Helping Boards assess and prepare for the UK Referendum on EU ...

Helping Boards assess and prepare for the UK Referendum on EU membership

Helping Boards assess and prepare for the UK Referendum on EU membership 1

Preface

The coming Referendum on the UK’s continuing membership of the European Union (EU) is a significant moment in the country’s history. It is a fundamental decision about the UK’s role in Europe. Whatever the result, it may have impacts on all areas of life, not least for financial institutions. As such, the pressure on Boards to assess and prepare for the most likely contingencies and their implications is intense. This document is the first in a series of practical, dispassionate papers designed to help senior management address the resulting issues.

Although the Government has until December 2017 to hold the promised Referendum (and must give four months advance notice), it is looking increasingly likely that it will be held during 2016, perhaps as early as May. Both ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns are marshalling their forces and arguments and the issue will claim increasing amounts of media space and time. Between now and the Referendum date, polling data will fluctuate with each camp claiming growing support for its position. We are entering a period of particular uncertainty, notwithstanding all the other uncertainties in domestic and international affairs.

At the time of writing (January 2016) it is assumed that the Prime Minister will campaign for the UK to remain in the EU on the basis of reforms requested in his letter of 10 November 2015 to the President of the European Council

(see Section 2 — What is Brexit?). In a recent speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed the policy thus: “we want Britain to remain within a reformed European Union”. The other major political parties are also broadly supportive of remaining although the recent change of leadership in the Labour Party may eventually modify that party’s stance.

If there is a ‘Leave’ vote, it is unclear precisely what will happen or the order of events. It is unprecedented for a member state to leave the EU and the domestic and international consequences could be significant. A ‘Leave’ vote may usher in a period of considerable uncertainty with many potential options and scenarios.

This paper contains:

► A description of the Referendum process as it is currently known.

► An analysis of the potential process should the UK opt to leave the EU.

► An exploration of the options for a post EU United Kingdom.

► A practical ‘to do’ guide for Boards in the run-up to the Referendum.

► A selection of further reading and contacts.

We hope this introduction is useful, welcome comments and observations and look forward to discussing it further.

2 Helping Boards assess and prepare for the UK Referendum on EU membership

What is Brexit?

The United Kingdom has always had a complicated relationship with the EU. At a political level this has been evidenced in the UK’s perpetual ‘Opt Out’ from the euro (emulated only by Denmark from amongst the euro ‘Outs’), and remaining outside the Schengen area of borderless travel, for example.

In recent years, the opposition to the EU has become more vocal and coalesced in the growth and importance of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which at one time looked destined to win a significant number of Parliamentary and local government seats. It should be noted that an anti-Brussels party is not unique to the UK, although no significant parties elsewhere actively campaigns for outright withdrawal from the EU.

It was against this backdrop that in 2013 Prime Minister David Cameron pledged, if his Party was returned to power in the 2015 General Election, he would hold a Referendum on UK membership “by the end of 2017”. The date has still to be announced — four months’ notice is legally

required — but indications at time of writing are that it will take place in 2016, and possibly within the first half of the year, with the Prime Minister, at the December European Council meeting, setting a February deadline to conclude negotiations, with expectations he wishes to hold the referendum in June.

The fundamental question will be the one shown below. A simple majority of votes cast will be sufficient to carry the day in either direction. In the event of a ‘Remain’ vote, the UK will likely revert to ‘business as usual’. The Referendum and the associated negotiations conducted with Brussels by UK Government may usher in a change in the UK’s relationship with the EU, reform in specific areas of legislation, and arguably wider change throughout the EU. However, in that eventuality, change is likely to be slow and its direction and impact likely to be relatively predictable.

S hould the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leav e the European Union?

Remain a member of the European Union

Leave the European Union

T he Referendum q uestion

3Helping Boards assess and prepare for the UK Referendum on EU membership

In a letter (10 November 2015) to the President of the European Council, the Prime Minister outlined four principal areas of reform that the UK Government was seeking:

► Legally binding guarantees to protect the interests of non-Eurozone member states.

► “ ... A clear long-term commitment to boost the competitiveness and productivity of the European Union …”.

► A “formal, legally-binding and irreversible” end to Britain’s obligation to work towards an “ever closer union”. A strengthening of national sovereignty and new arrangements to enhance the powers of national parliaments in EU affairs.

► Changes in immigration rules specifically to “crack down on the abuse of free movement”.

There is as yet no set of procedures or a timetable for what would happen on the morning of a vote to ‘Leave’. In concrete, legalistic terms nothing would change overnight. However, more generally it may introduce a period of uncertainty and possible political and financial market volatility. Immediate results might include calls for a general election; a call by the Scottish Government (assuming the Scottish National Party is still in power in Edinburgh) for a second Referendum on Scottish independence; pressure on sterling on FX markets; changes in the UK’s credit rating and borrowing costs.

No State has yet left the EU so the precise process is uncharted territory. However, Article 50 The Treaty of Lisbon, for the first time in the history of the European Communities, sets out a legal mechanism for a Member State to leave the EU.

T reaty of L isbon ( 2 0 0 9 ) , A rtic le 5 01. Any Member State may decide to

withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. It shall be concluded on behalf of the EU by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph two, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs two and three, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council in decisions concerning it.


Following a ‘Leave’ vote, the UK might consider the following ways of a legal withdrawal from the EU.

N egotiated w ithdraw al under A rtic le 5 0 — the UK would immediately give two years’ notice of its intention to leave the EU, during which the terms of an exit would be negotiated. The decision to leave does not require the agreement of the other Member States, which cannot block or delay beyond the two year period. The EU Treaties would cease to apply to the UK on the entry into force of a withdrawal agreement or, if no new agreement is concluded, after two years (unless there is mutual agreement to extend the negotiating period).

Unilateral w ithdraw al — the UK could repeal domestic legislation, the 1972 European Communities Act, which provides the Parliamentary consent for the primacy of EU law in the UK. This option may damage the UK’s chances of agreeing a trade agreement with the EU after exit.

N egotiate before w ithdraw al — the UK government may use a ‘Leave’ vote in the Referendum as a mandate to negotiate an exit with the EU, with the legal status of the negotiations left undetermined. The UK may then trigger Article 50 once talks have concluded to validate the agreement. This may lead to demands for a second UK Referendum on the negotiated deal.


It is also at this stage totally unclear what a post Brexit UK would look like or what institutional or trading relationships it would have with the EU, and with third countries with whom the UK’s trading relationships (for example) have been formed through collective EU agreement. Commentators identify four broad possible generic models:

N orw egian/ European Ec onomic A rea ( EEA ) model: offering access to the Single Market for goods and services without having to participate in either the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or fisheries policy. The UK would have to accept free movement of labour, accept Single Market rules without any ability to participate in their creation, accede to Schengen, and make ‘solidarity payments’ to Brussels.

T urk ish model: based around a limited customs union allowing tariff free access to EU markets but with little say in drafting the rules and regulations with which the UK would have to comply to retain access. A UK version of this could be broader and deeper than the arrangements with Turkey (which were designed originally with eventual Turkish accession to the EU in mind) and would be particularly complex in respect of financial services especially with the advent of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Financial Transaction Tax (FTT).

T he bespok e model: similar to the so-called ‘Swiss-model’, the UK would negotiate and agree a bilateral deal with the EU covering such elements as reciprocal product market access, financial services, travel and immigration. It may include elements from the other three principal models. The negotiations for such a custom-tailored deal would be complex, and the two years envisaged in Article 50 may well be optimistic.

T he W orld T rade O rganisation M odel ( W T O ) : under which the UK simply applies the normal trading rules of the WTO. This would imply tariffs on various goods and services, non- tariff barriers, and quite possibly UK reaction in kind to EU goods and services. Services, including financial services, would not be covered and would most likely require separate negotiation. It would however, exempt the UK from most EU regulations and policies.

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Any withdrawal and negotiation process remains unclear. The UK could be left with an uncertain relationship with the EU for some time, as any domestic political repercussions are worked through and further dialogue with the EU held.


It is hard to predict the outcome of the proposed Referendum and at the time of writing (January 2016) difficult to attempt to describe and model the implications of the numerous possible scenarios which would flow from a vote to leave the EU. These will have general implications for all financial institutions but will also vary greatly depending on the firm’s particular business model, governance and organisation structures and degree of exposure to EU markets outside the UK. Whilst likely to be less disruptive and problematic, a ‘Remain’ vote does not imply ‘no change at all’, although the pace of that change is likely to be more gradual and its nature more predictable.

It would also be imprudent to conclude that a vote to remain within the EU is certain, and all organisations should, at the very least, consider carefully what immediate impact a ‘Leave’ vote and eventual Brexit might have on their business. Depending on the business model, for some the first order effects may be relatively inconsequential for others they could be more profound. At the very least, a firm needs to consider the potential significant impacts, and build in sufficient optionality and flexibility in its plans to ensure it is not caught at a disadvantage should a vote to leave ensue.

On the assumption that the Referendum will be held within the next 12 months, and in all likelihood sooner, Boards should consider undertaking the following actions to equip themselves soundly for that period:

► Appointing a senior Executive and a small task force to be responsible for monitoring Brexit, identifying issues and concerns, briefing the Board and Board committees, undertaking specific analyses, and putting in place a skeleton framework, task list and timetable for a significant piece of work should there be a ‘Leave ‘ result in the Referendum.

► If it exists, it would be worthwhile reviewing any work undertaken to prepare for the eventuality of Scottish independence, both to reduce Brexit work, and because the question would likely again become a live issue in the event of a ‘Leave’ vote for the UK. It may be prudent to consider the preparation of a ‘Headline Impact Analysis’ to ensure the Board is briefed and prepared.

Firms should compile a full list of specific concerns relevant to them, review the principal elements, and analyse the significance of potential change — either positive or negative — for their businesses. It should not be assumed that Brexit would usher in a relaxation of the regulatory architecture, and indeed in some areas, the UK regulatory authorities may decide to apply a more rigorous regime than that currently applied by Brussels.

A ny analy sis might w ell c onsider the follow ing:

P ublic stanc e: as the pace and volume of campaigning picks up, it will be essential for the firm to decide what its public stance will be.

Questions to consider include:

► Associated with the ‘Remain’ campaign and the bodies promoting it or participating in the ‘Leave’ campaign? Publicly neutral and keeping its counsel?

► Will the firm’s stance be consistent with the public face of bodies and associations of which it is a member, and does it wish those bodies to speak on its behalf?

► In addition, to an overall policy, is there also a requirement for a set of guidelines for Board members, Directors and employees particularly in respect of public utterances associated with the Firm?

Key preparatory questions


► What is the firm’s overall communications strategy? Will the firm seek to engage directly with Government or stand alone?

Employ ment/ HR: Brexit will challenge the principle of free movement of labour and the benefits open to non-national residents, and could signal a gradual move to a UK that is less open to the employment of foreign nationals, regardless of country of origin. Firms will need to consider:

► Any EU citizens working in the UK may no longer have this automatic right, likewise any UK citizens based in the EU.

► Travel between the UK and the EU could become more cumbersome, particularly for business travellers.

T ax ation: currently EU Member States largely retain control of their own taxation systems, although they are required to exercise their power to tax consistently with EU law. EU influence is arguably extending with recent proposals in relation to the common consolidated corporate tax base and the EU FTT, both of which the UK has objected to. Firms would need to consider the following potential changes to current business activity:

► The main areas of EU influence are in relation to indirect taxes, particularly VAT and excise duties which are the most harmonised. Whilst Brexit would have no immediate impact on UK tax law, the UK would have greater freedom to amend the law in the future without the EU constraints.

► However, the UK would still be subject to other international influences on the UK tax system, most notably the OECD which has driven the recent agreement on automatic exchange of information, and is currently driving the project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).

► Financial institutions currently using beneficial tax structures in jurisdictions such as Luxembourg or the Republic of Ireland would need to monitor developments very closely indeed under any form of Brexit scenario.

► The precise status of, and implications for, activities based in or emanating from the Channel Islands would also require specific study.

Non-financial specific regulation: there are at least 153 separate pieces of specific legislation that the UK government may have to renegotiate with the EU in fields as diverse as intellectual property and brand rights, climate change, employment law and product specifications. There is also a whole body of law emanating from Brussels and the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) arising from the UK’s 40 years in the EU which are incorporated in UK law.

There would almost certainly have to be bespoke transitional arrangements put in place if the UK were to leave the EU and it is difficult to speculate on which specific laws and regulations would be repealed, reformed or retained, and the consequential implications.

It would be prudent however, to review financial documentation and major contracts. In addition, a jurisdictional analysis of booking entry locations would be a worthwhile precaution.

Risk management and disc losure: Brexit could pose general and specific risks to financial institutions which should be included in the firm’s risk register and monitored by the relevant Risk committees. It is possible that extra disclosure and commentary in financial reporting and such filings as the SEC Forms 20F or 10K will be required even at this stage.


The financial regulatory environmentThere are some 40 legislative proposals and accompanying radical institutional reforms primarily affecting financial institutions either on the statute books or currently in the works, each of which may be repealed, modified, or remain intact as a result of Brexit. Significant legislation to consider in light of a Brexit would be:

► Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)

► Bank Recovery & Resolution Directive (BRRD)

► Banking Union package (Single Supervisory Mechanism, BRRD, Deposit Guarantee scheme)

► Capital Markets Union (CMU)

► Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)

► Central clearing rules

► EU benchmark regulation

► European Long Term Investment Fund (ELTIF)

► European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

► Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP)

► Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD)

► Interchange bank fees

► Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II)

► Money market funds regulation

► Packaged Retail Investment and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs)

► Payment Services Directive (PSD)

► Resolution and recovery for Central Counter-Parties (CCP)

► Securities financing transactions regulation

► Shareholders’ Rights Directive II

► Solvency II

It is unlikely that the UK authorities would abandon the substance of Basel III/CRD IV, and capital and liquidity requirements for banks based in the UK are likely to be similar, if not tougher, than those applying to EU domiciled institutions. It is unlikely that there would be material change in the identity or scope of supervisory activities under any scenario, but the application of Resolution measures (say to the euroland subsidiary of a UK domiciled institution via the SSM) could be problematic.


O rganisational and business strategy — whilst it is difficult at this stage to identify just what relationship an exited UK would have with the EU (and with the rest of the world for that matter) and how long it would be before the broad outlines became clear (likely to be at least two years), there may be potentially profound effects for many organisations. These will need to be considered against the background of the attractiveness of the UK as a base for business, irrespective of specific EU considerations.

Since major strategic decisions — the location of significant business activities for example — require a long term perspective, the ‘Brexit factor’ will need to be included in the calculations of all significant and material business decisions at least up until the result of the Referendum is known. This will include:

► D omic ile Particularly for a UK institution with significant activities overseas especially within the EU, and especially if the UK surrenders passporting rights into the EU. For non-UK institutions, an outright exit from the UK may be an option.

► G roup struc ture The precise configuration of branch, subsidiary and HQ presences within the UK, EU, and elsewhere. This may require preparations to create new subsidiaries either in the UK or EU or to transfer staff and activities between locations. It may involve creating a new corporate structure, for example by establishing a new business/holding company within the Eurozone, and optimizing legal entity relationships.

► O perations The location of major trading, booking, distribution and back office activities. Some institutions have already decided to locate some operations outside of the UK (in Ireland or Poland for example) partly to take advantage of more favorable

tax or unit labour cost considerations, but also presumably to give greater flexibility in the event of Brexit.

► S trategy

► For firms whose activities are largely or wholly confined to the UK market, the first order effects of Brexit are likely to be minimal, although second order effects, such as macro-economic impacts (either positive or negative) will need to be borne in mind.

► For firms with an international trading model, particularly one in which the EU/Eurozone figures prominently, the sustained validity of the current business model under Brexit conditions will need to be thoroughly analysed.

Depending on the degree of market access negotiated between the UK and EU Commission in the event of Brexit, Firms’ physical and virtual access to EU/Eurozone markets could range from problematic to practical exclusion for a UK entity. Certain activities, such as euro clearing, might become impractical from a UK base under a Brexit scenario.

► D ata retention and transmission between UK and EU based operations may require reconsideration. Organisations hosting UK data in an EU country may need to repatriate them in the event of Brexit and vice versa. UK rights from agreements and frameworks such as the EU-US Safe Harbour Privacy Principles would potentially be at risk. The status of ‘offshore activities’ (i.e., those outside the EU, including the UK) providing goods and services to firms within the EU would come under scrutiny and may be subject to restriction.


Key contacts

A ndy Baldw in Managing Partner, EMEIA Financial Services

Tel: + 44 20 7951 4626 Email: [email protected]

O mar A li Managing Partner, UK Financial Services


Robert C ubbage Partner, UK Banking & Capital Markets leader



D av id Bark er Managing Partner, EMEIA Financial Services — Transaction Advisory Services


G areth L ambert Partner, Financial Services Advisory


P hilip M iddleton Senior Advisor, Central Banking



Appendix


Timeline

The UK has been a member of the EU since 1973, having previously been a part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Since subscribing to the EU’s acquis communautaire (EU community law), the UK has secured a number of opt-outs, concessions, and rebates; its relationship with the European institutions is slightly more bespoke compared with other EU Member States.

EFTA is launched as competitor to EEC by UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.1960

UK applies to join EEC. Vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle.1961

UK holds Referendum on EEC membership as a result of new Labour Government under Harold Wilson, who renegotiates EEC terms before putting vote to public. Vote is 67% in favour on 65% turnout.

1975

Margaret Thatcher wins budget rebate to take account of larger CAP subsidies paid on the continent.1984

Maastricht Treaty comes into force creating EU and paving way for monetary union and social policy. UK does not have a Referendum but receives opt outs; Denmark receives opt outs following a Referendum. French Referendum result is 50.4% in favour.

1993

National currencies are replaced by euro coins and notes in 12 EU countries.2002

New EU constitution signed by heads of states but France and Netherlands reject it in referendums.2004

Conservative Government legislate to hold EU Referendum by end of 2017.2015

Single European Act comes into force, modifying Treaty of Rome by removing national vetos and makes commitment for member states to create ‘European Union’.1987

Ireland and UK receive opt outs from Schengen acquis (community law); Denmark receives opt out from Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).

1997

Treaty of Rome creates European Economic Community (EEC) comprising Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands.1957

French President Charles de Gaulle no longer in office UK (under Heath), Denmark and Ireland join EEC.1973

Treaty of Lisbon replaces European Constitution. Article 50 sets out for the first time how Member States can leave the EU. Poland and UK secure opt outs from Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU.

2009


EU Referendum campaigns

There are two major campaigns organisations which have been established in the UK on both sides of the debate. Further to these two organisations, a number of other campaigns groups exists, which are either to run their own campaigns (such as a Labour campaign led by Alan Johnson; Conservatives for Britain led by Nigel Lawson), or outline an individual position (such as Trade Unions, lobbies, and pressure groups). Under the Referendum rules, only one group on each side can receive formal endorsement from the Electoral Commission. Such recognition would allow up to £7m of expenditure including £600,000 of public grants.

Britain Stronger in Europe Vote Leave

Management ► Chairman: Lord Stuart Rose (Conservative, former chair M&S)

► CEO: Will Straw

► Treasurer: Roland Rudd

► CEO: Matthew Elliott (ran the No2AV campaign)

► Three treasurers: Peter Cruddas (Con), John Mills (Lab), Stuart Wheeler (UKIP)

► Campaign Director: Dominic Cummings

Key Messages Single Market access to UK’s largest trading partner and jobs

International influence as a bloc

Freedom of movement of capital, people, labour, services

National sovereignty and reclaiming of parliamentary powers

Border control and reduction of immigration and ‘benefit tourism’

Trade and influence with the wider world

Main supporters

Cross-party group including Lord Mandelson, Tony Blair, Ken Clarke, Damian Green (Con), Danny Alexander, Lord Ashdown

Cross-party group of MPs and peers from the Con., Lab. and UKIP. Announced the backing of more than 20 prominent business people

Financial backers

Largest donor is Lord Sainsbury of Turville, who has provided at least half of the set-up financing so far

Funded by individuals of different party affiliations: Tory donor Peter Cruddas, Labour’s biggest private financial backer John Mills and Stuart Wheeler, a Tory-turned-UKIP donor

Website www.strongerin.co.uk www.voteleavetakecontrol.org


Parliamentary process

The Conservative Party’s pledge to hold a Referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU in January 2013 initiated a process to pass a Bill in Parliament to authorise it. Following the required readings and committee reviews in the House of Commons, the Bill currently sits with the House of Lords.

The Bill receives its Second Reading, passing by 304 votes to none after almost all Labour MPs and all Liberal Democrat MPs abstain.

The Bill clears the Commons, but is rejected by the House of Lords a month later.

Conservative Party win a majority of seats in general election; Cameron reiterates his pledge to hold an In-Out Referendum by 2017, after negotiating a new settlement for UK in the EU.

The planned Referendum is referred to in the Queen’s Speech, and an EU Referendum Bill 2015–16 is introduced to the Commons.

Conservative Government legislate to hold EU Referendum by end of 2017. Labour (under Harman) back a Referendum before 2017; Liberal Democrats oppose.

Third Commons reading of the Bill, before being passed to the Lords.

Second reading, and first, second, third Lords Committee sittings of the Bill, which currently sits at the Report stage.

First and second Commons Committee sittings of the EU Referendum Bill.

An alternative Bill is presented, but is unable to progress before the Dissolution of Parliament in March 2015.

Conservatives publish a draft EU Referendum Bill.

The draft legislation is taken forward as a Private Member’s Bill and read to the House of Commons.

David Cameron promises to negotiate a more favourable EU membership for the UK, before holding a Referendum.

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May 2013

June 2013

July 2013

Nov 2013

May 2015

June 2015

Sep 2015

Jul — Oct 2014

Oct — Nov 2015

TBC: third reading to the Lords, Consideration of Amendments, and Royal Assent before the Act is passed.


Key Publications on the Brexit Debate

Below is a selection of key material published by think tanks, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and government institutions in the run up to the Referendum. Other material is available.

P ublished by T itle D ate

Policy Network What would ‘out’ look like? Nov–15

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

Brexit to Nowhere: The Foreign Policy consequences of ‘Out’

Nov–15

The Economist Better off in or out? Oct–15

TheCityUK EU reform: Time for Change Oct–15

Bank of England The European Union, monetary and financial stability, and the Bank of England

Oct–15

Global Counsel Brexit: the impact on the UK and the EU Jun–15

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)

Brexit: Views from Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw

May–15

Bertelsmann Stiftung Brexit — potential economic consequences if the UK exits the EU

May–15

Open Europe What if ... ? The consequences, challenges and opportunities facing Britain outside the EU

Mar–15

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)

Brexit: Directions for Britain outside the EU Feb–15

Policy Network The Risk Of Brexit: Britain and Europe in 2015 Jan–15

UK Government Review of the balance of competences between the UK and the EU

Dec–14

Business for Britain Change or Go Aug–14

Centre for European Reform

The consequences of Brexit for the City of London

May–14

LSE Centre for Economic Performance

Brexit or Fixit? The Trade and Welfare Effects of Leaving the European Union

May–14

House of Commons Leaving the EU: Research Paper Jul–13


Notes

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