1

Overview study on the state

of the Rule of Law and justice

sector in Yemen

In support of the Friends of Yemen Rule of Law and Justice

Sector Working Group

April 2010, The Hague

2

Dear reader,

On 27 January 2010 a summit was called in London in connection with the situation in Yemen.

As a result of this high-level meeting a "Friends of Yemen"-group was formed. This group has several working groups,

including one on "Justice and the Rule of Law", which is co-chaired by Jordan

and the Netherlands.

In the weeks after the London conference, our Institute pulled together a first impression

of the most relevant material and knowledge that is available regarding the rule of law in Yemen.

Rule of law has been a key theme for the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL)

since its inception in 2005.

HiiL is the driving force behind the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, a knowledge platform for academics and practitioners, which is published by Cambridge University Press.

In 2009 HiiL established the Hague Visiting Chair on the Rule of Law, the first Visiting Chair dedicated to rule of law. We are very honoured to have Professor Veronica Taylor from the Australian National University as the

first holder of the Chair in 2010.

The Institute also acts as the convenor of the Hague Rule of Law Network, which brings together about 150 experts from practice and academia who share their experiences and knowledge on the most pressing issues

in the field.

HiiL is leader and co-founder of the Innovative Rule of Law Initiative, a partnership with the MicroJustice Initiative, the Centre for International Legal Cooperation and the European Academy on

Law and Legislation geared towards linking societal innovation with effective and sustainable rule of law

promotion initiatives.

Lastly, HiiL finances a large international research project that looks at rule of law development in a globalised environment, how that affects the way rule of law actors behave and what can be learned from that for better

rule of law strategies.

This report is largely built on all of these initiatives, but it benefited most from the insights, data and perspectives we

received from the members of the Hague Rule of Law Network. The members pointed us to much of the writing we

consulted and provided invaluable leads and general impressions.

The report is therefore a collective effort; true „wisdom of the crowds‟ in which experts share information and

knowledge together.

We are grateful to all the friends and colleagues in the Network who contributed and we hope to keep them involved.

Please refer to the bibliography for the full list of reports and articles that we used for this study.

A number of HiiL staff deserve a word of thanks: Ronald Janse, our Rule of Law theme coordinator who led the effort;

Morly Frishman (Research and Programme Officer), who holds the Hague Rule of Law Network together; Wouter van

Cleef, freelance research officer and in-house writer; Marie-Therese Gold, research officer; and Chizoba Edozie, intern.

All put hours into compiling this report on short notice. Furthermore, Hague Rule of Law Network member and Yemen

expert Laila al-Zwaini deserves special thanks for her assistance to this report.

Effective Rule of Law assistance is the cornerstone for a stable and secure living condition and the key to a more human rights abiding society. It is therefore my sincere hope you will find this report a useful aid to the important

work of the Rule of Law and Justice Sector Working Group of the Friends of Yemen.

Sam Muller

Director, Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law

3

Bibliography

Of Rule of Law Studies concerning Yemen

4

Summary of studies on the Rule of Law and Justice Sector in

Yemen

General remarks

This summary is based on the papers and reports which have kindly been provided

by members of the Hague Rule of Law Network and staff of the Hague Institute

for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) in response to the question: “Which reports and

analyses have been written on rule of law and the justice sector in Yemen?”.

The papers and reports we consulted can be found in the bibliography.

The whole process (from the articulation of the question to this summary

and bibliography) has taken 3 weeks.

HiiL has, within this limited time-frame, not been able to assess the validity

of the points mentioned in this summary; responsibility for the points mentioned below lies

squarely with the authors of the reports and papers.

However, HiiL has summarized those points which seem to be generally accepted;

we have left out points which seem to be disputed by experts.

HiiL has aimed to present the summary in neutral terms.

Rule of law and justice sector in Yemen

The most relevant legal issues for Yemenites are land reform, inheritance, family law, criminal

law and commercial law.

The most prominent actors in the formal justice sector are: the ministries of Justice, Human

Rights and Legal Affairs; the judiciary (Supreme Judicial Council, Judicial Inspection Authority,

the Supreme Court, specialized courts, judges and staff, Niyaba –public prosecutor); the Higher

Judicial Institute, the Yemeni Bar Association, local NGOs and Sana‟a University.

The legal system is a mix of formal state law, shari‟a and customary law.

The vast majority of disputes (more than 80%) are resolved through informal justice

mechanisms, which vary from mediation to arbitration. Advantages of informal justice

mechanisms are perceived to be its relative legitimacy, speed, accessibility, transparency and

limited costs. The formal system, by contrast, is perceived as costly, overloaded, corrupt,

inaccessible and ineffective. It is clear that interest in the justice sector and rule of law in Yemen

cannot be limited to the formal legal system.

There are links between the formal and informal justice sectors. The most important formal link

is the 1992 Law of Arbitration; informal arbitration and mediation are recognized under this Law.

However, many of the rules in the 1992 Law of Arbitration, for instance that decisions need to be

recorded in writing and submitted to formal courts for authorization and archiving, appear not to

be followed generally. The relation between formal and informal justice does not, appear to be

generally antagonistic; state officials, especially in remote areas, often work with tribal

authorities on an ad-hoc basis and often do not stand in the way of the application of informal

law. This is not to deny that formal and informal law and justice are sometimes incompatible.

Some aspects of the formal legal system are generally regarded as by and large satisfying rule

of law standards. This applies first and foremost to the constitution, but also for instance to the

organization of the Niyaba, i.e. the office of the public prosecutor and the Ministry of Human

Rights.

5

There are, however, also concerns regarding the extent to which the formal legal system reflects

the standards of the rule of law. These concerns regard legislation and, more importantly, the

behavior of key players in the justice and executive branches.

The independence of the judiciary is compromised by executive control and interference (which

has a legal basis in strong executive presence in the Supreme Judicial Council), which is partly

caused by a lack of administrative and financial autonomy of the judiciary; the judiciary is said

to suffer from a serious lack of adequate training, resources and staff; a significant group of

judges are reportedly corrupt; law enforcement appears to be weak and uneven, partly because

of corruption of members of the police force; security forces operate outside the law and without

adequate oversight. Access to formal justice appears to be limited, the legal aid system is

insufficiently coordinated (both the Ministry of Justice and NGO‟s like Oxfam play a role), and its

reach and effect is not known.

It is insufficiently clear whether informal justice (tribal law and dispute resolution) is in

conformity with rule of law standards. Are arbitrators sufficiently independent and impartial? Are

due process principles respected? Is enforcement adequate? Are rules sufficiently clear and

predictable? Concerns are voiced in relation to access to justice for women. The options for

women often seem very limited (largely dependent on male familymembers), and their rights

are insufficiently protected and guaranteed.

Donor assistance

Important donors in the justice sector are DFID (UK), USAID (USA), GTZ (Germany), the World

Bank and UNDP. The impact of rule of law and justice sector assistance appears to be limited;

there are no clear success stories.

The broad policy framework of donors is dictated by the realization of the MDG‟s and foreign

policy goals, influenced by counter-terrorism objectives.

Almost all rule of law and justice sector assistance appears to be focused on the formal justice

sector in the cities, despite the importance of informal justice and tribal law to most ordinary

Yemenis, especially outside the cities. There seems to be a consensus that projects would

improve if targeted at rural areas and at linking the informal and formal justice sectors.

Typically projects are targeted at training judges and judicial staff, automating court

management, infrastructure for the judiciary, anti-corruption programs for judges

and police and curriculum reform in law schools and in the Higher Judicial Institute. Some

projects aim to improve access to formal justice, for instance through awareness-raising.

A limited number of projects appear to have been targeted at tribal law and informal justice.

Some examples include training for community arbitrators in basic legal principles (of the formal

system), human rights (focusing on women and children) and dispute resolution methods

(including formal court proceedings). These projects aim to link informal and formal justice in

the sense that decisions by community arbitrators are informed by formal legal standards and

that some types of cases (criminal law cases in particular) are referred to the formal system.

6

Other ideas to link formal and informal justice and improve segments of the rule of law

chain

Awareness raising and improvement of skills for community leaders regarding the formal legal

system;

Improvement of recordkeeping and registration of cases and complaints, in order to increase the

transparency of informal justice jurisprudence and to make the formal justice sector more

accountable and responsive to demands for complying more with rule of law standards;

Mobile or ambulant courts, in order to make the formal justice sector more accessible in remote

areas;

The creation of family arbitration centers, where women and members of marginalized groups

can seek free legal advice and aid;

Organize more forums where representatives of the informal and formal justice sectors meet and

exchange information and knowledge.

Again, programs should not be limited to the cities, but should be executed and visible in rural

and remote areas, as well.

Improving access to justice

The first priority seems to be to measure access to justice in both the formal and informal

sectors. On this basis, strengths and weaknesses as well as useful interventions and programs

can be identified. Here, the Handbook for Measuring the Costs and Quality of Access to Justice

by the Tilburg University research group of Professors Barendrecht and Gramatikov - which has

just been published and is the result of an extensive research project carried out in developing

countries and funded by HiiL - could be of invaluable help. This tool was specifically designed to

measure access to both the formal and informal justice sectors. The Handbook will be launched

officially on April 26 and 27, 2010 in The Hague in cooperation with UNDP, the Open Society

Institute, and the International Development and Law Organisation (IDLO).

Legal awareness is a key to enhancing access to justice. In addition to training of the judiciary,

other officials in the official legal system and of authorities in the informal system, it is

imperative to reach out to ordinary people as well. Radio and television programs have proved to

be useful tools elsewhere. Another innovative idea, which has been developed and tested in

Argentina by the World Justice Project, is to develop educational materials for children, in order

to teach them some basics about the importance of the rule of law. Other ideas include mobile

courts, and efforts to record case law, so as to give better guidance to judges and others in the

justice sector. Opening better possibilities to register and process complaints about both formal

and informal justice may increase transparency and accountability.

7

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ACRLI, „Modernization of Criminal Laws in some Arab Countries‟

(note: available only in Arabic)

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(note: available only in Arabic)

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ThematicWorkshop20122009.pdf>

accessed 01 April 2010

ACRLI, „The National and Regional Report on the state of the Judiciary in the Arab countries‟

(note: available only in Arabic)

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accessed 01 April 2010

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(note: available only in Arabic)

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accessed 01 April 2010

Amnesty International, ‟Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security‟ September 2003

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE31/006/2003>

accessed 29 March 2010

Arab Social Science Research, „Yemen‟

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accessed 01 April 2010

C Boucek, „Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral‟ Carnegie Paper September 2009

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23827>

accessed 29 March 2010

8

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, „Yemen‟ in CIHRS „Bastion of Impunity, mirage of Reform:

Human Rights in the Arab Region Annual Report 2009‟

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Center for Global Development, „Yemen‟

<http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/mcamonitor/threshold/_yemen>

accessed 01 April 2010

Chatham House, „Reform Priorities for Yemen and the 10 point Agenda‟ February 2010

<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16128_180210summary.pdf>

accessed 01 April 2010

AH Cordesman and KR Al-Rodhan, „The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Yemen‟ July

2006

<http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_yemen.pdf>

accessed 30 March 2010

D Corstange, „Tribes and the Rule of Law in Yemen‟

<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/corstange/doc/corstange-tribes.pdf>

accessed 29 March 2010

DFID, „Evaluation of DFID‟s Country Programmes: Yemen 2004 – 2009‟

<https://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/evaluation/cnty-prog-eval-ye-summ.pdf>

accessed on 01 April 2010

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Response

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response>

accessed 29 March 2010

Freedom House, ‟Countries at the Crossroads 2006: Country Report Yemen‟

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?ccrcountry=143&ccrpage=31&edition=7&page=140&section=78>

accessed 29 March 2010

Global Integrity, „Global Integrity Report: Yemen 2008‟

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GRM International, „Yemen Justice and Policing Programme‟. Justice Assessment Report, August 2009

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GTZ, „Conflict Resolution in Yemen Today: A Report for the German Development Cooperation‟ GTZ

Discussion Paper, April 2006

9

Human Rights Watch, „In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government‟s Brutal Response to Southern

Movement Protests‟ December 2009

<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/15/name-unity>

accessed 30 March 2010

Human Rights Watch, „Yemen‟

<http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87738>

accessed 01 April 2010

MJ Kassim, „Regulatory Reform and Improving the Quality of Legislation in Yemen‟

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/11/38376701.pdf>

accessed 29 March 2010

Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, September 2005 „Millenium Development Goals

Needs Assessment: Yemen Country Report‟

<http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/undp/mdgr/yemen-nmdgr-05e.pdf>

accessed 01 April 2010

M A Moghram, „Political Culture of Corruption and State of Corruption in Yemen‟

<http://www.u4.no/training/incountry-open/yemen-docs/political-culture-corruption-yemen-

abdomoghram.pdf>

accessed 01 April 2010

National Democratic Institute, „Yemen: Tribal Conflict Management Program Research Report‟ March

2007

<http://www.ndi.org/files/2368_ye_report_engpdf_09122008.pdf>

accessed 30 March 2010

OpenNet, „Yemen‟

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accessed 01 April 2010

S Phillips, „What comes next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building‟ Yemen: On the Brink:

A Carnegie Paper Series No. 107/March 2010

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accessed 2 March 2010

S Phillips, Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized

Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)

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No. 80, February 2007

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accessed 30 March 2010

POGAR, „Public Prosecution: Yemen‟

<http://www.pogar.org/activities/marrakech04/yemen-rep-e.pdf>

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10

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<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/doc116?OpenForm&rc=3&emid=SNAO-74CSS6&secid=8>

accessed 01 April 2010

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2009

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+Windows+%E2%80%93+Security+Sector+Reform+in+Palestine+Lebanon+and+Yemen>

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Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World (I.B. Tauris Publishers: London and New York 2010)

G Steinberg, ‟Der Jemen vor dem Staatszerfall? Bürgerkrieg und Seperatismus sind bedrohlicher als al-

Qaida‟ SWP-Aktuell 6/January 2010

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quarterly report‟

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11

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12

Rule of Law indicators concerning Yemen

13

Summary of indicators on the Rule of Law and justice sector in Yemen

General

The question that formed the basis for this second part of the report was: “What do existing

indicators tell us about the state of the justice sector and rule of law in Yemen?”

The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of indicators and measurement systems for rule of

law and relevant related fields. These indicators employ different methodologies and measure

partly different things (some measure perceptions, others quantitative data, some measure

demand, others supply etc).

Many of the indicators on rule of law have been established recently, and are still a work in

progress. Many countries are not yet covered by these studies.

A comparative analysis of indicators does not exist yet, nor is there a tool which helps

policymakers and scholars navigate through these indicators.1

Experts involved in the major indicators advise to use as many indicators as possible. If many

indicators point in the same direction, it is safe to assume that what they say is largely correct.

Indicators do not provide causal analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the rule of law situation

in countries.

Experts involved with rule of law indicators reject the notion that results generated by indicators

are in themselves sufficient reasons for policy decisions or decisions to allocate funds, in part

because indicators say nothing about causes.

Indicators on rule of law in Yemen

The overview in annex A shows that most of the established indicators in the rule of law field do

not fully take Yemen into account.

Experts from the Hague Rule of Law Network have advised that the World Bank Governance

Indicators, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Freedom House Index and Transparency

International‟s Corruption Perception Index are applicable and reliable tools to assess the Yemeni

justice system and rule of law situation.

HiiL does not assume responsibility for the impressions and data contained in the studies.

The overall picture for the rule of law and justice sectors in Yemen does not appear to be

positive on the basis of the measurement tools we consulted, but some room for optimism

remains. Some of the scores indicate relative stability in Yemen‟s rule of law and justice sector.

The Freedom House score for instance, though not indicative of a large degree of political

freedoms and civil liberties in the country, has been stable for years.

The indicators do, however, also point to some serious concerns (which can also be found in the

narrative country briefings and reports that form the basis of the first part of this overview

study).

These concerns include: a lack of authority of state institutions; corruption in all sectors of

government and the judicial chain; weak checks and balances between the branches of

government and the judiciary; abuse of civil rights both by state and non-state actors; lack of

access to justice both in private law cases and public law cases. This provides an initial idea of

some of the most pressing issues both in the eyes of international experts and in the eyes of the

Yemeni people.

1 HiiL will fund both a comparative analysis of indicators and a navigation tool for policy-makers. The Hague Journal on Rule of Law will publish a special issue on measuring rule of law in the fall of 2011. HiiL has funded a recently completed measurement tool for access to justice by the Tilburg-based group of Professors Barendrecht and Gramatikov, which will be presented during the April 26 and 27 Hague Rule of Law Network Meeting 2010 in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) and the Open Society Justice Initiative.

14

Failed States Index (Yemen score)

99.7 96.6 93.2 95.4 98.1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Year

Sco

re

Detailed results per indicator

Failed States Index

The Failed States Index is composed of twelve indicators over 3 distinct dimensions (social,

political and economic). On the basis of computer based quantitative analysis of a vast amount

of publications and newspaper articles, a score from 0-120 (0 indicates a very high degree of

stability, 120 meaning least stable) on a total of 12 indicators is awarded.

With a score of 93.2 in 2007, Yemen was in the highest risk zone (“alert”). In 2008 and 2009 the

score deteriorated even further to 95.4 and 98.1, respectively. The score for state legitimacy has

significantly decreased over these 3 years, as well as the human rights score. Clearly on the

basis of these data, one can conclude that the writ of the Yemeni state was not in good shape

when it was first measured and has not gotten better since. The potential for acute state failure,

and all the risks associated with it (i.e. large scale strife, refugee streams and terrorism) is

therefore considered to be particularly high.

Bertelsmann Transformation Index

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index measures the progress of countries which have yet to

become fully democratic, rule of law abiding states. It focuses on 3 dimensions: democracy,

market economy and political management. The composite index relates to both a description of

their democratic and market economic state and the country‟s leadership management

performance to steer it on a course of solid transformation.

For 128 states, individual reports are written by a country expert, which is then subject to peer

review by another expert. This narrative report deals with the whole chain of issues mentioned

above. Subsequently scores (1-10) are given by the country experts on the 49 questions asked.

For the present purpose, the political transformation or democracy dimension of the index is

particularly useful, as it also details the degree of “stateness”, separation of power and

institutional stability.

15

Bertelsmann Transformation Index (political

transformation scores Yemen)

3.2

4.07 3.9 4.23

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2003 2006 2008 2010

Year

Sco

re

In 2003 scores were measured on a 5-point scale as opposed to the 10-point scale used in later

studies for the political transformation index. Correcting for this difference, Yemen scored a 3.2

(or 1.6) in 2003 on this dimension. In 2006 it scored a 4.07 indicating a steady improvement. In

2008 the country scored a 3.9, while in 2010 it was up again to a 4.23. Even though this is

indicative of a slight general improvement, according to this indicator it is a weak country where

a lot of work is still to be done.

Freedom House

Each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating, on a scale of 1 to 7. A score of 1

indicates a free society and 7 the least amount of political and civil freedoms. The Freedom

House index, often used in academic and political debates, is composed by experts who review

an extensive collection of data, primarily newspaper reports as well as analysis by think-tanks

and NGO‟s. On the basis of this information, separate reports are written for individual countries,

which subsequently lead to a score on the Freedom House indicators.

Two separate ratings are given; a political rights score and a civil liberties rating. On both

dimensions, scores range from 1 to 7. Yemen has been assessed as of 2002 by the Freedom

House. Its scores are consistently poor, even though there seems to be a slight improvement.

The scores below are an average of the two composite scales produced by the Freedom House

from 2002 onwards.

Freedom House: Yemen Scores

65.5

5 5 5 5 5 5

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Year

Sco

re

16

Transparency International CPI Index (Yemen scores)

2.6 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Year

Sco

re

Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption

in a country or territory. The CPI table indicates a country's ranking compared to other countries

in the index. The index is based on data from 13 sources and 10 independent institutions.

These sources measure the prevalence of corruption in the public and political domains. This

assessment is carried out for virtually all of the world‟s countries.

Scores range between 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the worst possible perception of corruption

and 10 indicating the lowest perception of corruption. Yemen has been assessed from 2003

onwards. In this indicator as well, Yemen scores consistently poor with a strong popular

perception of corruption in public and political life. From the assembled data over the last years,

one can even conclude a slight deterioration in the public perception of corruption in Yemen.

World Bank Governance Indicators

An authoritative scientific indicator in the field of law and governance is the World Bank

Governance Indicators. Instead of working with its own data, the World Bank Governance

Indicators Project compiles statistics from various other indices (among which are some of the

indicators used in this study). Data are statistically rescaled to a score from 0 to 1, with a score

of 0 indicating a bad result on a particular variable. Six different dimensions are measured; (1)

voice & accountability, (2) political stability and lack of violence/terrorism, (3) government

effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, (6) control of corruption.

The World Bank Governance indicators result in a percentile rank on each of the six dimensions.

Thus, a percentile rank of 20 on any certain dimension entails that only 20% of the world‟s

countries have a worse score. However, a state which scores 90 means that only 10% of the

world‟s countries do better. Consequently, a high percentile rank indicates better government

performance. Yemen‟s rank on the 6 dimensions can be found in Annex B with a timeline

indicating percentile ranks since 1996. Overall, Yemen‟s governance performance on all six

dimensions generally ranges between 10 and 30 (despite the margins of error indicated).

This means it‟s a weak country from a governance perspective, based on a wide range of

indicators and from a wide range of sources. Still, the regulatory quality and rule of law

dimensions demonstrate relative stability and even slight improvement respectively. However

these observations still fall within the defined margin of error for the statistical instruments used.

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Annex A: Overview of established Rule of Law indicators

Indicator / Index Data available for Yemen

Bertelsmann Transformation Index YES

Brown University Global E-Government Index PARTLY

CEELI Convention to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination against

Women Assessment)

NO

CEELI Judicial Reform Index / Prosecutorial Reform Index / Legal

Profession Reform Index

NO

CEELI- Legal Implementation Index- International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights

NO

Center for Systemic Peace YES

EBRD Sector Specific Assessment of Law and Practices NO

EBRD Transition Report NO

EBRD Country Law Assessments NO

Freedom House YES

Institute for Management Development: World Competitiveness

Yearbook

NO

International Budget Project PARTLY

Media Sustainability Index PARTLY

Press freedom index YES

Global integrity report YES

Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2009 YES

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer / Bribe

Payers Index 2008 / National integrity system assessment

NO

Failed State Index YES

World Bank Indicators YES

World Bank (Doing Business) PARTLY

2010 Index of Economic Freedom YES

Global Competitiveness Report NO

CIRI Human Rights Data Project PARTLY

The Ibrahim Index NO

Amnesty International Report 2009: State of the World´s Human

Rights

YES

World Justice Project Rule of Law Index NO

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Annex B: World Bank Governance Indicators, Country data report for Yemen 1996-2008

This Data Report provides a summary of the six aggregate governance indicators, together with all of the

publicly-available disaggregated data on which the aggregate indicators are based. The underlying data

as well as methodological issues are described more fully in "Governance Matters VIII: Governance

Indicators for 1996-2008" (June 2009).

The Report displays the country's performance for all available years between 1996 and 2008 in six

governance dimensions: i) Voice & Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism, iii)

Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. Each

page shows the country's percentile rank on one of the six governance indicators. Percentile ranks

indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. Higher values thus

indicate better governance ratings. The graph also reports the margins of error displayed in the line

charts by dashed lines, and corresponding to a 90% confidence interval. This means that there is a 90

percent probability that governance is within the indicated range.

Underneath the line charts, the Report also displays data from all the underlying sources used for that

indicator. Individual ratings have been rescaled to run from 0 (low) to 1 (high). These scores are

comparable over time and across countries since most individual measures are based on similar

methodologies over time. Scores from different individual indicators are not however directly comparable

with each other since the different data sources use different units and cover different sets of countries.

The data from the individual indicators are in fact further rescaled to make them comparable across data

sources before constructing the aggregate governance indicators. Note that for some variables we

present an "NP", where "NP" stands for "Not Public", because the data is confidential and cannot be

publicly disclosed at the request of the organizations producing the data. To find out more about each

source/organization click on the provided links. More information about each of the underlying

organization/source can also be found in Appendices A and B of the Governance Matters VIII paper.

Relevant links:

www.govindicators.org

www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/

Disclaimer:

The data and research reported here do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive

Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate

resources.

Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c243.pdf

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Aggregate Indicator: Voice & Accountability

Individual Indicators used to construct Voice & Accountability

20

Aggregate Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence

Individual Indicators used to construct Political Stability and Absence of Violence

21

Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness

Individual Indicators used to construct Government Effectiveness

22

Aggregate Indicator: Regulatory Quality

Individual Indicators used to construct Regulatory Quality

23

Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law

Individual Indicators used to construct Rule of Law

24

Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption

Individual Indicators used to construct Control of Corruption