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2010 23: 21History of the Human SciencesRobert Schuett

Classical realism, Freud and human nature in international relations

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Classical realism, Freud andhuman nature in international

relations

ROBERT SCHUETT

ABSTRACT

Classical realism is enjoying a renaissance in the study of internationalrelations. It is well known that the analytical and normative inter-national-political thought of early 20th-century classical realists isbased on assumptions about human nature. Yet current knowledge ofthese assumptions remains limited. This article therefore revisits andexamines the nature and intellectual roots of the human nature assump-tions of three truly consequential classical realists. The analysis shows similar to the causa Hans J. Morgenthau that the human nature

assumptions of George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann and E. H. Carr are to varying degrees Freudian. Unless this hitherto neglected dimen-sion is recognized, an understanding of their international-politicalthought and of the political philosophy of realism remains incomplete.Two conclusions are presented. First, current criticism of classicalrealisms human nature assumptions is unjustified. Second, any (re-)engagement with classical realism must recognize its human naturebaggage. Realist international-political theorizing is necessarily humannature-based international-political theorizing.

Key words E. H. Carr, human nature, George F. Kennan,Walter Lippmann, political realism

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INTRODUCTION

Theoretical concern with one of the most controversial concepts of social/

political theory human nature is absent from the politico-theoretical/practical engagement with the philosophy of classical realism of internationalrelations. On one hand, classical realism is enjoying a renaissance. Recentscholarship provides insightful accounts of its timeless virtues, philosophicaldepths and continuing relevance in the post-9/11 world (Williams, 2005;Clinton, 2007; Bell, 2008). Twentieth-century classical realists have receivedspecial attention, particularly their spearhead Hans Morgenthau (Williams,2007). On the other hand, these realists human nature assumptions embodiedin their international-political theories have been neglected. The concept of

human nature vis--vis classical realism is not much talked about (an excep-tion is Elshtain, 2008).The recent rise of classical realism is welcome. But that its return is paral-

leled by a neglect of the concept of human nature is unsatisfying. It seemsunfortunate that scholars of international relations are increasingly turningto classical realism, albeit without paying attention to its philosophical basis.Has Morgenthaus (1967[1948]: 4) dictum that realism believes that politics. . . is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature beenforgotten? Perhaps; but certainly the ancient and intimate relationship be-tween realism and the concept of human nature has been undermined. Bothcritical theories and post-classical realism have been critical of Morgenthauian-styled realism. Thus, one critic argued that Morgenthau had some rather un-flattering and unsophisticated views of human nature, and an embarrassinghabit of parading them as the philosophical basis of Realism (Rosenberg,1990: 292).

Is such neglect/criticism justified? The human nature question is not trivial.The stakes are high. For the criticism of the philosophy of classical realismis often based upon the criticism of its human nature assumptions. It is, there-fore, essential to revisit the human nature of classical realism. Morgenthau

is of prime interest, but his assumptions have already been reinterpretedrecently along Freudian lines (Schuett, 2007). This article follows this leadand explores the nature and intellectual roots of the human nature assumptionsof three consequential classical realists: George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmannand E. H. Carr. These three do not exhaust the list of leading 20th-centuryclassical realists (what about Aron, Berlin, Butterfield, Schwarzenberger,Weber, Wight, or Wolfers?). But a selection must be made, a balance struckbetween analytical depth and breadth. All three had seminal influence:Kennan was the creator of containment policy; Lippmann was perhaps the

most influential American journalist; and Carr remains a realist heavyweight.Further, they do represent the broadness and richness of 20th-century classicalrealism.

HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 23(2)22



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I focus on these three realists human nature assumptions, putting emphasison potentially Freudian elements. I argue that the human nature assumptionsof Kennan, Lippmann and Carr are to varying degrees Freudian. This is

significant in its own right, particularly from a history of social/politicalthought perspective. But it has wider implications. First, it helps countercriticism from both within and without realism these realists human natureassumptions are neither unsophisticated nor are they metaphysical specula-tions. Second, this reinterpretation helps one understand that any (re-)engage-ment with these realists is necessarily tied to the concept of human nature. Putdifferently, one cannot embrace classical realism without its human naturebaggage. Revisiting the human nature of classical realism, I seek to helpcontribute to the resurrection of the concept of human nature in realist inter-

national-political theorizing.Since this article argues for the return of, and renewed engagement with,human nature vis--vis classical realism, I will now describe what led to itsdemise.

REALISM AND THE (STRANGE) DEATH OFHUMAN NATURE

The first of Morgenthaus six principles of realism that realism believes thatpolitics is governed by laws which are rooted in the nature of Man or hisbio-psychological make-up has always provoked criticism. The same appliesto Morgenthaus positivization of an animus dominandi and to ReinholdNiebuhrs Augustinian-styled view of Man. Throughout the history of realistinternational-political thought, Realist Man was never a perfectible saint nora Kantian animal rationabile. This has led to hostile reactions, particularlyfrom critical theorists, feminists and postmodernists. Thus, one critic arguedrecently: realists are biased towards pessimistic destructive human natureassumptions; realists are wrong in their portrayal of Man as an anti-social,

fearful, self-interested and power-driven creature; realists human nature viewshave sinister effects on foreign-policy-making; and, finally, realists humannature assumptions cause policies of distrust, promote paranoia, increasethe probability of international violence, and stifle chances for peaceful co-existence (Freyberg-Inan, 2004, 2006).

Yet realists have also become increasingly wary of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-styled international-political theorizing. This scepticism has ledto a profound rift that runs down the middle of realism. Here are theMorgenthauians/Niebuhrians grounding the origins and necessities of Real-

politik in an animus dominandi or human sinfulness. There are post-classicalrealists such as John Herz, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer who arguethat the security dilemma makes the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes

CLASSICAL REALISM, FREUD AND HUMAN NATURE 23



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a primary fact of international relations. This rift is striking. For roughly2,500 years, realists had based their respective international-political theoriesupon some conception of human nature, when the post-classicals arrived on

the politico-theoretical scene in the 1950s to free realism from the tutelage ofhuman nature (Tellis, 1996). Herz was among the first to question humannature-driven Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realism. In Political Realism andPolitical Idealism, Herz argued:

Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or aggressive ordomineering, is not the question. The condition that concerns us hereis not an anthropological or biological, but a social one. It is his uncer-tainty and anxiety as to his neighbors intentions that places man in thisbasic dilemma, and makes the homo homini lupus a primary fact of

the social life of man. (1951: 3)

Herzs socio-structural reasoning that states are trapped in the securitydilemma has profoundly influenced subsequent generations of predomin-antly US-American realists, particularly Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structuralrealism.

For structural realists, the nature of Man has nothing to do with why statesseek power. They argue that the vicious circle of security/power accumu-lation among states does not stem from an innate urge for power, but ratherfrom the sociological fact that states must provide for their own security inan anarchical environment. Such socio-structural logic has allowed them toopt out of the internecine debates whether we are good/bad, perfectible/improvable, fact/fiction, or naturalistic/socially constructed. The death ofhuman nature in realism goes back to Waltzs classic Man, the State, and War(2001[1959]), which introduced the levels-of-analysis problem to the studyof international relations (on this problem, see C. Wight, 2006: 10220).Waltz has unearthed three images of international relations. First-imagetheorists see the causes of war in human nature. Second-image theoristsascribe explanatory power to internal attributes of states. Third-image theor-

ists argue that the constraining effects of the international-political systemcause the struggle for power and peace.

With the ascent of Waltz, realism eventually, as Stefano Guzzini (1998)succinctly put it, got rid of the first image (Guzzini, 1998: 127). Waltz (2001[1959]) argued that first-image theories fail. First, because Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians would fall into the trap of psychologism (ibid.: 28). Second,because first-image theories would amount to nothing more than the simplestatement that mans nature is such that sometimes he fights and sometimeshe does not (ibid.: 29). Thus, the concept of the Realist Man gave way to

the concept of the international-political structure. Waltzs quasi-economicreasoning in his Theory of International Politics (1979) is straightforward:the international-political system is ordered anarchically. States are like units




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performing similar functions (fighting external threats) and differ solelyregarding their capabilities for performing similar tasks. Since history hasshown the relative omnipotence of great powers vis--vis impotent small

states, Waltz discriminates between international-political systems onlyaccording the number of their great powers (1979: 97). Capabilities areconceptualized in terms of power, but Waltz is not interested in unit-levelcapabilities, rather with the distribution of capabilities/power within theinternational-political system. Analogous to economic theory, Waltz (1979)can now declare: Market structure is defined by counting firms; inter-national-political structure, by counting states (ibid.: 989). Where economictheory predicts economic outcomes based on market structures (monopolis-tic, oligopolistic, polypolistic), Waltzs post-classical realism predicts inter-

national outcomes based on the structures of international-political systems(unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar).The structural realism of Waltz is elegant and parsimonious. As Waltz

(1979) argues:

[W]e take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, andforms of government they may have. We do not ask whether states arerevolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological orpragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capa-bilities. Nor in thinking about structure do we ask about the relationsof states their feelings of friendships and hostility, their diplomaticexchanges, the alliances they form, and the extent of the contacts andexchanges among them. We ask what range of expectations arisesmerely from looking at the type of order that prevails among them andat the distribution of capabilities within that order. We abstract fromany particular qualities of states and from all their concrete connections.What emerges is a positional picture, a general description of the orderedoverall arrangement of a society written in terms of the placement ofunits rather than in terms of their quality. (1979: 99)

I quoted Waltz at length here, for the passage shows the irrelevance of humannature in Waltzs realism; he does not even mention it. But Waltz is no excep-tion. Instead, he has provided scholars of international relations with a newanalytical framework. Thus, Mearsheimers robust variant of structuralrealism (offensive realism) also ignores the nature of Man. In his The Tragedyof Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer argues powerfully that Struc-tural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power . . . are whatmatter most for explaining international politics (2001: 10). Neo-classical

realists have done likewise; although incorporating first- and second-imagevariables, they have remained committed to the concept of the international-political structure (Schweller, 2003).




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We must concede, then, that despite all the diversity within realism anddespite more than two centuries of human nature theorizing from the ancientGreeks up until the 20th-century classical realists the history of realism has

shown that one of its core concerns and core concepts human nature ismore or less dead; that it was buried both by critical theories of internationalrelations and by post-classical realism, above all by Waltzian/Mearsheimerianstructural realism. Yet, searching for a genuine understanding of the under-lying nature of international politics, whom would one read? Morgenthau orWaltz? Classicals or post-classicals? Many scholars of international relationshave recently turned to 20th-century classical realists for analytical and argu-mentative help in light of the post-9/11 era. This is to be welcomed. But theyseem to neglect that these realists started from first principles; their starting-

point was not the concept of international-political structure but the natureof Man, Realist Man.The tension, however, which arises from the renaissance of the classicals and

the neglect of human nature, makes it indispensable to revisit these realistshuman nature assumptions. For unless we do so, our understanding of theserealists and their insights into the intricacies of international politics remainsincomplete. I will, therefore, now turn to the human nature assumptions ofKennan, followed by Lippmann and Carr.

THE CRACKED VESSEL OF KENNAN

Consistent with the classical realists, Kennans realism is based upon two coreelements the forces of nationalism and human nature. International conflictsare mainly the product of nationalist sentiments among political communi-ties; these sentiments are mainly driven and reinforced by mass psychologicalprocesses that are rooted in the nature of Man. Kennan toyed with psycho-analysis throughout his life. In 1942, he lectured to American officials inGermany proposing to psychoanalyse the Soviet Union; two years later,

Kennan sought out Freuds daughter, Anna, in London (Costigliola, 1997:1323). Kennans preoccupation with psychoanalysis seems to have had alasting impact on how he conceptualized Man. I argue that his human natureassumptions as formulated in Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal andPolitical Philosophy (1993), a work that condenses his international-politicalthought reveal some striking similarities with Freuds.

As a classical realist, Kennan knows in contradistinction to Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural realists that any international-political theorymust use a theory of Man as its starting point (Kennan, 1993: 1736). Man is

a cracked vessel driven by two primary impulses and is entangled in pro-found and existential struggles on two fronts: both within his own self andvis--vis other Men. As Kennan writes: Man, to the degree that he tries to




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shape his behavior to the requirements of civilization, is unquestionably acracked vessel. His nature is the scene of a never-ending and never quiteresolvable conflict between two very profound impulses (ibid.: 17). Kennans

metaphor of Man being a cracked vessel signifies a potential proximity toFreudian-styled human nature assumptions; and, indeed, intellectual linksbetween Kennan and Freud can be established (albeit it is not argued thatKennans Man is Freudian Man or that Freud was a direct and/or the soleintellectual influence upon Kennan).

Like Freud (and others such as Rousseau and Schopenhauer), Kennanrecognizes quite clearly Mans profound discomfort as a member of civilizedsociety or a political community. Kennan emphasizes this essential fact of thehuman condition throughout his discussion of human nature, and it is worth

quoting at length. The psychic makeup of the cracked vessel, he argues, is. . . the scene for the interplay of contradictions between the primitivenature of his innate impulses and the more refined demands of civilizedlife, contradictions that destroy the unity and integrity of his under-takings, confuse his efforts, place limits on his possibilities for achieve-ment, and often cause one part of his personality to be the enemy ofanother. (1993: 27)

Here, Kennan is in broad agreement with Freuds social-philosophical argu-ment in Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud, 1930: 96) that Mans impulsesare irreconcilable with civilization. Man is confronted, to use Kennans words,with the profound conflict between what the individual actually is and whatthe interests of civilization would ideally require him to be (Kennan, 1993:27). This profound antagonism would, however, not exist and would remainirreconcilable if Man was not driven by two conflicting impulses that draghim in essentially two different directions. On one hand, Kennans Man isdriven by the need to preserve himself and by self-regard, self-love, egotism,or whatever one wishes to call it (ibid.: 20). But, on the other, Kennan recog-nizes that Man is also a compassionate social animal who wishes to comply

with societal demands (ibid.: 23). Such is Kennans conceptualization ofMans instinctual structure. And regardless of whether Kennan was inspireddirectly by Freud or not, the similarities between Kennans cracked vesseland Freuds early instinct theory, which distinguishes between Mans egoinstinct (self-preservation, self-regard) and sexual instinct (other-regard),respectively, are striking.

Based on that instinctual structuring of Man, however, Kennan is (just asFreud was) deeply aware of the dilemmatic fact that neither pure renuncia-tion nor pure gratification of the instincts is realistically feasible and desirable.

But Kennan also recognizes that some people do better or worse in con-tending with these contradicting instinctual demands (1993: 28). In Freudianterms, Kennan means thereby perhaps implicitly adopting Freuds structural




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theory of the psyche that the egos of some Men are capable of balancingmore effectively the demands of the unconscious id vis--vis the demands ofthe semi-unconscious superego than are other Mens, but that, ultimately, we

all do make use of defence mechanisms however successful we may be inemploying these coping strategies. Yet, unconscious motivations are alwayslurking in the back of the psyche; and to those Men who think that their egosare (apparently) balancing the instinctual demands fairly well, Kennandelivers a warning message:

One would do well not to be too easily misled by those impressivedisplays of a total personal autonomy. There are few who have not, atone time or another, had to do battle with the little troublemaker[s];and if there is at the moment no outward evidence of its being a factor

in their lives, dont worry: you may be sure it has been there in the past,or soon will be. (1993: 29)

Like Freud, Kennan recognizes that Man must permanently and prudentlyreckon and grapple with the amazing depths of his soul, the (sometimes ugly)battleground for profoundly conflictual instinct and impulses this not onlyfor individual-psychological reasons or concerns of inner well-being, but alsobecause virtually the entirety of social and (international-)political phenom-ena have, ultimately, their origins in Mans dualistic instinctual make-up including one of the most powerful forces and profound problems of inter-national relations: nationalism.

For Kennan, as for virtually all classical realists as well as for Freud, theforce of nationalism, one of the most constitutive problems of internationalrelations exacerbating the Schmittian us/them problmatique that hauntscontemporary normative international-political theory (Brown, 2002), findsits origins not so much in socio-structuralist laws but rather in laws that have,to paraphrase Morgenthau, their roots in the nature of Man. Kennan arguesthat nationalist sentiments are the consequent and powerful forces of auniversal need for people to feel themselves a part of something larger than

themselves, and larger than just the family (Kennan, 1993: 74). Such auniversal need to affiliate with fellow Men and to be a member of a group ora political community is, as he says, a natural need (ibid.: 78) KennansMan is a deeply social animal, a Man who may be described as some sort ofAristotelian zoon politikon, who cannot thrive except in a social context butwith a Freudian spin to it, or as some sort of Schopenhauerian Porcupine.But Kennans argument may also be considered as close to Freuds. First, eventhough the family constitutes Mans initial and primary social group, the aimof Mans instinctual configuration is such that it (eros) seeks to combine

individuals into ever larger units (Freud, 1930: 99, 122). Second, this driveto affiliate is like a natural programme inbuilt in Man in that his inclinationand disposition to group formation is an inherited deposit from the phylo-




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genesis of the human libido (Freud, 1921: 143). And, third, Kennan seemsto share the mass-psychological views of Freud, as formulated in GroupPsychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), that emphasize the impact of

inner-group identificatory processes on the internal and external behaviourof groups and political communities. To Kennan, nationalism is the greatestemotional-political force of the age (Kennan, 1993: 767), but he does notconsider all forms of nationalisms as equally problematic. Kennan distin-guishes two forms: patriotism versus romantic nationalism (ibid.: 7781).Although both are rooted in Mans social nature, it is only the latter thatconstitutes a pathological form of nationalism, quite sadly a mass emotionalexaltation to which millions of people . . . appear to be highly susceptible(ibid.: 78). The reasons why Man is highly susceptible to aggressive forms of

nationalism are rooted in Mans dualistic instinctual structure, i.e. they rest,ultimately, with Mans inclination to self-regard or self-love on the one hand,and with his social predispositions to affiliate with fellow Men, on the other;and the perennial conflict of antagonistic drives within Mans self finds itsoutlet on the international scene by large-scale, Freudian-styled processes ofcollective self-identification (ibid.: 77) in political communities. Frustratedby his impotence, Man is capable of establishing and fuelling his self-regardby being/becoming a member of a nation, and it is the nation that provideshim with the necessary reassurance as to his own worth. In addition, byreceiving a share of and indulging in the glory of the nation that he hasbecome emotionally attached to, Man can not only compensate for his frus-trations but also satisfy his natural need to affiliate with other Men (ibid.: 79).

Against the background of such a conceptualization of the nature of Man,i.e. human nature assumptions that represent some striking resemblances toFreuds individual and mass psychology, Kennan has formulated a profoundscepticism vis--vis two (international-)political projects. The first concernsthe role of the state. Kennan argues that the idea of the abolishment or retreatof the state or any other Weberian-styled form of political community pertains more to wishful thinking rather than to a realist(ic) assessment of

the human condition and international-political life. Though he shares thehope that these exaggerated concepts of national dignity and these excesses ofcollective self-admiration [will] decline in the not too distant future, the statewill, Kennan argues, remain the central entity around which the struggle forpower and peace takes place (1993: 81). Kennans second scepticism, whichalso comes directly from his human nature assumptions, concerns Marxist(international-)political thought. Its philosophical and practical attempts thatcall for a major overhaul of the international-political status quo seem ill-founded to Kennan, for Marxists do not recognize that a measure of tragedy

is built into the very existence of the human individual and that this is notto be overcome by even the most drastic human interventions in the econ-omic or social relationships among individuals (ibid.: 36). On that point,




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Kennan also agrees with Freud, who argued against Marxism on manyoccasions (Freud, 1927, 1930). Freud once confessed that he was a half-Bolshevist: a patient told him that the Bolshevist revolution would initially

bring chaos and misery but then an everlasting period of universal peace andprosperity to which Freud replied dryly that he believed the first half(quoted in Jones, 1957: 17). More seriously, like Kennan (and so many otherclassical realists), Freud derived such scepticism from the nature of Man andargued that

. . . thepsychologicalpremises on which the system is based are an un-tenable illusion. In abolishing private property we deprive the humanlove of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one,

though certainly not the strongest; but we have in no way altered thedifferences in power and influence which are misused by aggressive-ness, nor have we altered anything in its nature. Aggressiveness was notcreated by property. (Freud, 1930: 113; emphases added)

In summary, then, Kennans cracked vessel not only constitutes a rich andwell-constructed conception of Man, which is, in fact, rather a statementabout the human condition, but it also shares many similarities with FreudianMan. This seems to have been forgotten by a large section of contemporaryrealists who, however, still implicate Kennan as one of their forefathers. Suchan implication is perhaps misleading, for Kennan (and the other classicalrealists) approached world politics differently. This can also be seen whenlooking at one of the most controversial yet important foreign policy docu-ments of the 20th century i.e. the (in)famous Mr X article based on Kennanslong telegram, The Sources of Soviet Conduct (1947) where Kennan arguedfor the political strategy of containment vis--vis the Soviet Union. There,Kennan derived his policy-strategic conclusion from rather different yetperhaps much more revealing and fruitful theoretical premises and methodo-logical approaches. Rather than purely focusing on changing structures in the

international system, Kennan psychoanalysed the political personality ofthe Soviet Union and diagnosed that it suffered from a profound mentalpathology (Costigliola, 1997: 1323); Kennan complemented that with another(psycho-)analytical conclusion, i.e. that the Russian revolutionary movementfound in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their owninstinctive desires which include the yearning for power, a phenomenonas old as human nature itself (Kennan, 1947: 567). Taken together, Kennanargued that too much faith in negotiations is unwarranted, and he thereforeurged the US government to implement a policy of firm containment vis-

-vis the Soviet Union (ibid.: 581). That virtually the entirety of Kennansrealism is, ultimately, based on profound assumptions about the nature ofMan and the human condition is unfortunately often overlooked.




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LIPPMANN ON INFANTILISM AND NATIONALISM

Walter Lippmann had both personal and intellectual links to Freud. Lippmann

knew Freud; he was fascinated by him. As Lippmann wrote, I cannot helpfeeling that for his illumination, for his steadiness and brilliancy of mind, hemay rank among the greatest who have contributed to thought (Lippmann,1915: 10). This fascination with Freud and psychoanalysis led to Lippmannspath-breaking Preface to Politics (Lippmann, 2005[1913]), and it reached suchdimensions that Harold Laski once lamented that he wished that WalterLippmann would forget Freud for a little, just a little (quoted in Steel, 1980:173). But Lippmann did not forget Freud. Rather, together with Harold D.Lasswell, he became one of the prime importers of Freud to American social/

political thought.Like Kennan, throughout his work, Lippmann emphasized the theoreticaland practical significance of human nature in international politics; and Lipp-manns Man also shows striking similarities to Freudian Man. Lippmannsrealism is based on two core elements nationalism and Man. Internationalconflicts are driven by nationalist sentiments, and these potentially explosivesentiments held in favour of ones own political community are driven by thelaws of group psychology that are rooted in the nature of Man (Lippmann,2005[1913], 2008[1915]). To begin with human nature, it is rather safe to saythat the human nature assumptions of Lippmann resemble Freuds Man.Lippmanns Man is driven by primary impulses: he yearns for pleasure andinstinctual satisfaction. These immature drives, however, soon lead to intra-individual and inter-individual conflicts. Not only is each Man the psycho-logical battleground of his own antagonistic drives. But on a societal level,too, the rivalling and profoundly antagonistic instinctual demands interactwith the instinctual demands of fellow Men this both allows for cooper-ation but also causes conflict. The nature of Man, Lippmann has argued quiteconcisely, is a rather shocking affair if you come to it with ordinary romanticoptimism (Lippmann, 2005[1913]: 47); we must, therefore, come to terms

with human nature as it is, not as we wish it to be. In this regard, LippmannsPreface to Politics is intended as a wake-up call for the political class that itmust initiate a major overhaul of human regimes and political institutions;these reforms must, however, not be based upon idealistic-romantic concep-tions but on brute facts about Man. Lippmann seems to have derived thesefacts from Freud. He acknowledged that The impetus of Freud is perhapsthe greatest advance ever made towards the understanding and control ofhuman character (ibid.: 80).

Against this background, in Preface to Politics, Lippmann faults the taboo

philosophers on two counts. First, they have considered the drives of Man asbeing essentially evil, and, secondly, they have permanently and relentlesslysought to outlaw those lusts by which Man is driven. In the wake of his




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Freudian leanings, Lippmann disagrees energetically with such a socio- andpolitico-philosophical standpoint and argues instead that the energies of thesoul are neither good nor bad themselves; rather than tabooing our impulses,

we must redirect them; rather than trying to crush badness, he argues, wemust turn the power behind it to good account (ibid.: 545). Here, Lippmannseems to have found comfort in Freuds socio-philosophical presumption ofan inherent and profound antagonism between Man and society, but also inFreuds concept of sublimation, a defence mechanism that allows Man totransform evil instincts into approved forms of behaviour. Man is capableof becoming ever more and more liberated from the instinctual demandsplaced upon him; in Preface to Morals, Lippmann (1929) argues that Manmust continually attempt to become as liberated as possible from his passions

success or failure in this struggle against his own instincts will determinewhether Man will be able to lead the good humanistic life or not. The criticalphase in that struggle, Lippmann argues (and thereby agrees with Freud), isthe passage from childhood to maturity (1929: 183). Infantile Man, he writes,does merely as he pleases. But mature Man is capable of revising most, ifnot all, of his desires in the light of an understanding of reality (ibid.: 180).To Lippmann, Man ought, therefore, to make it one of his prime goals todevelop successfully from infantile to mature Man. He ought to yearn toreach full maturity, where, in Freudian terms, the reality principle replaces thepleasure principle and where reason (ego) provides a healthy balance betweenpersonal desires (id) and societal demands (superego). This psychoanalyticdevelopmental-psychological perspective of Man, which, as will be shownbelow, underlies much of his international-political theory, derives fromLippmanns reading of Freud, including one of his closest disciples, SandorFerenczi (ibid.: 1769). And a large proportion of the psychological conceptsLippmann has used in his works, including those on international relations,do relate back to Freuds theory of the unconscious as it was laid out inThe Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freuds groundwork, which Lippmannstudied carefully and whose impact he compared with Darwins Origin of

Species (Steel, 1980: 46).From these (Freudian-styled) human nature assumptions Lippmann has

deduced the origins of nationalism and how these sentiments arise in politi-cal communities, how and in what disguises they are being acted out in theinternational sphere. Nationalism, Lippmann (2008[1915]) argues, is rootedin the instinctual configuration of Man and represents one of his most basicoutlets. From an etymological viewpoint, nationality derives from natio,from birth. Without being apologetic, though, Lippmann emphasizes thatones own nationality means much more to Man than the sober-minded legal-

technical acknowledgement of being physically born in this or that countrywould suggest; nationality reaches beyond the mere holding of a certain citi-zenship and passport. Instead, to the mass of Men, Lippmann argues, nation-




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ality signifies and represents their first loyalties, profound impressions andearliest associations; nationality and national sentiments are, as Lippmannwrites,

. . . a cluster of primitive feelings, absorbed into a Man and rooted withinhim long before conscious education begins. The house, the street, themeadow and hill upon which he first opened his eyes, the reactions tofamily and strangers, which remain as types of his loves and hates, theearliest sounds that brought fear and pleasure these are the stuff outof which nationality is made. (Lippmann, 2008[1915]: 60)

That Men hold such irrational feelings towards their nation, that they

indulge in such national sentiments, that nationality is such a powerful forcewithin them, is but a mirror image of Mens instinctual struggles within themand vis--vis fellow Men and it is such grounding of these national senti-ments that makes them so powerful a force in the relations among politicalcommunities, whether they be tribes, states, nations, or empires: This unionwith the sources of ones birth is, Lippmann argues, the most powerful factorin all politics (ibid.: 70), for Mens nationality or sensibility and emotionalitytowards their own political community come more or less directly from thedeepest sources and is the essence of our being which defines us against thebackground of the world (ibid.: 667). Here, Lippmann seems to have madeuse (consciously or unconsciously) of the early-instinct theory of Freud andthe concept of identification. When Lippmann argues that nationalistic orpatriotic sentiments represent nothing but Mens primordial desire to have,to hold, to increase, to fortify whatever can be identified with our earliest hatesand loves (ibid.: 70), he seems to suggest that nationalism and patriotism aremerely the outlets that help in gratifying the sexual instinct and allow Mento satisfy their infantile desires. Part of these infantile desires is omnipotence,and by means of identifying with others, particularly with large groups andtheir leaders (who are usually perceived as immensely powerful), the mass of

Men are capable of realizing their desires, for Man feels instinctively that hisown importance is associated with the importance of his group (ibid.: 69);or more succinctly: if the nationality to which we belong is honored, wefeel honored (ibid.: 68). And in their most intense and extreme forms, suchfeelings of nationality are even capable of transforming a group of peopleinto one super-person where the group lives and where individual Man islost in its greater glory (ibid.: 69). Indulging in nationalist and patriotic senti-ments towards his own and vis--vis other political communities provides,however, not only the necessary instinctual satisfaction as required by Mans

sexual instinct, but also that of the ego instinct, which longs essentially forself-preservation. In other words: the sensations and symbolisms of nation-alism and patriotism are capable of providing Man not only with some of the




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enjoyments of his early infancy, namely, feelings of omnipotence, but alsowith one very profound and primordial desire: security. As Lippmann writesin Freudian vein: we love the security where we were born (ibid.: 61) and

nationalist and patriotic sentiments do provide such feelings of security andhelp satisfy Mans survival instinct.

It is such a conceptualization of Man in terms of which Lippmanns realismought to be understood. Lippmann, for the very same reasons as Kennan,warns of nationalism as one of the most powerful forces in the relationsamong nations. Because we are being confronted with mass psychologicalforces that have, ultimately, their roots in the nature of Man, stemming froman antagonistic instinctual make-up that leaves him torn apart between hisinstinctual demands and the requirements of civilization nationalism repre-

sents one of the most primitive, widespread and popular (in the truest senseof the word) outlets in international relations in the eternal struggle of theinstincts. The discussion of international trade by Lippmann confirms this,and it further demonstrates how parts of Lippmanns international-politicaltheory have been shaped by Freudian human nature assumptions. Lippmann(2008[1915]) argued a point still worth remembering today that theattempt neatly to disentangle economic interests from patriotic or national-istic sentiments is almost futile. Contra the Homo oeconomicus hypothesis,Man is not a one-dimensional actor driven by purely self-interested and econ-omic motives, but is rather a multi-contoured human being whose wants andneeds are merely sublimated infantile desires; as Lippmann writes: the dollhouse turns into a suburban villa, the dolls are the babies, the leader of thegang becomes president of the chamber of commerce (ibid.: 73).

Business and trade (both nationally and internationally) must, therefore,according to Lippmann, be seen in a different light. These economic activitiesare intimately connected to the deepest (irrational) desires of Man. Conse-quently, international business and trade issues are intrinsically intertwinedwith matters of national prestige, i.e. mass sentiments that have their roots inthe instinctual structures of Men thus, international trade and (inter)

national prestige motives reinforce each other, and the export of bicycles orsteel rails is no longer the cold-blooded thing it looks like in statistical reportsof commerce (ibid.: 76). Trade, surely, does serve economic and materialinterests, but it serves instinctual interests, too; and it is the latter elementthat is the cause of so many of the problems on the international sphere, forthe inherent emotionalization of international commerce means that whentrade is attacked, we are attacked and matters of international trade are, there-fore, often turning into a sporting event with loaded weapons (ibid.: 767).Thus, allegedly purely materialistic international commerce and also, of course,

some forms of economic patriotism can quite easily transform into an aggres-sive nationalism, particularly in times of crisis where we can usually witnessa swift retreat into our [instinctual] origins (ibid.: 61). Lippmanns warning




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seems as trivial as it is profound and, in any case, timeless: national senti-ments cause distrust and hate vis--vis them beyond the borders; them areportrayed and seen as potential enemies of us, of our national identity.

National autarchy is, therefore, often the prime value; and the nature androots of nationalism accentuate aggressive foreign policies.This then leads eventually to conflicts, crises and, potentially, wars. And

when it comes to that, Lippmann warns, in a passage similar to Freudsargument in Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (1915), Mansloyalty to his nation is so deep, strong, and powerful that it seems to survivethe breakage of everything else (Lippmann, 2008[1915]: 62); when his nationis under pressure or attack, Man feels emotionally and physically insecure,his life endangered, and he reacts to this existential threat by virtually dis-

integrat[ing] into an animal (ibid.: 62). Yet even if there are no existentialphysical threats, international relations are plagued by instability and conflicts.Since international trade issues are intrinsically intertwined with patrioticand nationalistic sentiments, Lippmann argues, specific disputes over specifictrade opportunities become the testing points of national pride (ibid.: 81). Byall means should contemporary international-political theorists and foreign-policy makers, therefore, constantly be reminded of Lippmanns timelesswarning that just as we are often (irrationally) prepared to fight emotionallyand financially costly lawsuits for rather trivial sums of money, internationalrelations remains the realm where we are constantly being faced with actorswho will risk war to score a diplomatic victory (ibid.: 81). That politicalcommunities broadly follow such behavioral patterns, and that, as in Kennanscase, almost the entirety of Lippmanns classical realism has, ultimately, itsroots in profound human nature assumptions (which show, moreover, strikingsimilarities to Freuds theory of Man), serve as a fruitful and timeless reminderand warning in a post-classical realist era, where international actors are seenas black-boxes or billiard balls.

CARR ON HUMAN NATURE AND FREUD

E. H. Carr is perhaps the most interesting case when it comes to the questionof potentially Freudian-styled human nature assumptions. For it is the widelyheld view that Carrs realism was without an underlying conception of humannature at all, be it Freudian or of any other kind (exceptions are Smith, 1986;Chong, 2007). But this is hard to believe, given one of the fundamentaltruisms of political thought namely, that, borrowing Martin Wights (1991:25) words, All political theory presupposes some kind of theory about human

nature (also Forbes and Smith, 1981; Pennock and Chapman, 1977). Surely,Carr knew that the study of international relations requires its own conceptsand methodologies. He made clear in his inaugural lecture that he did not




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conceive it to be any part of the function of the Wilson Professor to . . .practise psycho-analysis although he did not doubt that Freud had pro-foundly influenced modern thought and deny that . . . psychological mal-

adjustments . . . are contributory causes of war (Carr, 1936: 8467). Yet thisdoes not necessarily imply that Carrs realism is not based on human natureassumptions.

It seems safe to say that Carrs realism is based upon a particular concep-tion of Man. Already in the early pages of his classic The Twenty Years Crisis,19191939 (Carr, 2001[1939]), Carr made clear that one of the reasons whyutopians have failed is precisely because they have made unverified assump-tions about human behaviour (ibid.: 7). This does, of course, not say specifi-cally what his assumptions are, but his disagreement with utopian thinkers

tells us that Carr does have a view about the nature of Man. In this regard,it does not seem too speculative to suggest that Carr sought, and workedwith, a theory of Man that corresponds to one of his central international-politico-theoretical tenets, i.e. the balancing of utopia and reality; and it mightwell also be conceivable that Carrs Man bears some traces of Freuds psychol-ogy, for although Carrs biography says relatively little about any thoroughlinks to Freud, we do know that the young Carr had read Freud and thatthis had had a dramatic effect on his awareness of the subconscious world(Haslam, 2000: 46). This preoccupation has obviously led Carr to acknowl-edge and defend some of Freuds achievements.

True, Carr mentions Freud only once in the Twenty Years Crisis quotesfrom Freuds Moses and Monotheism (1939) (see Carr, 2001[1939]: 85) buthe has always overtly acknowledged Freuds significance for western thought,which is not an insignificant fact, for the history of thought (be it economic,social, political, etc.) has known many candidates who were intrigued byFreud but did not dare to admit this publicly (e.g. John Maynard Keynes).Thus, although Carr has been warning his contemporaries not to take every-thing that Freud wrote as gospel (Carr, 2000[1980]: xxi), he recognizedFreuds achievements in meaningful comparisons: like Marx, Freud, the great

thinker, has added a fresh dimension to reason (Carr, 1961: 133); and likeDarwin, Carr wrote, Freud helped to mould the climate of political opinion(Carr, 1951: 72). For Carr there is no doubt that Freud had dramaticallychanged the way in which we look at the world (Carr, 2000[1980]: xxi); and,in his classic Trevelyan lectures, Carr (1961) singled out two of Freuds majorsignificances. The first concerns theorists and scientists need for reflexivity.Freud has encouraged us, Carr says, to question ourselves, our historicalbackgrounds, our choice of topics, and our selection and interpretation offacts; Freud reconfirmed that the scientist has no excuse to think of himself

as a detached individual standing outside society and outside history (Carr,1961: 135). The second achievement of Freud, a somewhat negative or dis-illusioning achievement, concerns the nature and role of motives. Freuds




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psychoanalytic theory of Man, Carr saw correctly, has driven the last nailinto the coffin of the ancient illusion that the motives from which men allegeor believe themselves to have acted are in fact adequate to explain their

actions (ibid.: 134).Yet as if that is not enough recognition for a truly great thinker, Carr went

on to jump publicly to Freuds defence against two misleading charges, whichare unfortunately still widespread today. First, Carr raises the problem of thebiological Freud, for Freuds theory of Man had come under increasinglyharsh attacks by Marxists, who had deplored Freuds (allegedly) purely indi-vidualistic and ahistorical viewpoint and who blemished him as a mereliberal-bourgeois reactionary. Here, Carr disagreed by rightfully declaringthat most of these Marxist charges brought against Freudian Man were valid

only in part against Freud himself (ibid.: 133). Regarding a related theme,Carr is even firmer in his defence of Freud. The argument that Freud hadenlarged the notion of the irrational in human affairs, Carr makes unequivo-cally clear, is totally false, for such sort of criticism rests on a crude con-fusion between recognition of the irrational element in human behaviour anda cult of the irrational (ibid.: 133). Rather than blaming Freud, Carr rightlyinterpreted the cult of the irrational as a deep-seated, ultra-conservativepessimism which, however, does not stem from Freud (ibid.: 134). Freud isnot the high-priest of the irrational but a rationalist scientist, who opened upthe irrational to rational enquiry and who helped to increase Mans reflexiveability to understand and control himself and his environment. This, Carrwrites, represents not a conservative but a revolutionary and progressiveachievement (ibid.: 134). Against this broadly Freud-friendly background ofCarr, it well seems possible that Freud has provided at least some sort of smallimpetus for Carrs intellectual outlook indeed, Carr sounds like Freud whenhe (1951) writes:

To unmask the irrational by stripping from it its hypocritical fig-leaf offalse reason is a salutary and necessary task. But this does not entail a

panic flight from reason into the anti-rationalism of Kierkegaard andDostoevsky or into the irrationalism of Nietzsche; on the contrary, itis an essential part of the movement towards understanding and over-coming the irrational. Reason is an imperfect instrument: it is good torecognize and study its imperfections. (Carr, 1951: 106)

This now brings the discussion back to Carrs human nature assumptions asthey seem to appear in his international-political theory.

We do get a further impression of how important assumptions about thenature of Man are for Carrs realism by going back to the Twenty Years

Crisis. There, again in the early pages of that work, Carr (2001[1939]) intro-duces the antithesis of utopia and reality, the overcoming of which consti-tutes one of the main pillars of his classical realism, by elaborating on several




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dichotomies: theory/practice, intellectual/bureaucrat, left/right, ethics/politics.But Carr begins the discussion of the utopia/reality problem of internationalrelations with yet another and perhaps most daring theme of humankind,

namely, that of free will versus determinism, a timeless problem which datesback to the beginning of recorded human history and which is, after all, oneof human nature. Utopians, Carr says, are Kantian voluntarists who believethat Men can change the course of history by acts of free will; they are capableof conquering nature, which includes conquering human nature. Realists, onthe other hand, are said to believe in natural laws; they have approached bothhuman history and Man in terms of rather strict causalities. Carr finds bothof these ideal-typical Weltanschauungen wanting, for the characteristic viceof the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility (Carr, 2001[1939]: 12). Inter-

national-political theorists must, therefore, Carr suggests, avoid both naivetyand sterility. This, however, requires the careful balancing of utopia and reality,which, in turn, requires the finding of a middle ground between pure free-will optimism and pure determinist pessimism it is only such a balancing actthat will lead, Carr argues, to healthy thought and healthy human action(ibid.: 11). Here, Carrs yearning for the middle ground suggests two things.First, that Carrs realism requires a conception of Man that is neither purelyvoluntarist nor purely determinist. Second, Carrs language, i.e. that he speaksexplicitly of healthy thought and healthy action, might be revealing somepsychoanalytical substructures to his thinking, for his statement seems toimply that failed balancing acts would lead consequentially topathologicalthoughts andpathologicalhuman actions. Such reasoning, in turn, is broadlycompatible or consistent with Freuds argument or the underlying rationaleof psychoanalytic psychology, namely, that a continual imbalance betweeninstinctual satisfaction (which determinism requires) and instinctual renun-ciation (which voluntarism can provide) causes Men to suffer fierce psychicpathologies. And, indeed, Carrs human nature assumptions do seem to appearas at least somewhat reminiscent of Freudian Man.

Carr conceptualizes the nature of Man in the same way as he has concep-

tualized his international-political thought; or, the other way round, whichseems more logical as (international-)political thought usually follows a certainconception of Man: he broadly conceptualized his realism according to hishuman nature assumptions, namely, as a predominantly antagonistic affair.On the one hand, Carrs Man is egoistical and has a will to assert himselfamong his fellow Men. Yet, on the other (more benign) side, the human naturethat Carr sees displays signs of sociability including a desire to cooperate withothers. Such Man transcends time and place: in every society, Carr argues,these two qualities can be seen at work (ibid.: 95); and such Man makes the

human condition a complex and challenging one, for the state, or any othergroup or political community, is essentially built up out of these two con-flicting aspects of human nature (ibid.: 96). Failing to recognize such a Janus-




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faced psychic make-up of Man is likely to lead, as Carr reminds his readers,to disastrous results: utopians who want to wish away the egoistical side ofMan and who prefer to hide behind an admirable but ultimately unrealistic

belief in Mans earnest moral capacities will achieve nothing; but crude realistswho have often been ridiculing Mans altruistic side to the (almost shameful)breaking point and who view all political action in the light of universalegoisms and power considerations are just as wide of the mark (ibid.: 97).It is one of the basic premises of Carrs international-political theory to warnutopians and realists alike that they must not fall prey to simple conceptionsof the nature of Man. Carr argues that although politics either on thedomestic or the international plane is inherently bound up with powerconsiderations, the homo politicus who pursues nothing but power is as

unreal a myth as the homo oeconomicus who pursues nothing but gain(ibid.: 97). Thus, like Kennan and Lippmann and Freud, too Carr rejectscrude one-dimensionality, be it on positive or negative terms, when it comesto Man and rather emphasizes the multi-faceted nature of Man.

This multifaceted nature of Man is essentially characterized by a deep-seated Freudian-styled antagonism. Man must always reckon with his ego-istical instincts, but he also cannot dispense with fellow Men or any affiliationto any group, for Man is, as Carr argues, an Aristotelian political animal(ibid.: 95) capable of thriving only in a social context. The affiliation withgroups, or political communities such as states, ensures that Mans more anti-social instincts are being tamed and group norms do regulate the relationsamong their members; these relations are, therefore, mostly peaceful andfollow a more or less commonly shared morality. Relations among groups,including international relations, are, however, significantly different in nature.States remain largely hostile vis--vis each other and display only very fewsigns of a shared morality. Carr explains this paradox of peaceful societalrelations but hostile inter-societal relations in a way which is similar toFreudian mass psychology and which seems, after discussing Kennan andLippmann, only all too familiar: Man ascribes a different set of moral prin-

ciples to the state compared with that ascribed to himself and his societalfellows. Yet he does not only not demand the states adherence to the samemoral principles but expects from the state certain kinds of behaviourwhich he would definitely regard as immoral in the individual (ibid.: 159).This essentially derives from Mans ever-present yearning for self-assertion,which leaves him only two options. The first is to become so powerful thathe would be capable of leading the group according to his own ends. Thisis, however, unrealistic, and Man is, therefore, only left with the option ofaccepting his particular place in the order of things but even if he does that,

he can still be powerful, for he can still find compensation for his own lackof power to assert himself in the vicarious self-assertion of the group (ibid.:159). Such a psychological process is reminiscent of Freud and makes Man




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capable of overcoming his frustrations by means of projection and identifi-cation. As Carr argues: If we cannot win ourselves, we want our side to win.Loyalty to the group comes to be regarded as a cardinal virtue of the indi-

vidual (ibid.: 159). In this light, then, it seems unquestionable that Carrsrealism is based upon some profound assumptions about the nature of Man;and these human nature assumptions show striking similarities to those ofKennan and Lippmann and also Freud.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that friends and foes of realism must revisit the human nature

assumptions of classical realism. I focused on three consequential thinkers Kennan, Lippmann, Carr putting emphasis on potential Freudian influ-ences. Based on my reading, I draw two conclusions. First, some criticismsof the human nature assumptions of classical realism seem misleading, if notwrong. Secondly, those sympathetic towards the classicals must not forgetabout these realists heavy human nature baggage.

Any argument for, or renewed engagement with, classical realism must beseen against the background of its demise. These realists fell partly out offavour because they did use Realist Man as the starting point for their foraysinto international relations. Besides Herz, Waltz was one of the first realistswho warned of committing the error of psychologism: the analysis of indi-vidual behavior used uncritically to explain group phenomena (Waltz, 2001[1959]: 28). With Waltzs path-breaking Theory of International Politics (1979),Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-styled realism was more or less dead; and post-classical realisms such as Mearsheimers influential offensive realism, TheTragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), were gaining influence. But criticaltheories of international relations have also taken their shots. To reiteratebriefly, critics argued that realist human nature assumptions are wrong,embarrassing and biased in favour of destructive anthropologies; that these

are scientifically untenable; that these wrongly portray Man as an anti-social,fearful, self-interested and power-driven animal; that realists pessimistichuman nature views have sinister effects on foreign-policy-making; and,finally, that these human nature assumptions are causing policies of distrust,promoting paranoia, increasing the probability of international violence, andstifling chances for peaceful coexistence. This is strong criticism.

Such criticism can, however, be countered. My first point concerns theargument that these realists human nature assumptions are unsophisticatedreflections on Man made by a bunch of pessimists. This seems unjustified. It

is true that these realists were not indulging in nave-romantic perspectivesabout Man and the human condition; to paraphrase Lippmann again, thenature of Man can be a shocking affair. It is also legitimate to put the criti-




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cism that, for instance, Carr did not make his human nature assumptionsmore explicit. All these realists should have said more about their views onMan in appropriate places; this would have helped to avoid the impression

that they were trying to hide some sort of illegitimate influx of human natureassumptions. But once one engages with these realists assumptions in greaterdepth, the high degree of knowledge and reflectivity of Kennan, Lippmannand Carr vis--vis the nature of Man and individual and mass psychologicalprocesses that are constitutive of the human condition emerges quite clearly.

In this regard, it is worth remembering that these realists do not portrayMan as a merely physio-biological animal driven by power motives. Nodoubt, all three realists have constantly reminded and warned us abouthuman hubris and Mans inclination to assert himself vis--vis his fellows.

But they were, of course, reflective enough not to commit the error of one-dimensionality. Critics must recognize that these realists have surely empha-sized Mans longing for assertion, prestige and power. But they have equallyrecognized that such character traits do merely represent a few aspects ofMan among several others, such as that Man is a deeply social creature partlydriven by instinctual needs to affiliate with others. This raises a similar point.These realists do not portray Man as a fixed, purely biologically determinedanimal whose nature must, of necessity, lead to fatalistic pessimism. Surely,Kennan, Lippmann and Carr believe in a universal Man who transcends timeand place; they do reject idealistic notions of complete malleability towardsperfection they are, after all, political realists. But these realists humannature assumptions do not imply any form of crude naturalistic determinism.All three, and especially Carr, have wrestled with this issue and made clearthat, in Freudian language, Mans ego does certainly have a certain degreeof autonomy from the unconscious demands of the instinctual id and thesocietal superego (see also Allport, 1937). Man may not be entirely perfectible,but these realists have recognized some elements of improvability. Kennan,Lippmann and Carr would certainly agree with Freud:

We may insist as often as we like that mans intellect is powerless incomparison with his instinctual life, and we may be right in this. Never-theless, there is something peculiar about this weakness. The voice ofthe intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing.(Freud, 1927: 53)

None of these three classical realists (Kennan, Lippmann and Carr) was biasedtowards purely destructive or aggressive aspects of Man. Their human natureassumptions have not led them to become high-priests of fatalism but ratherto become political realists.

This raises a second point of criticism which needs refutation. Both Kennanand Carr, and, to a lesser extent, Lippmann, were not very outspoken in termsof their human nature assumptions; this includes the intellectual origins of




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their assumptions. This has led to the critical argument that these realistshuman nature assumptions are merely speculations or introspections. Thisarticles renewed analysis of their human nature assumptions, taken together

with its special reference to Freudian psychology, should help rescue theserealists from the charge that their assumptions are merely metaphysical spec-ulations. Regardless of whether Kennan, Lippmann, or Carr were directlyinfluenced by Freuds theory of Man, the analogies between these realistsassumptions and Freuds views make it much harder for critics to simplydismiss the thoughts about human nature of Kennan, Lippmann and Carr asmetaphysical ideas. For even though the scientific credentials of Freud havealways been disputed fiercely for example, Poppers verdict that psycho-analysis is some form of pseudoscience (Popper, 1963: 345; the major critical

voice remains Grnbaum, 1984) it hardly seems necessary to point towardsPoppers misreading of Freud (Grant and Harari, 2005) or to neuroscientists,who use neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonanceimaging and positron emission tomography, to explore the neural bases ofpsychoanalytical theories and concepts (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2002;Kandel, 2005), to argue that, despite all legitimate criticism, Freuds theoryof Man cannot be shrugged off as a myth or speculation.

This, then, raises again the point of crudeness and lack of sophistication.Even Freuds critics concede that Freud not only revolutionized our under-standing of mental life, ourselves, others and the world around us, but thathe provided us with extraordinarily coherent theories about unconsciouspsychic processes, the structure of the psyche, instinct configurations, and theirrationality of human motivation, to name only the most significant for socialand international-political thought. It is noteworthy for those who seem tobe over-critical of these realists human nature assumptions that only 10 yearsago Nobel laureate Eric Kandel (1999) reminded us that Freuds psycho-analysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view ofthe mind (1999: 505). Thus, to blemish these realists human nature assump-tions as being unsophisticated and embarrassing seems misleading.

Yet revisiting the human nature assumptions of these realists has been timelyand significant in two related ways. The first concerns the recent renaissanceof classical realism. The point I wish to make is as straightforward as it issignificant: whenever we turn to these thinkers for help or inspiration in ourdealings vis--vis some contemporary foreign-policy or international relationsissues, we must never forget the (heavy) human nature baggage that they arecarrying. In other words: the views of these three classical realists cannot betaken without all their human nature content; doing otherwise would beoversimplifying their thought, which would then result in the meaningless-

ness of their answers to the problems and issues we sought from them. Thesecond point is equally straightforward and significant. It concerns realism,the political philosophy or Weltanschauung. Surely, the realist tradition is a




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broad one, a philosophy with many breaks in its intellectual trajectory. Butthere are also some continuities. An essential part of such continuity is thatclassical realists had been committed to a certain conception of human nature

as the starting point for their respective international-political thought for overtwo centuries, when Waltz attempted to drag realism away from human naturetowards the concept of international-political structure. The philosophy ofscience may agree with such a turn of events.

Classical realists, however, both old and new, cannot. For post-classicalrealism has robbed realist international-political thought of its core intellec-tual and philosophical content; robbed it to such an extent that it may legit-imately be questioned whether post-classical realism should even be seen asbeing part of the philosophy of political realism. From a different perspective,

it would be equally interesting to trace in greater depth what really happenedto Realist Man (Freudian or otherwise) when post-classical realism brokeaway from the classicals. Is post-classical realism really as purified of the con-cept of human nature as its spearheads would have us believe? Addressingsuch a question would involve unearthing hidden human nature assumptionsin Waltzian/Mearsheimerian realism (Schuett, 2010). But be that as it may. Forit is the unease with post-classical realism against which this article sought tocontribute to the renaissance of classical realism the true or genuine realism and to the resurrection of the concept of human nature in the study of inter-national relations. In fact, these two things go hand in hand. For classicalrealists such as Kennan, Lippmann and Carr have known all too well what hasbeen succinctly noted recently: political realism is not merely pragmatismor enlightened self-interest, it derives from a grand conception of humannature in history that leads to tough conclusions about whats possible inpolitics (Elie, quoted in Isola, 2007). Those turning to the classical realistsshould not forget this.

NOTE

I wish to thank, though not implicate, John C. Williams, Peter M. R. Stirk, the threeanonymous reviewers, and the journal editor, James M. M. Good.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allport, G. (1937) The Functional Autonomy of Motives, American Journal ofPsychology 50(1/4): 14156.

Bell, D., ed. (2008) Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a

Realist Theme. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Brown, C. (2002) Sovereignty, Rights, and Justice: International Political Theory

Today. Oxford: Polity.




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Carr, E. H. (1936) Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace, International Affairs15(6): 84662.

Carr, E. H. (1951) The New Society. London: Macmillan.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

ROBERT SCHUETT has a PhD from the School of Government and Inter-national Affairs, Durham University. He is currently visiting the Universityof California, San Diego. His research interests are primarily based in poli-tical theory of international relations and security/strategic studies, with a

particular emphasis on political realism. Recent publications include PoliticalRealism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Address: Department of Psychology, University of California at San Diego,3582 Mandler Hall, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92039-0109, USA. Tel.+1 858 822 7813. Fax. +1 858 534 7190. [email: [email protected]]


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