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HoraiRiceintheMakingofJapaneseColonialTaiwan

WeiYiLeow,NationalUniversityofSingaporeLeow,WeiYi.2019.“HoraiRiceintheMakingofJapaneseColonialTaiwan.”Cross-Currents:EastAsianHistoryandCultureReview33:32–52.https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-33/leow.

Abstract

In1912,EikichiIsoarrivedtoserveasaplantbreederintheJapanesecolonyofTaiwan.IsoandhisresearchersdevelopedcrossbredHorairicethatproducedtheroundgrainsdesiredbyJapaneseconsumers.ThisarticleexplainshowHorairicemadeTaiwan intoaneconomicallyviablepossessionoftheJapaneseEmpire.IsomatchedtheterrainandconditionsofTaiwantotheregionsoftheJapanesehomeislandsclosest incharacter,andthevarieties fromeachregionwereselected forexperimentationat fieldstationslocatedinthematchingTaiwaneseregion.Theexperimentsyieldednewvarietiesofricethat fostered trade relations between Taiwan and the home islands. This changebroughtabouthigherincomesbutalsoincreasedcostsforthefarmers.Theadditionofanew cash cropunsettled Japanese attempts tomanage the sugar industry, instigatinggreaterstate intervention inricemarkets,evenaswardemandmeantthatTaiwaneserice became indispensable. The success of Horai gave Taiwan an identity as a ricecolony,which its leaderssought to leverageasexpertise tocolonizenewlyconqueredHainan.Themovementofpeople,ideas,andthegeneticmaterialsofriceplantscreateda“Japanized”Taiwanthatinturnexpandedbeyondtheshoresoftheislandcolony.

Keywords: Taiwan, Japanese Empire, history of agriculture, history of science, rice,Horai,genetics

TheaverageyieldofricegivenforTaiwanis13kokuperhectare.…Atthetimeofannexationtheaverageyieldwasonly6kokuperhectare.(Mendiola1949,69)

Nemesio B. Mendiola, a plant breeder with the Department of Agriculture of thePhilippines,visitedTaiwanin1944toobservethenoteworthyaccomplishmentsinricecultivation science and technology on Japan’s island colony. This article presents theway colonial ideology in Taiwan was shaped by the perceived power of scientificresearchwitnessedbyMendiolaandotherobservers fromfurtherafield.The focusofthis article is thework of Eikichi Iso, a Japanese plant breeder active in Taiwan from1912untilthe1950s,aftertheRepublicofChinatookcontrolofTaiwan.Hesucceeded

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in crossbreeding Japanese varieties with others to produce new types that could begrownonTaiwanesesoiltoproducericegrainspreferredbyJapaneseconsumers.Thesevarieties, known collectively as Horai, transformed both the internal economy andexternaltradeofTaiwan.ThesuccessofHoraiasacashcropinterferedwiththepolicieslaidoutbytheGovernment-GeneralofTaiwantoprotectJapanesesugarinterests.Yet,asHorairicebecameanintegralpartofthefabricoftheTaiwanesepoliticaleconomy,Taiwan’s Japanese rulers progressively adopted it as a key factor in their decisionmakingandtheirvisionforthefutureofthecolony.

Taiwanwasaplaceremadebycolonialism longbefore itsannexationbyJapan in1895 and the subsequent Japanese rule. In the mid-seventeenth century, Dutchcolonists brought sugar as a crop along with Chinese farmers for their skills andnumbers,andexportedricetofarawayPersiaandtheNetherlands(Koo2015).AftertheQing Empire took Taiwan in the 1680s, output growthwas achieved not through theapplicationofnewtechnologybutwiththeopeningofnewlandforagricultureandtheadditionoflaborinputs(Isett1995).Asaresult,Taiwanexperiencedclosetozeroper-capita growth at 0.3 percent annually in the lateQing period (1880s–1890s), but thisrateincreasedtomorethan2percentunderJapaneserule(Wu2001,3).Taiwancametobe“islanded”—aconceptproposedbyhistorianSujitSivasundaram(2013)—via theaction of successive colonizing powers, as new links were forged while old relationsweredisconnected.Suchwasthepalimpsestofplants,people,andtechnologiesfusedbyvariousformsofaliengovernancethatprovidedthebaseforJapanese-ruledTaiwananditsagriculture.

ImperativesfortheDevelopmentofColonialScienceEuropeans’journeysofexplorationandconquesttoAfricaandAsiabeginninginthelate1400s brought them into contact with unfamiliar flora and fauna. Their exploitativemode of production frequently led to despoliation of the environment. Measures tocurb theearly reckless deforestationengenderedbynegligent colonists brought forthbotanicalgardens,suchasthoseofCapeTownandMauritius,whichwerereplicatedinothertropicalcolonies.Meanwhile,Europeanswereexposedtostrangediseaseswhosecureswereoftenfoundinlocalplants.Interactionwiththenativepeoplesoftheselandsresulted in the absorption of the knowledge of indigenous pharmacopoeia into theEuropean corpus through translations and compilations (Grove 1995). From thedisastersofearlycolonizationarosethehabitusofconservationandanappreciationoftropicalplantknowledge.

By the mid-nineteenth century, colonial botanical gardens were producingeconomically valuable knowledge in a form that made them the equivalent of theindustrial research laboratories of today (Brockway 1979). Cinchona for quinine andHevea brasiliensis (Brazilian rubber) for rubber were some of the triumphs of thenetwork of collectors conveying plants to centers of calculation such as the RoyalBotanical Gardens in Kew, England, from which the seeds were dispersed to parts

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further afield for imperial cultivation. Such power came to shape the worldviews ofcolonialrulers.InNature’sGovernment,historianRichardDraytonnotedthatsincetheend of the eighteenth century, Europeans believed that they possessed amastery ofnaturethatwoulddeliverthe“greatestgoodonthegreatestnumber” (Drayton2000,xv). From merely coping with the maladies and trials of the exotic world, Europeanpractitioners refined their techniques and methods to the point where they couldconfidentlyaimtoaccomplishspeculativegoals,suchasthedomesticationofHevea inMalaya.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, imperial plant scienceswere built on astringofbotanicalgardensinvariouscolonies.WithintheBritishEmpire,thegardensatCape Town, Mauritius, Calcutta, and Peradeniya in Ceylon played important roles inplant transferandacclimatization.Theseprocessesoperated ina semiformalnetworkcentered on Kew. Under the direction of energetic leaders, such as Joseph Banks,Williamand JosephHooker,andWilliamThistleton-Dyer,programswere launched forobtainingeconomicallyimportantplantsfromnon-BritishterritoriesfortransfertositesunderBritishcontrol,withclimatesprospectivelysuitedtotheirgrowth.ThetransferofHeveaBrasiliensistoMalaya(Brockway1979;Grove1995;Drayton2000;Barnard2016)wasonesuchsuccessfulventure.

By thebeginningof the twentieth century, twomajordevelopments in theplantsciences had reshaped the practice of plant research in the colonial world. The firstdevelopment was the rise of genetics. The term “genetics” was coined by WilliamBateson,whoconductedresearchatCambridgeUniversity,atthetimewhenthepaperswrittenbyGregorMendel in1865and largelyneglecteduntil the turnof the centuryreemerged(Olby1987;Richmond2001).Withthenewscienceinhand,plantscouldbebredfordesiredcharacteristicswithgreaterprecision.Thisdevelopmentslottedintoanalready well-established tradition of research on plants with economic value toindustrialEurope,butatthesametimetheinstitutionalstructureforthisresearchwasalsoevolving,resultinginthesecondsalientdevelopment:in1898,theestablishmentofthe Imperial Department of Agriculture in Barbados heralded a shift in organizationmodelsawayfromthebotanicalgardentowarddepartmentsofagriculturecloselytiedtothebureaucracyofthecolonialstate(Worboys1979).

Scholarswhohavestudiedthehistoryofthesciencesincolonieshavequestionedtherelevanceofadistinctfieldofcolonialscience.HistorianLewisPyensonhasstatedthat“asophisticated,agricultural-experimentationstationinacolonymaycontributetobotanicalknowledge,butitspurposeistoadvancelocalproductionandexport”(1989,xiv).Forthatreason,hebelievesthatstudiesofcolonialscienceshouldavoidthetaintofbecoming tooentangled in thecolonialpolitical andeconomicorderby redirectingattention to the “exact” (physical) sciences. In a related vein, historian Helen Tilleyargues that there is no “colonial science” as such, becauseWestern science did notdevelopinisolationfromtherestoftheworld,nordidthesciencesinthecolonies.Onthatbasis,thereisnoessenceofcolonialsciencethatsetsitapartfromanyotherwidelyrecognizedformofscience(Tilley2011,10–11).

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Anunderlyingtensionexistsinthisfieldconcerningwhethertheempiricalrealityofscience, being about theonenature sharedby all nations andpeoples, shoulddefinestudiessuchasthis.Inthisarticle,Ipresentacasethatdemonstrateshowsociopoliticalarrangements within which colonial science was undertaken produced politicaleconomicstructuresthatweredistinctlycolonial.

Ibeginwithadiscussionofthewaysofseeingthatmodernstatesadopted,whichincolonialsitesproducedandreproducedideasofcolonialsupremacy. I thenproceedtothecaseofTaiwan,acolonialsitewheretheintensiveapplicationofplantsciencesinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcenturytransformedricecultivationandenabledfarmersto produce the round-grain rice preferred by Japanese consumers. Once this wasaccomplished,TaiwanwasdirectedbyitsJapaneserulerstoembracetheraisond’êtreofa ricecolony.Taiwan’sscientificexpertisewasappliedto thenewterritories fallingWorld War, the expertise acquired by Japanese scientists in shaping Taiwanese ricecultivationwasredirectedtowardthepostwarpro-Americanorder inAsia,nowunderthepatronageandsupportoftheUnitedStates.

From the perspective of the historical actors, the colonial nature of the politieswhere they served determined which sciences would proceed, which would besidelined,andhowresearchwouldbepracticed.Overtime,thedichotomizationoftheworld between the advanced and the colonized is indispensable to understandingscienceoutsidetheEuro-American“West”ascoloniesevolvedintodevelopingnations.

ColonialIdeologyandScienceThe concept of “coloniality” refers to a state of consciousness that divides theworldbetweentheWestandthenon-Westandconferstheleadershipoftheglobalordertotheformer.Duringthecolonialera(fromthe1500stothe1960s),aglobaldivisionoflaborplaced important industriesanddecisionmaking in the realmof theWestwhileassigning the work of extracting natural resources, sometimes through slavery orindenture,towhatwenowcalltheGlobalSouth(Quijano2000,538).ThedominanceofWestern power was asserted through colonial capital. This colonial capital achievedsupremacy by displacing other economic systems, such as the trade networks of theMalayworldandtheclothproducersofSouthAsia,oftenthroughviolentandcoercivemeans.Yetovertimethecoerciveprocesswaselided.SyedHusseinAlatasarguesthatcolonial power conferred the status of superiority to the Western powers and theircivilizations.Europeans,inturn,cametoperceivethepeoplesubjugatedtotheirruleasindolentandlackinginindustryandcreativitywithinthecapitalistworldsystem(Alatas1977;Baber1998).

Inanessaytitled“TheQuestionConcerningTechnology,”theGermanphilosopherMartinHeideggernoted that,uponattaininggreaterknowledgeaboutnature,humansocietiesexpectedtechnologytodeliverproductsfromnaturewithsurerpredictability.No longer were producers content to leave resource extraction to the vagaries ofchanceandnature;productiontechniqueswould“challengenature”toyielditsvalueon

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demand,onthebasisofcalculatedformulaeandstandardizedmethodsofobservation(Heidegger 1993; Scott 1998). Combined with Alatas’s argument, I propose thattechnosciencebecameanothertoolinthekitforcolonialsupremacy,asitstrackrecordofpastsuccessbecamejustificationforfurtherpursuitalongthesamelines.

Colonial science could be deployed to enhance both the material and symbolicpower of the colonizer. For example, the meteorological service reflected Japanesepower on the Korean peninsula. Beginning as a rudimentary network of observationstationsservingtheJapanesemilitaryduringtheRusso-JapaneseWarof1904–1905,themeteorologicalserviceexpandedtoimproveagriculturalefficiencyaftercolonization.Italso symbolically displaced the Royal Observatory of the Korean Kings, therebybuttressing the ideology of Japanese imperial hegemony (Miyagawa 2008).CorrespondingdevelopmentsinTaiwanenmeshedtheislandcolonywiththepeninsularcolony and the home islands (Zaiki 2007). Similarly, in the field of agriculture theJapaneseinKoreaestablishedanagriculturalexperimentstationinSuwonandnurturedindigenous agronomists who became the first generation of rice experts in theindependentRepublicofKorea(Kim2018,191).

Colonial ideology provided both solution and justification for Japanese rule onTaiwan. Administrators in Taiwan explicitly tied coloniality and science together in asocial-Darwinistapproachtodevelopingandcontrollingtheislandcolony.Astatementby Goto Shinpei, the Civil Administrator of the Government-General of Taiwan from1898to1906,providesinsight:

Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances inscience, should be based on principles of Biology. What are theseprinciples? They are to promote science, and to develop agriculture,industry, sanitation, education, communications and police force. Ifthesearesatisfactorilyaccomplished,wewillbeabletopreserveinthestruggleforsurvivalandwinthestruggleforthe“survivalofthefittest.”(Yao2006,45)

Research aimed at revealing the nature of Taiwan—not only its geology, fauna,

flora,andmeteorology,butalsoitssociety—wasthekeytosuccessforwhatwas,atthebeginningofShinpei’stenure,astrugglingcolony.Previously,Taiwanhadbeenadrainon Japanese finances due to the military operations launched to pacify the island.Continued colonizationwas proving unpopular, and therewere even calls among theJapanesepublictogiveitup.Shinpeideterminedtoturnaroundthecolony’sfinancessothatitwouldearnasurplusinsteadofdrainingsubsidiesfromthecentralgovernment.On March 22, 1899, Shinpei obtained a bond issue of 35 million yen; as a result,developmentexpendituresovertookadministrativecosts,makingup68percentofthetotal government costs in the period 1899–1905. The application of these fundsgeneratedrevenuesthatwereusedtorepaythedebt.Onekeyinitiativewastoconducta land survey that enabled the government to collect property taxes efficiently. This

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surveyconfirmedthenativeTaiwanesetenants’possessionofthelandtheyfarmedand,as a result, expansive plantations under the ownership of colonial capitalists did notbecome a feature in Taiwan (Ka 1995, 51–52). Large plantations did not develop,because Japanese firms simply purchased the harvests from the farmers (Grajdanzev1942,61).

In 1903, the government began the process of rationalizing the varieties of riceplanted in Taiwan. Starting with a total of 1,197 local varieties, the governmentrestrictedtheallowedvarietiestojust375,andeachvillagewaspermittedtoselectonlythreevarieties.AccordingtoKimTae-Ho,asimilarpatternofcoercionexistedinKoreaunder Japanese rule (Kim2019).1 Thegovernment thenplanted the threevarieties toyield seeds over four years, and when the desired seed supply was available, it washandedtothefarmers(Mendiola1949,76).Thisprocesseliminatedlower-yieldinglocalvarietieswhile retainingthosewithhigheryields (Mendiola1949,77).However,whiletheincreasedoutputofTaiwanesevarietiessuppliedexportstoJapan,thericedidnotfetchahighpricethere.AfterHorairicewassuccessfullycultivated,TaiwanesefarmerscouldsellitforahigherpricethanTaiwanesevarietiesinthemainislands,thoughitwasnotasexpensiveasricegrownontheJapanesehomeislands(Grajdanzev1942,53).

Institutional arrangements for rice research were constructed to advance rice-breeding. In 1902, following the endofmilitary action to pacify the island, governorsfromthedistrictsofTaiwanheldameetingtodiscussthedevelopmentoftheeconomy,including the topic of experimental farms. These discussions led to the establishmentlaterthatyearofthefirstexperimentstation,whicheventuallyemployedEikichiIso,in1912.

Althoughtheexperimentalfarmsdemonstratedthecolonialstate’scommitmenttoprogress, Japanese-ruled Taiwan cannot be mistaken for a liberal nation-state. Forexample, the ImperialUniversityofTaihoku,withwhich Isowasaffiliated,wasallbutclosedtoTaiwanesestudents.TaiwanesestudentswhosoughthighereducationoftenwenttoJapan,becausetheinstitutionsintheirhomelandwereexclusivelyforJapanesestudents (Tsurumi 1977). Despite being a state that was nominally committed tosupporting Japanese capital, Taiwan’s rulersdidnot completely trust their compatriotbusinessmen to be responsible stewards of the island’s resources. In forestry, forexample,thestatechosetoinvestdirectlyincommercialforestryoperationstoexploitforestsscientificallyandsustainably(Hung2015).Itiswithinthiscontext—afinanciallysolventcolonialstatewithanactiveposturetowardscience—thatIsocametoTaiwantoconducthisrice-breedingexperiments.

1Tae-HoKimnotesthatKoreanpeasantswerecoercedintoplantingnewvarietiesscientificallydevelopedinJapan(2018,191).ThenotabledifferencefromTaiwanwasthat,becauseofthesimilarityinclimatebetweenthehomeislandsandKorea,thetropicaladaptationrequiredinTaiwanwasnotnecessaryinKorea.

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TheScienceThatNurturedHoraiRiceinTaiwanEikichi Iso represented the breed of technical expertswhowouldmake the JapaneseEmpiremodernandproductive(figure1).Hegraduatedin1911fromwhatwasthentheTohoku Imperial University Faculty of Agriculture in Sapporo (renamed HokkaidoImperialUniversity in1918)andarrived inTaiwanin1912, initiallyattheGovernmentExperimentalFarminTaihoku.In1915,workinginTaichung,aresearchteamincludingIso developed the Taichu No. 65 variety of rice, which was a milestone in thedevelopmentofHorairice(seefigure1).2Horaiwasthenamegiventotheround-grainrice bred from crosses of Japonica and other varieties grown in Taiwan. In 1919 and1920,theGovernment-GeneralsentIsotoCornellUniversityinIthaca,NewYork,underappointmentasanoverseasinvestigator.ThereIsostudiedplantbreedingandbiologicalstatisticsunderthesupervisionofProfessorHarryH.Love.

Figure1.EikichiIso,seatedatright,togetherwithresearchassociatesatanagriculturalresearchlaboratoryinTaichung,Taiwan.Source:UsedbypermissionoftheNTUEikichiMemorialHouse.

At this time, the United States saw the emergence of new knowledge about

photoperiodism, the effect of light exposureon thedevelopment of plants— findingsthathadanimpactonagriculture.Photoperiodismwasdiscoveredastheresultoftheexperimental work of W. W. Garner and H. A. Allard, two scientists from the U.S.Department of Agriculture. According to Garner and Allard, the effect of light upon

2ForIso,seehttp://iso-house.agron.ntu.edu.tw/iso.html.SubsequentfindingsdeterminedthatthepersonmostresponsibleforbreedingTaichuNo.65wasJinSuenaga:https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/daily/20131130/35474524/.

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plantscouldbemeasuredinthreeways—intensity;quality,orwavelengthofradiation;andthedurationofexposure(GarnerandAllard1920,553).Theirfocuswasondurationofexposure,foritappearedthatplantscouldgrowoptimallywithlessthanfull-strengthdaylight,whereasexperimentswithdifferentraysfromdifferentpartsofthespectrum,suchasultraviolet,yieldedindeterminateresults.GarnerandAllardalsosystematicallyeliminatedfactorssuchaswaterandtemperaturebymeansofotherexperiments.

Photoperiodism influenced Iso in his search for solutions for rice-breedingproblemsinTaiwan.HewasatCornellwhenthisdiscoverycametolight,andthepaperspublishedbyGarnerandAllardwereavailableat theUniversityofTaihoku,where Isoworked. Iso identifiedtheways inwhichphotoperiodisminfluencedthespreadofricecultivation to Japan.His research into theoriginsof Japonicavarieties traced themtothreebasicpedigrees:HyugaorKasasa,Izumo,andKoshi.IsoobservedthatinthethreeJapaneseprovincesofSan-in,Kyushu,andHokuriku,thericegrowncouldbetracedtothesethreepedigrees(Iso1954,106–107).HetheorizedthatthespreadofvarietiesinJapanhadbeenpossiblewhenever theday-length (hoursofexposure todaylight in aday) and temperature of the newly cultivated region matched that of the region oforigin. Although the precise routes and periodicity of transmission could not bereconstructed, thefact thatthethreebasicpedigreeswerewidespreadgaveevidencetoadiffusionofcultivationfromtheearliestsitetothelatest.AsIsoexplained,through“the long natural and artificial selection” process, involving “mixing, naturalhybridizations, segregations and recombinations” over centuries, “present varietiesmusthavebeenconstructed”(Iso1954,107).

If that was indeed the history of rice in Japan,might it not be the pathway foradaptingJaponicavarietiestoTaiwan?“Thereisanindicationinthericeplantthattheaction of its heading and ripening accelerates as the length of day becomes short,”began Iso’s description of the response of varieties of rice to different day-lengthconditions(Iso1954,57).AppliedtoTaiwan,forexample,thenativevarietiesplantedinthe first crop would be weak in response to day-length and temperature. The dateswhenthetipsofthericeplants,knownasheads,begantoemergewererecordedasthedateeachvarietybeganheading.Thesevarietieswouldbeplantedwhentheday-lengthis shortand temperature relatively low in theearlypartof theyear,andwouldbeginheadinginJunewhentheday-lengthislong(13.16–13.65hours)andtemperaturehigh(26.6–27.3degreesCelsius,or79.88–81.14Fahrenheit).Bycontrast,varietieschosenforthesecondcropwouldhaveastrongresponsetoday-lengthandtemperatureandbeginheadinglater intheyearwhentherewouldbeonly11.52–12.25hoursofdaylight(Iso1954,58).Thus,theterritoryofTaiwanandtheplantingmaterialscouldberationalized,mapping latitude to day-length, and genes to appropriate day-length andtemperatures.3

3Thevulnerabilityofriceplantstoblastdiseasecameaboutbecauseofearlygrowth.JapanesevarietiesgrownonTaiwanmaturedtooearlywhengrownaccordingtonormalpracticeandtransplantedat40–60daysofage.Isoexperimentedbyreducingthetimethattheseedlingspentinthenurseryto20–30days.ThisdifferencewasthekeytothesuccessofHorairice

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Through this process of experimentation, Iso succeeded in producing Horai rice.The word horai蓬萊 was a neologism coined to name a new creation (inMandarinChinese,itwaspenglai;invernacularTaiwanese,ponlai).InthesharedmythologyoftheJapanese and Chinese cultures, the term refers to a paradisiacal mountain. Fittingly,HoraiwasalsoanarchaicJapanesenamefortheislandofTaiwan(Fujihara2018,143).Itshouldbenoted thatHoraididnotspecifyaparticularbreedorcrossbreedof rice; infact, as a category itwas a collection ofmany glutinous and non-glutinous types (Iso1947, 92). Promising candidateswere tested and further crossedwith other varietiesselectedfordesirabletraits.Thiscontinuousprocesswasdesignedtobringoutrecessivetraits,aswellastotransmitknowntraitsevidentinthephenotypeofthevarietybeingcrossed(Iso1954,132–133).Thesevarietiesweretestedindifferentlocationsbasedonqualitiesthatsuggestedaparticularvarietywaswellsuitedtoitstestlocation.

ForTaiwanesericetosellontheJapanesemarket,alength-breadthratioof1.6wasrequired. With this success, Taiwan became a rice producer for the Japanese homeislands.Italsocausedsignificantchangesintheislandcolony’seconomicpositionwithinthe empire and subsequently affected the political viewpoint of the colonial rulers ofTaiwan.

HoraiCultivationTransformsTaiwanTechnical advancement in the form of greater rice yields was a self-evident good inEikichi Iso’s opinion, and scientific breeding had spread this boon to the Taiwanesefarmer.TheoutstandingHoraivarietywasTaichuNo.65.Itwasgrownacrosstheentireisland,unlikemanyothers,whichweredesignated forspecificplaces.Theacreage forTaichuNo.65was246,349ko(238,958hectares,about590,478acres)in1936.Thiswasa cross of two Japanese varieties, Kameji and Shinriki, the original crossbreeding ofwhichwasperformedin1923(Iso1954,133–136).TaichuNo.65alsobecameapopularparentforfurthercrossbredvarieties.Farmersvoluntarilyattemptedtotrygrowingriceof evenbetter yield andquality than theTaichuNo.65 thathadbecome symbolicofHorai.“Theyweresowillingtodothisbecausetheywereambitioustohavetheirownvarietiesnamedwithlocaldescriptionintheforeignmarket,”explainedIso(1954,136).

Horaigaveanincreaseinyieldof2.5to4.4timesoverindigenouschailaivarietiesofrice.Butproductioncostsfortheformerwerealsohigher:342yenperkoforHoraiover 223.8 yen for chailai. Some of these expenses came from the cost of access toirrigationandchemical fertilizers,whichhadtobeused insteadofmanureduetotheshort nursery period. Products that used to be grown by the farmer now had to be

(Mendiola1949a,78).WhenavarietyknownasNakamuradevelopedfastandheadedearlyundertheshort-day(wintery)conditions,itwasexposedtoconditionsidealforthefungus-causedblastdisease.Bycomparison,theblast-resistantvarietiesdevelopedmoreslowlyand,asaresult,passedtheperiodwhentheclimatewasmostconducivetothediseasewithoutbeingexposedtoit.IyosengokuhadadateoffirstheadingofJune16;itwasMay29forNakamura,June20forYokichisen,andJune9forAikawa(Iso1954,113–114).

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bought for cash. As noted by historian Andrew Grajdanzev, “the expansion of areaunder Horai is therefore not so much a sign of prosperity, as it would at first sightappear,asasignofthegrowingneedofthefarmertopaytaxes,topayfor irrigation,and to pay for the tobacco which he formerly produced himself (and is now a statemonopoly)”(1942,55).

The nature of colonial technological improvement was to enmesh farmersmoretightlywithinthestructureofthecolonialeconomy.Cash-basedtransactions,credittofacilitatethehighercostofproduction,dependenceonphysical infrastructuresuchasirrigation and transportation, and penetration by technical extension officers andresearcherssuchasIsotransformedagriculturalpractice.ThecalendaroftheTaiwanesericefarmerbecamesynchronizedwiththatoftheJapanese,forthefirstharvestofHoraibetween June and October relieved food shortages in the home islands as it was awintercropthatcouldnotbegrownintheharsherclimateofmorenortherlylatitudes(Ka1995,168).

Horaicultivationupsetthecolonialpoliticaleconomyby initiallybenefitingnativeTaiwanese farmers at some expense to Japanese-owned sugar factories. Japanesecapitalchasedafterinvestmentopportunitiesoutsidethehomeislandsfromthe1910sonward, as profits declined at home. The Taiwanese sugar industry offered suchopportunities,buttherewerebarrierstoentry.Locallyownedmillscompetedintenselyforrawcaneanddrovepriceshighin1904and1905.Thiscompetitionchangedundernewregulations. In1905,allcane-growingfarmerswererequiredtoselltheirproduceexclusively to a designated sugar factory in their respective area. In addition, theopeningofnewmillswassubject togovernmentapproval, thuspreventingTaiwaneseproducersfromexpanding(Ka1995,79).

Thepricingmechanism for canewas regulated to favor Japanese sugar factories.PriortoJapaneserule,asugar-sharingsystemoperatedsuchthataportionofsugarwasreturned to the farmer afterdeducting the costof processing.After colonization, thispaymentinkindwaschangedtocashpayment.Theimpositionofregulationsknownas“measures for balancing the price between rice and sugar” established a new price-settingmechanism.Insteadoflinkingthepriceofcanetosugar,millsnowpaidfarmersanamountthatwasbasedonricepricesinstead.Atthetime,ricewaschailai,theIndicavarietiesprimarilyconsumedlocally(Ka1995,115).

In 1918, rice riots in Japan highlighted the importance of food supplies as Japanunderwentsocialchangesduetoindustrializationandurbanization.Governmentpolicybegan to favor importation of rice from the colonies of Taiwan and Korea (Ka 1995,134).ThispolicychangecoincidedwiththesuccessfulbreedingofHorairice,whichputTaiwan in a position to satisfy Japanese consumers. The rice buyers operated ascompetitivefirms,unlikethesugarfactories,whichweremonopsonybuyersprotectedbythestate.Asa result,Horaipricesroseandattractedmore farmers toswitch fromchailai.Theseconditionsdepressedthesupplyofchailai justwhendemandforitrose,becausetheHoraifarmersweresellingtheircropsforexportandneededchailairicefortheirownconsumption(Ka1995,139).

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Becausethepricingmechanismforcanepurchasewasbasedonchailaiprices,after1925 the factories had topaymore for their rawmaterials. As thepriceof rice rose,farmersshiftedawayfromcanefarming,thusreducingsupplyforthesugarfactories(Ka1995,161).Asaconsequence,TaiwanbecamelessattractiveasasiteofinvestmentforJapanesecapital.Disputesbetweenfarmersandfactoryownersoverthepriceofsugarwere frequent, but the factory owners sustained the practice of buying from farmersinsteadofrunningtheirownplantations,asthiswasmoreprofitableundertheregimeenforcedinthecolony(Grajdanzev1942,61).

Thefarmersexercisedtheiragencyinthedegreeofinvestmentthattheyappliedtotheirfields.EconomistsElliottFanandShu-jenYehnote,forexample,thatmoresecuretenancyencouragedfarmerstoinvest in irrigationfacilitiesbutatthesametimewerenot induced to increase fertilizer use; fertilizers did not have a long-term effect onoutput,resultinginanindifferencetoapplicationofthatinputunderthesecuretenancyarrangement (Fan and Yeh 2017, 14). Thus, farmers in colonial Taiwan could exercisetheiragencyinresponsetostatepolicy.

The Japanese capitalists sought government assistance to curtail the increase inrice prices andproduction. Although theGovernment-General hadusually helped thesugarindustry,thegeopoliticalsituationwaschangingascropfailuresinJapanandwarinthelater1930salteredthebalanceof interests inthemetropolis.TheGovernment-Generaldesiredapolicy thatwouldboth secure sufficient riceproductionandensurelowprices(Ka1995,163–165).The implementationofagovernmentmonopolyoftheTaiwanesericetradecoincidedwitha13-percentdropinthepriceofricein1939.Thisdropmayhavehelpedthesugarproducers,butitalsonecessitatedastateinterventiontostabilizeasocietyinthemidstofaturbulentperiodinworldaffairs.

The entrance of an alternative commodity crop with a ready market in Japanunbalanced the calibrated mechanisms in place in Taiwan to boost the sugarmanufacturers’ profits. The Government-General faced the arduous task of keepingsugarproducers’profitshighwhileensuringthatthenativesmallholdingfarmswerenotdriven to ruin.As Japan’s home islands increasingly came to rely on rice imports, thestate also had the added task of ensuring stable supplies of rice to the home islandswithout allowingprices to skyrocket. In thisway,Horai came tooccupy an importantpositionintheTaiwaneseGovernment-General’sperspective,asit identifieditselfasaricecolony.

ATaiwaneseSubempireBuiltonRiceExpertiseTropicalitywasacentralfeatureofTaiwanintheeyesofJapan.Taiwan’sclimatemadeit an ideal site for sugar cultivation.The production of sugar alleviated the balance ofJapan’s tradedeficit. In theearlierphasesof colonization,Taiwanhadbeenseenasasiteofcuriositiestobestudiedscientifically inordertomakeitfunctionaspartofthegrowingJapanesepolity.Thisideologicalsetting,guidedbythe“principlesofBiology”inGoto Shinpei’s words, was the site of Eikichi Iso’s experiments to breed Japanese

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varietiesofrice.Thesuccessofbreedingrice,togetherwiththatofthemoreestablishedcropof cane, gaveTaiwanan identityasaproducerof commodities for the Japaneseimperialeconomy.AstheJapaneseEmpireexpanded,Taiwan’sperceivedspecialismintropicalagriculturetranslatedintoa“subimperialsphereofinfluenceinSouthChinaandSoutheastAsia”fortheGovernment-General(Schneider1998,i).

The vehicle for the fulfillment of these subimperial ambitions was the TaiwanDevelopment Corporation (1936–1946) owned by theGovernment-General of Taiwanand engaged primarily in mining activities in Indochina and agriculture in Hainan. InJapanese, this entity was known as Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha, or Taitaku.Owned and supported by the government of Taiwan, Taitaku was a business thatcompetedwithotherJapanesefirms,whetherprivatelyownedorstate-controlled,withthe goal of inducing industrialization in Taiwan through the benefit of an economichinterlandcarvedoutofthenewterritoriesconqueredbytheJapanesemilitaryinAsia(Schneider1998,i).

Subimperialism implied that the colony emerging as the sub-metropolis hadinterests of its own, distinct from themetropolis, and had themeans to protect andexpand its powers even within a relationship that was formally dependent upon themetropolis.TheGovernment-Generalfounditselfinastrongerpositionwhenitwasnolonger dependent on subsidies after 1905. The developmental agenda of buildingirrigation and transport links and funding agricultural research could be pursuedthrough its own means. The success of Horai as an export commodity to JapandemonstratedthepotentialfortechnoscientificdevelopmenttodisruptTaiwan’stermsof tradewith themothercountry. Inshort,Taiwanwasacquiringpoliticalagencyasaresultofscientificresearchcapabilities.

Thedraftplanfora“TaiwanDevelopmentandIndustrialCorporation”preparedin1919forGovernor-GeneralAkashiMotojirowasanearlyproposal forastate-financedcorporation for development purposes. Its aim was to provide financing for landdevelopmentprojectstoodifficultforprivatefirmstoundertake,andtobeinvolvedinprojectsaroundSouthChinaandSoutheastAsia(Schneider1998,34).Thisbasicconceptwasdiscusseduntil1936.

Commentators noted that research about the region would be essential toTaiwan’sinterests.A1922articleintheTaiwanReview(Taiwanjiho),theofficialorganoftheGovernment-General,calledforatropicalresearchinstitutetoconducteconomicand commercial information-gathering and scientific research. The next year, anotherarticle called for the establishment of an economic research unit in theGovernment-GeneralthatwouldhaveitsowncommercialofficerspostedatJapaneseconsulates inSouth China and Southeast Asia. (Schneider 1998, 34). Goto Shinpei’s policy aim—toaccumulatedataformoreeffectivecontrol—wasnowtrainingthegazeoftheJapaneseinTaiwanbeyondtheisland’sshores.

Foratime,theconfluenceofopposingfactorspreventedtheestablishmentofsuchan organization. These factors might be parties with contesting interests or anunfavorable economic climate. Factors in favor of this organization finally aligned

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around 1935 as both the Colonial Ministry and the Government-General of Taiwandevelopedreasonstorallyaroundtheconcept.FortheColonialMinistry,establishedin1929,suchaprojectwouldgiveitgreatervisibilityandinfluenceinpolicy.Atthetime,its actual powerswere limited due to competingministries with different spheres ofinfluence, such as themilitary’s control of affairs inManchuria, and also because theGovernments-GeneralofKoreaandTaiwanhadsubstantialautonomy(Schneider1998,48).By1936,therewastalkofscrappingtheministryaltogether.

In1935, theGovernment-Generalhelda“Tropical IndustryResearchConference”in conjunction with the fortieth anniversary of Taiwan’s colonization by Japan. ForTaiwan,theconferencewasanopportunitytopublicizetheachievementsineconomicdevelopmenton the islandcolony (Schneider1998,50).At theconference,Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzo raised the concept of a nanshin, or southern sphere ofinfluence, that Taiwanand theMinistryof ColonialAffairswould jointly develop. Thiswas to be the next logical step following the rapid development of Taiwan underJapaneserule,onethatwouldconnecttherichresourcesofSouthChinaandSoutheastAsiatotheindustrializingsub-metropolisofTaiwan.

In Taiwan itself, the company engaged in land management, chemicalmanufacturing,andforestry.ThecompanywasstartedwiththeGovernment-General’scontributionof15,000ko(14,550hectares,or35,954acres)oflandandanissueoftheshares not held by the state that raised 3.75 million yen, mostly from JapanesecompaniesandJapaneseindividuals(Schneider1998,69–71).Outsidetheislandcolony,the major projects undertaken by Taitaku were iron mining in Indochina starting in1937, which expanded to other minerals such as nickel and phosphate in 1941(Schneider 1998, 197), and agricultural production on the island of Hainan. Otherprojects included jute production in Indochina, forestry in the Andaman Islands, andother agriculturalproduction in theDutchEast Indies and thePhilippines. TheminingactivitiesweremeanttoproviderawmaterialsforthedevelopmentofTaiwanesemetalindustries,whilericefarmingespeciallywouldtakeadvantageoftheexperiencegainedfromthedevelopmentofTaiwanitself.

Hainan was meant to become a “second Taiwan” through Taitaku’s program ofdevelopment (Schneider 1998, 230). After the Japanese Navy seized the island inFebruary 1939, the intention was to transform it into a colony of Japan, much likeTaiwan. One problem was that Hainan was a rice importer, as its agriculture andcommunications infrastructures were not developed enough to support a productiverice-farming sector.Hainan’s geographical locationwasof strategic importance to thenavy,sofoodsecuritywasanaddedincentivetodevelopitsagriculturalcapacity.

TaitakuhadalreadyoutlinedaplanforagricultureinHainanbeforetheoccupationproperbegan.Foodandothercropsexpectedtobereadilyprofitablewereprioritized.Landwouldbeacquiredandthence leasedtotenantfarmers,reflectingTaitaku’sownfunction as a major landlord in Taiwan. Taitaku operated on the basis ofexperimentationand localizationfirst; ithad itsownnurseries forproducingseeds fordistributiontoJapanesemilitaryunitslocatedneareachnursery(Schneider1998,252–253).

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HorairiceprovedtobeaqualifiedsuccessinHainan.Althoughitsintroductiondidincreaseoutputsignificantly,wartimeconditionsmeantthatsuppliesof fertilizerwerelimited.Further,itrequiredthetenantfarmerstofollowthesametechniquespracticedinTaiwan.In1940,thefirstexperimentalplantingsshowedthatcertainHoraivarietiesyieldedtwotothreetimesthatof indigenousHainaneserice.Underactualproductionconditions,however,onlythefieldsdirectlymanagedbyTaitakuproducedthesuperioryieldsexpectedofHoraicrops(Schneider1998,257).

The“invention”ofHorairiceprovidedasenseofmissiontotheadministrativeclassof the Government-General, creating a new identity for Taiwan as a rice colony.Althoughdomestictensionsarosefromconflictsbetweensugarproducersandfarmers,andtheneedtoprotectJapanesecapitalistintereststhroughpricecontrols,theaspectof Taiwan facing the rest of theempirewas thatof a rice colony, developed throughassiduous investments in scientific research, land reclamation, and irrigation works.Policy framing and the definition of the Government-General’s interests in theexpandingempirewerefocusedonitsproclaimedexpertiseinriceproduction.

ApplyingTaiwaneseRiceKnowledgetoAsiaAftermasteringrice-breedinginTaiwan,EikichiIsowasabletoapplythisknowledgetosimilar ventures in other parts of Asia. A common theme in his descriptions of riceregionsencompassedthetwofundamentals,varietytypeandday-length.WhentraineduponChina, his insights highlighted the similarities between themainland and Japan,mapping both varieties and geographies to read the unfamiliar Chinese mainlandthroughreferentsfromtheJapanesemainislands.

According to Iso,Chinese ricewas of theHsien andKeng non-glutinous varieties,respectively IndicaandJaponicadomesticated inTaiwanbeforeJapaneserule.TaiwanalsohadvarietiesofglutinousricecalledNuo,withboth IndicaNuoandJaponicaNuotypes.WhereasinJapantherewereonlyJaponicavarietiesofrice,thoseinChinaweremostlyIndica.InJapan,non-glutinousvarietieswereUruchi,whileglutinousoneswerecalledMochi.Withreferencetorice-growinginKiangsuandChekiang,Isonotedthatthevarieties in thesepartsofChinahada response to “light and temperature” similar tothat demonstrated by varieties grown in Kyushu and the southern parts of centralJapan.Asaresult,experimentalplantingsof“Shinriki,aJapanesevariety”grewwell inHangchow(Iso1954,76).

It is worth noting that Shinriki was a parent to the popular Taichu No. 65 Horaivariety.ItsintroductionthusrepresentedthescientificprospectingofterritoryonwhichJapanhaddesigns.JustasfindingecologicalnichesconducivetoJapanesericehadmadeTaiwanasuccessfulrice-producingcolony,matchingnewterritorytoTaiwaneseregionscouldperformthesameroleasJapaneseruleextendedtomoreofthemainland.

In addition to the Government-General’s designs on mainland China, plans forsouthward expansion also posed technical challenges to the Japanese imperial ricescientist. The farther south the latitude of a region was with respect to Kyushu, the

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harder it was to recreate conditions suitable for varieties of rice familiar to theJapanese. Two technical approaches could be attempted. In the first approach, theperiodinthenurserywouldbereducedtotheextremethroughtheuseoffertilizersinorder to take full advantage of the short day-length in the southern latitudes thatpromotedthegrowthanddevelopmentofJapanesevarieties.Inthesecondapproach,varieties less sensitive to day-length and temperature would need to be developed,possibly through crossbreedingwith Japanese varieties in a repetition of the processthroughwhichHoraihadbeenconceived.

From the sub-metropolis of Taiwan, Iso’s base in Taihoku became a center ofcalculationandcollectingdatafromvariouspartsofAsia,includingtheJapanesehomeislands. The harvest of the first Taiwanese crop arrived in Japan in time to alleviateshortages, because Japan could not sow its own rice during its harsh winter. Forexample,onpages77–79ofhisbook,RiceCropsinIts[sic]RotationinSubtropicalZones(1954),Iso presented “The recommended varieties of the rice plant in China” and“Temperature, rainfall, humidity & days free of frost in the agricultural regions ofChina.”Onpage124, a table showing “Day-length& TemperatureofHokkaido& theFirst Crop Season of Taiwan” noted the asynchronous crop cycle between these twoJapaneseterritoriesattheextremelatitudesofthepre-1937empire,withtheHokkaidocropbeingsowninApril–MayandtheTaiwancropinJanuary,andreadytoharvestinSeptember–OctoberandJune,respectively.

Limitedcapitalwasaconstraint inthecolonizationschemesof Imperial Japan.Astheempireexpandedintothemainlandafter1937,thisissuebecameevermoresevere.The struggle to transform Hainan into a “Second Taiwan” serves as a cautionaryexample.InadditiontothefailuretospreadthecultivationofHoraiisland-wide,despiteinitial success at the Taitaku-farmed nurseries on Hainan, development plans werehindered by shortages of such basic resources as trucks. No doubt, war conditionsworsened such problems, but even under the relative peace of the prewar period,Taiwanesedevelopmentwasnot lavishlycapital-intensive.Agricultureremainedhighlymanual and made use of basic equipment that was handcrafted rather than mass-produced. These “traditional” implements operated in conjunction with chemicalfertilizers and precise timing and irrigation to present a model colonial agriculturalsystemthatwasahybridoftechnoscienceandpreindustrialcraft.

Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,then,thatIso’sobservationsofSoutheastAsianrice-culturing methods paid close attention to the craft aspects of their agriculture. Forexample,IsonotedthatinMalaya“apeculiarseed-bedandtransplanting”methodwasin use. This method, a floating nursery, was implemented because the rice-plantingdistrictswereverywellwatered. Thisnurserywasmadeby laying thickmudonpiledrushgrasstomakeabedfortheseedlings.Asmorewaterenteredthefield,moregrassor straw was piled underneath to further elevate the seedbed. The seedlings weretransplantedtwiceintosecondarynurseriessothatthetotalperiodinthenurserywasfrom60to90days,farlongerthanthepracticeinTaiwan(Iso1954,161).Thistypeofknowledge was essential as the extreme rainfall of monsoon regions coupled with

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winterless years presented unknown challenges to Japanese imperial scientists. Theirexperience with Taiwan, where a hybrid approach adapted traditional techniques toharnessthebenefitsofmodernbreedsandinfrastructure,meantthattheyexpectedtoderivevaluefromabsorbingknowledgeaboutvariousformsofindigenousagriculture.

Japaneseimperialagricultureintheperiodfromthe1930sto1945didnotfeaturemechanization, so the particular methods of agriculture adapted to environments inSoutheast Asia continuedmuch as they had before Japanese rule. In a very differentsituationatalaterstageofdevelopmentinthe1970s,WorldBankfinancingeventuallyextendedtheuseoftractorsandcombineharvesterstoMalaysia,alongwithotherpartsof Southeast Asia, and created significant inequalities of access to capital andopportunity.4

Iso’s“anthropologicalapproach”toexplainingagriculturalpracticeswasafunctionof the limits of modern Japanese imperial agriculture. It was understood that Japan,beingunabletoaffordmethodsthatcouldmoreeffectivelydominatetheterrain,wouldhaveanapproachoflimitedmodernitystilldependentonhumanandanimalpowerandmakinguseof homemade strawandwood implements for some functions insteadoffactory-madetools.However,Japan’sapproachwasapracticalmodernitythatdeliveredonwhatcountedthemost:yieldsandproductivity.Thissimplemantraofprogresswasthe essence of colonial science. As long as this practice delivered substantialimprovements, it was not invalidated by the compromises that it had to make withrespecttocapital.

FromImperialRiceResearchtoPostwarInternationalCooperationAfter thewar, Japanese technocrats sought to translate theexperienceof developingHoraiintoaroadmapforAsianagriculturaldevelopment.Acompilationofthetechnicaland institutionalhistoryof Japanesericeresearch,ACenturyofAgriculturalGrowth inJapan: ItsRelevancetoAsianDevelopment,wasmeanttodemonstratehowthiscouldbeaccomplished.Thepreface states that thebook’spurpose is toprovide“apositiveeconomic analysis of the long-term growth of Japanese agriculture” in order to“facilitate a correct understanding of the nature and magnitude of the problems ofagricultural development in Asia today” (Hayami et al. 1975, xv). The book focusesprimarilyon theexperienceof rice researchand thedevelopmentof its cultivation inJapanproper from thebeginningof theMeiji Restoration to themid-1970s. Featuredtopics include economic trend data, a chronology of institutions founded for riceresearch and extension in Japan, and evaluations of the impact of technology,infrastructure,andrice-breedingresearch. It isnoteworthythatonly intheconcludingchapteristhecolonialexperienceinTaiwanexplicitlyhighlightedasapossibleJapanesecontributiontoriceagricultureinAsia.

4PoliticalscientistJamesC.Scott’sWeaponsoftheWeak(1985)providesanaccountofsomeofthechangesbroughtbymechanizationinricefarmsinKedah,NorthernPeninsularMalaysia.

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TheauthorsclassifythetechnologicalchangesbroughtbyJapanesecolonialruletoTaiwanandKoreaas“land-saving”anddescribethemasatransplantationofmethodsthathadbeendevelopedinMeijiJapan:thechangestooktheformof“localadaptationof a technology of Japanese origin (embodied typically in improved seeds)” and“investment in irrigation facilities as a prerequisite for the diffusion of the newtechnology” (Hayami et al. 1975, 204). The book goes on to note that, as land wasplentiful in the Philippines until about 1960, production could be increased throughreclaiming new land. However, as the frontier closed, the land-saving technologiesmentionedbecameincreasinglyrelevanttothePhilippines’needs(Hayamietal.1975,204).

Asexplainedinthisbook,theintroductionofHoraivarietiesinTaiwanmetwithabottleneck as irrigation facilities were well developed only in parts of Taiwan andprogressedover time as the irrigation system expanded under colonial developmentschemes.Theauthorsstate,“ItappearsthattheconstructionoftheirrigationsysteminTaiwanwas, to a large extent, inducedby theprofitability of such investmentswhichwas increasedby the technological breakthrough”ofHorai (Hayami et al. 1975, 213–214).Thelessonhereisthatagriculturaldevelopmentwasasystemandnotacollectionofdisparateprojects.Theessentialcatalyst in thiscasewasaplantingmaterialwithasubstantialandlucrativemarket,whichinturnneededtobebackedbythesupportofproducts suchas fertilizers,andby infrastructures for irrigationand transportation. Inthissense,wecouldconsiderrice-breedingresearchameansofachievingunbalancedgrowth, as advancement in one sector dragged others forward, as described byeconomistAlbertO.Hirschman(1958).

Itwould seemnatural, then, that YujiroHayami, the leadauthor andeditorofACentury of Agricultural Growth in Japan, was based in the Philippines, at theInternational Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in Los Baños. The IRRI was a long-termresearch program initially funded by the Ford Foundation and the RockefellerFoundation dedicated to research on high-yield rice breeds. The Japanese connectionwas essential to the operations of the IRRI. For example, a bibliographyof translatedrice-research articles in the possession of the IRRI in 1975 noted that, other thanEnglish, the language inwhichmostarticleswerepublishedwas Japanese. Inorder tomake the information in these articles accessible, a branch of the IRRI Library andDocumentation Center was established in Tokyo to produce translations (Malagayo-Alluri1976,2).

TheprevioussectionrecountedtheJapaneseexperienceofbringingriceagricultureto Hainan with less-than-impressive results under the constraints of war. After theSecondWorldWar,theperceptionthatJapanwasthetorchbearerofriceresearchforthe rest of Asia was reconfigured under a new political order, because Japanwas inalliance with the United States and had access to its capital. No longer aimed atexploiting land to support an exclusive clique of Japanese capitalists, the researchentered an era of international cooperation with friendly nations aligned with theWesternblocduringtheColdWar.

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Themeansremainedthesameasbefore:better-yieldingplantingmaterialsbackedbytherightsuppliesoffertilizersandirrigationwater,andaccesstoprofitablemarkets.AndwithfigureslikeEikichiIsocontinuingacareerthattoucheduponTaiwanandpartsof SoutheastAsia, thepeoplewhohadbeen responsible for the successesof colonialTaiwanese rice research were actively involved in making a success of the postwarinternationalrice-researchorder.5

ConclusionBetween September 20 and November 11, 1944, a Philippine Agricultural SurveyCommissionvisitedTaiwan.NemesioB.Mendiolaconductedastudyto“determinethemethodsofcultureused,particularlywhatcharacteristicsorfeaturesoftheTaiwanriceculturehadbeenresponsibleforthephenomenalprogressithadmade,”andthencetoadapt whatever was practical for conditions in the Philippines (Mendiola 1949, 41).Mendiola’s languagemakes it apparent that Taiwan hadmade a name for itself as arice-producing territory, and that this “phenomenal progress” could be credited toJapaneserule.

ThetropicalityofTaiwan,coupledwithitsprecariousfinances,presentedapuzzleto its Japanese colonizers. Howwere they to transform Taiwan into an economicallyviable possession of their fledgling empire? Agriculture became a key part of thesolution.Butbeforeagriculturecouldbereformed,thepoliticshadtobesetright.GotoShinpei’s commitment to transformTaiwan through “principles of Biology” led to theaccumulation of capital and its direction toward productive applications. Agriculturalresearch would serve to answer the question of how tropicality could benefit thecolonizers and the capitalists in their ranks, andHorai ricewould be one of its signalaccomplishments.Thisprogresscouldnotbeachievedwithoutfriction,forfirstithadtoget funded by a government facedwithmultiple demands and scarce treasure.Onceundertaken,theimpactofHoraicultivationuponthecolonialeconomywascomplicatedandnotbeneficialtothecapitalistclassinasimpleanddirectmanner.

ThelandsurveyandtaxregimeimposedbytheJapaneseconfirmedtenantfarmersinthepossessionoftheirland.Asaresult,sugarfarmingdidnotgiverisetothelarge-scale farming that characterized the crop in the Caribbean and other colonial sites.Instead,theJapanesecapitaliststookcontrolofthesugarfactoriesandimposedtermsoftradethatexploitedthefarmerssupplyingthem.IntothismixcameHorai,afruitofcolonialstatescience.Evenasitdisruptedthestate-imposedsugar-buyingmonopsonyarrangements,italsobecameasourceofstrengthforboththeGovernment-GeneralofTaiwanandtheJapaneseEmpireasawhole.

5IsodidnotagreetoparticipatedirectlyinIRRIresearchefforts.Hepreferreda“grounded”approachworkingcloselywithfarmers,ashehaddoneinTaiwanbeforethewar,asopposedtooperatingfromacenterofcalculationspreadingsuperseedstopartsunseenanddistant,suchasIndia(Fujihara2018,145–146).

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HorairiceandtheexpertiserequiredtoproduceitgaveTaiwanaraisond’êtreasarice colony. Taiwan supplied the Japanese home islands with rice during themonthswhentheyfacedshortagesduetotheabsenceofawintercrop.ThesuccessofHorailedtheJapaneserulersofTaiwantoenvisionsettingupa“secondTaiwan”onHainanwhenthat territory fell under Japanese occupation, though this scheme failed due to warconditions despite the limited successes achieved in areas tightly supervised byexperiencedpersonnelsentfromTaiwan.

TheexpertiseofmobileagentsofsciencesuchasEikichiIsomadethedevelopmentof Horai rice possible. Embodying modern scientific knowledge obtained first fromHokkaidoandthenfromCornell, Iso imaginativelymappedJapaneseconditionstothelatitudesofTaiwaninordertodeviseidealplansformatchingJaponicatypestovariousothers based on likely success. The emerging understanding of photoperiodism, firstidentifiedbyGarnerandAllard,enabled Isoto focusontheresponseof riceplants todaylighthoursinhiseffortsatselection.

Keeping pace with the expanding Japanese Empire of the 1930s and 1940s, IsoobservedriceconditionsfarbeyondTaiwan,insouthernChina,Indochina,Malaya,andJava.AftertheSecondWorldWar,deprivedofitsempire,JapancontinuedtooperateasaguidinglightforthedevelopmentofricescienceinSoutheastAsia,butasapartofPaxAmericana and with new headquarters at the IRRI in the Philippines funded by theRockefellerFoundationandFordFoundation.

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AbouttheAuthorWeiYiLeowisaPhDcandidateintheComparativeAsianStudiesProgramme,FacultyofArtsandSocialSciences,NationalUniversityofSingapore.TheauthorismostgratefulforthecriticalandthoughtfulcommentsprovidedbytwoanonymousCross-Currentsreviewersandtheguesteditorsforthisspecialedition,JamesLin,GraemeRead,andPeterThilly.