“High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.”
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Transcript of “High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.”
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“High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile,
Uruguay, and Argentina.”
Mara Loveman
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Introduction
Core Research Question:Why do some people put their lives at risk to oppose
repressive states/regimes?
Research Design: Comparative AnalysisTo address this question, Loveman conducts a competitive analysis of Human Rights Orgs (HROs) in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina.
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Introduction
Explaining Collective ActionRepression is supposed to depress mobilization. These
cases reveal that repression can stimulate collective action.
Factors That Can Influence: High Risk SituationsFactors that can influence collective action in high risk situations are the following:
1) Relationship between strategies of repression and embedded social networks2) Dense inter-personal networks are embedded within broader national and international networks
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Introduction
Military Governments and Human Rights:In each of the countries examined, HROs emerged in
response to systematic violations of human rights by military governments.
Research Questions:1) Why and how did individuals resist in the face of
repression?2) How we account for variations in the scope and strength of HROs in he countries under investigation?
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Introduction
Core Argument:We need a synthetic approach that focuses on:
1) Interpersonal links 2) Embedded social and political networks 3) Resource Mobilization capacity 4) Identity Construction5) Political Opportunity
…that is, focuses on everything
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Introduction
Two Main Research Questions:
1) Under what conditions do high risk SM occur?2) Why do people participate in such movements?
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Introduction
Social Movement Theory and High Risk Collective ActionThe SM literature offers different answers to these two
questions.
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Social Movement Theory
Social Movement Theory (480)
1) Micro-Level Approaches: Motivational Accountsa. Rational Choice Theory
2) Constructivist Approaches (Role of Identity)3) Social Networks 4) Resource Mobilization (Organizational Analysis) 5) Political Opportunity Structure
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Social Movement Theory
Micro-Level Approaches: Motivational Accounts (480)
Rational Choice Theory: Individual cost/benefit analysis, rational calculations
explains why do and do not participate in SM. Focuses
material benefits, and often ignores or reduces solidary or
purposive benefits.
Collective Action Problem: The Free-Rider
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Social Movement Theory
Rational Choice: LimitationsRC theories work best in situations where the costs and
benefits of participation are clear, or where the risks are low. In high risks situations, the costs and benefits of participation are rarely clear.
Also, RC cannot explain non-material motivations for participating, that is, were “meaning: matters more than “material” benefits. (480)
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Social Movement Theory
Theories of Participation:
Material: “tangible rewards that are easily converted into money” or status.
Solidary: “intangible rewards that stem from social interaction, like status, deference, and friendship.”
Purposive: Being involved in a worthy cause.*
Political Participation in High Risk SituationsIn high risk situations, solidary and purposive often
outweigh material incentives. (481) *Source: Rosenstone and Hansen
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Social Movement Theory
Constructivist Approaches: (482)Motivational theories fail to take into account the social
processes through which collective action occurs.
Role of Identity: Identity may help explain why someone participates, it may also be reshaped by participation. In either case, it may compel someone to participate regardless of the risk.
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Social Movement Theory
Social Network Theory (483)Examines “macro-mobilization” processes: the types of
social networks potential participants are embedded in can impact mobilization efforts.
Example: McAdam, Freedom Summer, MississippiParticipants in the 1964 Freedom Summer in Mississippi were encouraged to go by friends and family, and by the pre-existing networks of social activists in which they were situated.
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Social Movement Theory
Resource Mobilization Theory: (483)In addition to social ties, connections to certain types of
organizations, or the existence (or absence) of existing organizations may explain why people and do not participate.
The Importance of OrganizationThe right attitude, personality or social network is not enough. What generally determines the level of participation is the scope and strength of available organizations.
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Social Movement Theory
Organizations and High Risk SettingsThe presence or absence of organizations may help explain
the scope and strength of SMs (HROs) in repressive states.
HROs and Resources: (484)HROs need access to resources to sustain mobilization.
Institutional Links to:1) Unions2) Religious Organizations3) Universities4) NGOs, Parties
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Social Movement Theory
Political Opportunity Structure (484)Neither resources, nor networks/organizations help
explain the timing of social movement activity. To understand when SM occur, you need to consider the political opportunity structure.
Timing of Social Movement ActivityDo SM emerge when the state liberalizes, or becomes more repressive?
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Cases
Emergence of HROs in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina (485) Though separate and unique countries, they each experienced military
dictatorships in 1970s and 1980s, as well as movements that sought to resist government sanctioned human rights violations.
Historical Overview: Chile: Military Coup in 1973, ended a period of civilian ruleUruguay: Military Coup in 1973, ended a period of civilian rule Argentina: Coup in 1976, military intervention more common
In each, military saw itself as a defender of the public against “subversives.”
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Cases
Core Research Goal:Each country studied saw the development of HROs that
opposed a military government, but they varied both in terms of scope and strength.
In what ways does the SM literature help us explain this variation?
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Human Rights Organization in ChileDuring the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973-1989),
HRO emerged immediately and functioned even during the height of the repression.
Waves of HRO OppositionOrganized human rights opposition took place in three waves:
1) Religious Organizations2) Family of Victims3) Opposition political parties
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Waves of HRO Opposition
1) Religious OrganizationsThe first groups, networks and individual to
challenge the Pinochet dictatorship were primarily religious organizations.
Examples: COPACHI: Comite de Cooperacion para la Paz en
Chile (Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile)
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Waves of HRO Opposition
2) Family of VictimsThe activity of the religious organizations
provided an example and an opening for family of victims of
the regime to begin mobilizing against Pinochet.
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Waves of HRO Opposition
3) Opposition political partiesAfter the regime loosened some of its controls in
1977, a number of secular HROs emerged.
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Understanding these TrendsWhy did HROs emerge during the height of the
repression?
Political Opportunity: (489)Does the proliferation of HROs after 1977, when the regime relaxed its political controls confirm the idea that movements emerge when state repression declines?
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Understanding these Trends
Social NetworksWhat role did preexisting social, political and professional networks play in the organized
resistance to the Pinochet dictatorship?
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Chilean Case:The church, as well as existing national and international
networks that tied together students, labor unions, opposition political leaders and other professionals provided the organizational cover and space, as well as legitimacy for early HR resistance to the regime.
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Chile: Human Rights Organization
Understanding HRO activity at the Individual Level (492)What compelled individuals to risk arrest or death to
participation in HRO against the government?
The “Sense of Self”For many of the early activists, HRO work was not only political and ethical, it was also very personal.
A commitment to the cause, and specifically to those victimized by the state becomes “pro-social” and begins to outweigh individual concerns and calculations.
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Uruguay
Uruguay: Absence of HRO during Repression (498)The situation in Uruguay was very different from Chile:
the coup took place in 1973, but sustained HRO activity did not emerge until 1981.
Research Question: Why did HROs not develop at the same pace in Uruguay as in Chile, despite clear similarities between the cases?
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Uruguay
Chile and Uruguay: Many Political and Cultural SimilaritiesThe absence of HRO activity in Uruguay is even more perplexing
given the cultural and political similarities between the cases.
Similarities: 1) Highly developed political system2) History of electoral government 3) Large labor unions
4) Large urban population5) Strong educational systems
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Uruguay
Chile and Uruguay: Key DifferenceChile is a highly religious country, while Uruguay is more secular.
As such, the church in Uruguay was unable to provide either the moral or institutional cover/space that it did for HROs in Chile.
Church and State in Uruguay: Lacked InfluenceIn Uruguay, the church lacked the cultural and political power it
had in Chile. Though mostly silent in the face of human rights offences, the church was nonetheless targeted by the regime for its lack of open support for the government.
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Uruguay
Uruguay: Weak Personal NetworksThe type of cross-sectional personal networks –between
the church, universities, unions -- that supported HRO activity in Chile was comparative weak in Uruguay.
Example: Political Left in UruguayThe political left was historical weak in the Uruguay, and had few links to other institutions, like the church.
The lack of such interconnections was decisive.
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Uruguay
Uruguay: Strategies of Repression: Mass Arrests (506)Rather than use mass killings, the regime favored mass
arrest for anyone thought to be hostile to the government. Huge numbers of people were detained, even lawyers defending the accused were subject to arbitrary arrest.
Outcome: Culture of Fear The result was a culture of fear: anyone could be detained, at anytime, for any reason.
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Uruguay
Uruguay: Political Opportunity Structure (506)Only after the military government pursued constitutional
reforms in 1980, did the first HRO (Servicio Paz y Justicia SERPAJ (Peace and Justice Service Organization) emerge.
Conclusion: (507)Uruguay confirms the idea that repression depresses
mobilization. The church, in particular, was unable provide the moral and institutional cover necessary to promote HRO activity. And, in Uruguay, without the church, there was essentially no space for the formation of HROs.
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Argentina
Argentina: An Intermediate Case (507)HRO emerged after the 1976 military coup, even though
the church supported the government. As such, there was not the type of dense cross-sectional networks, between the church and other potentially oppositional institutions that activists could rely on.
HRO Development: Non-Institutional Channels (509)
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Argentina
Argentina: HRO Development: Non-Institutional ChannelsWith the doors to the church closed, and few other spaces
for opposition, HRO in Argentina to rely on:
- Existing communist/left groups- An existing chapter of SERPAJ (Peace and Justice Service Organization)
Each had become active in opposition to government abuses before the 1976 military coup.
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Argentina
Argentina: “Dirty War”A key strategy of repression after the coup was a policy of so-called
“disappearances.” The result had was a “culture of fear” similar to what happened in Uruguay.
Response: Relatives of the DisappearedThe disappearances resulted in the development of severalgroups of relatives of the disappeared who challenged militaryRule.
Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of May Square (Las Madres))Abuelas de Plaza de MayoFamiliares de Desaparecidos (Families of the Disappeared)
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Argentina
Response: Relatives of the DisappearedThe disappearances resulted in the development of several groups of relatives of the disappeared who challenged military rule through public marches/demonstrations.
Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the May Plaza) (Las Madres)Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo(Grandmothers of the May Plaza)Familiares de Desaparecidos (Families of the Missing)
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Argentina
Argentina: Relatives of the Disappeared (513)How do we explain the emergence of these groups? Was it a political opportunity
question? Did the demonstrators possess moral authority as parents, mothers?
Problems with Analysis:Many of the original demonstrators were detained, and subsequently disappeared. Moreover, many parents who lost children did not protest.
Links to International HR CommunityInternational attention helped the Las Madres, but were they nonetheless unable
to achieve their goals.
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Argentina
Argentina:Overall, HROs in Argentina lacked the social networks,
and thus organizational strength necessary for sustained opposition to the regime.
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Conclusion
Social Movements and High Risk SituationsThough the prevailing wisdom in the SM literature is that
heightened state repression depresses SM activity, the cases reviewed here suggest state violence may in certain circumstances (given certain conditions) stimulate opposition to the military government.
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Conclusion
Comparative Analysis of HRO in Chile, Uruguay and ArgentinaWhat a study of these cases suggests is that SM activity in high
risk situations depends upon particular types of pre-existing, cross-sectional, and dense personal networks linked to broader international support systems.
Such networks provide not only moral and institutional support, they are often tied into a preexisting social identity that encourages opposition at the individual level.