Health and Safety Executive KP4 website: HSE’s Ageing and Life Extension Key Programme (KP4) and...

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Health and Safety Executive website: www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/ageing.htm HSE’s Ageing and Life Extension Key Programme (KP4) and Human Factors Peter Fearnley, Energy Division - Offshore

Transcript of Health and Safety Executive KP4 website: HSE’s Ageing and Life Extension Key Programme (KP4) and...

Health and Safety Executive

KP4 website: www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/ageing.htm

HSE’s Ageing and Life Extension Key

Programme (KP4) and Human Factors

Peter Fearnley, Energy Division - Offshore

……..Covering…….

• Why?

• Ageing and Life Extension

• Equipment, Systems and People

• What can I do, what can I ask

Why?

• UKCS operates a Safety Case Regime

• The Safety Case describes measures in place reducing major accident risks to people to the lowest reasonable level

• *There are proper arrangements in place for an independent audit of the systems (?)*

• The systems are complex and need all our attention to remain effective

People

FitnessCompetenceMorale/TrustPerceptionBehaviour

Why?

Facilities & Equipment

DesignWork Environment

MaintenanceReliabilityDemand

To be safe all 3 have to work well, together

Systems

Hazard identificationRisk assessment

Management CommitmentProcedures, TrainingIncident investigation

MonitoringChangeLearning

Why?

Facilities & Equipment

• Design• Work Environment• Maintenance• Reliability• Demand

Systems

Hazard identificationRisk assessment

Management CommitmentProcedures, TrainingIncident investigation

MonitoringChangeLearning

People

FitnessCompetenceMorale/TrustPerceptionBehaviour

History of Development

Ageing and Life Extension

WHAT ARE AGEING & LIFE EXTENSION?

AGEING“Ageing is not about how old your

equipment is; it’s about what you know about its condition, and how that’s changing over time”

Condition Management is the key

LIFE EXTENSION• When assets exceed design life = Life

Extension phase• Half UKCS production platforms in LE

phase• Some platforms anticipate 50-70 years

production • Plus 5-10 years to removal from sea

bed

Across the European Union’s hazardous industries ageing is implicated in:

30% of incidents

28% of loss of containment

What Is ALE?It’s All About Managing Ageing

Forth Rail Bridge

• Opened 4th March 1890 (~123 years old)• Robust structure• 200 trains per day• Continuous painting programme

What Is ALE?It’s All About Managing Ageing

Forth Road Bridge

• Opened 4th September 1964 (~48 years old)• Highly engineered structure• 32 000 vehicles per day• IM programme didn’t identify cable corrosion risk• 2003: numerous wire strands in suspension cables found to be corroded and failed• Weight restrictions applied• Needs replacing ~£1.4 Billion

• Raising awareness of consequences of ALE

• Understanding & forecasting degradation mechanisms & rates of Safety Critical Elements

• Obsolescence management

• Sharing ALE knowledge for the benefit of all

• Working with industry for a common goal

• Reducing Hydrocarbon Releases

*MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING SAFETY*

WHAT IS KP4?

WHAT HAS KP4 COVERED?

• Process Safety, Fire and Explosion

• Structures

• Marine

• Mechanical and Corrosion

• Electrical, Control and Instrumentation

• Pipelines

• Human and Organisational Factors

HYDROCARBON LEAKS:EQUIPMENT, SYSTEMS, PEOPLE

Norwegian study found:

• 60% of leaks due to human interventions;– key issues:

• failure to check pre and post-work isolations and integrity;

• Technical degradation caused ~21% of HC leaks

• No relationship between age and leak frequency – condition management!

• 100% management system failure?

Equipment, Systems, People

EQUIPMENT, PEOPLE AND SYSTEM ISSUES

• When equipment doesn’t work as designed (ALE), carry out risk assessment

• Risk Perception & Assessment

– HSE still finding problems with Operational Risk Assessments (ORA) – risk assessment can be too difficult

– Failures identifying and addressing MAH risks, see ORA guidance rolled out by OGUK

– Clear procedures guiding correct thought process, e.g. ORA default should be shut-down unless there are good reasons to continue operations

WORKFORCE INVOLVEMENT IN ALE

• Need to equip people at all levels of the organisation with the right skills to recognise and respond to risk– Hazard awareness, assessment & anticipation

• Need to understand and actively manage the factors that influence human performance, e.g. operating wrong valve, not following a procedure– Distractions, badly written procedures, poor

communication, lack of feedback

• Need to develop a culture where ‘speaking up about concerns’ is managed appropriately– acceptable for ‘bad news’ to travel up the line

What Can I Do, What Can I Ask?

• Getting ALE and People (HF) issues right requires a focus – where is it in your organisation?

• Does your organisation have an ALE policy?

• How well are they doing?

• What are they planning to improve?

• Are you clear what your part is in this?

What Can I Do, What Can I Ask?

• Does your organisation have a clear approach to dealing with people issues/human factors?

• Do you see it worked out in incident and near-miss investigations?

• Are the reasons for mistakes understood and does this make a difference to the way jobs/tasks are planned and carried out?

• Are audits, monitoring and other learning seen as vital to stopping incidents before they happen?