence, big government and large organisations glo-balising production. Their deep arrogance rather mirrors that of some misguided early nuclear pio-neers — they feel they alone are saving the world for the rest of us.

Finally, it should be accepted that the use of lan-guage is also very important. We suffer today for some crucial errors of the past. If you ask anybody which words they associate most with “nuclear”, they will inevitably say “bomb”, “explosion” or “war” and not “power”. Had nuclear power alternatively (and more correctly) been designated as “fission power”, the difficulties over public approval would undoubtedly have been rather less. So it’s wise to be take care in what you casually say, as people are receiving messages beyond what you immediately intend.

The other obvious example is carelessly calling eve-rything coming out of the back of a reactor “waste”. This ensured that there would have to be a quick solution found as liabilities should not be passed onto future generations. As an alternative, referring to “used fuel” would have highlighted its potential economic value, so the time period could poten-tially be much-expanded (under the guise of pass-ing on an important asset, rather than liability, to future generations). Other nuclear terms such as “fast breeder” are less than ideal from the pub-lic perspective, conjuring up images of sinister Dr Strangelove scientists at work, whereas others, such as “pebble bed” seem more benign. It’s not neces-sary to bring in highly-remunerated image consult-ants, but some thought of the impact of new terms on public opinion should ideally be taken.

In conclusion, experience has taught us that there are a number of ways in which we can contribute to the industry obtaining a more favourable public image. Yet the most important remains carrying on operating the existing nuclear power plants as well as possible and putting this simple message across. Beyond this, good locally-based communications work and detailed plans for crisis management are also essential.

Steve Kidd is Director of Strategy and Research at the World Nuclear Association (WNA) in London. E-mail: [email protected]. Views expressed are not necessarily those of WNA or its member companies. His recent book, enti-tled “Core Issues-Dissecting Nuclear Power Today,” is published by Nuclear Engineering International. Website: www.neimagazine.com


YES?by Robert Knight

Opinion polls show that Britain is closer to public acceptance of new nuclear plants than it has been for years. Yet, this support remains fragile.

did you say


The Energy File | Did You Say Yes?

The reputation of nuclear energy in Britain has improved greatly in the first years

of the 21st century and now, apart from an endur-ing hard core of opposition from a minority, there is broad acceptance of the need for nuclear new-build to meet the twin challenges of energy secu-rity and climate change, provided this is presented to the public in an appropriate way. It has been a rocky ride for the industry, which has seen a difficult first 50 years in many respects. It has recently been greatly assisted by two critical factors however: the worldwide recognition of man made global warm-ing and the consequent need to reduce fossil fuel use; and the transformation in the industry’s own attitude to its communications and openness.

As one of the original nuclear powers, Britain has a long his-tory of nuclear weapons develop-ment stretching back to British sci-entists’ involvement in the WW2 Manhattan Project. The close links to national security through the Cold War years were eventually to become an obstacle to the public’s consent to the industry. In the 1950s it was a common view that the sci-entists and the Government knew best, and the urgency of the Soviet threat made the speed of devel-opment essential, under a cloak of necessary secrecy. Little considera-tion was given to the social respon-sibility of the fledgling-industry; its safety, the disposal of waste or the inevitability of decommis-sioning. Even the Windscale fire of 1957, in a weapons-producing reac-tor, did not seriously dent enthusi-asm for the “white heat of technol-ogy”. The 1960s, however, brought a change in the public mood, particularly among younger people. Though while this period saw popular marches to Aldermaston to protest over nuclear weapons, there was no serious groundswell of opposition to nuclear energy. Instead, the indus-try (together with successive Governments) engi-neered its own decline in public enthusiasm by its choice of technology for the second generation of British reactors — the AGRs. Each was effectively a first-of-a-kind because of its radical difference to the others, and the consequence was overspent budg-ets and repeatedly missed deadlines. For a decade, the news about the AGRs was gloomy. Public inter-est in the industry waned, then turned downright negative after safety concerns were highlighted by the Three Mile Island incident in the USA in 1979.

Further to this, the Chernobyl fire of 1986 marked the nadir of the industry’s fortunes worldwide, and it took many years to start to recover.

The 1990s saw opponents of nuclear energy as numerous as its supporters, and often much more vocal. The public enquiry over the construction of the PWR at Sizewell was held up for many years by the strength of protests and the willingness of opposition groups to fight on every front possi-ble. Originally intended as the first of a new gen-eration of PWRs, Sizewell B was eventually the only one built. Then the reputation of the British nuclear industry suffered its heaviest blow since Chernobyl. In 1999 its reputation was hit by the scandal over the

falsification of MOX fuel records at BNFL’s Sellafield plant, and the subsequent rejection of the fuel deliv-ery by the Japanese customer. Unfavourable views of the industry peaked in July 2001 before the MOX fuel was finally returned to Britain amid a storm of negative press and triumphant environmental pres-sure group activity.

But since 2001, global energy trends towards higher prices for oil and gas, concerns about secu-rity of energy supplies, the imminent closure of the older nuclear power stations and above all the paradigm change associated with the recog-nition of the effects of man made global warm-ing have all provided a fair wind driving the resur-gence in acceptance of the industry. At the same

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Q How favourable or unfavourable are your overall opinions or impressions of the nuclear industry/ nuclear energy?

Favourability towards the nuclear energy industry 1998-2007

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Favourability Towards The Nuclear Energy Industry1998-2007

Ipsos MORI


The Energy File | Did You Say Yes?

time, with no new incidents of concern, there was a sea change in the nuclear industry’s attitude to the public and to the media. Freed from the old policy of Decide Announce Defend, a new atmosphere of openness pervaded the industry, together with an overt acknowledgement of the need for public consent and social responsibility. With all of these forces working in the same direction, the result was a recovery in the industry’s reputation, to the point where, at Christmas 2004, favourable opinion over-took unfavourable opinion. In the latest (2007) sur-vey, the proportion favourable to the industry (35%) strongly outweighs the unfavourable proportion (26%), though a key feature of the research is the 39% who are undecided either way. This group has held the balance of the argument for some years and continues to do so.

Since 2002 we have also been measuring the British public’s more specific support for replacement nuclear newbuild. This again shows 2004 as the pivotal year, when support overcame opposition, before peaking in 2005 on 41%. Since 2005, however, the volume of information and opinion available to ordinary people about energy options has mushroomed, and though we have plotted a tentative rise in familiarity with the industry, the key outcome of this has been an upsurge in confusion about energy and specifically nuclear issues. With so many authoritative figures openly disagreeing, the public are less sure what to think. This has particularly affected those whose initial gut feeling was positive. The result has been a slight fall in

support for newbuild since 2005, while opposition remains firm, though less numerous.

Our question has been carefully worded to relate only to replacement newbuild, since that was the most likely (and most acceptable) scenario for the future. Recent Government speeches have sug-gested enthusiasm in Westminster for net expansion of the nuclear compo-nent. We have measured views of this only once, in 2005, when it received a resounding rejection by the public, at the same time as there was record support for replacement newbuild. This is there-fore a dangerous communications strat-egy for the Government; probably aimed more at demonstrating its commitment to the industry itself than showing sensi-tivity to fragile public acceptance.

The way a nuclear energy strategy is presented can undoubtedly affect its reception by the British public. While 35% are favourable to the industry and 36% support replacement newbuild, 65%, an overall majority, agree with the statement that “Britain needs a mix of energy sources to ensure a reliable supply of electricity, including nuclear power and renewable energy sources.” Just 10% dis-agree. Linking nuclear energy policy to renewables has a persuasive effect on its acceptance, as long as it also implies that it is part of a planned national strategy (something few have perceived Britain to have in recent years)

We can conclude that Britain is closer to public acceptance of nuclear newbuild than it has been for some decades, though this support is frag-ile and sensitive to the actual messages received. Communicating with the British public on this issue is notoriously difficult, particularly for the current Government, whose credibility on nuclear issues we recently measured as very low (2007). The nuclear industry has done much to rehabilitate its Cold War past, but is still held back by the British scepticism for companies and private profit generation, par-ticularly profits made out of public utilities, and by the growing obsession with risk aversion in all areas of life. Furthermore, the environmental NGOs are united in their opposition to nuclear energy having any role in future energy policy.

Robert Knight is Research Director at Ipsos MORI. E-mail: [email protected]

Support for Replacement Newbuild2002-2007

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Q To what extent would you support or oppose the building of new nuclear power stations in Britain TO REPLACE those that are being phased out over the next few years? This would ensure the same proportion of nuclear energy is retained.

27%

36%


World leaders need to take action on the energy crisis that is taking shape before our eyes. Oil prices are soaring and it

looks less and less likely that this is a bubble. The price of coal has doubled. Countries as far apart as South Africa and Tajikistan are plagued by power cuts and there have been riots in several nations because of disruptions to electricity. Rich states, no longer strangers to periodic blackouts, are worried about security of energy supply. In the developing world, 1.6 billion people — around a quarter of the human race — have no access to electricity.

I believe that fundamental changes are underway in the energy field whose significance we have not yet fully grasped. Global demand for energy is ris-ing fast as the population increases and developing countries such as China and India undergo dramatic economic growth. The International Energy Agency (IEA) says the world’s energy needs could be 50% higher in 2030 than they are today. Yet the fossil fuels on which the world still depends are finite and far from environmentally friendly. Serious thought needs to be given now to creating viable alterna-tives. The need for coordinated political action on energy and related issues — climate change and alleviating poverty, to name but two — has never been more acute. Yet there is no global energy insti-tution in which the countries of the world can agree on joint solutions to the potentially enormous prob-lems we see emerging.

We have a World Health Organization, two global food agencies, the Bretton Woods financial insti-tutions and organizations to deal with everything from trade to civil aviation and maritime affairs. Energy, the motor of development and economic growth, is a glaring exception. Although, like food and health, it cries out for a holistic, global approach,

it is actually dealt with in a fragmented, piecemeal way. A number of institutions focus on energy, but none with a mandate that is global and comprehen-sive and that encompasses all energy forms. OPEC, for example, has just 13 members and deals exclu-

Tackling the Global Energy Crisis

The world’s energy needs could be 50% higher in 2030 than they are today. Yet the fossil fuels on which the world still depends are finite and far from environmentally friendly.

The world needs a global energy organization that would complement, not replace, bodies already active in the energy field.

by Mohamed ElBaradei

The Energy File | Tackling the Global Energy Crisis


sively with oil — from the producers’ perspective. The IEA represents the 27 OECD countries from the consumers’ viewpoint. Only 51 countries, almost all in Eurasia, have signed the Energy Charter Treaty, whose focus is limited to issues such as trade, transit and dispute settlement.

The UN coordinating mechanism, UN-Energy, is barely four years old. It has 20 member agencies, an indication of how fragmented the UN’s energy activities are. UN-Energy has no budget or author-ity and serves as a modest forum for discussion and information sharing.

So does the world really need yet another interna-tional organization? Frankly, yes. A global energy organization would complement, not replace, bod-

ies already active in the energy field. It would bring a vital inter-governmental perspective to bear on issues which cannot be left to market forces alone, such as the development of new energy technol-ogy, the role of nuclear power and renewables, and innovative solutions for reducing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Here are a few things a global energy organization could do:

❖ provide authoritative assessments of global energy demand and supply and bring under one roof key energy data that are now dispersed and incomplete.

❖ speed the transfer of appropriate energy tech-nology to poor countries and give them objective advice on an optimal energy mix that is safe, secure and environmentally sound.

❖ develop a global mechanism to ensure energy supplies in crises and emergencies. (The IEA already does this for its members with oil. The International Atomic Energy Agency is considering establishing guarantees of nuclear fuel supplies for reactors).

❖ help countries run their energy services and even do it for them temporarily after a war or major nat-ural disaster.

❖ coordinate and fund R&D, both upstream and downstream, especially for energy-poor countries, whose needs too often get overlooked by commer-cial R&D oriented to rich countries.

Efforts in the 1970s to establish a global energy organization were unsuccessful. The world has changed dramatically since then and the need for joint action to develop long-term solutions to the looming energy crisis is now undeniable. It is difficult to see how this can be done without an expert mul-tinational body, underpinned perhaps by a global energy convention, with the authority to develop policies and practices to benefit rich and poor coun-tries alike, equitably and fairly. We need to act before crisis turns into catastrophe.

Even the pessimists believe we still have at least a few decades before the oil on which the world’s prosperity is built starts to run out. Let us use that time wisely to develop long-term solutions to the world’s energy needs which will benefit all human-kind.

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is Director General of the IAEA.

Even the pessimists believe we still have at least a few decades before the oil

on which the world’s prosperity is built starts to run out. Let us use that time

wisely to develop long-term solutions to the world’s energy needs which will

benefit all humankind.

Securityat the OlympicsChina, IAEA link up to

Bolster Security Plan

Over 10,000 athletes took part in more than 300 events during the 2008 Summer Olympics in China. As for many global events, security was an integral component in the planning of the Olympic Games.

During the Olympics stadiums and subways to Beijing were packed and keeping the Games safe was foremost on the minds of Chinese authorities.

Through advisory missions and training exercises, the IAEA helped Chinese authorities to enhance nuclear security measures in time for the Olympics.

Participants engage in classroom time before testing skills through real-life exercises.

One of 12 newly constructed venues, the Beijing National Stadium, or ‘Bird’s Nest’ as it is colloquially known, was the site of a nuclear security training exercise in preparation for the Games.

At major international events like the Olympics, radiation detection equipment is used to sniff out any potentially nefarious activity where fans enter the Games’ venues.

Meetings between IAEA experts, Chinese authorities, and other international experts were held far in advance of the Games. International cooperative efforts are integral to the prevention, detection and response to a nuclear security threat.


Beyond the China Olympics, IAEA-supported training and guidance has helped other countries — including Greece, Brazil and Germany — keep major global events safe and secure.

Security personnel were trained to use equipment for detecting radioactive material. During the Games and for other large-scale international events, security staff are

deployed to help spot suspicious activity.

Photographs: Petr Pavlicek/IAEA ❖ Captions: Dana Sacchetti ❖ Design: Ritu Kenn


Question: What are the origins of the safety culture concept?

Anne Kerhoas: Engineering issues relating to safety have received close attention from the nuclear com-munity over many years. However, it is only in the last two decades or so that organizational and cul-tural issues have been identified as vital in achiev-ing safe operation. More specifically, the concept of safety culture originated after the 1986 Chernobyl accident in the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG).

INSAG maintained in their report that the establish-ment of a strong safety culture within a nuclear facil-ity is one of the fundamental management princi-ples necessary for the safe operation of the facility. The definition recognizes that “safety culture has two general components. The first is the necessary framework within an organization and is the respon-sibility of the management hierarchy. The second is the attitude of staff at all levels in responding to and benefiting from the framework.”

This INSAG definition is still widely used.

Q: But what is exactly safety culture?

Marin Ignatov: First of all, we should look at what we mean by the term ‘culture’.

Culture is a deeply-rooted, rather than superficial, phenomenon and hence fairly stable over time. It is shared by people and relates primarily not to an individual but to a group, community or organi-zation. Besides, it is a broad concept and covers all aspects of external and internal relationships in a group, community or organization.

the mindset of

Nuclear safety depends on culture as well as good engineering practices, Anne Kerhoas and Marin Ignatov explain.

nuclear safety

Anne Kerhoas (left), a Senior Safety Specialist in the iAEA’s Division of nuclear installation Safety, speaks with marin ignatov, a safety consultant.

(Photo: D.Calma/IAEA)

by Giovanni Verlini

SCART

Safe and Secure | The Mindset of Nuclear Safety


The main differences of nuclear safety culture com-pared with general corporate culture touch on the concept of core hazards and the potential large effects associated with the dispersion of radioactive substances. It is this fact that makes nuclear power different and that demands a set of organizational values that place nuclear safety as the top priority of an organization.

Q: How can we define a strong nuclear safety culture?

MI: A strong safety culture consists in the association of three major factors: a viable management system; a widely shared awareness of nuclear hazards; and widely shared behavioural norms and values.

A strong safety culture can be only expected in cases where the Management System is imple-mented into actual behaviour not because nega-tive personal or group consequences (sanctions) are feared, but as a result of profound awareness about nuclear hazards and positive social norms, attitudes and values of management and staff.

Poor safety culture comes up in cases where the existing Management System is in itself underdevel-oped, insufficient or inadequate. Negative attitudes or disruptive informal social norms become pre-dominant. Such situations in today’s nuclear indus-try are rare.

Q: The IAEA has launched a new service called SCART. What is it?AK: SCART means Safety Culture Assessment Review Team and is one of the safety review service of the Agency. The difference with other services is that it focuses on human behaviour. In other words, SCART does not intend to assess the design or technical operation of a nuclear power plant.

The SCART assessment is based on five characteris-tics that are in the IAEA safety standards:

• Safety is a clearly recognized value;

• Leadership for safety is clear;

• Accountability for safety is clear;

• Safety is integrated into all activities; and

• Safety is learning-driven.

The service looks at a nuclear organization as a whole, which means that all major functional areas and all responsibility levels from the shop floor to the boardroom are included in the review.

Q: Assessing safety culture seems to be a difficult task. How can it be done?AK: The safety culture review process follows a sys-tematic approach, structured in several phases. The process seeks to integrate an initial independent assessment of the available empirical data by the international reviewers, followed by a discussion within the review team and a subsequent consen-sual decision.

The initial phase is data gathering – a review team usually consists of 5 reviewers, a team leader, and a deputy team leader. Each reviewer evaluates all char-acteristics of safety culture with their corresponding attributes (altogether 37 attributes) via interviews,

here, José ramón torralbo, Plant manager, reviews materials with Anne Kerhoas and marin ignatov. in 2008, an iAEA team reviewed safety culture at the Santa maría de garoña nuclear power plant in Spain. (Photo: Nuclenor)

SCART

Safe and Secure | The Mindset of Nuclear Safety


observations and documentation analysis. Usually, there are 4 interviews per day, per reviewer.

At the end of the data gathering phase, the reviewers analyse the data and come to conclusions concern-ing the attributes of all 5 safety culture characteris-tics. Their conclusions are individual and independ-ent. This is the second step.

Afterwards, the reviewers share their individual opinion and develop a team opinion for each of the assessed safety culture attribute.

Finally, based on this evaluation, the team identifies strengths and areas for improvement. Strengths are areas where the safety culture is strong and safety performance highly satisfactory. In areas identi-fied for improvement, the organizational perform-ance or attitude at the nuclear facility does not cor-respond to what is expected according to IAEA Safety Standards. It leads to recommendations to the organisation assessed.

Q: What kind of expertise goes into a SCART team?

AK: When composing the team, the correct balance between behavioural scientists and technical spe-cialists is essential for the implementation of the approach as well as for the outcomes. The strong synergy emerging from those two complementary skills allows a reliable expert opinion to emerge and provide credibility to the conclusions. This is one of the important differences of SCART with the other safety review services.

Q: What is the outcome of a SCART mission?

AK: SCART offers a reliable evaluation of the main characteristics of safety culture in a nuclear facil-ity. Actually, the process of combining interviews, observations and documentation analysis, which is used in SCART, is a means to assess deeper values or shared assumptions while questionnaire surveys may only reflect the visible level of safety culture.

SCART assists a facility in the enhancement of safety culture by identifying ways in which to continu-ously improve the safety culture. Based on recom-mendations and suggestions issued at the end of the SCART process, the facility would then be able to build its corrective action plan.

SCART supports international information exchange between the management of nuclear facilities and reviewers on safety culture.

Q: What message on safety culture would you like to convey to countries operating or planning nuclear plants?

AK: Missions have allowed us to validate the main principles of the SCART methodology. The review approach of SCART is the result of several years of discussion and proactive work. We managed to win the support and assistance of experienced and well known international experts on safety culture.

The SCART instrument itself is a sensitive tool that allows experts to reveal early signs of a deteriorat-ing safety culture.

It might be concluded that SCART as a safety review service for safety culture is a new level of support for Member States. Being a promotion tool for safety culture, it is also a motor of motivation for the Member States to enhance the safety culture in their nuclear facilities. On the other hand, SCART missions will increasingly become opportunities to facilitate the application of IAEA Safety Standards.

Anne Kerhoas is a Senior Safety Specialist in the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Installation Safety. Email: [email protected]. Dr. Marin Ignatov is a consultant on nuclear safety.

ScArt is a sensitive tool that allows experts to reveal early signs of a deteriorating safety culture. it allows a reliable expert opinion to emerge, which is then used by the nuclear utility to develop an enhancement plan for the safety culture.

Earth, Wind and FirePreparing nuclear power plants for nature’s fury.

by Dana Sacchetti

Mount Etna seen from space. Photo: NASA

Nuclear power generation does not occur in a vacuum. Exposure to the outside world can bring dangers such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, tsunamis and volcanoes. With safety the first priority for nuclear plants, it is incumbent upon nuclear installation designers and builders to prepare for the worst that nature can bring to bear.

Prepare for the Worst | Earth, Wind and Fire


Since the early days of nuclear power, the primary concern regard-ing nuclear power plants has been the prospect of human error or mechanical failure, leading to a radiological release to the environment. The examples of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island

left the impression that the greatest risk factors came from inside a plant’s walls.

Yet, events in recent years have raised the spectre of new threats: that the greatest menace facing a plant’s operation lay outside its walls, not inside. Nuclear power generation does not occur in a vacuum, and with plants dotted around the globe exposed to the elements, the chance for interference by natural phenomena is ubiquitous. Exposure to the out-side world can bring dangers such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, tsu-namis and volcanoes. With safety the first priority for nuclear plants, it is incumbent upon nuclear installation designers and builders to prepare for the worst that nature can bring to bear.

Seismic VulnerabilityOne of the first external events to capture the nuclear community’s atten-tion happened over thirty years ago, when a 1977 earthquake occurred in Romania, affecting the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in nearby Bulgaria. The quake’s shaking caused only superficial damage to parts of the plant which were not safety-related, but still alerted the international commu-nity to a possible Achilles’ heel with some of the older Soviet-designed plants.

“The Vrancea earthquake in 1977 was a wakeup call for the Soviet-designed plants,” explains Aybars Gürpinar, former director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Installation Safety. “It also propelled the Soviet Union to strengthen the plant in Armenia, and caused the IAEA to begin the first of many assistance missions to look at the designs of plants through-out the region.”

The Chernobyl accident also triggered a lot of introspection about nuclear safety through Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the inter-national nuclear community. Alongside the more general issues related to nuclear safety, concern grew that not enough was being done to pro-tect plants against possible external events.

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the IAEA dispatched several review missions to plants in Armenia, then Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation to evaluate the Soviet-designed plants. Through the missions, the IAEA found that first generation Water-Water Energetic Reactor (WWER) plants, were designed without external hazards fac-tored into their construction. The IAEA concluded its missions by rec-ommending that certain plant equipment be reviewed, along with the installation of additional supports and upgrading of safety equipment.

In other regions, the seismic design limits of nuclear power plants have also come under question. Some plants in the US have exceeded the design basis for earthquakes on occasion, though none have resulted in any significant risk to safety.

A January 1986 earthquake of 4.9 Richter magnitude occurred close to Perry nuclear power plant, a single unit reactor located in north-east-ern Ohio. Ground accelerations at the site were recorded as high as 0.19

Earth, Wind and FirePreparing nuclear power plants for nature’s fury.

EarthWindFire

Prepare for the Worst | Earth, Wind and Fire


to 0.23g, which surpassed the 0.1g design basis for the plant. The plant was offline at the time, though scheduled to be loaded with fresh fuel the following day. After the event, a team of engineers and seis-mologists was dispatched to the plant to check for any system failure and check for aftershocks in the days following. Small cracks in concrete and leaks in non-critical piping were observed, though both conditions could have existed prior to the quake. The Perry nuclear power plant quake set off a pro-tracted legal battle, but the plant was found to have soundly withstood the earthquake and restarted soon thereafter.

The largest earthquake to ever affect a nuclear power plant occurred last year near the world’s larg-est nuclear power facility in Japan. The strength of the quake killed 11 people in neighbouring areas, flattened nearly 400 structures, and disrupted auto production plants. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant, a seven-unit facility sited along the Sea of Japan coastline, was walloped by the 6.6 magnitude quake on 16 July 2007, which caused the plant to safely shut down. Though the reactors performed well, the quake was found to have occurred on a fault that was unknown to plant designers, and its force greatly exceeded the limits for which the plant was originally designed.

Two IAEA expert visits to the site concluded that while the design basis was exceeded, the plant was engineered correctly and held up well, in spite of the unexpected strength of the quake. Yet the plant is still shutdown since the earthquake, and no time-table has been set for restarting of operation.

As Japan is one of the most seismically active nations in the world, it has strict sets of regulations designed to limit the impact of quakes on nuclear power plants. These standards call for constructing plants on solid bedrock to reduce shaking and by classifying all of the plant’s components into differ-ent safety categories. As some aspects of the plant are more vulnerable than others, the design for rug-gedness follows suit.

Tsunamis and FloodingWith a significant number of the world’s nuclear plants drawing from seawater for cooling pur-poses, a second threat that nuclear power plants face is coastal flooding and more specifically tsu-namis. The massive Indian Ocean earthquake of 26 December 2004 generated a series of devastating tsunamis, killing nearly a quarter of a million peo-

ple and causing widespread catastrophic damage in eleven countries.

Two power units at Kalpakkam nuclear power plant in India were hit by the tsunami, though both weath-ered the waves well. Even though plant designers never planned for a tsunami to ever descend upon the plant, they did take the similar phenomenon of cyclone storm surges into account. Plant builders had estimated the maximum water level that could approach the plant in the case of a storm surge, and had built accordingly. Two wells, one far out at sea and one on land, were constructed to alert operators in the event of an approaching storm wave. Once the plant operator received the warn-ing, the plant was immediately shut down. Even still, the reactor buildings were encased in meter-thick walls, so water was likely not able to enter the reac-tor units.

So even with rising levels of water and the crushing impact of a massive wave, the Kalpakkam plant per-formed well under duress.

“To make such vital buildings withstand earth-quakes, a large concrete base mat is built,” explained L. V. Krishnan, former director of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam. “So if the structure moves it will move all together without getting cracked.”

Severe floods also affected the Le Blayais nuclear plant in the Bordeaux region of France. During a severe storm that struck in December 1999, high waves crashed over a protective dyke installed at the plant, partly submerging portions of the facil-ity. Water affected performance of the plant, namely units 1 and 2. Water pumps that would normally be used to draw water away from the plant were knocked out, forcing plant managers to take emer-gency action to prevent a possible core meltdown. Emergency feedwater systems were used to rem-edy the flooding, and the plant later returned to service.

French safety standards call for placing the plat-form that supports safety-relevant equipment at a level at least as high as the maximum water level and to block any possible routes through which external waters could reach reactor safety equip-ment located below the level of the site platform. As a result of the Le Blayais flooding, where both standards failed, French nuclear safety authorities were forced to re-examine standards with regards to flooding.

WindPrepare for the Worst | Earth, Wind and Fire


The Way Forward

The IAEA has worked to evaluate nuclear power plants for hazard readiness around the world since the late 1970s. Most of its early missions targeted developing countries, with the IAEA assisting in ensuring that nuclear installations were rugged enough to withstand certain environmental risks. The IAEA has also long published safety standards that set recommendations to countries seeking guidance on improving nuclear installation safety.

Roughly eight years ago, the IAEA began to devise safety standards that are more risk-informed and rely upon prob-abilistic evaluations. This change in approach calls for plant builders to integrate the likelihood of an external hazard occurring when constructing a plant, whereas older stand-ards prescribed a more uniform set of standards to all plants around the world.

The IAEA also leads conferences and meetings among nuclear power states to discuss ways in which plants can be built and retrofitted for external events. In the past year, the IAEA held two such conferences regarding external haz-ards, focusing on seismic safety and threats posed by tsu-namis.

The workload of the IAEA with respect to external hazards is expected to increase in the coming years.

“Now a lot of new build countries are coming to us, request-ing the IAEA to assist in site evaluation and external events consideration,” explained Mr. Gürpinar.

Still, determining the best way to protect nuclear facilities against mother nature’s fury continues to be a learning proc-ess. “We re finding that our most significant learning about the effects of earthquakes on nuclear power plants always occurs after strong seismic events,” said Antonio Godoy, Acting Head of the IAEA s Engineering Safety Section.

With continued communication and transparency among nuclear power countries, the IAEA, and regulators world-wide, are working to keep plants safe from all that nature can bring to bear.

Mr. S.N. Ahmad of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, summed up the design of nuclear plants with respect to natural phenomena. “Man must live with natural calami-ties,” he stated. “Wisdom lies in effectively meeting the chal-lenges of such situations and ensuring safety of human life and property. In nuclear power plants the whole spectrum of such natural calamities and highly improbable accident conditions are factored in site selection and design.”

Dana Sacchetti, Division of Public Information, IAEA. E-mail: [email protected].

Steady Lessons from Shaky Events

Kashiwazaki, Japan — In the wake of the significant earthquake that struck the world’s largest nuclear power plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, last year there has been renewed inter-national focus on the structural strength of nuclear facilities. From 19-21 June 2008, the IAEA organized a workshop with the goal of sharing recent technical knowledge and approaches on designing and maintaining the ruggedness of nuclear power plants to safely withstand such severe external hazards. The meeting convened over 300 attendees from various fields of expertise, and concluded in late June 2008 in Japan.

“We organized the workshop with the objective of sharing recent findings and information obtained from the occurrence of strong earthquakes that impact nuclear power plants, as well as good prac-tices and lessons learned,” explained Antonio Godoy, Acting Head of the IAEA’s Engineering Safety Section and leader of the workshop.

Key conclusions of the workshop included:

❶ Seismic hazard evaluation continues to be a key element of assur-ing seismic safety of a nuclear plant;

❷ Site-specific information and a full understanding of the geologi-cal and tectonic features of a nuclear power plant’s site are critical to seismic safety;

❸ In light of the July 2007 earthquake at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, it is clear that design and safety regulations play a critical role in keeping the plant robust in spite of an under-estimation on the orig-inal seismic input from the seismological studies performed at that time; and

❹ Learnings from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant experience is providing valuable input to the IAEA’s safety standards.

“Science is making enormous progress, but we have to remain eager to acquire new findings and new information to ensure nuclear power plant safety. And we also need to maintain transparency as well,” said Mr. N. Hirawaka, of Japan’s Tohoku Electric Power Company.

The workshop was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), and Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency cooperated in organizing the workshop.

A related IAEA-led workshop on the effects of tsunamis on nuclear power plants was held on 23 June 2008 in Daejong, Korea.


It is five o’clock in the morning at Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant on Mexico’s East Coast. A fire is detected in the service water

pump room driving the plant operator to decrease power at the plant. Due to further deterioration of the conditions at the plant the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) receives notification from Mexican authorities of a “site area emergency” and the IEC begins to assess the situation.

Thankfully, on this day in July 2008, the IEC is responding to an international emergency exer-cise, also known as ConvEx-3 (Convention Exercise), designed to test and evaluate the exchange of infor-mation, coordination of assistance and harmoniza-tion of the information for the public on an interna-tional scale.

More messages arrive at the IEC via the offi-cial and secure Early. Notification and Assistance Conventions (ENAC) website. There are casualties and signs the situation will continue to deteriorate at Laguna Verde and the IEC moves toward full activa-tion. IAEA staff who are part of the Agency’s Incident and Emergency System (IES) are called in to the Centre. Before long, almost two dozen staff mem-bers from various divisions are hard at work analyz-ing data, communicating with the ‘Accident State’, Member States and relevant international organiza-tions, and responding to press enquiries. They will rotate and continue to work tirelessly for the next 43 hours – the duration of the exercise.

The goals of the exercise were three-fold:

Lessons were learnt from a large-scale nuclear emergency exercise held in July that tested international readiness.

43-hour Global Drill

The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) during the ConvEx-3 exercise. In total, 75 Member States and ten international organizations participated, substantially more than in 2005 when the last ConvEx-3 took place in Romania. The scenario was prepared by the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, the National Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Commission (CNSNS) and the Inter-Agency Committee for Response to Nuclear Accidents (IACRNA). (Credit: D.Calma/IAEA)

by Rafael Martincic and Lisa Obrentz


Lessons were learnt from a large-scale nuclear emergency exercise held in July that tested international readiness.

43-hour Global Drill❶ to test the response of Member States and rele-vant international organizations in a severe nuclear accident;

❷ to test and evaluate the international emer-gency management system [e.g. current Emergency Notification and Assistance Technical Operations Manual (ENATOM) arrangements];

❸ to identify good practices as well as deficiencies and areas requiring improvement that cannot be identified in national exercises.

The exercise scenario was based on a severe nuclear accident with serious transnational implications: “actual” for few States, “potential” for some and “per-ceived” for many. In total, 75 Member States and ten international organizations participated, substan-tially more than in 2005 when the last ConvEx-3 took place in Romania. The scenario was prepared by the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, the National Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Commission (CNSNS) and the Inter-Agency Committee for Response to Nuclear Accidents (IACRNA) working group on coor-dinated international exercise.

Prior to the exercise, many staff received special training in response to radiation incidents or emer-gencies. Members of the IES served several func-tions such as: liaison officers, public information officers, emergency response managers, logistics officers, technical specialists, communication spe-cialists, etc.

Testing preparedness and response skills is key to gauging how ready the Agency and international community are to face events with consequences of “the big accident.” Exercises identify weaknesses in the international emergency response system — at least in regard to nuclear safety concerns and give the opportunity to improve response prepared-ness. The next step will be to practice responding to emergencies that have a security component, such as a terrorist attack, in light of the changing nature

of the world’s emerging security threats. The fre-quency of exercises, currently held every three to five years, will also increase in order to increase test-ing and thus enhance the emergency response sys-tems.

The observations, evaluations, and conclusions that emerge from the exercise will be included in a report summarizing the major findings on the simu-lation and providing insight into possible shortcom-ings in national and international response systems. In the meantime, the IEC returns to “ready” mode, better prepared for the worst-case scenario.

Rafael Martincic is a nuclear safety consultant. E-mail: [email protected]. Lisa Obrentz is Action Plan Outreach Officer at the IEC. E-mail: [email protected].

Practice Makes Perfect

Every few years, IACRNA, whose purpose is to coordinate the actions of relevant inter-national organizations in the case of a radi-ological emergency, works in conjunction with other States and organizations to test global emergency preparedness.

The previous such event took place in May 2005 at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant in Romania and was viewed as a success.


Question: In the past, nuclear inspectors were considered to be “nuclear accountants”, while as of late they are portrayed as investigators. It is often said that this shift in public per-ception is due to the development of nuclear forensics. How has nuclear forensics evolved over the past years?

Klaus Mayer: We have frequent contact with the IAEA, with the Department of Safeguards, with the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and with the Office for Nuclear Security. In the discussions and in the technical cooperation we also experience this shift in activities of the IAEA and of its inspectors in particular.

The driving force behind this evolution is certainly the move from traditional safeguards (INFCIRC 153) to the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) and to Integrated Safeguards. A combination of differ-ent technical measures provides the tool-set for the implementation of these agreements. Nuclear forensic science provides clues on the history and possibly on the origin of nuclear material.

Today, we have a systematic and comprehen-sive approach for analyzing seized nuclear mate-rial. Parameters like isotopic composition, chemical impurities, particle morphology or the age of the material provide useful hints on the material under investigation.

Our laboratory, the JRC — Institute for Transuranium Elements, experienced an increasing number of requests for impurity measurements in certain types of nuclear material. This is a clear indication of the trend towards more investigative safeguards.

Q: What are the typical nuclear forensic tools available today?

KM: The measurement techniques applied in nuclear forensics comprise of methods that have been traditionally used in nuclear safeguards, in iso-tope geology or in material sciences. Investigative radiochemistry, however, remains the backbone of any nuclear forensic analysis.

The actual measurements, though, provide only data which are partly self-explaining. For interpreta-tion of the data we often need to rely on reference information, which is obtained through model cal-culations, through data bases or through the open literature. All these parameters are combined to a “nuclear fingerprint.” In any case, a good under-standing of the nuclear fuel cycle and of nuclear physics and radiochemistry is key for interpretation and attribution.

Q: Looking forward, what kind of nuclear forensic tools are being developed today for the future?

KM: Today, we are working in several areas. On the one hand, we investigate new, characteristic parameters, like the isotopic composition of trace elements. On the other hand, we are also working on the application of classical forensic techniques (like taking fingerprints or DNA) on radioactively contaminated evidence. Furthermore, the applica-tion of micro-analytical techniques enables us to investigate individual particles of only few microm-eters in size. Nuclear forensics is very powerful and

Nuclear forensic expert Klaus Mayer talks about the new tools of atomic investigations.

Nuclear ForensicsVorsprung durch Technik

Regaining control over material that has been diverted or stolen requires significantly higher efforts. Nuclear forensics provides clues on the history and on the origin of nuclear material.

by Giovanni Verlini

Progress Through Technology | Nuclear Forensics


Nuclear Forensics significant development work is performed to fur-ther increase its effectiveness. Beyond the technical developments, increasing emphasis is put on the implementation of a comprehensive concept, cov-ering the investigations from the crime scene to the laboratory.

This “model action plan” was conceived by the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) and is being propagated also by the IAEA.

Q: Are remote detection technologies being developed for those cases where there is no physical access to a facility?

KM: Remote detection technologies are being developed. Today most of the available techniques provide an indication on the activities being per-formed inside a facility where the inspector has no access.

With progressing development of such method-ologies the nuclear forensics value will certainly increase.

Q: How important is nuclear forensics in the fight against nuclear trafficking, terrorism and proliferation?

KM: The three main steps in combating illicit traf-ficking, nuclear terrorism and proliferation are pre-vention, detection and response. Prevention is certainly the most effective and efficient way of keeping nuclear material under control. Regaining control over material that has been diverted or sto-len requires significantly higher efforts. Nuclear forensics provides clues on the history and on the origin of nuclear material.

It is therefore an important element of sustainabil-ity in combating illicit trafficking or proliferation. Because if the place of theft or diversion can be iden-tified, appropriate countermeasures can be taken to avoid that such incidents are repeated in the future. Moreover, if the source of the material can be traced back, also the perpetrators handling the material take a high risk of being identified. Nuclear forensics therefore provides a strong element of deterrence.

Q: What is the relationship between the JRC-ITU, the IAEA and other national and interna-tional bodies involved in nuclear forensics?

KM: JRC-ITU is a research institute of the European Commission. Nuclear forensics is one of our activ-ities and we draw upon the rich experience in nuclear material analysis in our laboratory. This experience is made available to the IAEA through the European Commission’s support programme to the IAEA, through participation in co-ordinated research activities and through consultant’s meet-ings and joint activities.

In the specific area of nuclear forensics, the ITWG takes a prominent position, as this group gathers the key players in the area and is in continuous dialogue with the IAEA. Exchanging experience and interna-tional cooperation are very important for advanc-ing nuclear forensic science and thus for sustainable success in combating illicit nuclear trafficking, ter-rorism and proliferation.

Klaus Mayer is leader of activities on fo-rensic analysis and illicit trafficking at the European Commission Joint Research Centre-Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU). E-mail: [email protected]. He spoke with Giovanni Verlini, Editor of the IAEA Bulletin, in July 2008.

Europe’s Nuclear Science LabThe mission of the Institute for Transuranium Elements

(ITU) is to provide the scientific foundation for the protection of the European citizen against risks asso-ciated with the handling and storage of highly radio-active material. ITU’s prime objectives are to serve as a reference centre for basic actinide research, to contrib-ute to an effective safety and safeguards system for the nuclear fuel cycle, and to study technological and medi-cal applications of radionuclides/actinides.

ITU works very closely with national and international bodies in the nuclear field, both within the EU and beyond, as well as with the nuclear industry. In addition

to playing a key role in EU policy on nuclear waste man-agement and the safety of nuclear installations, ITU is also heavily involved in efforts to combat illicit traffick-ing of nuclear materials, and in developing and oper-ating advanced detection tools to uncover clandestine nuclear activities. ITU provides the expertise and access to the necessary special handling facilities for the study of the actinide elements. This is of relevance for issues related to nuclear power generation and radioactive waste treatment and disposal, but also for the advance-ment of science in general. Another key role is in the study and production of radionuclides used in the treat-ment of cancer.

Risk CommuniCation


The IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency states “All seri-ous nuclear and radiological emergencies have resulted in the public taking some

actions that were inappropriate or unwarranted, and resulted in significant adverse psychological and economic effects. These have been the most severe consequences of many radiological emer-gencies. These effects have occurred even at emer-gencies with few or no radiological consequences and resulted primarily because the public was not provided with understandable and consistent infor-mation from official sources.”

As dramatic as this statement is, it does not go far enough. Lack of effective communication about radiological risk can cause physical harm as well. Chernobyl prompted unnecessary abortions. In response to the incident in Goiânia, thousands flooded medical facilities asking to be examined, hampering the ability of the medical system to care for the truly sick. Ongoing worry about nuclear radi-ation, whether after an emergency or just because of general apprehension, is a source of chronic stress, which causes cardiovascular damage, weak-ens the immune system, contributes to adult onset diabetes, increases the likelihood of clinical depres-sion, and interferes with memory, fertility, and bone growth.

It is therefore incumbent on any agency that man-ages the risks associated with radiation to recog-nize that dealing with the bequerels and sieverts is not enough. The risks inherent in how the pub-lic responds to the threat of radiation must be taken more seriously. One vital way to address these risks is more effective risk communication as part of over-all risk management.

To describe what risk communication is, it is help-ful to begin with what it is not. Risk communication

began in the late 1970s with efforts by the nuclear and chemical industries in the United States to coun-teract widespread public concern about those tech-nologies. It was believed that clear, understandable information was all that was needed to make peo-ple see that the risks were lower than many feared. To this day, many still believe risk communication is just a matter of making information understanda-ble. This is particularly true in fields like nuclear tech-nology, strongly influenced by people with scien-tific and engineering backgrounds.

For decades this approach has failed, and most risk communication experts say it is inadequate. The perception of risk, and the behaviors that result, are a matter of both the facts and our feel-ings and instincts and personal life circumstances. Communication that offers the facts but fails to account for the affective side of our risk perceptions is simply incomplete.

Risk communication is also commonly thought of as what to say under crisis circumstances. This too is inadequate. While it is certainly true that commu-nication in times of crises is important in managing public response, countless examples have taught that a great deal of the effectiveness of risk commu-nication during a crisis is based on what was done beforehand.

Finally, risk communication is widely thought of as what is said, a matter of which words and mes-sages are delivered. Again, this approach is incom-plete. Risk communication is implicit in the actions an agency, industry or company takes. Nowhere could it be more true that “actions speak louder than words” than when people are alert to anything that might threaten their health or survival.

Here, then, is a more complete definition of risk com-munication:

Risk CommuniCationmore than facts and feelings

Risk CommuniCation


Actions, words, and other interactions that incorporate and respect the perceptions of the information recip-ients, intended to help people make more informed decisions about threats to their health and safety.

This definition emphasizes that:

➠ Risk communication is a matter of what an organization does, not just what it says.

➠ Risk communication must account for the affec-tive component in people’s perceptions of risk.

➠ Risk communication will be more effective if it is thought of as dialogue, not instruction. It will be more successful if the goal is to encourage certain behaviors, not simply to expect that the information recipients will think and do what the communica-tors want them to.

This approach recognizes findings in the fields of neuroscience and psychology which have estab-lished that the perception of risk is a dual process of fact and feeling. We use the information we have and a set of instincts which help us gauge how frightening something feels. Instinctive factors that bear on public concern about radiation include:

➠ Pain and Suffering. The greater the pain and suffering from a risk, the greater our fear. Radiation is associated with cancer, widely perceived as a partic-ularly painful way to die.

➠ Unknowability. People are generally more afraid of things they can not detect with their own senses, like ionizing radiation

➠ Is the threat natural or human-made? A nat-ural risk, like radon, evokes less fear than the same type of ionizing radiation that comes from a human-made source.

➠ Risk versus Benefit. The greater the benefit, the less we fear the risk. Many people who willingly sub-ject themselves to medical radiation still fear nuclear waste.

➠ Choice. A risk taken voluntarily, such as when communities offer to host a waste disposal facility or nuclear power plant, is less frightening than the same risk if it is imposed, as the people in Nevada in the U.S.A. feel about Yucca Mountain.

➠ Control. The more we feel we can affect events as they occur, the less afraid we will be. (This is not a matter of whether to engage in the risk voluntar-ily in the first place, but how much actual control we feel over what’s happening to us.) Airborne radia-tion from a radiological dispersal device or nuclear plant accident feels like something we can’t do any-thing about.

➠ Is the risk Catastrophic or Chronic? Risks that threaten large numbers at one time evoke more fear than statistically greater causes of injury or death where the victims are spread out geographically and temporally. Images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Chernobyl associate safety-related events at nuclear power plants as potentially catastrophic.

➠ Trust. We are more afraid when we don’t trust the agencies or officials supposed to protect us, or the industries creating the risk. Do we trust their competence? Their honesty? Their motives? Incompetent performance, keeping secrets, and inconsistent information are trust-destroying hall-marks of the way officials have behaved in many nuclear and radiological events.

Consider this example, irradiating food to make it safer. In many places where this process has been approved by the government, it is not widely used because of industry concerns about public appre-

Risk CommuniCationby David Ropeik

more than facts and feelings

More than Words | Risk Communication


hension. Yet studies have found that effective risk communication can increase consumer acceptance of food irradiation, which directly improves public health.

The risk communication offered to prospective con-sumers in these studies went beyond clear, under-standable language. It included a discussion of both risks and benefits. The communications acknowl-edged people’s apprehensions about radiation, rather than dismissing them by only offering infor-mation about how irradiating food poses no risk, or just talking about the benefits. It asked people to say what they would choose, including offering a policy to require labeling to identify irradiated products.

In short, clear and understandable messages were important, but they were not enough. Clear and understandable information is part of any commu-nication. Risk communication also must account for people’s affective perceptions, and demonstrate respect for those perceptions in actions as well as words (the policy of labeling).

These same concepts can be applied to many risk communication challenges connected with nuclear issues. Here are some specific suggestions:

❶ Nations interested in starting up a nuclear power programme need to:• openly acknowledge risks as well as discuss ben-efits like energy independence from a low-carbon source, and economic growth.

• establish processes that give people choice, par-ticularly about siting.

• offer clear, understandable information via sources who are trusted.

• establish mechanisms for on-going public input, or for answering questions from the public, to cre-ate a true dialogue.

❷ Responders to emergencies — including events perceived as emergencies by the public, regardless of where they might rank on the INES scale — need to:

• give people a sense of control by telling them what they can do, e.g. shelter-in-place, evacuate, don’t go anywhere, seek medical examination, take iodine pills.

• communicate constantly.

• honestly acknowledge uncertainty when it exists.

• avoid keeping secrets (though this is difficult in events involving security and law-enforcement).

• highlight the risks and benefits of certain behav-iors, e.g. evacuation, coming to contaminated areas to rescue loved ones, coming to medical facilities depending on likelihood of exposure.

❸ Officials responsible for long term storage of nuclear waste should:• respect public concerns.

• establish processes giving people choice, particu-larly about siting.

• provide simple information from trusted sources on the nature of the disposed material, the disposal process and disposal facilities.

• acknowledge uncertainty about long term dis-posal.

• note the benefits of reduced disposal of green-house gasses — a form of waste — from fossil fuel use, versus the potential risk from disposal of long-live radionuclides produced by nuclear energy.

The IAEA mission statement says the agency “…pro-motes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the envi-ronment against ionizing radiation.”

This focuses only on the physical dangers of radiation. But potential radiologiocal harms extend far beyond the direct impacts of flying bits of atoms. The human perception of radiation risk can itself lead to physical, psychological, social, and economic harm, often in excess of the radiological harm itself. Risk communication is a tool for managing those risks, and should be given much greater emphasis at the most senior levels of any organization concerned with the peaceful applications of nuclear science.

David Ropeik is a risk communication consultant. E-mail: [email protected]

Risk communication is a tool for managing those risks, and should be given much

greater emphasis at the most senior levels of any organization concerned with the

peaceful applications of nuclear science.


Professional science communication is under-going a period of crisis. It was born as a tool to ease acceptance of technologies which had become controversial, or to improve the scientific and tech-nical literacy necessary in a modern economy. The results, as we all know, have been poor at best.

For quite a long time, the consensus was that these problems are due to a lack of “public understand-ing of science”, that is, of scientific knowledge, theo-ries and methods. If only these were translated from specialist terminology into popular language and widely disseminated, controversies would automat-ically resolve themselves. The public was consid-ered to be a homogeneous and passive audience for the “pure” knowledge produced by scientists or technologists.

This rather simplistic approach to the relationship between science and society, and, therefore, to the communication of science, has shown clear signs of its shortcomings. Transforming citizens into “lit-tle molecular biologists” or “little statisticians” is a far more difficult task than can be imagined, and for two good reasons. First, people would need to know too much. In order to understand the possi-ble risks of electromagnetic fields, for example, one should become familiar with electromagnetic radi-ation, its interactions with living cells, and heaps of epidemiological research. How many areas of exper-tise should a citizen have to master? The second rea-son is the lack of sufficient motivation. How many people are willing to invest the time and effort nec-essary to get a good scientific education?

The idea of changing citizens into little scientists could also turn out to be useless. If we look at sur-vey results, we see no clear correlation between the level of scientific literacy and attitudes and opinions on controversial science or technology.

Establishing a Relationship

After being a label for every type of initiative launched by the scientific community for the gen-eral public, public understanding of science is now definitely out of fashion. Today, experts prefer to talk about engagement, bi-directionality, public debate and, above all, dialoguing. The communication of science is no longer simple dissemination.

However, in order to remain an authorative voice, science (or industry) has to keep society’s trust, which is obtained through reciprocal understand-ing and not simple statements of facts, no matter how incontrovertible they are, let alone statements of authority. Instead of asking only “what do people need to know,” we should ask “what do people think they need to know,” “what will be the effect on peo-ple of what we want to say ,” “what do they know, or think they already know.”

Dialogue is of course a good thing, because com-munication is not about transferring information from one party to another, but about establishing a relationship. In fact, even more important than the information being exchanged is the quality (patronizing, neutral, personal, empathic, etc.) of the exchange.

Before talking, therefore, we must listen. Not just through opinion polls, but also through the general press, public debates, meetings, even small talk. To make ourselves understood, we must first under-stand.

Listening and dialoguing are also excellent ways to avoid the so-called “curse of knowledge”, the diffi-culty for experts to see something as all other peo-ple might see it and therefore to make themselves understood.

Expert Imagination

by Giovanni Carrada

Trust and a favourable “big picture” are essential to good scientific communication.

More than Words | Expert Imagination


Listening to the public is essential but not enough. Dialogue is useful but often impractical. Maybe the time has come for science and technology commu-nication to take one big step further.

The Power of the Big PictureThe public understanding of science needs the sup-port of a higher level of understanding. We may call it the understanding of the big picture, as opposed to the many scientific and technological facts and details.

In fact, we all primarily understand the world in terms of big narratives, also referred to as public rep-resentations, framing, or metaphors. Only at a sec-ondary level are we willing to examine the tech-nical details. A few examples: are cloned animals dangerous because human cloning is bad? Are sil-icone breast implants dangerous because they are immoral? Never mind what the truth is: in public debates all that has consequences is real.

Before (or instead of) considering the technical details, we often make a judgment on the basis of the big picture we have in mind. Indeed, there is a clear hierarchy between the two levels: the big pic-ture prevails on the technical picture because it is the shortcut our mind tends to take whenever we don’t have all the necessary information and exper-tise. And the less time and less expertise we have, the more we rely on the big picture.

There is also a difference in literary genre between big pictures and traditional science communica-tion: the former are stories, the latter usually have the form of the essay.

A story is the most natural way to absorb informa-tion: it is engaging, it fires the imagination, it is easy to remember and makes you act. An essay, on the other hand, though better suited to exchange infor-mation, is an unnatural way to communicate. It requires an effort from the public and is often cold and abstract.

In professional science communication we tend to concentrate only on the second level and its asso-ciated genre, as if the first one, i.e., the big picture, were not “science communication”. Therefore, we often forget to work on, update or change the big narrative of our field, and limit ourselves to the nar-rower, honest and apparently safer work of explain-ing facts. The problem is that if the big picture is negative, or just not interesting, we don’t get the public’s attention in the first place, or we get a neg-

ative attention, thus compromising any further understanding.

Sharing a FutureNuclear power has a very big “big picture”, and not the most positive one. It’s made of the Bomb, green movements of the 1970s, Chernobyl, technocratic industries and behemoth public administrations. It takes a big communication effort to change a big picture, but a top-down communication strategy is an illusion on both practical and political grounds and luckily, it cannot be done in a mature demo-cratic society. It may also easily backfire.

What you need is a new vision capable of spread-ing itself through a bottom-up, self-sustaining proc-ess. If you can craft a good vision, it will stimulate other people to join your communication effort. Just think about information technology and the army of enthusiastic evangelista it has always effort-lessly recruited. This is good for democratic public debate and credibility and multiplies the communi-cation effort. That is, after all, what public relations is all about. It also makes traditional science commu-nication — explaining scientific and technological details — more effective.

Visions, however, cannot be imposed. Besides con-sidering what the technology can deliver, a good vision is just the right interpretation of the stake-holders’ material, economic, social, psychological and moral needs. That is why a good vision must go beyond the cold idea of the future that is typical of the technology forecaster, and should let people understand how they can contribute to shape their own future.

In order to craft a good vision, you need to listen and engage in dialogue, but, first of all, you need imagi-nation. A vision is not something that the public can suggest, it is a vivid new story that does not exist yet and must be invented.

In technology, a good vision must be both bold and realistic. Science is difficult to muster, and the most interesting and exciting visions are to be found in the experts’ minds. That is why we need expert imagi-nation. We should look for it in the professional com-munity, though outside the mainstream, probably in the younger generations. In people, who usu-ally have little voice in big organizations. But who knows, things may change.

Giovanni Carrada is a science writer and a communica-tion consultant based in Rome, Italy.E-mail: [email protected]

Expert Imagination

by Giovanni Carrada

Trust and a favourable “big picture” are essential to good scientific communication.

More than Words | Expert Imagination


Barcelona, Spain — “Science for a better life” was the theme of the 2008 Euroscience Open Forum (ESOF), during which the future of nuclear power and the importance of research in the nuclear field was also debated.

“Be it in the development of fusion as a source of energy or in technological advances in fission, it is essential that research in the nuclear sector carries on,” said Friedrich Wagner, President of the European Physical Society.

Wagner’s view was echoed by Dr. David Ward, a researcher work-ing on fusion at the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority in Culham. He pointed to the fact that current investments in energy research and developments (R&D) only amount to the equivalent of less than 0.1 per cent of the energy market value. “Without putting more resources into R&D, we will never reduce our reliance on fossil fuels,” he commented.

The call for renewed investments and efforts in nuclear research came as Sir David King, the former UK Chief Scientific Advisor and conference keynote speaker, warned participants that energy security will become a key factor in tackling the popu-lation growth problem, which he described as mankind’s main challenge for the 21st century.

“This population explosion will present a series of intercon-nected challenges that are qualitatively different from those facing humanity at the start of the twentieth century - ranging from food and energy security to increased terrorism and the impacts of climate change,” he said.

Two panel sessions organized by the UK s Institute of Physics looked at future prospects for fission and fusion technologies in Europe and beyond.

Dr. William Nuttall, Senior Lecturer in Technology Policy at Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, spoke of the need for smaller nuclear plants that are cheaper and more flexible to develop as a way to address nuclear’s weak points, i.e., high capital costs and lengthy construction times. He noted that Russian plans for a floating nuclear power station, and the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor being developed in South Africa are two examples of nuclear research going in the right direction.

Speaking at a session entitled Fusion — Will It Always Be 40 Years Away?, David Campbell, Assistant Deputy Director General for Fusion Science and Technology for the ITER project, illustrated the likely timetable for fusion power development. He said that, according to plans, the experimental, multinational ITER facility to be built in Caradache, France, is expected to be up and run-ning by 2018. After an estimated 20 years of testing, a model fusion reactor called DEMO will then be built, thus inaugurat-ing the era of fusion power.

It might be 40 years or longer before nuclear fusion makes a sig-nificant contribution to the world s energy needs, but if it can be demonstrated that nuclear fusion for power generation is possible, safe and competitively priced it will have been worth the wait, he said.

A conference session was also dedicated to illicit nuclear traf-ficking and the threat of nuclear terrorism. “Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and the threat of nuclear terrorism are reasons for serious concern,” said Gabriele Tamborini of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU).

“Nuclear forensics may provide information on the history, the intended use and possibly on the origin of nuclear mate-rial. This scientific discipline is at the interface between physical science, prosecution, non-proliferation and counter terrorism,” he added. Tools and tactics that enable teams of atom detec-tives to do their job have changed profoundly over the last few years.

The IAEA s Diane Fischer, a senior safeguards analyst, addressed the tools used to detect undeclared nuclear activities, notably environmental sampling techniques. “Today we can say that environmental sampling is key to nuclear forensics,” she said. The role of intelligence and international cooperation, how-ever, was also emphasized by the experts taking part in the panel.

ESOF 2008, Europe s largest interdisciplinary scientific gathering at-tracted some 4000 scientists, researchers, policy makers and jour-nalists, in Barcelona, Spain, from 18-22 July 2008.

ESOF 2008 attracted some 4000 participants.(Credit: ESOF 2008)

Science y Tapas by Giovanni Verlini

How Long to 2020, IAEA Bulletin September 2008

Documents

Transcript of How Long to 2020, IAEA Bulletin September 2008