ISSN - [0952-049x]

SUDAN STUDIESNumber 37 Apr i l 2008

CONTENTS

Editorial

Professor Peter Shinnie "

Dams on the Nile: from Aswan to the Fourth CataractDerek Welsby

Neutral? Against What? Bystanders and Human Rights Abuses:the case of Merowe Dam

Nicholas Hildyard

Old Friend, New Actor:a Historical Note on Sudan's Relations with China

Dan Large

Book ReviewWek: Sudanese Refugee to International Supermodel

SSSUK Notices2008 Symposium and AGM

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Editorial Board, Sudan St~d/es: Dr John Alexander, Dr Anisa Dani; Dr H R J Davies; Ms Jane Hogan; DrD K Lindley; Dr W T W Morgan; and ProfPeter Woodward

EDITORIAL

We have decided upon a different arrangement for the publicationof Sudan Studies. The new plan is for issues to appear in Januaryand in July. This will mean that we will avoid the Christmas postalrush and by having one in July it should be able to circulate detailsof the forthcoming AGM and Annual Symposium. This will alsohave the added advantage of saving the postal costs of a separatecirculation.

Members will be aware of the passing of Professor Shinnie.Accordingly, in this issue you will find a tribute to him by two ofour members. Again, we have to record with regret the deaths ofSir Donald Hawley who was a member of the Sudan PoliticalService from 1941 to 1955 and in April of this year of RobertCol l ins a wel l -known scholar of Sudanese studies. Anappreciation of each of them will appear in Sudan Studies 38.

On a happier note we are pleased to report that Ibrahim El Salahihas accepted an invitation to become the Society's President inplace of Tayeb Salih. We thank Tayeb for his contribution asPresident and look forward to working with Ibrahim. A briefaccount of Ibrahim's interests will appear in the next issue.

We had excellent presentations at our 2007 Symposium, andrevised versions of three of them are reproduced here. NicholasHildyard works with Comer House, a UK Research and Advocacyorganisation concerned especially with human rights, and discussesthe Merowe Dam Project. Over many years he has developed aparticular interest in the impact of dam construction. Dan Largeprovides a historical perspective on China's interest in the Sudan.This is a revised version of a paper he presented at the SudanStudies Conference in Bergen in 2006. He wishes to thank theSSSUK for their support which enabled him to attend thatConference. Dan Large is Director of the Sudan Open Archive in

the new Africa-Asia Centre at SOAS. Derek Welsby is based atthe British Museum and is a well-known authority on Sudanarchaeology. He is President of the International Society forNubian Studies and a member of the SSSUK Committee.

There are a number of other papers awaiting publication. I doapologise to these contributors and assure them that they have notbeen forgotten and that their papers will appear in Sudan Studies assoon as possible.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

A GENTLE REMINDER!! I f you have not yet paid yoursubscription for 2008, please do so immediately. Details are to befound inside the front cover

Peter Shinnie (1915-2007)

Peter Shinnie, who died at the age of 92 on 29 October 2007,was a pioneering Meroitic and Africanist archaeologist. AtOxford before World War Two he read Egyptology, joined theCommunist Party, and learned to fly. He left his job astemporary assistant at the Ashmolean Museum when war brokeout and joined the RAF, serving in Bomber Command andsubsequently in intelligence, interpreting air photography. Afterthe war he returned to the Ashmolean but joined the SudanAntiquities Service in 1946 as Assistant Commissioner forArchaeology under A.J. Arkell, whom he ultimately succeeded.It was during this period that he began his long career studyingNubian and Meroitic civilisations. Shinnie was an experiencedfield archaeologist beginning fieldwork under MortimerWheeler at the excavations of Maiden Castle and he introducedmodem techniques on his numerous excavations in the NileValley and elsewhere.

With the approach of the Sudan's independence Shinnie'sposition was classified as 'political' (at the suggestion of hisSudanese deputy)and was 'Sudanised' in 1954, the post beinggiven to a Frenchman! Shinnie then served for two years asDirector of Antiquities in Uganda before being appointedProfessor of Archaeology at the University in Legon, Ghana, in1958, then Professor of Archaeology at the University ofKhartoum in 1966, and finally to the chair of archaeology at theUniversity of Calgary in Canada in 1970. Whilst in these postshe continued with his lifelong interest in Sudan excavating withthe University of Ghana in the important medieval settlement atDebeira, a contribution to the UNESCO High Dam campaign.He then went on to conduct extensive work at Meroe, the capitalof the Kingdom of Kush, the final report of which waspublished a few years before his death. It is arguably his periodsspent in Uganda and Ghana which helped him broaden the scopeof Meroitic studies from being merely an appendage ofEgyptology to being firmly rooted in the archaeology of Africa.

With his interest in history, ethnography and linguistics, and acontinuing commitment to the archaeology of both Ghana andthe Sudan, he refused to recognize the 'sub-Saharan' divideprevailing in much Africanist scholarship.

Shinnie was the founding editor of Kush (the journal of theSudan Antiquities Service) and Nyame Akuma (the newsletter ofthe Society of Africanist Archaeologists). His Sudanpublications include Mero~: A Civilization of the Sudan (1967),The African Iron Age (1971), (with Randi Haaland) African IronWorking: Ancient and Traditional (1985), Ancient Nubia(1996), and (with J.R. Anderson), The Capital of Kush 2. Mero~Excavations 1973-1984 (2004). He was co-editing a Nubiandictionary at the time of his death. He was awarded the Order ofthe Two Niles by the Sudan Government in 2006 in recognitionof his services to Sudan's archaeology.

DAMS ON THE NILE:FROM ASWAN TO THE FOURTH CATARACT

DEREK WELSBY

Dams are not a new phenomenon. They were built by manyancient civilisations among them the Ancient Egyptians. However,the first attempt to dam the course of the Nile dates to the lastdecade of the 19th century when Britain began to harness thewaters of the river. In 1894 the design for a dam on the Nile atAswan was submitted by W. Willcocks and approved by aninternational committee of engineers. The decision to build thedam, which for part of the year would raise the water level in theriver immediately upstream by 100 feet (30m), raised a storm ofprotest, not from Egyptians but from European archaeologists, as itwould submerge the Temple of Isis at Philae for a part of the year(Peel 1904, 75ff). As a solution to the problem Willcockssuggested to his former chief, Scott Moncrieff, that the cost of thedam might be met by selling the Philae temples to the Americansfor removal and re-erection in New York! (Sandes 1937, 382).

Ultimately, the Government compromised and ordered that theheight of the dam, and consequently the level of the reservoir,should be reduced by 26 feet, so that only the base of the templeswere partly submerged for a portion of the year and measures weretaken to strengthen their foundations. Captain H. G. Lyons, R.E.,the Director of Survey, was appointed to carry out this work duringthe winter of 1895-96. This capitulation of the dam builders, andtheir political masters, to archaeological pressure is a very raretriumph and drew the following bitter comment from a well-knownpolitician "The State must struggle and the people starve in orderthat professors may exult and tourists find some place on which toscratch their names. "" (Winston Churchill quoted in Sandes 1937,383).

The triumph was extremely short lived. In 1907 work began on aheightening of the dam allowing the reservoir level to rise by 7mand this was completed in 1912 (Addison 1959, 63ff.). TheGovernment was well aware that this might have revived theanimosity of the antiquaries and, therefore, exercised tact anddiscretion. "In order to avoid a storm of criticism such as theoriginal submergence of the Philae temples had aroused," writesSir Henry Lyons, "it was announced that an archaeological surveyof the area of the valley to be submerged would be made, and thatany ancient structure which would be affected wouM bestrengthened" The survey was entrusted to the SurveyDepartment: the strengthening, to the Department of Antiquities(Sandes 1937, 384). This was the first major rescue campaignlaunched inthe world 100 years ago this year (see Adams 2007).The American Egyptologist, George Reisner was invited to leadthe survey. He directed the first season of excavation mainly atShellal on the east bank adjacent to Philae, the work beingcontinued thereatter by Colin Firth (Firth 1912; 1915; 1927;Reisner 1910). Reisner's work in the cemetery at Shellal was offundamental importance to the study of the Middle Nile andhighlights the important contribution that rescue projects inadvance of dams have made to our knowledge of the history andarchaeology of the Middle Nile.

Alongside the immense destruction of archaeological sitesresulting from the Aswan Dam, from its first heightening in 1907-12 and from its second heightening in 1929-34 (see Emery 1938;Emery and Kirwan 1935), which raised the water level a further7.4m, a vast amount of archaeological information was recovered.This was augmented still further with the replacement of theAswan Dam by the Sadd el-Ali, The High Dam, which impoundeda reservoir stretching as far upstream as the Dal Cataract inNorthern Sudan. [For missions involved in the UNESCO HighDam Campaign see Adams 1977, 83-86]. As a result of theseactivities this part of the Nile Valley became, and still remains, one

of the most intensively studied archaeological landscapes in theworld.

Inthe 1940s a proposal was put forward for the construction of adam at the Fourth Cataract of the Nile in northern Sudan to aid inflood control and to act as a storage facility. During talks in 1950and 1951 Sudan agreed to allow the Egyptian Government to beginconstruction, but the decision to go ahead with the Aswan HighDam caused the project to be shelved (Collins 1990, 249-250).There was renewed interest in a Fourth Cataract Dam, by theSudan Government, beginning with a study conducted in 1979 forthe Ministry of Irrigation (Hakem 1993, lff) and throughout the1990s the threat of the dam's construction ebbed and flowed. Overthe last few years, however, the dam project has become a reality.Construction of the actual dam began in November 2003 and whencompleted will result in the flooding of 170 kilometres of the NileValley as far upstream as the head of Mograt Island.

In response to an appeal from the Sudan National Corporation forAntiquities and Museums (Hakem 1993) many missions from asfar afield as California, Peru and Poland are participating in theMerowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project (MDASP).Although time is very short - the completion date for theconstruction project is 2008 - it appears that the work wil lrevolutionise our understanding of the archaeology of this region.

The Fourth Cataract is a long series of rapids over a considerablereach of the Nile. These make navigation difficult while theconvergence of the direction of the river's current, here generallyfrom north east to south west, with the prevailing north wind meantthat it was virtually impossible for sailing boats to travel upstream.The problems faced by the invading army of Ismail Pasha illustratethe difficulties. It took his nine shallowest draught boats 57 days totravel upstream, through the Fourth and Fifth Cataracts to Berber(Udal 1998, 217) while the Nile Column of the Gordon Relief

Expedition in late December 1884 to February 1885 endured manydifficulties when moving through the cataracts (Brakenbury 1885;Featherstone 1993, 77).

The river was not an artery for transport and trade. Owing to thegreat Nile bend, land traffic tended to shun the river valley in thisregion, crossing the Bayuda Desert from Kareima or Korti towardsBerber and Shendi or from ed-Debba to Omdurman. These factors,together with the very rough nature of the terrain, led mostantiquarians and archaeologists also to avoid the region. At thebeginning of the present dam-stimulated project very fewarchaeological sites were known in the area (Innes 1931; Jackson1926; Titherington 1939). As elsewhere in the Nile valley,however, the absence of archaeological sites on the distributionmap cannot be equated with an absence of human occupation in thepast but only with an absence of archaeological work. Alreadymany thousands of sites have been discovered, many more willundoubtedly be discovered before the project is completed, whilemany more will disappear for ever before they have even beenlocated.

An initial survey of the region had been undertaken on behalf ofthe Commissioner for Archaeology by Gray and Thabit Hassan inJanuary and February 1949 (Gray 1949). Rumours of plans toreactivate the dam project in the 1980s led to a short season ofwork by the Italian mission based at Jebel Barkal (Caneva 1988;Donadoni 1997) which was followed by a survey begun inDecember 1989 of the whole region conducted by NCAM with theassistance of the Section Fran~aise de la Direction des Antiquit6sdu Soudan (Berger 1994; Hakem 1993, 11; Leclant 1991; 1992;1993; Montlugon 1994) followed by joint excavations of NCAMand the University of Dongola (Abdel Rahman Ali Mohamed andKabashy Hussein 1999). In July 1992, following the init ialsurveys, a list of the registered sites, compiled by Abdel RahmanAli Mohamed, gave a total of 141 (Hakem 1993, 16-20).

There are currently nine archaeological missions working in theregion:

Germany - Humboldt University Berlin; University of KSlnHungaryPoland - Gdafisk Archaeological Mission; Polish Centre forMediterranean Archaeology, University of WarsawSudan - National Corporation for Antiquities and MuseumsUK - Sudan Archaeological Research Society/Brit ishMuseumUSA - University of California Santa Barbara; OrientalInstitute, Chicago

[Also the University of Delaware undertook a shortseason in 2005]

The whole area to be flooded has been divided up into concessionsand these have been awarded to archaeological missions (for theconcessions see Welsby, in press).

It is still too early to access the impact of the current research onour perception of the role of this region in the past but the ongoingwork has already caused us to rethink our preconceptions whichwere based largely on negative evidence. The Fourth Cataract zonehas been considered an inhospitable area for human settlement.Travel through the region by river is fraught with difficulties whiletravel along the river banks, through the often extremely roughterrain, is slow. The amount of land available for irrigation usingmodem technology provided by diesel water pumps, and theirpredecessor, the saqia, which may have been introduced into thearea around the middle of the first millennium AD, is limited. Inmany places the rocky hil ls plunge straight into the river,elsewhere the alluvium along the river banks is of limited extent.Today, the region supports a relatively small population with littleopportunities for expansion of agriculture.

A number of discoveries during the MDASP have however,suggested that in the past there may actually have been somesignificant advantages to living in the region. One advantage thathas long been recognised is that the nature of the region will haveprovided a measure of natural defence during times of trouble, forexample in the later medieval period. It was considered that therewould have been an upsurge of occupation at such times when theregion was seen as a refuge.

Such an explanation for settlement in the region is now becomingincreasingly untenable as large numbers of sites of many differentperiods are found. Among the discoveries which have reallycaused us to reconsider our ideas is that of a building constructedof granite located during surveys in 1999 and excavated in 2003. Itwas the lower part of apyramid approximately 5.8m square with aoffering chapel on its east side, the whole surrounded by anenclosure wall (Welsby, 2003, 30, colour plates XVI-XVII; 2004).Set within a funerary landscape, where there are many cemeteries

t l a t h BC it testifies to theof the early Kushite period (8 - 5 century ), " "presence of a significant population in the vicinity and also to thepresence within that population of an individual of considerableprestige and wealth. What is such an individual doing in thissupposedly inhospitable region?~

Elsewhere in the Fourth Cataract there are a number of massive4.

fortresses of the medieval period, dating from a time when theinhabitants were Christian. These fortifications indicate thatsubstantial manpower could be mobilised through the power of anindividual or a political system both to effect their constructionand, presumably, also to man them, at least in times of perceivedthreat . Looking back fur ther in to the past we now haveconsiderable evidence for cemeteries and settlements dating to theperiod of the Kerma Culture, the first Kingdom of Kush, betweenc. 2500 and 1450 BC.

How were these large ancient populations supported in thisenvironment? The most sought after agricultural land in northernSudan is what is termed seluka land, the banks of the river betweenthe high and low water marks. As the water level of the river fallsfollowing the annual inundation crops can be planted near thewater's edge and can be harvested before the ground dries out and,therefore, before there is any necessity for irrigation. As late as theearly 20m century nearly 50% of the cultivated land in the DongolaReach for example was seluka land (Allan and Smith 1948, 628;Tracey and Hewison 1948, 745-6). Irrigation is costly either inmanpower with the use of the counterweighted pole, the shaduf, inanimal power with the saqia or in diesel fuel for the modern waterpumps, reducing significantly the profit margin. Today, such areasas the northern Dongola reach and the Kerma Basin are extremelyproductive with large-scale irrigation. However, in the periodbefore the advent of the modern pumps and, to a lesser extentbefore the arrival of the saqia, it is those reaches of the Nile valleywith the greatest amount of seluka land that will have been._

especially favoured. Within the Fourth Cataract in certain areasthere are large numbers of islands divided by a myriad of riverchannels many of which dry up between the annual inundationsfurnishing, in some cases, an abundance of seluka land. Thus, anarea which today inhibits the expansion of agriculture may in thepast have been ideally suited for maintaining a substantialpopulation. Other advantages focus around the suitability of theregion for fishing and as a source of raw materials, both hard stoneand gold (Abdelrahim Mohammed Salih 1999, 49). It is in thiscontext that we should view the large numbers of Kermasettlements and cemeteries, the early Kushite pyramid and theimpressive medieval fortresses.

Another major result from the current work is the realisation thatthe Fourth Cataract is not a frontier zone as had been thought. Ithad generally been considered that the first Kingdom of Kush,ancient Egypt's trading partner and rival from the early Old

Kingdom period around 2500 BC until the early New Kingdomaround 1500 BC, only controlled as far upstream as the regionaround Jebel Barkal. Although the presence of pottery of a typeassociated with the Kerma culture had been noted some time agoin the Fourth Cataract (Gratien 1978, 21) this was not consideredsignificant. Material clearly belonging to the Kerma Moyen (2050- 1750 BC) and Classique (1750 - 1450 BC) phases of the culturalassemblage has now been found on the right bank of the river inthe Fourth Cataract by the Gdafisk Mission (Paner 1998, fig. 12,2003). A typical Kerma Ancien cemetery was discovered andexcavated by the Sudan Archaeological Research Society on thelett bank near et-Tereif (Welsby, 2003, 31) and material of all theKerma periods has been noted on the right bank close to MogratIsland by the University of California, Santa Barbara mission.

Elements of the Kerma culture, although with some regionaldifferences from those well known from the metropolis and itshinterland, are thus attested right through the Fourth Cataract andwe must look further upstream for the southern frontier of the firstKingdom of Kush. The symbolic southern boundary of theEgyptian Empire was located at the Hagar el-Merwa, a large quartzoutcrop in the modem district of Kurgus. This rock bears boundaryinscriptions of the pharaohs Thutmose I and III which state inexplicit terms the significance of this place to the Egyptians "As

for any Nubian who shall transgress this stela which my fatherAmun has given to me, his chieftains shall be slain, he shall endurein my grasp, the sky shall not rain for him, his cattle shall notcalve; there shall be no heir of his upon earth" (Davies 2001). Onemight suggest that the choice of this point for the boundaryinscriptions may be that it was the southern boundary of theKingdom of Kush which the Egyptians had just overthrown,although the highly visible nature of the white rock itself may alsohave made it an irresistible location for major imperial inscriptions.

The work at the Fourth Cataract is very rapidly changing ourperception of this hitherto virtually unknown reach of the Nile.That the knowledge is being gained at the expense of thedestruction of the whole region by flooding is to be regretted but,as with the construction of the first dam at Aswan, "the well-beingof the living and of the unborn should .... prevail" (Peel 1904, 77).Among the positive results of the dam's construction, along withthe generation of vast amounts of hydroelectric power, must be setthe advances in knowledge of the past. As in the 20th century it hasbeen the construction of dams on the Nile that has revolutionisedour knowledge of the history and archaeology of the Middle Nilevalley. It is much to be regretted that the construction of the damsfurther upstream, at Sennar and Roseires on the Blue Nilecompleted in 1925 and 1966 respectively and at Jebel Aulia on theWhite Nile, completed in 1937, were not accompanied by similararchaeological rescue projects. Those regions even to this dayremain little explored.

To conclude, one aspect of the archaeological work at the FourthCataract remains to be mentioned. Archaeologists have never beensupporters of dam projects. They do not support the large-scaledestruction of the heritage of mankind wherever in the world itmay occur. However, they cannot be opposed to developmentprojects per se. It is the archaeologists' task to recover as muchinformation as they can in the time available in advance of suchprojects. Occasionally, when a site or monument is of worldheritage status, they might be forced to oppose, or urge amodification in, the development plans, as in the ease of theconstruction of the First Aswan Dam but, except in theseexceptional cases, they have very little power and influence.

In the light of this the recent developments in the region of theFourth Cataract set a very unfor tunate precedent . Thearchaeological community from many countries has gone toconsiderable lengths to raise money for rescue work in the region

to be inundated by the new reservoir. Raising the necessary moneyis far from an easy task. The various missions have workedextremely hard, often in difficult conditions, to do their utmost togather whatever information they can in the short time available.Dur ing thei r endeavours they have l ived wi th the localcommunities of the Shagiya, Manasir and Rubatab renting housesin the local villages and employing local workmen. They have, as aby-product of their work, injected a considerable amount of moneyinto the local economy. The archaeologists have invariably beenwelcomed by the local people. Although perhaps not fullyunderstanding why the archaeologists would choose to spend manymonths, and considerable amounts of money, in the region it is myimpression that the local people respect the archaeologists for theirhard work and obvious dedication.

Over the last few years however, a section of the Manasir tribe hassought to use the archaeologists as pawns in their political struggleagainst the Sudan Government. Although the members of theManasir Higher Committee are meant to represent the local peopletheir attitude to the archaeologists is at variance, certainly with thelarge numbers of people amongst whom I and many of mycolleagues have worked. The Higher Committee has forbiddenarchaeologists to work in the Dar el-Manasir. Quite what benefit ithopes to gain from this is a mystery to the archaeologicalcommunity. Archaeologists are the first to acknowledge that theywield little power or influence.

By banning archaeologists from the region the Manasir HigherCommittee is wantonly destroying the heritage of the people it isthere to represent. The dam will also destroy that heritage but,notwithstanding the problems with the dam, it will bring someconcrete benefits. However, the activities of the Manasir HigherCommittee vis-a-vis the archaeologists will bring no benefitswhatsoever. It is vandalism of the highest order and one can onlyhope that succeeding generations of Manasir do not feel too keenly

the wanton disregard shown for their cultural heritage by theirrepresentatives in the first decade of the 21st century.

Many missions have been forced from the area over the last fewyears. In the ease of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society'sproject based at Ed-Doma and Sineita~we were given 24 hours toleave the area by a member of the Manasir Higher Committeewhen he passed through the area on 22nd December 2006. Themembers of the team, from the UK, Germany, Sweden, Norway,the USA, Sudan and Peru, were informed that should theydisregard this 'order' their safety could not be guaranteed. Thelocal people amongst whom we lived were bemused by thesituation developing, many were deeply embarrassed by thisbreach of hospitality and some were extremely angry. Theyappeared to have a sound grasp of the fact that our archaeologicalactivities were totally divorced from the Manasir's struggle againstthe Merowe Dam Administration and the Sudan Governmentrelating to issues of compensation and resettlement. The localpeople are well aware that the archaeologists in their midst areseeking to save as much as possible of the heritage of the Dar el-Manasir and of the present-day inhabitants of the region.

The Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project is now drawingto a close. Notwithstanding both the unavoidable and avoidableproblems facing the archaeologists and related specialists in thefields of ethnography, climatology and geomorphology, a vast

--a..mount of data has been collected. This will ensure that the regionof-th-e-Fourth Cataract will take its rightful place in the story ofhuman settlement in the Nile Valley.

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WELSBY, D A (2004) 'The SARS Amri to Kirbekan Survey. Excavations atthe Pyramid, Site 4-F-71', Sudan & Nubia 8, 2-3.

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NEUTRAL? AGAINST WHAT?BYSTANDERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES:

THE CASE OF MEROWE DAM

Nicholas Hildyard

"All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing. Heappeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak noevil. The victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to sharethe burden of pain. The victim demands action, engagement,and remembering." Judith Herman, 1997~.

It is now widely accepted that companies have a responsibilityto ensure that their activities do not harm the environment orcause human rights and other abuses. The recognition of suchrespons ib i l i t i es i s no t on ly enshr ined in the na t iona lenvironmental and social regulations which bind companiesoperating in specific jurisdictions, but also in the in-house codesof conduct that many companies have adopted to promotesocially-responsible corporate behaviour.But are there limits to such responsibilities? And if so, what orwhere are they? I f a company suppl ies turb ines for ahydroelectric dam, does it have a responsibility, legal or moral,to ensure that the dam's environmental and social impacts areminimized? Or do its ethical policies and legal obligationsextend only to ensuring that the manufacture of the turbine isenvironmentally sound and without human rights impacts?What of other actors involved in the dam or any other project?Banks and other financial institutions, such as export creditagencies2 and multilateral development banks, for example? Dothey have a duty to ensure that the money they provide forprojects does not facilitate adverse environmental impacts andhuman rights abuses? What about institutions that have no directcontractual relationship with an environmentally or socially

egregious project, but whose association, albeit on theperiphery, nonetheless gives the project or its promoters acredibility they would not otherwise enjoy? Do they have aresponsibility to voice their concerns when human fights abusesoccur? Do they have a duty to respond to requests from thoseaffected to use their good offices to bring pressure to preventfurther abuses or to help resolve conflicts that may arise?These questions are far from academic. Companies and otherinstitutions face them every day, particularly where thosecompanies and institutions have chosen to operate in countries,such as Sudan, with poor human fights and environmentalrecords. Some have stepped 'up to the plate', withdrawing fromprojects that do notmeet international best practice or refusingto become involved in the first place, fearful of the reputationaldamage that involvement might inflict on their business. Oneexample is the withdrawal in 2000-01 of three multinationalconstruction companies from Sweden,3 Italy and the UK4 fromthe planned Ilisu Dam5 in the Kurdish region of south-eastTurkey on the grounds that the project failed to meet minimalenvironmental standards. Two commercial banks - UBS6 andZueficher Kantonalbank7, both from Switzerland- have alsodeclined to finance the project on similar grounds. Othercompanies and banks, however, have shown no such qualmsboth on Ilisu and more generally, brazenly adopting a minimalistview of their corporate responsibilities to pick up business leftbehind when more progressive companies withdraw fromegregious projects. Still others have attempted to avoid the issuealtogether by insisting that they cannot 'take sides'.The Merowe Dam in Sudan is a case in point. Despite theproject being i l legal under Sudanese law at the time thatconstruction commenced (its environmental impact assessmenthad not been certified by, or even shared with, the relevantauthorities) and despite widespread human fights abuses- fromthe arbitrary detention and torture of critics to the killing ofprotestors - all but one of the German, French, Swiss, Chineseand British companies and institutions involved have refused torespond to requests from the affected communities to use their

influence to press the Sudanese Government to honour itsobligations to the affected communities. Even when faced with adirect appeal from the United Nations' Special Rapporteur forthe Right to Adequate Housing that they suspend theirinvolvement in the dam, the companies have declined to act,insisting on their 'neutrality', As a result, the risk of a violentconflict in the region is growing. This prompts a question of thecompanies and institutions: who or what are you 'neutral'against?

THE PROJECT:The Merowe/Hamadab Dam, currently being built on the RiverNile in Sudan, is the largest hydro project under construction inAfrica. The dam will be used to generate electricity, with aplanned output of 1,250 megawatts, and will irrigate some120,000 hectares on both banks of the Nile.8 Once completed, itwill create a 174-kilometre long reservoir, displacing anestimated 50,000-78,000 people9, mainly from the Manasirethnic group. Many have already been moved to poorly plannedand inadequately resourced 'resettlement' sites in the Nubiandesert, where they have been unable to sustain a livelihood.Poverty in the resettlement sites is on the increase, with manynow reliant on food aid.Merowe would be the most northerly dam, on the main stem ofthe Nile River, in Sudan. The idea of constructing a dam on theFourth Cataract of the Nile, 350 kilometres upstream fromSudan's capital, Khartoum, was first proposed by Britishcolonial authorities in the early 20th century. However, due to acombination of economic and political factors, it remainedshelved until 1992 when the government commissionedMonenco Agra, a Canadian consultancy firm, to carry out afeasibility study.1° The project was unable to attract funding,however, and it was not until the late 1990s, when Sudan's oilwealth improved the country's credit rating, that finance wassecured.

Construction of the dam is already advanced: the dam itself nowstraddles the Nile, damming the river on 30 December 2005.11Filling of the reservoir has now commenced, with the projectslated to become operational in 2008 (delayed from 2007).

THE FUNDERS AND THE FINANCES:The project owner is Sudan's Ministry of Irrigation and WaterResources' Merowe Dam Implementation Unit, now renamedthe Dam Implementation Unit.~2 Official sources cite thefollowing institutions as having provided finance for the dam:the Peoples' Republic of Chinat~$519 million),13 mainly throughthe China Export/Import Bank; the Kuwait Development Fund($150 million);15 the Saudi Development Fund ($200 million);16the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development ($250million);17 the Abu Dhabi Development Fund ($150 million);18the Sultanate of Oman ($106 million);19 and the Government ofQatar ($15 mil l ion).2° The Government of Sudan is alsoproviding $575 million.2~The total cost of the project, however, is not known. The DamImplementation Unit puts the figure at $1,966 mil l ion.22However, press reports in 2008 indicate that the Arab Fund forEconomic and Social Development has now loaned a further$211 million and the Kuwait Development Fund an additional$50 million, which would bring the total cost to date of theproject to $2,227 million.23Resettlement costs are also disputed. Monenco Agra (theCanadian consultancy firm which carried out the feasibilitystudy in 1992) estimated that resettlement would cost $1 billion.The official budget is $382 million.

THE COMPANIES AND INSTITUTIONS:Major contracts for the Merowe project were awarded to threeEuropean companies: Germany's Lahmeyer International(project management),24 France's Alstom (hydroelectricequipment),25 and Switzerland's ABB (transmission)26. The

Lahmeyer contract is worth $34 million, Alstom's $299 millionand ABB's $16 million.A l l t h ree compan ies have a reco rd o f i nvo lvement i ncontroversial hydropower projects.27 Both ABB and LahmeyerInternational were involved in the Lesotho Highlands WaterProject28, the biggest water scheme of its kind in the world andone dogged by major resettlement and corruption concerns: in2004, Lahmeyer International was convicted of seven counts ofbribery29 and has since been debarred from bidding for WorldBank contracts.3° Alstom has been involved in the Birecik Damin Turkey31 (major resettlement concerns) and the massiveThree Gorges Dam in China32 (resettlement and corruptionconcerns). In 2001, ABB announced that it would withdrawfrom power generation projects, selling its hydro division toAlstom.33 However, the company is still indirectly involved indams through its electrical transmission line business.The main construction work is being undertaken by a Chinesejoint venture company established between China InternationalWater & Electric Corporation and China National WaterResources and Hydropower Engineering Corporation, which hasa contract worth $650 million.34 Harbin Power EngineeringCompany and the Jilin Province Transmission and SubstationProject Company, both also from China, have contracts to buildtransmission lines.35 Some work on the dam and resettlementsites has been sub-contracted to local companies.36Although not directly contracted to the project, the BritishMuseum has been taking a leading role in salvaging thearchaeological sites that would be submerged once the dam'sreservoir is filled.

S O C I A L , H U M A N R I G H T S A N D E N V I R O N M E N TA LIMPACTS:The Merowe Dam will have profound social and environmentalimpacts, many of which have yet to be fully assessed.

Implementation of the project has also been characterised byhuman fights abuses, forced resettlement, illegality and a failureto conduct all but the most minimal environmental impactstudies. Despite this, the companies and institutions involved inthe project have consistently failed to use their influence to haltimplementation of the project until the issues surrounding itspossible impacts are resolved. Following are some examples:Environmental Impacts:Sudan's Environmental Protection Act 2001 requires thatp r o j e c t s s u c h a s t h e M e r o w e D a m s h o u l d h a v e a nEnvironmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and that constructionshould not begin until the EIA has been reviewed and approvedby the Government's Higher Council for Environment andNatural Resources (HCENR). The Higher Council is thetechnical arm of Sudan's Ministry of Environment. No such EIAexisted for Merowe prior to the commencement of construction,making the project illegal under Sudanese law. This, however,did not deter the companies involved from entering intocontracts with the project developers.Although an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) wasbelatedly undertaken for the project by Lahmeyer in 2002, it isshort, superficial and incomplete. The report lacks both amanagement plan and a compliance commitments register -components that are routine in environmental assessments thatmeet international good practice. Moreover, key impacts areglossed over or left unexplored; the evidence presented-is oftencontradictory; and assertions are made without adequatesupporting evidence.The EIA's treatment of downstream flows is indicative. Bestpractice requires that provision be made in a dam's flow regimefo r re leas ing env i ronmenta l flows " to he lp ma in ta indownstream ecosystem integrity and community livelihoods".37The EIA for Merowe/Hamadab acknowledges, however, that therequirements of downstream users have not been taken intoaccount in the existing reservoir operation studies.38 The peakhour operations of the power plant will lead to daily downstream

water fluctuations of up to 4.9 metres. This will severely impactthe operation of the countless small irrigation pumps on theriverbanks, a threat acknowledged by the EIA.39 Daily massive'water walls' Will also present a hazard for the people that workon the riverbanks.4°The EIA also accepts that the sedimentation regime downstreamwill be affected by the dam,41 but provides no assessment of theimpacts for downstream flood-plain agriculture of the loss offertile silt deposits. Again, no figures are given for the numbersof farmers likely to be affected. Although the EIA notes that theriver downstream will experience "some form" of "degradationof its beds and erosion of its banks", the data base on which theimpacts have been assessed is described as 'weak'.42 Furthermodelling would produce better results but the EIA recommendsagainst this.43 Instead it notes: "The issue will have to beaddressed by monitoring in order to identify sensitive sites andeventually determine the necessity for revetments to protectendangered building".44Evaporation of water held in the reservoir is also a problem. TheEIA estimates that the water loss could be as high as theequivalent of 2 per cent of the annual flow of the River Nile -and describes the issue as 'significant'. No consideration,however, is g iven to the ecological and socia l impactsdownstream and no mitigation measures are proposed.Although the project questionnaire specifically states that anirrigation component is planned for the project, with theintention of irrigating "two areas of 300, 000 hectares on bothsides of the Nile ", no consideration is given to the impacts thatthis will have on downstream flows and water quality.ResettlementThe Merowe Dam will displace an estimated 50,000-78,000people. The majority of the affected communities are from theManasir tribe, including two sub-clans who have lived in the"Amri" and "Hamadab" areas and who are often referred to asseparate groups. The "Hamadab" and the "Amri" are located inthe Northern State, whilst the majority of the Manasir are in Nile

State. The dam authorities intend tO remove all three affectedcommunities, against their will, out of their ancestral lands toremote desert resettlement sites.No resettlement plan to international standards exists for theproject. Yet, not one of the companies or institutions involvedhas made such a plan a condition of their involvement with theproject. And, with the exception of ABB, none of the companieshave responded to calls from the committee representing theaffected communities to use their influence to press theauthorities to reach a negotiated agreement on resettlement.The result has been a resettlement process that has been marredby violence, broken promises and forced relocation. About10,000 of the Hamadab, for example, have already been movedto El Multaga, a settlement in the Bayuda Desert, where theresettlement package has failed to deliver the benefits promised.When two non-governmental organisations, International RiversNetwork and The Corner House, visited the site in 2005, manyplots were still covered with sand. The soils were so poor thatthe farmers could not sell their produce on the market. Promisedservices had not materialised or had been denied to villagers.Villagers were also being charged for services such as water andelectricity, which the state promised would be free for the firsttwo years. The poverty rate at E1 Multaga had escalated from10% in 2003 to 65% in 2005, and many families were alreadyleaving the resettlement site. "We are poor farmers, but thegovernment is treating us like enemies'" said one of the villageleaders. According to recent reports, many of those resettled arenow dependent on food aid distributed via local religiouscharities.The Amri, who are to be resettled at Wadi AI Mugadam in theBayuda desert, have suffered a similar fate. It was originallyintended to move them by the end of December 2005. However,the resettlement site, known as New Amri, was not ready: onlyhalf of the needed houses had been built, and there wasinsufficient land to meet the legal resettlement entitlements ofthe affected communities. The site covers 35,000 feddans but

Sudanese law requires that almost double that amount (60,000feddans) should be made available to compensate the totalnumber of people being resettled. As of March 2008, half ofthose affected had been moved to New Amri; the remainderhave refused to move. Many of those who went to New Amrihave since returned, unable to make a living at the new site.Amongst the Manasir, the planned forced relocation to distantdesert resettlement sites at El Fida has also created considerabletension. The Manasir have consistently stated that they wouldrather die than be forced to move out of their ancestral lands.Arms are reported to have entered the area, and officials fromthe dam authority have been refused access to villages. In sharpcontrast to the government of the Northern State, within whoseboundaries the Amri and Hamadab lie, the Manasir's home state- Nile State - has sought to reach a negotiated resettlementagreement that would have the community's active support. Thenegotiations, which were initiated by the Governor of Nile State,began earlier in February 2006 and came to fruition on la June2006 when an Agreement was formally signed between theManasir and Nile State in Khartoum. The Agreement providesfor a consensual resettlement programme, with responsibility forreset t lement be ing removed f rom Merowe 's DamImplementation Unit and handed to Nile State. The Agreement,however, has yet to be honoured, the Dam Implementation Unitplacing obstacles in its path at every opportunity.Human Rights Abuses:The communities affected by the Merowe project haveconsistently stated that they are not opposed to the dam inprinciple but that they wish to see their rights to justresettlement and compensation respected. Peaceful protests toachieve these ends, however, have been repeatedly met withforce. Critics of the project have also been subject to arbitraryarrest, intimidation and torture. For example:

In September 2003, a group of Hamadab farmers who hadbeen moved to an ill-prepared resettlement site in theNubian desert sought to return to their original villages.

The government met them with unprovoked violence,using live bullets to break up protests, and injuring many;the farmers were forced back to the resettlement site by thepolice and security agents.In October 2003, security forces opened fire on protestingwomen and children in the village of Korgheli, seriouslywounding five people.46 Four people - AI Nazir Omar A1Tahir, Hussain Zaidan and two persons from Hamdab -were subsequently arrested, detained and tortured for fivedays.In April 2006, mil i t ia allegedly associated with theMerowe Dam Authority attacked a peaceful gathering ofvillagers in the Amri area. The villagers were meeting todiscuss whether or not to participate in a planned censusby the dam authorit ies of affected communities. Themilitia opened fire without warning when the villagerswere having breakfast in a school courtyard. Three peoplewere immediately killed and more than 50 injured, 30 ofthem seriously. Eyewitnesses say the dam militia attackedthe school using 16 pick-up' land cruisers equipped withheavy artillery and machine guns. Local car owners drovethe wounded to the nearest hospital (25 kilometres away)in Kariema town. According to eyewitness reports, thosewho assisted the wounded were arrested.47 Police blamedthe killings and injuries on protestors, claiming that thepolice and census officials had been attacked by 1,000protestors.48

The non-governmental organisations that have sought todocument the issues surrounding the dam have also been subjectto visits by the security forces. Following the visit of The ComerHouse and International Rivers Network, for example, theSudanese NGO that had facilitated the visit was interviewed bysecurity agents.Journalists covering the Merowe Dam have also been detainedwhere they are critical of the project or attempt to report theviews of affected people. On 16 August 2006, Naser Eldin

Ahmed A1 Tayeb, a journalist working for the AI Ayam Arabicdaily newspaper, was arrested and beaten whilst reporting on theplight of thousands of people who were displaced by floods inthe area around the dam.49 In March 2008, security officers fromMerowe's Dam Implementation Unit threatened to close AISahafa, one of Khartoum's leading papers. The threats followedcoverage in the paper of a meeting in London between China'sEnvoy to Africa, Mr. Liu Guijin, and Ali Askouri, a leader ofMerowe dam affected communities. The newspaper was forcedto issue a denial that the meeting in' London had taken place.Reports from the El Multaga resettlement site also confirmongoing intimidation of resettled villagers who are critical of theresettlement programme. In particular, there is evidence ofintimidation through discrimination: in settlement sites wherethe leadership is linked to the dam authorities, health centres getsupplies regularly, some even getting new ambulances assignedto serve that particular village only; by contrast, sites wherevillagers are critical of the project receive no supplies.Although the companies have been informed of such abuses,they have (with the exception of ABB) either stood resolutely onthe sidelines, refusing to intervene, or have sided with theauthorities. Responding to the April 2006 shootings at Amri, forexample, the China International Water and Electric Corporationissued a statement denying that any disturbances had takenplace:° Lahmeyer acknowledged that shootings had taken placebut placed the blame on "a group of landless protestors'" whoa t tacked o ffic ia l s who were a t tempt ing to dea l w i thcompensat ion d isputes: l A ls tom remained s i lent on themassacre. Only ABB acted, expressing its concern directly tothe Sudanese authorities, calling for "a full inquiry and for theresults to be made public". 52

CULTURAL HERITAGE:The Merowe Dam will flood an area rich in cultural heritage andarchaeological remains. According to the EIA, more than 1,000archaeological sites are located in the reservoir area and 120 in

the area of the El Multaga resettlement site. As of 2002, the areahad still to besubject to a final archaeological survey.53An internal memo by Sudan's Nat ional Corporat ion forAntiquities and Museums states:

"Over the last 13 years a number of excavation campaignswere conducted by various international archaeologicalexperts, including UNESCO. These activities have thrownmore light on the archaeological potential of the regionand resulted in the recording of hundreds of sites. Theyconsist of cemeteries and tombs, rock drawings, remainsof settlements, and monumental fortresses of the medievalperiod."

Although the British Museum undertook an archaeologicalsurvey, it was too late to affect the siting or planning of theproject, a key requirement of best practice standards. Despiteinternational recognition amongst archaeologists of theimportance of consulting with local people in order to assess thecultural significance of sites, no systematic consultation hastaken place.Although representatives of the affected communities haveurged the British Museum to use its influence to improve theproject, as they have asked the companies involved, theMuseum has refused to do so, arguing that it is a neutral party.Yet such neutrality has not prevented the Museum fromcr i t ic iz ing the communi t ies ' leadership when, in 2007,representatives of the communities requested archaeologistsexcavating the reservoir area to leave. The request followed thefailure of the government to honour an undertaking thatarchaeological treasures salvaged from the reservoir area wouldnot be removed to distant museums.

F A I L U R E T O A B I D E B Y I N T E R N A T I O N A LSTANDARDS:Since the 1980s, many countries, international developmentagencies, companies and hydro industry associations have

responded to public concern over the impacts of large-scaledams by adopting policies and regulations aimed at mitigatingthe environmental and social damage they cause. The WorldBank, for example, now has ten safeguard policies,54 which setout gener ic guidance on such issues as envi ronmentalassessment, resettlement, indigenous peoples and culturalproperty. It is generally acknowledged, however, that bestinternational practice for developing water and power projectsnow consists of the Strategic Priorities and Policy Principles setout by the World Commission on Dams (WCD), an independentmulti-stakeholder review set up by the World Bank in 1998,which reported in 2000.55Not only does the Merowe Dam violate at least five of the sevenStrategic Priorities of the WCD (Gaining Public Acceptance,Comprehensive Options Assessment, Sustaining Rivers andLivelihoods, Recognising Entitlements, and Sharing Benefits,and Ensuring Compliance), i t also breaches World Bankguidelines on Environmental Assessment (on 38 counts), onNatural Habitats (on 10 counts), on Involuntary Resettlement(on 12 counts), and on Cultural Property (on 3 counts):6The WCD states clearly that there must be good baselineinformation gathered over several years prior to any decision tobuild a dam. The World Bank's Environmental AssessmentSourcebook similarly requires that "the functions and servicesof natural habitats and ecosystems should be systematicallyassessed and evaluated, and the ecological, social and economicvalue of such functions quantified as TPart of the cost~benefitanalysis of programmes and projects.''5The Merowe/Hamadab EIA, however, fails to provide adequate- or in many cases, .any - assessment and evaluation of theimpacts of the project on fauna and flora, biodiversity, andecosystem functions or to quantify these functions as part of acost-benefit analysis. Indeed, no cost-benefit assessment is evenincluded in the EIA.No site specific field surveys appear to have been conducted offlora and fauna (and none is reported in the EIA): instead, the

EIA appears to rely on a desk study of regional surveys, themajority of which are over 15 years old (1958, 1984, 1987),very general (Important Birds of Africa) or taken from un-peerreviewed web pages. No indication is given as to the 'accuracy.and reliability', in contravention of World Bank guidelines.

THE UN'S APPEAL TO HALT THE PROJECT:In August 2007, the UN Rapporteur for Adequate Housingissued a damning statement on Merowe:

"I continue to receive disturbing reports that large-scaleforced evictions may be imminent in the Merowe area...Last year, thousands of people in the Merowe area wererelocated in similar circumstances which temporarily leftthem without food or shelter, and some remain homeless... 1urge the companies involved in the projects, such as Harbin. . Lahmeyer. . . and Alstom . . . to put a hal t to thei ractivities until a full and impartial assessment of the impacton the human rights of the population is~ made . . . I alsostrongly encourage that States . . ensure that the work oftheir national companies does not- directly or indirectly -negatively impact the human rights of the affected people. ,~8

The statement followed an investigation by the UN Rapporteurinto the 2006 flooding of an estimated 2,200 Amri families inthe reservoir area upstream of the Merowe Dam site. It is widelybelieved by the affected communities that the flooding was partof a deliberatestrategy by Merowe's Dam Implementation Unitand the Government of Sudan to force the Amri communities toaccept a resettlement package that they had previously rejected.The affected villagers lost everything and were left withoutshelter, clean water or food. The rising floodwaters coveredfields and destroyed crops and fodder. More than 12,000 head oflivestock were lost to the rising floodwaters, with many deniedaccess to fodder. Neither the Dam Implementation Unit nor theGovernment of Sudan acted to relieve the suffering of the

affected communities. On the contrary, the authorities cordonedoff the area and relief efforts were blocked.By actively denying relief to those affected by the flooding, theGovernment of Sudan violated the rights guaranteed to theaffected individuals under the following conventions andinternational instruments to which Sudan is a party: TheUniversal Declaration of Human Rights; The Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); TheConvention on the Rights of the Child; and The InternationalConvention on Civil and Political Rights.

BYSTANDERS OR PROTAGONISTS: Despite the UN Rapporteur's statement, the companies remainin the Merowe project and work continues on its construction.Appeals for help in bringing Merowe's Dam ImplementationUnit to the negotiating table also remain unheeded. Alstom'sresponse to the UN Rapporteur is indicative of the companies'refusal to assist: "Alstom has not done anything directly topromote and protect human rights as the Group is employed bythe MDPIU [Merowe Dam Project Implementation Unit], whois ultimately responsible for such issues.''59Faced with a human rights disaster in the making, such slicingand dicing of responsibility is hard to reconcile with thecompanies'/'hetoric of commitments to uphold human fights.The companies may be under contract to Merowe's DamImplementation Unit, but that does not preclude their pressingthe case for negotiations with the communities. Nor are thecommunities asking the companies to do anything that wouldjeopardise their commercial future in the Sudan. The Manasirand the other affected communities are not calling for theproject to be abandoned, or even for higher compensation. Theyare not even asking that the companies should engage in alengthy negotiation with them. All that they are requesting isthat the sacrifices they are being asked to make by the Sudanesestate should be recognised - and that those who stand to profitfrom those sacrifices should use their undoubted influence to

facilitate dialogue with the authorities and the honouring ofexisting agreements.Given these limited demands, the reluctance of the companiesinvolved and the British Museum to respond positively to thecommunities' requests might be interpreted as arising less froma reluctant "neutrality" born of powerlessness ("we are simplycontractors") as from a deliberate decision to turn a blind eye tothe impacts of the project, even at the cost of the communities'lives and livelihoods. Only action to support and promote therights of the affected people is likely to persuade manyobservers otherwise. It is action that the companies andinstitutions that have made Merowe possible should now take.

REFERENCES

1. Hemmn, J., Trauma and Recovery: The Aflermath of Violence -from Domestic Abuse toPolitical Terror, Basic Books, 1997.

2 . Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) are public agencies that typically provide export financein the form of government-backed loans, guarantees, and insurance to privatecorporations from their home country to do business abroad.

3 . Brown, P., "Swedish firm deals blow to British-backed dam", The Guardian, 26September 2000.

4 . Balfour Beatty, "Balfour Beatty withdraws from Ilisu Dam project - No clear prospect ofresolution of environmental, commercial and social complexities", Press re/ease, 13November 2001.

5 . For details, see llisu Dam Campaign, http://www.ilisu.org.uldindex.html.6 . UBS Bank of Switzerland, Letter to Christine Eberlain, B©me Declaration, received 1

February 2006. "We have withdrawn our funding from the Ilisu Dam project in 2002, dueto environmental and sooial concerns among others".

7 . World Developm~t, Ecology and Development (WEED), "Zuericher Kantonalbankwithdraws from Turkish Ilisu project'; Press Release, 15 June 2007.

8 Labrneyer International, EnvironmentalAssessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, p.I-1 and p.I-2. At the time the EnvironmentalAssessment Reportwas written, the irrigation project was in the pre-feasibility stage: nonetheless, intakes fortwo irrigation areas are incorporated into the dam struetm'e. More recently, in 2006,contractors for the dam have confirmed the irrigation component, but put the area to beirrigated at 60,000 hectares - see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01/29/content_4115771.htm

9 . Official figures originally put the number to be resettled at 50,000. However, in 2006, anarticle in Hydropower & Dams by E. Failer (Chief Executive of Lahmeyer International,the company in charge of project management for Merowe), M. Mutaz ( Director Generalof Financing of the Dam Implementation Unit) and A. AI Tayeb (Resident Engineer ofthe Merowe Dam Project) put the figure at 78,000. See: Failer, E., Mutaz, M., and A1Tayeb, A., "Merowe: The Largest Water Resources Project under construction in Africa",Hydropower & Dams, No.6, 2006.

10. For official history of the project, see: Dams implementation Unit,http://www.merowedam.gov, sd/en/establishinent.html

11. Sinohydro Corporation / Xinhua, "Damming on Nile River completed inMerowe/Hamdab", 31 December 2005.

12. The unit was renamed under Presidential Decree 217, 18 September 2005. See:http://www.merowedam.gov, sd/en/establishment.hUnl.

13. Darns Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding.html. The Peoples Republic of China isproviding 85 per cent of the funding required for the transmission lines and electrical sub-stations. The DILl records three loans (of $400 million, $65 million and $54 million), allsigned in 2003.

14. For analysis of China Ex-Im's environmental record, I: Bosshard, P. and Chan-Fishel,M., A Case of Environmental Money Laundering,http://www.im.org/programs/finance/index.php?id=050721 exim.html. Established in1994, the China Export-Import Bank is China's official export credit agency. Its financialinstnnnents include export credits, guarantees, and concessional loans from the Chinesegovernment. With $8.2 billion in newly approved credits and $30.4 billioti in outstandingcredits, the Bank was one of the world's three largest export credit agencies in 2003. TheChinese government is actively courting governments such as Burma, Sudan andZimbabwe that are rich in raw materials; they also have poor human rights records, andare shunned by other governments. Through its active international economic policy, theChinese government aims to win political patronage, boost ~ade and secure access to rawmaterials.

15. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding,html. The DIU records two loans: $I00million in 2002 and $50 million in 2004. In 2008, A1 Sahara Daily (No. 5252, 2 February2008) reported that the Kuwait Development Fund has lent Sudan a fm~er USD50million.

16. Dams Implementation Unit (D1U), "Funding",http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding.html~ The DIU records two loans: $150million in 2003 and $50 million in 2004.

17. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",httP://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding.htn~ The DIU records two loans: $150million in 2002 and $100 million in 2004. However, in 2008, further loans worth $211were reported in the Sudanese press: see, AI Sudani Daily, 7 March 2008.

18. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Tunding",http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding.htmL The DIU records two loans: $100million in 2002 and $50 million in 2003.

19. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/funding.htmt The loan was agreed in 2002.

20. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",http ://www.merowedam.gov. sd/en/funding.html

21. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",http://www.merowedanxgov, sd/en/funding.html

22. Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), "Funding",http ://www.merowedam.gov. sd/en/funding.html

23. See: Al Sahafa Dally, No. 5252, 2 February 2008 andAl Sudani Dally, 7 March 2008.24. Labmeyer International, "Merowe, Sudan",

http://www.labrneyer.de/d/units/gw/merowe.pdf.25. "Alstom selected for Merowe M and E package", Middle East Economic Digest,

http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/sutmnmy_0286'19671264_ITM.26. ABB, "ABB wins $16 million order to strengthen power supply in Sudan", 7 June 2004,

http ://www.abb.com/cawp/seitp202/DOD541FOEEC75DF085256E8 A006 A74C3 .aspx.27. For information on the records of ABB and Lahmeyer, see: Geary, K, Crrainger, M.,

Hildyard, N. and Lang, C., Dams Inc 1: The Record of Twelve European Dam BuildingCompanies, Swedish Society for Conservation of Nature, 2000,http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/item.shtml?x=52008; and Lang, C and Hildyard, N,

Dams Ine 2, Comer House, 2003. The updated 2003 analysis of Lahmeyer's record isavailable: http://www.irn.org/programs/safiica/pdf/LahmeyerComerhouse.02.28.03 .pdf

28. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project is the biggest water scheme of its kind in the world.The £5.5 billion ($8.7 billion) project, which is due to be completed in 2020, will divertwater fi'om the mountains of Lesotho through a series of dams and tunnels to SouthAfi'ica's industrial province of Gauteng. Some 27,000 people have lost their farms oraccess to grazing pastures as a result of the first two dams (Katse and Muela) built so far(five or six are envisaged in all). About 2,000 people have been resettled. Many of thesepeople believe that they have not received fair compensation, and mass demonslrationsagainst the project have taken place. At one demonstration in 1996, prompted by thesacking of 2,300 workers for slriking, five people were killed and 30 injured. Massivecorruption was discovered on the LHWP in 1999, when more than 12 mul "tmational firmsand consortiums were found to have bribed the CEO of the project. After the CEOhimself was found guilty, three major European firms were put in the dock; thus far, twohave been found guilty and charged, and one has been debarred at the World Bank. Forfurther information, see: http://www.irn.org/programs/lesotho/

29. The Lesotho High Court convicted Lahmeyer International, a German engineeringconsulting firm, of paying approximately US$550,000 in bribes to the former chiefexecutive of the multi-billion dollar Lesotho Highlands Water Project in exchange forfavourable contract decisions, according to South African press reports. Lesotho JusticeGabriel Mofolo found Lahmeyer guilty of 7 of the 13 counts for which they werecharged. See: Intemalional Rivers Network, "Lesotho Judge Convicts GermanEngineering Firm of Bribery Charges",http://www.im.org/programs/lesotho/index.php?id=030618conviction.html

30. World Bank, "World Bank sanctions Labmeyer International for corrupt activities inBank-financed projects", 6 November 2006,http://web.wofldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,comentMDK:21116!29~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376-4heSitePK:4607,00.htnd.

31. The 672 megawatt Birecik dam is situated on the Euphrates River some 30 kilometresfrom Turkey's border with Syria. The project affects 1,200 square kilometres, its reservoirflooding or partially flooding 44 settlements, including the town of Halfeti. Some 30,000people were affected, but only 6,500 people were officially resettled. No resettlementplan or environmental impact assessment was made available for public comment, andthose evicted were not consulted, in violation of international standards. Those withouttitle to land were not compensated. The inhabitants of some 18 villages located close tothe cons~uction sites were forcibly evacuated by soldiers in 1996 and 1997, while overone thousand villagers from Kavalica, a village close to Halfeti, were for6ed to abandontheir homes and belongings when they awoke to find their houses partially submerged bythe rising reservoir. Project officers did not alert them to the rising waters. Numerousfamilies received no compensation whatsoever because they did not have land rights andstill have not been given houses despite promises that they would be re-housed. Villagerswho have been moved to new resettlement sites complained that their new houses areovercrowded and had not even been finished. One oustee told a fact-finding mission: "inthe new villages, it is like death". See: "Birecik" m ECAWatch, A Trojan Horse for LargeDarns, Paris, 2005, http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/fora/oecd/ECAWreportondams_2sept05.pdf

32. The $24 billion Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze river will be the largest hydroelectricdam in the world. It will span nearly one mile across and tower 575 feet above theworld's third longest river. Its reservoir will stretch over 350 miles upslzeam and force thedisplacement of close to 1.9 million people. Construction began in 1994 and is scheduledfor completion by 2009. The project is omTently facing massive corruption problems,spiralling costs, technological problems and resettlement difficulties. By 2005, onemillion people had been displaced; many are living under poor conditions with no

recourse to address outstanding problems w/th compensation or resettlement. See:http://www.im, org/programs/threeg/

33. Alstom, "ALSTOM Aoquires ABB's Share in ABB Alstom Power", Press Release, 28December 2001

34. China International Water and Electricity Corp., "China Signs Dmn Project Contract forUS$650 million in Sudan", http://www.cwe.com.cn/Enewsl.htm

35. "Merowe Dam", http://en.w/kipedia.org/w/ki/Merowe_Dam36. Dan Fodieo, Dar Consult, Higleig, Brooj (Towers) Consultancy, Ingaz Concrete

Contractors, Qasr AI Loolo, National Company for Building, Shirian A1 Shamal, and A!Nasr.

37. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making, 2000, available at http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdchg.pdf

38. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoun~ April 2002, p.I-9.

39. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartomn, April 2002.

40. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, pp. 4-11.

41. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, pp.3-6.

42. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, pp.4-6.

43. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, pp.4-6.

44. Lahmeyer Internalional, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, pp.i-4.

45. Labmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartonm, April 2002, p.bl and p.I-2. The plan is as yet in the pre-feasibility stage:nonetheless, intakes for two irrigation areas are incorporated into the dam structure.

46. Askouri, A., "The Merowe Dam: Controversy and Displacement in Sudan", ForcedMigration Review, Oxford, September 2004,http://www, fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR21/FMR2123 .pdf

47. LOHAP, "Sudan Government Massacres Merowe Dam Affected People", 23 April 2006,http://internationalrivers, org/en/afi'ica/merowe-dam-sudan/sudan-govemment-massacre s-merowe-dam-affected-people. An AI Jazeera report, with footage of the shootings, isavailable at: http://www, alj azeera.net/mritems/streams/2006/4/24/1 __613597_1 _ 12.wmv

48. "Three killed in Sudan Protest",http ://www.terradaily, com/2006/0604 23102947.sxn 7mwoj.htrrd.

49. Amnesty International Alert, "Merowe Detainees", AI Index: AFR 54/014/2007, 17 April2007.

50. "So far within our site no such event of what you mentioned in your e-mail occurred.Meanwhile, we haven't received any report from the project Client, Engineer and localgovernment agencies on any of such event beyond the contractor's site". See: "Responseof China International Water and Electr/c Corporation to concerns about shooting atMerowe Dam, Sudan", 12 May 2006, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/CWE-response-Merowe-dam-incident-12-May-2006.doe.

51. '~duneyer comments incident in which 3 civilians were killed during protests overMerowe Dam, Sudan", 3 May 2006, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/646250/jump.

52. "ABB statement regarding incident in which 3 civilians were killed during protests overMerowe Dam, Sudan", 5 May 2006, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/420069/jump.

53. Lahmeyer International, Environmental Assessment Report for Merowe Dam Project,Khartoum, April 2002, p3.-21.

54. World Bank, Safeguard Policies, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/safeguards. TheWorld Bank has 10 safeguard policies covering: Enviromnental Assessment, NaturalHabitats, Forests, Pest Management, Cultural Property, Involuntary Resettlement,Indigenous Peoples, Safety of Dmns, Disputed Areas and Inte~ational Waterways. Thesafeguard policies are aimed at "prevent[ing] and mifigat[ing] undue harm to people andtheir environment in the development process"

55. The WCD's review of dams is the most comprehensive to date and its seven strategicpriorities have been widely accepted by governments, financial institutions, the damindustry, and civil society. The WCD's conclusion as to the record of the industry wasunequivocal: "In too many cases, an unacceptable and often unnecessary price" had beenpaid to secure the benefits of large dams. Moreover, the burden had fallendisproportionately on "the poor, other vulnerable groups and future generations", causing"the impoverishment and suffering ofmillions."For details, see: World Commission onDams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making, 2000, availableat: http ://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdch8.pdf.

56. Bosshard, P. and Hildyard, N., "A critical Juncture for Peace, Democracy and theEnvironment: Sudan and the Merowe/Hamadab Dam project", 1 May, 2005, InternationalRivers Network and The Comer House, http://internationalrivers.org/en/africa/critical-juncture~peace~dem~cra~y-and-envir~nment-sudan-and-mer~we~hamadab-dmn~pr~ject-~.

57. World Bank, EnvironmentalAssessment Sourcebook, Update No.20, October 1997,"Biodiversity and Environmental Assessment", p.1.

58. "UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing Statement re Merowe Dam", Sudan, 27August 2007, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Doeamaents/KothariMerowedamAug2007.

59. Response of Alstom to UN Rapporteur's report, 10 September 2007, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Alstom-response-Miloon-Kothari- 10-Sep-2007.doe. See also: Harbin'sresponse, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Harbin-response-re-Merowe-Dam- 10-Oct-2007.doc; Labmeyer's response, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Lahmeyer-response-to-Miloon-Kothari-3-Sep-2007.doe.

OLD FRIEND, NEW ACTOR:a Historical Note on Sudan's Relations with China

DAN LARGE

China has become a prominent and regular feature in coverage ofSudan as a result of the ongoing conflict in Darfur. With China nowSudan's most important foreign economic partner and key player inits oil industry, Sudan has become an issue in China's foreign policytoward Africa and in international affairs. However, with attentionlargely focused on the present, one neglected aspect in Westerncoverage of present relations is the longer history of ties between thetwo countries.

At the same time as appreciating historical ties, China's history inSudan should not be overstated. Beijing only became significant inSudan's external relations and internal politics when relationsdeveloped after 1989 and particularly over the past decade. China isnorthern Sudan's dominant trade partner today but this has beenachieved relatively recently. China may be an 'old friend' of Sudanbut arguably the notion of China as a 'new actor' in Sudan is moreapt. Furthermore, it could also be said that the lack of a serious,widely embedded Chinese engagement in Sudan was one factorcontributing to good relations until recently. Older historical ties arefirst noted before links between independent Sudan and China arebriefly covered. The current period is then considered in this context.

ANCIENT TO COLONIAL CONNECTIONSThe ancient history of China's links with Africa in general, as well asSudan in particular, is somewhat abstract and elusive but hasnonetheless been an enduring point of reference for China's officialunderstanding and presentation of the background to its modernrelations with both. In terms of what is known about Sudan's ancientconnections with China, much depends upon whose accounts we lookto and believe in. For Chinese scholars indirect trade links existed

between the Hart Dynasty (202BC-220AD) and the kingdom of Kush,based at Meroe in northern Sudan, as well as the kingdom of Axumin the Ethiopian highlands. A possible Chinese influence on potteryand bronze utensils in Kush brought by Indian or Arabian ships to theRed Sea ports has also been noted. The first surviving account of theTang Dynasty's (618-907) connection with the region is the Chinesemilitary officer Du Huan's Record of My Travels which appears todescribe a trip he made to Axum and today's Eritrean coastland,where he may have been part of a delegation escorting a Nubianprince to his kingdom in Dongola (Snow 1988: 2-4; Shen Fuwei1996:45; Gao Jingyuan 1984).

One footnote to Europe's colonial enterprise in Africa and Sudan wasan actively entertained interest in using Chinese labour in Africa inthe construction of infrastructure and resource extraction activities forimperial ends. The idea that Chinese could best assist in the 'opening-up' and 'civilisation' of Africa was experimented with by a numberof European powers, including Britain, Portugal and France. Theefficacy of Chinese labour under 'enlightened' European directionwas deemed by some to be so great as to provide the optimal meansfor the project of European colonization and exploitation of Africanresources. The view of Emin Pasha, writing from Southern Sudan asgovernor of the new Egyptian province of Equatoria, is worth quotingat length:

'I cannot get over the conviction that if it is possible forCentral Africa to be opened up, it can only be accomplishedby means of the Chinese, and that our beautiful country, withall its rich resources, and with the possibility which is offeredof establishing good communications between eachsettlement by means of such workmen, would repay athousandfold such an undertaking. The idea has been one ofmy dearest projects for four years .... Will you convince theBelgians that a few hundred Chinese established in anysuitable place - under the direction of practical Europeans -

would form a better nucleus for the colonization of Africathan any number of Indian elephants and ironclad steamers?'(Snow 1988: 45. Italics as in original)

Emin Pasha's conviction was shared by other Europeans. Differentexperiments aimed at implementing the idea were tried, with mixedsuccess.

The most prominent historical connection linking Sudan with Chinais, of course, 'Chinese' Gordon, who continues to represent sharedhistorical experience of European colonialism. Successivegenerations of post-independence Sudanese and Chinese statesmenhave used Gordon as a figure symbolising both violent imperialismand heroic resistance to one of its representatives. While in China as aCaptain in the Royal Engineers, Gordon was present when the royalSummer Palace was attacked by forces commanded by Lord Elgin inOctober 1850 (the resulting ruins are partially preserved in the sitetoday for visiting tourists). As Gordon commented: 'We went outand, after pillaging it, burnt the whole place, destroying in a vandal-like manner most valuable property which would not be replaced forfour millions. Although I have not as much as many, I have donewell.' It was reported that part of a throne from the Summer Palacewas presented to the Royal Engineers Mess in Chatham, and thatGordon sent his mother and sisters jade, vases and enamels (Trench1978:25). However, it is his military exploits that are rememberedmost vividly. Appointed General by the Qing government, after hisnomination and approval by the Brit ish government, Gordoncommanded the Ever-Victorious Army militia against the Taipingrebels from March 1863. This marked the genesis of his legend thatwould be confirmed through his death in Sudan.

After being appropriated in official state-state relations betweenChina and Sudan in the twentieth century, the mythology surroundingGordon would be developed and used in rather different ways fromthat generated in Britain. Official post-1949 Chinese history and

attitudes to Gordon, for example, depart rather vividly from theaccounts depicting him as heroically fighting 'as Civilisation'sknight-errant in her eternal conflict with the forces of Barbarism'(Hake 1896"328). When Premier Zhou Enlai visited Khartoum in1964, the fact that the Sudanese people had, in Zhou's phrase, 'finallypunished' General Gordon was a rare case of a genuine sharedexperience between the Chinese government and Africa (Adie 1964).Official Chinese history texts and media have continued to viewGordon in the same unambiguous terms: 'The criminal with blood ofboth Chinese and Sudanese people on his hands got what hedeserved' (Zhang Guobin 1996).

Since Zhou's visit, Sudanese visitors to China and Chinese visitors toSudan have often cited Gordon as a common bond. The formula isoften to portray Sudan as having taken revenge on Gordon for Chinain an episode of successful and just anti-colonial resistance. Forexample, in June 2000 a delegation of the Sudanese Council ofFriendship, headed by the Chairman of the Council for Sudan-ChinaFriendship, Major-General Mubarak Osman Rahama (a formerSudanese ambassador to China in the 1970s) paid a goodwill visit toChina. It was duly noted that 'the brave Sudanese people' had killedGordon 'a British butcher stained with the blood of officers and menof the Taiping Uprising, and avenged the Chinese people' (GaoXuesong 2000). Chinese visitors visit the place where Gordon issupposed to have died as a site of special historical interest. In 2002,a delegation of Chinese Association for International Understandingalso visited the tomb of the Mahdi as a tribute for his perceived rolein killing Gordon (Yu Xingchang 2002). Gordon continues to beinvoked in official state-state relations and exchanges. In June 2002,for example, when the first high ranking Chinese military delegationfor ten years visited Sudan, its head of delegation Du Tiehuan saidthat: 'Like the Chinese people, the heroic Sudanese people were alsoonce repressed by the British Colonist Gordon, thus the people ofboth China and Sudan are comrades in arms from the same battle.

Sudan is an all weather friend of the Chinese people. '(transcript fromChinese media).

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO REVOLITION: 1959-1969Sudan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) formallyestablished diplomatic relations on 4 February 1959. While the PRChad recognised the newly independent Sudan early in 1956, Sudanreciprocated only after General Abboud came to power. Sudan wasthe fourth diplomatic mission China established in Africa. This is notinsignificant: at the time the PRC was isolated internationally,excluded from the United Nations, and engaged in a struggle withTaiwan to win a battle for diplomatic recognition from Africangovernments. Extending full recognition was a tangible sign offriendship and is not forgotten in pronouncements by the Chinesegovernment. Moreover, Sudan also supported PRC entry into theUnited Nations. President Abboud, for instance, argued in favour ofthis before the UN General Assembly in 1961.

Trade relations at this time rested mainly on China's need for cotton.These were also characterised by friendly benevolent gestures fromthe PRC including examples from its policy of making trade dealsaccording to political motivations rather than economic calculation.In 1964, for example, the PRC sold 500,000 tons of refined sugar at£51 per ton, two-thirds of the world market price, amidst Sudanesegovernment concern about its foreign exchange and sugar bill(Hutchison 1975). Between 1962 and 1971, the PRC also grantedSudan a total of $75 million in interest free loans (Deshpand andGupta 1975).

On top of a cultural agreement between the two countries, Sudan wasalso one place where Chinese Muslims passed through on their wayback to China after Mecca. There were l imited exchanges ofSudanese students as part of the PRC's efforts to educate a generationof Africans. According to one Cold War-conditioned source, in 1961,the-four Sudanese students who were then studying in Beijing refused

to stay in China for the seven-year course they had begun. Theyreturned home at the end of their first year 'complaining thatsegregation made life impossible for them' (Cooley 1975: 202).However, anecdotal accounts suggest that the image China projectedinto Sudan, as with other countries in Africa, through Arabictranslations of newspapers or the writings of Chairman Mao,represented a source of optimism in certain young generations ofpolitically conscious Sudanese.

Premier Zhou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi visited Khartoum from 27to 30 January 1964. Apparently resenting Beijing's support for theexiled communist A.M. Kheir, Zhou's meeting with PresidentAbboud was reportedly rather 'mechanical', although Abboud didagain express support for PRC entry into the United Nations and asecond, Chinese-sponsored Bandung conference. Overall, Zhou didnot achieve a successful visit to Sudan; the two sides did not sign afriendship or aid agreement. Abboud visited China in May 1964.Minor Chinese activity was reported later that year during the 1964uprising (Hutchison 1975: 120). Official government relations,however, were generally good and benefited from China's principleof non-interference in Sudan's internal affairs. Beijing did notsupport Anyanya 1, which might have been viewed as a people'sstraggle worthy of support, and this contrasted to its support for'revolutionary armed conflict' in other parts of the African continent.It continued to support the government in Khartoum havingconcluded, it seems, that any other policy would jeopardise relationswith a friendly government and its wider interests in the Middle East.Furthermore, Khartoum's support for Congolese nationalists in 1964

aligned with the PRC's policy. When the Congo threatened to helpAnyanya I in Southern Sudan, Beijing expressed concern and 'hopedthat the problem would be solved within the framework of Sudaneseunity and announced its readiness to help the Sudan against anyforeign intervention aiming at undermining this' (Ogunsanwo 1974).

NIMAIRI TO THE NIF: 1969-1989During the Nimairi period, Khartoum's relations with Beij ingimproved to the point of being described as 'excellent' (Dunston1979). When contextualised against Sudan's foreign relations andinternal political economy of this period, however, China was not anespecially important foreign partner of Sudan in the manner it wouldbecome after the mid-1990s.

President Nimairi visited China in August 1970 as the leader of aSudanese Friendship Delegation following the conclusion of a tradeprotocol in May 1970. Chairman Mao reportedly praised his'opposition to imperialism and racial discrimination'. A number ofcooperation agreements were signed covering economic, cultural andeducational links. The Chinese government granted an interest-freeloan of $42 million earmarked for the construction of factories, roadsand a radio station. Nimairi also visited China in 1971, May 1977(after Sudan expelled its Soviet military experts), and 1984. Besidesbeing reportedly impressed by 'Chinese efficiency and discipline',Nimairi is said to have 'consistently maintained a high respect andadmiration for the Chinese' ( Dunston 1979). As he commented in 1975: 'The Sudan's relations with the People's Republic of Chinahave their own special character, because the People's Republic ofChina is serious in helping us without interfering in our internalaffairs' (Ali 2006:11).

Instrumental in this was the marked contrast in the reactions of theSoviet and Chinese leadership to the attempted coup. The leadershipof the Chinese Communist Party prudently kept silent over theSudanese Communist Party's attempted coup and was quick tocongratulate Nimairi once he was re-established. Furthermore,Beijing's unequivocal support for the suppression of the Communists,contrasting as it did with Soviet protests against the execution of thecoup's ringleaders, won the PRC favour with Nimairi. Exploiting theSoviet's disfavour, the government in Beijing offered to help trainSudan's armed forces and supply military equipment. Following the

coup attempt, in early August the Vice-President and DefenceMinister of Sudan visited Beijing. As Major-General Khalid Abbas,head of the Sudanese armed forces, said while visiting Beijing inDecember 1971: 'our people and our revolutionary leaders will forever be proud of the brave stand taken by the Chinese people andtheir militant leader Mao Tse-tung and the great party in firmlystanding by our people and our revolution when the traitorousconspiracy took place and in the ensuing days' (Hutchison 1975:171-2). Following the reported signing of a military agreement inApril 1972, the PRC reportedly gave Sudan eight MIG-17 fighteraircraft and Chinese-made modem tanks sufficient to equip anarmoured division. Nimairi, it seems, said that Chairman Mao hadtold him that the Chinese offer to supply this hardware was a giftfrom the Chinese people. We do not sell arms to fight imperialism.China is not an arms merchant. Nimairi, smiling, is said to havereplied, 'If I had known your policy on arms deliveries, we wouldhave saved the foreign exchange we had to pay the Russians'(Hutchison 1975: 173). Some of these were displayed not longafterwards in a military parade marking the anniversary of the 1969coup on 25 May.

Sudan continued to receive Chinese economic grants, soft loans, andtechnical expertise. Between 1970 and 1972, the PRC granted Sudansome S£28 million in loans for a variety of projects, the biggest(some S£14m) being for the construction of a road between WadMedani and Gedaref. Other projects included the Hassa HeissaFriendship Textile Mill, bridges, fishing development (Lake Nasser),modemising rice cultivation (Gezira), and a survey of chromeresources (Ingessana Hills, Blue Nile). After the 1972 Addis Ababapeace accord, other Chinese aid included £$258,000 for rehabilitationand resettlement in Southern Sudan.

A prominent part of Chinese engagement at this stage wasdevelopment and aid assistance. China's medical programme inSudan followed the signing of the 1970 Cultural, Scientific and

Technical Protocol and a Health Cooperation Agreement the yearafter. China agreed to send and fund Chinese medical teams in Sudan,starting with a team that worked at the Buluk hospital, Omdurmanfrom early 1971. This was expanded to include Chinese medicalteams of nine men and two women working in Juba and other clinicsin Malakal, Omdurman, Aweil and Karima (Nile Province). TheChinese use of acupuncture was new to many parts of Sudan. Noteveryone readily took to it, as some Sudanese who were treated inJuba, for example, recall today. However, the manner in whichChinese aid teams conducted themselves - living standards the sameas Sudanese counterparts, personal qualities of dedication, self-denial, discipline, integrity and treating Sudanese as equals - and theprojection of an altruistic China produced a positive contrast to otherforms of aid; the Chinese 'aid is the most effective type simplybecause it helps the Sudan to help itself and thus becomeeconomically independent' (Ali 2006:39).

Trade links expanded. China was not a particularly significant foreigneconomic partner for Sudan at this stage. Similarly, while not a tradepartner of importance for China in world terms, Sudan mostly rankedas comparatively significant in China's African trade (see Table 1).Early in 1974 China and Sudan signed trade agreement envisagingsome £35m worth of two-way trade. China mainly imported cotton,beans and sesame from Sudan and exported textiles, tea, tyres,canned goods and light manufactured products (Hutchison 1975:205). In November 1979 Sudanese radio described the Sudan-Chinarelationship as 'a successful model' for cooperation betweencountries (Harris 1993: 149). Khartoum's Chinese-built FriendshipHall stands as a monument to this idea.

Table 1: China's Foreign Trade with Africa and Sudan: 1956-1990(US $10,000)

Year Africa Export Import Sudan Export Importtotal total

J 956 4,865 1,952 2,913 279 31 2481960 11,057 3,384 7,673 1,139 266 8731970 17,721 11,200 6,521 3,292 1,503 1,789i 980 113,103 74,703 38,400 9,585 3,490 6,095

1990 93,485 65,957 27,528 11,150 1,108 10~042

Source: Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,various dates

The 1980s were a quieter period of relations as Sudan's civilwarspread and China under Deng Xiaoping withdrew from its activeforeign policy in Africa to focus on modernisation at home. Chinafinanced a number of projects in the early 1980s (including the Singabridge, road maintenance and the Omdurman hospital). The CCP andthe Sudanese Socialist Union signed a friendship and cooperationprotocol in March 1983. Nimairi visited China in December 1984.Sudan in the 1980s was, for some commentators, an example whereChina's tendency to provide verbal support for a conflict deemed alegitimate armed popular struggle against injustice was conspicuouslylacking. This is not surprising. Like its stance on Anyanya I, Chinapreferred to maintain relations with the Sudanese government inKhartoum. Trade continued on a limited basis and attempts weremade to expand economic links, including in 1986 when a committeewas convened to promote economic ties.

AFTER 1989: CHINA AS A NEW ACTOR IN SUDANSudan and China both, in different ways, experienced political unrestin 1989, the violent suppression of protests in China happening on 4June and the National Islamic Front's military coup of 30 June 1989.The Chinese government appeared to adopt a cautious stance towardthe unknown entity that was the new National Islamic Frontgovernment, which was demonstrated during Omar al-Bashir's firstvisit to Beijing in November 1990. The Chinese government's fear ofmilitant Islam in China was reinforced by the NIF and its war inSudan. While China expressed formal support for Sudan, relationsonly resumed through Iranian'funded Chinese arms supplies in 1991,worth US$300 million. Later this was followed by Chinese exports ofmilitary aircraft and small arms.

China's engagement in Sudan progressed from a comparatively smalleconomic trade partner to key patron with consequential investmentafter 1989. This process was assisted by the unintended consequencesof Western-promoted efforts at containment against the NIF andChina's recognition of the opportunities Sudan presented, as well asarmed conflict, which deterred other investors especially in the oilsector. President Bashir turned to China in a moment of necessityiChina represented a politically dependable option in the face ofWestern pressure. Sudan was viewed by China as a friendly, resourcerich state with a market deemed to have high, untapped potential due,in part, to the lack of business competition from Western companies.

In the 1990s relations developed as a genuine case of 'mutual benefit'for the Sudanese and Chinese governments and would see Chinabecome a progressively more important economic actor withinSudan. Ties thickened through oil development in which the role ofChina, by no means the only operator, was significant in drivingthrough a process that would see Sudan become an oil exporter forthe first t ime in August 1999. While business l inks had beenpromoted in the early 1990s, including a Khartoum trade fair in 1993,Sudan's trade with China remained proportionally small until the

advent of oil exports. According to the Bank of Sudan, in 1994, forexample, China accounted for 6.1% of Sudan's total exports and3.2% of Sudan's total imports. However, in 2006, China accountedfor 75% of Sudan's total exports and some 23% of imports. Sudanwas China's third largest trade partner in Africa (though thistranslated into a very small part - some 0.2% -of China's overallworld trade).

CONCLUSION

It could be argued that the longer history of relations is interestingonly as background decoration: it is far-fetched to suggest thatChinese Gordon is anything more than a colourful symbolic linkwhose mythology is constructed and mobilised in the Chinese contextto further its own interests. However, while China's recent role inrelation to Sudan is driven by strategic calculation and investmentprotection concerns, it has also been partly driven by historically-informed political concerns representing the product of its ownexperience. Two broad factors are relevant here. First, history isunavoidably and centrally important to China's foreign relations. It isone medium informing China's international politics and currentrelations with Sudan. The historically informed approach to currentrelations employed by the Chinese government is seen, for example,in China's defence of Sudan's state sovereignty, a key politicalorganising principle for Beijing stemming in large part from itsexperience in the modern world. Second, history is mobilised tolegitimate current intervention and is more prominent in Chinesecoverage than frequently ahistorical Western coverage. China'sapproach and conduct of relations with Sudan is predicated on what ispresented as being a fundamental difference from Sudan's colonialpast. The absence of a Chinese colonial record and its commonexperience of semi-colonialism was central to its official discourse ofsolidarity with post-colonial Africa and remains so today.

China's present role in Sudan is more problematic than its officialdiscourse of friendship and mutual benefit suggests. However, theofficial Chinese discourse of historical exceptionalism in its relationswith Khartoum renders Sudan unusual in China's wider Africanengagement in providing a genuine example of common solidaritythrough the figure of Gordon. The nature of recent relations,however, has begun to undermine this image. China's economicascendancy within Sudan has given rise to complaints sometimesarticulated in the language of neo-colonialism or concern, at theperceived Chinese designs in Sudan.

It might thus be argued that it was the absence of a widely embeddedChinese socio-economie polit ical engagement in Sudan thatcontributed to good state relations until recently. As thicker socio-economic and political relations have developed since the 1990s,these have imposed strains on official state relations as Beijing seeksto engage in investment protection activities and to reconcile thecommercial agenda of its major oil companies and other businessinterests in Sudan with its own desire to be seen as a 'responsiblepower'. This very different period of relations to those limitedrelations pursued with socialist China is also marked by the new castof Chinese actors that are no longer always directed by nor controlledby the central Chinese government. This features a growing Chinesesocial presence in the form of a more diverse array of small businessentrepreneurs, as well as those companies who have been operationalin Sudan for longer. Here the key role of the big Chinese corporationspursing commercial agendas has posed challenges for the Chinesegovernment, for whom Sudan policy has become a contested arena inwhich commercial and political agendas are not easily reconciled.The dominant position China now has in Sudan's economy andforeign relations also poses new challenges to the government ofSudan. These reflect China's position as a new actor in Sudan in thesense of a more important player but clearly China's role is markedby a growing complexity of relations in Sudan. Against the narrative

of old historical friendship, this trend undoubtedly departs fromprevious historical experience to take relations into uncharted waters.

REFERENCES

ADIE, W A C (1964) 'Chou-en-Lai on Safari, The China Quarterly, No.18

ALI ABDALLA ALI (2006) The Sudanese-Chinese Rela t ions before and a f te r O i l ,Khartoum

cOOLEY, J K (1965) East Wind over Africa: Red China's African Offensive, New York

DESHPANDE, G P & GUPTA, H K (1986) United Front against Imperial ism: China'sForeign Policy in Africa, Bombay

DUNSTAN, M W (1979) 'The Sudan: Domestic Polit ies and Foreign Relations underNimeiry' African Affairs 78

GAO J INJUAN (1984) ,Ch ina and Af r ica ; the deve lopment o f re la t ions over manycenturies', African Affairs 83, 241-250

GAO XUESONG (2000)' Delegation of the Sudanese Council of Friendship visits China'Voice of Friendship No.21

HAKE, A E (1896) Gordon in China and the Soudan, London

HARRIS, L C (1993) China considers the Middle East, London

HUTCHISON, A (1975) China's Africa Revolution, London

OGUNSANWO, A (1974) China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971, Cambridge

SHEN FUWEI (1996) Cultural Flow between China and the Outside World, Beijing

SNOW, P (1988) The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa, London.

TRENCH, C C (1978)Charley Gordon: An Eminent Victorian re-assessed, London

YU XINGCHANG (2002) 'Add Luster to the New Silk Road: thought on visiting the Omanand Sudan ..... ' International Understanding No.2

ZHANG GUOBIN (1996) 'Where the Two Niles meet', ChinaAfrica No.2

BOOK REVIEW

Alek Wek, Wek: Sudanese Refugee to InternationalSupermodel, Virago, London, 2007, II + 214pp. ISBN 978-1-84408-442-5, pbk £12.99.

This is not a 'rags to riches' story, but one of great courage andvision. Alek was born in 1977 in Wau. The family was Dinka withher father employed by the local Board of Education. A happychildhood with eight brothers and sisters was interrupted firstly,when she travelled alone to Khartoum to seek treatment for herserious psoriasis and secondly, on her return by the resurgence ofthe civil war, having to flee to her mother's village south-east ofWau. Here Alek's desire to travel was heightened by thechallenges of village life. After another spell in Khartoum shemanaged to join a sister in London. She re-entered school and withgreat resourcefulness took part-time jobs in supermarkets andshops, thereby picking up a range of additional skills.

It was a casual approach in the street when she was 19 that startedher modelling career and TV work. Appearing on the cover ofItalian Vogue made her a supermodel, enjoying international travelwith houses in New York and London. However, she retains heraffinity with the Dinka community in London, where her motherhas now finally settled. Not beguiled by international fame, sheenjoys painting, and has recently started a handbag business. Herobservations and account of her return to the Sudan to celebrateher 21 a Birthday, and again when she took her mother to search forher father's grave are poignant. She is now dedicated to givingsomething back to her people and to the Sudan.

This is a very interesting book, a remarkable story and a tribute tothe ability of many Sudanese women.

Gwyneth Davies

SSSUK NOTICES

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Preliminary Notice about the 2008 Symposium and the23rd Annual General Meeting.

These will be held on Saturday, 4th October 2008 atSOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) offRussellSquare, London.

The Annual Symposium and Annual General Meeting arebeing held later this year than usual in order to avoidRamadan.

There will be three sessions during the day, one of whichwill focus on Darfur.

WE TRUST THAT THERE WILL BE A GOOD TURN-OUT FOR THIS ANNUAL OPPORTUNITY FORLEARNING ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN

SUDAN AND OF CA TCHING UP WITH OLDFRIENDS

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