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House of Commons Committees on Arms Export Controls

Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013): Scrutiny of the Governments UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012, the Governments Quarterly Reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the Governments policies on arms exports and international arms control issues

First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 201314 Second Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 201314 Third Report of the Defence Committee of Session 201314 Third Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 201314 Third Report of the International Development Committee of Session 201314

Volume III Oral and additional written evidence Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 3 December 2012 and 1 July 2013

The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees are appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and any associated public bodies.

Current membership

BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS: Mr Adrian Bailey, Mr Brian Binley, Paul Blomfield, Katy Clark*, Mike Crockart, Caroline Dinenage, Julie Elliott, Rebecca Harris, Ann McKechin*, Mr Robin Walker*, Nadhim Zahawi* DEFENCE: Rt Hon James Arbuthnot*, Mr Julian Brazier*, Thomas Docherty*, Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson*, Mr Dai Havard, Mr Adam Holloway, Mrs Madeleine Moon, Penny Mordaunt*, Sir Bob Russell*, Bob Stewart*, Ms Gisela Stuart, Derek Twigg* [John Glen*left Committee 8/11/2012] FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Rt Hon Sir John Stanley* (Chair of the Committees concurrent meetings), Richard Ottaway, Mr John Baron, Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell, Rt Hon Ann Clwyd*, Mike Gapes*, Mark Hendrick*, Sandra Osborne, Andrew Rosindell, Mr Frank Roy, Rory Stewart* INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce*, Hugh Bayley, Fiona Bruce*, Richard Burden*, Fabian Hamilton*, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy, Mr Michael McCann, Fiona ODonnell*, Mark Pritchard, Chris White* * Member who participated in the inquiry leading to this Report Chair of a participating Committee

Powers

The Committees are departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Standing Order No 152. The powers of the Committees to work together and agree joint reports are set out in Standing Order No. 137A. These Standing Orders are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

The Reports and evidence of the Committees are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committees (including news items) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/caeccomm

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committees are Keith Neary (Clerk), Jacqueline Cooksey (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer)

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, House of Commons, Committee Office, Palace of Westminster, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 2420; the Committees email address is [email protected]

http://www.parliament.uk/http://www.parliament.uk/caeccommmailto:[email protected]

Contents

Oral evidence

Tuesday 10 September 2012 Page

Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Richard Tauwhare, Head of the Arms Export Policy Department, and Ambassador Joanne Adamson, Head of the UK Delegation on ATT, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev w1

Monday 3 December 2012

Roy Isbister, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, Oliver Sprague, Arms Programme Director, Amnesty International UK, and Martin Butcher, Policy Advisor, Arms Campaign Oxfam GB Ev w13

Mr David Hayes, Chairman, Mr Barry Fletcher, Executive Committee Member, Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), Mr David Barber, International Trade Compliance Manager, Europe, UTC Aerospace Systems, and Mr Michael J V Bell, Export Controls Consultant Ev w21

Wednesday 19 December 2012

Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, and David Frost, Director, Europe, trade and International Trade Ev w27

Rt Hon William Hague MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, James Paver, Deputy Head of Arms Export Policy Department, and Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Export Policy Department Ev w33

Additional written evidence

1 Drone Wars UK Ev w44 2 Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) Ev w45, Ev w78, Ev w79 3 Transparency International Ev w53 4 Andrew Feinstein Ev w57 5 Campaign Against Arms Trade Ev w62 6 Toxic Remnants of War Project Ev w66 7 UK Working Group Ev w68

Ministerial correspondence

Date From To Subject Evidence

reference 11/07/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Propofol Ev w79

12/07/2012 Mark Prisk Chairman Written Ministerial Statement on Transparency

Ev w81

18/07/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman Arms Trade Treaty Ev w82

18/07/2012 Chairman William Hague Syria extant licences Ev w82

20/08/2012 Chairman William Hague Arms Trade Treaty Ev w85

29/08/2012 William Hague Chairman Arms Trade Treaty Ev w86

03/09/2012 Chairman William Hague Open General Trade Control Licences

Ev w89

06/09/2012 Chairman William Hague Export of security services Ev w90

06/09/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Syria extant licences Ev w90

18/09/2012 Chairman William Hague Strategic Export Controls Government Report (HC 337)

Ev w92

30/09/2012 William Hague Chairman Export of security services Ev w97

08/10/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Open General Trade Control Licences

Ev w98

07/11/2012 Chairman William Hague Government Response (Cm8441) to CAEC Report

Ev w101

12/11/2012 William Hague Chairman Strategic Export Controls Government Report (HC 337)

Ev w107

29/11/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman Arms Trade Treaty Ev w129

05/12/2012 Chairman William Hague Arms Trade Treaty Ev w129

06/12/2012 William Hague Chairman Arms Export Controls policies Ev w129

06/12/2012 William Hague Chairman Government Response (Cm8441) to CAEC Report

Ev w130

22/1/2013 Michael Fallon Chairman Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, Syria

Ev w155

25/1/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Crown Prosecution Service Prosecutions

Ev w156

25/1/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Mr Michael Ranger Ev w157

25/1/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Mr Gary Hyde Ev w157

25/1/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Mr Christopher Tappin Ev w157

6/2/2013 William Hague Chairman Arms Trade Treaty, gifting of equipment, UK/Bahrain Defence Co-operation, Syria

Ev w157

14/2/2013 Vince Cable Chairman UKTI DSO Priority Markets Ev w159

27/2/2013 Chairman William Hague Syria Ev w159

28/2/2013 Vince Cable Chairman Crown Prosecution Service Prosecutions

Ev w160

11/3/2013 Chairman William Hague Uzbekistan Ev w164

Date From To Subject Evidence reference

18/3/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Syria extant licences Ev w164

18/3/2013 Chairman William Hague Illegal arms shipments Ev w164

20/3/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Fake bomb detectors Ev w164

22/3/2013 Chairman William Hague Wassenaar Arrangement Ev w165

22/3/2013 Chairman William Hague Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Ev w165

25/3/2013 William Hague Chairman Syria Ev w165

27/3/2012 Hugo Swire Chairman China Ev w166

8/4/2013 William Hague Chairman Wassenaar Arrangement Ev w166

9/4/2013 William Hague Chairman Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Ev w167

10/4/2013 Vince Cable Chairman Syria extant licences Ev w168

12/4/2013 Baroness Warsi Chairman Gifting equipment to Afghanistan

Ev w168

16/4/2013 Vince Cable Chairman Fake bomb detectors Ev w168

23/4/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Extant licences to FCO Countries of concern

Ev w169

25/4/2013 Chairman Vince Cable Extant licences to other Countries of concern

Ev w169

7/5/2013 Chairman William Hague Licence revocations Ev w170

10/5/2013 Vince Cable Chairman Extant licences to FCO Countries of concern

Ev w170

16/5/2013 William Hague Chairman Gifting equipment to Jordan Ev w262

16/5/2013 William Hague Chairman Licence revocations Ev w263

20/5/2013 Vince Cable Chairman Extant licences to other Countries of concern

Ev w264

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Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev w1

Oral evidenceTaken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls

on Monday 10 September 2012

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Katy ClarkAnn ClwydJohn GlenAnn McKechinFiona ODonnell

________________

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Richard Tauwhare, Head of the ArmsExport Policy Department, and Ambassador Joanne Adamson, Head of the UK Delegation on ATT, Foreignand Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q1 Chair: Minister, we welcome you and yourcolleagues, Ambassador Joanne Adamson andRichard Tauwhare, to the Committees on Arms ExportControls. We were very eager to put in this additionaloral session, at relatively short notice, because of thegreat importance of the arms trade treaty situation andthe sad failure of the negotiations in New York.I would like to start by taking you back to 27 July inNew York. The situation was that the arms trade treatyhad been in preparation and under negotiation foryears. On that day, the British Government werewilling to sign up to it, as were 90 countries in all,including all the European Union countries andcountries all over the worldAfrica, central America,South America and Asia. In their statement on thatday, those countries said, We had expected to adoptsuch a draft Treaty today.Minister, you will know as well as anybody that, onsuccessive occasions, you and the Foreign Secretaryhave referred to the British leadership in the armstrade treaty negotiating role. Why, given the claimedBritish leadership, did the British Government notdisplay the necessary leadership on 27 July, alongwith the other 90 countries, and bring into being thefirst international arms trade treaty that there hasever been?Alistair Burt: Thank you, Chairman, for the warmwelcome. I appreciate that it is useful to have anopportunity to look at arms trade treaty issues so soonafter the end of the negotiating conference in July. Itwas not a question of leadership. The decision wasmade a couple of years ago that the rules of procedureshould prescribe consensus. The United Kingdom hasalways proceeded on the basis that the best arms tradetreaty would be one that was consensual, that broughtin as many parties as possible and that was robust andeffectiveterms with which I know the Committeeis familiar.The truth was that that was not the situation when wegot to 27 July. Yes, a number of countrieslike uswere content with the text and would have signed, butthe chair held that more time was needed in order tobring more countries into a position where they couldsign. On 27 July we were at the end of an intense

Bob StewartRory StewartChris WhiteNadhim Zahawi

negotiating period in New York, in which AmbassadorJo Adamson was closely involved all the time and inwhich both I and Minister of State Alan Duncan wereinvolved. But the view was taken that we agreed withthe chair of the conference, who had been runningthe negotiations over a lengthy period, that more timewould enable more countries to sign the text at theend of the day and thus fulfil the United Kingdomsobligations to Parliament to support a text that was asconsensual as possible, drew in as many parties aspossible and was both robust and effective.Accordingly, we agreed with the chair that it was bestto allow some more time for states parties to come onboard. That is why we displayed leadership in saying,Yes, we think this is the right process from now on.

Q2 Chair: You say that the root of the problem wasthe requirement for consensus. I suggest to you thatthe British Government have a real explanation to doas to why they went along with the consensusprinciple. Consensus has always beenand continuesto bea kiss of death on large-scale multilateral armscontrol negotiations. There is no progressand totaldeadlockin the fissile material cut-off treatynegotiation in Geneva because of consensus. Therewould never have been a cluster munitions conventionif there had been a need for consensus. There wouldnever have been a land mines convention if there hadbeen a need for consensus. So why on earth did theBritish Government go along with the principle ofconsensus?Alistair Burt: First, as the Committee is well aware,this was a decision taken by the previous Government.Secondly, we have taken the view that, in thisparticular case, there is merit in pursuing a policy ofconsensus. The merit is that it enables people tonegotiate from a position in which they dont feelthreatened. At the end of the day, they can be engagedon the basis that they know that, if they dont agree,things will come to a stop. That is true, but sometimesthat particular process and negotiating procedureenables them to move further than they mightotherwise do.

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Ev w2 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

10 September 2012 Alistair Burt MP, Richard Tauwhare and Ambassador Joanne Adamson

I draw the Committees attention to the gains thatwere made, as displayed through the draft text.Clearly, a number of countries were able to sign up tothings we had never seen before: a global commitmentto arms control; mechanisms that would ensure thathuman rights criteria were taken into account forsmall arms, ammunition and components; andmainstreaming sustainable development andcorruption. All of those are in the draft basic text. Idont think that we would necessarily have got all ofthem if we had not been able to negotiate and, onthe basis that we were proceeding consensually, movesome countries that have long been sceptical about theidea of an arms trade treaty.That does not mean that, at the end of the day, if wecant get where we want to with consensus, we cantchange that. Again, I think the Committee is aware ofthis. If we reach a point at which it is clear that wewill not achieve the aims and objectives that theGovernment have set out to the House on a numberof occasions, it may be necessary to change ourapproach, take another tack and go with other nationsto seek an agreement under the UN procedure, whichis by majority rather than by consensus. However, forthe time being, on the basis of what we know fromthe negotiation process and the work put in by ChairMoritn, the chair of the conference, we think there isa possibility of achieving the objective of more statesbeing able to sign up to this in the terms that theUnited Kingdom would support than if we decided todrop that approach and go for a majority agreement,either at this stage or in the past. That is the reasonfor pursuing the discussion through consensus.

Q3 Chair: Is there not a risk that, by conceding theneed for consensus, we could end up with no armstrade treaty at all?Alistair Burt: That has always been a risk. It was arisk before people entered into the conversation, itremains a risk today and it will be a risk in sixmonths time. When put to the bit, a state can alwayssay, No, we are not going to do this. Of course thatis where we are now. We want to see a situation thatis demonstrably better than what we have now. Thatrequires an arms trade treaty that we say is worth thepaper it is written on. We have already made it clearthat we will not sign up to something just for the sakeof it, but we believe that, if we continue with theprocess, we will get somewhere. You are right to saythat the risk remains that, at the end of the day, wewill not get something we want to see, but that seemsless likely than it might have done in the past.The parties that are going to do this have beendiscussing with one another in detail, over the periodof a month, what they might do. We have the supportof a significant number of states for the draft text,whichas I indicated in my letter to all MPs, signedwith Alan Duncan, the Minister of Statedemonstrates the significant gains that have beenmade in the process. The sense is that, if we move tooearly now to force things to a vote or to seek amajority, there is a risk that, with luck, we will be leftwhere we arewe may have some people peelingoffbut we wouldnt have the opportunity to do

better. We think we can, and thats why it is worthstaying with the process.

Q4 Ann Clwyd: Can I ask you about the rules ofprocedure for the conference? Is it not the case that,in 2009, it was the United States that made thestipulation that agreement had to be reached byconsensus rather than by majority vote, otherwise theywould not have taken part in the whole procedure?Alistair Burt: I believe they certainly soughtconsensus, but it was agreed by everybody else, andthat is now in the procedure and the process. Theanswer to your question is yes.

Q5 Ann Clwyd: Was that done specifically at therequest of the United States?Alistair Burt: That may be the case, but, as I say, itwas not the decision of this Government. No matterwho instigated it, that is the procedure we have now.I am certainly prepared to say that we see benefits inthat in taking forward the discussions that we have,because it enables everybody to be engaged on thebasis that they are not risking anything right until thelast moment, when they have to choose whether ornot they will sign up to the text.

Q6 Ann Clwyd: Evidence that we had from Oxfamsaid that the draft treaty was too weak due to lack ofclarity, did not cover all conventional weapons, wasambiguous about ammunition and unconvincing onthe issue of human rights. Do you agree or disagreewith that?Alistair Burt: No, I wouldnt agree, but from that youcan see why we might as well think that we can dostill better. No, I dont agree quite with the way thatOxfam wished to put it. They and other members ofcivil society have been very engaged and have workedvery closely with us over a period of time. We wouldall like to see the most perfect arms trade treaty. Weare not going to get that, but, where we can see thingswhere we might like to do better, we will continue topress for that. If that is Oxfams view, I presume thatthey would not wish us to commit to a vote on thisparticular treaty as the bottom line. If they think, aswe do, that we might be able to strengthen it in someof the areas that they describe, we are keen to do so.

Q7 Ann Clwyd: Oxfam go on to say that they feelthe threshold has been set so high that it would onlyprohibit arms sales in situations where the weaponswere intended for genocide.Alistair Burt: I think you are picking on one particulardetail where we are looking at human rights as anapplication of overriding concern as opposed to asubstantial or other concern. That is an example of thesort of detail that we believe it might be possible tochange. Let me say something in general terms. Wedont come here to suggest that the basic text thatmost countries indicated they were content with on 27July is an equivalent to what we do on a day-to-daybasis with our arms export control legislation, norwhat the EU does. What we have is something thatreplaces a vacuum, where today there are no controls.As we know from our researches and everything else,

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hundreds of thousands of people die each yearbecause of a lack of such controls.Accordingly, the basic text takes forward a negligibleset of provisions in this area. It doesnt end up wherewe are in this country or in the EU, but it isimmeasurably better than what is there. It willcertainly be possible for the Committee to look at eachterm of the basic text and say that this or that isweaker than ours. That is absolutely true and I haveno difficulty conceding that. The question is, is itbetter than what is there?The issue on overriding human rights concerns is anarea that we would like to see changed. I will giveyou an example of the sort of negotiation that goeson. My understanding is that the clause in relation tohuman rights concerns would be used where therewere overriding considerations that somethingwould happen. Negotiation has changed that tooverriding concerns that something could happen.That is a marginal lowering of the threshold. It is thatsort of discussion that went on in detail on everyclause.Our position is clearly that, where we can get athreshold with which we are more comfortable, wewill go for that. However, there will be occasionswhen we will be able to get some marginal changebut it may still not end up where we would like to seeit. That is where we are at the moment. There is ageneral perception that the basic text has taken us agood distance towards where we would like to go. Itis much better than what is there at the moment andis not weak and ineffective, but it could be better. Thatis why we are holding out for what the chair believesis a useful opportunity for consultation and discussion.Chair: We want to cover the position of the US,Chinese and Russian Governments.

Q8 Katy Clark: The United States, China and Russiaall objected to the final text of the treaty. Could yougo through the specific reasons that each of thosecountries gave for their objections to the draft text?Alistair Burt: I will turn to Ambassador Jo Adamson,if I may. Ambassador Adamson has been present rightthe way through the negotiations and for someconsiderable time beforehand. As the Committeeknows, there are few people in the world who knowmore about this, so this is a useful opportunity to bringin the ambassador. My broad understanding is thatthey were not specific about the things that they wereconcerned about and they left it fairly vague.However, to give a flavour of the discussion, it isappropriate to bring in Jo at this stage.Joanne Adamson: First, thank you very much forholding this hearing. I will be going to New York inOctober and it is always good to have a sense of yourthoughts when I am at the UN; so I really welcomethis. I regard 27 July as a pausenot failure. I wantto be very clear about that. It was a pause for moretime and not failure.On your question, the US were not specific.Essentially, they called for more time; they did notcall time on the whole ATT. Once they did that andsaid they needed more time to consider the issuebecause it was very complex, other countries came inbehind them, again saying they would like more time.

On the day, the Chinese delegation was very positiveabout future engagement and said on the record thatit wanted to continue to be involved in the process.Throughout July, I talked to the Chinese a lot. Theywere very engaged and made clear on a number ofoccasions that they wanted to be part of the process.Their statement on the last day is a matter of record.It was a pause. None of them mentioned any specificclause as being sub-optimal. They simply said, Thisis such a complex matter that we need more time.

Q9 Katy Clark: So they said that they wanted moretime. You have mentioned October. Do you have anyindication from them of how much more time theythink they need? Do you think that any concerns theyhave can be addressed in the next few months, forexample?Joanne Adamson: No, they have not given a specifictime. Lets talk about each of them individually. Theexpectation from the three of them was that therewould be another conference session; it would not besomething that we did immediately in October,through the General Assembly, but would be anothersimilar process. Whenever that process was set up,they would engage with it. Clearly, the US are notsaying much more. I dont expect anything morepublicly, given where they are in their electoral cycle.Being realistic, I do not expect to hear anything fromthem. I think the Russians and Chinese will want tosee that there is a new phase in the UN process. Theyhave not specified a time, either, but all three of themare looking for another UN conference to finish thisoff.Alistair Burt: It may be helpful if I say two things tothe Committee. First, this is not a never-endingprocess. There have been six years of negotiation,which is a long time. In the world in which we live,that is not unusual for this sort of agreement, but wehave no sense that this should drift on ad infinitum.Secondly, if it does come to a point at which we haveto take a decision about whether we have enough tobe going on with and should we go for it, we maywell do that. At the moment, we are looking very hardat what procedure we will adopt in New York whenthe UN General Assembly session starts again, tobank what we already haveto see what mechanismcan best be used to get a commitment that the textthat we have is a good base to work on. That is notfoolproof; until something is signed, anything can bechanged. But it would give an indication to states toreinforce what they have already said about the textthat they see it as something worth taking forward asopposed to something that they want to pick apart andlose the benefits of.We believe, therefore, that there is a reasonable timescale that we can consider for making furtherprogress. We do not envisage this process going on adinfinitum. We would like to see progress made withina matter of months, which we believe is well withinthe UNs timetable.

Q10 Katy Clark: The three countries that have beenmentioned are obviously key players. How are the UKGovernment going to address them? How are they




going to lobby to try to make sure that there isprogress? How will any lobbying take place?Alistair Burt: We lobby in a variety of different ways.Some of it is direct. Ministers will take part. Wherewe have opportunities to talk bilaterally with keypartners in the arms trade treaty process, then we willdo so. During the course of the negotiations, Icertainly telephoned a number of states directly to seewhere they were placed on certain items. Lobbyingwas done with the delegations that were there. Somehave a wide remit from their capitals and can makedecisions; others have to refer quite a lot back. So wehave that process to go through.We have good negotiating relationships with all ofthem. People who deal with the same thing all thetime get to know one another, so they know what theycan and cant say and where they can trust oneanother. That process is going on. Ministers will beengaged when we take the view that that direct sortof approach is necessary, either really to get to thebottom of what a concern may be or to give directionto a delegation in the process of a negotiation.Joanne Adamson: We hope that, in addition toGovernment, we will carry on working in partnershipwith civil society and industry, which have helped usso far in the campaign, and also with parliamentarians,to support the arms trade treaty. From where I see it,there is nothing easier than making a treaty with thepeople who agree with you. The issue is the reallytough nuts to crack. I hope that we will carry on inthat kind of partnership. Even if we have slightdifferences of tactics with regard to how to get astrong treaty on the ground, I think we all share thesame objectives. That is still what we are after, andwe need to get the partnership going forward again.

Q11 Chair: Before we finish with the United States,it has been widely reported, as you know, that theNational Rifle Associationwhich, I understand, hasquite considerable influence in the Republican partyin the USwere lobbying on the Hill in the UnitedStates to the effect that, if the United States enteredinto this treaty, it would be contrary to the claimedright under the US constitution of the Americancitizens to bear arms. Do you and the BritishGovernment take the view that, if a RepublicanPresident should be elected in November, it will becurtains for the arms trade treaty for the foreseeablefuture?Alistair Burt: You are taking me into the sort ofterritory where a loose phrase could be headline newson NBC for quite a period of time to come. Withrespect, I am not going to go there. I will say that thelobbying conducted by any NGO in the United Statesof their respective political parties is a matter forthem. We do not deal with them; we deal with electedGovernments. The position of the United StatesGovernment in this negotiation was to expressconcern at certain elements of the arms trade treaty,for reasons that they are entitled to hold and to keepto themselves. We expect to continue to negotiate onthe arms trade treaty with both the existingAdministration, should it be successful in being re-elected, and any new Administration. We will judge

Governments as we find them rather than take accountof what lobbyists may say to them.

Q12 Katy Clark: Do you think that the internalelectoral process in the United States will be one ofthe decisive factors in whether we are able to get anarms control treaty? It may well be possible if BarackObama is re-elected, but it may not be if anotherindividual is elected. What would the Governmentsview be?Alistair Burt: The Governments view is that they willcontinue to negotiate with the United StatesAdministration. Of course, the electoral process in theUnited States must have a bearing on how theAdministration approaches any internationalconference and any international negotiation. That isentirely a matter for them. Any changes in theirposition after 6 November will again be a matter forthem.It is not a matter of speculation for the UnitedKingdom what the election of different parties maymean for the treaty or the United States position; thatis for them to consider. We have the very bestrelationship with the State Department and those whonegotiate for the United States. We expect that tocontinue whether there is a re-elected DemocraticAdministration or a new Republican one. All ourexperience over the years of elections, election run-ups and things like that is that many things are said inthe heat of and run-up to an election. It is best to putall of that to one side and for Governments tonegotiate and talk with Governments when they are ina position to do so. The present position is that theUnited States found themselves unable at this stage tosign up to the treaty and asked for more time. We willfind out what the position of the Administration after6 November will be, if we have not been able toconclude anything by that stage.Chair: We now turn to the arms trade treaty text inrelation to trying to prevent weapons being used forinternal repression, as is, of course, the BritishGovernments policy.

Q13 Nadhim Zahawi: In his oral evidence to theCommittees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February2012, the Foreign Secretary said, We will not issuelicences where we judge there is a clear risk theproposed export might provoke or prolong regional orinternal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitateinternal repression. That is the confirmed position ofthe UK Government. Why is there no comparablewording in the draft treaty?Alistair Burt: Again, I come back to something that Imentioned before. If we are looking to see that a drafttreaty mirrors United Kingdom arms exportregulations, we are all going to be disappointed; it isnot going to do so. What we are looking for issomething that provides a floor to arms controlsdecisions that just does not exist at present; it iscertainly not a ceiling. We take the view that, althoughthe draft treaty doesnt use the specific terms relatingto conflict and internal repression, it would requiresignatories to assess whether a proposed export wouldcontribute to or undermine peace and security. Also,exporting states would assess whether a proposed




export could be used to commit or facilitate a seriousviolation of international human rights law orinternational humanitarian law. Where an overridingrisk exists, the export will not be authorised.In emphasising that, I come back to the matter thatthe Chairman raised earlier. These are provisions thatare being negotiated with states that have nothing likethis in their existing legislation. If we make theprogress that we have made with what is in the basictext, we are markedly improving the situation as it isnow, but the wording is unlikely to be the same as hasbeen developed by the United Kingdom and the EUover many, many years. That is why you will see adifference.Nadhim Zahawi: Thank you for that very full answer.Chair: We now turn to the arms trade treaty inrelation to the EU common position.

Q14 Ann McKechin: Earlier in the session, youmade reference to the comparison between this drafttreaty and the EU control of arms, which, as youcommented, is much stronger. Can I draw yourattention to the issue of reporting of applications forexport licences that have been denied? You will notethat, under the EU Council common position, whichis set out in annex 4 to our Committees reportpublished in July, Member States shall circulatedetails of applications for export licences which havebeen deniedtogether with an explanation of why thelicence has been denied.When I look at the terms of the current draft treaty,there really isnt anything equivalent to that. There issimply an obligation to submit annually to the UNsecretariat a report about authorization or actualtransfer ofarms under the scope of this Treaty. Itwould be helpful if you could comment on whetheryou consider this is lax and whether there is anypossibility in the final negotiation of this beingstrengthened.Alistair Burt: We are talking about article 10,paragraph 5.Ann McKechin: Yes.Alistair Burt: This area is a good example of what wewould like to press further. The wording as it standsis ambiguous. I will quote: Reports shall be madeavailable and distributed to States Parties by thesecretariat. You can read that in two ways. Whatexactly does the term made available mean? Wewould certainly intend to publish our reports underthis, and we believe they will be made available byone states party to another, but how widespread isthat? We can certainly see the force of saying, Letspress further and see whether we can get an additionto this wording. If we get the opportunity to get intofurther negotiation, we would like to see that.I agree that it is not records in quite the way that wewould like to see them, but record keeping is there forthe first time and states have already madecommitments to say that all of this is important in away in which they have not done before. It isincremental.

Q15 Ann McKechin: Can I press you just a little bitfurther on the last sentence of paragraph 5, whichstates: Reports may exclude commercially sensitive

or national security information. Is there anunderstanding of that definition, because obviously itcould be used in a very wide sense, which would bevery unhelpful?Joanne Adamson: When we were negotiating this,many different variants of the terms were beingthrown around. The term commercially sensitiverefers to how we would handle things in the UKsystem. A company that was applying for an exportlicence would expect us not to talk about thatcompany and the pricing, for example, in a way thatwould allow competitors to gain information. Theterm is there simply for that purpose so that we do notlet the competition get into some sensitive details. Ibelieve that is quite a well-understood definition.National security information may refer to thingsthat the United Kingdom, for example, does not wishto publish that we regard as very sensitive for our ownnational security.No, you are right to say that there is no agreeddefinition of that particular term, but I believe it istalking about the type of activity that a state judges istoo sensitive for its own defence needs to publish. Youare right to say that it needs a little bit more definition.Chair: Minister, you and the Foreign Secretary haverepeatedly made reference to the importance of thetreaty being binding in international law. Katy Clarkhas a question on this point.

Q16 Katy Clark: On 7 February this year, theForeign Secretary said, We are very firmlycommitted to securing a robust, effective and legallybinding Arms trade treaty, but there are no provisionsor mechanisms in the draft treaty that specificallymake it legally binding under international law. Whyis that?Alistair Burt: Because it is not necessary to havethose specific provisions in order to make it legallybinding. From the language used in the operationalsections of the treaty, it is clear what the obligationsof states parties are. For example, the use of wordssuch as agree, shall and states parties signalsthe clear intention of the negotiating states that thetreaty is to be legally binding upon entering into force.Upon ratification, a states party will be legally boundby the treaty provisions under international law andrequired to implement it in its domestic system.I think the thing we have all been searching for is thatthere will not be an international police force, as itwere, for this. No country is going to sign up to givingup its sovereign decisions on arms exports to someinternational body. It was, therefore, always envisagedthat the treaty would require people to implement itwithin national law. My understanding is that that isbroadly accepted and it is not inferred that the absenceof any specific provision negates the points that Imade earlier about states intentions.

Q17 Katy Clark: From what you are saying,enforcement is going to be a massive problem if thetreaty as drafted is the treaty that is eventually signedup to.Alistair Burt: No. I dont think there are any changesthat will alter the fact that, if it is to be enforced, itwill be enforced nationally, within states. The




obligation to the international treaty and theinternational treaty obligations make it very clear whatstates are publicly signing up to. If they areconsistently in breach of that, there will beinternational condemnation from other parties and soon, but there is no provision for legal sanction per se.It is always understood that this will have to be dealtwith internally. Again, we are moving a long wayfrom states with no controls whatsoever even to besubject to this sort of regulationsubmission ofreports, external scrutiny and the work of civil societynot just in this country but, of course, around theworld. You are raising the threshold for accountabilityin quite a marked way, but it was never envisagedthat the treaty would be legally binding internationallythrough international legal action.Joanne Adamson: Can I add an important point aboutwhat we dont have now? We dont have a singleplace where the international community gatherswhere we can challenge other states to explain theirexport licences. We in the UK have these kinds ofgatherings. The media will focus on particularcountries, but right now we have nothing. I think thatan ATT and the community of the ATT will build atype of informal peer review that will make it possibleto ask people, Why did you issue that licence? Thatwill provide a forum that just isnt there at themoment, which will be a step forward.

Q18 Katy Clark: Do you think that the possibility ofhaving a court or institution that would enforce thetreaty may be looked at in the future?Joanne Adamson: Looking back at the negotiations,as the Minister said, this is not going to be somethingfor which there is an international policing body. Thatis one thing that was clear. To get the broadparticipation of the 193we hopeit will have to beimplemented nationally, but we will have a forum tocome together.Alistair Burt: Again, I think it is helpful to be clearerpolitically on this. Those of us who care about this,which includes every member of this Committee anda large proportion of the House, will not be able tosay, An ATT has been signed; thanks very much;thats a tick in the box. It will always include thingsthat we will want to see improved and changed overtime. The whole point of it being a baseline, as itwere, for further opportunity is that neither civilsociety nor we will stop saying, What more can wedo?, because, again, all of us know that, if this treatycomes into being, all the tragedies that we currentlysee around the world will not automatically end.It is all a process. All of it, including counter-proliferation measures and various internationaltreaties, is incremental. It is trying to get the worldinto a state of recognising the damage that is beingdone and to get something done. We see the limits ofinternational effectiveness every day in relation toSyria and everything else. After the length of time wehave all been in this, nobody mistakes an internationaltreaty for the end of the line on something. But itought to be important for the Committee to know thatthe present United Kingdom Governmentand, Isuspect, any future Governmentwill see the armstrade treaty, even when signed, as something about

which one can say, Right; weve got this. Now, howdo we improve it? How do we engage with states thatare sceptical and did not want to sign in the first placeto convince them that this is not threatening, it isdoing them, their people and others good, and so on?That is the process. We will not stop just because weget something signed.Chair: Fiona ODonnell has a question on the sameissue.

Q19 Fiona O'Donnell: Minister, you said that thepressure would be national, within a country, if it wasin breach of the ATT. The ambassador also spokeabout a forum. However, if a state repeatedly brokethe ATT, could you foresee a situation in which a bodysuch as the EU, perhaps, would impose sanctions?Alistair Burt: It is a very wide question. I suppose theshort answer is that you would not rule anything outin those circumstances. If a state were persistently inbreach, you would first have condemnation throughthe United Nations. It would depend on the extent ofwhat people had done. That point goes well beyondthis treaty; it is how you deal with international roguestates in certain circumstances. It is not impossible toenvisage that at some stage in the future the companyof nations could say, Enough; you are a signatoryto this.To take another example, we have issues with the non-proliferation treaty. One stateIranis being pursuedat the moment because of breaches of its obligationsunder something it has signed up to, and sanctions arebeing imposed. We are all well aware that there areother states that may or may not have nuclear weaponsthat are outside the non-proliferation treaty. Adifferent view is taken of them, because there is adifferent process, perhaps, to bring them to where wewould all like them to be.The principle is that, if states are persistently in breachof international obligations, it is possible for theUnited Nations, in time, to consider any action againstthem, but I do not think there will be anything withinthe treaty itself because, as I said, nations that aresceptical or cautious are not going to remove fromthemselves the power to make their own decisions orput themselves in a position where they might feel atrisk from that sort of sanction at this stage.Joanne Adamson: It is clearly not a replacement forthe Security Councilwe have been very clear aboutthat throughoutbut I can see where it might help. Ifyou look at the UKs own system, criterion 1 is aboutrespect for international law and internationalobligations. You can see that a body of evidencewould build up on how a state implements its ATTcommitments. When the licensing officeras I wasbefore taking on this joblooks at a proposed exportlicence, therefore, one of the things they will ask is,how is this country doing with its ATTimplementation? That would feed into the riskassessment of whether or not you should approve thelicence. Even without it being at an international level,it could help in our own system right now, once it isimplemented, to see how countries behave vis--vistheir commitments.Chair: Minister, as you know, the Committee hasbeen very concerned not only that ammunition should




be included but that it should be included on the samebasis as other weapons. Bob Stewart has a questionon this point.

Q20 Bob Stewart: Can we talk briefly about thedifficulties of including conventional armssmallarms or light weapons, which I presume meansmachine gunsand ammunition? We have alreadyalluded to the fact that the United States may have aproblem on this matter. Where do we stand on thematter of small arms? The draft treaty suggests thatwe want them brought under control, but it talks aboutconventional arms and does not include ammunition,for example. I know how difficult it is to control smallarms, ammunition and so on in a world where theyare proliferating right the way across. I can see thatthat will be very difficult, but where do we as aGovernment stand on this matter?Alistair Burt: Mr Stewart brings up a very goodexample of compromise, negotiation, discussion andso on. Small arms are included in article 2the articleentitled Scopeas indent 1(h). Ammunition is notthere. It is included in article 6(4), which deals withthe export of ammunition. What we have there is acompromise between those who did not wish to seeammunition up front in the scope and those whobelieved that controlling the export of ammunition andmaking it subject to risk assessments, including onhuman rights, was an essential part of a treaty wewanted to sign. So there is, in essence, a compromisehere. We believe that the terms in article 6(4) allowthe treaty to operate in terms of human rightsobligations and risk assessments, which are set outvery clearly in the article, but enable ammunition notto be considered in relation to other parts of the treaty.It was a compromise to get ammunition on board andto have the treaty cover a significant set of criteria thatwe think are important to consider. It enabled us toinclude ammunition. We should not take the view thatonly one country was concerned about this; a numberof states parties were.

Q21 Bob Stewart: We would be concerned aboutammunition, as well, would we not?Alistair Burt: We are.

Q22 Bob Stewart: I personally would be concernedif we couldnt export ammunition.Alistair Burt: The bottom line for the UnitedKingdom, which we have expressed on more than oneoccasion, is that we want to see ammunition as partof the treaty. If, ultimately, an opportunity waspresented to me that did not include ammunition atall, and a significant state said, We will not sign iteven if this is there, I would not support it. TheUnited Kingdom has made it clear that we seeammunition as part of the arms trade treaty. Thediscussion is about how we get that in, in ameaningful way, which involves those who are majorexporters of ammunition, and has them bound by theterms of the treaty. It is very important to us. Jo,describe how we got to this position.Joanne Adamson: I will start with small arms andlight weapons. You asked how hard it was to get thosein; it was very hard. Countries such as China and

many middle eastern countries originally said thatthey did not need to be included, because they are notcovered officially in the UN register of conventionalweapons; so it was hard. I pay tribute to civil societyfor focusing on small arms over a long time in thecampaign to make sure that we did get them in, but itwas not easy or a given.At one stage in the negotiation, ammunition was inthe scope but in a complete gobbledegook version thatwas more about anti-circumvention and simply said,You wont do anything with ammunition if it willcircumvent the treaty. The language of where it isnow, under implementation, is much clearer. The issueis, which of the criteria are you applying onammunition? We have human rights and internationalhumanitarian law, but at the moment things likediversion, sustainable development criteria andcorruption are not applied on ammunition. However,I would say that where it is now in terms of clarity isbetter than where it was in the earlier draft, where itwas really very weak but still under scope.

Q23 Bob Stewart: We are still a long way away,because this situation is almost impossible to crack.We will find a lot of opposition outside this country,but even in this country there will be some problems,particularly in making sure it happens and allowingsome ammunition to go and some not. That is the realproblemthe practical matter of policing this sort ofthing throughout the world.Alistair Burt: As far as we are concerned, our armsexports controls apply to ammunition, so we indeedapply the full rigour of all our criteria to that. Thatwont change. There is nothing in this treaty that willaffect the way in which the United Kingdom dealswith ammunition with the various countries that weseek to supply.

Q24 Bob Stewart: So we could sign up to it with noproblem at all.Alistair Burt: We can sign up because this does notimpact on us. We already have higher and strictercontrols. For clarityI am sure that the Committeeand those beyond it would want to be very sure aboutthisthere is nothing in this treaty that enables us orallows us, even if we wanted to, to reduce the levelof our national controls to what is in the treaty. Thisis a treaty with whose provisions we are already fullycompliantand more. We will continue to operate tothose higher standards. This brings people into ameasure of control of their arms exports, includingsmall arms, components and ammunition, whichreaches at least a reasonable threshold in relation tointernational humanitarian law and internationalhuman rights law. The compromise that Jo has beendescribing has been to get nation states to commit tothat but not to the full package, but we think there issufficient there to have made serious progress that wecan sign up to. That is the distinction.Bob Stewart: I want to pursue this matter just a little.Chair: Just one more.Bob Stewart: I will stop, if you want me to.Chair: No, one more.




Q25 Bob Stewart: I am worried about the policingof it internationallynot for ourselves, but outside. Ifa state is not compliant with something it has signedup to, what do we do? Who does what? Is it theSecurity Council? Is it the United Nations? Is it theInternational Court of Justice? Who actually does it?At that point I will stop, Chairman.Alistair Burt: In the first place, it would be a nationalissue for the state, which would be challenged byparties within that particular state saying, You havesigned to a treaty which you have ratified in ournational law. You are not compliant with theprocesses. As I understand it, a state would be takento court by parties nationally within that country. Aswe have discussed, there is no international policingprocess.Again, if a state is persistently in breach of terms thatit has clearly signed up to, a range of sanctions isavailable through the international community. Theyare not mandatory and not prescribed by this, so thereis not an automatic process that if we discover, say,that ammunition has been supplied clearly in breachof these terms, X will therefore follow. It would be anexample used by those who wish to say to a state,You are not complying with your obligations, to beable to point to that.

Q26 Bob Stewart: The International Court of Justicemight well be involved. Is that possible?Joanne Adamson: We have not discussed it.

Q27 Bob Stewart: So we are not that far.Joanne Adamson: No, we have not discussed it.When we get the treaty and are looking atimplementation, the states parties will meet to look athow we can further refine how we meet this challengeand how it is going to work. Will there be peer review,as in the Human Rights Council, or something else?That is still to be decided.Bob Stewart: The Chairman has told me to cut andI do.

Q28 Chair: Just before we leave this, which countryor countries forced the removal of ammunition out ofarticle 2A(1)?Alistair Burt: I dont know if anybody forced theremoval out of it.Joanne Adamson: No, I dont think anybody did that.Alistair Burt: It is known that countries such as theUnited States have concerns about the issue.

Q29 Chair: Minister, you said that a compromise hadto be made. Who was not prepared to settle forammunition being included on the same footing as theother items specified in article 2A(1)?Alistair Burt: I think Ambassador Adamsonmentioned that China and certain middle easterncountries were concerned about the inclusion ofammunition in the first place.Joanne Adamson: It was China and the middle eastthat had concerns about small arms.

Q30 Chair: And the United States.Joanne Adamson: There are two different things.China and some middle eastern states were concerned

about small arms and light weapons. The US, Indiaand some others were concerned about ammunition.It was not that they blocked it; it was more that theycame up with an alternative solution that they put tothe chair. I do not think that it was as clear as saying,Im blocking this. It was an alternative. It was up toChair Moritn to work out what he thought would getconsensus. That is how it worked; someone came upwith an alternative.Chair: As we know, transparencybringing intopublic viewis crucial to having a responsible armstrade. John Glen has a question on this point.

Q31 John Glen: I refer to the Foreign Secretaryswritten statement of 13 October. He said: TheGovernment will continue to work to improve publicinformation on defence and security exports,including enhanced transparency of routine exportlicensing decisions. Some of the provisions in article10 of the draft treaty could be seen as substantiallyinferior to the standard of public information that hasalready been adopted with respect to defence andsecurity exports in the UK.During this afternoons discussion, the issue for mehas become, what is a minimum threshold that ismeaningful? Throughout this draft article 10, thereseem to be so many caveatswhere feasible, whenappropriate and so onthat it could be quitemeaningless. In paragraph 4, who defines whatrelevant activities are? How do you see the relativestrength of what is in this draft article 10 as againstwhat we have?Alistair Burt: As I mentioned earlier, we do not for amoment suggest that what is in the draft ATT, or whatis likely to be produced in the ATT, will meet therigorous standards of reporting and transparency thatwe have developed in the United Kingdom over alengthy period of time. However, the draft, if adoptedin its current form, would create significantimprovements to the current situation by requiringstates to keep records and report on authorisations oractual transfers of conventional arms under the scopeof the treaty. There is also a requirement to report onwhat activities have been undertaken to implement thetreatys obligations.As I indicated in answer to an earlier question, it isclear that the treaty would require reports to be givento the secretariat of the treaty; that is the improvementI referred to a moment ago in terms of record keeping.Again, we are talking not about states moving from ahigh quality now; we are talking about introducingsomething.Again, as I indicated, and as the ambassador hasmentioned, this is part of a process. If we can establisha floor for reporting and transparency, we can buildon that. I also indicated that we would like tochallenge the provisions that are currently there to seewhether we can make more clear precisely what theterm made available really means. Does it meansolely made available to the secretariat, or does itmean made available more widely? What is theobligation of states, for example, when receivinginformation from others under the treaty to keep itsecret? To what extent could a state be challenged tosay what it has received and asked, Can we see it?




This is all stuff to be worked through. Remember, weare dealing with places that will be required for thefirst time to keep records and notes of authorisationsin the manner that I have indicated. That is anadvance. It doesnt get us to where we are, but its astart. That is always what was envisaged with thetreaty.Chair: Ann McKechin has a question on the veryimportant issue of preventing arms from going intosituations of ethnic or religious conflict, which is,sadly, all too frequent.

Q32 Ann McKechin: Minister, when replying to theAdjournment debate about this treaty in July, youmentioned that All groups, whether characterised byage, gender, ethnicity, religion or other, should beafforded protection by an ATT. However, in the drafttreaty as it currently stands, under article 4, there isspecific mention only of arms being used to commitor facilitate gender-based violence or violence againstchildren. What do you say to those who see thefailure to mention other types of targeted crimes as anomission or a weakness in this draft?Alistair Burt: We dont believe it is. If the Committeelooks at article 4 in terms of national assessment, youwill see there what is considered in terms of theconditions whereby exports can be authorised.Paragraph 2 of that article says that, prior toauthorisation and pursuant to its national controlsystem, the state party shall assess whether theproposed export of conventional arms could a. beused to commit or facilitate a serious violation ofinternational humanitarian law; b. be used to commitor facilitate a serious violation of international humanrights law; c. be used to commit or facilitate an actconstituting an offense under internationalconventions and protocols relating to terrorism, towhich the transferring State is a Party.We believe that the requirement to have cognisance ofinternational humanitarian law and human rights lawcovers the issues relating to ethnicity, religiousviolence and the like. It is because of particularconcerns in relation to gender-based violence andviolence against children that there is specific mentionof those later in the article. It does not negate orsuggest any relegation of the importance of othermatters. We are perfectly confident that, legally, thoseare equally well covered, but it was because a numberof states expressed particular concern about theawfulness of gender-based violence and violenceagainst children that they wanted those specificallyconcluded. You are correct to say that we could widenthe clause to include extra things, but that would notadd to the importance of paragraph 2, which wouldcover all of it in any case. Am I right in saying thatthat is how the negotiations went?Joanne Adamson: You are absolutely right. It doesnot subtract anything from those clauses. As theMinister said, there were a lot of countries that werekeen on the reference to gender-based violence. Itgoes along with UNSCR 1325, on women and peaceand securityit is of a part with thatand also theForeign Secretarys initiative against sexual violencein conflict. It was included to highlight that but was

not intended at all to detract from any of the othercategories that we think are covered in other areas.

Q33 Ann McKechin: Do you believe there isestablished precedent on the issues of ethnic originand religious belief?Alistair Burt: We are perfectly confident that theywould be covered.Chair: With the reported Russian arms flowing intoSyria, we turn now to whether there is a loophole onGovernment-gifted equipment and Government-to-Government arms transfers. Ann Clwyd has aquestion on the issue.

Q34 Ann Clwyd: Amnesty International has said thatthe draft treaty does not include the transfer of armsthat are gifts or are considered as aid. Will the UKGovernment be negotiating for the inclusion of thosetransfers in the treaty?Alistair Burt: Again, let me kick this off andAmbassador Adamson may comment further. Webelieve that military gifting is inside the ambit of anATT. The draft treaty sent to UNGA does not applyto the international movement of conventional armsby a state party for its armed forces or lawenforcement authorities outside its national territories,only provided that the conventional arms remainunder the state partys ownership. The only way thatthey fall outside the treaty is if the state party doesnot relinquish ownership. If it gifts them, they do fallwithin it. We believe that is covered.Joanne Adamson: I have nothing to add to that.

Q35 Ann Clwyd: What do we gift? I would not havethought that we were in a position to gift anything.Alistair Burt: I do not think the discussions aroundthe clause have been associated with us, but I willgive an example. Occasionally, I see requests passacross the desk where equipment may have beenloaned to a particular state but its financial provisionmakes it reasonable for us to write off the return ofan asset, if it has been helpful to the country inprotecting its security or something like thatwherefinancially it is not much of an issue to us but it is ofimportance to the country we are dealing with. I amnot sure how much we do that, because I am not inthe MOD and am not an export expert, but I knowthat we do it from time to time.Going slightly outside the remit, I would not expectevery item of equipment that currently belongs to theinternational forces to be brought home to either theUK or the US from Afghanistan post-2014. A certainamount is going to be left in Afghanistan and will begifted to the Afghan national security forces. There isa perfectly proper process of gifting.What NGOs and othersand ourselveswereconcerned about was whether gifting could be used asa way to circumvent the provisions of the treaty. Wedont believe that is the case. There was a lot ofdiscussion about that, because one or two states, inparticular, expressed concern about it. However, myunderstanding is that we think the text covers that.Bob Stewart: The Minister has covered the point Iwas going to make. Gift military aid will definitelytake place in Afghanistan. It has happened before and




will continue to happen, under the rules that we haveset up. The Minister is absolutely right to raise it. Iwill cut there, because I agree with the Minister.

Q36 Fiona ODonnell: Can I ask the Ministerquickly which states objected? I was wonderingwhether there were concerns about Palestine.Alistair Burt: I am just checking if we are allowedto say.Joanne Adamson: There was nobody who said on therecord, I object to this. You asked whether there wasa particular state. I dont remember someone objectingin the plenary. There were a lot of people lobbying tosay that it must cover gifting, and a lot of states saidthat it should apply to that.Alistair Burt: I think people were worried about otherstates and therefore allegations came up. It probably isnot fair to name the countries that other people allegedmight use gifting to get round this. That is the wayit is.Chair: In these financially straitened times, we wantto cover the funding implications of this.

Q37 Fiona ODonnell: The draft text of the treatyestablishes a unit to support states parties in theimplementation of the treaty. How will this be funded?Do you have any indication of what the cost to theUK might be? Which Government Department orDepartments would pick up the bill for that?Alistair Burt: The ambassador wants to pick this oneup.Fiona ODonnell: It is a specialist subject.Joanne Adamson: Going into the negotiations, one ofthe things that I had in my back pocket and had tofollow at all times was, Look at the cost to the UK.There was not to be some convoluted secretariat withhundreds of people in it. Exactly what theimplementation support unit would doits dutiesisone area that we did not quite get through at the levelof detail that was needed in the month we had. At thefirst meeting of states parties, you would want tospecify a bit more what it was going to do. I imaginethat it will be a lean, small unit.The biological and toxin weapons convention, whichI cover in Geneva, has a very small, three-person unitthat handles a lot for member states and is veryeffective. I would not like to give the figures offhand,because I dont have with me what it costs, but it isnot a huge amount. With a bit more time, we can lookinto what the costs might be. I want to reassure youthat this was one area where we were absolutelyconscious that there must not be an explosion in newUN bodies that would cost the United Kingdom a lotof money.

Q38 Fiona ODonnell: Has it been decided whosebudget it will come out of? Will it be DFID, the FCOor a combination of the two?Alistair Burt: My understanding is that it would be aUN responsibility, so presumably it would come outof the normal payments that we make to the UN.Joanne Adamson: In the case of the BTWC, it comesfrom the Foreign Office vote through to the UNbudget.

Alistair Burt: My experience of the last couple ofyears looking at counter-proliferation issues and howthey are policed is that this is not something that isdone by a mass of people; it is done by very smallnumbers of experts in particular areas. Look at theIAEA and the specialists it sends to Iran or anywhereelse. They have got to be people who know what theyare doing. This is not something that would be policedor tracked by vast numbers of people watching everyshipment in and out. It would involve recognisingwhere there might be a problem and sending expertswho knew what to look for when they were goingthrough documentation and everything else. We havebeen very cognisant of the need for this to be leanand mean.

Q39 Fiona ODonnell: I was really looking for anassurance that it wouldnt come from DFIDs budget.You will be aware that in the past the SelectCommittee has had concerns about some items ofexpenditure that have fallen on DFID.Alistair Burt: In all honesty, I really couldnt answerthat at this stage. I am sure that has not been decidedby the UK Government.

Q40 Chair: We turn to the last main area for us.From your earlier answer, I am still not clear aboutthe UK Governments precise plan as to where we gofrom here. You have talked about banking what wehave achieved and about this being only a pause, butit is still obscure to me what the British Governmentare now going to try to achieve. Can I ask you thisquestion: is the UK Governments goal now to get atext of the arms trade treatypossibly an improvedtextthat is acceptable to the British Government infront of the UN General Assembly and to have theUN General Assembly vote on it and secure therequired two-thirds majority? Is that your objective?Alistair Burt: In due course, but I have to discuss theoptions and timings with the Committee, if I may, toindicate what options there are in order to securevarious objectives. There are different ways ofproceeding from this point.Today I had a conversation with representatives ofNGOs in order to take their view on this, because atpresent we are still considering what we think will bethe best way forward. We are in consultation with theco-authors of the arms trade treatythe people weworked with originally to get this up and running. Weare also in consultation with EU and other partners tosee what is best. As I understand it, the options arethese. We could take the present text to the openingof the UN General Assembly in three weeks, put it tothe first committee and vote on it as it stands.

Q41 Chair: Before you go on, if you secured a two-thirds majority there, would that be sufficient?Alistair Burt: There are pros and cons. Yes, it wouldbe, but the pros and cons of this are as follows. Itwould lock in the present text. The risk would be thatthose who were not sure about it wouldnt sign up.Why should they? They didnt sign up in July, as theywanted more time. They would see that they werentbeing given more time and would just say, We dontwant to do this. We would also lose the opportunity




to strengthen it. The pro is that you would have thetext that we have already said we are pretty contentwith, but, as the Committee has already mentioned tome, there are elements that you think you would liketo change, and we agree. Although it is pretty goodand certainly demonstrates real progress from whatthere has been in the past, we are all looking forsomething rather better. The pro is that we could lockthat in. That would be an end of it, and states coulddecide over time whether they wanted to ratify. Wouldwe get sufficient support for it? We think we probablywould. If it were put to the UN, we would probablyget the two thirds.The other options are these. One is to run an informalconsultation process with the other countries and, atsome stage, to bring back to the UN GeneralAssembly a new text and have that voted on. Insteadof the informal process, we could go for somethingmore formala short further conference. The UNcould give up a couple of weeks of its time and say,There will be a further conference to finish off whatthe UN arms trade treaty negotiation conference inNew York did not finish. Effectively, that would putpeople back in the situation of seeing whether theycould reach a conclusion if they were given a specificamount of time and a timetable within which to do so,or we could go outside the UN altogether and opt fora different process.At present, our thinking is that what we hear from theco-authors of the idea of the treaty in the first place,partners in the EU and others suggests to us that ashort further conference might be the best wayforward. It would focus the discussions we havealready been having and will continue to have untilwe get a further text, and it would give us theopportunity to bring it back to a conference and securethe treaty we are looking for.The pros and cons of that are as follows. The pros arethat we get an opportunity to look at the present text,to improve it and to get more states to agree to itpossibly the United States, if the electoral process on6 November has a bearing on its view. Clearly, havinga decision after that date will flush that out one wayor another. The pros are that we could get more peopleand the text could be better.The risks are that things could go backwards and thetext could be unpicked, but we dont think that is thecase at present. Our evidence doesnt suggest that. The90 states that are prepared to sign up, the commentsthat we have had from people and the sense that wehave made progress indicate that this is not a processthat is going to go backwards; it is going to goforward.As a further support to that, we are consideringwehave not yet made up our minds on this but will haveto do so quite quicklywhether to pass a resolutionat the first committee of the United Nations GeneralAssembly to bank what we have. It would mean notputting it in aspic or saying, This is the text, butsaying that what we have is the basis on which wewill go forward and getting a lot of votes to say thatwe agree to this and will move forward. Informally,we would bank the text and move on.At presentwithout making a decision, but openingour decision-making processes to you, Chairman, and

the Committeewe think that might be the best wayforward. We would bank what we have and aim for anew conference, which would be in the early part of2013. I go back to the comment I made to Ms Clark.This is not an open-ended process; if it goes on forever, we will have to find a way of bringing it to anend. I have described our thinking at present, if thatis helpful to you.

Q42 Chair: Thank you for that further elaboration,which is very helpful. One of the options you referredto was that of taking it out of the UN. Were youalluding to going down the convention route?Alistair Burt: Yes.

Q43 Chair: What do you see as the pluses andminuses of that route?Alistair Burt: There is no particular evidence that thatis any more likely than anything else to produce anend result of a robust and effective treaty. The mostimportant thing is to get as many effective people aspossible signed up to it and prepared to abide by itsterms. That will come only through a process ofnegotiation and discussion. The UN has a formula forthat and we are well down the road. It seems to us tomake sense to press on with this for a short period oftime, rather than go outside it, with no guarantee thatthat would be any more successful.

Q44 Ann Clwyd: Who will be leading ATTnegotiations going forward? You will remember thatin the past this Committee has criticised the lack ofcontinuity among FCO staff on another very importantissue. I take it that Ambassador Adamson will becontinuing.Alistair Burt: She will. At this stage, I should seek tospare the blushes of Ambassador Adamson, but thosepeople engaged in the negotiationsboth people fromcivil society and Members of Parliament who are wellversed in this issuewill know of AmbassadorAdamsons reputation, the commitment she has madeto this and her knowledge of it. Every report we havefrom the negotiations in New York indicates howinfluential we were. The work that we have done totry to ensure that more states comply, that civil societyis informed and that we get the right negotiations canbe tracked back both to her and to Ms SarahMacIntosh, who is the director of the appropriateDepartment. They are both in place. Myunderstanding is that for the next few months, as faras we can see, personnel in the FCO, that team willremain in place. As the Prime Minister confirmed lastweek, so will I, so we have a bit of continuity allround that I hope will serve us all as well as possible.Chairman, I presume that the same applies to you andyour team. We have the very best possible base fortaking this forward.

Q45 Ann McKechin: Let us aim to be positive andhope that we reach a successful treaty negotiation bythe early part of next year. If we do so and adoptthe treaty, do we require to make any changes in UKlegislation and to the current processes by which wecontrol UK arms export licences?Alistair Burt: I dont believe so.




Joanne Adamson: I dont think so. I think that wouldbe something that the experts from BIS will want tolook very closely at, because I know when it isenacting any changes from the EU into the UKslegislation that is something we should ask our BIScolleagues about. I dont think that there is anythingmajor, but they would want to look at it.Alistair Burt: I must say very clearly that any changesit did make would be only legal and technical. Therewont be anything that requires us to weaken thecontrols that we have or the way we do that becauseI am sure, Mr Chairman, you would be on me like aton of bricks if you thought there was even theslightest possibility of that. If any changes do comeforward, it will be because of legal requirements andthe ratification of the treaty.

Q46 Ann McKechin: We have all been waiting forthis for a very long time. If we get final agreement tothe treaty, when do you think it will be ratified andimplemented by all the member states? What sort oftime period might we be thinking about?Alistair Burt: My understanding is that 65 stateswould need to ratify within 90 days1. We canassume that, if states pass this treaty, there will bemore than those who have agreed to it already and thecommitment to move to ratify it will be strong. I haveno doubt that, if we reach that point, it will be ratifiedby enough states to bring it into force. In themeantime, of course, we are trying to get as manystates as possible and to make sure they are theeffective ones that will actually deliver what we wantthrough an arms trade treaty. You can be absolutelysure that that is our commitment and what we aredetermined to do.

Q47 Bob Stewart: I think I have the answer to myquestion already, but I will ask it. Is there absolutelyno possibility that this European Union negotiationwill mean our being dragged into some EU legislationthat forces our hand? We have a very strong armscontrol regime at the moment. Obviously, I amflummoxed as to why the EU is doing it because it isan inter-state matter, as far as I am concerned, but let

1 To be accurate, Article 16, paragraph 1 of the draft treatydated 26 July states that: This Treaty shall enter into forceninety days following the receipt of the deposit of the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval oraccession with the depositary.

us leave that aside, as it is a long discussion. I justwant a reassuranceI think you have given italreadythat anything the EU suggests might happenwill not be forced upon us as a sovereign state.Alistair Burt: There is a technical point about theEUs involvement that, again, I would likeAmbassador Adamson to deal with, but our armsexport controls are already part of an EU-wideagreement, which is staying fixed in place. The EUcame along at a late stage in the negotiations andexpressed an interest in one part of them, whichAmbassador Adamson will let you into.Joanne Adamson: There were a couple of things weneeded to look out for. There is something in place onintra-Community transfersthat is transfers of armswithin the EUthat we had to respect, to make surethat was not breached. The second thing was that wewere to push for the EU to be able to be a member ofthe treaty. In fact, in the end, it was not looking likeit would be possible for the EU to be part of the treaty.We had to use our best endeavours to make thathappen.Alistair Burt: Which we did.Joanne Adamson: That was the wording that wenegotiated.

Q48 Bob Stewart: I am very glad to hear it, becausethis is actually a sovereign state matter.Alistair Burt: It is; that is absolutely right. However,there were elements of the commercial transferprovisions on which the EU expressed an interest. Itasked us to look after those interests, but only to theextent that we used best endeavours to do sowhichwe did, in order to comply with that. You areabsolutely right to say that this is a sovereign positionfor us. Our export controls are in no way weakenedor affected by it.

Q49 Chair: From what you have said, the next fewweeks will be of the utmost importance. You haveoutlined a number of options that are open to theBritish Government. We ask you to keep theseCommittees very closely and fully informed, and in atimely way, on what you decide regarding the variousoptions you have outlined.Alistair Burt: I shall do so.Chair: Thank you for coming in front of us today.Thank you, Minister, Ambassador Adamson and MrTauwhare.

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Monday 3 December 2012

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Mr James ArbuthnotKaty ClarkAnn ClwydThomas Docherty

________________

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Roy Isbister, Team leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, Oliver Sprague, ArmsProgramme Director, Amnesty International UK, and Martin Butcher, Policy Advisor, Arms Campaign,Oxfam GB, gave evidence.

Q50 Chair: Mr Isbister, Mr Sprague and Mr Butcher,welcome to you. We have a lot of subjects that wewish to cover with you. We have just one hour. I amsure that the members of the Committee will seek toput concise questions to you; equally, I hope that youranswers can be reasonably concise, but do not feelthat all three of you have necessarily to respond toevery question. In that way, I hope that we will beable to get through all the subjects that we want tocover with you.We want to start with the Arms Trade Treaty. I wouldlike to ask you a broad question on that. My questionis this. Do you consider that the British Governmentwere in any way responsible for the failure of thenegotiations in New York in July, when 90 countrieswere willing to sign up; or do you believe that, in thecircumstances, the British Government did all thatthey reasonably could to try to secure agreement tothe Arms Trade Treaty?Martin Butcher: We would be absolutely clear, as wewere in our written evidence, that the primaryresponsibility for the failure to adopt a treaty at theend of the conference in July lay with the UnitedStates. It was clear that the UK was ready to continueworking on the final day, on that final draft, to tweaka few items and adopt a treaty.We have at least anecdotal information that that ranfor some of the countries that were on the scepticalside; that some of the very strong sceptics had beenpersuaded by the chair not to block the treaty,although there was no chance that they were going tosign up to it. The United States came in and said thatit needed more time, in that UN language, and broughtthe conference to an end. That is where the primaryresponsibility lies, certainly. The FCO and otherDepartmentsthe FCO in the leadcertainly workedvery hard throughout the conference. The UKGovernment, as I say, were ready to go ahead.

Q51 Mike Gapes: I understand that Iran is a problemwithin this process. Is there going to be certainty thatwe will have a treaty in March, or are we going tofind that some country might block the whole thing atthat point?Martin Butcher: I do not think that there is certaintythat we will get a treaty in March. The conference inMarch will run on the same consensus rule that thetreaty ran on in July, so any one state can blockadoption of a treaty at the end of the conference. Iran

Mike GapesAnn McKechinBob StewartMr Robin Walker

is a sceptic state concerning the ATTthere areothers: Syria, Algeria and Egypt spring to mindbutit could equally be that, if negotiations have gonebadly, a state friendly to the ATT would want to blockto stop a weak treaty being adopted. However, thanksto the First Committee resolution, we now have thefall-back that, either in the late spring or early summerof next year, during the continuing 67th session of theUN General Assembly, a draft treaty can be taken toan Extraordinary Session of the GA and voted throughon a two-thirds majority; or, if that cannot be workedout, then a treaty will be taken through the FirstCommittee and then the General Assembly process inthe autumn, where again a two-thirds majority willsuffice. That will cut out all of the sceptic states. Weknow that we can get a treaty on a two-thirds majority,and a strongish treaty at that.

Q52 Mike Gapes: In your submission to us, you didpoint out concerns about a number of loopholes andproblems with the drafts. Is it likely that we will geta better or a worse treaty in March than we wouldhave had earlier this year?Martin Butcher: We certainly have some concerns.We have enumerated the loopholes for you. The mostimportant thing in March, we think, is that we get arobust Arms Trade Treaty rather than a universal one.The Foreign Office has said that the threat, if you liketo use that word, of going to the General Assemblyand getting a two-thirds vote will mean that they cansay that the draft that we have so far is a floor and nota ceiling, and that we work up from there, becausethey can block anything lower than that. Sceptic stateswho might want to weaken the treaty know that wecan go to the General Assembly, where we will getsomething stronger than we will get from aconsensus process.We do have worries. As I say, it is important that thetreaty is robust. We can always persuade non-signeesto sign up later, but the track record of strengtheningtreaties once they have been adopted is not good, sowe would rather not have to try that.

Q53 Mike Gapes: We have had evidence from somepeople about concerns that there is no robust anti-corruption provision within the draft treaty. Is thatlikely to be strengthened, or is this one of the issuesthat is more difficult?

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3 December 2012 Roy Isbister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher

Martin Butcher: That is something that we will beworking hard on, and civil society as a whole will beworking to push it. Given the UK Bribery Act, I amsure that the Government will also be pushing that asan issue. For Oxfam, for example, it is something thatis extremely important because it relates very directlyto development. It is an important issue; I think thatwe can make some progress on it.

Q54 Mike Gapes: Finally, the US decisionpresumably had a lot to do with domestic politicsbefore the presidential election. Is it likely that theObama Administration, in its second term, will bemore positive in pushing this forward than it wastowards the end?Martin Butcher: We certainly hope so. It wasundoubtedly difficult, given the politics of an electionyearand in some ways particularly poisonouspolitics this yearfor the Administration to agree tosomething that the NRA was trumpeting was all aboutHillary Clinton going to the United Nations to takeaway peoples guns, when the treaty has nothing to dowith that. Certainly, in a situation where the Presidentdoes not have to run for office for anything ever again,and as far away from an election as it is possible toget in the United States, if there is ever going t

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