Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength

volume19,no.25 july2019

Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength:

Later Wittgenstein on the Difficulties of

Philosophy and the Philosophical Virtues Gabriel Citron

Princeton University

© 2019 GabrielCitronThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019025/>

Wittgenstein used to say to me, “Go the bloody hardway”; and he would write this in letters as well.1 I remember this more of-ten, perhaps, than any other single remark of his. He might have added something like …: “Otherwise you will never be able to do what you want to do. There is … something important in go-ing … against the tendency to seek comfort or stimulus in this or that.”—RushRhees2

Wittgenstein writes: “you can’t think decently if you don’t want to hurt yourself …”3 This was … something he said in one way or another to any of his pupils who were close to him … [P]hilosophy for Wittgenstein was a source of suffering… [a]nd… you could not be intimate with him without knowing that this was so.—MauriceO’ConnorDrury4

If, at the end, no visible traces of your influence remain in my thought, which is extremely unlikely, so shall I at least always have to acknowledge that I learnt from you, how difficult phi-losophy must be, if it is to be more than a collection of materi-als for academic controversy and learned conversation.—G.H.vonWrighttoWittgenstein(WC:414)

OneofthethingswhichsetsWittgensteinapartfrommanyotherphi-losophersisthathedoesnotjusttrytopointoutwhereandinwhat

1. See,forexample,WC:371.(Akeytoallthebibliographicabbreviationscanbefoundattheendofthepaper.)

2. RushRhees,‘TheStudyofPhilosophy’,inhisWithout Answers,London,Rout-ledge&KeeganPaul,1969,p.169.ThisquotationalsoopensthepaperbyJamesConantwhichprovidedtheearly impetus formythoughtsonthesematters (see his ‘On Going the Bloody Hard Way in Philosophy’, in The Possibilities of Sense, ed. JohnH.Whittaker,Houndmills,Palgrave,2002,pp.85–129).

3. WC:370.

4. Maurice O’Connor Drury, The Selected Writings of Maurice O’Connor Drury on Wittgenstein, Philosophy, Religion and Psychiatry, ed. JohnHayes, London,BloomsburyAcademic,pp.212–3[LettertoRushRhees,Spring1966];Ihavesilentlycorrectedatypo.

gabrielcitron Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.25(july2019)

Itwas likelywith this insight inmind thatWittgenstein stressed toMauriceDrury in 1930 that “the distinction between a philosopherandaveryclevermanisarealoneandofgreatimportance”(F:III:195).At least one of the things which distinguishes a philosopher fromsomeonewhoismerelyverycleveristhatthegoodphilosopher—inadditiontovariousintellectualtalentsandskills—needscertaincorevirtuesofcharacter,which Iwill call the ‘philosophicalvirtues.’ It isthesephilosophicalvirtues—aswellasthedifficultiesofthewillthatmakethemnecessary—whichwillbethesubjectofthispaper.

Ininsistinguponthecentralimportanceofcertainvirtuesofchar-acter in thepracticeofphilosophy,Wittgenstein shouldbe countedanotablepredecessortocontemporaryvirtueepistemologistsofthe‘responsibilist’variety.6Hisapproach,however,isbothnarrowerandbroader than thatofmanyvirtue epistemologists. It isnarrowerbe-causemostofWittgenstein’sremarksonthistopicfocusonthosevir-tuesrelevanttoidealphilosophicalpracticespecifically,ratherthantoidealintellectualconductacrosstheboard.Ontheotherhandhisen-gagementisalsobroaderthanthatofmostvirtueepistemologists,be-causeindiscussingthephilosophicalvirtueshedoesnottakehimselftobecontributingmerelytoaparticularsub-fieldofphilosophy(viz.epistemology), nor to a specific researchprogram (viz. the analysisoftheconceptofknowledge),butrather,tobeinvestigatingthepre-conditionsofproperengagementinphilosophyaltogether.Moreover,Wittgenstein’sinvestigationsofthephilosophicalvirtuesareintendedtobepractical: toguidehimselfandhisstudentstowardsbecomingbetterphilosophers,andindeedbetterpeople.Thus,indiscussingphi-losophy’sdifficultiesofthewillandthevirtuesneededtoovercomethemWittgensteinisaddressinghimselftoallwould-bephilosophers

justhowfaragoodcharactercangenuinelytakeoneinphilosophyevenintheabsenceofgreattalent.

6. For an overview of contemporary virtue epistemology—including a sum-maryofthedifferencesbetweenitsresponsibilistandreliabilistforms—seeHeather Battaly, ‘Virtue Epistemology’, Philosophy Compass, 3:4 (2008), pp.639–63.

wayswe gowrong in our thinking, but—like Kant,Nietzsche, andHeidegger—healsohasa lot tosayaboutwhywegowrong in thewayswedo.Wittgenstein’sdiagnosesoftherootsofourphilosophicalmisstepsusuallytakeadoubleform:firstheidentifiesa“difficultyofphilosophy”whichtendstotripusupinourphilosophizing,andthenhe identifiesawayofavoiding thisdifficulty,usually in the formofcertainqualitieswhichwouldallowus toovercomethedifficulty inquestion.

Broadlyspeaking,Wittgensteindistinguishedbetweentwokindsofdifficultyinphilosophy:intellectualdifficultiesontheonehand,anddifficultiesofthewillontheother.Andhethoughtthateachofthesekindsofdifficultydemandsadifferentkindofqualitytoovercomeit:the intellectualdifficultiesmustbeovercomebyvarious intellectualtalents or skills, and thedifficultiesof thewillmustbeovercomebyvariousvirtues of character.Ofthesetwosetsofphilosophicallyhelpfulqualities,Wittgensteinwasclearastowhichwasthemoreimportant.AsheoncesaidtoRushRhees:

[I]nphilosophycharacterwilloftenmakeupforalesserdegree of intellect and talent—whereas it doesn’t holdtheotherway:amorepowerfulintellectbutwantofchar-acter.“Godgiveamancharacter:itwillcarryhimoverallsortsofgapsanddifficulties.”(WPCR:56–75)

5. This relativeweightingofcharacterabove intellect in thegoodpracticeofphilosophyaccountsforWittgenstein’sconsistentjudgementofG.E.MooreasthepreferablephilosopheroverBertrandRussell(atleastinRussell’slateryears).KnutTranøy,forexample,recalledthatononeoccasionWittgenstein“comparedRussellandMoore,sayingthatalthoughMooreonlyhadafractionofRussell’s intellectualpowers,MoorepossessedsomethingwhichRussellhadlost:sincerity.Thatiswhy,headded,onecanstillprofitablydiscusswithMoorewhileithasnotbeenpossibleformanyyearstodosowithRussell”(F:IV:127).Morepointedly,F.R.LeavisreportedhisimpressionthatWittgen-steinhadoncesaidtohim:“Moore?–heshowsyouhowfaramancangowhohasabsolutelynointelligencewhatsoever”(F:II:249).Whenthisremarkisunderstoodin thecontextofWittgenstein’s judgementof thegreater im-portanceofcharacterthanintelligenceinbeingagoodphilosopher,itturnsfromamockingdisparagementofMoore’sphilosophicalachievements,intoasincereandseriousexpressionofadmirationforMoore’scharacterandfor



hisaccountof thevirtuesofcharacter thatareneeded toovercomethosedesires.Section3willaddressourdistortingdesiresregardingphilosophicalformandthevirtuesneededtoovercomethem.Section4willthendiscussWittgenstein’sviewoftheplaceofthephilosophi-calvirtuesinphilosophicalpedagogy.Andfinally,inSection5,Iwillconsiderhowtotakeseriouslytheroleplayedinourphilosophizingbydistortingdesiresandthephilosophicalvirtueswhileavoidingthedanger of havingour philosophical disagreements devolve into theexchangeofmerelyad hominemmoralandpsychologicalattacks.

1. Difficulties of the Will Regarding Philosophical Content

The Big Typescriptcontainswhatcouldprobablybeconsideredthe lo-cus classicus forWittgenstein’s remarkson thedifficultiesof thewillregardingphilosophicalcontent:

[The] difficulty of philosophy [is] not the intellec-tualdifficultyof the sciences, but thedifficultyofa change of attitude. Resistance of thewill must beovercome: … [P]hilosophy … require[s] a resignation,but one of feeling, not of intellect. Andmaybe that iswhatmakes it sodifficult formany…(…Whatmakesasubjectdifficulttounderstand…istheantithesisbetweenunderstandingthesubjectandwhatmostpeoplewanttosee.Becauseofthistheverythingsthataremostobviouscanbecomethemostdifficulttounderstand.Whathastobeovercomeisnotadifficultyoftheintellect,butofthewill.)(BT:86:300)

Thedifficultyofthewillwhichmustbeovercome,then,isthattherearecertainthingsthatpeoplewanttobethecase—andthismakesithardforthemsomuchastoseeanypossiblealternatives,letalonetounderstand themor to accept them.Thus, however strong the con-siderationsagainstourcherishedpositionsmightbe,wewillnotbeabletoproperlyappreciatethemuntilwecanovercomeourconativeresistancetodoingso.

inthehopeofmakingagenuinedifferenceintheirapproachto,andpracticeof,philosophy.7

Despite beingobsessedwith thephilosophical virtues—and thedegreestowhichheandothersdidordidnotembodythem—Witt-gensteinnowherewroteabouttheminasystematicmanner.Rather,inordertouncoverhisunderstandingofthesevirtues,wemustengageinaspeculativereconstructionofhispositionbygatheringtogetherandorganizingthemanyseeminglyoffhandedremarkswhichheleftscatteredthroughouthisnotebooks,diaries,letters,andlectures,andinreportsofconversationshehadwithstudentsandfriends.Whenwedoso,wefindasmallnumberofrecurrentconceptsandconcerns,andtheemergenceofaremarkablyconsistentandsystematicposition.Thepurposeofthispaperistosetforththisposition.

AccordingtoWittgenstein,philosophy’s“difficultiesofthewill”de-rivefromthefactthatmanyofushavestrongdesireswhichinterferewithourphilosophizingandleadusastray.Therearemanywaysthatthesevariousdesirescouldbecategorized,butonehelpfuloptionistodividethemintotwoclasses:desiresregardingphilosophicalcontent, anddesiresregardingphilosophicalform.Theformerclasscoversde-sirestoaffirmparticularphilosophicalpositionsorkindsofpositions,andthelatterclasscoversdesirestophilosophizeinparticularstylesortoundertakeparticularkindsofphilosophicalprojects.8Section1ofwhat followswillsketchWittgenstein’sunderstandingofourdistort-ingdesiresregardingphilosophicalcontent,andSection2willsetout

7. CompareAristotle’s famousremark inThe Nicomachean Ethics, that “weareinquiringnotinordertoknowwhatvirtueis,butinordertobecomegood”(trans.DavidRossandLesleyBrown,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,p.24[II:2,p.1103b27–8]).Happily,somerecentworkemergingfromthefieldofvirtueepistemologyhasmoved in thisbroaderdirection:analyzingandclarifyingtheintellectualvirtuesduetotheirpracticalimportanceforgoodthinking,ratherthanmerelyasameanstosolvevariousoutstandingepiste-mologicalproblemsorpuzzles(IamthinkingparticularlyofRobertC.Rob-ertsandW.JayWood,Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, Oxford,ClarendonPress,2007).

8. Ofcourse,theremaybecaseswhichareindeterminatebetweenthesetwocategories,andcaseswhichsimultaneouslyfallintoboth.



important truths…willbeexpectedinvainfromthosewhohaveaninterestinnotallowingthemtobeaccepted.Such an interest springs either from the fact that suchtruths contradictwhat they themselves teacheveryday,orfromtheirnotdaringtomakeuseofitandafterwardsteachit;or,evenifallthisisnotthecase,theydonotac-knowledgesuchtruths,becausethewatchwordofmedi-ocritieswillalwaysbe:“Ifanyonemakeshismarkamongus,lethimgoanddosoelsewhere.”10

AccordingtoSchopenhauer,then,thebarriersthatthewillputsupinphilosophyboildowntothingslikenotwantingtoadmitthatonewaswrong,beingfearfulofteachinganunorthodoxposition(orapositionfrowneduponbytheauthorities11),orjustplainunwillingnesstorec-ognizetalentanywhereotherthaninoneself.Alloftheseareparadig-maticexamplesofcontextualintereststhatphilosophersmighthavefororagainstparticularphilosophicalpositions.

ThecontextualconsiderationofwhosedistortingeffectsWittgen-steinwasmostwary,however, isourtendencytobecomedeeplyat-tached toourown long-termpositions (whatever theymaybe), be-causewehavebecomehabituated to them. Itwas thisphenomenonwhich lay behindWittgenstein’s 1929 remarks to Drury aboutW.E.Johnson,that“[h]islife’sworkhasbeenhisthreevolumesonlogic.12 Youcan’texpecthimnowtoseethatthereissomethingfundamentallywrongwithwhathehaswritten.Iwouldn’ttryanddiscusswithJohn-son now” (F:III:193).More specifically, Rhees recalledWittgensteinsaying that “it ishard toadoptanewwayof thinking;notbecause

10. ‘OnthePrimacyoftheWillinSelf-Consciousness’,inhisThe World as Will and Representation,VolII,trans.E.F.J.Payne,NewYork,DoverPublications,1958,p.226(chap.XIX,Sec7).

11. FormoreonmotivationsofthiskindseeArthurSchopenhauer,‘OnPhiloso-phyattheUniversities’,inhisParerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Es-says,VolI,transE.F.J.Payne,Oxford,ClarendonPress,1974,pp.137–97.

12. W.E.Johnson,Logic,PartsI–III,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1921,1922,and1924.

WhatkindsofpositionsdoesWittgensteinthinkphilosopherssodesire to be true that their thinking becomes distorted as a result?Wittgensteinthoughtthatsomekindsofdistortingdesireweredeeperthanothers.Onthesuperficialsidetherearepositionswhichphiloso-pherswanttobetrueformerelycontextualreasonswhichareonlyac-cidentallyrelatedtothepositions’specificcontent.Andonthedeeperside therearepositionswhichphilosopherswant tobe true for rea-sonsinternaltothepositions’content.Iwilldealwiththeseinturn.

1.1. Philosophical positions attractive for merely contextual reasonsContextualreasonscouldinclude,forexample:wantingthepositionyou’vebeenworkingonallmonth(whateveritmaybe)tobetrue,sothat youdon’tneed to start again fromscratch;wanting the radicalposition(whateveritmaybe)tobetrue,sothatyoucangainanameasaphilosophicalmaverick;wantingtheas-yetunproposedposition(whateveritmaybe)tobetrue,sothatyoucanbeknownasthefirsttohavearguedforit;orwantingthefashionableposition(whateveritmaybe)tobetrue,sothatyoudon’tneedtoswimagainstthephilo-sophicaltideintryingtogetpublished.Schopenhaueroftenhighlight-edthewaysinwhichthesekindsofcontextualmotivesinterferedper-vasivelywithgoodphilosophicalpractice.Thus—inapassage fromwhichWittgensteinlaterquotedonmorethanoneoccasion9—Scho-penhauerobservedthat:

Nothing ismore tiresomeandannoying thanwhenweargue with a person with reasons and explanations …undertheimpressionthatwehavetodealonlywithhisunderstanding, and thenfinallydiscover thathewill notunderstand; thatwe thereforehad todealwithhiswill, whichpaysnoheed to the truth,butbrings intoactionwillful misunderstandings, chicaneries, and sophisms,entrenching itselfbehind itsunderstandingand its sup-posedwantofinsight…Acknowledgementofthemost

9. See,forexample,MS:158:34v.



inwhichthewillcaninterferewiththeintellectwaslimitedtodesiresofthismerelycontextualsort.Wittgensteinwrote:

OnecouldcallSchopenhaueraquitecrudemind.I.e.,Hedoeshaverefinement,butatacertainlevelthissuddenlycomestoanend&heisascrudeasthecrudest.Whererealdepthstarts,hisfinishes.OnemightsayofSchopen-hauer:henevertakesstockofhimself.(CV:41)

It takes a certain degree of self-reflective refinement to realize thatourdesires tend to leadusastray in thepracticeofphilosophy.Butif Schopenhauer could think that considerationsas crudeas thede-sire simply to save faceor to retainone’s jobare theprincipalwaysinwhichthewill interfereswiththeintellect inphilosophy,thenhemustsurelyneverhavetakenstockofhimself—foraccordingtoWitt-genstein,countlessmuchmoreprofoundresistancesofthewillareatworkthroughoutSchopenhauer’sownphilosophy,andSchopenhauerwasclearlyoblivioustothem.

1.2. Philosophical positions attractive for intrinsic reasons: the phenomenon of philosophical “charm”Wittgensteinhadadeceptivelyquaintwordforthekindofattractive-nessthatcertainphilosophicalpositionscanhavebyvirtueoftheirin-trinsiccontent—namely,‘charm’.16AccordingtoWittgenstein,certainphilosophicalpositionsandideascharmus,andtothedegreethatweareundertheirattractivespelltheycanradicallydistortourthinking.Charm,forWittgenstein,comesinmanydegrees—fromthingswhichwewanttobethecase,throughthingswhichwelongtobethecase,allthewaytothingswhichweseemtoneedtobethecase.17Moreover,

16. ‘Reiz’ inGerman(thoughmostinstancesofthewordappearinvariousstu-dentnotesofWittgenstein’sEnglish-languagelectures,sothechoiceoftheEnglishword‘charm’ishisown).

17. Wittgensteinpresumablyhadinmindboththemodernandtheoriginalsens-esof‘charm’.Inthemodern(weak)sensesomethingmightbesaidtocharmsomeonesimplyifitfascinatesandattractsthem.Butinitsoriginal(strong)sense,ifsomethinghadcharmedsomeonethenitheldacontrollingmagical

it’s hard to understand, but because you don’twant to give up theway you’ve always gone” (WPCR:61). There aremany reasonswhyitmightbedifficult togiveupa familiarwayof thinking.Habitsofthought,forexample,maysimplyblindustotheexistenceofalterna-tivepossibilities.13Butevenifwedonoticethealternatives,pridemaymakeusunwillingtoadmitthatwehadbeenwrongallthistime.Ad-ditionally,stubbornnessmaymakeusaverse toacknowledging thatour investment in those ideaswasallwasted.Butperhapsthemostpowerfulofthesedifficultiesisthesimplefactthatwetendtofeelathomeamongideasandwaysof thinkingtowhichwehavebecomeaccustomed—theycometofeelsafe,makingitafrighteningprospecttoleavethembehind.As“Wittgensteinoftensaidinconversation,”it“canbejustplainunpleasant”foraphilosopher“togiveupallhispetnotions…andstartagainfromnothing”(WPCR:5914).BertrandRus-selldescribedthisphenomenonmoredramatically:

[W]henamantellsyouthatsomethingyou’vealwaysbe-lievedwasinfactnottrue,itgivesyouafrightfulshockand you think, ‘Oh! I don’t knowwhere I am.When IthinkI’mplantingmyfootupontheground,perhapsI’mnot.’Andyougetintoaterror.15

AsImentionedearlier,however,Wittgensteinconsideredthedesireforaphilosophicalpositionthatrestsentirelyonitsaccidentalcontex-tualproperties—ratherthanonitsintrinsiccontent—tobethemoresuperficial of philosophy’s distorting desires. Indeed, I would sug-gestthatWittgenstein’s1939/40condemnationofSchopenhauerwasbasedpreciselyonthefactthatSchopenhauer’sdiscussionoftheways

13. Andforthisreasononeoftheprincipalaimsofphilosophy,forWittgenstein,iswakingpeopleuptotheexistenceofalternativepossibilities(seeF:III:77,WPCR:36–9,andofcoursePI:113–5andthereabouts).

14. SeealsoF:III:280–1.

15. InBertrandRussell,Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind,Westport,GreenwoodPress,1974,p.133(chap.10;Ihaveaddedintheclosingquotationmarkthatwasmissingfromtheoriginal).



mathematics—there is a “natural tendency” to think that “[m]ath-ematical propositions say something about a mathematical reality”(LFM:140). One of the reasons for this is that “certain branches ofmathematicshavebeendevelopedinwhichthecharmconsistsinthefactthatpuremathematicslooksasthoughitwereappliedmathemat-ics—appliedtoitself.Andsowehavethebusinessofamathematicalrealm”(LFM:15018).Whyisthenotionoftheexistenceofa“mathemat-ical realm”socharming?Ofcourse itmightnotbecharming forev-eryone,andforthosetowhomitischarmingitmaybesoforavarietyofdifferentreasons—butWittgensteinthoughtthatonefundamentalreasonsomanypeopleareattractedtotheexistenceofadistinctmath-ematicalrealmisthatsucharealmwouldaffordthemthepossibilityofaworldintowhichto“escape”.AwonderfullyillustrativeanecdoteisrelatedbyKarlBritton.BrittontoldWittgensteinthathehadreviewedC.E.M.Joad’sbookTeach Yourself Philosophy19,andWittgensteinrepliedthathe“assumedit[was]abadbookandhoped[Britton]…hadnotlosttheopportunityofsayingso.”Brittonrecounts:

IsaidthatIhadsaidso;butthatIhadlentthebooktoapolicemanofmyacquaintancewhohadread italoudto hiswife cover to cover. They had both been greatlycharmed:“Itopenedupanewworldtome,” thepolice-man said. This very much interestedWittgenstein andafter amomenthe said: “Yes, Iunderstandhow that is.Haveyoueverseenachildmakeagrottowithleavesandstonesandcandles—andthencreepinoutoftheworldintoakindofworldhehasmadeforhimself?Itwasthegrotto that your policeman friend liked to creep into.”(F:II:21020)

18. SeealsoLFM:144–5andRFM:V:5.

19. C.E.M.Joad,Philosophy(TeachYourselfBooks),HodderandStoughton,1944.

20.SeealsoF:III:211onDrury’smotivesforreadingThomasàKempis’The Imita-tion of Christ.

inmanyinstanceswhenthecharmdoesnotseemallthatserious,oneneedbutscratchthesurfacetodiscoverthatwhathadappearedtobemerelyamildattractionactuallyspeakstoaverydeepneed,andwearefarfurtherintotheclutchesofthischarmthanwehadsuspected.Indeed,whatismostinterestingaboutWittgenstein’svariousdiscus-sionsofphilosophicalcharmisthefactthatheuncovers(oratleasttakeshimselftohaveuncovered)deepexistentialmotivationsinthemostunlikelyareas. Itmightbethoughtobviousthatpeoplewouldhaveanexistential stake in thedebatesofmoralphilosophyor thephilosophyofreligion—butWittgensteindiagnosesequallydeepex-istentialconcernsinsuchabstractandseeminglydisinterestedfieldsasthephilosophyoflanguageorthephilosophyofmathematics.IwillillustratethisbybrieflysketchingtwoexamplesofthingswhichWitt-genstein took tobe liable tocharmsomephilosophers inways thatcould cause intense resistance to seeing things differently.Wittgen-stein’snotionofcharmshouldnotbetakentostandorfallwiththeseparticularcases,rathertheyshouldbeseenmerelyasexamplesofthekindsofwaysinwhichdistortingdesirescaninsidiouslyaffectourphi-losophizing—eveninthemostunexpectedplaces.

First example: the charm of a mathematical (or metaphysical) realm. Ac-cording toWittgenstein—inhis 1939 lectureson the foundationsof

powerover them.There canbenodoubt thatWittgenstein sometimes in-tendedthisstrongsensetobeheardinhisuseoftheword‘charm’,becauseonotheroccasionshedescribedourphilosophicalpredicamentusingwordsexplicitly indicative of an untowardmagical force. Compare, for example:hisfamousremarkthat“[p]hilosophyisastruggleagainstthebewitchment[Verhexung]ofourunderstandingbytheresourcesofourlanguage”(PI:109);histhoughtthat“[o]urmottomightbe:‘Letusnotbebewitched[behexen]’”(Z:690);hisobservationthat“[y]ouareunderthemisapprehensionthatthephilosophicalproblemis difficult,whereasit’shopeless.Iwantyoufirsttore-alisethatyou’reunderaspell”(MS:158:37r;writteninEnglishintheoriginal);andhisreflectionthat“Inowbelievethatitwouldberighttobeginmybookwithremarksaboutmetaphysicsasakindofmagic[Magie].ButindoingthisImustnot…makefunofit.Thedepthofmagic[Magie]shouldbepreserved…For,backthen,whenIbegantalkingaboutthe‘world’(andnotaboutthistreeortable),whatelsedidIwantbuttokeepsomethinghigherspellbound[bannen]inmywords?”(PO:116–7).



generallycouldplaytheverysameescapistrole.23ThusWittgensteincanwritethatourphilosophicalmisstepsoften“satisf[y]”preciselyour“longingforthetranscendental”(BT:90:312).

Giventhisanalysis,thecharminvolvedhereisnotmerelyatriflingattraction,butsomethingthathasroots inaperson’sdeepestneedsand longings, and perhaps even in their highest ideals and aspira-tions.Togiveupawayofthinkingthatanswerstosuchfundamentalneedsistoriskentirelylosingoneself,24or—asWittgensteinputittoRheesin1944—torisk“leav[ing]oneallbewildered&withafeelingofworthlessness” (WC:317). It isprofoundresistance to thiskindofoutcomethatWittgensteinhadinmindwhenhecountedresistancesofthewillassuchaseriouskindofdifficultyforphilosophy.

Second example: the charm of the remarkable, the dazzling, and the paradoxi-cal. AnotherclusterofthingswhichWittgensteintooktoprofoundlycharmmanypeople—thereby leadingthemastray—are theremark-able, the dazzling, and the paradoxical. In this connectionWittgen-steinfindsGeorgCantor’snotionofthetransfinitetobeaparticularlyrichcasestudy.Inhis1939lecturesWittgensteinsaid:

IfIsay‘thecardinalnumberofallcardinalnumbers’…itconjures up… the picture of an enormous colossal num-ber—whichgivesitagreatcharm.Andtosaythatthereisasubject treatingof thisnumberandofgreaternum-bers—wearedazzledbythethought.(LFM:25325)

23.WittgensteinoncesaidofC.D.Broad:“PoorBroadthinksofphilosophyasthephysicsoftheabstract”(quotedinAllanJanikandStephenToulmin,Wittgen-stein’s Vienna,NewYork,SimonandSchuster,1973,p.258[chap.8]);seealsoLFM:138.

24. Indeed,Russellreportsthathewouldhavecommittedsuicideasanadoles-centwereitnotforhisstudyofmathematics(inhisThe Autobiography of Ber-trand Russell: 1872–1914,Boston,LittleBrownandCompany,1967,p.50[chapII]).Presumablyitspowertoprovidehimwithanescapefromtheworldofabulliedmisfitschoolboyintothepristineandpeacefulheavenofmathemati-calformsplayedaroleinthis.

25. SeealsoRFM:II:42.

Wittgenstein’s analysis of what had so “charmed” the policeman isveryacute,andIthinkthatthisiswhatWittgensteinconsiderstobeattheheartofthecharmofbelievinginamathematicalrealm.Infact,thisispreciselywhatRussellexplicitlyadmittedofhimself,callinghis“beliefinthePlatonicrealityofnumbers”a“comfortingfaith”21.Asheexplained:

Whatisbestinmathematicsdeserves…tobeassimilatedasapartofdailythought,andbroughtagainandagainbefore the mind with ever-renewed encouragement.Reallifeis,tomostmen,alongsecond-best,aperpetualcompromisebetweentheidealandthepossible;buttheworld of pure reason knowsno compromise, no practi-cal limitations,nobarriertothecreativeactivityembody-inginsplendidedificesthepassionateaspirationaftertheperfectfromwhichallgreatworksprings.Remotefromhumanpassions,remoteevenfromthepitifulfactsofna-ture, thegenerationshavegraduallycreatedanorderedcosmos,wherepure thoughtcandwellas in itsnaturalhome,andwhereone,atleast,ofournoblerimpulsescanescapefromthedrearyexileoftheactualworld.”22

Tobelieveinanobjectivelyexistingmathematicalrealmistobelievethatthereisatleastsomewherethatisperfect,thatisunsulliedbythedisorderanddisappointmentsofmaterialreality,andthatwecanin-habititinourminds.Russellmightaswellhavedeclared—inHilber-tian tones—“Noone shalldriveus from thisparadise thatwehavecreatedforourselves!”Andofcoursethisisnotlimitedtothemathe-maticalrealmalone,forspeculationsaboutametaphysicalrealmmore

21. Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, New York,W.W. Norton&Company,1903,p.x(‘IntroductiontotheSecondEdition’).

22. BertrandRussell,‘TheStudyofMathematics’,inhisMysticism and Logic: and Other Essays,London,GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1959,pp.60–1(fora longerdiscussion see Russell’s My Philosophical Development, London, Routledge,1995,pp.154–8[chap.17]).



“thereisabsolutelynoreasontomarvelat”them(CV:7).27Peoplearetrapped, forwhile they cannot escape the scientistic outlookwhichinsiststhatoncesomethingisscientificallyexplaineditcannolongerbewondrous,theynonethelessstillneedsomethingtowonderat.

Ifmodernsarenolongerabletonaturallywonderatthecommon-placeortheexplicable,sciencewillneedtofillthisvoidbyproviding“scientificallysanctioned”marvels—paradoxeswithin thesciencestodazzlepeople.Thusthephysicistsofferupastonishingentities(suchastableswhicharesoliddespitebeingalmostentirelyempty28), themetaphysicians offer up bizarre objects (such as goldenmountainswhich do not exist but which nonetheless have being29), and themathematiciansofferupmind-bogglingnumbers(suchasthecardinalnumberofallcardinalnumbers).30AsWittgensteinremarkedregard-ingthetransfinite,itgivestheimpressionthat“itintroducesustothemysteries of themathematical world” (RFM:II:40). Such paradoxesandmysteries are a religionmanqué—they provide the last remain-ing breathing-hole in the suffocating layer of cellophanewhich sci-

27. Thisattitudeiswell-encapsulatedbyJohnKeats’famouslines,railingagainstthenaturalphilosophers:“Donotallcharmsfly/Atthemeretouchofcoldphilosophy?/Therewasanawfulrainbowonceinheaven:/Weknowherwoof,her texture;she isgiven/ Inthedullcatalogueofcommonthings./PhilosophywillclipanAngel’swings,/Conquerallmysteriesbyruleandline,/Emptythehauntedair,andgnomedmine—/Unweavearainbow,asiterewhilemade/Thetender-person’dLamiameltintoashade”(‘Lamia—PartII’,inhisThe Poetical Works of John Keats,ed.WilliamT.Arnold,London,KeganPaulTrench&Co,1884,p.198,lnn.229–38).

28.See,forexample,ArthurS.Eddington,The Nature of the Physical World,NewYork,TheMacmillanCompany,1929,pp.ix–xii(‘Introduction’).

29.See,forexample,BertrandRussell,The Principles of Mathematics,NewYork,W.W.Norton&Company,1903,pp.449–50(§427).

30.ThisispartofwhatlaybehindWittgenstein’sdisgustwithmostofthe‘pop-ularscience’ofhisday: that itprovidedpeoplewithcheapandmisguidedmarvelingasareplacementfortruewonder.AsDesmondLeereported,“hehatedthepronouncementsabouttheuniversewhichitbecamefashionablefordistinguishedscientiststomakeduringthetwentiesandthirties(Edding-tonandJeansarethebest-knownexamples).Hespokeofthemas‘pontificat-ing’,meaning,Ithink,puttingonthemantleofpriesthood,tryingtoarrogatetothemselvesasemi-religiousstatus,whichWittgensteinregardedaswhollybogus”(F:II:194;seealsoLA:27).

Earlier in that lecture series Wittgenstein had discussed a simplemathematical trickandnoted that—at least for thenovice—it “setsthewholemindinawhirl,andgivesthepleasantfeelingofparadox”(LFM:16).Hethenobservedthat“[i]fyoucanshowtherearenumbersbiggerthantheinfinite,yourheadwhirls.Thismaybethechiefreasonthiswasinvented”(LFM:16).Aswiththepreviousexampleofcharm,thephenomenonof reveling in the remarkableand theparadoxicalis not limited to mathematics, but is common throughout philoso-phy.Thusentireapproachestometaphysics,philosophyofmind,andphilosophyoflanguagearebuiltuponsuchseemingly“paradox[ical]”factsasthat“onecanthinkwhatisnotthecase”(PI:95),orthatpropo-sitions are“somethingveryremarkable”(PI:93)becausetheycanrep-resentbothhowthingsareand equallyhowthingsarenot.Indeed,in1931Wittgensteinwentsofarastoclaimthatthewhole“fascinationofphilosophy lies inparadoxandmystery” (KLWL:63).Onceagain,Russellalmostadmitstothisplainlywhenhesays—evenifsomewhatfacetiously—that“thepointofphilosophyistostartwithsomethingsosimpleasnottoseemworthstating,andtoendwithsomethingsoparadoxicalthatnoonewillbelieveit.”26

Now,whiletheremarkableandtheparadoxicalmightsometimesbecharminginonlythetamesense—actingmerelyastitillatingdis-tractions—they areoftenmuchmore than that. In fact, aswith thepreviousexample,peopleoftenhaveaprofoundneedtoclingtotheremarkablenessandparadoxicalityof thesephenomena.Foraccord-ingtoWittgenstein,inourscientisticagetheremarkableandthepara-doxicalcanplayasurreptitiouslyreligiousroleinpeople’slives—fill-ingwhatwouldhavebeentheplaceofreligiousaweandwonder.AsWittgensteintells it,peoplewereonceableto“marvel”at“everydayphenomena”andthe“commonplace”(CV:7),butsciencehascometobe“awayofsending[people]offtosleep”byconvincingthemthatonce it is “see[n] clearly that these phenomena have causes” then

26.BertrandRussell,The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,London,Routledge,2009,p.20(Lecture2).



orthecharmofgrandunifyingexplanations(LA:26,fn6).33Andjustaswiththecharmofthemathematicalrealmorthecharmofthepara-doxical,Wittgenstein thought thateachof these couldbe shown tohavedeeprootsinfundamentalhumanneedsandlongings.Ofcourse,evenifwearenotconvincedbyWittgenstein’sspecificdiagnosesofwhichpositionscharmusandwhy,34wemaystillgrant—andgivenwhatweknowabout thepowerof subconsciousneedsanddesires,it would seem very reasonable to grant—that the phenomenon ofdistortingphilosophicalcharmisarealone,andthatitstentaclesarelikely to runverydeep. Itwasagainst thebackgroundof thesepro-foundandsubterraneandesires tuggingatus inourphilosophizingthatWittgenstein,in1938,declared:“Nothingissodifficultasnotde-ceivingyourself”(CV:39).

2. The Corrective Virtues of Honesty, Humility, Courage, Strength, and Seriousness

Whatwemustaskatthispointis:ifthesearethekindsofresistanceof thewill that philosophy is up against, thenhow can philosophyhaveanyhopeofsucceeding?Wemightworry,afterall,thatmererea-soncannotovercomecommitmentswhichstemnotfromreasonbutfromdeepexistentialneedsandyearnings.Wittgenstein’sanswer isthatthereareparticularvirtuesofcharacterwhichcouldenableonetoovercomethesekindsofphilosophicalattractions—virtues,unfor-tunately,farrarerthanintellectualtalentandskill.35ForWittgensteintherearetwoessentialmomentsinvolvedinsuccessfullydealingwith

33. Suchas,according toWittgenstein, thecharmofDarwin’s theoryofevolu-tion.Perhapshehadinmindherethatmanypeoplehaveadeepneedfortheworldtobetidyandorderedbecausechaosisprofoundlyunsettling.ItisinthisconnectionthatWittgensteinwrotein1948that“[w]henphilosophizingyouhavetodescendintotheoldchaos&feelathomethere”(CV:74).KarlBrittonreported thatWittgensteinoncesaid tohim“withgenuinecompas-sion”:“Iamsorryforyou…Iseehowitis:youhaveatidymind”(F:II:210).

34.AndgivenWittgenstein’scommitment toacknowledgingheterogeneity,heoughttobehappytograntthatdifferentpeoplearelikelytobecharmedindifferentwaysandbydifferentthings.

35. See,forexample,F:II:9andF:II:195.

enceiswrappingaroundusevermoretightly(seeCV:57)—andgivingthemupwouldbeashardasgivingupone’sreligion.Thusthecharmof the remarkable and theparadoxical is no longer that of a parlorgame—rather,itisthatofthedeepexistentialneedforawonder-sur-rogate.WittgensteinsummedthematterupverywellinadespondentremarktoRhees:

YoucancertainlyexposeandrefutetheCantorbusiness.You can knock the Cantor business sky high. But thatwon’tpreventpeoplefrombelievingitandgoingonre-peatingit.Becauseitisn’tforsuchreasonsthattheyholdtoit.(WPCR:61–2)

Thepoint is thateven ifWittgensteinhad theargumentsandanaly-ses to “show… that”Cantor’s transfinite paradise “is not a paradise”atall,butmerelyasetofconfusions(LFM:103),thiswouldhavenoeffectonpeoplewhoaresodeeplyattachedto inhabitingthatpara-disethattheyaresimplyunwillingtocountenanceitsunreality.Suchpeoplewillbeunable toappreciateandabsorb thearguments—nomatterhowsoundorpenetratingtheymightbe.Incasessuchastheseitshouldcomeasnosurprisethatpeople,“whencontradicted”,tendto“kickwithforelegsandhindlegslikesomeanimals”(WC:338).31

NumerousotherexamplescouldbebroughtofthingswhichWitt-gensteintooktopowerfullycharmmanyofus,suchas:thecharmofreductionstotherepellentorlowly(LA:24,WC:390,andMWL:9:9),32

31. This is reminiscentofFrege’sexasperatedcomplaintsabouthowhard it istoconvincephilosophersofanythingunfamiliar:“Thiswayacademicshaveofbehavingremindsmeofnothingsomuchasthatofanoxconfrontedbyanewgate: it gapes, itbellows, it tries to squeezeby sideways,butgoingthroughit—thatmightbedangerous”(inhisPosthumous Writings,eds.HansHermes,FriedrichKambartel,andFriedrichKaulbach,trans.PeterLongandRogerWhite,Oxford,BasilBlackwell,1979,p.186[‘IntroductiontoLogic’]).IamgratefultoJamesKlaggeforpointingmetothispassage.

32. Suchas, according toWittgenstein, thecharmofFreud’s theoryofdreams.Perhapshehad inmindhere that it is enormously attractive to think thateven themost lofty things are really just repellentor lowly, for then I amexcusedforallthatisrepellentandlowlyinmyself(afterall,it’snotreallyanydifferentfromwhatisloftyinothers).



Talentandclevernessarenecessaryforbeingagoodphilosopher,buttheywillnothelpifonedoesnotknowoneself.39Forifyoudonotevenknowwhatcharmsandattractionsaresecretlyorientingyourthinking,thenyoucannotplausiblyhopetoovercometheirdistortinginfluence.FreudservedWittgensteinasaparticularlydramaticexampleoflackof self-knowledge, because—onWittgenstein’s reading—Freudwasundertheinfluenceofcharmpreciselywherehethoughtthathehadovercomeitsinfluence.Thus,in1944Wittgensteinwrote:

[Freud] always stresses what great forces in the mind,whatstrongprejudicesworkagainsttheideaofpsycho-analysis.Butheneversayswhatanenormouscharmthatideahasforpeople,justasithasforFreudhimself.Theremaybestrongprejudicesagainstuncoveringsomethingnasty,butsometimesitisinfinitelymoreattractivethanitisrepulsive(WC:390).40

Thus,thoughonecertainlyneedsclevernessinordertosucceedinad-dressingphilosophicalproblems,oneneedswisdomagreatdealmore.

[F:III:18]).ItisaninterestingquestionwhetherrelatedfactorscouldaccountforWittgenstein’s consideringKant andBerkeley to bedeep (F:III:174), orwhetherhehaddifferentmattersinmindinthosecases.

39. Infact,ifonelackswisdomandtheothervirtuesofcharacter,increasedclev-ernesswilltendtomakeoneworseoffratherthanbetteroff,fortheclevereroneisthemoretoolsforself-deceptiononewillhaveatone’sdisposal.AsWittgensteinwrote toLudwigHänsel in 1937: “[C]larityof thoughts…be-comesexceedinglyimportantwherelackofclaritycouldleadtoself-decep-tion.Ibelieve,forexample,thatIcouldmakemyselfmoreeasilyunderstoodtoapersonwhoislessintelligentthanyouare,sincehewouldnothaveaparrysoreadilyathisdisposal,whichmustonlythenagainbeestablishedasunsound.ButImeanofcoursenotthatthisintelligenceissomethingbad;it is only something dangerous unless it is joined by another intelligence”(WH:299)—namely, by wisdom and the ‘moral intelligence’ of the otherphilosophicalvirtues.(SeealsoWittgenstein’ssimilarremarktoPieroSraffaatWC:372).

40.Wittgenstein took thisblindness tohimself tobeagreat failingonFreud’spart. I imagine that this is what lies behind Wittgenstein’s extraordinarycondemnationof Freud from 1930: “[A]s far ashis [=Freud’s] character isconcernedheisprobablyaswineorsomethingsimilar”(D:17;interestingly,Wittgensteinsaysexactlythesameofhimselfin1937[WH:305]).

ourdistortingdesires for certainphilosophical positions:firstly, thedifficultprocessofcomingtoknowthedistortingneedsanddesiresthatonehas,andsecondly,thedifficultprocessofovercomingthem.Iwilldiscussthesetwomomentsinturn.

2.1. The difficulty of coming to know one’s philosophically distorting desires: acquiring wisdom through a combination of honesty, humility, courage, and strengthThe first challenge is that of coming to knowoneself and one’s de-sires.AsWittgensteinwrotein1937:“Whoeverdoesnotwanttoknowthemselves,theirwritingwillbeakindoffraud”(MS:120:72v36).Heexplainedfurther,in1946,that“[t]helesssomebodyknows&under-standshimself the lessgreathe is,howevergreatmaybehis talent”(CV:5337)—andhepointed toFreud(amongahandfulofothers)asanexampleofathinkerwho,whilehighlytalented,couldnotbegreat becausehedidnotknowhimself.Wittgensteinusuallyusedtheterm‘wisdom’ to signify knowledge of the darker byways of the humanpsycheinoneselfandinothers—soitshouldcomeasnosurprisethatWittgensteinoncetoldRheesthat“wisdomissomethingIneverwouldexpectfromFreud.Cleverness,certainly;butnotwisdom”(CF:42).38

36.Mytranslation;inthisandallthefollowingcasesIamgratefultoDavidEganforhisgeneroustranslationhelpandadvice.

37. Comparealsohiswell-knownremarkstoRussellfrom1913:“Ican’twriteyouanythingaboutlogictoday.Perhapsyouregardthisthinkingaboutmyselfasawasteoftime—buthowcanIbealogicianbeforeI’mahumanbeing!Far themostimportantthingistocometotermswithmyself!”(WC:63).

38.SeealsoD:103–5whereWittgensteinaccusesSpinozaoflackingself-knowl-edgeandthereforeofhavingmerelyhollowwisdom.Ithinkthat—at leastsometimes—Wittgenstein’suseof‘deep’and‘shallow’wasrelatedtothis:aphilosophyisdeepifitshowsanunderstandingof,andisthereforeabletogenuinelymeet,ourtrueneedsanddesires(asinWittgenstein’sremark:“Iwouldliketobedeep&yetIshyawayfromtheabyssinthehumanheart!!–”[D:183]). Thus, I take it that he accuses both Schopenhauer (CV:41 andF:III:174)andNietzsche(F:III:18)ofbeingshallowbecausewhiletheytookthemselvestobeaddressingpreciselyourdeepestneeds,theyfellwoefullyshortdue tonothavingunderstoodwhat thoseneeds really are (thus, forexample,ofNietzsche’s“generalworldview”Wittgenstein“saidthathedidn’tthinktherewasmuch ‘consolation’tobehadfromit—itwas ‘tooshallow’”



Itisterribletohavetoacknowledgehowfragileourhappinessis,howweakwemustbetobesobeholdentoillusionforthathappiness,andhowfarthisweaknessmakesusslavesofuntruthandself-deception.

Whatwouldittake,then,inordertoovercomethedifficulty,hor-ror,orjustplainnastiness,ofcomingtoknowourselves?AccordingtoWittgenstein this demands a combination of humility and cour-age:noonecouldbear to trulyknowthemselves “unless theywanttohumiliatethemselvesthrough&through”(D:221),and“[w]ithoutalittlecourageonecan’tevenwriteasensibleremarkaboutoneself”(D:9).Humilityistheprimaryvirtuethatisneededhere,fortherearetwocentralformsofhumilityandeitherwouldbesufficienttogreatlylessenthepaininvolvedinhonestself-knowledge.Ontheonehand,beinghumble canmeanbeing cognizantof your fallibility—and tothedegreethatyoudonothavedelusionsofperfectionyouwillbeless disappointed when confronted by your failings and shortcom-ings.44Ontheotherhand,beinghumblecanmeanbeingunpreoccu-piedwithyourself—andtothedegreethatyouarenotthecenterofyourownconcernsitwillbelessdistressingforyoutodiscoveryourflawsandweaknesses.45Thushumility—inbothitsforms—takesthestingoutofself-awareness,andthetrulyhumblepersonwillbefreetoknowthemselveswithoutanyresistanceofthewill.Thisiswhy,in1931,Wittgensteinobservedthat“[s]elf-recognition&humilityisone”(D:105).

44. IamremindedofMigueldeMolinos’rebuke:“Ifyoubecomedisturbedwhenyousuccumbtosomeviceornegligence,thentakeitasamanifestsignthatsecretpridestillreignsinyoursoul.Didyouthinkthatyouwouldnolongersuccumbtovicesandweaknesses?…Humbleyourself”(The Spiritual Guide, trans.RobertP.Baird,NewYork,PaulistPress,2010,p.133[BkII,§§125–6]).Closelyrelatedtothehumilityofrecognizingone’sownfallibilityisthequal-ityof self-forgiveness—akindof compassion towardsoneself andone’s fail-ings—whichwouldalsohelpease thewaytohonestself-knowledge.Thisquality,however,wassofar fromWittgenstein’sowncharacter(see, forex-ample,hisoutbursttoFaniaPascalatF:II:240),thatIdoubtitevenoccurredtohiminthisconnection.

45. SeeRobertC.RobertsandW.JayWood,Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regula-tive Epistemology,Oxford,ClarendonPress,2007,pp.240–1(chap.9).

ThisexplainsWittgenstein’s1931thoughtaboutthepossibilityofusingacertaincommonGermanproverbastheepigraphforhisnewbook:“Icouldchooseasthemottoformybook:Afoolcanaskmorethantenwisemencananswer”—towhichheimmediatelyadded:“Actuallyitshouldbe‘tenclevermen’”(MS:109:28841).Thefoolcanindeedstumptenmerelyclevermen,butpreciselythewisemanwillbeabletotellwhere the foolhasbeenmisledbecauseheunderstands thestringstuggingatthefool’sheart.

Soonemustknowoneselfandone’sdesiresifonewantstobeableovercometheresistancesofone’swill—inshort,onemustbehonestwithoneselfaboutoneself.Butthisishard.InMarch1937Wittgensteinexclaimedinhisdiary:“Howdifficultitistoknowoneself,tohonestlyadmitwhatoneis!”(D:221).42Threedayslaterheexplained:“Toknowoneselfishorrible,becauseonesimultaneouslyrecognizesthelivingdemand&,thatonedoesnotsatisfyit”(D:221).Inhisphilosophicalnotebooksfromthesametimehetouchedonthisthemeagain,speak-ingof“thosewhodonotwanttodescendintothemselves,becauseit is toopainful” (MS:120:72v43).Later, in1944,hewrote toNormanMalcolmthat“itis…difficulttothink,ortrytothink,reallyhonestlyaboutyourlife&otherpeople’slives”because“thinkingaboutthesethingsis…oftendownrightnasty.Andwhenit’snastythenit’smost important”(WC:370).Ofcourse,thereareasmanyreasonswhyitisnastytogenuinelyknowourselvesastherearefailingsandshamefultruthswaitingtobeknown.Butthedifficultyofself-knowledgemostrelevanttothisdiscussionisthatoftrulyadmittingtoourselveshowprofoundlydependentweareuponcertaindelusions.Itisterriblyhardtohavetoacknowledgehowutterlyourhappiness—sooften—reliesonillusions,theshatteringofwhichwouldleaveuslostandhopeless.41. Mytranslation.

42. ThisthemecanbetracedbacktotheveryfirstWesternphilosopher:whenThales was asked “What is difficult?”, he replied, “To know oneself” (Dio-genes Laertius,Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol I, trans. R.D.Hicks, Cam-bridgeMass.,HarvardUniversityPress,1959,p.37[I:36];Ihaveamendedthepunctuation).

43. Mytranslation.



effectsonourthinking.Wecandothateitherbyeliminatingthecul-pabledesiresentirely,orelsebyresistingtheirpulldespitetheircon-tinuedexistenceandpower.Becauseitisextremelydifficulttoknowhowtogoaboutuprootinganderadicatingagivendesire,48Wittgen-steinconcentratesontheoptionofacceptingthatsuchdistortingde-sires exist inusbut attempting towithstandorovercome the forcethattheyexert.Ashewrotein1939/40:“Onecannotspeakthetruth…ifonehasnotyetconqueredoneself.Onecannotspeakit—butnot,becauseone is stillnot cleverenough” (CV:41).Theproblem isnotourlackofintelligence,butthefactthatwe“live…inuntruthfulness”(CV:41)—that is,we live steeped in our various inclinations, yearn-ings,andneedsfortheworldtobeacertainway,andthesesteerourthinkingwithnoregardfortruth.Itisthesedesireswhoseinfluencethegoodphilosophermustbeabletoconquer.

Now, justascourage is integral toseeingourselvesaswereallyare rather thanaswewould likeourselves tobe, so too courage isnecessaryforseeingtheworldasitreallyisratherthanaswewouldwishit—thatis,forgivingupwaysofthinkingthatarerootedinourdistortingdesires.49Thus,Druryreportsthat:“OncewhenIwastalk-ingtoWittgensteinaboutMcTaggart’sbookThe Nature of Existence50

48.Wittgensteinseemstothinkthatthemostprofoundphilosophicallydistort-ingdesirescanonlybeeradicatedbymeansofsociety-wideshiftsinmodeoflife,overwhichnoonepersonhascontrol(seeRFM:II:23,CV:70–1,andF:II:210).

49. CompareNietzsche:“[T]hesamecouragethatittakestoknowoneselfalsoteachesustolookatlifewithoutwhims:andviceversa”(Writings from the Ear-ly Notebooks,eds.RaymondGeussandAlexanderNehamas,trans.LadislausLöb,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,p.196[32(67)]).Afterall,beingawarethatthingsareotherthanwewouldlikethemtobe—whetherintheworldorinourselves—isafairlytraditionalunderstandingofwhatsuf-feringamountsto.Forexample,Schopenhauer—oneofWittgenstein’sfirstphilosophical influences—characterizedsufferingas “adissatisfactionwithone’scondition”(The World as Will and Representation,volI,trans.JudithNor-man,AlistairWelchman,andChristopherJanaway,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,p.336[§56]).

50.JohnMcTaggartEllisMcTaggart,The Nature of Existence,VolsI–II,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1921and1927.

Butitispossibletocometoknowourselvesevenwithouthumility,oratleastwithoutenoughofit.Forwecanforceourwaythroughtosuchknowledgebymeansofacombinationofstrengthandcourage:byconfrontinghead-onourshame,self-disgust,andself-disappointment,and powering through them despite the pain they cause us.WhenWittgensteinspeaksofcouragehemostoftenseemstohaveinmindawillingnesstoenduresuffering,46andwhenhespeaksofstrengthhemeansthecapacitytoenduresuffering(or“anenormouscapacityforsuffering”[CV:81],asheputitin1948).Neitherwillingnessalone,norcapacityalone,wouldbesufficienttoallowustofacetheunflatteringtruthaboutourselves.Rather,honestself-knowledgedemandsboththewillingnessandthecapacitytobearthepainofshatteredillusions.ItshouldthereforecomeasnosurprisethatWittgensteinoftenspokeofcourageandstrengthinthesamebreath.In1946,forexample—inprecisely the context of the difficulty of self-knowledge—he con-fessed:“Ihaveneitherthecouragenorthestrength…tolookthefactsofmylifestraightintheface”(MS133:7r47).Tothedegreethatwelackhumility,then,wecanonlycometothewisdomofself-knowledgeifwe areboth courageous and strong—that is, ifwe arebothwillingandabletobearthedisappointingandshamefultruthswhichhonestintrospectionislikelytouncover.

2.2. The difficulty of overcoming one’s philosophically distorting desires: living delusionlessly through heroic courage, strength, and seriousnessIt isallverywell toattainadegreeofself-knowledgeregardingourphilosophicallydistortingdesires—butmerelytoknowone’sdesiresisnotyettobeabletoneutralizethemsoastoavoidtheirdeleterious

46. Itmust be remembered, after all, that courage is not limited solely to act-ingdespite fear,butoftenalso refers toactingdespitepain, suffering,anddistress.AsHenrySidgwick—anotherCambridgephilosopher—hadalreadyobserved,“[w]esometimes…callthosewhobearpainunflinchingly,coura-geous”(The Methods of Ethics,London,Macmillan&Co,1907,p.332[BkIII, chap.X,sec1];Ihaveaddedthecommaforthesakeofclarity).

47. My translation. See alsoMS117:132v for another example ofWittgensteinmentioningcourageandstrengthtogether.



Hewrestles”(F:IV:116).How,then,doesthisdifferfromacourageousandstrongperson?Wefindapotentialclueinaself-reproachwhichWittgensteinnotedinhisdiaryin1936:“Mywork(myphilosophicalwork)is…lackinginseriousness&loveoftruth”(D:153).Thepoint,Itakeit,isthatcouragecanbedeployedinwaysthatarenotserious.Forexample, tobewilling toexposeoneself tosufferingmerely forthethrillofit,orinordertocarryoutavendetta,orsoastoimpressothers,takesgenuinecourage,butisentirelyfrivolous.Bycontrast,tobewillingtoenduresufferingforagoodreason—suchasforloveoftruth—istobecourageousinaseriousmanner.Anditisonlythiskindofseriousstrengthandcourage—strengthandcourageyokedtoloveoftruthandclarity—thatwillallowaphilosophertoovercomehisorherdistortingdesiresandtobegenuinelyopentoseeingrealityasitis,howeveritis.

2.3. The cost of good thinking and the centrality of the endurance of sufferingIn a letter to Malcolm from 1944 Wittgenstein warned darkly that “[y]oucan’tthinkdecentlyifyoudon’twanttohurtyourself”(WC:370).Presumablyhemeantthatgoodthinkingdemands—ifnotthatweac-tivelydesiretohurtourselves—atleastthatwebefullywillingtobehurt.Afterall,wehaveseenthatalmostallthecorephilosophicalvir-tuesorbitaroundtheenduranceofthesufferingthatisdemandedbyhonesty.53

ThisfactbeginstoexplainathemetowhichWittgensteinreturnedagainandagain:thecostofgoodthought.In1937heexclaimedthat“[t]oproducesomethinggoodcostsalot,afterall!”(WH:295).Andinastrikingdevelopmentofthisideain1946headded:“Youcouldattachpricestoideas.Somecostalotsomelittle…Andhowdoyoupayfor

53. ThecapacitytoenduresufferinghadloomedlargeinWittgenstein’sthoughtevenasfarbackas1912,whenRussellreportedinaletterthat“Wittgenstein…saidhowheadmiredthetext‘Whatshallitprofitamanifhegainthewholeworldandlosehisownsoul’and…saidhethoughtitdepended…onsuffer-ingandthepowertoendureit.”(QuotedinBrianMcGuinness,Young Ludwig: Wittgenstein’s Life 1889–1921,Oxford,ClarendonPress,2005,p.113[chap4];referringtoMark8:36).

hesaidtome:‘Irealizethatforsomepeopletohavetoforsakethiskindofthinkingdemandsofthemanheroiccourage’”(F:III:175).51 AndonanotheroccasionWittgensteintoldDrury:“IthinkIcanseevery well what Schopenhauer got out of his philosophy… Forsomepeopleitwouldrequireaheroicefforttogiveupthissortofwriting”(F:III:19552). It takes immensecouragetodenyoneself—inthenameoftruth,honesty,andclarity—thepositionsandbeliefsthatoneseemsforalltheworldtoneed,the“truths”whichseemtobenec-essarytomaketheworldaminimallytolerableplace.Andwhencour-ageisexhibitedtoahighenoughdegree,itisheroic.Thus,ifwearetoavoidcapitulationtoourphilosophicallydistortingdesires,whatisdemandedisheroiccourage.InthisveinWittgensteinwroteinhisdi-aryin1931thattolookat“theworld…asitis”—ratherthanallowingoneself tobe “lull[ed]…intoabeautifuldream”—is to lookat “theworld…likeahero”(D:81).

Asbefore,thiscourage(thiswillingnesstosufferthetruth)canonlybecomeeffectiveinallowingustoactuallyfacereality,ifitiscoupledwithinnerstrength(thecapacitytosufferthetruth).Thisiswhybothstrengthandcourageareneeded inorder toresist thepullof thosedeepdesireswhichleadusphilosophicallyastray.Andthisiswhy,ina1938lettertoLudwigHänsel,Wittgensteinendedwiththeexhorta-tion:“Mayyouhavethestrengthnottofoolyourself”(WH:313).

Thereisathirdvirtue—namely,seriousness—whichWittgensteinsometimesmentions,andwhichisnecessarytocompletethetrinityof “endurance-virtues”, in addition to courage and strength. In 1950BouwsmaaskedWittgensteinwhathemeantwhenhecalledathinker“serious”,andWittgensteinrepliedthathemeant“amanwhoenduredconflictandstruggle,whocamebackagainandagaintothesematters.

51. WhenWittgenstein’sowncommitment to theTractarianviewof theworldcameunderpowerfulandsustainedattackbyFrankRamsey—duringtheirregular discussions in 1929—Wittgenstein wrote: “[My] discussions withRamsey…trainmeinacertaincourageinthinking”(MS:105:4[mytransla-tion];seealsoPI:Preface).

52. It is also possible that this is an alternative account of the previousconversation.



tial that aspiringphilosophers take theirmoral education into theirownhands,andtrainthemselvesinenduranceinwhateverwaystheycan—forthisisthecostofgoodthought,andthisiswhatliesattheheartofallthephilosophicalvirtues.57

3. Difficulties of the Will Regarding Philosophical Form and the Virtues Needed to Overcome Them

Section1lookedatthedifficultiesposedbydesiresforthetruthofpar-ticularphilosophicalpositions.Those,however,arenottheonlykindsofdesirethattendtoleadusastrayinourphilosophizing.Wittgensteinwasequallyconcernedaboutthewaysinwhichdesirestoengageincertainphilosophicalforms,styles,andprojectscanalsoleadtosignif-icantdistortionsinourphilosophy—namely,incaseswhentheyareforsomereasoninappropriate,butwedesirethemnonetheless.Itistothesemanifestationsofphilosophy’sdifficultiesofthewill,andtothe

conversationswithsomeyoungpersonswhohadsurvivedthehorrorsofaconcentrationcamphesaid:‘Iwasabletomakemyselfunderstoodatonce,youseetheyhadbeenwell educated’”(MauriceO’ConnorDrury,The Selected Writings of Maurice O’Connor Drury on Wittgenstein, Philosophy, Religion and Psy-chiatry,ed.JohnHayes,London,BloomsburyAcademic,p.215[LettertoRushRhees,Spring1966]).

57. IamputinmindofThomasMerton’sinitialreactiontoattemptingSt.IgnatiusofLoyola’sfirst spiritualexercise: “Ivaguely rememberfixingmymindonthisnotionofindifferencetoallcreatedthingsinthemselves,tosicknessandhealth,andbeingmildlyappalled.WhowasItounderstandsuchathing?IfIgotacoldInearlychokedmyselfwithaspirinsandhotlemonade,anddivedintobedwithundisguisedalarm”(The Seven Storey Mountain,London,Soci-ety forPromotingChristianKnowledge,1990,p.269[pt. three,chap.1,secii]).TheattituderecalledbyMertonillustratesexactlywhatWittgensteinwassoconcernedabout:thewayinwhichtheleastsuffering—orevendiscom-fort—hasbecomeutterlyintolerabletomany,sothatitmustimmediatelybeeasedoreradicatedasfaraspossible.Thepointisnotthatsufferingshouldbeembracedforitsownsake,butratherthatacertainkindofappalledshrinkingfromlife’slessersufferingsisasuresignthatoneisnotreadytoendurethemoreprofoundsufferingsoftrulyhonestphilosophizing.Moreover,regularpracticeinsubmittingtominorsufferingsisanessentialcomponentoftrain-ingoneselftodevelopgreaterpotentialforendurance—asŚāntidevawrote:“Thereisnothingwhichremainsdifficultifitispractised.So,throughpracticewith slight pain, even great pain becomes bearable” (The Bodhicaryāvatāra, trans. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton, Oxford, Oxford University Press,2008,p.51[VI:14];Ihaveslightlyamendedthetranslation).

ideas?Ibelieve:withcourage”(CV:6054).Aswehaveseeninthepre-cedingdiscussion,thepricewepayforgoodphilosophizingisatleasttwofold: first of all the suffering involved in courageous self-knowl-edge (i.e. incoming toknowourphilosophicallydistortingdesires),and secondly the suffering involved in courageous self-overcoming(i.e. in resisting thosedistortingdesires soas to see theworldas itactually is).Given the centrality of suffering and thewillingness toendure it inhonestphilosophical thinking itmakes sense thatWitt-gensteinshouldinsistthatgoodthoughtcostsmuchandthatcourageisthecurrencywithwhichwepayforit.

Wittgensteinworried, however, that the contemporary age doesnotsufficientlyvaluethevirtuesofstrengthandcourage.Ashewrotein1948:inthe“presentday…[thec]apacityforsufferingisnotratedhighly,sincetherearenotsupposedtobeanysufferings”(CV:81).55 Indeed,Rheesspeaksof“howoftenWittgenstein…criticis[ed]…con-temporaryeducationofchildren…[for]notsee[ing]aneedtomakechildrenabletobearsuffering”56.Inthisdayandage,then,itisessen-

54. For further references to the cost of good thought, see also CV:66, D:139,WC:390,andF:III:80.

55.Wittgensteinsawthisde-emphasizationofsufferingandenduranceasbeingaresultofthecontemporarydelusionthatscienceandtechnologyareonthewaytoeradicatingallsuffering(seeCV:46andCV:8).

56.RushRhees,‘NotesDated27/11/73’,RushRheesCollection,RichardBurtonArchives,SwanseaUniversity,(SU/PC/1/86).SeealsoCV:81.PresumablythenotoriousharshnessofWittgenstein’s 1920’sexperiment inprimary schoolteaching (see Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, London,JonathanCape, 1990, chap.9)derived—at least inpart—from thisdeeplyheldbelief that training children to endure suffering, rather than to avoidit,isanintegralaspectofearlyeducation.Wittgenstein’sviewsontheplaceofsufferingandenduranceineducationstoodinsharpcontrasttoRussell’s(see, forexample,Russell’sshortessay ‘ShouldChildrenbeHappy?’, inhisMortals and Others: American Essays 1931–1935,ed.HarryRuja,London,Rout-ledge,1996,pp.100–1).Indeed,Wittgenstein’spedagogicalphilosophywassoalien toRussell thatwhenWittgensteinoncecomplained “withdisgust”that “school-children” thesedays“weresimply taught toenjoythemselves”,RheesreportsthatRusselldismissedthisasmerely“anamusingbitofcranki-ness” on Wittgenstein’s part (Rush Rhees, ‘Notes Dated 25/11/73’, ibid.).Wittgenstein,however,couldnothavebeenmoreserious.SomuchsothatDrury recounts—rather shockingly—that “after he [= Wittgenstein] had



3.1. Refraining from philosophical styles and projects made inappropriate by lack of talentIn themidst of an acrimonious argument with Alice Ambrose—inMay1935—WittgensteinwroteofhertoG.E.Moore,saying:

Ithinkyouhavenoideainwhataserioussituationsheis…[S]heisnowactuallystandingatacrossroad.Oneroadleadingtoperpetualmisjudgingofher intellectualpow-ers and thereby to hurt pride and vanity60 etc. etc. Theotherwouldleadhertoaknowledgeofherowncapaci-tiesandthatalwayshasgoodconsequences.”(WC:242)

Whatare thegoodconsequences that invariably followfromknowl-edgeof one’s own capacities?At least onemajor consequence thatWittgensteinwouldhavehad inmind is the resultant avoidance ofthatforwhichoneisnotequipped.Differentphilosophicalformsanddifferentphilosophical tasksdemanddifferentdegreesandkindsoftalent inorder tobesuccessfullyundertaken.Sobeingconsciousofourowndegreesandkindsoftalentwillhelpustoensurethatwedonottakeonstylesorprojectstowhichwecouldneverdojustice.

Ina1937lettertoHänsel,Wittgensteinillustratedthisdynamicinhisowncase,referringtothewayhehadtoresignhimselfnottowritepolemicsagainstcontemporarypopularscience,despitetakingthelat-tertobenothinglessthan“anabomination”(F:III:205):

I…havethoughts(&notbadones)aboutthepopular-scientificscribblingoftoday’sscientists;butIambarredfromcommunicatingmyopinionstopeopleintheformof polemic writings. I don’t have the requisite gift61; &mustgetmyconviction,whichisimportanttome,across

60.Interestingly,WittgensteinoncesaidtoDrury:“Woundedvanityisthemostterribleforceintheworld.Thesourceofthegreatestevil”(F:III:172).

61. RegardingwhatWittgensteintookgoodpolemicalwritingtoconsistin,seeCC:4/9/1945andWC:410.

virtuesneededtoovercomethem,thatIturninthissection—thoughrathermorebriefly,havingalreadylaidmostofthegroundwork.

IntheprefacetohisFables in Prose,GottholdEphraimLessingwrotethat “[h]avingduly reflectedon the theoryof fable, Iwas surprisedthatthesimplecourseofAesop,whichleadsdirectlytotruth,shouldbedesertedbythemodernsfortheby-pathofafloweryandgossip-ingmodeofnarrative”.58 In themarginsofhiscopy,Wittgensteinre-spondedbyjotting:

Canonetakesomethingasamodelmerelybecauseitisgood?Doesn’toneoftenhavetogivewhatislessgood,be-causeone’sowntalentandthecircumstancesdon’tallowthegreaterone?Shouldeveryone try,and is itpossible,atalltimestowritealapidarystyle?!Ifanyonetriestodothisatthewrongtime,hegivesonlyartificiallapidarity.59

Noteverygoodandvaluablestyleorproject shouldactasamodelforouremulation,becausenoteverysuchstyleorprojectisopentous.InhismarginalnoteWittgensteinidentifiedtwofactorsthatcouldlimittheformsortasksthatitmightbeappropriateforapersontotakeon:firstly“one’sowntalent”,andsecondly“thecircumstances”.Iwillbrieflydiscusseachof these limiting factors in turn,andthevirtuesinvolvedintheresignationthattheydemand.

58.GottholdEphraimLessing,‘ExtractontheSubjectofFable’,inhisFables and Epigrams; with Essays on Fable and Epigram,London,JohnandH.L.Hunt,1825,p.vii;Ihavesilentlymodernizedthespellingofthetranslation.

59.Quoted and translated by Rush Rhees in his ‘Correspondence and Com-ment[Letter3]’,The Human World,Nos.15–6,May–August1974,p.156;Ihaveslightlyamendedthetranslation.SeealsothefinalremarkinWittgenstein’s1937diary:“Oneisrighttofearthespiritsevenofgreatmen.Andalsothoseofgoodpeople.Forwhatproducedwell-beinginhimcaneffectill-beinginme”(D:251).



rangeofstylesandtasksproperlyavailabletoone,andthemoreonewillneedtorestrainone’stemptationtoactbeyondone’scapabilities.

Exactly aswe saw in Section 2, the process of combatting thesedistortingdesires—thistimedesiresregardingstylesandtasksratherthanregardingparticularpositions—willfallintotwostages:firstself-knowledgeandthenself-overcoming.Thus,wewillneedtobeginbyacknowledgingthedegreesandkindsoftalentweactuallyhave—de-spitethefactthattheymaybepainfullysmalleranddifferenttothosewewouldhavelikedtohave,andindeedpainfullysmalleranddiffer-enttothosewemayhaveflatteredourselvesthatwedidhave.Aswesawabove,thiskindofhonestself-assessmentisenormouslydifficult.Somuchso,thatOswaldSpengler—athinkermuchadmiredbyWitt-genstein—couldclaimthat“[t]hemostbitterthinginlifeistohavetosaythatoneisnotequaltoatask,thatoneisnotagreatscholar,soldier,orartist.Butinnerdignitydemandsthatonesayit.”64

Afterthestageofself-knowledgemustcomethatofself-overcom-ing:havingacknowledgedourlimitations,ifwediscoverthatwedonothavethetalenttoproperlyfulfilthestylesandtaskstowhichweareattracted,wemustforceourselvestoturnasidefromthosestylesandtasksregardlessofthestrengthoftheirpulluponus,andregardlessofwhatevermerittheymayhaveinthemselves.KarlKraus—anotherofWittgenstein’searlyinfluences—summedupWittgenstein’ssentimentin a typically pithy aphorism: “Somany peoplewrite because theylackthecharacternotto.”65Bythispointitshouldcomeasnosurprisewhatkindofcharacter—thatis,whichvirtues—Wittgensteinthoughtwouldbeneededforthiskindofself-assessmentandself-restraint.HetoldHänselthatturningasidefromaprojectbecauseoneisnotsuf-ficientlyfittedforit“takesstrengthandcourage”(WH:297).

Sometimeinthe1930’sWittgensteinsaidtoDrury:“OfonethingIamcertain.Thereligionofthefuturewillhavetobeextremelyascetic;

64. InhisAphorisms,trans.GiselaKoch-WeserO’Brien,Chicago,HenryRegneryCompany,1967,§16(‘OnFate’).

65.KarlKraus,Dicta and Contradicta,trans.JonathanMcVity,Urbana,UniversityofIllinoisPress,2001,§627(chap6).

inanother,farlessdirectmanner.62—Justbecausesome-oneelsecandoitwell,Icannot [necessarilytherefore]doitmyself;&justbecauseyetsomeoneelsedoesitbadly,Iamnot[therefore]allowedtodoitbadly,too!”(WH:297)63

Thestrongdesiretowriteinacertainphilosophicalstyleortounder-takeacertainphilosophicaltaskmaycomefromagenuineandcorrectsenseofthevalueofthatformoroftheimportanceofthatproject.Butevenso,togiveintothisdesirewhenonedoesnothavetherequisitedegreeorkindoftalentrequiredtodoatrulygoodjob,wouldbetoact“indecently”(WH:297).Theindecencyliesinthefactthatengag-inginwhatisboundtobeasubstandardundertakingwouldinvolvecheatingoneself,cheatingone’saudience,and—intheend—cheatingtheveryprojectthatonetriestoundertakeandwhichoneostensiblyvalues.Thus,whenMalcolmreceivedhisPhD,Wittgensteinwrotetohim:“[M]ayyounotcheateitheryourselforyourstudents”,andcon-cludedhis letter by saying: “Iwish yougoodnotnecessarily cleverthoughts,&decencythatwon’tcomeout inthewash”(WC:326). Itisthroughsecuredecencythatweresistthetemptationtocheatour-selvesandothers.

Thisdemandthatwenotcheatourselvesorothersappliestoevery-one,ofcourse;butthelesstalentonehas,themorelimitedwillbethe

62. Infact—quiteremarkably—Wittgenstein’sentirelaterphilosophicaloeuvrecouldbeseenas this “far lessdirectmanner”, forWittgensteinsaid toBou-wsmain1949thatthe“consummationofphilosophy”mightsimplybe“finepopularscience”(F:IV:106).

63. Ihaveaddedthephrasesinsquarebracketsforthesakeofclarity.Forasimi-lar sentiment—this timeregardinghisneed toholdback frompoetryduetobeinga“second-ratepoet”—seeMS:117:193.TogetasenseofhowveryseriousWittgensteinwasaboutthiskindofrestraint,comparealsothestun-ning1948passageinwhichheponderedwhatheconsideredtobeGustavMahler’speculiaranddifficultsituation:“Ifitistrue,asIbelieve,thatMahler’smusicisworthless,thequestioniswhatIthinkheshouldhavedonewithhistalent.Forquiteobviouslyittooka string of very rare talents toproducethisbadmusic.Shouldhe,say,havewrittenhissymphonies&burntthem?Orshouldhehavedonehimselfviolence&nothavewrittenthem?”(CV:77–8;seealsothecontinuationofthepassage).



Wittgenstein that theirCambridgecontemporary,FrederickTennant,hadbeentrying“torevive inacomplicatedwaythe ‘argumentfromdesign’”,67Wittgensteinreplied:“YouknowIamnotonetopraisethispresentage,butthatdoessoundtomeasbeing‘old-fashioned’inabadsense”(F:III:182).ItakeWittgenstein’scomplaintagainstTennanttobethatthelatterwasphilosophizingasthoughthemedievalperiodhadnevercometoaclose,andWittgensteindidnotneedtobeafanofmodernityinordertobelievethattherewassomethingdeeplywrongwithphilosophizingasthoughonewerenotamodern.68

Indeed, insensitivity to one’s philosophical circumstances wasthe focus ofWittgenstein’s very first philosophical publication—hisdamning1912reviewofPeterCoffey’sbook,The Science of Logic.69Witt-gensteinopenedhisreviewwiththefollowinglament:

Innobranchoflearningcananauthordisregardthere-sultsofhonestresearchwithsomuchimpunityashecanin Philosophy and Logic. To this circumstancewe owethepublicationofsuchabookasMr.Coffey’s “ScienceofLogic”:andonlyasatypicalexampleoftheworkofmanylogiciansofto-daydoesthisbookdeserveconsideration.Theauthor’sLogicisthatofthescholasticphilosophers,andhemakesalltheirmistakes….(PO:2–3)

Theproblem—asWittgensteinlaterunderstoodit—isthattheformswhich make for greatness in one age do not necessarily do so in

67. SeeparticularlyF.R.Tennant,Philosophical Theology, vol II: The World, the Soul, and God,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1956.

68.InthinkingaboutthesethingsWittgensteinnodoubthadinmindSpengler’sinsistencethatonapproachinganytask—includingphilosophicaltasks—aperson “mustbeginby askinghimself…what to-day is possible andwhathemustforbidhimself”,becausewhoeverfailstoacknowledgetheeraintowhichtheyhavebeenbornandthelimitationswhichthatimposesmustre-main“eitherasimpleton,acharlatan,orapedant”(inhisThe Decline of the West (Complete in One Volume),NewYork,AlfredAKnopf,1932,p.44[volI,chap.I,secXV];Ihaveslightlyamendedthetranslation).

69.P.Coffey,The Science of Logic: An Inquiry into the Principles of Accurate Thought and Scientific Method (In Two Volumes),London,LongmansGreen&Co,1912.

andby that Idon’tmean justgoingwithout foodanddrink.”DrurylaterrecalledofhimselfthatwhenWittgensteinmadethatremark,“I[=Drury]seemedtosenseforthefirsttimeinmylifetheideaofanasceticismof the intellect” (F:III:203). It turnsout that tobeagoodphilosopher demands an immense asceticism of the intellect—andthelesstalentedoneis,themoresuchrestraintisdemanded.

3.2. Refraining from philosophical styles and projects made inappropriate by circumstancesSomuchforthewaysinwhichtalentmightlimitthekindsofphilo-sophicalendeavorwecandecentlyundertake.Howmightexternalcir-cumstancesalsolimittheremitofproperphilosophicalengagement,andthereforealsoleadtodifficultiesofthewillwhenourdesirespushagainst such limits?The circumstanceswhichmost concernedWitt-gensteininthisconnectionweretemporalcircumstances:thecharacteroftheageintowhichwehavebeenbornandinwhichwearephiloso-phizing.Wittgensteinobservedthatwearenot free tophilosophizehoweverwewish,forifourphilosophizingistobedoneingoodfaiththenitmustbedoneinamannerthatisresponsivetowherephiloso-phyhasarrivedintheerainwhichwearethinkingandwriting.

Thedevelopmentofphilosophyimpingesuponthewaysinwhichwecanlegitimatelyphilosophize,forafterasignificantphilosophicalrevolutionwe are not free simply to continue thinking andwritingjustlikebefore,asthoughnothinghadhappened.Thus,forexample,after Kant, philosophers cannot legitimately continue to engage instraightforward metaphysical speculations—however strong theirinclination todosomightbe—at leastnotwithoutseriously takingKant’s critique ofmetaphysics into account. In short, there is some-thingdishonestaboutphilosophizingasthoughonedoesnotliveintheageinwhichoneactuallylives.66Thus,whenDrurymentionedto

66.Andifnotdishonest,thenperhapsabsurd—intheveinofPierreMenard’sattemptto(re)writeDon Quixoteinthe20thcentury(seeJorgeLuisBorges,‘PierreMenard,AuthoroftheQuixote’,trans.J.E.I.,inBorges’Labyrinths: Se-lected Stories & Other Writings, USA,NewDirections,2007,pp.36–44).



ofphilosophicalvirtues thatwehave seenareneeded toovercomethe various difficulties of thewill in philosophy—namely: first self-knowledge,andthenself-overcoming.

4. The Place of the Philosophical Virtues in Philosophical Pedagogy

Tothedegreethatthephilosophicalvirtues—suchashonesty,humil-ity,courage,andstrength—arenecessaryforthepracticeofgoodphi-losophy, theyshouldalsobegivenasignificantplace inphilosophi-calpedagogy.Andfortunately,ensuringthatthephilosophicalvirtuesarenotignoredinphilosophicaleducationissomethingthatcanbeachievedevenbyphilosopherswhoare relatively lacking in the tal-entsandskillsnecessaryfortheattainmentoftrulysignificantphilo-sophicalachievements.Infact,thispedagogicalrolemaybetheprinci-paltaskthatsuchphilosophershave.This,atleast,wasWittgenstein’sjudgement—in1937—ofthevalueofG.E.Mooreasaphilosopher:

Thoughhe[=Moore]isa thinker henevermade—asfarasIcanjudge—adecisivediscoveryinphilosophy.71Butinhisvocationasateacherhehasbeenmoreusefulthanmanyotherswhohadadecidedlygreatertalentthanhe.Andthissimplythroughhishonesty.Oronecouldalsosay,throughhisseriousness,forthisamountstothesamehere…[A]lecturebyMooreisanythingbutentertainingforheacknowledgeshimself asonewho is gnawing&notyetclear.(Heisgnawingduringthelecture.)72…[Buteven] the least clever learns from him: 1.) how dif-ficult it is to see the truth& 2.) that one need not say

71. Forlatertemperingsofthisjudgement,however,seeWPCR:53,WC:365,andF:III:88.

72. Backin1913thisquality—Moore’sinconclusiveandrepetitivegnawing—haddriventheyoungWittgensteintodistraction.AsMalcolmrecorded,Wittgen-stein“saidthathehadattendedMoore’slecturesonlyafewtimes,whenhewasastudentatCambridgebeforeWorldWarI,becausehecouldnotbeartherepetitiousnessthatalwayscharacterizedthem”(F:III:87–8).

another.Heconsideredthistobetruenotjustforphilosophybutforallculturalproductions.Thusin1930hemusedthat:

Because… [at] a particular periodof time, a particularrace associates its pathos with very particular ways ofacting,peopleareledastray&believethatthegreatness,significanceliesnecessarilyinthatwayofacting.Andthisbeliefisalwaysreducedtoabsurdityjustwhenatransval-uationofvaluescomesaboutthroughanupheaval,thatis,whentruepathosnowsettlesuponanotherwayofacting.Then—probablyalways—theold,nowworthlessbillsre-mainincirculationforsometime&peoplewhoarenotquitehonestpassthemoffasgreat&significantuntilonefindsthenewinsightonceagaintrivial&says‘ofcoursetheseoldbillsareworthless.’(D:31–3)

ForWittgenstein,everygenuinephilosophicalrevolutionamountstoa“transvaluationofvalues.”70Tocontinuetophilosophizeintheoldwaysevenaftersucharevolutionhastakenplaceisthereforetodis-honestlytradeonworthlessbills.

What,then,isonetodoifonefindsoneselfborninthewrongage,so to speak—powerfully attracted to a formofphilosophyorphilo-sophicalprojectwhichhasbeenleftbehind?Exactlyaswewouldex-pect,Wittgensteininsiststhatsuchcircumstancescallfor“genuine&strongcharacters”whowill“simplyturnawayfrom”theinappropriatefield(CV:8).Againwefindthesametwomoments:onemustfirstofall be genuine—in the senseofhonest andnot self-deceiving—foroneneedstobeginbyrecognizingthat thecircumstancesreallyaresuchthattheymakevarioushighlydesirablephilosophicalstylesandprojectsillegitimate;andthenonemustbestrong—foronceonehasrecognized that those philosophical styles and projects are illegiti-mate,oneneedstheself-controltodenythemtooneself.Inthisshortphrase,then,weseeWittgensteinonceagainsummarizethecomplex

70.Ashewrotein1937:“IfIwanttoteach…anewmovementofthought,thenmypurposeisa‘re-valuationofvalues’”(MS:120:145r;mytranslation).



manwithout cheating him and yourself. Imean that ifyoudon’tfind itoverwhelminglydifficult to teachphilos-ophyyouwon’tbemuchgoodat it. For I imagine that‘rock-bottomhonesty’, asyoucall it, isdamndifficult toacquire.(WC:23374)

Tobeagoodteacheryoumustnotfoolyourselforyourstudentsre-gardinghowclearyouare inyour ideasorhowfaryouhavegot inyourthinking;buttoavoidfoolingyourselforyourstudentsinthesewaysyoumustbebrutallyhonest,andbesoinpublic;tobepublicallyhonestaboutyourlackofclarityandlackofunderstanding,however,ishorriblydifficult.Forthisreasonbeingagoodteacherwillrarelybepleasant.And,forthisreason—andallthosediscussedabove—thishonesty in teaching will demand both courage and strength. Theteacherofphilosophywho isnot yet clearor certain—though theymaynotbeabletoconveytotheirstudentsthefinalwordonthena-tureofnumbersoronthemoralityofabortion—hasanunsurpassedopportunitytomodelfortheirstudentstheessentialvirtuesofhonesty,humility,courage,andstrength.75

Morethanthis,though,notyethavingmanagedtoreachfirmphil-osophical conclusions—beingstuckgroping towards the truthwith-out having arrived—demands courage in anotherway too.Namely,thecouragetopushonwithone’sphilosophizingdespitethedisori-entinglostnessofnothavinganswersandnotbeingsurethatonewill

74.Hewrote toMalcolm in 1940along similar lines: “[M]ayyounot cheat ei-theryourselforyourstudents.Because,unlessI’mverymuchmistaken,that’s whatwillbeexpectedfromyou.Anditwillbeverydifficultnottodoit,&perhapsimpossible;&inthiscase:mayyouhavethestrengthto quit.Thisendstoday’ssermon”(WC:326).Andalittleearlier—in1933—hehadwrit-tentoStevensonasfollows:“Iknowthat,asaprofessorofphilosophy,you’vegottoprofesstounderstandwhateveryonemeantwhentheysaid---.Butyouaren’taprofessor,&sojustenjoyyourfreedom!”(WC:218).

75. Interestingly,Wittgenstein sawhimself as lacking this honesty in his ownteaching,asheconfided tohisdiary in 1936: “[I]nmy lectures Ihavealsocheatedoftenbypretending toalreadyunderstandsomethingwhile Iwasstillhopingthatitwouldbecomecleartome”(D:153;andseealsoWH:295andWH:303).

one understands what one does not understand.(WH:299–30173)

Thus,evenifonedoesnothaveenormoustalentone’sphilosophizingcouldnonethelesshavethevalueofmodelingthecorephilosophicalvirtues,therebyteachingone’sstudentssomethingfarmoreimportantfortheirphilosophicalgrowththananyparticulartruths,insights,ortechniques.Ofcourse, tothedegreethatwhenteachingphilosophyoneisactivelyengagedinphilosophizing,onewillhavetheopportu-nitytoexemplify—intherangeofwaysdescribedabove—allthevir-tuesessentialtogoodphilosophizing.Butlackofspecialphilosophicaltalent—talenttothedegreethatallowsonetomakegenuineprogressinphilosophy—willcalluponthosesamevirtuesinspecialways.

Themostobviousisthewayinwhichhonestyiscalledfor.Namely,thehonestynottofooloneselfintothinkingthatonehasfoundthean-swersoneislookingforwhenonehasnot,andthehonestytobeabletoadmitthistoothersaswell.Thishonestyisessentialforateacherof philosophy, but not easy to come by—asWittgenstein wrote toCharlesStevensonin1934:

Ihopeyou’llenjoyteaching;butifyou’reanygoodatitIthinkyourenjoymentwillbekeptdownsomewhatbythediscoveryofhowenormouslydifficultitistogetclearenoughaboutathingtobeabletoexplainittoanother

73. See theentire letter for context.Wittgensteinwasnot alone in this assess-mentofMoore’spowerfulpedagogicalimpact.Compare,forexample,thefol-lowingremarksbyWittgenstein’sandMoore’sCambridgecolleague,RichardBraithwaite: “[I]nhispublic character,Moorewasaphilosopherandnoth-ingbutaphilosopher.Inthisisincludedbeinganeducatorofphilosophers:Moore’s single-minded and passionate devotion to the search for truth in-spiredallwhocameintocontactwithhim”(inhis ‘GeorgeEdwardMoore,1873–1958’,inG. E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect,eds.AliceAmbroseandMorrisLazerowitz,London,GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1970,p.30).AndcomparealsothefollowingreportbyAliceAmbrose,astudentofbothWittgenstein’sandMoore’s:“Mooreinhislectureswasself-effacing.Criticismsheputforwardofclaimshehimselfhadmade,sayinapreviouslecture,couldaswellhavebeendirectedtoananonymousphilosopherwhosemistakescalledforcor-rection”(‘MooreandWittgensteinasTeachers’,Teaching Philosophy,12:2,June1989,p.107).



Sincehonesty,humility,courage,andstrengtharethefourprincipalphilosophicalvirtuesintegraltothesuccessfulpracticeofphilosophybythosewhodohavetalent,itturnsoutthatindemonstratinghonesty,humility,courage,andstrengthintheirownphilosophical ‘gnawing’,eventeachersofphilosophywholacksignificanttalentwillnonethe-lesshavesomethingessentialtopassontotheirstudents—includingevenstudentswhoaremoretalentedthanthem.79

This explainshowWittgenstein can talkof the relationbetweenthecostofa thoughtand itsvalue inbi-conditional terms: “[I]fyouwritesomething,letitcostyoumuch.Thenthere’lldefinitelybesome-thing to it.Otherwise definitely not” (WH:297). It is clearwhy, if athoughthasnotcostmuch,itwilllikelynotbeofmuchphilosophicalvalue—for given all our distorting desires, philosophically valuablethoughtsareveryunlikely tobeobtainedwithout thepriordifficultacquisitionofthephilosophicalvirtues.Butwhyshoulditbethatjustbecauseathoughthascostalot,itwillnecessarilybevaluable?Surelyifapersonentirelylackstherequisitephilosophicaltalentsandskills,their thoughts might not be worth much, despite the cost of hon-estyandcouragetheypaidtoobtainthem.Theexplanation,I think,isthatathoughtthatgenuinelycostalottoattain,will—quiteapartfromwhatever value itmay ormay not have as a philosophical in-sight—bearthesignificantvalueofembodyingandexemplifyingforotherstheessentialbutall-too-rarephilosophicalvirtues.Andthatwillmakeitvaluable,regardlessofitsphilosophicalcontent.AsWittgen-steinsaid:“Strangely,eveninalectureapersonaffectsmorethroughtheexamplehegivesthanthroughthestatedopinions”(WH:301),for“disingenuousnessbreedsdisingenuousness&ingenuousnessbreedsingenuousness”(WH:303).80

79.Andbearinmindthatif,byWittgenstein’slights,thecategoryof‘thosewholack significant talent’ included a philosopher such asG.E.Moore, it willsurelyalsoincludethevastmajorityofthoseteachingphilosophyatuniversi-tiestoday(tosaytheleast).

80.OswaldSpenglerexpressedasimilaropinionabout the ‘exemplary’powerof teachers: “The influenceofagenuineeducator lies inwhathe is ratherthaninwhathesays.Thisisthewayinwhicheverygoodsocietyhasalways

everarriveatthem.ForasWittgensteinobserves,thelimboofphilo-sophicaluncertaintycanbedeeplyexistentiallyunsettling.InhisearlyletterstoRussellin1913,Wittgensteinfeltthathewasfacedwithjustthekindofexistentialdisorientationthatresultsfrominsufficienttal-ent.Hewrote:

WhatIfeelisthecurseofallthosewhohaveonlyhalfatalent;itislikeamanwholeadsyoualongadarkcorridorwithalightandjustwhenyouareinthemiddleofitthelightgoesoutandyouareleftalone.(WC:39)

Just a few letters later,Wittgenstein then spoke of courage aswhatwasneededtomoveforwarddespitethislonelydarkness:“ShallIgetanythingout??! Itwouldbeawful if Ididnot&allmyworkwouldbelost.HoweverIamnotlosingcourage&goonthinking”(WC:45).Andafewletterslaterstill:“Ihaveallsortsofideasforasolutionoftheproblembutcouldnotyetarriveatanythingdefinite.HoweverIdon’t losecourage&goonthinking”(WC:4976).This ispresumablywhat lies behindWittgenstein’s candid assessment of NormanMal-colmasaphilosopher.In1949hetoldBouwsmathat“Malcolm…hadnotmuchtalent,buthedidnotgiveup.”77Wittgensteinmeantthisasa full-throated compliment—for character ismore important inphi-losophythantalent,andittakessignificantcouragetorefusetogiveupone’sthought-pathsdespiteseeingnosettledsolutionsanywhereonthehorizon.78

76.SeealsoBT:121:427foraverysimilaruseof‘courage’inasurprisinglydiffer-entcontext.

77. O.K.Bouwsma, ‘ConversationswithWittgenstein’,Typescript,p.22;inTheRushRheesCollection,RichardBurtonArchives,UniversityofSwansea,callmark:UNI/SU/PC/1/8/7(thislinewaseditedoutofthepublishededitionofBouwsma’snotes,andbelongsintheellipsisatF:IV:113).

78.ComparealsoWittgenstein’spraiseofAliceAmbroseintherecommendationletterhewroteforherinApril1935:“I…havefoundherindefatigableintry-ingtounderstandtheextremelydifficultproblemswehavebeendiscussing”(CC:25/4/1935).



this—thoughithardlyneedsconfirmation—wefindthatcontempo-raries ofWittgenstein’s as diverse asRussell andHusserlwere alsomuch concerned with philosophy’s difficulties of the will and itscorresponding virtues.82 Thus, for example, Russellmaintained that “[c]ourage is essential to intellectual probity”83 because “[t]hedesiretoestablish thisor that result,orgenerally todiscoverevidence foragreeable results, of whatever kind, has… been the chief obstacletohonestphilosophizing.”84AndHusserl—inanurgentandearnesttoneclosertoWittgenstein’s— issuedacallfor“aheroismofreason”85 whichwouldinvolve“thecourage…toaccept…whatreallypresentsitselftomentalinsight,and…todescribeithonestlyinsteadoftwist-ingitsmeaning”.86Indeed,Husserlsawthedemandforphilosophicalvirtueasaquasi-religiousone,for“[w]hatinreligionistheprobityoftheheart, inphilosophy is thehonestyof the intellect”.87 Inshort, itis—quite rightly—not justWittgensteinwhoharborsgrave fearsofourphilosophicaltemptations,anditshouldnotbethoughtthatitisjustWittgensteinianphilosopherswhostandinneedthecorrectivesofheroiccourageandhonesty.

82.Thoughtheydidnotdwellon themas insistentlyasWittgensteindid,norgivethesameaccountoftheirrolesandinterrelations.

83.BertrandRussell, ‘TheAimsofEducation’, inhisEducation and the Good Life, NewYork,Boni&Liveright,1926,p.78(PtI,chapII).

84.Bertrand Russell,Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy,Chicago,TheOpenCourtPublishingCompany, 1914,pp.237–8(chapVIII).

85.EdmundHusserl,‘PhilosophyandtheCrisisofEuropeanMan’,inhisPhenom-enology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as a Rigorous Science & Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man,trans.QuentinLauer,NewYork,Harper&Row,1965,p.192(PtIII).IamgratefultoKevinMulliganforpointingmetothisandthenextpassage.

86.EdmundHusserl,Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,trans.W.R.BoyceGibson,London,Routledge,2013,p.306[§108:thirdsection,fourthchapter];Ihaveslightlyamendedthetranslation.

87.RecordedbyAdelgundisJaegerschmid,inher‘ConversationswithEdmundHusserl,1931–1938’,inThe New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenologi-cal Philosophy, vol. I, eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell,London,Rout-ledge,2001,p.337(Sept.4,1935).

Remarkably,itwasthisroleofpositivelyaffectingpeople’scharac-terthatWittgenstein—atleastononeoccasion—claimedtobewhattrulymadesomeoneaphilosopher.WhenspeakingofSchopenhauertoTheodoreRedpath,Wittgensteinonceexclaimed:“Well,hewasaphilosopher.”AndwhenRedpathaskedhimwhathemeantbythat,Wittgenstein tookRedpathby surprise in responding: “A teacher ofmanners81”(F:III:18).

5. A Practical Conclusion: Avoiding the Danger of Cheap Psychologiz-ing in Philosophical Debate

WhatisthestatusofWittgenstein’sthoughtsonphilosophy’sdifficul-tiesofthewillandthephilosophicalvirtues?Wittgensteinwouldsure-lynothavecountedthemasapartofphilosophyproper,asheconsid-eredthattoconsistsolelyintheconstructionofilluminatingsynopticoverviewsofareasoflinguisticandconceptualterrain.However,ifwedonotacceptWittgenstein’sunusuallynarrowconceptionofphiloso-phy,thenthestudyofthephilosophicalvirtuesandvices—whattheyare,therolestheyplayinthepracticeofphilosophy,andthewaysinwhichtheyinteract—couldandshouldbecountedanimportantpartofmeta-philosophy.Forthekindofcharacterapersonshouldideallyhaveinordertobeagoodphilosopherissurelyjustasimportantforanunderstandingofthenatureandpracticeofphilosophyasthekindoftoolsandmethodsphilosophersoughttouse,theaimstheyoughttohave,andothersuchmeta-philosophicalstaples.

ItisalsoessentialtonotethatthephilosophicalvirtuesdiscussedbyWittgensteinareimportantnotjustforthepracticeofspecifically‘Wittgensteinian’philosophy.Rather,almosteverythingthatWittgen-steinsaidaboutphilosophy’sdifficultiesofthewillandthevirtuesofcharacterneededtoovercomethemisrelevanttophilosophyinthevastmajorityof its forms,Wittgensteinianorotherwise.Confirming

educated.The eye learns faster andbetter than themere intellect” (inhisAphorisms,trans.GiselaKoch-WeserO’Brien,Chicago,HenryRegneryCom-pany,1967,§329[‘MiscellaneousThoughts’]).

81. ‘Manners’presumablyinthenowsomewhatarchaicsenseof‘morals’.



Onepotentialsolutiontothisproblemisforphilosopherstotakeupon themselves theblanketpolicynever to engage in attempts todiagnose the untoward psychological roots of other people’s philo-sophicalpositions. Instead theywould focussolelyonexposing thesubstantivephilosophicalmistakesandweaknessesof thepositionswithwhichtheydisagree,andonconstructingwhattheyconsidertobemoreplausiblephilosophicalalternatives.Wittgenstein,however,wouldconsiderthisanill-advisedandoverlyreactionaryresponsetothedanger.Afterall,ifwelookatWittgenstein’sownpracticeweseethatheconsidersthepsychologicaldiagnosisofhisinterlocutors’phil-osophicalvicesandtemptationstobeaproductiveandperhapsevennecessary90aspectofphilosophicaldiscussion—aslongasitdoesnotdisplace the provision of substantive philosophical arguments. ThusthevastmajorityofWittgenstein’sownphilosophicaloutput iscom-prisedofsubstantivephilosophicalinvestigationsandanalyses—andtheseareabsolutelyessentialtowhatheisdoing—butinthecourseofpresentingthesephilosophicalconsiderationshealsoperiodicallyreferstothepsychologicaltrapsandtemptationwhichhetakestolieinthevicinity.91Themerefactthatengaginginthiskindofdiagnosishasthepotentialtoleadusastraydoesnotmeanthatitcanthereforesimplybeavoided.

In the end, theonly thoroughgoingdefence against theunphilo-sophical deployment of the concepts of ‘charm’, ‘philosophical vice’,andthelike, isthegreaterdevelopmentofthephilosophicalvirtuesofcharacterinoneself.Themorehonestandhumbleoneisintherec-ognitionofone’sownphilosophicalshortcomings,themorehumble

‘Are you having your period?’” (Klagge andOtt, ‘Eugen Fischer, Philosophi-cal Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution’,British Witt-genstein Society: BookNOTES, at: http://www.britishwittgensteinsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/fischerreview.pdf[retrieved:November19,2016],pp.8–9)

90.See,forexample,BT:87:303.

91. For an illuminating list of such instances inPhilosophical Investigations seeJamesC.Klagge,Wittgenstein in Exile,Cambridge,MA, MITPress,2011,p.25(chap.2).

The problemwith all this, however, is that the practice of diag-nosing thesubterraneandesiresandviceswhich leadpeopleastrayin theirphilosophizing isadangerousone—for it canall tooeasilybecome yet another toolwhichwe use to cheat ourselves and oth-ers.Afterall,withsufficientingenuityandimaginationit ispossibletocomeupwithatleastplausiblesuggestionsofulteriormotivesforholdinganyphilosophicalpositionatall,orforundertakinganykindofphilosophicaltaskorstyle.Appealtothesekindsofpsychologicaldiagnosiscould thensimplybecomeacheapwayofdismissingouropponents’ positionsbymeansofad hominem attack insteadof sub-stantiveargument.

It should not be surprising that this danger exists. After all, giv-enthatthisvisionofphilosophystressestheubiquityofthecharms,temptations,and“easywaysout”whichplagueourphilosophizing,itis only to be expected that the vision itself has the potential to be-comeastumblingblock.88Therecognitionof the importanceof thephilosophicalvirtuestothepracticeofphilosophycanthereforeturnasubstantivephilosophicaldebatealltooquicklyintonothingbutanexchangeofaccusationsabouthowtheothersideismiredinvariousfundamentalphilosophicaldelusionsandvices.89

88.Wittgensteincertainlyrecognizedthathisownwayofphilosophizingheldadangerouscharm,bothoverhimselfandothers.Regardinghimself,forex-ample,heobservedin1931that“Iamsomewhatinlovewithmysortofmove-mentofthoughtinphilosophy.(AndperhapsIshouldomittheword‘some-what’)” (D:109);andregardingothers,Malcolmrecounts thatWittgensteintoldhim,in1939,“thathesawthatIwas‘charmed’byCambridgephilosophyandthatitwouldbeapityif Iwentawayinthatcondition”(F:III:64–5;by‘Cambridgephilosophy’Wittgensteinmeantchieflyhisownphilosophy,seeWC:404).

89.This is theworryraisedbyJamesKlaggeandWalterOtt intheconclusionoftheirreviewofEugenFischer’sbook,Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy (New York, Routledge, 2011). Theywrite: “In standard philosophical argu-mentsweareaccustomedtobeingcalledwrong,andbeingofferedreasonsthatwearewrong.InFischer’sviewwearetobecalled‘deluded,’andofferedexplanationsastowhywearedeluded.Butthisisadismissiveresponsethatdoesnottaketheotherseriouslyasarationalandintentionalbeing…[It]isanalienatingresponse,notonelikelytoengageothersinadiscussion,ratherlikearguingwithyourspousebysaying:‘HaveyouskippedyourProzac?’Or:



from Notes Taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor,ed.CyrilBarrett,Oxford,Blackwell,1966(usingpagenumber).

CVLudwigWittgenstein,Culture and Value,ed.G.H.vonWrightandHeikkiNyman,trans.PeterWinch,Oxford,Blackwell,1998(usingpagenumber).

D LudwigWittgenstein,‘MovementsofThought:Diaries1930–1932,1936–1937’, inhisLudwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions, ed.&trans.JamesC.KlaggeandAlfredNordmann,Lanham,Row-man&Littlefield,2002(usingpagenumber).

F FA Flowers III (ed.), Portraits of Wittgenstein (4 volumes), Bristol,ThoemmesPress,1999(usingvolumenumber,thenpagenumber).

KLWL Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1932: from the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee,ed.DesmondLee,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1980(usingpagenumber).

LA LudwigWittgenstein, ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’, in his Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief: Compiled from Notes Taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor,ed.CyrilBarrett,Oxford,Blackwell,1966(usingpagenumber).

LFMLudwigWittgenstein,Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939: from the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Nor-man Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, ed. CoraDiamond,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1989(usingpagenumber).

LRBLudwigWittgenstein,‘LecturesonReligiousBelief’,inhisLectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief: Com-piled from Notes Taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor, ed.CyrilBarrett,Oxford,Blackwell,1966(usingpagenumber).

andseriousoneisinvaluingtruthoverone’sownrightness,andthemore strong and courageous one is in being able to face the possi-bilityofone’sownmistakenness,thelesslikelyonewillbetotrytoavoid genuine and substantive philosophical exchanges with one’sinterlocutors, and the lessquicklyonewill thereforebe tempted toshutdownsubstantiveargumentinad hominemways.Indeed,therealreasonthatitisimperativetoacknowledgeandinvestigatethewaysinwhichmisguidedtemptationsanddesirescan leadusphilosophi-callyastrayisnotatallsoastohelpusinthediagnosisofotherpeople.Rather,itissothatwecanbemoreconsciousoftheworkthatwemusteachdoonourselvesinourpracticeandteachingofphilosophy.AsWittgensteinsaid:“workonphilosophyisactuallyclosertoworkingononeself”(BT:86:300).92

REFERENCE KEY

BTLudwigWittgenstein,The Big Typescript: TS 213,ed.&trans.C.GrantLuckhardtandMaximilianA.E.Aue,Oxford,Blackwell,2005(us-ingchapternumber,thenpagenumber).

CCLudwigWittgenstein,Gesamtbriefwechsel/Complete Correspondence, eds.MonikaSeekircher,BrianMcGuinness,andAntonUnterkirch-er,Charlottesville,InteLex,2005(usingtheletter’sdate).

CFLudwigWittgenstein, ‘ConversationsonFreud’, inhisLectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief: Compiled

92. IwouldliketothankDavidSternforinvitingmetoparticipateintheOber-mann Center’s ‘Summer Seminar on Wittgenstein’s 1930–33 Lectures’ in2015—forwhichIpreparedthefirstversionofthispaper—andtothankalltheseminarparticipantsfortheirhelpfuldiscussionandfeedback.Forvalu-ablecommentsonvarioussubsequentdraftsof thispaper Iamgrateful toDavidEgan,JamesKlagge,KevinMulligan,DavidStern,MartinUrschel,andtwoanonymousrefereesforthisjournal.Andformanyilluminatingconver-sationsalongthewayIamthankfultoLochinBrouillard,JosephCarlsmith,YuvalDolev,PaulFranks,RichardFumerton,NaftaliGoldberg,SolGoldberg,ElishaMallard,VolkerMunz,Alois Pichler,ChristinePountney, andZe’evSultanowitz.



WPCR LudwigWittgenstein and Rush Rhees, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philo-sophicalConversationswithRushRhees(1939–50):fromthenotesofRushRhees’,ed.GabrielCitron,Mind,124:493,January2015(us-ingpagenumber).

MSLudwigWittgenstein,Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition, Charlottesville, InteLex, 2003 (using item number, thenpagenumber).

MWL LudwigWittgenstein,Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933, from the Notes of GE Moore,ed.DavidG.Stern,BrianRogers,andGabrielCitron,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2016(us-ingmanuscriptvolumenumber,thenmanuscriptpagenumber).

PI LudwigWittgenstein,Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations,trans.GEMAnscombe,P.M.S.Hacker,andJoachimSchulte,Wiley-Blackwell,2009(usingsectionnumber).

POLudwigWittgenstein,Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions, ed. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, Indianapolis, HackettPublishingCompany,1993(usingpagenumber).

RFM Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathemat-ics,ed.G.H.vonWright,R.Rhees,andG.E.M.Anscombe, trans.G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978 (using part number,thensectionnumber).

WCLudwigWittgenstein,Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Docu-ments 1911–1951, ed. BrianMcGuinness,Malden,Wiley-Blackwell,2008(usingpagenumber;IhavesilentlycorrectedWittgenstein’sspellingmistakesinEnglish).

WHLudwigWittgensteinandLudwigHänsel, ‘LudwigHänsel–Lud-wigWittgenstein:AFriendship,1929–1940’, inWittgenstein’sLud-wig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions, ed. & trans. JamesC.KlaggeandAlfredNordmann,Lanham,Rowman&Littlefield,2002(usingpagenumber).

Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength

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