Hegel’s Logic, An Essay in Interpretation, J. G. Hibben, 1902

8/14/2019 Hegels Logic, An Essay in Interpretation, J. G. Hibben, 1902

1/331


2/331

193 H46zhi 62-23059HibbenHegel's logic

193 H46zhi 62-23059HibbenHegel's logic


3/331

MAY4S 19S8


4/331


5/331

HEGEL'S LOGIC


6/331

BOOKS BYJOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

HEGEL'S "LOGIC." An Essayin Interpretation. 12mo.$1.25 net.

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSO-PHY. An Introduction to theStudy of Philosophy. 12mo.$1.00.

INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 12mo.$1.50.


7/331

HEGEL'S LOGIC

AN ESSAY IN INTEBPRETATION

BTJOHN" GEIEE HIBBEN, Pn.D.

STTTABT PEOFBSSOa OF LOGIC IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

]


8/331

COPYRIGHT, 1902, BYCHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

PCULISHED NOVEMBER, 1902,

J. 8, Gushing & Co.- Berwick k SmithNorwood Mass. U.S.A.


9/331

J. D. H.Drei Scliwestern, Giite, Heiterkeit, Verstand,Da hast zu Deinen Parzen sie erkoren ;Sie siad's, die weben Deines Lebens Band,

HEGEL.


10/331


11/331

PREFACEIN his Logic Hegel has endeavored to incor-

porate the essential principles of philosophywhich in the development of the world's thoughthave forced themselves upon men's convictions,and have been attested by a general consensusof opinion. An insight into the Hegelian sys-tem means, therefore, a comprehensive and ap-preciative grasp of the history of philosophy inthe salient features of its progress. The Logicserves also as an excellent introduction to themore specific study of German philosophy whichhas been most profoundly affected by the writ-ings of Hegel, both in the philosophical schoolswhose doctrines have been grounded confess-edly upon Hegelian principles, and also amongthose which represent a radical reaction againstHegel. Moreover, the system of philosophy asoutlined in the Logic is not merely a speculativesystem of abstract thought, but is at the sametime an interpretation of life in all the fulnessof its concrete significance. Upon these con-siderations, therefore, it is evident that aknowledge of the Hegelian system must prove


12/331

PBEFACBof inestimable value to the student of philoso-phy. Unfortunately the proverbial obscurityof Hegel has deterred many from undertakinga systematic study of his works. It is my con-viction that the text of the Logic is self-illumi-nating. It has been my endeavor, therefore,to simplify all technical terms and explain theirsignificance in the light of the definitions asgiven by Hegel himself, and as indicated inthe context where such terms severally occur.There has been throughout an attempt to renderintelligible the fundamental Hegelian doctrinesby means of simple statement and illustration.The method of interpretation has grown out ofthe belief that the best commentary upon Hegelis Hegel himself. The basis of this expositionhas been the Logic of the lEncyldopadie. der phi-losophiscJien Wissenscliaften, Hegel's Werke, VI.During the preparation of this volume I havereceived valuable suggestions from my friend,Professor Creighton of Cornell University, towhom I gladly express my indebtedness.

j. a. H.PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,October 6, 1902.


13/331

CONTENTSINTRODUCTION

CHAPTER PAGEI. THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY . 3

II. THE VARIOUS ATTITUDES OF THOUGHT TO-WARDS THE OBJECTIVE WORLD. THEMETAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS .... 23

III. THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL .... 38IV. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY .... 45V. THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE . 61VI. A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC . . 68

PART ITHE DOCTRINE OF BEING

VII. QUALITY 85VIII. QUANTITY 105IX. MEASURE 119

PART IITHE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

X. THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE IN ITS GENERALFEATURES ....... 135XL ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE . 148

XII. APPEARANCE, OR THE PHENOMENAL WORLD 167XIII. ACTUALITY, OR THE REAL WORLD . . 183

is.


14/331

X CONTENTSPABT III

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTIONCHAPTER PAGB3XIV. THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION . 205XV. THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION .... 215XVI. THE OBJECTIVE NOTION .... 249XVII. THE IDEA on THE ETERNAL REASON . . 269XVIII. THE RELATION OF THE LOGIC TO THE PHI-

LOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE PHILOSOPHYOF MIND 288

APPENDIXA GLOSSARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL

TERMS IN HEGEL'S LOGIC ..... 295INDEX 309


15/331

INTBODUCTION


16/331

Von der Grbsse und JWacht des Qeistes Tcann derJtfensch nicJit gross genug denJcen. Das verscJilosseneWesen des Uhiversums hat 7cei?ie Kraft in sicli,welclie dem MutUe, des JSrlkennens 'Widerstand leistenTcdnnte, es muss sic7i vor ifim auftJiun und seinenReicUtliu'm und seine Tiefen Him vor ^4.^igen legenund gum Gfenusse bringen.


17/331

INTRODUCTIONCHAPTER ITHE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

HEGEL'S Logic is not a logic in the formaland restricted sense in which that termis usually understood, as the science or the artof reasoning. It has a far larger scope, embrac-ing as it does a complete system of philosophyin itself. Philosophy, according to Hegel, is ascience of things in a setting of thoughts ; it isthe science of the universe as it is interpretedby thought, and as it has significance for themind which observes the wealth of its variedmanifestation. The intelligence which contem-plates the universe finds therein a like intelli-gence revealing itself, as face answereth to facein a glass. That intelligence which character-izes the observing mind and the world whichis the object of the observation is one and thesame. In order to understand the essentialfeatures of the Hegelian system, it is neces-sary to appreciate at the beginning the funda-


18/331

4 INTRODUCTIONmental characteristics of the intelligence whichconstitutes its centre and core.With Hegel thought, whether manifested in

the activity of mind or revealed in the orderand harmony of the universe, has four distinc-tive features.

It is essentially active and never passive.The mind is not to be regarded as a plasticmedium upon which impressions are producedby the varied stimulation of the several senses.The mind is not a photographic plate to holdwhatever may be printed upon it and then togive back upon demand whatever it may havereceived. Thought is the rather to be conceivedas a force, a dynamic centre. Its function is con-structive. The creative and sustaining sourc6of the universe is a thought force; and thethought activity which we are conscious of ex-ercising partakes of the same nature.The second function of thought is to trans-mute the crude material given by the sensesinto a systematic body of knowledge. Out ofa chaos of sensations, perceptions, feelings, andthe like, thought builds up an orderly cosmos.To extend the figure already employed, thoughtinterprets the world in a series of portraitsrather than photographs. And as an interpre-


19/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 5tation by means of a portrait always involvesan ideal element, so in the interpretation ofthe world of thought there is always an idealelement. But the introduction of an ideal ele-ment does not render the interpretation unreaLOn the contrary, whenever a superficial view ofthe world gives place to a deeper insight, whenthought like the great creative Spirit broodsover it, we are persuaded that the change whichis wrought by thought brings us nearer to theheart and truth of things themselves.

It is of the nature of thought in the thirdplace to seek the universal significance of everyparticular experience by which it is confronted.The animal lives and moves and has its beingin the midst of particular experiences, and itdoes not possess the capacity of reflecting uponthem, or possesses it in a very restricted manner.^Reflection, which is the characteristic mode ofthought, may be defined as the reference of aparticular experience to its appropriate univer-sal. Man as the reflective animal alone pos-sesses this power of seeing things in theiiuniversal aspect. It is often said that mandiffers from the animal in that he is endowedwith a conceptual capacity, that is, the capacityto form universal ideas. Thus when one says,


20/331

6 INTRODUCTION" This is a man, a dog, a horse," etc., he is sim-ply referring the particular object of perceptionwhich occupies the centre of the field of visionfor the moment to the appropriate class or groupor kind to which it belongs. Such a group orclass idea is a concept and has always a univer-sal significance, and all of our assertions containsome such reference to a universal. Moreover,language itself as the vehicle of thought is asystem of symbols which represent universalideas, and which thought employs for the pur-pose of a complete characterization of particularexperiences which must remain without meaninguntil they are properly interpreted in the lightof their universal relations.

In the fourth place, every thought referencecarries with it a consciousness of the Ego, orthe personality which makes the reference.Every conscious thought process, however sim-ple, and however relatively unimportant, is initself the declaration of a free personality.Wherever there is thought, there is person-ality, according to Hegel's fundamental dictum.Therefore the intelligence which is so variouslymanifested in the world about us bespeaks anall-embracing Ego, which is the great universaland to which all separate Egos are to be referred


21/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 7as individuals to their corresponding genus.Such an Ego, as a cosmic centre, gives unityto the activities of all personalities throughoutthe universe, comprehending all in one system,which in every part, however minute, is charac-terized by intelligence.Such being the nature of thought in general,a dynamic, constructive, interpretative, and per-

sonal force, we will now examine its functionsmore in detail. Occupying as it does the cen-tral place in the Hegelian system, it is necessaryat the outset to understand fully Hegel's con-ception of thought activity. It is obvious thatthought manifests its activity in numerous ways.In the reference of the individual experience toits appropriate universal there is an incalculablenumber of universals, as various as the manifoldpossibilities of the world of experience itself.In this connection there is a question whichnaturally suggests itself, and which is also oneof the fundamental problems of philosophy,"Are there not in thought a certain definitenumber of comprehensive universals to whichall others may be referred, and which will serveto mark off well-defined areas of knowledge ormodes of thought, so that when we speak of theworld of knowledge these divisions may be re-


22/331

8 INTRODUCTIONgarded as constituting the great continents ofthought?"

Such large divisions of our knowledge arecalled categories (die Denklestimmungen).The original meaning of category is found in.the Greek verb KaTrjyopelv, to predicate, that is,the categories are the possible ways one canpredicate various attributes of any subject, sothat together they form a natural classification ofthe most comprehensive themes of our think-ing. They indicate the different ways in whichthe mind can view the world of experience.They are to be regarded as the typical modes ofthought.As an illustration, we may take the table ofthe categories, as outlined by Aristotle, whichis as follows :

1. Substance.2. Quantity.3. Quality.4. Relation.5. Action.6. Passion (i.e. the object of action).7. Where (i.e. space).8. When (i.e. time).9. Posture.

10. Habit.


23/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 9When we have described anything as regards itssubstance, how large it is, what its nature is, itsrelations to other things, how it acts, how it isacted upon, its space and time conditions, itsposture and its habit, then we have well-nighexhausted the possibilities of description.

Hegel's system of philosophy as contained inhis logic may be appropriately styled a naturalhistory of the categories, being essentially anexposition of their nature, their relations, andthe mode of their development. The main doc-trines of the logic concerning the categoriesmay be summarized briefly as follows :The categories are not to be regarded as sepa-rate and isolated points of view. They sustainsuch reciprocal relations that together they forma single and harmonious system. This system,moreover, partakes of the nature of a series, inwhich the several terms may be grouped in theorder of their progressive complexity, the firstterm being the simplest, and the succeedingterms more and more complex. Every term alsocontains two kinds of elements, the explicit andthe implicit. Explicitly every term is the resultof all the terms which precede it, and implicitlyit is the potential of all which are to follow.

It is the nature both of thought itself, and


24/331

10 INTBODUCTIOKalso of things as interpreted by thought, thatwhen we start at the lowest category whereknowledge is reduced to a minimun, i.e. theleast that can be possibly predicated of any-thing, there is a natural constraint of the mindto pass on to a higher category, a higher level ofthought, in order to complete the defects and toremove the limitations of the lower ; and so onand on, until the highest possible category isreached which will comprehend and explain allthe others. This movement of thought isoccasioned by the circumstance that the mindrevolving about itself in the sphere of a singlecategory is always confronted by two disquiet-ing considerations. It is never satisfied with aresult that is partial, and it will not tolerate acontradiction or inconsistency. Hence arisesthis inner constraint to transcend the limits ofthe single category in question, that is, a partialpoint of view, in order to overcome its defectsand contradictions. This progressive movementof thought is called the dialectic, and is the dis-tinctive feature of the Hegelian method in theconstruction of his system of philosophy.The term "dialectic " originates in the ancient

Greek philosophy, probably with the old EleaticZeno, and it has been made familiar in the teach-


25/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 11ings of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato. Thelatter recall to mind a picture of two disputants,the one maintaining a proposition, the otheropposing it, while out of the discussion thereemerges a more exact and adequate statement oftruth. This is, in substance, the method ofHegel : the examination of a positive statementor thesis, which is confronted by an opposedstatement or antithesis, and out of the oppositionthere results a synthesis, which is a resolution ofthe existing contradiction upon a higher planeof thought. Upon the same level or from thesame point of view contradictory statementsmust ever remain obstinately irresoluble; it isonly in a higher sense that they can be regardedas half truths combining to form truth entire.Such a synthesis, therefore, always represents aprogress in thought, an advance to a higherpoint of view, a more comprehensive survey, adeeper insight, a wider prospect.

In order to understand the dialectic method,the following observations must be carefullyconsidered :The first stage, that of the so-called thesis, is

designated by Hegel as the stage of the abstractunderstanding ; the second, the antithesis, whichis a representation of the incompleteness of the


26/331

12 INTRODUCTIONfirst by showing its obverse side, is known as thatof the negative reason ; the third, the synthesis,is known as the speculative stage, or that ofpositive reason.The terms which are here employed theabstract understanding, the negative reason,and the positive reason are used in a sensepeculiar to Hegel. There is a fundamentaldistinction drawn between abstract and con-crete, a distinction which runs through theentire philosophical system of Hegel. Abstractis used always in the sense of a one-sided orpartial view of things. Concrete, on the otherhand, is used to indicate a comprehensive viewof things which includes all possible considera-tions as to the nature of the thing itself, itsorigin, and the relations which it sustains ; itis the thing plus its setting.The first of the three stages is referred to also

as the product of the understanding (der Ver-stand), the second and third, as that of the nega-tive and positive reason (die Vernunftf) respec-tively. There is evidently a distinction drawnbetween the understanding and the reason.Hegel does not intend to leave the impres-sion, however, that there is a certain definitefaculty of the mind which we call the under-


27/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 13standing, and still another quite distinct whichwe call the reason. Such a view fails whollyto grasp his meaning. Hegel maintains thatthe mind works as it were upon two levels,a lower and a higher, and yet one and thesame mind withal. Upon the lower certainconsiderations are overlooked which are thecharacteristic and essential features of thehigher. Upon the lower level, that of the under-standing, the mind employs one of its functionsto the exclusion of the rest; namely, that ofdiscrimination, the seeing of things in theirdifferences, and therefore as distinct, separate,and isolated, out of relation to other thingsand to the unitary system which embracesthem all. While, therefore, the function of theunderstanding may be regarded as a processof differentiation, that of the reason is essen-tially a process of integration. Reason is thesynthetical power of thought. It is the put-ting of things together in their natural rela-tions. The reason takes note, it is true, of thedifferences which are in the world of experience,and yet nevertheless is capable of apprehendingthe unity which underlies these differences. Itsees things not as apart and separate, but ascohering in systems, and the distinct systems


28/331

14 INTRODUCTIONthemselves as forming one all-comprehendingsystem, the universe itself.

It is evident, therefore, that the understand-ing and the reason are not necessarily antitheti-cal terms. The work of the understanding ispreliminary to that of the reason. Where theyappear, as they often do in the Logic, as antago-nistic, it is the false view of the understandingwhich is the object of the Hegelian scorn ; namely,that view which regards the offices of the under-standing as complete in themselves, and needingno higher operation of the mind to supplementor correct them.

It is the office of the negative reason to makemanifest the limitations of the understandingand the contradictions which every one-sidedand partial view of things necessarily involves.The office of the positive reason, on the otherhand, is to make good the defects which thenegative reason reveals. In this connectionHegel employs two technical terms which ap-pear frequently in the development of his sys-tem. They are negation and absolute negation.By negation is to be understood this process ofnegative reason which results in the denial ofthe primary thesis. By absolute negation ismeant the overcoming in turn of this first con-


29/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 15tradiction by an assertion which denies it andwhich involves a higher point of view. Thisis equivalent to a negation of a negation, whichhas the force always of an affirmation. Duplexnegatio affirmat. The three steps of the dialectic,therefore, are affirmation, negation, then a nega-tion of this negation which is itself an affirma-tion. It is to be observed, moreover, that theterm " dialectic " is used in two senses in Hegel,a general and a special sense. In the formersense it designates the threefold process ofthought as a whole, which has just been out-lined. In its special use it is applied merelyto the second or negative stage of the process,

the limiting of the original statement throughits contradiction.The antithesis, moreover, which opposes in

thought the primary thesis is not a chance con-fronting of a statement by another which hap-pens to oppose it. The contradiction is neverexternal, artificial, or arbitrary, but is one whichgrows out of the very nature of the originalthought itself. Every thought which is one-sided, thereby of necessity involves its owncontradiction. From the very fact that it isfinite and therefore incomplete, it must at somepoint or other prove inadequate, and therefore


30/331

16 INTRODUCTIONfall of its own weight. It cannot support itself,nor can it justify itself. Thus, to use an illus-tration of Hegel, we say that man is mortal,and seem to think that the ground of this mor-tality lies in the external circumstances whichconstantly surround and menace him; but thetrue view of the matter is that life in its verynature as life involves the germ of death, andso the life of a finite creature being essentiallyat war with itself works its own dissolution.This dialectic may be seen in the common prov-erb summum jus, summa injuria ; that is, to pushan abstract right to its extreme is to pass in-sensibly to its contradictory, and to cause inreality injustice rather than justice. So alsoHegel draws attention to the fact that in thesphere of politics extreme anarchy passes overinto its opposite extreme despotism; and that inthe sphere of ethics the following proverbs attestthe same general principle, " Pride goeth be-fore a fall " and " Too much wit outwits itself."The dialectic finds further illustration in

the history of philosophy itself, wherein theseveral systems of thought are confronted eachby its opposed system, while out of the contro-versies which ensue there emerges a more com-plete system which combines the truth and


31/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 17discards the errors, which each of the conflictingsystems contained. Such a process is repeatedagain and again in the gradual developmentof the fulness of truth which only centuriesof controversy and of experience are able toreveal.We have referred thus far to the method bywhich Hegel proposes to construct the world ofknowledge, and to show how part is related topart throughout, and all parts to the whole in aprogressive development wherein every advancemarks a growing completeness of knowledge.But this is but one-half of his system ; forHegel maintains, as one of the cardinal doc-trines of his philosophy, that the laws of thoughtare at the same time the laws of things, and thatthe categories of thought correspond preciselywith the determining characteristics of things.The rational system of thought is with himequivalent to the true philosophy of all being.Thus with him epistemology and ontology areone ; the secret of the mind is the secret of theuniverse. Man as a rational being is veritablya microcosm. " Know thyself and all is knowrr."This is all summarily expressed in the Hegeliandictum, " The real is the rational, and the ra-tional is the real." This is in accord with the


32/331

18 INTRODUCTIONdoctrine of Spinoza, who affirms that "theorder and concatenation of ideas is the same asthe order and concatenation of things." 1 Hegelregards the cosmos and the cosmic processes asthe manifestation of reason. Moreover, it is ofthe essence of reason to manifest itself in the ob-jective world. Eeason has two .sides, a thoughtside and a force side, a rational and a dynamicessence, and these two are one. Reason is tobe regarded, therefore, as underlying all thoughtsand all things. In the physical world the lawsof phenomena finding expression in mathemati-cal formulae represent the thought side of rea-son ; the phenomena themselves are but theparticular manifestations of these laws, the con-crete and dynamic realization of the reason im-plicit in them. Every individual thing in theuniverse must be regarded as having some uni-versal law or principle of reason as the very rootand substance of its being, attributes and activi-ties. This universal principle of reason is thecreative and constructive force of the universe.It is seen in the architectonic principle which isthe soul of the plant, in the creative and sustain-ing power in the animal and in man, in theformation of character, in the building of insti-

1 Spinoza, Ethics, II, p. 7.


33/331


34/331

20 INTRODUCTIONas the manifestation in its various phases ofthe all-embracing reason, and all history as anevolution of this reason in the progressive un-folding of its inner activity. This idealism is,moreover, an absolute idealism ; that is, the un-derlying reason, which is the creative and sus-taining principle of all things, is in the midstof all its variety of manifestation absolutely oneand the same, from which nothing can be taken,and to which nothing can be added. It is com-pletely unconditioned and independent. It is,therefore, the Absolute, that is, God. Thehighest manifestation of this principle of reasonHegel calls the Idea (die Idee), desiring to indi-cate by a single word that the supreme powerof the universe is not mechanical and material,but essentially rational and spiritual. The Idea,the Absolute, God, are to be regarded as strictlysynonymous terms used by Hegel interchange-ably, and with no shade of distinction in theirmeaning.

In the exposition of Hegel's system he en-deavors to show that the world of knowledgeunfolds by the inner constraint of its own dia-lectic from the simplest beginnings throughmore and more complex stages until it reachescomplete fulfilment in the all-embracing Abso-


35/331

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 21lute. But though the Absolute is the consum-mation of the process as a whole, neverthelessthe Absolute, as the creative and sustainingprinciple of reason itself, must be both the be-ginning of the process, and must underlie everysucceeding stage of the process as well. There-fore every cross-section, as it were, of thisprocess of evolution reveals some phase of theAbsolute, incomplete it is true, and, therefore,if taken by itself misleading, but so far forth itremains an unmistakable manifestation of thedivine reason which is its ground and justifica-tion. Thus Hegel defines the Absolute as theessence of all being in general ; as cause, and aslaw in the physical universe ; as consciousness,purpose, beneficence, justice, etc., in the realmof mind. From this point of view Hegel's sys-tem may be characterized as the progressiverevelation of God.

Hegel's method of exposition in general maybe summarized, therefore, as an attempt to showthe various stages of development in the mani-festation of the principle of reason as a growingrevelation of the Absolute in such a manner thatevery stage by itself is partial, and thereforeinvolves its own contradiction; but that thesecontradictions contain, nevertheless, common


36/331

22 INTRODUCTIONelements by which, from a higher point of view,they may be reconciled and combined. Such apoint of advantage being gained in the progressof thought, there will be disclosed, however, anew contradiction, again to be resolved byearnest consideration and penetrating insightin a higher synthesis, and so on and on throughevery stage of the process to the end wherealone there may be found an abiding place inthe Absolute, wherein there is found no contra-diction and no incompleteness. The process isone, the underlying ground is one, and any ele-ment in the process receives its full significancesolely in the light of the whole ; then and thenonly is its truth revealed. Truth with Hegelmeans always that knowledge which embraces itsobject upon all possible sides and in all of its possi-ble relations as the complete expression of the eter-nal reason which underlies it. This is a thoughtakin to that of the old Hebrew poet and philoso-pher who said, " In thy light shall we see light,"and that of the later Hebrew who so constantlyinsisted that everything is known only as it isviewed sub specie aeternitatis.


37/331

CHAPTER IITHE VARIOUS ATTITUDES OF THOUGHT TOWARDSTHE OBJECTIVE WORLD. THE METAPHYSICALSYSTEMS

THE fundamental conception of the Hegeliansystem of philosophy is that of universalreason dominating all thoughts and all things.It is necessary, therefore, at the very beginningto appreciate the inherent relation betweenthoughts and things in general, or more specifi-cally between the thinking mind and the objec-tive world. In order to understand fully theHegelian attitude of thought to the objectiveworld, the world which furnishes us the materialsof knowledge, and of which we ourselves arebut a part, it will be worth our while to examinesomewhat in detail the doctrines of other philo-sophical systems upon this subject in the lightof Hegel's criticism of them. Their divergencefrom the Hegelian system will serve by contrastto mark the characteristic features of that systemitself. There are four typical views as to the

23


38/331

24 INTRODUCTIONrelation of the thinking subject to the objectiveworld. They are as follows :

1. The metaphysical systems.2. The empirical schools.3. The critical philosophy.4. The theory of intuitive or immediate

knowledge.The first of these attitudes of thought re-gards the external world as perfectly picturedin thought. The question is not raised as tothe difficulty of passing from the object whichis perceived to the thinking subject which per-ceives it. The way is regarded as open andfree. The objective reality of the outer worldis assumed as a matter of fact. The testimonyof the senses is taken as unquestionable. Itis the standpoint of nai've realism, which restsupon the assumption that all things are in theiressence what they seem to be in our perceptionof them. A natural result of this point of viewand of this method of interpreting the world ofexperience was that abstract and empty phrases,refined metaphysical distinctions, in short, theterminology of the schools came to be used in-stead of living words in the description of livingexperience. No wonder that philosophy becamesterile and dry as dust when the truth of the


39/331

THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 25world of reality was expressed in the desiccatedformulse of metaphysical speculation. In otherwords, the actual world of living experiencewas forced in a purely artificial and arbitrarymanner into metaphysical molds. For thesemolds were cast with no consideration what-soever of the patterns which the real worldmight have furnished. They were fashionedaccording to the caprice of speculation, andthe demands of certain postulates of thoughtwhich had no basis in reality. In respect toall this, Hegel's contention is that a genuineknowledge of the external world must comethrough a process in which the particular ob-jects of knowledge are allowed actually to char-acterize themselves; in other words, we mustinterrogate the facts of experience and allowthem to tell their own story. We must nottake for granted certain characteristics and cer-tain relations as necessarily obtaining becauseour speculations seem to demand them. Wedare not apply to concrete objects of thoughtpredicates which have been derived elsewhereand without any consideration of the nature ofthe objects themselves. We should not antici-pate experience, but faithfully interpret it.Take for example the supreme object of all


40/331

26 INTBODUCTIOKthought, God Himself. It is but a poor andinadequate conception of God which resultsmerely from ascribing to Him a series of predi-cates which have been deduced from certainmetaphysical necessities. However many suchpredicates may be, they together fail utterly toexhaust His infinite nature. The Orientalsappreciated this when in the Hindoo philosophyGod is declared to be the many-named, or themany-sided, and this without limit of any kindor degree, so that if the resulting names shouldbe formed together to constitute a series, theresult would of necessity be an infinite series.

Moreover, Hegel insists that the various meta-physical schools all adopted a wrong criterionin that they are content to derive their defini-tions from popular conceptions. Any popularconception of God, of the world, or of the soulis necessarily inadequate and therefore false,for it must be colored necessarily by the natureof the age, or of the race whence it emerges,and so far forth it is particular, local, and mis-leading. Any definition of God which embodiesa popular conception of Him, however completethat conception may be, fails to sound thedepths of His being and nature. It is Hegel'smost vehement contention that the only true


41/331

THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 27method of building up the world of knowledgeis to allow the objects of thought freely andspontaneously to expound their own characteris-tics. Thus God's being is known only as re-vealed in the continuous unfolding of Himselfin the cosmic processes, in nature, in history, inman. And so we may define man as a rationalanimal ; but at best this is only a vague gropingin the dark, for our knowledge of man cannotbe compressed into a single judgment. Thatwas the snare of the metaphysical schools, thebelief that all objects of knowledge could beexpressed completely within the scope of aformal definition or a stereotyped formula.What man is, in all the possibilities of his devel-opment as artisan, mechanic, scholar, soldier,citizen, statesman, martyr, or reformer, and soon without limit, that the complete history ofhumanity alone can reveal. The term "ra-tional," as used in the traditional definition ofman, conceals a vast territory of knowledge whichlies behind it. We appreciate the limitless extentof this region when we even superficially medi-tate upon the many-sided manifestations ofwhich the idea of rationality is capable. It isonly in the free activity of the constructiveprinciple working within an object of knowl-


42/331

28 INTBODUCTIOKedge that its essential characteristics are re-vealed.

Moreover, the old metaphysic was dogmaticin the extreme. Although the results of suchspeculation were partial and one-sided, they werenevertheless stoutly maintained as absolute andfinal. This insistence upon the ultimate natureof partially conceived truth indicates the char-acteristic spirit of the school. Content with thehalf truth and the twilight of the understandingthey never attained the full knowledge as re-vealed in the light of reason. In addition to thegeneral point of view and method of the meta-physical systems, their treatment of severalspecial problems is not only a matter of inter-est in itself, but has an indirect bearing uponsome important points of the Hegelian system.These problems are four in number.

1. As to the nature of being in general,ontology.

2. As to the nature of the soul, rationalpsychology or pneuinatology.

3. As to the nature of the world, cos-mology.4. As to the being and nature of God,

natural or rational theology.The doctrine of being, or ontology, resulted


43/331

THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 29from the attempt to answer the question as tohow being in general might be adequately char-acterized. The distinctions raised by the meta-physical schools were largely verbal. Whenevercertain absolute terms were found which seemedto involve no contradiction to the generallyreceived conceptions of the day, then the meta-physician was completely satisfied that he hadgiven expression to the truth in its fulness.He did not pause to inquire as to the concretesignificance of the terms which he used or asto their illustration in actual experience. Suchterms, for example, as existence, finitude, sim-plicity, complexity, and the like, were used asthe current coin of expression by the metaphysi-cal school, and with but little thought as totheir precise meaning and the definite scope oftheir application. Hegel's criticism, at thispoint, is quite characteristic and illustrative ofhis general method. He insists that every termwhich we employ in philosophical thinkingshould represent a notion, that is, an idea ofuniversal and necessary significance, and thatsuch a notion cannot have a one-sided, abstract,and rigid meaning, but must have a wealth ofmeaning in itself. Every notion, moreover,must be regarded as a small world within itself,


44/331

30 INTRODUCTIONhaving manifold characteristics connected andinterrelated in an indefinite variety of ways.The term which represents such an idea cantherefore never be employed in a stereotypedmanner as was the custom of the metaphysi-cians. The very fact that such an idea embodieswithin itself inner connections or relationsrenders it necessary that contradictions mustarise which can be resolved only by viewingthem in the light of the whole body of knowl-edge. To cut such an idea off as a finishedproduct, incapable of further modification ordevelopment, is to deal with it in a mannerextremely artificial and unphilosophical as well.Ideas are living processes and not dead prod-ucts. "Let us avoid, therefore," Hegel wouldsay, " the use of terms to which we have attachedpartial and poor meanings. Let the supremetask of thought be to overcome the superficialand the abstract."The second question discussed by the meta-

physicians was that of rational psychology, orpneumatology ; it had special reference to thenature of the soul. The pre-Kantiaii meta-physic regarded the soul as a thing, an in-dependent entity. This conception at oncesuggested the question, which proved to be an


45/331

THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 31utterly futile and misleading inquiry, as to theseat of the soul; and the further question asto whether the soul, inasmuch as it is a thing,should be regarded as simple or composite. Itwas thought that upon the fact of its simplicitydepended the truth of the doctrine of immortal-ity, inasmuch as whatever is not composed ofparts can suffer no dissolution. Hegel insistsat this point that the inner life of the mind orsoul cannot be regarded as a finished thing, aproduct once for all complete, without possibil-ity of development. Such a conception rendersimpossible also any processes of action and re-action between the several elements which con-stitute the essence of the soul's life and variedactivity, and leaves unexplained the externalphenomena of the mind which are so incalcula-bly complex in all the variety of their many-sided manifestations. The mind must beregarded, according to Hegel, as a concretereality which is evidenced by its manifestations.It is not a " thing," as the metaphysicians usethe term "thing," but rather an inward con-structive force determining the various phasesof its external phenomena in an unlimited, pro-gressive development.The third branch of the traditional metaphysic


46/331

32 INTRODUCTIONwas that of cosmology. The topics which itembraced were the world, its contingency ornecessity, its eternity or its necessary limita-tion in time and space, the formal laws of itschanges, the freedom of man, and the origin ofevil. The general standpoint of the metaphy-sician before the time of Kant was that thoughtpresents to us a number of alternative judg-ments, one of which must be wholly true andits opposite wholly false. Therefore, in refer-ence to the particular questions which arose inthe sphere of cosmology, the metaphysiciansheld that one is of necessity constrained tochoose between the theory that the world iscreated or that it is eternal; that man is theproduct of the law of necessity or that he isfree. They held, moreover, that the good andevil in the world are natural opposites, and cannever be reconciled. Hegel characteristicallyopposes this one-sided view of things by main-taining that the world contains on all sides anindefinite number of opposites, and that it isthe peculiar function of the reason to reconcileand harmonize them completely. His systemis essentially a universal resolution of all thecontradictions and inconsistencies of existencein the all-embracing synthesis of the reason.


47/331

THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 33Thus the idea of freedom which involves nonecessity, and the idea of necessity whichinvolves no freedom, are alike merely thepartial abstractions of the understanding. Inthe actual world, the world in which we live,and move, and have our being, freedom andnecessity are not divorced. For there can befreedom only in that community wherein libertyis guaranteed by law. And as regards thenecessity which nature everywhere imposesupon us, it must be remembered that the freeactivity of the individual is possible only to theextent to which he can depend implicitly -uponthe uniformity of nature's laws ; for were naturewithout law, and its phenomena the result ofthe caprice or whim of ruling deities as in theold mythological conception, the free purposeof man would be

constantly thwarted andannulled.The fourth branch of metaphysics is that of

natural or rational theology. It is concernedwith the fundamental conception of God, Hisattributes, and the proof of His existence.The radical error of the metaphysical logicis revealed in their attempt to discover someobjective ground for the being of God. Theresulting idea of God thus formed, creates the


48/331

34 INTRODUCTIONimpression of being derived from somethingexternal to God Himself. But God must beconceived as the sole ground of all things vis-ible and invisible, and therefore as independentof anything in the nature of a foundation orsupport of His being and existence. For ifGod is regarded as a being, derived from theworld, then the very finitude of the worldprocesses would cling to the idea of a God thusconceived. As Hegel suggests, the metaphysi-cian is confronted with the following dilemma :either God is the actual substance of theworld, including the mind of man, which isendeavoring to come to a knowledge of Him,which is pantheism ; or God is an object distinctfrom the apprehending mind, the subject,which is dualism. Hegel in the development ofhis system endeavors to effect a synthesis of thedivine and human consciousness in such a wayas to avoid the two extremes of dualism and ofpantheism ; it is only, however, when the entiresystem is unfolded before us that we have anybasis for judging whether he has succeeded inthis difficult undertaking. At this stage of thediscussion it is sufficient merely to mark hisgeneral purpose in this regard as a radical pointof departure from the metaphysical view.


49/331

THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 35There is a phrase which is often employed

in speculations concerning the being of God.It is this, "Consider nature, and nature willlead you to God." Hegel in this connectionenters a vigorous protest, inasmuch as thisphrase seems to imply that God is the consum-mation merely of the great cosmic process,whereas the truth lies in the thought thatwhile God may be regarded in a certain senseas the final consummation of all things, yetnevertheless He must be regarded also as theabsolute ground of the initial stage and everysubsequent stage of the cosmic development.God is the beginning as well as the end ofthe world's evolution. It is only in a verypartial sense, therefore, that we are justified insaying that nature leads man to God, for inanother and deeper sense we are constrainedto believe that it is God Himself who makesnature possible. Nature leads backward aswell as forward to God.As to the attributes of God, they were con-

ceived by the metaphysicians in so indefiniteand vague a manner as to be utterly devoidof any genuine significance. These schools ofthought seemed to possess a natural dread of as-signing to God any attributes whatsoever which


50/331

36 IOTBODUCTIONwere distinctively human upon the groundthat to think of God's nature as at all resem-bling human nature would be to degrade anddishonor Him. Fearing that they might be-come anthropomorphic, they lapsed into avague indefiniteness which was without anysignificant content whatever. Yet they seemedoblivious of this evident defect, and satisfiedwith a summary of the divine attributes insome such vague and unmeaning expressionas the following, " God is the most real ofall beings." But Hegel in criticising such astatement as this insists that the most real ofall beings of whom, however, nothing is af-firmed definitely, is after all the very oppositeof what it purports to be, and what the under-standing supposes it to be. Instead of abeing ample and above all measure, the ideais so narrowly conceived that it is on thecontrary poor and altogether empty. It iswith reason that the heart craves an answerto its question as to the nature of God whichwill mean something. When the idea of Godis reduced to an indefinite and meaninglessformula, God is then removed to a sphere soforeign to our thought and life as to be reducedto an absolute zero. Without a content pos-


51/331

THE METAPHYSICAL, SYSTEMS 37sessing any positive significance our thought isshorn of all meaning whatsoever. As Hegelputs it in striking epigram, " Mere light ismere darkness." I Notwithstanding Hegel'sradical difference in general point of view,however, and his critical attitude toward themetaphysical schools, nevertheless he franklyacknowledges that there is something of per-manent value in one feature at least of theirteachings, namely, in their insistence uponthe fundamental truth that thought constitutesthe essence of all that is. And this truth hehas incorporated in his own philosophical sys-tem as its cardinal doctrine. Thought, how-ever, with Hegel does not consist in abstractdefinitions and formulae, but is revealed in itsfulness only in the concrete realities of life.

* Werke, VI, 36, Zusatss.


52/331

CHAPTER IIITHE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL

IN the course of the development of philo-sophical thought it was natural that thereshould follow a reaction against the abstract,vague, and indefinite results which had beenthe outcome of the metaphysical speculations.This reaction found expression in the teachingsof the empirical school of philosophy. Theempiricists insisted that the starting-point ofall thought must be something definitely fixedand secure, some concrete reality such as canbe found only in actual experience. Themetaphysical procedure started with abstractuniversals, and the difficulty which it couldnot overcome lay in the fact that there was noway of passing from vague generalities to theabundant variety of particular manifestationswhich correspond to such universals in theworld of reality. It is the function of thoughtto interpret experience and not to anticipate it.Therefore the empiricists urged that the logical

38


53/331


54/331

40 INTRODUCTIONwhich he feels constrained to accept. If oneis really to know things, he must see them asthey are. This is certainly in complete accordwith the modern scientific spirit of inductiveinquiry which grounds all investigation upona study of actual sources, and that, too, at firsthand.The weakness of empiricism, however, asHegel points out most conclusively, consists inthe fact that any sensation, or combination ofsensations which according to the empiricist isthe ultimate ground of appeal, is always a par-ticular and individual experience. It is impos-sible to pass from such experiences to theuniversal idea or law which they illustratewithout introducing some conceptions whichtranscend the purely empirical presuppositionthat we know only particular phenomena andtheir immediate connections and relations.Hume had long since drawn attention to the

fact that when we interpret the phenomena ofexperience as manifesting universal principlesand as related by necessary causal connections,we are thereby reading into the phenomena whatthey themselves do not contain, but that withwhich they have been invested by our thought.Granted that necessity and universality are found


55/331

THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 41everywhere in our consciousness, what reasonhave we, Hume would say, to assert that thesecharacteristics are also the attributes of thingsthemselves. If sensation is to maintain itsclaim to be the sole basis of all that men holdas truth, then these ideas of universality andnecessity must be regarded as merely conven-ient fictions of the mind, clever it is true, butby no means trustworthy. Hume very franklyaccepted this conclusion; and so must everythoroughgoing empiricist. Hegel insists, how-ever, that the reason joins to these fundamentalprocesses of sensation and perception its pecul-iar function of interpreting in the light of theiruniversal and necessary significance that whichthey present as particular experiences. Thisrelation between the reason on the one handand the elementary data of the senses on theother, follows logically from, the basal postulateof the Hegelian system that whatever is foundto be an ultimate characteristic of reason mustalso apply in like manner to reality itself.

Again, the method of empiricism is essentiallyone of analysis, that is, the subjecting of ourexperiences to a kind of dissecting process whichseparates them into their constituent elements.The defect of such a method is that it makes


56/331

42 INTRODUCTIONno provision whatsoever for any correspondingsynthesis. After the work of analysis is com-plete, it is necessary to have some unifying andconstructive function of the mind as its naturaland necessary complement. It is such a functionwhich enables us to pass from phenomena to thelaws which underlie them. Dissection as anexclusive process is suggestive only of death,and can never reproduce the living organism.

Moreover, if thought is active in systematizingthe crude material which is given by the senses,then it must bring to the process somethingmore than that which the crude sensation ofitself is able to give.As to the questions which are of special mo-ment for the philosophical thinker, concerningGod, the soul, and the world, the empirical schooltook the position that the mind of man is soconstituted that it can deal only with finitematerial. Finding truth only in the outer worldas mediated by the senses, they insisted that evenif the existence of a supersensible world begranted, any knowledge of that world would beimpossible. From this point of view it followsthat there is no place in such a system either fora theory of morals or a philosophy of religion.Both ethics and religion thus lose all objective


57/331

THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 43character, and at the same time their universalvalidity. The logical outcome, therefore, of thisdoctrine is materialism, which in its generalmethods and results is diametrically opposed toHegelianism. There have been, however, somephilosophers who have styled themselves disci-ples of Hegel and yet have been pronouncedmaterialists. They are the so-called Hegeliansof the left; they are such writers as Feuer-bach and Strauss. This peculiar development ofthe Hegelian school must be regarded as a perver-sion of Hegel's teaching rather than the logicaloutcome of his system. Hegel's criticism of ma-terialism is so clear and emphatic as to give nouncertain sound. He draws attention to thefact that materialists in general regard matterin the light of an abstraction ; it is after all theunknown somewhat behind phenomena, of whichthey are merely the manifestation. And whenthe materialists come to explain what matteritself is, its fundamental nature and essentialcharacteristics, they are constrained to employcertain concepts as force, causation, action andreaction, and the like, which are essentially meta-physical concepts for which materialism pureand simple can give no warrant whatsoever.

Moreover, the world of sense-perception, as


58/331


59/331

CHAPTER IVTHE CRITICAL, PHILOSOPHY

THE critical philosophy takes its name fromthe fundamental Kantian point of view thatthought must itself investigate how far it hasa capacity of knowledge, and in this way becomecritical of itself. Inasmuch as the sensationregarded as a pure sensation can never givein and of itself the idea of necessity and univer-sality, and yet we are conscious that our wholebody of knowledge depends upon this very ideafor its primary features of order and uniformity,therefore, the source of this idea, according toKant, must lie in the very nature of thoughtitself. Moreover, he insists that this source isnot to be sought for in the thought of anyindividual, regarded merely in his individualcapacity, but in the thought which is the com-mon possession of all individuals alike, that is,in the very nature of thought itself as purethought irrespective of the peculiar modes, orhabits of thought incident to the peculiarities of

45


60/331

46 INTRODUCTIONany particular individual whatsoever,, Thesefundamental ideas which seem to be the com-mon property of all rational creatures, andwhich, together with their relations and con-nections, form the determining factors in reduc-ing the crude material of sensation to a systemof knowledge characterized by order and law,are the so-called categories, such as the ideasof necessity, cause and effect, unity, plurality,and the like.The critical philosophy sets itself the task of

testing the value of these categories in referenceto their application to the sciences, to the sphereof metaphysics, and to our ordinary conceptualprocesses. It also seeks to determine the pre-cise nature and function of these categories soas to distinguish in our knowledge between thatwhich is subjective and that which is objective.These terms " subjective " and " objective " playsuchan importantr61e in philosophical discussionsgenerally, and especially in the systems both ofKant and of Hegel, that it will repay us at thisstage of our investigation to inquire somewhatin detail as to the meaning and usage of theseterms. Hegel draws attention to three distinctsenses in which the term " objective " is used :

In the first place, objective is used in a loose


61/331

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 47and rather popular manner to designate what-ever subsists externally, in contrast to whichthe subjective comes to be regarded as thatwhich exists only in our fancy, hopes, ordreams.

In the second place, the Kantian use of objec-tive consists in an application of the term to theelements in thought which are universal andnecessary, that is, what all men are constrainedto think, in contrast to the subjective characterattached to individual experiences which givethem a certain particular and occasional color-ing.In the third place, the Hegelian use of theterm objective has regard to the universal and

necessary elements of thought in general afterthe manner of Kant, but in addition Hegel con-siders these universal and necessary elementsof thought as representing at the same timethe real essence of existing things.

This latter distinction marks the point ofdeparture of Hegel from Kant. For, as Hegelmaintains, if the necessary and essential factorsin the building up of our world of knowledgebelong only to the processes of thought, thenall thought must be forever separated from thething itself as the object of our thought which


62/331

48 INTRODUCTIONperceives it, and as it exists apart from our per-ception of it. And although it is true that thecategories as causality, necessity, universalityand the like lie strictly within the province ofthought, it does not necessarily follow that theymust be ours merely in a subjective sense andnot at the same time also the essential charac-teristics of things themselves. Hegel, moreover,will not allow that the convenient Kantian fic-tion of the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sicJi) canpossibly express the real nature of the objectwhen we have eliminated all that is present inconsciousness relative to it, all the deliverancesof feeling and all specific judgments concerningit as to its evident attributes and qualities.What is left, Hegel asks, but an utter abstrac-tion, a total emptiness ?When the balance between subjective and

objective is struck by Kant, the totality ofknowledge is found to be on the side of thesubjective, while nothing at all remains to thecredit of the objective. For when Kant speaksof the unity of consciousness as transcendental,he means by this phrase that our body of knowl-edge regarded as constituting a system possess-ing order and unity throughout has validityonly for our thoughts, and not for objects apart


63/331

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 49from our knowledge. What they are in them-selves must remain, therefore, an unknownquantity, the insoluble x of the equation ofknowledge.

It is characteristic, moreover, of the Hegelianmethod that the significance which he attachesto the term

objective is in reality a synthesisof the two other views mentioned above. Thefirst holds that objectivity refers to the exter-nal thing; the second that objectivity refersto the necessary and universal thought; whileHegel insists that the objective is the combina-tion of the two, being the true thought concern-ing the real thing. The subjective would signify,therefore, that which for the time being has aplace in our thoughts but has no reference toreality, and which others under similar circum-stances might not be constrained necessarily toentertain.

Kant's position is known as one of subjectiveidealism, that is, the things which we knoware appearances merely, and we possess nocertitude as to the truth of what they are in.themselves. Hegel's position, on the otherhand, is one of absolute idealism, as has beenalready mentioned, that is, it is conceded thatthe objects of our knowledge are phenomena,


64/331


65/331

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 51transition from the soul as we think it to be,to the soul as it really is in itself, than in theprocedure from the appearances of things asperceived by thought to the things as they arein themselves. Hegel, however, repudiates themetaphysical definition on the ground that theseattributes enumerated as the elementary char-acteristics of the soul are totally inadequate toexpress the concrete wealth of content whichour idea of the soul should embrace.As to the problem of the world, Kant drawsattention to the fact that the thought in en-deavoring to comprehend the unconditionednature of the world stumbles upon certain con-tradictions which are called antinomies, for itis frequently found necessary to maintain twocontradictory propositions about one and thesame object in such a way that each one of themutually destructive propositions seems of itselfto have the stamp of necessity and of universalvalidity. The Kantian antinomies are four innumber and are as follows :

1. The world is limited as to space and time.The world is not limited as to space andtime.

2. Matter is indefinitely divisible.Matter is not indefinitely divisible.


66/331


67/331

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53we obtain a characteristic glimpse of the fun-damental Hegelian conception, and a sugges-tion as to the working of his dialectic method.As to the final problem, the theistic question,it would be well to examine briefly the Kantiancriticism of the proofs concerning the being ofGod. These proofs may be divided into twokinds according to one or the other of twomethods of procedure :We may begin, on the one hand, with ananalysis of being and through that processreach the idea of God.

Or, on the other hand, we may begin withan analysis of the idea of God, and throughthat process reach the ground of His being.The former of these methods of procedurewill give either the cosmological or the physico-theological proof of the being of God. Thecosmological proof reasons from the variouslyrelated and interconnected phenomena of theuniverse to a first cause as necessary to accountfor their origin and their sustained existence.This proof turns upon the concept of causation.The physico-theological proof reasons from evi-dences of design manifested in phenomena tothe existence of One who is the great architectof them all, and this proof turns upon the con-


68/331


69/331

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55exercise this function of transmuting sensationsinto these higher forms of the mind. But insuch a process the crude sensation is destroyedas a sensation. This is what Hegel calls theelement of negation in the process of transitionfrom the world to God. The world regardedas an aggregate of sensations has disappeared.Out of its ashes rises the new world as inter-preted by the categories of thought, and such aworld with its implications of universality andnecessity is an adequate starting-point for theproof of the being of God.

Hegel's second contribution to this generaldiscussion relates to the matter or body of truthsto which the transition from the world to Godat first leads, such truths as concern the natureof the world's substance, its necessary essence,and the cause which regulates and directs itaccording to design. These ideas express but avery partial and inadequate knowledge of God,and yet they are necessary to a complete con-ception of Him. Hegel insists that while theyshould not be overlooked, they must neverthelessbe supplemented by higher truths, and that whileinanimate nature gives us intimations of God,there is a higher revelation of Him. when westart with living organisms. Thence we reach


70/331


71/331


72/331


73/331


74/331


75/331


76/331


77/331

THE THEOKY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE 63process by which it has been mediated, andcomes to be what it is in its seemingly completeand independent state. We may further illus-trate the Hegelian idea of mediation by theknowledge which we may have of a book whosetitle, author, and general point of view we knowonly by common report, but we ourselves havenever read the book itself. Such knowledgeHegel would call immediate in a general andabstract sense, and that kind of immediateknowledge would have no special significanceor value. However, after reading the book andmarking the relation of step to step in the grad-ual unfolding of the author's conception, andthe bearing of each part to the whole as itfinally reaches its complete expression, we findthat our knowledge has grown in definitenessand consequent value through this process whichis one of mediation. And then also the bookas a whole will be found to leave upon ourmind a certain final impression as a summaryof its total significance, which in turn wewould call immediate knowledge; for in thecourse of time the various steps of the processof mediation become merged in the very resultof the process itself, and we come to retain inconsciousness only the finished product as a,


78/331


79/331


80/331


81/331

THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE 67thought to the objective world may be brieflysummarized as follows :The metaphysician has his abstract forms of

thought, but they prove to be empty.The empiricist has a vast wealth of materialbut no thought forms in which to express thesame.The critical philosopher has his thought

forms, but that which seems to be the paterialat hand ready for the casting, proves, upon in-vestigation, to be shadowy and unsubstantial.The intuitionist possesses thought forms butthey lack any distinctive pattern ; and thereforewhatever may be the material which is run intothem, the casting which results is always thesame, possessing no specific characteristics andtherefore without significance or value.The evident defects of these various types ofphilosophy Hegel seeks to obviate by unitinginto one system the partial truths which theyseverally contain. By what method this isattempted and with what success it is attended,we shall hope to see in the detailed expositionof the Logic) the task which lies immediatelybefore us.


82/331

CHAPTER VIA GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC

THE Logic is divided into three parts :I. The Doctrine of Being. (Die, Lehrevom Se^/n^)II. The Doctrine of Essence. (JDie Lehre

vom Wesen.*)III. The Doctrine of the Notion. {Die

Lehre vom jBegriff.**)These divisions represent the successive stages

in the progressive unfolding of our knowledgethrough which the various processes of thoughtcome to their complete and final expression.They are to be regarded as successive stagesonly in the sense that by our analysis we sepa-rate them in our thoughts, and think of one asfollowing the other. But in reality we shouldconceive of these elements of knowledge in sucha manner as to regard one as lying within theother, and this in turn within the third. Theprogress indicated in their development is onenot of advance so much as a deepening insight

68


83/331

A GENERAL SURVEY OP THE LOGIC 69into more and more fundamental attributes andrelations.The doctrine of being is the result of an

answer to the question as to what a thing is.The doctrine of essence, in answer to thequestion of what is it composed and by whatis it constituted.The doctrine of the notion, in answer to thequestion, to what end is it designed and is itcapable of progressing.The complete knowledge of a thing, therefore,embraces the categories of its being, the groundof its being, and the purpose of its being.

It will be readily seen that the first categoryinvolves the second, in order to complete itsmeaning, and that the second involves the thirdin a like manner, and that the third underliesthe other two. For the being of a thingbecomes definitely known to us only whenwe are able to refer it to its appropriate ground,and when we possess some insight as to whenceit came and by what processes its being is main-tained and perfected; also the ground of itsbeing finds its full significance only in the con-sideration of the end which it is realizing andwhich its being subserves. Thus, the questionwhat implies the question whence ; and the ques-


84/331


85/331


86/331

72 INTRODUCTIONknowledge is that which is not subjected to anyanalysis whatsoever, and such is the nature ofmere being.The word " undetermined " signifies the lackof any definite qualities or attributes, and has theforce of the adjective " indefinite " when appliedto being.The phrase " in itself " (an sicfi) means thatwhich is implicit or potential; it is used indistinction to the phrase " of itself " (Jur sicli)which signifies that which is explicit. Whilethe former applies to being, the latter appliesto essence, indicating that the one is explicitlywhat the other is implicitly. Thus, being is tobe regarded merely as a transition state ofknowledge, the veriest beginning of knowledgein fact, inasmuch as that which may becomedefinite and determined as essential being, isstill indefinite and undetermined as mere being.It, however, does contain the potential of allthat appears explicitly in essence.We come now to consider the chief char-acteristics of essence in contrast to those ofbeing. The essence is the result of a deeperinsight than is represented by mere being. Theessence of a thing is what it is, regarded nolonger as an isolated fact, but as a part of a


87/331

A GENERAL SUBVEY OF THE LOGIC 73system of interrelated elements. The idea ofsystem is closely associated with a technicalterm which Hegel uses constantly in connectionwith the category of essence; it is the word" reflection." The essence of a thing is revealedonly when we see the thing in its completesetting, and when we possess a thorough knowl-edge of the relations which it sustains to everypart of the system to which it may be referred.The thing, therefore, does not shine in its ownlight so much as in the light reflected from allthe coordinate elements with which it is related.We know a thing only when it is in the focalpoint of the illumination due to its completesetting. It is in this sense that Hegel saysthat the essence of a thing is known by meansof the category of reflection.

Moreover, in order to understand fully the es-sence of a thing we must analyze the total massof surface appearances, and disclose the underly-ing elements and processes which have given riseto its being. As mere being, the thing appears asan unanalyzed whole, a simple product withoutany reference to the processes which have pro-duced it. In this analysis into constituent ele-ments and formative processes we employ inour thought the category of mediation. Media-


88/331


89/331


90/331

76 INTRODUCTIONAs essence may be regarded as the develop-

ment and completion of the category of being,in like manner the category of the notion is thedevelopment and completion of that of essence.Each stage marks a deeper penetration, and aprogress towards the fulness of knowledge.If we inquire as to the nature of the processwhich necessarily underlies anything regardedmerely as a product, we have raised the ques-tion as to its essence; and if then we probedeeper and inquire as to the thought which hasdevised the process, and is at the same timeboth the dynamic source of the process itselfand its complete realization as well, we haveraised the question as to its notion, that is,creative and sustaining reason. The notion,therefore, embraces the truth, both of being andof essence.

It has been before remarked that the cate-gory of being represents immediate knowl-edge, that is, the acceptance of an object ofknowledge as a fact merely while yet unana-lyzed and unexplained ; and that the category ofessence represents mediated knowledge, thatis, knowledge analyzed and explained. The cate-gory of the notion, therefore, may be regardedas the combination of these two kinds of


91/331


92/331


93/331

A GENERAL SUBVET OF THE LOGIC 79coherent heterogeneity, through successive dif-ferentiations and integrations. "The change which is indicated by the Spen,cerian definition occurs between two states of anorganism; the first corresponds to that of merebeing, the second to that of essence. The sameterms,

"indefinite

"and "incoherent," are usedby Hegel to characterize the state of mere being.The term " homogeneity " has a significance simi-

lar to the Hegelian phrase of abstract identity,that is, without distinction and characterizationof its parts. So also the opposite terms " defi-nite" and "coherent" permit of an exact ap-plication to the state of essence. The term" heterogeneity " indicates, moreover, the state inwhich the initial sameness has been resolved intoseparate elements possessing distinctive charac-teristics, and may in all propriety be applied tothe Hegelian conception of essence. The transi-tion from the one state to the other is regardedby Spencer as a process which is mediatedthrough successive differentiations and inte-grations.

" Differentiation " corresponds to theprocess of mediation by negation in the Hegelianterminology, and " integration " to the synthesiswhich is the resulting product of such a process.As every integration, according to Spencer,


94/331


95/331


96/331


97/331


98/331

Das $eyn ist nicht zu empfinden, nichtschauen und nicht vorzustellen, sondern es ist derreine Gfedanke und als soldier mac7it es den A.nfa,ng.HEGEL.


99/331


100/331

86 THE DOCTRINE OF BEINGit can well be made. The knowledge whichranges upon so low a level is equivalent tono knowledge at all, or as Hegel tersely putsit, "Being is the' same as non-being." Theidentification of being and non-being whenthrust upon us as a bare statement and with-out commentary upon it, not only startles usbut also arouses a very natural feeling ofprotest, and perhaps of indignation. We sayto ourselves "Is Hegel a mere juggler withwords? Is it possible that behind this abruptformula he is secretly laughing at us, andthat his whole system is merely a keen satireupon the limitations of the powers of reason?"So it would seem, at least after a rapid andsuperficial glance at such a proposition. Butwhen we come to analyze the statement thatbeing and non-being are the same, we findthat it is only an epigrammatic expression ofthat which we have always believed mostthoroughly; for we are accustomed to saythat any statement which is indefinite andnon-committal is of no value or significanceas knowledge. If it should be put to us inthe form of a promise, it would carry withit no weight of assurance that the promisewould ever be fulfilled. For us it would


101/331


102/331


103/331


104/331

90 THE DOCTRINE OF BEINGteristics, as to form, color, and the like, whatit is in fact, that is unknown; it is nothing,But while it is so indefinite as far as ourknowledge of its true nature is concerned thatwe correctly designate it as nothing, neverthe-less, it contains at the same time the poten-tiality of something which under propercircumstances may be revealed. And so wemay imagine that the light gradually growsbrighter, penetrating the darkness which sur-rounds it ; and with the growing illuminationthe object becomes clearer, and all that a mo-ment before was indefinite and unknownbecomes definite and known. Such a processis one of becoming, and it consists of a transi-tion from the unknown to the known, a revela-tion of all hidden qualities; and this processmay be appropriately characterized as the unityor the uniting of that which is not to that whichis, or as Hegel puts it, the unity of non-beingand being.

Hegel maintains that his system of thought-evolution brings together in one all the differ-ent phases of philosophical speculation whichin turn have emphasized exclusively some onestage of the total process of development, andwhich have overlooked the relation of each par-


105/331


106/331

92 THE DOCTEINE OF BEINGthe other, regarding it as an essential factorin the process of becoming. It is of interestto note that this historical difference of opinionhas followed, as it were, the lines of a dialec-tic movement, inasmuch as the seemingly con-tradictory positions from one point of vieware brought together in a higher unity, andfrom a more comprehensive point of view, asthe being of Parmenides is absorbed in thebecoming of Heraclitus. Hegel's dialectic, ashe himself claims, is only a following of thelines of development

which philosophical thought,as a whole, has described in its path of progress.The process of becoming, moreover, in anyconcrete instance, must result in some defi-nite product. The process of becoming Hegellikens to a fire which is constantly consumingits material, and yet, nevertheless, does notleave an empty nothing as a result. Thatwhich is destroyed in one form is conserved inanother. The result which is attained by theprocess of becoming Hegel calls Daseyn^ thatis, being which has been rendered definitethrough the manifestation of its characteristicqualities. The term Daseyn has the force of thephrase "definite being," and may be so trans-lated.


107/331

QUALITY 93That which renders being definite is its quality

(die Qualitat). It is that which constitutes itwhat it is. Modify its quality, and being itselfis likewise modified. It is Hegel's plan to dis-cuss the bare idea of quality in general and notto enter upon the discussion of the nature ofany specific qualities in particular. The ques-tion which he puts is this, " What do we under-stand by the idea of the quality of a thing inrespect to its most general aspects ? "

He, at the outset, draws a distinction betweenthe categories of quality and of quantity (dieQuantitaf). Quality may be defined as theinternal determining factor of being ; and quan-tity as the external determining factor. Anyvariation, in that which makes being what it iswill, of course, affect the nature of being itself ;but a variation may occur in that which deter-mines how much or how little of the being inquestion may be taken, and yet this need notnecessarily affect the nature of that being itself.A drop in the ocean does not differ in qualityfrom the entire body of which it is but an in-finitesimal portion. It is obvious that beingand its quality are identical, when we seekillustrations in the sphere of nature. It is notso obvious when we seek them in the sphere of


108/331


109/331

QUALITY 95negative determination, in the sense that if itsbound is transcended, the being in questionsuffers a radical change in its nature. Sucha limit is, therefore, the determining point ofbeing. To understand the nature of the beingwhich we have in any particular instance, wemust know, not only in a general way whatkind of being it is, but we must know definitelyat just what point a variation in its qualitywill subject it to a complete transformation intosome other kind of being altogether. Hegelwishes to emphasize especially the thought thatthe very idea of a limit signifies that it marksa line of boundary between two kinds of being.It is impossible to conceive of a limit whichwould be the boundary of only one thing, forwhile it bounds one, it separates at the sametime from something else. Therefore, everydeterminate being necessarily implies that some-thing lies beyond its limit; this somethingHegel calls its other. This conception of another (ein Anderes)^ the obverse face, as it were,of every definite being, plays a very conspicuousand significant r$le in the Hegelian system.The other which stands over against everydefinite being is not any other thing whatso-ever which happens to lie outside the sphere


110/331


111/331


112/331

98 THE DOCTRINE OF BEINGof its own weight. As Hegel characteristicallydescribes it, it negatives itself. It needs alwaysto be referred to some other being as its causeand explanation, its necessary other. But sucha process is without limit, as we have seen.Hegel's idea of the true infinite is that, in spiteof this indefinitely continued process of referringon and on always to some other beyond, there isat each stage of such a process an intimationthat the underlying ground not only of theparticular stage of the process in question, butof the entire evolution itself of which it is buta very small phase, rests upon some absolutebasis. Therefore, every cross-section, as it were,of the continuous process of development is tobe regarded as a manifestation of the eternalreason, of the Absolute, of God. This is in fullaccord with Hegel's fundamental principle ofabsolute idealism. In every change, therefore,from any imperfectly determined being to someother there is nevertheless a something whichremains unalterable, which when it passes overinto its other is still itself. This Hegel calls Fur-sichseyn, or being for itself, that is, a concep-tion of being as possessing a certain constantcore of self-identity in the midst of all variation,and which preserves its own integrity as definite


113/331


114/331


115/331


116/331


117/331


118/331


119/331


120/331


121/331


122/331

108 THE DOCTRINE OF BEINGmere abstraction, that is, a partial and there-fore misleading conception. Truth is foundalways in the unity of the two. Every contin-uous quantity is in a sense discrete ; and in likemanner every discrete q

Hegel’s Logic, An Essay in Interpretation, J. G. Hibben, 1902

Documents

Transcript of Hegel’s Logic, An Essay in Interpretation, J. G. Hibben, 1902