Hope Creek Generating Station; Component Design Bases Inspection.

t--wUNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COtUTi,| ISSIONREGION I

21OO RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1OO

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

October 12, 2012

Mr. Thomas P. JoycePresident and Chief Nuclear OfficerPSEG Nuclear LLCP. O. Box 236Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASESTNSPECTTON REPORT 05000354/2012007

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On August 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat the Hope Greek Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on August 30,2012, with Mr. John Perry, Site VicePresident, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components tomitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents. The inspectioninvolved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, andinterviews with station personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection inthe NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC'sdocument system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Cjd^"r.r^^^, OEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-354License No. NPF-57

Mr. Thomas P. JoycePresident and Chief Nuclear OfficerPSEG Nuclear LLCP. O. Box 236Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASESI NS PECTI ON REPORT 05000354/201 2007

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On August 30,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat the Hope Creek Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on August 30, 2012, with Mr. John Perry, Site VicePresident, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components tomitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents. The inspectioninvolved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, andinterviews with station personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in

the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC'sdocument system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp:/iwww.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RN

Lawrence T. Doerflein, ChiefEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-354License No. NPF-57

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRS\Engineering Branch 2\Schoppy\HQ CDBI 201207 -docxADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML12286A120

X suNslReviewX Non-Sensitive

n Sensitive

X Publicly Available

tr Non-PubliclyAvailable

OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS

NAME .JSchoppy "ABurritULC LDoerflein

DATE 10t1112 10t5t12 10t12112

* aaa ararri CIAL RECORD COPYsee prevlous concurrence

T. Joyce 2

Enclosure:I nspection Report 050003541 20 1 2007

MAttachment. Supplemental lnformation

cc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ

T. Joyce 3

Distribution Mencl: (via E-mail)W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Roberts, DRP (RIDRPMAIL Resource)J. Clifford, DRP (RlDRPMail Resource)C. Miller, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)P. Wilson, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)A. Burritt, DRPL. Cline, DRPA. Turilin, DRPF. Bower, DRP, SRIR. Montgomery, DRP, RlK. McKenzie, DRP, AAC. Santos, Rl OEDORidsN rrPMHopeCreek ResourceRids N rrDorlLpll -2 Reso u rceROPreports ResourceJ. Schoppy, DRSL. Doerflein. DRSD. Bearde, DRS

Docket No:

License No:

Report No:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

lnspection Period:

Inspectors:

Approved By:

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-354

NPF-57

05000354/2012007

PSEG Nuclear LLC

Hope Creek Generating Station

P.O. Box 236Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

July 30 - August 30,2012

J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS),Team Leader

J. Brand, Reactor lnspector, DRSD. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSJ. Rady, Reactor Inspector, DRSO. Mazzoni, NRC Electrical ContractorT. Tinkel, NRC Mechanical Contractor

Lawrence T. Doerflein, ChiefEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500035412012007;713012012 - 813012012: Hope Creek Generating Station; ComponentDesign Bases Inspection.

The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of fourU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors and two NRC contractors. The NRC'sprogram for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described inNUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFEW

Cornerstones: lnitiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R21 Component Desisn Bases lnspection (lP 71 111.21)

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The team selected risk significant components for review using information contained inthe Hope Creek Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model and the U. S. NuclearRegulatory Commission's (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model forthe Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS). Additionally, the team referenced theRisk-lnformed Inspection Notebook for the Hope Creek Generating Station (Revision2.1a) in the selection of potential components for review. In general, the selectionprocess focused on components that had a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) factorgreater than 1.3 or a Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) factor greater than 1.005. Thecomponents selected were associated with both safety-related and non-safety relatedsystems, and included a variety of components such as pumps, breakers, strainers,diesel engines, relays, motors, and valves.

The team initially compiled a list of components based on the risk factors previouslymentioned. Additionally, the team reviewed the previous component design basesinspection (CDBI) reports (0500035412009007 and 05000354/20006015) and excludedthe majority of those components previously inspected. The team then performed amargin assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 16 components and 4operating experience (OE) items. The team selected a torus vent valve for large earlyrelease fraction (LERF) implications. The team's evaluation of possible low designmargin included consideration of original design issues, margin reductions due tomodifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipmentreliability issues. The assessment also included items such as failed performance testresults, corrective action history, repeated maintenance, Maintenance Rule (aX1) status,operability reviews for degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector insights, systemhealth reports, and industry OE. Finally, consideration was also given to the uniquenessand complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins.

The inspection performed by the team was conducted as outlined in NRC InspectionProcedure (lP) 71 111.21. This inspection effort included walkdowns of selectedcomponents; interviews with operators, system engineers, and design engineers; andreviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of thecomponents to meet design basis, licensing basis, and risk-informed beyond designbasis requirements. Summaries of the reviews performed for each component and OEsample are discussed in the subsequent sections of this report. Documents reviewedfor this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

Enclosure

2

.2 Results of Detailed Reviews

.2.1 Detailed Component Reviews (16 samples)

.2.1.1 B Residual Heat Removal Svstem Suction Strainer

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR), the configuration baseline document (CBD), and drawings to identify systemand component design requirements for the residual heat removal (RHR) system, the B

RHR suction strainer, and the B RHR pump. The team reviewed procurement designspecifications and drawings for the strainer to identify detailed characteristics that affectflow during normal and design basis accident (DBA) conditions. The team reviewedcalculations and vendor test reports to verify that the strainer was capable of requiredflow without exceeding established head loss limits for both debris free and debrisloaded conditions. The team also reviewed calculations to verify that adequate netpositive suction head (NPSH) was available for the B RHR pump for worst case flow andsuppression pool conditions and that unacceptable vortexing or air entrainment wouldnot occur.

The team reviewed applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs) to identifysystem operating parameters during periods of degraded emergency core coolingsystem (ECCS) performance. The team reviewed in-service test (lST) surveillanceprocedures for the RHR system to verify that design basis head/flow requirements werecorrectly translated into the procedures. The team interviewed the RHR systemengineer to discuss details of the ECCS suction strainer modification for the currentlyinstalled RHR strainers. The team reviewed the corrective action program (CAP)database, system health reports, and margin management reports to identify applicablefailures, adverse trends, or abnormal performance and to ensure any such issues werebeing properly addressed.

b. Findinos


.2.1.2 125Vdc Switchsear 10D440. Distribution Panel 10DD417 and Fuse Box

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed bus loading calculations to verify that the 125Vdc switchgear hadsutficient capacity to support its required loads under worst case accident loadingconditions. The team reviewed cable sizing calculations to ensure that cables wereadequately sized for load and service conditions. The team reviewed 125Vdc shortcircuit calculations to verify that protective devices were applied within their ratings andappropriate fault values were used in protective relaying calculations. The teamreviewed breaker coordination studies to determine whether equipment was protected

Enclosure

3

and protective devices featured selective coordination. The team reviewed maintenanceprocedures and schedules for the 125Vdc switchgear to ensure that equipment wasbeing properly maintained. The team reviewed preventive maintenance (PM) and

corrective action documents to determine if there were any adverse operating trends. Inaddition, the team performed a visual inspection of the 125Ydc switchgear, distributionpanel, and fuse box to assess the material condition of the equipment.

b. Findinqs


.2.1.3 Safetv Auxiliaries Coolinq Svstem and Reactor Auxiliaries Coolinq Svstem ServiceWater lsolation Valve (EAHV-2204)

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected safety auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) and reactor auxiliariescooling system (RACS) service water (SW) isolation valve EAHV-2204 to verify that itwas capable of performing its design function. Motor-operated valve (MOV) EAHV-2204is designed to isolate SW to the non-safety related RACS heat exchangers (HXs)following an accident or RACS room flooding in order to ensure an adequate SW supplyto the safety-related SACS HXs. The team reviewed the UFSAR, calculations, andprocedures to identify the design basis requirements of the valve. The team alsoreviewed accident system alignments, valve testing procedures, and valve specificationsto verify that component operation and capability was consistent with the design and

licensing bases assumptions. The team reviewed periodic diagnostic test results and

stroke test documentation to verify that acceptance criteria were met and consistent withthe design basis. Additionally, the team verified the valve safety function wasmaintained in accordance with Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 guidance by reviewing torqueswitch settings, performance capability, and design margins. The team revieweddegraded voltage conditions and voltage drop calculations to confirm that the MOVwould have sufficient voltage and power available to perform its safety function at theworst case degraded voltage conditions.

The team interviewed the MOV program engineer to gain an understanding ofmaintenance issues and overall reliability of the valve. The team conducted a walkdownto assess the material condition of the valve, and to verify the installed valveconfiguration was consistent with design basis assumptions and plant drawings. Theteam also reviewed corrective action documents to verify that PSEG appropriatelyidentified and resolved deficiencies and properly maintained the valve.

Enclosure

4

In addition, the team evaluated operator actions to recognize and mitigate a SW pipe

break in the RACS room located in the reactor building. Specifically, operator criticaltasks included:

o Recognize condition. Direct response in accordance with alarm response procedurer Determine cause. Confirm floodingo lsolate source

The team conducted a step-by-step walkthrough of time-critical flood mitigation

strategies with a plant equipment operator. In addition, the team independently walked

down accessible portions of the reactor building to assess the material condition of the

associated structures, systems and components (SSCs) with particular focus on

potential high volume internal flood sources. The team independently assessedprocedure quality, flood barrier material condition, and the operators' ability to perform

the required actions to locally isolate the postulated rupture. The team reviewedcorrective action notifications (NOTFs), maintenance history, internalflood analyses,

and inspection results and performed independent in-field observations to assesspotential internalflood vulnerabilities and to ensure that PSEG maintained appropriate

configuration control of critical design features.

b. Findinqs


.2.1.4 D 4.16kV Vital Bus Offsite Power ln-feed Breakers

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the Class 1E 4.16kV breakers supplying offsite power to the D vital

bus to verify their ability to meet the design basis requirements in response to transient

and accident events, including automatic bus transfers included in the design to ensure

continuity of power to the Class 1E equipment connected to the bus. The team

reviewed electrical drawings, component calculations, and system calculations to verify

that calculation inputs and assumptions were accurate and justified, The team

evaluated the voltage and load capability of the 4.16kV breakers, by review of the plant

wide system calculations, to verify that the minimum acceptable voltage was adequately

calculated. The team verified that the breakers were properly designed to carry their

assigned full load current under normal conditions and during DBA events. The team

verified that breaker and bus protective relays were properly set to protect theconnected loads against abnormal fault conditions, and that spurious tripping would not

take place. The team verified that the protective relay setpoints were properly translatedinto system procedures and tests. The team reviewed the applicable sections of the

Hope Creek UFSAR and Technical Specifications (TSs) to verify that PSEG operatedand maintained the breakers and protective features as designed. The team conductedseveral detailed walkdowns to visually inspect the physical/material condition of the

Enclosure

5

switchgear and its support systems, to check the adequacy of environmental conditions,to assess potential seismic issues, and to ensure adequate configuration control. Theteam also reviewed the maintenance and operating history of the 4.16kV breakers,associated corrective action NOTFs, the system health report, and surveillance testresults to determine if there were any adverse operating trends and to ensure thatPSEG adequately identified and addressed any adverse conditions.

b, Findinqs


.2.1.5 Hiqh Pressure Coolant Iniection Svstem Iniection Valve (BJ-HV-F006)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, the CBD, and drawings to identify

the design basis requirements for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system and

the injection valve; a flex-wedge gate MOV. The team reviewed vendor manuals to

identify design conditions for the valve and actuator and identify any vendorrecommendations for lubrication. The team reviewed design characteristics for the

valve to determine the potentialfor pressure locking and thermal binding. The teamreviewed calculations for valve stem thrust, motor operator actuator characteristics, and

weak link analysis to determine whether the actuator and valve were capable ofoperation under worst-case line pressure and differential pressure (D/P) conditions. The

team reviewed system operating procedures and EOPs to identify required valvepositions during operation and accident conditions. The team reviewed IST surveillanceprocedures and test results to determine whether design basis stroke times were

enveloped by test acceptance criteria.

The team interviewed the PSEG MOV engineer and a MOV technical specialist to

review PSEG's MOV program including diagnostic testing, aging management, and

MOV lubrication practices. The team interviewed the system engineer to discuss

system configurations for conducting surveillance testing and to verify valve design

temperature enveloped expected system temperatures during normal and accident

conditions. The team reviewed corrective action NOTFs, system health reports, and

margin management reports to identify applicable failures, adverse trends, or abnormalperformance and to ensure any such issues were being properly addressed. The team

also reviewed corrective action NOTFs and work order history to identify whether issues

such as thermal binding were properly evaluated to prevent recurrence. The teamperformed a walkdown of the valve and adjacent area to assess the material condition,operating environment, and configuration control.

b. Findinos


Enclosure

6

.2.1.6 D 4kV Bus (104404) Loss of Voltaoe Relavs (127A)

a. lnspection Scope

The team reviewed the design of the 4kV bus under-voltage (UV) protection scheme todetermine whether it would cause the bus transfer to the alternate offsite power supplyor automatic separation of the bus from the offsite power supply during accident loadingconcurrent with loss-of-grid voltage as designed. This included review of UV relaysetpoint calculations, motor starting and running voltage calculations, and motor controlcenter (MCC) control circuit voltage drop calculations. The team reviewed UV relay testprocedures and results to determine whether the relays were performing as required bythe design bases and Technical Specifications (TSs). The team reviewed protectiverelaying schemes and calculations to determine whether equipment such as motors andcables were adequately protected, and to determine whether protective devices featuredproper selective tripping coordination. The team reviewed maintenance procedures todetermine whether equipment was being properly maintained. The team reviewedcorrective action documents and maintenance records to determine whether there wereany adverse operating trends. Finally, the team performed a visual inspection of the4kV safety buses to assess material condition and the presence of hazards.

b. Findinss


.2.1.7 Torus Vent Valve l GSHV-1 154'1

a. lnspection Scope

The team inspected torus vent valve lGSHV-11541to verify that the valve was capableof supporting the functional requirement to provide controlled containment pressurerelief via the torus hardened vent path as credited in the HCGS PRA. This pressurerelief path is commonly referred to as the hard torus vent (HTV). Instrument air is thenormal supply to actuate lGSHV-11541, but it is not seismically qualified. A seismicallyqualified nitrogen gas supply and a local manual operating station are installed toprovide operators with two methods to operate the HTV if instrument air is not availablefollowing a seismic event. The team reviewed the UFSAR, drawings, and procedures toidentify the functional requirements of the valve. The team reviewed designcalculations, including the backup nitrogen gas actuator supply volume, seismicqualifications, and system operating parameters to verify that the design basis had beenappropriately translated into specifications and procedures. The team reviewed PRAmodeling of the HTV function with the PRA engineer to verify that the backup nitrogensupply and manual operator capabilities were properly addressed.

The team reviewed EOPs which direct operation of the HTV, reviewed operator traininglesson plans, and performed a field walkdown with an operator to assess the materialcondition of lGSHV-11541and to verify that procedures and operator knowledge weresufficient to successfully operate the HTV. The walkdown included verification of local

Enclosure

b.

7

manual operation of lGSHV-11541. The team also reviewed performance centeredmaintenance (PCM) templates, vendor manuals, maintenance work orders, PMdocuments, and selected corrective action documents from the last three years toevaluate whether appropriate corrective and preventive maintenance was performed.The team performed additional independent walkdowns of the accessible portions of thetorus vent path (from the torus to the external vent discharge) to assess the materialcondition, structural supports, potential hazards, and configuration control.

Findinqs


1E 480V Motor Control Center 108222

lnspection Scope

The team inspected the Class 1E MCC 109.222 to verify its ability to meet the designbasis requirements in response to transient and accident events to ensure continuity ofpower to the Class 1E equipment connected to the MCC. The team reviewed electricaldrawings, component calculations, and system calculations to verify that calculationinputs and assumptions were accurate and justified. The team evaluated the voltageand load capability of MCC 108222, by review of the plant wide system calculations, toverify that the minimum acceptable voltage was adequately calculated and translatedinto proper setting for the degraded grid protection relays. The team verified that theMCC breakers were properly designed to carry their assigned full load current undernormal conditions and during DBA events. The team verified that breaker controlsystem would provide adequate voltage to all connected loads, and that circuitprotection was properly selected to protect the connected loads against abnormal faultconditions, and that spurious tripping would not take place. The team verified thatprotective setpoints were properly translated into system procedures and tests. Theteam conducted several detailed walkdowns to visually inspect the physical/materialcondition of the switchgear and its support systems, to check the adequacy ofenvironmental conditions, to identify potential seismic ll/l issues, and to ensureadequate configuration control. The team also reviewed the maintenance and operatinghistory of the MCC breakers and support equipment, associated corrective actionNOTFs, the system health report, and applicable breaker functional tests to determine ifthere were any adverse operating trends and to ensure that PSEG adequately identifiedand addressed any adverse conditions.

Findinqs


2.1.8

a.

Enclosure

.2.1.9

a.

IB Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow ControlValve (BC-HV-F007B)

Inspection Scope

The team inspected the B RHR pump minimum flow control MOV (BC-HV-F0078) toverify that it was capable of performing its design function. The valve is normally opento ensure pump minimum flow requirements are met at low flow conditions and also hasa safety function to automatically close at higher flows to protect the B RHR pump fromreaching run-out conditions. The team reviewed the UFSAR, calculations, andprocedures to identify the design basis requirements of the valve. The team alsoreviewed accident system alignments, valve testing procedures, and valve specificationsto verify that component operation and capability was consistent with the design andlicensing bases assumptions. The team reviewed periodic diagnostic test results andstroke test documentation to verify that acceptance criteria were met and consistent withthe design basis. Additionally, the team verified the valve safety function wasmaintained in accordance with GL 89-10 guidance by reviewing torque switch settings,performance capability, and design margins. The team also reviewed degraded voltageconditions and voltage drop calculations to confirm that the MOV would have sufficientvoltage and power available to perform its safety function at the worst case degradedvoltage conditions.

The team interviewed the MOV program engineer to gain an understanding ofmaintenance issues and overall reliability of the valve. The team conducted a walkdownto assess the material condition of the valve, and to verify that the installed valveconfiguration was consistent with design basis assumptions and plant drawings. Theteam also reviewed corrective action documents to verify that PSEG appropriatelyidentified and resolved deficiencies and properly maintained the valve. In addition, theteam performed a review of the valve interlock design and testing to ensure that thevalve and other associated RHR system components would function as designed underthe most limiting design basis conditions, including a single failure of a valve or powersupply.

Findinos


.2.1.10 Portable Batterv Charoer Power Supplv (Baldor Generator)

Inspection Scope

The HCGS PRA model credits the Baldor portable generator during a long-term loss ofAC power event. PSEG developed procedure HC.OP-AM.TSC-0004, "Alternate PowerSupply to 1E 1251250vdc," to align the portable generator to provide 480Vac power towelding receptacles in the emergency diesel generator (EDG)/control building to provideAC power to the 1251250Vdc battery chargers. The team reviewed equipment sizingcalculations to verify that the portable battery charger power supply had sufficientcapacity to support its required loads under worst case accident loading. The team

b.

Enclosure

9

reviewed cable sizing calculations to ensure that cables were adequately sized for loadand service conditions. The team interviewed operations personnel and reviewedprocedure HC.OP-AM.TSC-0004 to ensure that the portable battery charger powersupply could supply adequate 480Vac power to the 1251250Vdc battery chargers. Theteam performed a walkdown of the procedure with PSEG technicians and evaluated theavailable time margins to perform the actions. The team also walked down theassociated portable battery charger power supply storage area, the safety-relatedbattery and battery charger rooms, and the associated welding receptacles in theEDG/control building to assess the material condition of the SSCs within those areas.The team reviewed corrective action documents and PM procedures to verify that issuesidentified were properly evaluated and corrected.

b. Findinss


.2.1.11Hioh Pressure Coolant Iniection Svstem Turbine

a. lnspection Scope

The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, the CBD, and drawings to identifydesign basis requirements for the HPCI system and its steam turbine that drives theattached HPCI main and booster pumps. The team reviewed a PSEG calculation forsuppression pool heat-up in response to a small break loss-of-coolant accident(SBLOCA) to identify the HPCI turbine mission time and maximum suppression poolwater temperature during the HPCI credited DBA. The team reviewed EOPs to identifylicensing basis accident scenarios requiring HPCI operation with suction on thecondensate storage tank (CST) or the suppression pool. The team reviewedprocurement specifications and design data sheets to identify continuous and shorttermwater temperature limits for HPCI turbine lube oil cooling and other HPCI systemcomponents.

The team reviewed the vendor manual and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)Terry turbine maintenance guideline for recommendations on maximum allowed bearingoiltemperatures. The team reviewed PSEG's associated calculation to verify existingheat transfer margin in the turbine lube oil cooler. The team reviewed design basisdocuments, drawings, and calculations to determine whether the turbine lube oil coolingsystem was capable of maintaining acceptable bearing oil temperatures during worst-case normal and accident conditions.

The team reviewed HPCI operating procedures to verify instructions for checking turbineoil levels and oiltemperatures. The team reviewed IST surveillance procedures toensure the HPCI system was capable of meeting specified test requirements. The teamreviewed work orders to verify that components essential to turbine operation such asthe exhaust system vacuum breakers were tested to ensure proper operation. Theteam interviewed the system engineer to discuss system performance and details of thelast complete overhaul of the turbine. The team reviewed corrective action NOTFS,

Enclosure

10

system health reports, and margin management reports to identify applicable failures,adverse trends, or abnormal performance and to ensure any such issues were beingproperly addressed. The team performed several walkdowns of the turbine andassociated HPCI pump room to assess the material condition, operating environment,and configuration control.

b. Findinss


.2.1.12 D Emeroencv Diesel Generator (Electrical)

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the D EDG to verify its ability to meet the design basis requirementsin response to transient and accident events to ensure continuity of power to the Class1E equipment connected to the EDG. The team reviewed electrical drawings,component calculations, and system calculations to verify that calculation inputs andassumptions were accurate and justified. The team evaluated the voltage and loadcapability of D EDG, by review of the EDG loading calculations, to verify that the EDGhad sufficient margin to start and supply its assigned loads. The team verified that therelaying protection was properly selected and set to protect the connected loads againstabnormal fault conditions, and that spurious tripping would not take place. The teamverified that protective setpoints were properly translated into system procedures andtests. The team reviewed the maintenance and operating history of the D EDG and itssupport equipment, associated corrective action NOTFs, the system health report, andsurveillance test results to determine if there were any adverse operating trends and toensure that PSEG adequately identified and addressed any adverse conditions. Theteam conducted several detailed walkdowns to visually inspect the physical/materialcondition of the D EDG and its support systems, to check the adequacy ofenvironmental conditions, to identify potential seismic issues, and to ensure adequateconfiguration control.

b. Findinqs


.2.1.13 D Emerqencv Diesel Generator (Mechanical)

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the D EDG to verify it was capable of meeting its design basisrequirements. The design function of the D EDG is to provide standby power to theD channel safety-related loads (4.16 kV, 480 V, and 2081120 V) upon loss of both thenormal and alternate offsite power supplies. The team reviewed selected sections ofthe UFSAR, EDG system design calculations, and recent plant modifications to verifythat the EDG design assumptions and operating requirements were properly identified,

Enclosure

11

evaluated, and maintained. The team also reviewed implementation of TS AmendmentNo. 188, which extended the EDG allowed outage time to 14 days under certainconditions. This TS amendment became effective on May 5, 2011. The teamperformed interviews and reviewed procedures, training, and selected operator logs todetermine whether operators had properly assessed Salem Unit 3 gas turbine generatoravailability when determining on-line maintenance risk and TS limiting condition ofoperation applicability for periods when any of the four HCGS EDGs were inoperable.

The team reviewed vendor manuals, corrective and preventive maintenance records,completed surveillance test records, lube oil analysis documents, and operator logs todetermine whether EDG operational performance was properly monitored and whetherEDG maintenance was performed consistent with manufacturer recommendations andindustry OE. Activities reviewed included the last three 24-month maintenanceoverhauls, the last 24-month operability run, and the last three monthly TS operabilitytests for the D EDG. The team also reviewed historical weather records for the last fiveyears to verify ambient temperature limits for EDG operability, as stated in the UFSAR,had not been exceeded.

The team interviewed the EDG system engineer and plant operators; reviewed PCMtemplates, the most recent EDG system health report, and applicable corrective actiondocuments; and performed several walkdowns of the D EDG and associated supportequipment to assess material condition, potential vulnerability to hazards such asflooding, configuration control, and PSEG's use of the CAP to identify, evaluate, andcorrect conditions adverse to quality. During EDG walkdowns, the team also assessedthe functionality of essential support equipment and EDG standby readiness includingjacket water and lube oil keep warm temperatures, fuel oil system integrity and storagevolumes, air start system integrity and air receiver pressures, and EDG room ventilationsystem and room temperatures.

b. Findinos


.2.1.14Automatic Depressurization Svstem Looic

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the automatic depressurization system (ADS) logic to verify that itwas capable of meeting its design basis and TS requirements. The team reviewedapplicable portions of the UFSAR, the CBD, and drawings to identify the design basisrequirements for the ADS logic. The team also reviewed schematic diagrams andcalculations for ADS initiation to ensure that the ADS valves would actuate based on thecorrect input conditions. The team reviewed completed surveillance tests to ensure thatthe ADS logic and valve circuits would respond appropriately during accident ortransient conditions. The team reviewed the CAP database and system health reportsto determine if there were any adverse operating trends. The team reviewed completedmaintenance and calibration records to verify that the associated reactor pressure and

Enclosure

12

level instrumentation were being properly maintained. The team also conducted severalcontrol room walkdowns to visually inspect the material condition of the ADS valveinstrumentation and indication, and to ensure adequate configuration control.Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to verify that PSEGappropriately identified and resolved any ADS related deficiencies.

b. Findinqs


.2.1.15 D Station Service Water Svstem Pump

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, the CBD, drawings, and thevendor manual to identify design basis requirements for the SW system and designcharacteristics for the D SW pump; a single-stage centrifugal deep well pump. Theteam evaluated vendor pump curves for the originally installed pumps to determinewhether use of these curves was appropriate for the installed replacement pump. Theteam reviewed calculations for pump flows during normal operation and accidentscenarios to verify that adequate NPSH was available for worst case flow with minimumriver water level and maximum river water temperature. The team reviewed systemoperating procedures to determine whether design basis conditions were reflected inprocedures. The team reviewed SW pump IST surveillance procedures to verify thatspecified acceptance limits for D/P head were consistent with design basis requirementsfor system head/flow. The team reviewed surveillance test results to ensure that SWpump performance was consistent with the IST acceptance criteria. The team alsoreviewed IST engineer trend data for pump D/P to verify that SW pump performancewas being monitored for signs of possible degradation.

The team interviewed the SW system engineer and discussed system performance,operating history, and SW pump replacement activities. The team reviewed the workorder history for the most recent D SW pump replacement to identify and evaluate theinstallation of new wear rings purchased under a non-safety grade procurementprocess. The team reviewed PSEG's internal response to NRC Information Notice (lN)2007-05, "Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures," to determine whetherPSEG's actions were appropriate. System health reports were reviewed to identifyinstances of Maintenance Rule (aX1) status and margin management reports werereviewed to identify failures or abnormal performance of the pump. The team reviewedcorrective action NOTFS, system health reports, and margin management reports toidentify applicable failures, adverse trends, or abnormal performance and to ensure anysuch issues were being properly addressed. The team performed severalwalkdowns ofthe D SW pump and the SW intake structure to assess the material condition, operatingenvironment, and configuration control.

Enclosure

13

b. Findinss


2.1.16 B Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the B RHR pump motor to verify its ability to meet the design basisrequirements in response to transient and accident events to ensure continuity ofservice under normal and DBA conditions. The team reviewed electrical drawings,component calculations, and system calculations to verify that calculation inputs andassumptions were accurate and justified. The team evaluated the voltage and loadcapability of the B RHR pump motor to verify that the motor had sufficient margin topower the B RHR pump during normal and accident conditions, including degradedvoltage. The team verified that the 1 .15 percent motor service factor and designenvironmental conditions were appropriately accounted for in the motor rating andprotection, and that the protection was properly selected, set to protect the motoragainst abnormal fault conditions, and set to preclude spurious tripping. The teamverified that protective setpoints were properly translated into system procedures andtests. The team verified that the D RHR motor replacement, completed in April 2009,was adequately performed and that the replacement motor was equivalent to theoriginal motor (form, fit, and function). The team reviewed the motor cable sizingcalculations to ensure that they adequately considered the maximum loading, voltagedrop, and short circuit conditions. The team reviewed the maintenance and operatinghistory of the B RHR pump motor, associated corrective action NOTFs, the systemhealth report, and RHR surveillance test results to determine if there were any adverseoperating trends and to ensure that PSEG adequately identified and addressed anyadverse conditions. The team walked down the B RHR pump motor and supportequipment to visually inspect the physical/material condition, to check the adequacy ofenvironmental conditions, to identify potential seismic issues, and to ensure adequateconfiguration control.

b. Findinss


.2.2 Review of Industry Operatinq Experience and Generic lssues (4 samples)

The team reviewed selected OE issues for applicability at the Hope Creek GeneratingStation. The team performed a detailed review of the OE issues listed below to verifythat PSEG had appropriately assessed potential applicability to site equipment andinitiated corrective actions when necessary.

Enclosure

14

.2.2.1 NRC Information Notice 2007-01: Recent Operatinq Experience Concerninq HvdrostaticBarriers

a. Inspection Scope

NRC lN 2007-0l discussed potential problems pertaining to water leaking into areascontaining safety-related equipment due to deficient hydrostatic barriers. Thesedeficient barriers were degraded, missing, and/or composed of non-watertight materialssuch as fire stop (e.9., silicone foam). The team evaluated internal and externalfloodprotection measures for the EDG rooms, auxiliary building, reactor building, and SWintake structure to assess potential flood vulnerabilities. The team walked down theareas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundantsafety-related components and vital electric power systems from flooding. Thesefeatures included equipment drains, door seals, backflow check valves, flood detectionand alarms, flood barriers, and wall and floor penetration seals.

The team also reviewed engineering evaluations, calculations, alarm responseprocedures, preventive and corrective maintenance history, operator training, andcorrective action NOTFs associated with flood protection equipment and measures.Finally, the team interviewed PSEG personnel regarding their knowledge of indications,procedures, and required actions associated with several postulated internal andexternal flood scenarios.

b. Findinos


.2.2.2 Operatinq Experience Smart Sample FY 2008-01 - Neoative Trend and RecurrinqEvents Involvinq Emeroencv Diesel Generators

a. lnspection Scope

NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2008-01 is directly related toNRC lN 2007-27, "Recurring Events Involving Emergency Diesel Generator Operability."The team reviewed PSEG's evaluation of lN 2007-27 and their associated correctiveactions. The team also reviewed PSEG's evaluation of NRC lN 2009-14, "PaintingActivities and Cleaning Agents Render EDGs and Other Plant Equipment Inoperable"and PSEG evaluation 70111708 regarding EDG long{erm reliability. The teamindependently walked down the four EDGs on several occasions to inspect forindications of vibration-induced degradation on EDG piping and tubing and for any typeof leakage (air, fuel oil, lube oil, jacket water). The team also reviewed PSEG's EDGsystem health reports, EDG corrective action NOTFs and work orders, leakagedatabase, and surveillance test results to verify that PSEG appropriately dispositionedEDG deficiencies. The team also directly observed portions of the A EDG monthlysurveillance on July 30 and the B EDG monthly surveillance on August 13 andperformed pre and post-run walkdowns to ensure PSEG maintained appropriateconfiguration control and identified deficiencies at a low threshold. Additionally, the

Enclosure

15

team reviewed maintenance records of the biennial maintenance work performed on the

D EDG in July 2012 to assess the material condition of the EDG and its supportsystems.

b, Findinqs


.2.2.3 Operatinq Experience Smart Sample FY 2010-01 - Recent lnspection Experience forComponents Installed Bevond Vendor Recommended Service Life

a. Inspection Scope

NRC OpESS FY 2010-01 is directly related to NRC lN 2012-06, "lneffective Use ofVendor Technical Recommendations." The team reviewed PSEG's evaluation oflN 2012-06, and their associated corrective actions to assess whether PSEG was aware

of and had properly implemented industry and vendor recommendations for selected

safety-related components. For cases where PSEG deviated from the recommendedmaintenance practices, the team reviewed the associated technical evaluation to

determine whether the basis for PSEG's maintenance practices was reasonable.

Components selected for this review included seven mechanical expansion joints in the

SW, core spray, and EDG systems and medium voltage power cables which transit

underground cable vaults for the four SW pumps'

ln 2Q10 and 2011, age-related electrolytic capacitor failures caused events at several

nuclear power plants. The team independently reviewed PCM templates for safety-

related EDG voltage regulator (VR) cabinets and 120 volt vital inverters containing

electrolytic capacitors, warehouse operations proced ures, shelf-life proced u res,

warehouse storage procedures, vendor manuals, and various industry guidelines formaintenance and testing of electrolytic capacitors to verify that the electrolytic capacitors

were properly maintained to support reliable equipment operation. Additionally, the

inspectors inierviewed station personnel and performed plant walkdowns to verify that

the maintenance and storage of components containing electrolytic capacitors was

appropriate. The team reviewed EDG VR control chassis age and replacement plans,

EDG room temperatures, and EDG VR operating performance to assess longtermreliability and potential challenges to this essential support equipment'

b. Findinqs


Enclosure

16

.2.2.4 NRC Information Notice 2010-09: lmportance of Understandins Circuit Breaker ControlPower Indications

a. Inspection Scooe

NRC lN 2010-09 discussed potential problems pertaining to circuit breaker controlpower indication issues that could result in degraded circuit breaker protection andcontrol. The team reviewed PSEG's evaluation and disposition of the lN. The teamreviewed PSEG's applicable procedures for inspection and verification of circuit breakercontrol power indication, and the Maintenance Rule scoping criteria for circuit breakerfailures and loss of control power (fuse failures). The team performed severalwalkdowns of safety-related buses and MCCs to assess the adequacy of the circuitbreaker control power indication, the material condition of the SSCs, and PSEG'sconfig uration control.

b. Findinqs


4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 fdentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)

The team reviewed a sample of problems that PSEG had previously identified andentered into the CAP. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriatethreshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions.In addition, NOTFs written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed toverify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into thecorrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampledand reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs


40,46 Meetinos. includins Exit

On August 30,2012, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. John Perry, SiteVice President, and other members of PSEG management. The team verified that noproprietary information was documented in the report.

Attachment: Supplemental lnformation

Enclosure

A-1

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

PSEG PersonnelJ. Boyer, Mechanical Design Engineering ManagerD. Bush, System EngineerV. Chandra, Mechanical Design EngineerE. Ciemiewicz, MOV SpecialistS. Connelly, System EngineerJ. Dower, Operations SupervisorP. Duca, Senior Engineer, Regulatory AssuranceA. Ghose, Design Engineer Civil StructuralY. Ghotok, System EngineerC. Johnson, MOV Component EngineerM. Kelly, PM engineerK. Knaide, Engineering DirectorP. Koppel, Preventive Maintenance Program CoordinatorE. Maloney, Principal Nuclear Engineer (lSl)C. Matos, Risk EngineerM. Moore, Senior Reactor OperatorJ. Perry, Hope Creek Site Vice PresidentL. Powell, Technical Analyst Design EngineeringV. Rubinetti, Design Engineer Civil StructuralD. Schiller, Design Engineer ElectricalC. Serata, Manager, Operations SupportG. Stith, Design Engineering ManagerM. Wharton, Electrical EngineerK. Wichman, System EngineerM. Zimmerman, Design Engineer Civil Structural

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Open and Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Audits and Self-Assessments70132091-0020, Focused Area Self-Assessment to Determine Readiness for NRC Component

Design Bases Inspection (CDBI), dated 3123112

Attachment

A-2

Calculations1BC-HV-F0078, MIDACALC Results, AC Motor Operated GL 96-05 Gate Valve, Rev. 21BJ-HV-F006, GL 96-05 Safety Function Assessment, Rev. 26H4-0136, Service Water Project - Valve Pits, Rev. 1

11-92, Reactor BLDG Flooding, Rev. 512-0164, ECCS Suction Strainer Bubble Ingestion, Rev. 024-4, Flood Levels - lntake Structure, Rev. 0317103 (50)-10, Maximum Thrust and Seismic Analysis for PSEG Hope Creek- 14" - Class 900

CS Flex Wedge Gate Valve with SB-3-150 Limitorque Actuator, Rev. 0323342, HCGS Head Loss Calculations and Test Reports for ECCS Suction Strainers, Rev. 2BC-0002, NPSH for RHR Pumps with Suction from Suppression Pool- EPU, Rev. 5BJ-0001, NPSH for HPCI System Pump (Suction from Suppression Pool), Rev. 0C-1733, Service Water Piping ISO 1-P-EA-02 & 1-P-EA-04 Piping Stress Summary, Rev. 7CLC 646-0008, Equipment Foundation Calculation, Rev. 4DEH120233 (70142567-020), Stress Evaluation for 4" Abandoned Pipes Penetrating West Wall

of the Emergency Diesel Generator Building, dated 8123112E-1 .1 , Short Circuit Studies of 13.8, 7 .2, 4.16 kV and 480V Systems, Rev. 8E-1.4, Class 1E 125 and 250 Vdc Systems: Short Circuit and Voltage Drop Studies, Rev. 6E4J, Class 1E 125 Vdc Station Battery and Charger Sizing, Rev. 16E-4.2, Class 1E DC Equipment and Component Voltage Study, Rev. 4E-7 .4, Class 1E 4.16kV System Protective Relays Settings, Rev. 6E-7.6, Diesel Generator Protective Relaying, Rev. 0E-7.9,125Vdc and 250Vdc Class 1E System, Rev.4E-9, Standby Class 1E Diesel Generator Sizing, Rev. 9E-10.1, Cable Medium Voltage Ampacity Cable Sizing, Rev. 1

E-15.1, Load Flow and Degraded Voltage Analysis, Rev. 10E-17B, Voltage Drop for 125Vdc Control Circuit, Rev. 0E-17D,125Vdc: Voltage Drop from Distribution Panel to Load, Rev. 5EA-0001, Station Service Water System Hydraulic Model, Rev. 5EA-0003, Station Service Water System Hydraulic Analysis, Rev. 10EG-0046, STACS Operation, Rev. 7EQ-HC-021A, EQ Supplemental Review Sheets, Rev. 1

EQ-HC-056A, Environmental Qualification Binder for Tyco Electronics, Control and TimingRelays, Model(s) E7000 Series, Rev. 1

EQ-HC-0568, Environmental Qualification Binder for Tyco Electronics, Control Timing Relays,Model(s) ETR Series, Rev. 1

GE-NE-0000-0005-3504, Hope Creek Generating Station Extended Power Uprate (App. R FireProtection), Rev.4

GM-0001, Hope Creek: Auxiliary Building, Diesel Area Heating Ventilating and CoolingSystems Capacity, Air Flow Rate, Air Handling Units Capacities, Coil Selection, PowerRequirements, Rev. 7

GM-0027, Diesel Generator Area HVAC Analysis, Rev. 1

H-1-BJ-MDC-1997, HPCI Lube Oil System Analysis, Rev. 0H-1-KB-MDC-1007, Backup Pneumatic Supplyfor lGSHV-4964 and lGSHV-11541 Valves,

Rev. 1

MIDAS 2011.101, 1BC-HV-F0078, AC Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve, Rev. 2MIDAS 2011.101, 1EA-HV-2204, AC Motor Operated GL96-05 Butterfly Valve, Rev. 3

Attachment

A-3

MIDAS Test 201 1.21, 1BC-HV-F007B, MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet, Rev. 2SC-BB-O179, High Drywell Pressure to Core Spray, RHR, ADS Initiation and RCIC lsolation

Logic, Rev. 2SC-BB-0212, Reactor Water Level to Core Spray, RHR, and ADS lnitiation Logic, Rev. 2SC-BB-0217, ADS Bypass Timer 1-BB-KY-K1148, D, F, H, Rev. 3SC-PB-0002,4kV Vital Bus Degraded Grid Voltage Relay Setpoint/Accuracy, Rev. 2\ffD 317103(04)-01, Weak Link Calculation for MOV 1BC-HV-F0078, dated 1121194\/FD 317104(79), Weak Link Calculation for MOV 1EA-HV-2204, dated 2l14ll1

Corrective Action Notifications20027243200298902012259920305386203374862038177820391 15920391 1602039549220412848204202372043452020435657204379632044122220442561204455702045964720461355204615032046352220467132204699092047421920477368204781322047843620483027204888432048905220489053204890542048905520495609205092572051282220523527

2052528320525322205355352053553720535636205360532053797420542440205441322054598820547369205473812054830020549780205508432055503520555745205564002055710020558004205583222056083220561 3012056389220564923205673012056817020568361205684742056868920568730205688932056891920569024205690412056904220569073

205691732056917420569293205693292056936s20569416*20569419*20569513*20569514*20569598*20569604*2056961 1*2056961 3*20569659*20569670*20569697*20569702*20569713*205697302056980320569855*20569856*20569857*20569861.20569862*20569863*20569864.20569940*2056994120570002*20570026"20570027*20570247*20570422*2057043520570454*20570502*

20570543*20570548*2057058620570641*20570642*20570644*20570822*20570839"20571160*20571203*20571220.20571339*20571342*20571362*20571405"2057140620571418*20571419*20571423*2057143020571438*20571459*20571506"20571507"20571576*20571597*24571620*20571631*20571635*20571724*20571923*2057203120572047*20572050*20572051*20572052*20572133*

20572217*20572395"2Q572403*20572405*2057243220572483*20572490*20572565*2Q572575*20572577"20572581*20572619*20572671*20572683*20572690*20572793"20572818"20572823*20572827*20572868*20572869*20572939.20572962*20572964*20572965"20572967*20573031.20573032*20573033*20573034.20573035*20573036*20573055"20573121"20573122*20573138*20573139.

Attachment

20573140*20573154*20573155.

20573156"20573157*20573160

A-4

20573267*20573268*20573608"

20573609*20574773*

* NOTF written as a result of this inspection

Desiqn & Licensinq Bases10855-D2.8, Design Criteria for Station Service Water System Intake Structure and Related

Yard Piping for the Hope Creek Generating Station, Rev. 1

80072434, Add a Time Delay to the B RHR Min. Flow Valve Hl BC-BC-HV-F0078 Close Logic,Rev. 1

80093669, Relocate Diesel Generator Lube Oil Heater Temperature Switches Hl KJ-1KJTS-75394/-D, Rev. 0

DE-CB.BC-036, Configuration Baseline Document for RHR System, Rev. 1

DE-CB.BJ/FD-073, Configuration Baseline Documentation for High Pressure Coolant Injection(HPCI) System, Rev. 0

DE-CB.EA/EP/EQ-052, Configuration Baseline Documentation for Station Service WaterSystem, Rev.2

DE-CB.KJ-083, Configuration Baseline Documentation for Emergency Diesel GeneratorSystem, Rev. 1

DE-CB.PB-045, Configuration Baseline Documentation for 4 l(\l Auxiliary Power System,Rev. 1

DE-CB.PG/PH-055, Configuration Baseline Documentation for 480 V Auxiliary Power System,Rev.2

DE-CB.PK-062, Configuration Baseline Documentation for 125 VDC Control Power System,Rev. 1

HC.DE-BD.KJ-0001, UFSAR Chapter 15 DB/LB System Validations - EDG System, Rev. 0HCGS-UFSAR Table 3.4-1, Flood Levels at Safety Related Structures, Rev. 0HCN 10-025, Revise Table 9A-2 and 9A-3, to Include MOV EAHV-2204 as Required for Safe

Shutdown of the Plant, Rev. 0N-119-4, Pump Internal ltems Section lll, Division l, Class 1,2and 3ASME Boilerand

Pressure Code Case, dated 2l21l84NLR-N89220, Response to Generic Letter 89-16, lnstallation of Hardened WetwellVent, Facility

Operating License NPF-57, Hope Creek Generating Station, dated 10/30/89NRC Generic Letter 89-16, Installation of a Hardened WetwellVent, dated 911189NRC Letter to PSE&G, Receipt of Response to NRC GL 89-16, dated 1129190Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Amendment No. 120

to Facility Operating License NPF-57, Public Service Electric & Gas Company, HopeCreek Generating Station, Docket No. 50-354, dated 4119199

Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Amendment No. 168to Facility Operating License NPF-57, PSEG Nuclear LLC, Hope Creek GeneratingStation, Docket No. 50-354, dated 8l1l9o

SCI-91-0474, 12" Containment Hard Pipe Vent Project, dated 7131191SCI-92-0219, Discrepancy Between S&L Calculation H-1-GS-MDC-0863 and PRA Engineering

Evaluation H- 1 -GSA-M EE-047 3, dated 3127 192TAC No. ME6440, Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 - Closeout of Bulletin 2011-01,

"Mitigating Strategies," dated 81 10112

Attachment

A-5

Drawinqs01-400-039, 24 VSN Service Water Pump Outline, Rev. H01-600-033, 24 VSN Service Water Pump SectionalArrangement, Rev. G1-P-EA-02, System lsometric Reactor Building Service Water System, Rev. 2093-14250,14'-900 Flex-Wedge Gate Valve, Rev. 793-14257,4'-300 Weld Ends Carbon Steel Flex Wedge Gate Valve with SMB-000-5 Limitorque

Operator, Rev. B5226-E-0327,4160V Connection Diagram, Rev. 710855-E121-22,Vendor Drawing for Switchgear 10D440, Rev. 810855-E1 21-47, Cabinet lnstallation Drawing, Rev. 468393, Outline for CCS Terry Turbine, Rev. E103411, Enaconda Metal Hose Expansion Joint Assembly, Rev. 5103415, Enaconda Metal Hose Expansion Joint Assembly, Rev. 4601701 S 1000, Salem/Hope Creek 500, 13.8, 4kV Elementary One Line Electrical Diagram,

Rev. 3480098425, Vendor Drawing, 480V Motor Control Center (1E), Unit 108,222-012, Rev. 1

A-0201-0, General Plant Floor Plan Level 1, Rev. 13A-0202-0, General Plant Floor Plan Level 1, Rev. 20A-0203-0, General Plant Floor Plan Level 1, Rev. 19A-0205-0, General Plant Floor Plan Level 5, Rev. 22A-0531-0, Separation Criteria Reactor Building Plan, Rev. 4A-0532-0, Separation Criteria Reactor Building Plan, Rev. 44-0533-0, Separation Criteria Reactor Building Plan, Rev. 64-0541 -0, Separation Criteria Auxiliary Building-Control/Diesel, Rev. 6A-0542-0, Separation Criteria Auxiliary Building-Control/Diesel, Rev. 9A-0543-0, Separation Criteria Auxiliary Building-Control/Diesel, Rev. 144-0544-0, Separation Criteria Auxiliary Building-Control/Diesel, Rev. 6A-0549-0 Sh. 1, Separation Criteria Service Water Intake Structure-Sections, Rev. 0C-0222-O Sh. 2, Service Water Valve Pits Sections & Details Valve Pits 4 & 5, Rev. 1

C-0304-0 Sh. 2, Project Civil Standards Typical Concrete Embedment Details, Rev. 27C-0314-0 Sh. 1, Project Civil Standards Blockout and Penetration Sealing Details and Sections,

Rev. 10C-0399 Sh. 270, Equipment Foundation Details, Anchor Bolt Information, Rev. 2C-0938-0 Sh. 2, HCGS RHR Strainer BF211 at Torus Penetration P2118, Rev. 0C-1439-0 Sh. 2, Auxiliary BLDG - Diesel Generator Area Exterior Wall, Rev. 11E-0001-0, Single Line Diagram, Rev. 24E-0002-1 Shs. 1 & 2, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram, Revs. 12 &9E-0003-1, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram Generator-Main Transformer, Rev. 23E-0004-1, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 7.zkV Station Power System, Rev. 9E-0005-0, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16kV Station Power System, Rev. 9E-0005-1 Sh. 1, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16kV Station Power System, Rev. 9E-0006-1 Shs. 1 & 2, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16kV Class 1 E Station Power

System, Revs. 11 & 10E-0021-1-Q, Load List MCC 8.222, Rev. 24E-0048-1, Schematic and Meter and Relay Diagram Diesel Generators, Rev. 10E-6443, Electrical Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Circuit Breaker Control RHR Pump 1BP202,

Rev.8E-0096-0 Sh. 1, Unit Substation-48O V System MCC and Panel Feeder Ckt. Brkrs, Rev. 7

Attachment

A-6

E-0097-0 Sh. 1, Unit Substation-480 V System MCC and Panel Feeder Ckt. Brkrs, Rev. 7E-0211-0 Sh. 4, Electrical Schematic Diagram-Station Service Water System RACS HX Cooling

Loop B Supply MOV HV-2204, Rev. 5E-6231-0, Electrical Schematic-RHR Pump Min Flow Bypass Valves, Rev. 6FSK-P-1-LF-602, Small Pipe/lntake Structure Sump Pumps IAP 577,IBP 577 &lFP 577

Discharge To Debris Trough, Rev. 3FSK-P-1-LF-606, Small Pipe/lntake Structure Sump Pumps IAP 577 & IBP 577 Discharge To

Debris Trough, Rev. 3FSK-P-039, Temporary Air Water and Propane Piping Layout in Power Block, Rev. 6M-10-1 Sh. 1 & Sh. 2, Service Water P&lD, Revs. 54 &42M-15-0, Compressed Air (lnstrument), Rev. 8M-30-1, Diesel Engine Auxiliary Systems - Fuel Oil, Rev. 19M-51-1, Residual Heat Removal P&lD. Rev. 42M-55-1, HCGS High Pressure Coolant Injection, Rev.39M-56-1, HPCI Pump Turbine, Rev. 32M-57-1, Containment Atmospheric Control, Rev. 42M-85, Auxiliary Building DieselArea Ventilation, Rev. 3M-97-0, Intake Structure Building and Equipment Drains Pl&D, Rev. 7P-8831-0, Plumbing and Drainage lntake Structure Plan, Rev. 6P-8832-0, Plumbing and Drainage Intake Structure Plan, Rev. 6PN1-E41-1020-0004, HCGS HPCI System Process Diagram, Rev. 16

Engineerino Evaluations128-10855-1, Seismic Qualification Test Report for the 1E Direct Current Switchgear

Equipment, Rev. 1

70003264,Investigation of HPCI Valve BJHV-F006 Failure to Open during Bypass Testing,Rev.0

70069878-060, Loss 104401 4KV Bus, Trip of Two Reactor Feed Pumps and Resultant ScramRoot Cause Report, dated 3/6/08

70071901, HPCI Feedwater Injection Valve Failure to Open Due to Thermal Binding, dated9t18t07

70105471, D EDG Field Volts and Amps High Root Cause Evaluation, dated 212611070124871-020, Salem 3 GTG, Stage Requirements Technical Evaluation, dated 612011170126024, Create a Reliability PM for Listed MOVs, Rev. 070131512, D SSWS Pump Vibration PMT Not Performed, dated 11411280092449, Backup Pneumatic Supply for lGSHV-4964 and lGSHV-11541 Valves, Rev. 1

80101120, Service Water 4160V Cable Vault Inspection Ports, Rev. 080102571, Evaluate Missing Under-voltage Time Delay Data for D LOOP/LOCA Test, dated

10t19t1080102783-010, Evaluation of B EDG Load Swings During Monthly Surveillance Test Performed

11 11412010, dated 11 l161 10B RHR Motor Replacement Paper, dated 4116109DCR No. 4EC-3538, Replacement ECCS Strainer lnstallation, Rev. 2DCR No. 4EC-3579, HPCI Pump Discharge Valve Disc Weep Holes l BJHV-F006, Rev. 0DP-Y250751, NC.PM-AP.ZZ-0724, HlEA-HV-2355A, Commercial Grade ltem Dedication

Evaluation for Deep Groove Ball Bearing-Single Row, Rev. 0

Attachment

A-7

Evaluation Nos. 70006456,70028584, 70060872,70066560, 70071 704,70073385, 70080090,700801 45, 70083961 , 7008881 9, 70098980, 700991 53, 701 082 47 , 70109413,70 1 099 1 4, 7 01 1 1248, 7 01 1 17 08, 7 01 1 4395, 7 0128340, 7 0129512, 70 1 3 1 1 99,70131512,70138638,70142567, 80096881, 801 02665, 801 03903, 801 06290,80106344. and 80106977

H-1-BB-MEE-1168, Determination of Drywell Insulation Material Debris Sources and QuantitiesGenerated Due to Postulated High Energy Pipe Breaks, Rev. 2

OpEval 12-010, Penetrations HOZZ-W-5112-002andH0ZZ-W-5112-003 Operability Evaluation,Rev.0

PSE-21576, Exelon Powerlabs Evaluation Report for Failed Time Delay Relay, dated 1212110

Functional. Surveillance and Modification Acceptance TestinqHC.IC-CC.BC-0006, RHR-Division 2, Channel E11-N6528 Pump Discharge Flow, performed

9t18t10H C. OP-D L .ZZ-0028, Cathod ic Protectio n Log, performed 7 128 | 1 2HC.OP-IS.BC-0001 , AP202 A Residual Heat Removal Pump In-service, performed 713112HC.OP-IS.BC-0003, BP2O2 B Residual Heat Removal Pump In-service, performed 5116112 &

7t17t12HC.OP-IS.BC-0004, DP202 D Residual Heat Removal Pump In-service, performed 5122112HC.OP-lS.BC-0102, Residual Heat Removal Subsystem B Valves In-service Test, performed

218109, 4125109, 12118109, 312511 1, 4126112, 4128112, and 5119112HC.OP-|S-BJ-0001, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set - OP204 and OP217 - In-service Test,

performed 318112 and 615112HC.OP-lS.BJ-O101, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Valves In-service Test, performed

7t16t12HC.OP-|S.EA-0004, D Service Water Pump - DP502 - In-service Test, performed 5122112HC.OP-|S.GS-0102, Containment Atmosphere Control System Valves - 18 Months, performed

5t1to9 &5t11t12HC.OP-ST-BC-0001, RHR System Piping and Flow Path Verification - Monthly, performed

7t17t12HC.OP-ST-BJ-00O1, HPCI System Piping and Flow Path Verification - Monthly, performed

7t31t12HC.OP-ST-BJ-0002, HPCI System FunctionalTest (Low Pressure) - 18 Months and HPCI

System Response Time Test (High Pressure), performed 11111110 & 518112HC.OP-ST-BJ-0003, HPCI System Valve Actuation Functional Test, performed 11130111HC.OP-ST.EA-0002, Service Water System Functional Test-18 Months, performed 417112HC. OP-ST. EA-0003, Service Water System Functional Test-1 8 Months, performed 31 1 1 | 12HC.OP-ST-KJ-0001, Emergency Diesel Generator 1AG400 Operability Test - Monthly,

performed 7130112HC.OP-ST-KJ-0004, Emergency Diesel Generator 1DG400 Operability Test - Monthly,

performed 61 121 12, 7 l28l 12, & 8l2ol 12HC.OP-ST.KJ-0008, Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator 1DG400 Test - 18 Months,

performed 4126112HC.OP-ST.KJ-0017, EDG 1DG4O0-24 Hour Operability Run and Hot Restart Test, performed

3t21t12SC.OP-PT-TSC-0003, Baldor Portable Emergency Generator, performed 8129112

Attachment

Maintenance Work Orders30035781300777603008751 43009648430098332301 1 69753015027830152544301 53325301 5682130159022301650363016529130171079301 79604301 80379301 97481301 9751 3301 97878301 99748

MiscellaneousANSI/ASME N45.2.2, Packaging, Shipping,

Nuclear Power Plants, 1978Receiving, Storage, and Handling of ltems for

ANSI/ASME OM, Operation and Maintenance Manual, 1987

ASME NQA-1, Quality Assurance Program requirements for Nuclear Facilities, 1994

Certificates of Compliance for PSEG P.O. 4500342078Dresser-Rand Letter to Susquehanna, dated 12118100

E-Mailfrom Hayward Tyler to PSEG (Related to D SW Pump), dated 816112

EPRI Technical Repoft 112175, Capacitor Application and Maintenance Guide

EPRI Technical Report NP-6408, Plant Engineering: Guidelines for Establishing, Maintaining,

and Extending the Shelf Life Capability of Limited Life ltems, Rev. 0 and Rev. 1

ER-HC-310-1009, Hope Creek System Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping, Rev. 7

Final Qualification Plan 46447-01, Uninterruptible Power Supply for Cyberex Inc., Rev. A

Flowserve Letter to PPL, dated 1l22lj1GE Letter PFB-10-83, dated 2111183

HC.OP-DL .ZZ-OOO4, HC - Reactor Bldg Log 4, dated 719112 - 7111112

Hope Creek Generating Station CRIDS Summary - All Points in Alarm, dated 8114112

Hope Creek In-service Testing Program Basis Data Sheets-Valve 1EAHV-2203, Rev. 0

Hope Creek In-service Testing Program Basis Data Sheets-Valve 1EAHV-2204, Rev. 0

Hope Creek - Open Low Margin lssues, dated 6112112

MIL-HDBK-1 131, Storage Shelf Life and Reforming Procedures for Aluminum Electrolytic Fixed

Capacitors, dated 717 199

MOV PVT Report Category: 96-05 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1, dated 6112112

QP-AA-111-101-1001, Hope Creek Narrative Log, dated 5128107 - 5131107

Test Report UG04950246-Q2, PSE&G 24 VSN SSW Pump, dated 112196

3020098330202237302032773022175430222994500624295006551 35008357450095348501 1 1 851501 1 1 855501 1 5071501 1 508350122239501223845012242450122425501225795012258050124143

A-8

50125144501 251 4850127116501273075012730850129051501 29061501 33298501 35344501 35544501 35559501 35637501 35993501 3599950136060501 36066501 3609150136127501 361 59501 361 60

501 361 90501 3626150136264501 3626950136273501 364975013788450140645501 46561501476805014807450148090501 494805014952250149677501 50005501 50303501 50491501 50508501 50765

501 50971501 50996501 51 263501 51 583501 51 71 1

501 51 859501 552036002254360029809600300416007774860090720600947476009489460098087960221285

Attachment

A-9

Test Report UG04950246-05, PSE&G 24 VSN SSW Pump, dated 3118197TNC.DE-WB.ZZ-0002-8, Maintenance Modification Closeout Checklist for Change

No. 4ER-01 17, Rev. 0

Non-Destructive Exam inations60090728-1 90, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 11 111 11060105180-060, W-5112-002 Ultrasonic Thickness Examination, performed 8123112Tan Delta Cable Testing for Service Water Pump 1D-P-502, performed 11109 - 01112

Normal and Special (Abnormal) Operations ProceduresHC.OP-AB.COOL-0003, Reactor Auxiliary Cooling, Rev. 4HC.OP-AM.TSC-0004, Alternate Power Supply to 1E 1251250vdc, Rev. 6HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0001, SACS Pump Room Flooded, WindowAl-85, Rev.21HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0002, RACS Pump Room Flooded, Window A2-D2, Rev. 21HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0022, RACS Pump Room LSH-2365A, Rev. 12HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0135, Station Blackout // Loss of Offsite power ll EDG Malfunction, Rev. 37HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0155, Degraded ECCS Performance/Loss of NPSH, Rev. 8HC.OP-AR.KJ-0007, High Priority Alarm ANN L2 - Combustion Air Temperature High, Rev.22HC.OP-DL.ZZ-0004-F1, Reactor Building Operator Log 4, Rev. 10HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101-FC, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control, Rev. 1 1

HC.OP-EO.ZZ-02OOA, ATWS-RPV Flooding, Rev. 9HC.OP-EO .ZZ-0318, Containment Venting, Rev. 7HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0319, Restoring Instrument Air in an Emergency, Rev. 2HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0323, RHR Shutdown Cooling Injection Valve lsolation Override, Rev. 3HC.OP-EO.ZZ-LIMITS-CONV, EOP Limit Curves and Cautions Conversion Document, Rev. 5HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set - OP204 and OP217 - ln-service Test,

Rev. 56HC.OP-IS.BJ-0101, High Pressure Coolant lnjection System Valves In-service Test, Rev. 65HC.OP-|S.EA-0004, D Service Water Pump - DP502 - In-service Test, Revs. 55 & 56HC.OP-LR.GS-0007, Containment lsolation Valve Type C Leak Rate Test, Rev. 2HC.OP-SO.BC-0001 Table 1, Valve Table, Rev. 51HC.OP-SO.BJ-0001, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operation, Rev.45HC.OP-SO.EA-0001, Service Water System Operation, Rev. 37HC.OP-SO-GM-O001, DieselArea Ventilation System Operation, Rev. 17HC.OP-SO.JE-0001, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System Operation, Rev. 31HC.OP-SO.KJ-0001, EDG Operation, Rev. 64HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0001, Power Distribution Lineup, Rev. 34.53.OP-SO.JET-0001, Gas Turbine Operation, Rev. 34S3.OP-SO.JET-0002, Dead Bus Operation - Station Blackout, Rev. 12

Operatinq ExperienceBrowns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 LER 50-25912012006, HPCI Turbine Failed to Trip Using

ManualTrip Pushbutton, Rev. 0Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1, LER 1-2012-00{ High Pressure Coolant Injection

(HPCI) lnoperable due to Erratic Governor Operation, Rev. 0NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss, dated 5/5/88NRC Bulletin2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System, dated 7127112

Attachment

A-10

NRC Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-RelatedPower-Operated Valves, dated 91 18196

NRC Information Notice 94-24, Inadequate Maintenance of Uninterruptible Power Supplies andInverters, dated 3124194

NRC lnformation Notice 2007-01, Recent Operating Experience Concerning HydrostaticBarriers. dated 1 131 107

NRC Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures, dated2t9t07

NRC Information Notice 2010-09: lmportance of Understanding Circuit Breaker Control PowerIndications. dated 4114110

NRC lnformation Notice 2012-11, Age-Related Capacitor Degradation, dated 7123112

Operator TraininoHope Creek Nuclear Equipment Operator Qualification Checkout Card, Rev. 7Job Performance Measure 2000950501. Vent to Control Containment Pressure with

Suppression Pool Level Less than 180 Inches, Rev. 3NOHO4ADSSYSC-O7, Automatic Depressurization System Lesson Plan, dated 4125112NOH01EOP300, 300 Series Emergency Operating Procedures, dated 315107NOH04EDG000C-02, EDG Systems, dated 1118110NOHO4INERTC-O2, Containment Inerting and Purge System Lesson Plan, dated 312111NOH04SERWATC-09, Operator Lesson Plan for Service Water System, dated 4119112Shift Training Notebook Log #2011-39, Availability of Salem Unit 3

Preventive Maintenance and Inspections20572939, Portable 8.5.b Generator 480V Test, performed 812911230073960-010, MRule 5Y Condition Monitoring HC AUX BLDG, performed 11127107Hope Creek Generating Station Battery Chargers (Static) PCM TemplateHope Creek Generating Station EDG PCM TemplateHope Creek Generating Station Inverter (t or = 5 kVA) PCM TemplateHIZZ-F -4209-002 Penetration Seal I nspection, performed 1 1 125100Maintenance Strategy: HlGS-lGSPSE-1 1554PM 033864, 36 Month Inspect Hard Plant Vent Disc lGSPSE-11554PM Template for Terry (Style) Turbines, Rev. 3SH.MD-EU .ZZ-0009, Motor Power Monitor Data Acquisition for Motor Operated Valves,

performed 4126103

ProceduresCC-AA-203, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. 7CC-HC-102-1001, Control of Time Critical Operator Actions, Rev. 0ER-AA-302, Motor-Operated Valve Program Engineering Procedure, Rev. 5ER-AA-302-1003, MOV Margin Analysis and Periodic Verification Test lntervals, Rev. 6ER-AA-310-1009, Condition Monitoring of Structures, Rev. 2ER-AA-700-1001, License Renewal Program lmplementation Guidelines, Rev. 1

HC.IC-FT.BC-0006, RHR-Division 2, Channel E-11-N652B, Pump Discharge Flow, Rev. 6HC.IC-GP.ZZ-0048, Device/Equipment Calibration Circuit Board Rework, Rev. 2HC.MD-CM.EA-0002, Service Water Pump Overhaul Repair, Rev. 20HC.MD-CM.PK-0001, 125Vdc Battery Charger Troubleshooting, Rev. 11HC.MD-PM.FD-0002, HPCI Turbine Oil System Inspection and Turbine Auxiliaries PM, Rev. 5

Attachment

A-11

HC.MD-ST.PK-0006, 125 Volt Station Batteries Performance Discharge Test, Rev. 2HC.MD-ST.PK-0007, 125 Volt Station Batteries 18 Month Service Test, Revs. 6 & 7HC.MD-ST.PK-0008, 18 Month 125V Battery Chargers Service Test, Rev. 6LS-AA-115, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 13LS-AA-115-1006, Manual for Processing OE Documents, Rev. 0MA-AA-716-012, Post Maintenance Testing, Rev. 18MA-AA-716-210, Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) Process, Rev. gMA-AA-716-210-1001, PCM Templates, Rev. 11

MA-AA-716-210-1005, Predefine Change Processing, Rev. 1

MA-AA-716-230-1001, Oil Analysis Interpretation Guide, Rev. 9MA-AA-716-230-1003, Thermography Program Guide, Rev. 5MA-AA-723-300, BC-F007B, Attachment 7, Diagnostic Test Data Sheet, Rev. 2MA-AA-734-461, Bolt Torquing and Bolting Sequence Guidelines, Rev. 1

MA-AA-746-1001, Electronic Circuit Card RefurbishmenVReplenishment Process, Rev. 2OP-HC-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Rev. 20SA-AA-129-2118, General Guidelines for Temporary Power (TP&L) and Communications Cable

lnstallation/Removal, Rev. 7SM-AA-102-1001, Warehouse Operations, Rev. 7SM-AA-300-1004,In Storage Maintenance of Nuclear Material, Rev. 3SM-AA-300-1005, ln Storage Shelf Life Program, Rev. 3SM-AA-4028, Material Repair Process, Rev. 3

Risk and Maroin ManaqementC149070003-8070, Hope Creek Generating Station Human Reliability Analysis, dated 1112112HC-005.06, Hope Creek Generating Station PRA HPCI System Notebook, Rev. 3HC-005.16, Hope Creek Generating Station PRA Containment Atmosphere Control System

Notebook, Rev.2Hope Creek Generating Station Individual Plant Examination, April 1994Hope Creek Generating Station Individual Plant Examination for External Events, July 1997Margin Management Report, dated 6112112OP-AA-101-112-1002, Online Risk Assessment, Rev. 6Risk-lnformed Inspection Notebook for Hope Creek Generating Station, Revision 2.1a

Svstem Health, Svstem Walkdowns. and Trendinq1DG-400 Lube Oil Analysis Report, dated 5103112, 5130112, 6123112, and 8lO7112125 VDC (Class 1E) System Health Report, Q1-2012250VDC (Class 1E) System Health Report, Q1-2012480 VAC (Class 1E) Substation Power System Health Report, Q1-20124.16kV System Health Report, Q1-2012B RHR Pump Room Walkdown Report, performed 12112111D Emergency Diesel Generator HlKJ-1D-G-400 Lube Oil Condition Report, dated 513112,

5t30t12, & 6t23t12Diesel Generators System Health Report, Q1-2012 and Q2-2012Diesel Generators Walkdown Report, 1131112 and 6107l12D SSWS Pump IST Trend Data, dated 811112EDG Room Temperature Plots for the Period January 1, 2008, to August 29,2012HPCI/RCIC System Walkdown Report, performed 2129112 & 615112HPCI System Health Report, Q1-2012

Attachment

A-12

Reactor Protection System Health Report, Q1-2012RHR System Health Report, Q3-2010 and Q1-2012Service Water System Health Report, Q1-2012Service Water System Walkdown Report, performed 2122112 &6112112

Vendor Technical Manuals and Specifications10855-A400(f)-17, High Pressure BISCOSEAL Typical Installation Detail Parameters, Rev. 610855-E-109, Technical Specification for Metal-Clad Switchgear, Rev. 6322416, Service Water Pump, Rev. 5901505, Towable Generators Installation and Operating Manual, Rev. 1

901506, Tier 213 Towable Generators Installation and Operating Manual, Rev. 1

ECA 8522, Model SER-CB Static Exciter Regulators, Rev. AFDDR No. KT1-623, Terry Turbine HPCI Instruction Manual, Rev. 2H-1-VAR-MDS-0357, Design Specification for ECCS Suction Strainers, Rev. 0PE109Q-0173,4kV Vendor Manual, dated 4120101PM080Q-0028,24 VSN Service Water Pump Performance Curve 97308-1006, Rev. 1

PN1-E11-C001-0040, GEH3292, General Electric Motor Manual, Rev. 0PN1-E41-C001-0055, Byron Jackson HPCI Pump Manual, Rev. 7PN1-E41-C002-0054, Terry Turbine HPCI Pump Drive, Rev.22PNO-E41-4010-0072, GE Specification, Rev. 10PO 4500691988, dated 4119112PP301302-0186, AnchorlDarling Gate, Globe, and Check Valves, Rev. 21PP303AQ-0305, Limitorque SMB Operator, Rev. 7PSE&G WD-324225, RHR Pump Curve N'749, Rev. 0Specification 21A9203, HPCI Turbine Steam Auxiliary Drive, Rev. 4Specification M-0890, Technical/Design Specification for Service Water Pumps for the Hope

Creek Generating Station, Rev. 8WD 314420, Continental Disc Corporation Rupture Disc, Rev. 3WD 315285, GH-Bettis Spring Return Actuator 1GS-HV11541\/fD 315812, GO Inc a Vemco Co Torus Vent Valve Air Supply Regulator Valve, Rev. 2VTD 323602, EPRI Terry Turbine Maintenance and Troubleshooting Guide, Rev. 0

ACADSADAMSASMECAPCBDCDBICFRCSTDBADCD/PDRS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Alternating CurrentAutomatic Depressurization SystemAgency-Wide Documents Access and Management SystemAmerican Society of Mechanical EngineersCorrective Action ProgramConfiguration Baseline DocumentComponent Design Bases InspectionCode of Federal RegulationsCondensate Storage TankDesign Basis AccidentDirect CurrentDifferential PressureDivision of Reactor Safety

Attachment

ECCSEDGEOPEPRIGLHCGSHPCIHTVHXKVINIPIPEIPEEEISTLERLERFMCCMOVNOTFNPSHNRCOEOpESSP&IDPCMPMPRARACSRAWRHRRRWSACSSBLOCASPARSSCSWTSUFSARUVVacVdcVR

A-13

Emergency Core Cooling SystemEmergency Diesel GeneratorEmergency Operating ProcedureElectric Power Research InstituteGeneric LetterHope Creek Generating StationHigh Pressure Coolant InjectionHard Torus VentHeat Exchangerkilo-Voltlnformation NoticeInspection Procedurelndividual Plant ExaminationIndividual Plant Examination of External EventsIn-Service TestLicensee Event ReportLarge Early Release FractionMotor Control CenterMotor-Operated ValveNotificationNet Positive Suction HeadNuclear Regulatory CommissionOperating ExperienceOperating Experience Smart SamplePiping and Instrument DiagramPerformance Centered MaintenancePreventive MaintenanceProbabilistic Risk AssessmentReactor Auxiliaries Cooling SystemRisk Achievement WorthResidual Heat RemovalRisk Reduction WorthSafety Auxiliaries Cooling SystemSmall Break Loss-of-Coolant AccidentStandardized Plant Analysis RiskStructure, System, and ComponentService WaterTechnical SpecificationsUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportUnder-VoltageVolts Alternating CurrentVolts Direct CurrentVoltage Regulator

Attachment

Hope Creek Generating Station; Component Design Bases Inspection.

Documents

Transcript of Hope Creek Generating Station; Component Design Bases Inspection.