Hermeneutics and Psychology: A Review and … and Psychology: A Review and Dialectical Model Steven...

Hermeneutics and Psychology: A Review and Dialectical Model

Steven J. SandageBethel University

Kaye V. CookGordon College

Peter C. HillBiola University

Brad D. StrawnSouthern Nazarene University

Kevin S. ReimerAzusa Pacific University

The authors encourage psychologists to transcend the simple but often made a contrastof quantitative and qualitative epistemologies by reissuing a call to consider a herme-neutical realist perspective. The authors recognize that such calls are not new and havelargely gone unheeded in the past, perhaps because of how a more radical hermeneu-tical perspective has been conceptualized and communicated. Rooted in P. Ricoeur’s(1981) philosophy of distanciation, the authors propose a dialectic of understanding andexplanation that values both quantitative and qualitative methodologies by (a) tracingthe philosophical development of hermeneutics as a paradigm for knowing, (b) dem-onstrating useful hermeneutical applications to psychology as a whole and to somespecific subdisciplines, and (c) illustrating how a hermeneutic realist approach isbeneficial to the multicultural study of virtue.

Keywords: hermeneutics, methodology, positive psychology, virtue, culture

Humans are “self-interpreting animals” (Tay-lor, 1985). That is, humans engage in herme-neutical processes of interpretation that involvemaking meaning out of life experience. In thisarticle, we explore three sets of implicationsrelated to this general thesis. First, discourseabout hermeneutics in psychology and socialscience often contrasts hermeneutics with posi-tivistic, realist, and quantitative approaches toscience. Yet, social science is inescapably in-terpretive. Moreover, philosophical hermeneu-tics comprises a diverse body of literature with

a variety of philosophical assumptions. Thereare important differences in hermeneutical phi-losophies and paradigms of interpretation inboth the sciences and humanities, with differingviews on the definition of validity (Moss, 2004).It is misleading to simply contrast hermeneuti-cal or qualitative and positivistic or quantitativeparadigms of knowing. We further argue that ahermeneutical realist approach to psychologycan be reconciled with a valuing of distancia-tion, quantitative methods, and critical realistepistemologies (e.g., Browning & Cooper,2004). Across numerous subdisciplines of psy-chology there are tensions between theoreticalperspectives that emphasize either objectivity orsubjectivity, explanation or understanding(Hunt, 2005). There is a converging need formoving “beyond objectivism and relativism”(Bernstein, 1983) in psychological science andpractice, and a hermeneutical realist paradigmcan illuminate the contours of just such a dia-lectical model.

Second, many hermeneutical theorists arguethat how we interpret depends on contextualdynamics, particularly as we encounter chal-

Steven J. Sandage, Department of Marriage and FamilyTherapy, Bethel University; Kaye V. Cook, Department ofPsychology, Gordon College; Peter C. Hill, Department ofPsychology, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola Uni-versity; Brad D. Strawn, Department of Spiritual Develop-ment, Southern Nazarene University; Kevin S. Reimer, De-partment of Graduate Psychology, Azusa Pacific University.

We are grateful for the grant from the Council for Chris-tian Colleges and Universities that helped support thisproject.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Steven Sandage, Bethel Seminary, 3949 BethelDrive, St. Paul, MN 55112. E-mail: [email protected]

Review of General Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association2008, Vol. 12, No. 4, 344–364 1089-2680/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1089-2680.12.4.344

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lenging levels of alterity or otherness. In otherwords, it is necessary to understand the contex-tually shaped hermeneutic of an individual orgroup to understand their psychology. This isparticularly true with respect to positive psy-chology constructs in the areas of human flour-ishing, virtues, or ideals. MacIntyre’s (1984)influential work on virtue ethics has offered acompelling case that virtues are best understoodas embedded in particular social and contextualtraditions. For MacIntyre, there are no trulygeneric interpretations of virtue. In contrast,Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and Seligman (2005)have argued for a transcultural approach to thescientific study of virtues and have producedevidence of some core virtues that recur acrossnumerous cultures. We suggest that etic (uni-versal) and emic (culturally specific) perspec-tives can be used in dialectical and hermeneu-tical tension to enhance our understanding ofstrengths and virtues. Subdisciplines in psychol-ogy that study strengths and virtues should em-phasize the hermeneutical integration of contex-tual awareness with more distanciated empiricalmethodologies. The emerging field of positivepsychology can and must integrate rigorous sci-ence with hermeneutical awareness to contrib-ute to knowledge generation in diverse, globalcontexts.

Third, developmental dynamics and individ-ual differences influence hermeneutical ap-proaches to meaning-making. As Gadamer(1989) argued, hermeneutics is not simply amethod but also is ontological. Humans makemeaning as a way of being in the world. Yet, theways of making meaning differ with humandevelopment. And the development of virtueswill influence the hermeneutical processes ofinterpreting life (MacIntyre, 1990).

Hermeneutical Traditions

As noted, hermeneutics as a philosophicalendeavor is not monolithic, and any attempt tobriefly describe hermeneutical discourse islikely to fall short. However, in this section,after defining hermeneutics, we trace two piv-otal developments that helped shape contempo-rary hermeneutics, with a special highlight onthe role of key figures in each development.

Defining Hermeneutics

The term hermeneutics is derived fromHermes, the messenger of the Greek gods, andthe origin of the Greek verb hermeneuein,which means to “make something clear, to an-nounce or unveil a message” (Thompson, 1996,pp. 360–361). Hermeneutics is the process ofinterpretation and originated during the GreekEnlightenment through efforts to understandwriters such as Homer. This connected herme-neutics with the linguistic disciplines of philol-ogy, exegesis, and textual criticism (Thompson,1996). Interest in hermeneutics also rose duringthe Reformation as Protestants and Catholicsengaged in a power struggle about the role oftradition in interpreting sacred scripture. Likeearlier classical scholars, theologians becameintensely engaged in elaborating “the rules andconditions which governed the valid interpreta-tion of texts” (Thompson, 1996, p. 360). By the17th century, hermeneutics was well establishedas a theological discipline that developed meth-ods of biblical interpretation (Richardson, Fow-ers, & Guignon, 1999) and also came to refer tothe interpretive challenges in law and history.

From Authorial Intent to the LinguisticTurn: Schleiermacher, Dilthey,and Heidegger

Modern hermeneutics in the West was shapedby the influence of three key figures: FriedrichSchleiermacher, William Dilthey, and MartinHeidegger (Inwood, 2005). First, the Protestantscholar Schleiermacher (1768–1834) definedhermeneutics as “the art of understanding” andproposed a theory for the interpretation of texts.This involved interpreting from two vantagepoints: “grammatical,” in relation to the lan-guage in which it is written, and “psychologi-cal,” in relation to the mentality and develop-ment of the author (Inwood, 2005, p. 353).Schleiermacher argued that texts needed to beinterpreted in relation to their historical andliterary context in an effort to empathically un-derstand the psychological intention of the orig-inal author. His theory pointed to the hermeneu-tical circle or the circularity of all understand-ing as a dialectical relation between the partsand the whole, texts and contexts (Brown,2007).

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Second, Schleiermacher’s biographer, Wil-liam Dilthey (1833–1911), extended hermeneu-tics beyond theological texts into understandingall human behavior and cultural products.Dilthey conceived of hermeneutics as a humanscience (Geiteswissenschaften) as opposed to anatural science (Naturwissenschaften). Hesought an effective method for the human sci-ences but resisted the more objectivist episte-mologies of the natural sciences, saying, “Noreal blood flows through the veins of the know-ing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, andKant, only the diluted juice of reason, a mereprocess of thought” (Rickman, 1988, p. 135).Like literary texts, human actions need to beunderstood as embedded within a historicalcontext. For Dilthey, the self is constructedthrough experience and forms a historically andculturally conditioned worldview (Weltan-schauung) or interpretive lens (Hunt, 2005).Dilthey’s focus was on epistemology, whichcontributed to an opposition between explana-tion and understanding.

Third, Martin Heidegger (1884 –1976) ex-tended hermeneutics even further thanDilthey beyond a method for interpretation tothe phenomenological interpretation of thehuman being who interprets texts. Heideggerviewed life as “a fundamentally hermeneuticprocess” (Nakkula & Ravitch, 1998, pp. 7),and his non-Cartesian notion of being (Da-sein) emphasized knowing through creativeaction in the world. Rather than understand-ing essences, Heidegger suggested uncover-ing hidden meanings and expanding horizons.Interpretations are the ways humans constructthe meaning of their life experience in anongoing process of raising new questions.Rather than asking epistemological questionsabout how we know, Heidegger was initiallyinterested in the ontological mode of being-in-the-world that comprises understanding. Inhis later work, Heidegger (1971) moved awayfrom ontology toward an increased focus onlanguage, which he referred to as “the houseof being” (p. 135). Rather than communicat-ing or expressing our selves through lan-guage, Heidegger said that we are thrown intoa communal linguistic process that expressesus. Language serves to constitute reality, butHeidegger dissociated the linguistic and theempirical.

The Development of DialecticalHermeneutics: Gadamer, Habermas,and Ricoeur

Heidegger was an influential figure in thephilosophical transition from modern to post-modern hermeneutical perspectives by shiftingthe focus from rational methods of knowing tothe ontology of being-in-the-world and his laterlinguistic emphasis. Heidegger’s student Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) advanced philo-sophical hermeneutics in the human scienceswith an intersubjective emphasis on meaningemerging through dialogue and conversation(Gadamer, 1989). Like Heidegger, Gadamer didnot develop a specific method of interpretationbut emphasized human life as fundamentallyinterpretive and dialogical. However, Gadamerattempted to avoid the twin pitfalls of objectiv-ism and relativism, methodologism and nihil-ism, by developing a dialectical philosophy ofthe hermeneutical process (Bernstein, 1983; Ri-chardson et al., 1999). For Gadamer, all inter-pretation is value-laden and embedded within atradition or “effective history” (p. 299), yet a“fusion of horizons” (p. 305) is possible throughhermeneutical conversation. The horizon of anauthor and the horizon of an interpreter canintersect through participation in dialogue.

Gadamer also suggested that the hermeneuti-cal circle involves two arcs: an arc of projectionand an arc of reflection. Humans project aninterpretation of life experience from their “fore-structure of understanding.” These forestruc-tures involve prejudices or prejudgments thatarise from the effective history of one’s sociallocation. For Gadamer, such prejudices are notnecessarily bad or bigoted (although they couldbe) but simply represent the unavoidable tradi-tion-grounded preunderstandings that shape aworldview. In this way, he differed fromSchleiermacher and Dilthey by emphasizing thehistorical context of the interpreter. We shouldbecome aware of our prejudices, which can berevised through reflection as new horizons andforms of language are encountered. Understand-ing is creative as new horizons are encounteredand events of truth emerge. Fusing of horizonsis not a process of assimilating an alien otherinto a master perspective but rather “integratinganother’s horizon in such a way that one’s out-look is changed in the process” (Richardson et

346 SANDAGE, COOK, HILL, STRAWN, AND REIMER

al., 1999, p. 231). In this way, our own horizonor being is transformed through hermeneuticaldialogue and respectful I–thou encounters withothers.

Gadamer’s rejection of objectivist and induc-tive methodologies in the natural sciences foruse in the human sciences has led some toconsider him a relativist. Although he certainlycontended that knowing human subjects in-volves different levels of subjectivity thanknowing inanimate objects, he also suggestedthat traditions provide guidelines that constrainpossible interpretations.

Jurgen Habermas (1929–) developed his crit-ical social theory and “hermeneutical dialec-tics” out of the rise and fall of Nazi Germany(Bernstein, 1983, pp. 177, 195). This gave himgreater political concern than Gadamer for thecorruptive power of traditions in shaping cul-tural knowledge, as well as a correspondingneed for critically revising the structural barriersof social institutions toward emancipatory ide-als. Habermas shares with Gadamer an empha-sis on the influence of our own interpretivehorizons in knowing and a strong interest inpraxis. However, his main social scientificproject is one of specifying the universal con-ditions to communicative action, which leads tointersubjectivity and mutual understanding.Habermas argued that speech acts have an in-herent telos (or purpose) of promoting mutualunderstanding through social discourse. He hasbeen more optimistic than many postmodernistsabout the potential for discourse ethics to trans-form societies toward egalitarian justice.

Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) was a philosopherand linguistic scholar who developed a dialec-tical approach to hermeneutics in an attempt toreconcile understanding and explanation(Ricoeur, 1981). Ricoeur built on Gadamer’sawareness of historical embeddedness in tradi-tions but suggested that Gadamer exaggeratedthe opposition of truth and method (Browning& Cooper, 2004). Ricoeur developed a uniquedialectical hermeneutic philosophy that com-bined existential phenomenology with the moreobjective, exegetical, or empirical disciplines ofstructural linguistics. He argued for the value ofawareness of preunderstandings and effectivehistory along with critical moments of distan-ciation in the process of interpretation. Distan-ciation is not complete objectivity, but it doesinvolve a reflective ability both to be aware of

one’s historical horizon and to partially detachor distance oneself from it. Ricoeur was work-ing from the thesis that situations of speakingand writing are different, and that written textsare already somewhat distant from the author’ssubjective mind. In this way, texts help consti-tute distance and necessitate structured methodsof linguistic interpretation as a moment of val-idation in an overall process that moves frompreunderstanding to explanation to understand-ing. Distanciation or explanation allows a way outof the viciousness of the hermeneutical circle andcan also facilitate the critique of ideology that hasconcerned Habermas. The hermeneutical processshould not end with explanation but open intoemergent meaning of the whole and self-understanding. Ricoeur and Gadamer agreed thatinterpretation culminates in practical appropria-tion or “making one’s own” (Ricoeur, 1981, p.185) what was formerly alien.

Ricoeur (1981) also likened human actionto a text that requires interpretation, and hecontributed to the literature linking narrativeand selfhood. Ricoeur’s work offers a chal-lenge to quantitative researchers to recognizetheir effective history and subjectivity in in-terpretation and to qualitative researchers toconsider the benefit of partial objectivitythrough structured methods of interpretation.For Ricoeur, “distanciation is the counterpartto belonging” (p. 16). He was trying to movehermeneutics toward a more dialectical ap-proach beyond Cartesian subject– object du-alism. Toward the end of his career, Ricoeur(2004) explored the connections between neu-roscience and phenomenology on the dialec-tical hermeneutics of memory.

Hermeneutics and General Psychology

Several books and numerous articles haveapplied the differing traditions of hermeneuticalphilosophy to general psychological researchand practice, with much of this literature emerg-ing in the 1980s. We overview not only some ofthe major contributions of a hermeneutical ap-proach that apply to the field as a whole but alsooffer suggestions as to why, in general, herme-neutical perspectives have had such a limitedinfluence on psychology.


Hermeneutical Theorists inGeneral Psychology

Almost universally, this literature offers astrong contrast of hermeneutic and interpretiveapproaches with quantitative methods. Typi-cally, advocates of hermeneutics in psychologyvigorously critique scientism and positivismand the limits of quantitative research. Forexample, Messer, Sass, and Woolfolk (1988)edited a volume that addressed methodological,ontological, and critical applications of herme-neutics to psychology. They note in the preface“the editors’ shared dissatisfaction with the cur-rent overvaluation of a scientistic and positivis-tic attitude within psychology” (p. xv). Packerand Addison (1989) also edited a volume onhermeneutical or interpretive approaches to re-search in psychology in an effort to challengethe traditional modern scientific assumptions ofempiricism and rationalism. They argued thatscientific methods are not interpretation-freeand that all interpretations reflect contexts. LikeGadamer, they focused not on specific criteriafor valid interpretations but the relational stanceof caring and “concerned engagement” in dia-logue with the research subject and the practicalconsequences of interpretations (p. 279; for cri-tiques on these points, see Barratt & Sloan,1988; Russell, 1988). Packer (1985) also lik-ened empirical and rational explanations to amap of a city, whereas hermeneutic interpreta-tions are like accounts of the city from someonewho has lived there.

In one of the most original psychologicalworks employing hermeneutical philosophy,Cushman (1995) draws extensively on Gadamerand Foucault to offer a cultural history of psy-chotherapy in America. He not only offers asocial and political critique of the associationsbetween psychotherapy and consumerism butdevelops a hermeneutical view of psychother-apy as moral discourse within intersecting tra-ditions. For Cushman, psychotherapy offers thepossibility of a fusion of horizons where thetherapist is able to see (albeit imperfectly) fromthe client’s horizon while also helping open uphorizons with new terrain.

Richardson et al. (1999) have offered one ofthe most recent and comprehensive proposalsfor a hermeneutical psychology in their bookaptly titled Re-envisioning Psychology. Theywork largely from Heidegger, Taylor, and

Gadamer to reconceptualize the positive con-tribution of social and moral commitments forresearch and practice. Although they retain aplace for partial objectivity, Richardson et al.largely critique empirical and quantitative ap-proaches to research and mainstream clinicalpractice.

There is a tendency among psychologicalwriters to oversimplify the contrast betweenobjective and subjective epistemologies and be-tween realist and relativist ontologies. Con-structivism is frequently contrasted with posi-tivism or postpositivism as a research paradigm.For example, Ponterotto (2005), in an otherwisehelpful primer on research paradigms and thephilosophy of science, describes the researchparadigm of “constructivism–interpretivism” as“a hermeneutical approach” (p. 129) and distin-guishes it from both positivist and postpositivistparadigms. Ponterotto associates the paradigmof constructivism–interpretivism with nonreal-ism, relativism, and emic and idiographic re-search goals. As evident from the review ofhermeneutical philosophy above, this representsa fairly limited application of the diverse set ofhermeneutical schools of thought. Perhaps thislimitation is due to Ponterotto’s focus onDilthey, who strongly contrasted natural andhuman sciences, as a representative of construc-tivism–interpretivism rather than reviewingother more dialectical thinkers (e.g., Gadamer,Ricoeur, Habermas).

A Limited Influence on Psychology

It is curious that many of the interestingpoints argued by Richardson et al. can be founda decade earlier in the works cited above ex-ploring a hermeneutical critique of psychology(Messer et al., 1988; Packer & Addison, 1989).This raises the question of why hermeneuticalperspectives seemingly have had such a limitedimpact on the field of psychology, at least in theUnited States. We do not have a definitive an-swer to that question, but the following sectionsof this article explore several possible reasonsand potential correctives that might make her-meneutical perspectives more broadly relevantto psychological researchers and practitioners.There are several limitations of the current bodyof literature applying hermeneutics to psychol-ogy that we hope to overcome.


First, as a field American psychology hasgenerally worked to establish itself as a naturalscience and to dissociate connections to philos-ophy. Integrating hermeneutical philosophyinto psychology is working against a stronghistorical tide (Hunt, 2005). To compoundthis problem, the hermeneutical philosophersthat appear to be most commonly employed inpsychological literatures are Heidegger andGadamer. Both strongly resisted natural sci-ence approaches to knowing in the humansciences and deemphasized methods for vali-dating competing interpretations. The herme-neutical work of Ricoeur is much less fre-quently used by psychologists. Yet, along withBrowning and Cooper (2004; also, seeO’Grady, Rigby, & Van Den Hengel, 1987), wesuggest that Ricoeur’s notion of distanciation,emphasis on language, and dialectic of expla-nation and understanding offers a better rap-prochement between hermeneutical philosophyand psychological science and practice.

Second, it is surprising that the American liter-ature on hermeneutics and psychology offers verylittle engagement with the psychology of religionand spirituality. One exception is Browning andCooper (2004), although their work is more accu-rately located in the fields of pastoral care andethics. The historical connections between herme-neutics and the exegesis of sacred texts wouldseemingly suggest valuable points of convergencefor the contemporary psychology of religion andspirituality. These connections to hermeneuticsare better realized in European psychology of re-ligion (Wulff, 2003), perhaps due in part to thegeographic proximity to the traditions of continen-tal philosophy. We suggest that the recent emer-gence of research on the positive psychology ofstrengths and virtues with the accompanying in-terest in meaning, purpose, and spirituality pro-vides an opportunity for integrating hermeneuticalperspectives with quality empirical science. Ourproposal differs from that of Wulff (2003), whosharply contrasts empirical and hermeneuticalmethods and laments the quantitative focus incontemporary American psychology of religion.However, we also suggest that differing religiouscommunities employ differing hermeneutics(Brown, 2007), and that positive psychologicalresearchers will need some familiarity with her-meneutical dynamics to understand a group’s con-strual of such value-laden constructs as virtue orspirituality.

Third, the literature on hermeneutical per-spectives in psychology offers surprisinglylittle explicit multicultural engagement withthe diversity issues of ethnicity, race, gender,class, or sexual orientation. Cushman (1995)is one exception with his attention to socialclass and politics, and Lee (2003) appliedmulticultural hermeneutics to the problem ofdomestic violence in Korean American fami-lies. The paucity of multicultural engagementseems like a strange oversight given the con-sistent emphasis among hermeneutical philos-ophers on historical and cultural embeddenessand the need for self-awareness of one’s so-cial context. Fowers and Richardson (1996)played into this problem by using hermeneu-tical philosophy to argue the controversialthesis that multicultural perspectives are in-debted to Euro-American traditions and ide-als, which received a vigorous critique frommulticultural advocates (Hall et al., 1997).

Perhaps one associated problem is that most ofthe well-known hermeneutical philosophers inwestern scholarship are White males, some ofwhom have been criticized for social conservatismand a lack of political awareness (e.g., Heideggerand Gadamer). In contrast, deconstructionist phi-losophers who have considered hermeneutical is-sues and offered intellectual fuel for political cri-tique of ideology (e.g., Derrida and Foucault)probably go too far in undermining empirical sci-ence for most psychological researchers. Haber-mas, Ricoeur, and emerging perspectives in eth-nohermeneutics offer better resources for a her-meneutical perspective that can resonate with theemancipatory goals of the growing multiculturalmovements in psychology while still valuingquantitative methods.

Hermeneutics andPsychological Subdisciplines

Our focus now turns to hermeneutical issuesand approaches that have emerged in specificsubdisciplines of psychology. Hermeneuticalperspectives, although generally limited, havehad differential impact on the various subfields.

Qualitative Research Method

Hermeneutical philosophy has been appliedto qualitative research methods in a variety of


ways, meaning there is not a single herme-neutical method in social science research.For example, hermeneutical perspectiveshave been integrated with two of the mainapproaches to qualitative research: phenome-nology and grounded theory. Hein and Aus-tin’s (2001) study compared empirical andhermeneutical phenomenological approachesto the same qualitative interview data. Theseauthors defined empirical phenomenology inrelation to Husserl and an emphasis on thestructural essentialization or description ofthe phenomenon of interest and the “factualdata” (p. 8) or actual words used by partici-pants. In constrast, they related hermeneuticalphenomenology to Heidegger and Gadamerand an emphasis on the researcher’s horizonof understanding as making a contribution tothe interpretation of data that goes beyond theparticipant’s description. it is curious that, intheir comparison of these two approacheswith data from a single interviewee, the au-thors reached considerable similarity in de-scription.

Hermeneutic phenomenology represents aloose collection of approaches that can be foundacross various disciplines. Cohen, Kahn, andSteeves (2000) provide a helpful historicaloverview of hermeneutic phenomenology,which they define as “the tradition of looking ata phenomenon, a single kind of human experi-ence, rather than a social process or structure ora culture” (p. 8). They also suggest that herme-neutical phenomenology is “empirical” in thesense of studying “experience based on obser-vations rather than theory” (p. 11). This latterpoint about theory speaks to the issue of brack-eting, that is, intentionally limiting the influenceof prior interpretive assumptions when ap-proaching data. Some hermeneutic phenom-enologists emphasize a complete bracketing ofinterpretive assumptions (Jackson & Patton,1992; Nystrom, Dahlberg, & Carlsson, 2003),whereas others follow Heidegger and Gadamerin admitting that complete bracketing is notpossible (Mak & Elwyn, 2003; also see Rennie,2000; Sherrard, 1992). Some promote a consen-sual team approach to interpreting data (Halling,Leifer, & Rowe, 2006; Mak & Elwyn, 2003),whereas others point out the limited validity ofgroup consensus (Polkinghorne, 1983; Rennie,2000). Perhaps the most significant difference isbetween those who conceive of hermeneutical re-

search as achieving deeper understanding (Hein &Austin, 2001; Jackson & Patton, 1992; Mak &Elwyn, 2003) versus those who view hermeneu-tics more dialectically as potentially achievingboth understanding and explanation (Polking-horne, 1983; Sorlie, Lindseth, Uden, & Norberg,2000; Wiklund, Lindholm, & Lindstrom, 2002).This latter group cites Ricoeur and makes distan-ciated use of narrative and linguistic structuralanalysis along with many of the other phenome-nologically oriented hermeneutical understand-ings developed by Heidegger and Gadamer.

Rennie (2000, 2007) offers a unique perspec-tive in arguing that grounded theory methodol-ogy can be considered hermeneutical. Buildingon Ricoeur, Dilthey, and C. S. Peirce’s theory ofscientific inference, Rennie (2007) suggests thathermeneutical-grounded theory steers a coursethat reconciles realism and relativism, under-standing and explanation. His main point is thatthe constant comparative method of part–wholeanalysis in grounded theory methodology in-volves making inferences through abductive orinterpretive “guesses” based on inductive data,and these guesses are in turn validated by fur-ther examination of data. In this way, inductioncan be hermeneutically self-correcting.

Hermeneutically inclined qualitative re-searchers differ as to whether the goal is under-standing alone or understanding and explana-tion. However, we could find no researcher whospecifically argued for a hermeneutical perspec-tive on quantitative research, although Hunt(2005) comes close by using Dilthey’s herme-neutical philosophy to suggest that all psycho-logical research is interpreted through world-views. Most seem to concur with Polkinghorne(1983) that mathematics involves objective pre-cision of a different order than the interpretationrequired with qualitative data. Yet, quantitativeanalyses do involve researchers making choicesat various levels about variables and methods ofanalysis, which makes it an interpretive process.As an example, Bayesian statistical methodsassume subjective selection of a “prior” or con-straint on probabilistic outcomes. Recent qual-itative methods have emerged that attempt toapply mathematics to participant narrativemeaning as a process of hermeneutical interpre-tation (Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004). Such ef-forts suggest that traditional distinctions be-tween mathematical and qualitative inferencemay evolve.


Social Psychology

Hermeneutical issues in social psychologyare unusually explicit in that the study of socialcognition, perhaps the dominant research para-digm within social psychology in the past 30years, is precisely about how people make senseof their social world. Whereas social–cognitiveresearchers have focused largely on generalcognitive structures and processes, many (e.g.,Dweck, 1975; Markus, 1977) acknowledge thatindividuals’ representations of social phenom-ena both help generate and are the product ofsubjective meaning.

People’s interaction with their social worldon the basis of the meaning assigned to eventshas a rich history in social psychology. Forexample, George Kelly (1955) contended thatmeaningful information in the world is filteredthrough a set of conceptual representations orpersonal constructs. The symbolic interaction-ism tradition in social psychology (Mead, 1934)is premised on the notion of the self-concept asimagination of one’s appearance to relationalothers; such imagination requires a cognitivemap to provide the social contours throughwhich others and the self are evaluated. Morerecently, Baldwin (1992) has proposed theconcept of relational schema—the notion thatpeople develop, through the regularities theyobserve in their interpersonal relationshippatterns, cognitive maps or working modelsby which they navigate their social environ-ment. Such cognitive maps include images aswell as scripts of expected interactions of selfand other. For example, a senior law partnerwill carry working models of interpersonalscripts that constitute appropriate types ofprofessional interaction with her junior part-ner; such scripts necessarily involve schemasor images of what each partner (and position)represents.

That people engage in a motivated construc-tion of their own realities is the basis of socialconstructionist theory (Gergen, 1971, 1999).Gergen (1971, 1999) has proposed that thelogical conclusions drawn from empirical so-cial psychology—that knowledge of the so-cial world (including self-knowledge) is con-textually influenced and therefore subject tomomentary fluctuation—should cause socialpsychologists to question their heavy relianceon traditional empirical methodologies, espe-

cially those that depend exclusively onclosed-ended self-report measures. Indeed,much traditional empirical research in socialcognition and perception has documentedwell how “erroneous impressions tend to beperpetuated rather than supplanted, becauseof the impressive extent to which people seewhat they want to see and act as others wantthem to act” (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002, p.173). Yet, as noted by several researcherswho have reflected on the social construction-ist critique (e.g., Higgins, 1992; Jost &Kruglanski, 2002; Reis & Stiller, 1992), ex-perimental social psychologists have reactedby tightening their empirical reins and, as aresult, have become even more methodologi-cally conservative and traditional.

There are, however, social psychologistsfrom the experimental camp who call for arapprochement with perspectives and method-ologies outside traditional experimental bound-aries. Jost and Kruglanski (2002) make a strongcase that experimental social psychology andsocial constructionism have more similar genesthat what is commonly perceived and that therift between the two is somewhat exaggerated.Although admitting that there are contentioushurdles (such as the issue whether truth is on-tologically real and to be discovered or is sim-ply fleetingly manufactured and fickle), theseauthors draw on (a) the metatheoretical work ofsuch standard bearers of the discipline asDonald Campbell and William McGuire toshow how, indeed, social constructionist princi-ples can be embraced without abandoning theexperimental method; and (b) how the empiricalwork in such standard domains as the situatedself-concept, social identity, communication,and “shared reality” can rightfully gain much bysupplementing traditional methods with morenuanced approaches such as those espoused bysocial constructionist theory.

In a similar vein, Molden and Dweck (2006)have offered a creative alternative approach tothe standard psychological focus on universalprinciples. Drawing from research on socialcognition, Molden and Dweck propose that peo-ples’ lay theories about the stability and mallea-bility of human characteristics not only helpcreate larger meaning systems but are influ-enced by such meaning systems as well. Themeaning that is constructed through such laytheories, the authors argue, can dramatically


alter such basic processes as social perception(e.g., endorsing and applying social stereotypes,engaging in lay dispositionism—the tendency tooveremphasize personality traits in explainingthe actions of others) and self-regulation (e.g.,responding to social challenges, mastering bothpositive and negative transitions in life). Al-though they do not propose specific methodol-ogies, Molden and Dweck stress the importanceof the content of the meaning systems to whicha hermeneutical approach would be especiallyhelpful.

Developmental Psychology

Hermeneutic theory is somewhat sparse inthe developmental psychology literature, withsome notable exceptions (Balswick, King, &Reimer, 2005; Martin & Sugarman, 2001; Mc-Adams, 1997; Packer, 1987; Tappan & Brown,1992). Yet the field appears to be changing,with hermeneutic issues (although usually notso identified) becoming increasingly prominentin developmental theory and research throughthe following three approaches: narrative, con-textual and ecological, and cultural psychology.

Narrative approaches. Popular withinmoral development (Tappan, 2006; Tappan &Brown, 1992) and lifespan development (Mc-Adams, 1997), narrative approaches exploremeaning-making through stories. McAdams’(2005) program of research in narrative psy-chology is particularly well developed, and hedescribes his work as “split between empiricismand hermeneutics” (p. 114). In the introductionto his Stories We Live By, McAdams (1997)invokes Ricoeur as a means to interpreting de-velopmental change where personal identity iselaborated through stories that situate the selfthrough various “life chapters.” A life chaptermay be a particular period (e.g., middle child-hood) that employs narrative meaning-makingas a response to developmental transition. Clas-sic examples include the formation of a coher-ent social self in adolescence or generative wis-dom in advanced age. Less conventional lifechapter narratives eschew lifespan stages in fa-vor of ongoing stories focused on existentialchallenges such as chronic illnesses, spiritualquests, or vocational struggles. In either case,identity emerges from socially embedded nar-ratives that grow to function as benchmarkmyths in one’s life. Although the word herme-

neutic is not explicit in this approach, the con-textual basis for storied meaning is unmistak-able.

Contextual and ecological approaches. Ef-forts to operationally understand developmentin context reflect considerable challenges andcomplications (Winegar & Valsiner, 1992).Does context function as an independent vari-able, or is it dynamically interwoven with everyother variable and inseparable from them? Her-meneutic psychology implies recursive aware-ness or the idea that each part of the largersystem affects every other part. When exploringhuman behavior, therefore, it is important thatthe researcher recognizes his or her influence inshaping the behavior of another and, whereverpossible, gives the research participant a voicein explaining his or her behavior.

In his study of thought and language in childdevelopment, Vygotsky (1962) emphasized thecontext in which the child is embedded. Vy-gotsky’s context was Stalinist Russia, an influ-ence recognizable in his insistence that internalrepresentations of reality were artifacts of ex-ternal, social cues. He argued that knowledge isnot constructed by the child in isolation butcoconstructed in relationships with others. Vy-gotsky’s exploration of the “zone of proximaldevelopment” subdivides the immediate fromthe larger context, focusing attention on “scaf-folding” provided by caregivers and otheradults who nurture the child’s development. Incontrast to contemporary psychological ap-proaches, Vygotsky made a distinction betweeninterpsychological and intrapsychological pro-cesses but did not differentiate between socialand individual cognitive processing. Vy-gotsky’s recognition of the importance of con-text, the interrelatedness of social and cognitivedevelopment, and the distinction between inter-psychic and intrapsychic processes makes histheory particularly useful for hermeneutic work.We wish, however, to broaden Vygotsky’s con-clusions beyond language to include all behav-iors.

The human ecology of Bronfenbrenner(1979) expanded several of Vygotsky’s coreassumptions into a distinctive systemic frame-work. Bronfenbrenner believed that develop-ment is precipitated by involvement in variousrelational contexts replete with expectations forrole definition and behavior. Successive levelsof relational context form a web of intercon-


nected systems; these levels include the dyad(child and caregiver), microsystem (family, re-ligious, or kin affiliation), mesosystem (connec-tions between microsystems), exosystem (ex-tended networks through parental work), andmacrosystem (social or cultural mores). Bron-fenbrenner’s theory proved durable and widelyinfluential, pushing developmentalists to con-sider the significance of contextual influencesfor individual change. Perhaps even more sig-nificant was Bronfenbrenner’s observation thatdevelopmental influences include many non-psychological phenomena. The prominence ofbiological factors in developmental reciprocityopens the door for hermeneutic consideration ofneuropsychological and genetic development.

Cultural psychology approaches. The cul-tural developmental work of researchers such asCole (1996) and Valsiner (1997) helps us un-derstand the reciprocal impact of cultural mean-ings on a child’s development and vice versa. If“culture is a fundamental constituent of humanthought and action” (Cole, 1996, p. 2), newmethods and measures are needed to explorewhat this means.

Parental messages socialize children into cul-tural meanings (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994).Valsiner (1997), for example, illustrates, in anecological analysis, the degree to which culturepermeates everyday life. Valsiner deconstructsthe meaning of mealtimes, suggesting that theuse of high chairs in feeding American infantsunconsciously teaches cultural meanings aboutindependence and equality. Bruner (1990) ar-gued that human behavior consists of these“acts of meaning” and that “given that psychol-ogy is so immersed in culture, it must be orga-nized around those meaning-making and mean-ing-using processes that connect man [sic] toculture” (p. 12). Implicit within the use of highchairs is the moral vision that it is good to learnindependence and equality. These may not,however, be values that parents would con-sciously wish to pursue. Consideration of thedirection of development helps us realize thatthere are many possible trajectories and thatthese directions are embodied within and de-fined by culture.

Perhaps it is surprising that few developmen-tal studies compare alternative moral visions ofcultures. A fundamental question within cul-tural exploration of this area concerns the uni-versalism and, alternatively, the cultural embed-

dedness of morality and values. Research usingKohlberg’s (1976) model of moral reasoninggenerally explores universals of moral develop-ment, but Snarey (1985), in a review of thesestudies, argues that moral reasoning is less uni-versal than Kohlberg predicted. It seems reason-able to us that values may be universally sharedbut locally interpreted somewhat differently. Insupport of this, virtue research indicates thatwidely valued constructs such as forgivenessand taking care of another’s needs can be ex-pressed and even understood somewhat differ-ently in various cultural contexts and commu-nities (Cook, Orton, Norton, & Mendes, 2005;Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Sandage &Williamson, 2005). A hermeneutic stance opensthe possibility of exploring universality and cul-tural embeddedness without necessarily favor-ing either perspective.

Psychoanalysis

Despite Freud’s positivistic leanings via hisemphasis on a biological drive, Ricoeur’s(1981) “semantics of desire” (p. 7) suggested adialectical and hermeneutical reading of Freudas offering a “mixed discourse” of both subjec-tive meaning and biological drive. Ricoeur(1970) also described Freud, Nietzsche, andMarx as all advocating a “hermeneutics of sus-picion” that works to unmask false conscious-ness and disguised symbolic meanings. Indeed,although hermeneutical perspectives also havebeen employed in other clinical disciplines(e.g., clinical psychology, family therapy, socialwork), hermeneutical interest appears most pro-nounced among psychoanalytically inclinedtheorists. Although few theoreticians wouldprobably classify themselves as hermeneuticalpsychoanalysts, many would admit to beinghighly influenced by hermeneutical perspec-tives through postmodernism, social construc-tivism, narrative theory, and continental philos-ophy. Although it is dangerous to try to proposea set of criteria that makes one a hermeneuticalpsychotherapist, it may be safe to assume thatmost of these thinkers endorse some if not all ofthe following: (a) Psychoanalysis is primarilyan interpretive activity (e.g., persons as texts)oriented toward the construction of narrativetruth rather than historical fact (Spence, 1982);(b) psychoanalysis is more a human scienceoriented toward understanding than a natural


science of explanation; (c) subjective and con-textual factors influence meaning-making hori-zons for both the client and therapist (Cushman,1995); and (d) psychoanalysis is a dialogical,intersubjective, and relational process of cocon-structing meaning (Saks, 1999).

Jung (1916/1920) may have been the firstpsychoanalyst to actually describe his approachas hermeneutical. Jung was less oriented towardFreudian suspicion of the symbol than an ap-preciation for symbol and actually “addingmore analogies to that already given by thesymbol” (pp. 468–469; also, see Beebe, 2004).Among more contemporary hermeneutical psy-choanalysts, Schafer (1992) suggests discardingFreud’s outdated natural science-based meta-psychology but retaining Freud’s clinical the-ory, which can be helpful for understandingpsychological phenomenon in terms of narra-tive. Schafer also emphasizes the hermeneuticaland worldview theme of context (Hunt, 2005),and he views the therapy process as reconstruct-ing meaning through the client–therapist dia-logue. Fayek (2004) also views psychoanalysisas a hermeneutically reconstructive process andmakes a unique contribution by drawing paral-lels to religious hermeneutics in Islam.

The contemporary theoreticians who are ar-guably the most explicit about their hermeneu-tical leanings are the Intersubjectivists(Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002). Althoughthere are several prominent theoreticians use theterm intersubjective (all in different ways),these researchers provide an “Alternative Meta-physics Model” (Saks, 1999) by arguing thatthere is no unmediated access to reality.Stolorow et al. (2002) reject what they call the“myth of the isolated Cartesian Mind” in favorof intersubjectivity, which purports that experi-ences and reality are always and only cocon-structed from the particular relational fields thatone is in.

Although difficult and potentially erroneousto synthesize these thinkers, it appears thatmany clinicians are moving, with far-reachingimplications, toward a perspectival realism orhermeneutic pragmatism (Orange, 1995). Forexample, therapists sometimes now speak of theexperiences their patients report as being bothgiven and made. Hermeneutics has also openeda new way for therapists to understand theircontribution to the therapeutic dyad. The thera-pist is always and only an interpreter of the

patient’s experience. The analyst does not sit insome distant objective place from which she cansee the “truth,” but she too brings her subjec-tivity to the hermeneutical task. Understandingis therefore always a dialogic event (Stern,2003) and a relational or intersubjective expe-rience created in particularity based on eachunique interpersonal field (Stolorow et al.,2002).

Hermeneutical psychoanalysis, however,does not have to fall into a kind of antiscientific,epistemological nihilism (Sorenson, 2004).Some hermeneutical psychoanalysts can accepta critical realist epistemology that there is a realevent (e.g., experience) to be known but stillbelieve that the event will always involve sub-jective interpretation. This implies that what iscreated between the patient and the analyst isreally only an approximation of the real thing(Schafer, 1983; Stern, 1997). It is also notewor-thy that Saks (1999) excluded Habermas andRicoeur from her review, despite referring tothem as “the seminal psychoanalytic herme-neuts” (p. 6). Although much of the hermeneu-tical literature in psychoanalysis focuses on un-derstanding, the dialectical hermeneutics ofRicoeur and Habermas suggest ways of recon-ciling understanding and explanation withinclinical practice. Scholars in the emerging fieldof interpersonal neuroscience are working to-ward integrating psychoanalytic theories of re-lational development with scientific research onbrain functioning (Schore, 2003), which offersintriguing possibilities for hermeneutical psy-chology of both meaning and embodiment(Ricoeur, 2004).

The Contours of a Hermeneutical RealistParadigm in Psychology

The sophisticated debates of hermeneuticalphilosophy in religious discourse have served togenerate some rather unique, dialectical ap-proaches to hermeneutics that attempt to inte-grate realist and constructivist perspectives.Theological ethicist Don Browning (2003;Browning & Cooper, 2004) has developed anapproach to interdisciplinary research he callshermeneutic realism (p. 319). Browning buildson the hermeneutics of Gadamer (1982),Ricoeur (1981), Bernstein (1983), and Haber-mas (1971) in calling for awareness of contex-tual preunderstandings and effective history but


also in valuing the place of distanciation.Browning (2003) explains,

Hermeneutic realism . . . acknowledges that all under-standing—including scientific understanding—is his-torically and linguistically shaped. But it also holdsthat it is possible, through various methodological ma-neuvers, to gain degrees of what Ricoeur calls “distan-ciation” (1981, 64–65). The concept of distanciation isRicoeur’s happy substitute for the positivist concept ofobjectivity. The idea of objectivity holds that under-standing must begin with a cognitive self-emptying ofone’s prejudices and, through controlled experiment,conclude with objective propositions of states of af-fairs. Hermeneutic realism argues against the possibil-ity of these positivistic assumptions about objectivitybut contends that the inquirer can gain enough distancefrom his or her historically conditioned beginningpoint to achieve glimpses of the stable structures ofreality (kinds of regularities within the human andnatural world), even though one can never grasp themcompletely unsullied by culturally and historicallyshaped prejudgments. (p. 319)

For Browning, hermeneutical realism offers adialectical approach that moves back and forthbetween understanding and explanation. Fol-lowing Bernstein (1983) and Ricoeur (1981),Browning interprets Gadamer’s dialogical orconversational hermeneutic as including a placefor limited distanciation that allows for “de-grees of approximation to reality” (p. 319). Thismakes hermeneutical realism similar to criticalrealism (Hathaway, 2002) but with a strongercontextual awareness that “knowledge is con-structed in some sense” (p. 319). Browning alsomakes use of the critical hermeneutics of Haber-mas to challenge social practices that becomeoppressive, which offers a sociopolitical per-spective often lacking in versions of criticalrealism. Hermeneutical realism offers a per-spective “beyond relativism and objectivism,”to use the title of Bernstein’s (1983) book.Browning et al. (2000) use a hermeneutical re-alist approach to social science research, draw-ing on both quantitative and qualitative methodsin studying the relationship between religionand family dynamics in the United States.

Grassie (1994) offered a model of interdisci-plinary scholarship that parallels and comple-ments Browning’s by extending Ricoeur’s her-meneutical philosophy to the biophysical sci-ences, arguing that nature can be likened to atext and science to a reader. When any of usattempt to read the text of nature, we do so withprejudgments due to our own biophysical be-longingness with nature. Grassie develops indi-

rect or metaphoric realism as a hermeneuticalparadigm for reconciling realist and construc-tivist approaches to the natural sciences. In thefollowing section, we outline the contours of ahermeneutical realist paradigm for psychology.

Hermeneutical philosophy offers the intellec-tual resources to move beyond a particularmethod of social science research or therapeuticpractice. Browning’s approach to hermeneuticalrealism outlines the philosophical contours for asocial science research paradigm. A paradigmhas been defined as a “set of interrelated as-sumptions about the social world which pro-vides a philosophical and conceptual frame-work for the organized study of that world”(Filstead, 1979, p. 34). Denzin and Lincoln(2000) similarly defined a paradigm as “the netthat contains the researcher’s epistemological,ontological, and methodological premises” or“an interpretive framework” (p. 19). To ourknowledge, the implications of Browning’s her-meneutical realist approach have not been ap-plied to a research paradigm in psychology. Asmentioned above, previous applications of her-meneutics to psychology have tended to ad-vance strong versions of constructivism or tosimply undervalue distanciation. We considersome of the practical implications of hermeneu-tical realism.

The Inescapability of Interpretation

All social science research methods involveinterpreting data. In this sense, all social scienceresearch is hermeneutical (Hunt, 2005). Quantita-tive methods in psychology involve transforminghuman actions into numerical data for analyses,but this still requires interpreting the meaning ofthe data and the results. The ubiquity of interpre-tation does not necessitate that all interpretationsare equally valid or beneficial. Schwandt (2000)uses the term strong holism in reference to theposition that there is no way to arbitrate interpre-tations. Hermeneutical realism is consistent with aweak holism that seeks to identify effective meth-ods and normative criteria for preferable interpre-tations, even if the hermeneutical process is un-derstood as ongoing.

Reality as Discovered and Constructed

Psychological researchers frequently debatethe merits of realist versus constructivist views


of ontology (or the nature of reality and being).A more limited number of psychologists andpsychoanalysts have articulated dialectical per-spectives that view reality as both discoveredand constructed by humans, a view that reso-nates with hermeneutical realism (Bernstein,1983; Gadamer, 1989; Ricoeur, 1981). Stern(1997) invokes Winnicott’s (1971) dialecticalview of development as both given and made:“Any experience is sometimes given, some-times made, depending on how and when welook at it” (p. 3). Richardson et al. (1999) offera similar dialectical perspective in explainingHeidegger’s ontological hermeneutics: “Our na-ture or being as humans is not just somethingwe find (as in deterministic theories), nor is itsomething we just make (as in existentialist andconstructionist views); instead, it is what wemake of what we find” (p. 212).

Systems theorists Maddock and Larson(1995) also offer a dialectical model, contend-ing “humans simultaneously perceive and cre-ate their own experiences” (p. 107). Mentalmaps or interpretations of experience are shapedby both internal neuropsychological processesand external social dynamics. Human represen-tational maps are thus “continuously trans-formed by shared social experiences” (p. 109).Cushman (1995) takes the Gadamerian or dia-logical view of reality as coconstructed: “Thereis a very subtle and complex dialectic at work inhuman life: the world we are thrown into con-structs us and then we must continually recon-struct it” (p. 310). These hermeneutical realistor dialectical views of reality as both discoveredand constructed differ from many of the one-

sided constructivist views of some who haveapplied hermeneutics to psychology (e.g., Ger-gen, 1994).

Understanding and Explanation

A hermeneutical realist paradigm for psy-chology could also provide a framework forvaluing the dialectic of understanding and ex-planation that was central to Ricoeur’s herme-neutic. Grassie (1994) contends that “Explana-tion corresponds to analytic thinking in science,whereas understanding corresponds to inferen-tial, synthetic thinking. In explanation, thereader stands intentionally at a distance in orderto objectify the text, to analyze linguistic pat-terns and structures, as well as the historical,social, and psychological contexts which gaverise to a text” (p. 105). For Ricoeur (1981),“understanding is entirely mediated by thewhole of explanatory procedures which precedeit and accompany it” (p. 220). Figure 1 depictsthe ongoing hermeneutical process in Ricoeur’smodel, which moves from preunderstanding todistanciated explanation to deeper understand-ing or comprehension and appropriation (also,see Grassie, 1994, p. 108). As stated earlier,appropriation involves personalized interpretiveunderstanding and application or “making one’sown” what was formerly alien. This can lead torevised understanding as the hermeneutical pro-cess continues to evolve.

Psychological researchers and practitionersoften become divided over emphasizing eitherexplanation or understanding. Quantitative re-searchers tend to focus on explanation of parts,

Hermeneutical Process(Adapted from Grassie, 1994; based on Ricoeur, 1981)

Explanation

Distanciation

Comprehension

Appropriation

Pre-Understanding

Prejudice

Textual Data

Revised Understanding

Figure 1. Hermeneutical process (adapted from Grassie, 1994, based on Ricoeur, 1981).


whereas qualitative researchers herald under-standing wholes. Clinicians preferring explana-tion often celebrate empirically supported treat-ments and clear diagnostic taxonomies, whereasunderstanding-oriented clinicians resonate withhumanistic, narrative, and systems therapies. Adialectical approach calls into question theseoppositions.

The implications for psychological researchinvolve a valuing of both quantitative and qual-itative methods. This could include the dialec-tical approach to mixed methods research thatintentionally uses competing research para-digms, such as postpositivism and constructiv-ism, for productive triangulation (Hanson, Cre-swell, Clark, Petska, & Creswell, 2005). An-other approach is to use both quantitative andqualitative methods in an overall program ofresearch but not in the same study.

Quantitative and qualitative methods obvi-ously rest on differing criteria for validity.However, a unique feature of Ricoeur’s modeland a hermeneutical realist approach comparedwith other hermeneutics is the place for clari-fying standards of validation. Moss (1994,2004) has argued for the benefits of differingtypes of validity in educational assessment andtesting, including psychometric and hermeneu-tic approaches. One of her more interestingpoints is that a hermeneutical perspective sug-gests validity can ultimately be enhancedthrough interrater disagreement if it leads toproductive self-reflection and dialogue.

Sociology of Knowledge

Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) controversial work TheStructures of Scientific Revolutions challenged thepositivist paradigm in science by arguing that ob-servations of data are actually theory-laden andthat scientific advances are situated within theontological priority of historical contexts. Kuhncontributed toward an emphasis in postpositivistphilosophy of science on the hermeneuticalthemes of understanding and interpretation (Bern-stein, 1983). In a later work, Kuhn (1977) refers tohermeneutics by observing

What I as a physicist had to discover for myself, mosthistorians learn by example in the course of profes-sional training. Consciously or not, they are all practi-tioners of the hermeneutical method. In my case, how-ever, the discovery of hermeneutics did more thanmake history seem consequential. Its most immediate

and decisive effect was instead on my own view ofscience. (p. xiii)

Kuhn suggested that scientists typically ap-proach data influenced by the governing para-digms of their historical period. This is similarto Gadamer’s (1989) notion of prejudgments.Kuhn has been widely critiqued for his socialconstructionist view of science, which deem-phasizes ontology and suggests that pragmatismis the only criterion for scientific validity. Nev-ertheless, Kuhn exerted a major influence on thephilosophy of science by arguing for the rele-vance of the sociology of knowledge.

The sociology of knowledge also offers auseful framework for a hermeneutical realistparadigm by drawing attention to the socialembeddedness and disciplinary matrices of psy-chological discourse (Berger & Luckmann,1966; Cushman, 1995; Kuhn, 1970, 1977). Psy-chological researchers typically participate inmultiple social networks that exert influenceson knowledge generation and legitimization.Funding bodies, tenure committees, journal ed-itors, peer reviewers, and participants are only afew of the social agents that help shape theresearch of psychologists. Practitioners are like-wise influenced by their professional communi-ties or networks, including supervisors, licens-ing bodies, insurance companies, agencies, andprofessional organizations. Mentors, col-leagues, students, and clients offer even morepersonal levels of social influence on research-ers and practitioners.

Psychologists cannot avoid being influencedby traditions and the limitations of social con-texts. In fact, hermeneutical philosophers likeGadamer and Ricoeur suggest that traditions areboth helpful and limiting for knowledge gener-ation. But a hermeneutical realist paradigm canalso serve to emphasize self-awareness of one’spersonal and professional contexts and tradi-tions and the accompanying sources of bias.Moreover, psychologists might reflect on thelevels and types of diversity within those con-texts and traditions and the ways in which limitson certain types of diversity might influenceinterpretive processes.

A Hermeneutical Realist Psychology ofVirtue

We illustrate some of the benefits of a her-meneutical realist paradigm by considering the


psychology of virtue. Martin Seligman heraldedthe positive psychology movement during histerm as president of the American Psychologi-cal Association to encourage scientific researchon human strengths and virtues (Seligman &Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Researchers in vari-ous subdisciplines in psychology and other so-cial sciences had been studying humanstrengths for decades; however, Seligman didhelp galvanize and organize a more explicitpositive psychology research movement. Peter-son and Seligman (2004) developed a taxonomyof strengths and virtues to overcome the post-World War II focus on pathology in psychol-ogy. The positive psychology movement hashelped generate an excellent body of researchon virtues, mostly involving postpositivist par-adigms and quantitative methods. We wouldlike to see more of this. However, we also wantto suggest ways that a hermeneutical realistparadigm can deepen and diversify the qualityof psychological research and practice related tovirtues.

Defining Virtue

In both philosophy and contemporary psy-chology, virtues are generally understood asembodied traits of character, not simply moralbehaviors, values, or principles (Sandage &Hill, 2001). McCullough and Snyder (2000)suggest that character represents the structure ofthe human psyche that results from life experi-ence, and virtues represent specific expressionsof a person’s character. Virtues are qualities orstrengths of human development and excellencethat enhance the capacity to flourish and live lifewell, to live “the good life” (Meara, Schmidt, &Day, 1996). A virtue-oriented approach in psy-chology can provide a helpful complement tothe more cognitive and individualistic ap-proaches to moral development (Cawley, Mar-tin, & Johnson, 2000). Many cultural and reli-gious traditions also promote virtues like for-giveness as expressions of spirituality withsacred meaning (Rye & Pargament, 2002).

The differences between the terms strengthand virtue appear to still be unclear in positivepsychology literature and are used somewhatinterchangeably. Peterson and Seligman (2004)outlined seven criteria they use for their taxon-omy of strengths or virtues. To be considered astrength/virtue, a construct must be (a) trait-

like, (b) valued in its own right rather thansimply as a means to other ends, (c) commonlydesired by parents for their children, (d) culti-vated and ritualized by social institutions, (e)exemplified in real or mythical cultural rolemodels, (f) exemplified in prodigies who dem-onstrate significant levels of the strength or vir-tue, and (g) valued almost universally.

Sandage and Hill (2001) also articulated anoutline of the construct of virtue by drawing onmoral philosophy and recent social science re-search related to virtue. In contrast to Petersonand Seligman (2004) they were not trying toidentify specific criteria for a construct to beconsidered a strength or virtue. Rather, theysuggested six dimensions for the definition ofvirtue. These include the understanding that vir-tues (a) integrate ethics and health, (b) are em-bodied traits of character, (c) are sources ofhuman strength and resilience, (d) are embed-ded within a cultural context and community,(e) contribute to a sense of meaningful lifepurpose, and (f) are grounded in the cognitivecapacity for wisdom.

Virtues as Descriptive and Prescriptive

Discourse on virtues in both philosophy andpsychology tends to move back and forth be-tween descriptive and prescriptive functions.Virtues can be viewed as both prescriptive ide-als (e.g., striving to be humble as an ideal ofhuman functioning) and embodied states andtraits (e.g., present level of humility as an indi-vidual differences state and trait). A hermeneu-tical realist perspective in social science sug-gests that there is an inherent dialectical tensionbetween description and prescription that can-not be completely collapsed (Browning & Coo-per, 2004). Hermeneutical critics of positivismin psychology frequently argue that there areoften unacknowledged moral and cultural as-sumptions embedded in psychological theoriesand models of therapy (Cushman, 1995; Rich-ardson et al., 1999). Quantitative researchersreply that without descriptive empirical data tovalidate models and theories, at least partially, itis difficult to know whether ideals or prescrip-tions are worth supporting. Ricoeur’s (1986)hermeneutical philosophy suggests an ongoingprocess of ideals (what should be) challengingideologies (what is). Yet, prescriptive ideals canreadily become oppressive ideologies if not


submitted to descriptive study or if critical her-meneutics are not employed. For example,Lamb (2002) has argued that a valorizing offorgiveness can become oppressive in certaincontexts for women and others if there is animbalance of social power. In a related vein,Flanagan (1991) offered a critique of Kohl-berg’s theory of moral development for notadequately bringing theoretical formulationsinto contact with actual descriptions of folkexperiences of moral behavior. In our opinion,hermeneutical philosophy will make a lastingand substantive impact on psychology onlythrough a more robust dialectical balancing ofdescriptive and prescriptive functions.

Virtue, Epistemology, and HumanDevelopment

Virtues or character strengths represent bothdevelopmental and hermeneutical constructs.MacIntyre (1984) related character virtues tonarrative worldviews that are employed for in-terpreting life. Whether viewed prescriptivelyor descriptively, virtues are affected by contex-tual and developmental factors. And in a recur-sive fashion, virtues influence the processes ofknowing (i.e., epistemology) or interpretinglife. For example, a person who can be charac-terized as having a high level of trait compas-sion will interpret life differently from someonelow in trait compassion.

In psychology, the subdisciplines of devel-opmental and personality psychology can of-fer large bodies of data that demonstrate howindividual and contextual differences (i.e.,ontological differences) affect epistemologi-cal interpretations of life in various domains.And recursively, new experiences of knowingcan restructure developmental ontology,which is a major tenet of Kegan’s (1994)evolutionary model of human development.Applied to the construct of virtue, this recur-sive view suggests that interpretations are in-fluenced by both contextual referents and in-dividual factors, and that our interpretationsin turn serve to constitute our being (Taylor,1985). This recursive model of epistemologyand ontology challenges the views of someconstructivists or “radical epistemologists”who have downplayed ontology.

Etic and Emic Approaches to Virtue

One point of tension in the emerging positivepsychology literature is whether virtues are con-strued as universal or culturally embedded. Anetic approach emphasizes universal categoriesand taxonomies (e.g., Dahlsgaard et al., 2005;Peterson & Seligman, 2004), whereas an emicapproach emphasizes cultural particularity andquestions cross-cultural generalizability (e.g.,Lamb, 2002; Sandage, Hill, & Vang, 2003).Hermeneutically, etic and emic approaches toresearch basically map onto the categories ofexplanation and understanding, and these sets ofinterpretive stances are not necessarily mutuallyexclusive. It seems possible that a particularvirtue (e.g., wisdom, justice, gratitude, compas-sion, fortitude, or forgiveness) might be univer-sally valued, perhaps to varying degrees of pri-ority, but is still locally embedded in specificcultural institutions and rituals (Sandage &Naicker, in press). This would mean that virtueconstructs like wisdom or courage might beexpressed or even defined somewhat differentlyin various cultural contexts and communitiesbut still valued in a nearly universal fashion.This is analogous to the cross-cultural study ofpsychopathology and the way in which symp-toms of depression appear across cultures whilethe meanings associated with those symptomsare socially constructed in diverse ways. It mayprove to be that the cultural variables that arerelated to differing construals of some virtuesrepresent general worldview differences (e.g.,individualism vs. collectivism) rather than morespecific cultural demographics (e.g., Korean vs.Chinese). There is some evidence supportingthis thesis for the psychology of forgiveness(Sandage & Williamson, 2005). Cultural differ-ences in the virtues could hold important prac-tical implications for contextualizing psycho-logical interventions aimed at facilitating vari-ous developmental virtues.

Virtue Traditions

MacIntyre (1984, 1990; see also Dueck &Reimer, 2003), in his widely cited philosophicalaccount of virtue ethics, argues that virtues areembedded in traditions that provide a narrativeenvelope for particular taxonomies of virtue.MacIntyre does not engage literatures in herme-neutical philosophy, but he can be read as quite


consistent with hermeneutical emphases on ef-fective history and interpretive communal con-texts for the social practices that form virtues.He advocates what psychologists might con-sider a thick, emic approach for understandingvirtues as tradition-specific and particular ratherthan a more thin, universal, or encyclopedicapproach to virtues such as that described byDahlsgaard et al. (2005).

MacIntyre has been criticized for an idealisticview of traditions as coherent or unitary inhuman experience. Volf (1996) pointed out thatmost people are probably influenced by multi-ple cultural and religious traditions in a lessunified way than might be implied by MacIn-tyre. Traditions prescribe ideals of how to real-ize certain virtues, but the actual human practiceof those virtues might be achieved in variousways. One of the advantages of quantitativeresearch on virtues is to descriptively validateaspects of differing traditions that do predict theexpressions of certain virtues. However, Ryeand Pargament (2002) found that it is difficult toexperimentally control for the use of traditionsin practicing virtues in a mixed method studythat compared a religious and a secular groupintervention to promote forgiveness. Qualitativeanalyses revealed that some participants in theso-called “secular” group condition did draw ontheir religiosity in working on forgiveness de-spite the lack of religious content in the manu-alized intervention. Qualitative research canalso be useful for understanding thick descrip-tions of the psychology of virtues and the dif-fering moral sources people draw on in practic-ing virtues (Taylor, 1989). A hermeneutical re-alist approach can be used to work towardcontextualizing virtues to fit various contempo-rary contexts or systems (Sandage et al., 2003;Sandage & Naicker, in press; Sandage & Wil-liamson, 2005).

Ethnohermeneutics of Virtue

A hermeneutical realist paradigm for the psy-chology of virtue can also facilitate the use ofethnohermeneutics. Geertz (2003) has describedan anthropological approach called ethnoher-meneutics, which uses methodological plural-ism to interpret the indigenous hermeneutics ormeaning construction of particular groups. ButGeertz also defines the ethnohermeneutical ap-

proach as achieving an intersubjective conver-gence of horizons in that it

attempts to locate the scholar and the people understudy in each their own network of discourses, tradi-tions, texts and meanings in the context of their socialand intellectual circumstances. The result, I suggest, isa third perspective whereby the frames of reference ofthe scholar and the people under study are transcended.(p. 315)

This includes a hermeneutical approach thatmakes use of (a) taxonomic and linguistic anal-yses of texts and other data, (b) awareness ofindigenous hermeneutical practices, and (c) re-flection on the researcher’s own hermeneuticalhorizon. The study of indigenous hermeneuticalpractices involves clarifying the particular her-meneutic of a specific individual or group,which is necessary for understanding their vir-tues or ideals. An interesting example is drawnfrom Hood et al.’s (2005) analysis of religiousfundamentalism and what is perhaps their sur-prising application to the Amish. What are in-deed to the outsider puzzling markers of Amishlife (the practice of shunning, nothing beyondan eighth grade education, eschewing modernconveniences, etc.) make sense once one under-stands the Amish Ordnung or hermeneutic (theorally transmitted, biblically based, and com-munally enforced behavioral code), the funda-mental purpose of which is to protect what isperceived to be the purity of the community andto foster the development of personal characterconsistent with an understanding of that collec-tive purity.

Conclusion

In this article, we challenge psychologists toreconsider a sole allegiance to either quantita-tive or qualitative epistemologies by examiningthe potential benefits of a hermeneutical realistperspective. By proposing a dialectic of under-standing and explanation that values both quan-titative and qualitative methodologies, we con-tend that the search for broad psychologicalprinciples and processes is not undermined, butrather is enhanced. Our caution is not againstthe search for universal principles, but likeMolden and Dweck (2006), we are concernedthat without a willingness to engage the mannerin which people construct and interpret theirworld, psychological researchers will lose“sight of the person behind the process” (p.


201). We have attempted to supplement thebroad philosophical contours of a hermeneuticalperspective with specific examples and recom-mendations of how we can maintain sight ofthat person.

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Received December 12, 2006Revision received September 21, 2007

Accepted October 8, 2007 �


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