Historical radar
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Editorial Historical Radar This special issue contains, in the main, papers on the early development of British Radar that were written near the end of the Second World War by people close to the events they describe. Most of these papers lay buried among the records of the Ministry of Defence until recent- ly, but they have now been declassified. Some are available in the Public Records Office but the compilers of this special issue feel that they are all of sufficient interest to merit the wider circulation which, it is hoped, they will now receive. In selecting and preparing these papers for publication, several problems had to be resolved. First, the amount of worthwhile material greatly exceeded the space available. To include as wide a selection as possible, the Editors decided, reluctantly, that they must shorten slightly some of the papers. Complete copies have been deposited in the IEE Archives. The papers selected deal mainly with the use of radar. They complement the technical descriptions given in the Proceedings of the IEE Conference on Radiolo- cation in 1946*. A second problem was that most of the papers either were not illustrated or the original illustra- tions had been lost. Pictures from the RSRE photographic collection and elsewhere have therefore been included to accompany the papers. Readers of these papers are advised to treat them with a historian's due reserve. They say what the authors believed to be correct and, as such, are as close to a contemporary account of radar development as we are likely to get. But they were written in haste by people closely involved in the events they describe. Writers today might put a different stress on some aspects of the story. Where this occurs it is worth pausing to ask why. Apart from minor corrections, the Editors have avoided any attempt to alter the original emphasis. They have cross-checked the papers against other records and have assured themselves that they contain no major errors of fact. The first paper, by Sir John Cockroft, describes his experiences of radar from the time he stopped nuclear research at the Cavendish until he became Director of Chalk River in Canada. Cockroft's contributions to radar included his part in the Tizard Mission to the USA and the direction of the Air Defence Research and Develop- ment Establishment (ADRDE) (later the Radio Research and Development Establishment (RRDE)) for most of the War. This is followed by an account of the Telecommunica- tions Research Establishment's (TRE's) contribution to the D-Day operations written by the late Prof. J.W.S. Pringle. Pringle, a distinguished zoologist and a skilled glider pilot, was concerned with helping the airborne troops and with RAF-Army co-operation in general. His description of the radar contributions to D-Day contains much hitherto unpublished material. A major battle that has never been widely understood was the struggle at sea, in the Atlantic and other oceans, to maintain our supply lines. This provided the first task for airborne radar. We are therefore indebted to the late Prof. R.A. Smith and his colleagues for a very detailed mono- graph on the development and use of ASV (aircraft to surface vessel). * Proceedings of IEE Radiolocation Convention. J. IEE, 1946, 93, Pt MA IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 6, OCTOBER 1985 More has been heard of the development of AI (airborne interception) enabling night fighters to pursue their prey. This requirement provided the main impetus for the development of the first centimetric radar. This is described in Dr. W.E. Burcham's article reprinted from the originally secret TRE Journal of 1945. A subject still of major controversy is the RAF bombing offensive against Germany. It is as well to remember that this offensive could not have been carried out without the radar navigational aids developed by TRE. The next two articles, also reprinted from the 1945 TRE Journal describe two of these: the Oboe precision bomb aiming system and the H2S navigational and blind bombing aid. A distinguished American historian has said that the cavity magnetron had a greater impact on the War than the atom bomb. Its contribution to the destruction of Germany through these radar aids is but one example. The spectacular advances in airborne radar tended to overshadow the continuing progress of radar on the ground. Ground radar did not stop with the Battle of Britain. A new and more extensive system (GCI: ground controlled interception) had to be built up to support the night fighters, and when Fighter Command, in 1941, began offensive operations over Europe, the GCI system had to be further developed to support these. In doing so, the foundations of today's air traffic control systems were laid. Finally, when the Allied Armies moved into Europe, mobile radar control systems went with them. This is described in the paper by Neville Orgel. Although the papers so far have shown the power of radar as a weapon of war, there was in another sense a radar war. As soon as both sides realised the importance of radar techniques, they began attacking each other using all methods from brute force jamming and physical assault to deception techniques to feed in false information. Sir Robert Cockburn's paper, written in 1945, describes the British effort, which he led. A major problem with military radar, still not completely solved, is that of telling friend from foe (Identification friend or foe: IFF). Considerable success was achieved by the development, starting before 1939, of simple airborne transponders which enabled our aircraft to identify themselves. Lord Bowden, who played a major part in this development, has recently prepared an account of it which can very appropriately be included here. We are also very pleased to be able to include a short account of the Moonshine deception scheme used before D-Day, written, just before his recent death, by Prof.. Martin Ryle, better known as a pioneer of radio astronomy. The final paper is an account of early Naval radar rep- rinted from the Naval Electrical Review. The contributions to British radar made by the Naval Signals School and the Admiralty Signals Establishment have never received full recognition. Their importance in the purely Naval context is obvious, but what is not so widely realised is that, before 1939, the Naval laboratories were the only ones with the expertise on valve design required to organise the develop- ment and production of the vast numbers of new and improved valves, from centimetric magnetrons to high power rectifiers and cathode ray tubes, needed before the radar designers could start work. The final paper is a 325
Transcript of Historical radar
EditorialHistorical RadarThis special issue contains, in the main, papers on the earlydevelopment of British Radar that were written near theend of the Second World War by people close to theevents they describe. Most of these papers lay buriedamong the records of the Ministry of Defence until recent-ly, but they have now been declassified. Some are availablein the Public Records Office but the compilers of thisspecial issue feel that they are all of sufficient interest tomerit the wider circulation which, it is hoped, they willnow receive.
In selecting and preparing these papers for publication,several problems had to be resolved. First, the amount ofworthwhile material greatly exceeded the space available.To include as wide a selection as possible, the Editorsdecided, reluctantly, that they must shorten slightly someof the papers. Complete copies have been deposited in theIEE Archives. The papers selected deal mainly with the useof radar. They complement the technical descriptions givenin the Proceedings of the IEE Conference on Radiolo-cation in 1946*. A second problem was that most of thepapers either were not illustrated or the original illustra-tions had been lost. Pictures from the RSRE photographiccollection and elsewhere have therefore been included toaccompany the papers.
Readers of these papers are advised to treat them with ahistorian's due reserve. They say what the authors believedto be correct and, as such, are as close to a contemporaryaccount of radar development as we are likely to get. Butthey were written in haste by people closely involved in theevents they describe. Writers today might put a differentstress on some aspects of the story. Where this occurs it isworth pausing to ask why. Apart from minor corrections,the Editors have avoided any attempt to alter the originalemphasis. They have cross-checked the papers againstother records and have assured themselves that theycontain no major errors of fact.
The first paper, by Sir John Cockroft, describes hisexperiences of radar from the time he stopped nuclearresearch at the Cavendish until he became Director ofChalk River in Canada. Cockroft's contributions to radarincluded his part in the Tizard Mission to the USA andthe direction of the Air Defence Research and Develop-ment Establishment (ADRDE) (later the Radio Researchand Development Establishment (RRDE)) for most of theWar.
This is followed by an account of the Telecommunica-tions Research Establishment's (TRE's) contribution to theD-Day operations written by the late Prof. J.W.S. Pringle.Pringle, a distinguished zoologist and a skilled glider pilot,was concerned with helping the airborne troops and withRAF-Army co-operation in general. His description of theradar contributions to D-Day contains much hithertounpublished material.
A major battle that has never been widely understoodwas the struggle at sea, in the Atlantic and other oceans, tomaintain our supply lines. This provided the first task forairborne radar. We are therefore indebted to the late Prof.R.A. Smith and his colleagues for a very detailed mono-graph on the development and use of ASV (aircraft tosurface vessel).
* Proceedings of IEE Radiolocation Convention. J. IEE, 1946, 93, Pt MA
IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 6, OCTOBER 1985
More has been heard of the development of AI(airborne interception) enabling night fighters to pursuetheir prey. This requirement provided the main impetus forthe development of the first centimetric radar. This isdescribed in Dr. W.E. Burcham's article reprinted from theoriginally secret TRE Journal of 1945.
A subject still of major controversy is the RAF bombingoffensive against Germany. It is as well to remember thatthis offensive could not have been carried out without theradar navigational aids developed by TRE. The next twoarticles, also reprinted from the 1945 TRE Journaldescribe two of these: the Oboe precision bomb aimingsystem and the H2S navigational and blind bombing aid.A distinguished American historian has said that thecavity magnetron had a greater impact on the War thanthe atom bomb. Its contribution to the destruction ofGermany through these radar aids is but one example.
The spectacular advances in airborne radar tended toovershadow the continuing progress of radar on theground. Ground radar did not stop with the Battle ofBritain. A new and more extensive system (GCI: groundcontrolled interception) had to be built up to support thenight fighters, and when Fighter Command, in 1941, beganoffensive operations over Europe, the GCI system had tobe further developed to support these. In doing so, thefoundations of today's air traffic control systems were laid.Finally, when the Allied Armies moved into Europe,mobile radar control systems went with them. This isdescribed in the paper by Neville Orgel.
Although the papers so far have shown the power ofradar as a weapon of war, there was in another sense aradar war. As soon as both sides realised the importanceof radar techniques, they began attacking each other usingall methods from brute force jamming and physical assaultto deception techniques to feed in false information. SirRobert Cockburn's paper, written in 1945, describes theBritish effort, which he led. A major problem with militaryradar, still not completely solved, is that of telling friendfrom foe (Identification friend or foe: IFF). Considerablesuccess was achieved by the development, starting before1939, of simple airborne transponders which enabled ouraircraft to identify themselves. Lord Bowden, who played amajor part in this development, has recently prepared anaccount of it which can very appropriately be includedhere.
We are also very pleased to be able to include a shortaccount of the Moonshine deception scheme used beforeD-Day, written, just before his recent death, by Prof..Martin Ryle, better known as a pioneer of radioastronomy.
The final paper is an account of early Naval radar rep-rinted from the Naval Electrical Review. The contributionsto British radar made by the Naval Signals School and theAdmiralty Signals Establishment have never received fullrecognition. Their importance in the purely Naval contextis obvious, but what is not so widely realised is that, before1939, the Naval laboratories were the only ones with theexpertise on valve design required to organise the develop-ment and production of the vast numbers of new andimproved valves, from centimetric magnetrons to highpower rectifiers and cathode ray tubes, needed before theradar designers could start work. The final paper is a
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token acknowledgment of this debt, which really deservesanother volume in its own right.
It is appropriate to acknowledge the work done by theco-Editor of this issue, Mr. H.R. Johnson. As a formerScientific Officer in the Navigational Aids Division at theTRE in Malvern, he had first-hand experience of the devel-opment of some of the equipments described in this issue.His work on the initial editing of the papers was invalu-able in giving the issue a coherent structure from an earlystage. Both Guest Editors are grateful for the help of refer-ees and members of IEE Professional Group S7. Theirsuggestions on the presentation of the papers are muchappreciated.
Photographs were provided by Mr. I. Graham, ChiefLibrarian at RSRE Malvern, and Mr. H.R. Johnson. TheGuest Editors would also like to thank Mr. I. Graham forhis help in finding copies of many of the manuscripts.
E.H. PUTLEY
A.P. Rowe C.B.E.The development of British radar was a co-operative effort involving many people from awide range of disciplines. One individual whocan represent them all is A.P. Rowe, whose earlystudies on air defence led to the setting up of theoriginal Tizard committee (of which he wassecretary) and who, from 1938 to 1945, was headof the Telecommunications Research Estab-lishment.
Crown Copyright Reserved
326 IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 6, OCTOBER 1985
