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Ḥasan al‐Bannā or the Politicisation ofIslamAna Belén Soage aa University of Granada

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Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,Vol. 9, No. 1, 21–42, March 2008

ISSN 1469-0764 Print/ISSN 1743-9647 Online/08/010021-22 © 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14690760701856374

asan al-Bann[amacr ] or the Politicisation of Islam

ANA BELÉN SOAGE

University of GranadaTaylor and FrancisFTMP_A_285801.sgm10.1080/14690760701856374Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions1469-0764 (print)/1743-9647 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & Francis91000000March 2008AnaSoagesoage@ugr.es

ABSTRACT The politicisation of Islam can be traced back to the establishment of theMuslim Brothers’ Society in Egypt in the late 1920s. Its founder, asan al-Bann[amacr ] , wasgreatly influenced by the European political religions that appeared in the first decades ofthe twentieth century, and there were significant similarities between the Society’s organ-isation and that of fascist parties. In addition, al-Bann[amacr ] embraced totalitarianism anddeveloped the notion of Islam as a ‘comprehensive’ system. Finally, his worldview showsstriking parallelisms with that of the totalitarian ideologues, with its depiction of historyas a process of decline from a mythical past, and of the Muslim Brothers as the saviourswho will lead the nation back to the lost utopia.

In hindsight, the establishment of the Muslim Brothers’ Society [Jam iyyat al-Ikhw[amacr

] n al-Muslim[imacr ] n] in the Suez Canal town of Ismailia in 1928 or 19291 was one ofthe most significant events in the development of political Islam. However, theSociety started off as just another reformist association inspired by the convic-tion that the sorry state of the Muslim world was to be attributed to its depar-ture from religion. Its original concerns were to spread a ‘correct’ understandingof Islam, to offset Christian missionary efforts in Islamic heartlands and tocombat the perceived moral decline brought about by western influences. Itsfirst project was the madrasat al-tahdh[imacr ] b [school of moral education], in which theinitial Brothers gathered to memorise and recite the Koran, as well as studythe Sunna2 and the exemplary lives of the prophet Mu ammad’s Companions.The Society’s founder and uncontested leader, shaykh asan al-Bann[amacr ] , endeav-oured to encourage a spirit of fraternity among his disciples, rectify deviationsfrom the Islamic creed and praxis, and form preachers who would attract newmembers.3 As such, the Society was not so different from similar organisationsthat the shaykh had created or participated in, almost since his childhood.4

asan al-Bann[amacr ] was born in 1906 in the Egyptian village of Ma m[umacr ] diyya, theeldest son of the local im[amacr ] m and ma dh[umacr ] n, shaykh Abd al-Ra m[amacr ] n al-S[amacr ] [amacr ] t[imacr ] .5 Hisfather, who had earned some renown as an expert on the Sunna, introduced him atan early age to the Islamic sciences and to Rash[imacr ] d Ri [amacr ] ’s al-Man[amacr ] r6 and imbued himwith a strict sense of morality. When asan was still a schoolboy he was electedpresident of the Society for Moral Behaviour, which one of his teachers set up toencourage good morals among the pupils.7 However, the child and some of hisfriends wished to have an impact outside the school, and they launched the Society

Correspondence Address: University of Granada, Faculty of Humanities, Granada 18071, Spain. Email:soage@ugr.es

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22 A. B. Soage

for the Prevention of the Forbidden, which secretly sent admonishing letters tovillagers who neglected their prayers and café owners who hired belly dancers.8

Later, inspired by the Sufi order whose sessions he had started attending, he co-founded the a [amacr ] fi Welfare Society to promote Muslim values and to counterthe activities of three female missionaries suspected of teaching Christianity underthe cover of charity work.9 While he was a student at the teacher-training D[amacr ] r al-Ul[umacr ] m college in Cairo he joined the Islamic Society for Noble Morals, which regu-larly organised lectures on Islamic morality. In addition, feeling that the messagewas not reaching the common people, he organised a group of students from D[amacr ] ral- Ul[umacr ] m and al-Azhar to preach not only in mosques, but also in the coffee houseswhere workers gathered.10

In his last year at D[amacr ] r al- Ul[umacr ] m, al-Bann[amacr ] wrote in an essay that his greatesthope was to become a counsellor and a teacher to children during the day and totheir parents in the evening.11 Such was the objective that inspired the creation ofthe Muslim Brothers’ Society in Ismailia, where he had his first post. Its foundingmembers were six workers who had been moved by the young teacher’s lessonsin the town’s mosques and clubs, and asked him to lead them ‘in the service oftheir nation, their faith and their umma’ [community of believers].12 Al-Bann[amacr ] ,who had been involved in Sufism from his early adolescence, adopted many of itstenets and practices: he took the title of al-Murshid al- mm [General Guide], andthe Society’s members gave him the bay a [oath of allegiance] and adhered to strictrules of self-discipline and obedience. According to Jam[amacr ] l, al-Bann[amacr ] ’s youngerbrother – who resided with him in Ismailia at the time – their weekly meetingswere not unlike those of Sufi congregations.13 That particular Sufi character, whileappropriate to the popular classes who made up most of the Society’s earlymembership, gradually disappeared as it started attracting middle-class effendis,who despised ‘dervishism’.14

In 1932 shaykh al-Bann[amacr ] obtained a teaching position in Cairo, and the Society’sheadquarters made the move to the Egyptian capital with him. This move markedthe beginning of its real take-off. In less than a decade, it became one of the largestorganisations in the country, claiming half a million members representing allsocial groups – from peasants to students, from civil servants to army officers –and with branches in Sudan, Syria, Palestine and Morocco. It soon had its ownprinting press that published a weekly journal, and the General Guide’s Epistles[Ras[amacr ] il, see Appendix],15 which he addressed to his followers and to Egyptian,Arab and Muslim leaders. Furthermore, as the 1930s advanced, the Societybecame embroiled in the political life of the country, until it became one of itsmain players. In the words of Olivier Carré, ‘the influence of the Muslim Brothersin everything that happens in Egypt from the 1940s onwards cannot be over-stated’.16 As we will see, that politicisation was not entirely unconnected to eventshappening on the other side of the Mediterranean.

A Muslim Reaction to the Age of Mass Politics

In a previous issue of this journal Renato Moro studied the Catholic response tothe emergence of political religions, in particular Fascism. He concluded:

The Catholic reaction to the age of revolutions and to the sacralisation ofpolitics accepted a challenge that stimulated the peculiar dynamism ofthe same ecclesiastical world, in order to influence masses and society in

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depth by entering the field of politics, competing with political religionsand drawing means of expressions, codes and languages from them.17

A similar phenomenon can be observed in the Arab-Muslim world, although thechange did not come from the sclerotic religious establishment (notably al-Azhar),but from new movements that combined the religious and the political. In an Egyptstill under British occupation and whose parliamentary system was completelydiscredited due to palace interference, party corruption and an increasing resort toviolence, fascism seemed to provide an attractive alternative.18 The Italian andGerman regimes had been able to restore their nations’ self-confidence and pres-tige, and they did so by challenging the main colonial powers, Britain and France.Paramilitary organisations modelled on Mussolini’s Black Shirts and Hitler’sbrown-shirted storm-troopers proliferated. The first were the Green Shirts ofYoung Egypt [Mi r al-Fat[amacr ] t], a pseudo-fascist party set up by A mad usayn in1933 which had as its slogan ‘Country, Islam and King’. To challenge the GreenShirts, notorious for their provocations and general hooliganism, and strengthenits control over its own supporters, the nationalist Wafd party launched the Leagueof Wafdist Youth, popularly known as the Blue Shirts. For their part, the MuslimBrothers had their yellow-shirted Rovers’ brigades, which would become the larg-est and best organised of all the paramilitary groups.19

It was not uncommon for the Brothers’ Rovers and the Green Shirts to holdrallies to mark the same occasions (the prophet’s birthday, the anniversary of theking’s coronation), or to protest against the same evils (colonialism, Zionism).When they met, shouting matches would ensue, occasionally followed by scuf-fles. Nonetheless, the two groups shared many features: both were vocal in theirsupport of the monarchy20 and received, in turn, the backing of young king F[amacr ] r[umacr

] q, who saw them as a useful tool against the Wafd and shared their leaningtowards the Axis powers.21 Both were fiercely anti-communist and critical ofparty politics. A mad usayn did not hide his admiration for Hitler and Musso-lini; shaykh al-Bann[amacr ] hailed them as, ‘the leaders of modern revival in Europe’,and made of Hitler a model for his followers on a par with Muslim heroes like(first caliph) Ab[umacr ] Bakr, Saladin and Abd al- Az[imacr ] z ibn al-Sa d.22 Moreover,Young Egypt gradually Islamised its discourse – it would change its name to theNationalist Islamic Party in 1940 – and sought to outdo the Brothers by attackingbars and other ‘places of sin’. Conversely, the Brothers adopted their rivals’ popu-lism, and started demanding land reform (compensating landowners), and thenationalisation of foreign companies. usayn even approached the shaykh tosuggest a merger.23 In fact, the two movements were so alike that an irritated al-Bann[amacr ] felt compelled to clarify that the Society ‘was not a branch of YoungEgypt’.24

Even apparent ideological differences are less significant than might appear atfirst sight: usayn was an ultranationalist, whereas al-Bann[amacr ] stressed the impor-tance of religious identity. However, he believed that Islam dictates love forone’s land – as shown by the prophet’s longing for Mecca – and the capture ofothers. After all, had it not inspired ‘the most righteous of colonisations, the mostblessed of conquests’?25 He often remarked on the special status of Arabs inIslam,26 and argued that Egypt was the natural leader of all Muslim nations.27 Healso attached great importance to the strengthening of the armed forces, whichhe considered a religious duty and included among the priorities to be financedby zak[amacr ] t (religious alms).28

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On a different topic, usayn was strident in his denunciation of parliamentarydemocracy and the Egyptian constitution. Al-Bann[amacr ] affirmed that the parliamen-tary system was not incompatible with Islam, but insisted that the existence ofpolitical parties was contrary to the spirit of unity and common purpose thatshould inspire Muslim societies. He stressed that there should only be one party,with a unique programme: to implement the shar[imacr ] a.29 In addition, only certaintypes of people, identified by tradition, should be allowed to run as candidates:knowledgeable ulema,30 heads of families and clans and experts.31 Regarding theConstitution, al-Bann[amacr ] asserted its compatibility with Islam and used the articlestating that Islam was the religion of the state to demand the amendment or rejec-tion of all ‘un-Islamic’ legislation.32 Nonetheless, he is also quoted as envisioningits radical revision with a view to unifying all powers, and even criticising theconcept of a constitution itself, as ‘an alien garment, unsuited to our tastes, ourtraditions and our ideas’.33

Returning to the Society’s paramilitary brigades – the Rovers – they had startedoff in Ismailia as sports and excursion groups to promote the fitness that is pleas-ing to God and necessary to fulfil the duties prescribed by religion, such asprayer, fasting or pilgrimage.34 Physical exercise was also perceived as a safeoutlet for the sexual energies of the young.35 When al-Bann[amacr ] moved to Cairo,those groups were organised along the lines of the Scout movement, and all‘active’ Brothers of the appropriate age were required to join their brigades.36 Onthe other hand, their martial character acted as a magnet for the youth, andmembership of the Rovers became a stepping stone into the Society. Theirnumber increased steadily throughout the 1930s and 1940s, in 1948 reaching75,000.37 Many of their activities were not unlike those of more conventionalscouts: marching, camping, participating in sanitation campaigns, assisting inpublic crises such as floods and epidemics and so on.38 However, their militarydemeanour and training led some to believe that al-Bann[amacr ] was preparing a coup,and when the Society was disbanded in 1948, the immense majority of thosearrested were Rovers.39 Nonetheless, one of the historic leaders of the MuslimBrothers, A mad Kam[amacr ] l, maintained that it was clear from the emphasis onparading that the Rovers’ main role was propagandistic – and, crucially, to divertattention from the Society’s secret elite corps.40

The latter, known internally as the Special Organisation [al-ni [amacr ] m al-kha ] – or,more descriptively, the Secret Apparatus [al-jih[amacr ] z al-sirr[imacr ] ] – would play a decisiveand unfortunate role in the Society’s history. It was rumoured to have appearedduring the Second World War, after the Society had its first serious clashes withthe government and its leaders, including al-Bann[amacr ] , were briefly banished, thenjailed due to their anti-British agitation and alleged plotting.41 Its members – maybearound 1000 in 1948 – were carefully selected, after which they underwent a gruel-ling military, intellectual and spiritual training programme. The Society’s membersand sympathisers claim that the Secret Apparatus was established to fight colonial-ism and Zionism, and have sought to exonerate al-Bann[amacr ] of its excesses.42 In anycase, its violence against Egyptian targets and its assassination of several Egyptianpublic figures turned the ruling elites against the Brothers. Al-Banna pretendedthat such attacks were the work of a few disaffected youths, and denounced aconspiracy by, ‘international Judaism, Zionism, colonialism and the advocates ofatheism and debauchery’.43 All was to prove in vain. After the banning of the Soci-ety and the imprisonment of many of its members, al-Bann[amacr ] himself was assassi-nated, most probably by the king’s secret police, in February 1949.

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However, at the height of its strength, the Muslim Brothers’ Society did notonly appeal to zealous youths looking for an outlet for their energies. Its ideol-ogy was attractive and easy to understand to a population that was deeplyreligious, overwhelmingly illiterate, dismayed at the perceived moral declineand alienated from the westernised political and intellectual elites. Its schools,clinics, social welfare section and small industries provided basic services,financial aid and jobs to the underprivileged masses that bore the brunt of the1929 crisis, which was felt well into the 1930s, and the rise in unemploymentprovoked by the withdrawal of Allied troops after the Second World War. Itsuncompromisingly anti-British stance attracted the backing of Egyptian nation-alists, particularly after the disappointing 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement,which many viewed as a betrayal. This feeling was further exacerbated by thehumiliating capitulation of the king in 1942, when British tanks crushed thegates of the Abd[imacr ] n palace to impose a government more amenable to theAllies. Conversely, the role of the Wafd in both events, combined with accusa-tions of corruption and abuse of power, cost it dearly. Furthermore, theSociety’s vocal anti-Zionism and active support for the Palestinians earned itpraise from both the old al-Man[amacr ] r party and the incipient pan-Arabistmovement.44

More importantly, the Society was able to secure the backing of the middle andlower-middle classes, together with a significant proportion of the ruling oligarchy,with its conservative socio-economic programme. Al-Bann[amacr ] stressed the God-given right to private property and, adopting a theme reminiscent of the Protestantethic, equated work with worship.45 He endorsed the existence of ‘God-sanctioned’social inequalities, to be attenuated by institutionalised zak[amacr ] t.46 Finally, he envi-sioned a corporate society in which the worker was aware of his duties towards,‘God, himself, and the owner of the plant’.47 It seems undeniable that the MuslimBrothers received financial support from rich patrons, including the palace.48 Notsurprisingly, they were denounced by their political opponents as the tool of capi-talist landlords and industrialists.49 Al-Bann[amacr ] replied that they had never taken ‘asingle piaster’ from anybody, and that all their funds came from what theirmembers could economise ‘from their children’s food’.50 Building on that idea, hisadvocates have tried to depict the Society as a revolutionary organisation thatworked for the promotion of the working classes or, even more outlandishly, as anearly Muslim version of the ‘liberation theology’ movement.51 The fact is that alarge portion of its membership and the immense majority of its cadres were crafts-men, traders and professionals, and more dispassionate observers consider theSociety a middle-class reaction to the socio-political and cultural circumstances ofthe time.52

Islam as an ‘Integral’ System

The consequences of the politicisation of Islam, however, went beyond thecreation of a mass movement. It also led to a new conception of the Muslim reli-gion. Again, comparisons with the Catholic Church are enlightening. At a timewhen the papacy was appealing for an ‘integral Catholicism’, defined as one‘which applies itself to every need of the society of our times, evoked in the lightof its doctrine’,53 al-Bann[amacr ] started to talk of Islam as an ‘integral’ or ‘comprehen-sive’ system [ni [amacr ] m sh[amacr ] mil], which should regulate all aspects of life. Let us look atjust a few examples:

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We believe that the rulings and precepts of Islam are comprehensive andorganise the affairs of this life and the next, and that those who think thatits precepts are only concerned with the ritual or the spiritual are wrong.Islam is creed and worship, nation and nationality, religion and state,spirituality and action, Book and sword.54

Islam is a comprehensive system, concerned with all aspects of life. It iscountry and nation, government and umma. It is ethics and power, mercyand justice. It is culture and law, science and judiciary. It is matter andwealth, gain and prosperity. It is holy war [jih[amacr ] d] and calling [da wa],55

militia and idea. It is true creed and correct worship, indistinctively.56

Do not forget, Brothers, that God has blessed you by granting you acorrect understanding of Islam, as straightforward, comprehensive, suffi-cient, complete … You have understood it rightly: creed and worship,nation and nationality, ethics and matter, kindness and strength, cultureand law. You have believed in it in its true nature: religion and state,government and umma, Book and sword, and stewardship from God toMuslims over all nations [ummas] on Earth.57

In Islamist circles, it has become commonplace to insist on shum[umacr ] liyyat al-Islam,the ‘totality’ of Islam, but the novelty of such a discourse cannot be emphasisedenough. The Islamists themselves credit al-Bann[amacr ] with coming up with the concept,although they claim that he merely recovered the true essence of Islam.58 The clas-sical authors never referred to Islam as sh[amacr ] mil, a modern term used to characterisethe totalitarian doctrines that appeared in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. By adopt-ing it, al-Bann[amacr ] was trying to challenge the separation of religion and state which,for the Islamists, was the corollary of an unfortunate concatenation of circum-stances. First, the ulema ‘closed the door of ijtih[amacr ] d’ (the personal effort of interpre-tation of the Koran and the Sunna to find answers to new questions), thereby failingto adapt Islam to the new times. As a result, Muslim rulers had been forced to aban-don the shar[imacr ] a and resort to foreign laws and institutions. That had paved the wayfor foreign domination, eventually leading to the abolishment of the caliphate.59 Inreality, for a significant part of its history, the caliph was a mere figurehead instru-mentalised by powerful political dynasties to legitimise and strengthen their rule.And even at the height of the Islamic empire, the shar[imacr ] a was insufficient to fulfil itsjuridical needs due to its silence on numerous topics and the rigidity of its proce-dure.60 But historical fact has never been the forte of political ideologues.

Al-Bann[amacr ] is often considered the intellectual heir of Jam[amacr ] l al-D[imacr ] n al-Afgh[amacr ] n[imacr ]

and Mu ammad Abduh because, like them, he argued for the need to go back tothe path of the salaf, the righteous ancestors, and practice ijtih[amacr ] d. However, theformers’ Salafism had been an attempt to circumvent the stringency of traditionand recover the first Muslims’ undogmatic approach to religion in order to justifythe adoption of western institutions and practices, which they saw as essential toshake the Islamic world out of its torpor. Al-Afgh[amacr ] n[imacr ] revamped the Arab tribalcustom of sh[umacr ] rà [consultation] – only mentioned twice, and rather vaguely, in theKoran – into a Muslim version of the parliamentary system. Abduh identified theshar[imacr ] a with natural law, and reformulated the notion of ma la a [public welfare]to legitimise the use of reason in deciding what constituted the best interest of theMuslim community. In contrast, al-Bann[amacr ] seemed reluctant to depart from the

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dictates of tradition, as shown by his understanding of parliamentary democracy,and distrusted reason, which he deemed in continuous need of God’s guidance.61

Al-Afgh[amacr ] n[imacr ] and Abduh used the term taql[imacr ] d [imitation] to designate the ulema’sblind imitation of their predecessors; al-Bann[amacr ] used it to allude to his contempo-raries’ imitation of the West. As Nazih Ayubi has pointed out, ‘whereas the earlier“Islamic reformers” such as Afghani and ‘Abdu were striving to modernise Islam,the following generation of Islamists such as al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherswere striving to Islamicise modernity’.62

The concept of the ‘totality of Islam’ was, therefore, al-Bann[amacr ] ’s response to theuncertainties of modernity. Islam, he insisted, provided a blueprint for this lifeand the next, for all peoples, in all places, and at all times.63 He rejected the ‘colo-nised, submissive and servile Islam’ that accepts its confinement to the privatesphere, and condemned the distinction between religion and state as a foreignillegitimate innovation [bid a].64 In his opinion, Islam must have executive andjudicial authority. It is useless for the preacher to repeat that alcohol is the work ofthe devil if the law allows drinking and the police protect the drinker, and evenmake sure that he gets home safe and sound!65 Consequently, Muslims must bepolitical. Those for whom politics is not an integral part of Islam are at best igno-rant of their religion – at worse, its enemies.66 Indeed, in al-Bann[amacr ] ’s eyes, the onlyreal Muslims are those who agreed with the Muslim Brothers’ understanding ofIslam.67 He described the Society’s objective as ‘the hope of every Muslim, thewish of every believer’; its da wa, as ‘the legacy of the messenger of God’ and itsprogramme, ‘the guidance of the Lord of the two worlds’ – and he considered anydeviation from that programme tantamount to a deviation from Islam itself.68

In his epistle ‘Towards the light’, addressed to King F[amacr ] r[umacr ] q and to Egyptian,Arab and Muslim political leaders in 1936, al-Bann[amacr ] asserted that Islam providesall the elements a budding state needs: hope, ambition and determination; anationalism in which loyalty to one’s country does not preclude devotion to thewhole umma; discipline and obedience, to implant the military spirit in the soulsof the nation’s sons; a concern for public health; thirst for knowledge; a moralcode; the fundamentals of an economic policy.69 Similarly, he stressed the totalityof Islam in his 1939 epistle ‘Under the banner of the Koran’, in which he laid outthe institutional and political underpinnings of the Islamic state:

A domestic policy that fulfils the divine injunction:

‘So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follownot their desires, but beware of them lest they seduce thee from some partof that which Allah hath revealed unto thee.’ (Koran 5:49)70

A foreign policy that fulfils the Koranic injunction:

‘Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnessesagainst mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you.’(Koran 2:143)

A judicial system derived from the noble verse:

‘But nay, by thy lord, they will not believe [in truth] until they make theejudge of what is in dispute between them and find within themselves no

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dislike of that which thou decidest, and submit with full submission.’(Koran 4:65)

A defence and military policy that realises the objectives of the generalcall to arms:

‘Go forth, light armed and heavy armed, and strive with your wealth andyour lives in the way of Allah!’ (Koran 9:41)

An independent economic policy to manage individual and state wealth,based on the divine injunction:

‘Give not unto the foolish [what is in] your [keeping of their] wealth,which Allah hath given you to maintain.‘ (Koran 4:5)

A cultural and educational policy that puts an end to ignorance andobscurantism, matching the sublimeness of the first revealed verse of theBook of God:

‘Read: In the name of thy Lord who createth.’ (Koran 96:1)71

A family policy that rears the Muslim boy, the Muslim girl and theMuslim man, realising the divine injunction:

‘O ye who believe! Ward off from yourselves and your families a Firewhereof the fuel is men and stones [i.e. hell].’ (Koran 66:6)

A moral system for the individual which accomplishes the salvationintended by the divine teaching:

‘He is indeed successful who causeth it to grow [i.e. the soul].’ (Koran 91:9)

Finally, a general spirit that dominates all individuals of the umma, bethey the ruler or the ruled, on the basis of God’s words:

‘But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah hath given theeand neglect not thy portion of the world, and be thou kind even as Allahhath been kind to thee, and seek not corruption in the earth.’ (Koran 28:77)72

As well as espousing these general principles, al-Bann[amacr ] also proposed concretemeasures to deal with the political, economic and, as he saw it, moral crisis thatplagued Egyptian society. In ‘Towards the light’ he set 50 main objectives, underthe headings ‘Political, judicial and administrative goals’, ‘Social and educationalgoals’ and ‘Economic goals’. Most of them have a religious and/or moral charac-ter, like the amendment of all laws so that they conformed to the shar[imacr ] a; the insti-tutionalised collection and distribution of zak[amacr ] t [legal alms]; the banning ofdancing, gambling, alcohol and usury;73 the development of links with otherMuslim states so as to prepare the ground to give ‘serious consideration’ to thequestion of the caliphate;74 censorship of the theatre, cinema, music and literature;punishing the neglect of religious duties (prayer, fasting, etc.) and moral

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‘offences’ by, for example, flogging adulterers;75 scrutinising the private life ofgovernment employees and café regulars; a complete segregation of the sexes ineducation and within society as a whole;76 the promotion of marriage and procre-ation; making religion a basic subject at all levels of education, including univer-sity; reviewing the girls’ curriculum to make it distinct from that of boys;77 theprevention of bribes and nepotism; and employing graduates of al-Azhar in thepublic service and in the army.78

On the other hand, the list includes a number of proposals that have no clearIslamic basis, such as encouraging projects to provide jobs for the unemployed,nationalising foreign-owned firms, improving the productivity of peasants andindustrial workers, reducing the power of monopolies, promoting public health andexploiting natural resources.79 A decade later, the shaykh reiterated these measuresin a treatise entitled, ‘Our problem in the light of the Islamic system’, and he addedothers, notably universal social security, industrialisation and land reform.80 Hecould always find a prophetic tradition or a Koranic verse to support his espousalof any particular policy. In favour of industrialisation he quoted, among others, thetradition ‘God loves the skilful believer’, together with the verse ‘and We revealediron, wherein is mighty power and [many] uses for mankind’ (Koran 57:25).81

However, the Muslim Brothers’ programme was akin to that of the radical nation-alists, and many of its proposals – a single party, land reform, social justice, statecontrol of the economy, a corporatist vision of society – would be implemented bythe Free Officers after the 1952 Revolution.82 What distinguished al-Bann[amacr ] ’s visionwas his conviction that the first cause of Egypt’s problems was moral corruption,and that the solution necessarily involved a return to Islamic values.

Totalitarian Structure of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s Thought

The similarity between Islamism and political religions such as Marxism andNazism has often been pointed out. In an article recently published by this jour-nal, Hendrik Hansen and Peter Kainz compared the thought of Sayyid Qutb tothat of Karl Marx and Adolf Hitler. The authors concluded:

This analysis of the three ideologies shows that they are all based on thesame structure. History is always interpreted as a process of decline, inwhich a fundamentally evil power has brought mankind to the verge ofdisaster and threatens its very existence. A particular group of people isthe standard-bearer of hope and, as the personification of good, has themission of saving humankind from doom and ridding it of evil. Thisgroup will then realise the utopia of the classless society, the natural racestruggle, or the purified society of followers of the true faith.83

Sayyid Qutb, who was one of the leading members of the Muslim Brothers’Society from the early 1950s until his execution in 1966, is invariably blamed forIslamism’s totalitarian drift, not least by the Brothers themselves.84 However,Qutb was a great admirer of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s and considered himself loyal to his legacy.In any case, it is difficult to imagine that he would have become the Society’s mainideologue had his thought constituted a radical departure from that of its vener-ated founder. In this section, we will use the structure proposed by Hansen andKainz to further argue that, far from being Qutb’s addition to Islamism, totalitari-anism was already one of the constitutive elements of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s worldview.

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History as a Process of Decline

asan al-Bann[amacr ] attributed the decline of the Muslim world to its abandonmentof religion, and was convinced that its rebirth required a return to the teachingsof Islam.85 He maintained that the Islamic programme had been ‘tested byhistory, when it created the strongest, most virtuous, most merciful, most blessedof ummas’.86 In his idealised vision of history, the prophet and his Companionsfought Jihad not to satisfy their personal ambitions, acquire booty or subjectother peoples, but to fulfil the mission they had been burdened with: to spreadthe da wa. They were noble knights prepared to sacrifice everything theypossessed, including their lives, for the sake of God. They fought merciful wars,in which there was no plundering, stealing or rape. Their intention was to civi-lise, to teach and to lead toward the Truth. When they conquered a land, the sunof Mohammedan guidance [al-hid[amacr ] ya al-mu ammadiyya] shone over the souls ofits people, and there was no question of any triumphant conqueror or defeatedenemy; they all became loving brothers. What a contrast with modern colonial-ism! What a contrast with the wars waged by the ‘civilised’ nations! What acontrast with ‘their’ international law!87

The shaykh offered his most comprehensive analysis of history in his 1942 epis-tle ‘Between yesterday and today’: the ideal society was embodied in the virtuousIslamic state established by prophet Mu ammad and continued by his immediatesuccessors. Based on unshakable faith in the principles of Islam, and characterisedby complete social and political unity, that state had been able to create a power-ful empire that relegated Christianity to a defensive position within the ByzantineEmpire and destroyed the religious and political authority of ‘devious Judaism’,confining it to a narrow region.88 Its armed forces enjoyed complete mastery overland and sea, and its language and religion succeeded in Arabising and Islamis-ing peoples of other civilisations, while accepting what was beneficial from themas long as it did not threaten its unity.89 Alas, Muslims gradually deviated fromthe precepts of Islam, thus bringing about their state’s ruin. The reasons for thatdownfall can be classified under the following headings:

Political factors – infighting among Arab leaders, which led to power falling intothe hands of non-Arabs – Persians, Daylamites, Mamluks,90 Turks – who ‘hadnever tasted true Islam’ because they had not been Arabised.91 Contrary to al-Afgh[amacr ] n[imacr ] , Abduh and Ri [amacr ] , al-Bann[amacr ] did not include among the political factorsof Muslim weakness the neglect of sh[umacr ] rà and the transformation of the caliphateinto a hereditary dynasty.

Social factors – the uncontrolled enjoyment of luxury and sensual pleasures.92 Asshown above, al-Bann[amacr ] ’s biography reveals a puritanical obsession with enforc-ing morality, and in his epistles he often quotes the Koranic verse ‘Allah changethnot the condition of a folk until they [first] change that which is in their hearts’(13:11), which had already been a favourite of his predecessors.93 Elsewhere, headded as social factors of decadence ‘the tyranny of women, the depravity of theyoung and the abandonment of Jihad’.94 He was particularly concerned withthe first, which he dubbed ‘the primary evil that ruins the social structure of theumma’ and regarded as a consequence of, ‘women overstep[ping] the limits thatreligion has prescribed them, flout[ing] natural law and disregard[ing] their taskin life’.95

Intellectual factors – rivalries and controversies between the different religioussects and schools, and the reduction of religion to ‘dead words and expressions,

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with neither spirit nor life’.96 The shaykh wished to recover the simplicity of origi-nal Islam, when ‘a Bedouin could sit with the prophet (peace be upon him) a fewminutes or one hour and, when he got up, he was a Muslim’.97 He was also eagerto overcome sectarian differences yet insisted that they were inevitable, evendesirable, and that Muslims should be tolerant amongst themselves.98 He identi-fied a second intellectual factor of decline, namely that Muslims neglected theapplied sciences and wasted their time with speculative philosophies and pseudo-sciences; in the meantime rival nations developed, until they caught the ummaunawares.99

External factors – the enemies of Islam, always lying in wait, were able to takeadvantage of Muslim weaknesses on two occasions: the Tatars and the Crusaders,in the sixth century after the Hijra (twelfth century A.D.); and the modern colonialpowers, in the fourteenth century (nineteenth and twentieth centuries A.D.).100 Al-Bann[amacr ] perceived a Muslim world under siege politically, economically, intellectu-ally, socially, psychologically, militarily and culturally.101 He emphasised thedangers of cultural colonialism. Dazzled and deceived by the West, Muslimswere abandoning Islam to imitate the Europeans – especially the rulers, ‘raised onthe laps of foreigners’.102 In effect, the shaykh paid special attention to the western-isation of the elites. Among the 50 measures mentioned above can be included,‘(p)utting an end to the foreign spirit in the home with regard to language,customs, dress, governesses, nurses, etc. All this should be corrected, particularlyin upper-class homes’.103

Al-Bann[amacr ] was extremely critical of the West. He claimed that its people hadbeen seduced by demons, that its materialism had killed all compassion and spir-ituality, that its most prominent features were atheism, lechery, selfishness andusury.104 Its nominal Christianity was but a tool to subjugate the ignorant andjustify the conquest of the rest of the world.105 He dismissed its achievements,contending that all its scientific, intellectual and artistic progress had been unableto bring happiness, feed the hungry or eradicate crime.106 Furthermore, anythingthe western systems had to offer, Islam had offered first.107 According to theshaykh, westerners were well aware that the only chance of a revival for the Eastwas through Islam, so they tried to tempt Muslims away from their religion withtheir liquors, their theatres, their cabarets, their ‘half-naked’ women, and to sowdoubt and atheism in their souls with their schools and cultural centres.108

However, that aggression had had the opposite effect, and instead had given riseto resistance in the shape of nationalism and Islamism.109

Confronted with the decadence and fragmentation that afflicted Muslims as aconsequence of these factors, al-Bann[amacr ] set two main goals for the Muslim Brothers:first, to liberate the Muslim world from all foreign authority; second, to establishan Islamic state, because until such a state existed ‘all Muslims are living in sin’.110

In his 1936 epistle to King F[amacr ] r[umacr ] q, he tried to persuade him of the merits of anIslamic order. Egypt, he wrote, was at a crossroads, and had to choose between‘the way of appetites and vanities’, in other words, the western model, and ‘theway of Truth’, namely Islam. In the way of Europe there is ‘ostentation and splen-dour, delights and luxury, dissipation and licentiousness’, while the way of Islamis ‘glory and fortitude, truth and strength, blessedness and righteousness, firm-ness, virtue and nobility’. And he urged the king: ‘Take the umma down this way,and may God grant you success! Be the first to come forward in the name of theprophet of God, peace be upon him, with the medicine of the Koran, to save thistormented, ailing world!’111

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The Muslim Brothers as the Standard-bearers of Hope

In the mid-1930s, al-Bann[amacr ] saw the western masters of the world plagued bydictatorship, economic crisis and the absence of values, and confidently assertedthat they stood at the edge of the abyss.112 After the Second World War he paintedan even bleaker picture: the West – which included the two Cold War blocks –had completely abandoned the noble principles it had pretended to espouse in itshour of need, and the possibility of a third world war in which nuclear weaponsmight be used conjured up images reminiscent of the Day of Judgement. Mean-while, the Arab and Muslim lands continued to be subjected politically andcorrupted morally, and their societies were ravaged by poverty and unemploy-ment.113 Fortunately, the Brothers held ‘the torch of light, the bottle of medicine’to guide humanity and cure all its ills.114 The shaykh instilled in his disciples a feel-ing of belonging to an elite destined to save the umma and ready for self-sacrifice.Those unwilling or unable to pay the ultimate price were asked to ‘move awayfrom the ranks so as to allow God’s brigade to advance’.115 He required fromthem complete dedication, and told them that the da wa was incompatible withother loyalties.116 He distinguished them from other Muslims, in that the latter’sfaith was dead – or, at best, asleep – whereas that of the Brothers burned brightlyin their souls.117 He categorised people into groups, depending on their attitudeto the Society and to Islam, and directed the Brothers to relate to them accord-ingly.118

During the sixth general congress, held in 1941, he exhorted them:

Remember it well, Brothers! You are exceptional beings who act with integ-rity when everybody else has been corrupted. You are a new way of think-ing with which God shows humanity the difference between right andwrong at a time the two are confused. You are the preachers of Islam, thebearers of the Koran, the connection between heaven and earth, the heirsof Mu ammad (peace be upon him), the successors of his Companions …Remember it well, Brothers! Your da wa is the purest of da wa-s, your Societyis the most honourable of societies!119

A year later, he reminded them in ‘Between yesterday and today’:

Brothers! You are not a charitable society, nor a political party, nor anorganisation with limited aims. You are a new spirit that makes its wayto the heart of this umma, reviving it with the Koran. You are a new lightthat shines, dispelling the darkness of materialism with the knowledgeof God. You are a resounding voice that rises, echoing the message of theMessenger (peace be upon him). In truth and without exaggeration, youmust feel that you are bearing this burden, which humanity hasneglected.120

And in 1947, he addressed the Rovers as follows:

You are not boys. You are the soldiers of the Koran, the brigades of God,the followers of the prophet’ message. Those who think that they canprevent you from realising your aims and achieving your objectives withslanders and insults, or with threats and banishment, will not succeed.

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For what is your aim, but the triumph of Islam? And what is your objec-tive, but to institute the state of the Koran? They do not know the faiththat has captured your hearts. They do not know the strength containedin your souls – and that God is behind it, supporting you.121

Examples of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s messianic rhetoric abound. Elsewhere, he referred tothe Muslim Brothers as ‘the heirs to the Koran from the prophet of God …, thedepositaries of his shar[imacr ] a’; as ‘monks by night, knights by day’, just like Mu am-mad’s Companions. He even went as far as to describe them as ‘the Companions[sic] of the prophet of God, the bearers of his banner’.122 The Society’s slogan, sooften used to great effect in rallies and demonstrations, was: ‘God is our goal, theprophet is our leader, the Koran is our constitution, jih[amacr ] d is our path, and dyingfor the sake of God is the loftiest of our wishes’.123 Furthermore, the shaykh spokeof death as the most beautiful of arts, leading from the harshness of worldly life toeternal bliss, and promised the Brothers victory or martyrdom, and God’sreward.124 Time and again he repeated that God grants victory to those whostruggle [muj[amacr ] hid[umacr ] n], that today’s dreams are tomorrow’s realities, that the onlyobstacle is despair.125

The Way to Utopia

In the Khaldunian vision of history proposed by al-Bann[amacr ] , the pendulum ofpower oscillated between East and West throughout history. However, hepredicted, that cycle would be broken when supremacy returned to the East andhumanity reached a stadium of unity and perfection within the Islamic order.126

He believed that God had designated Muslims as the guardians of mankind, andgranted them dominion over it to guide it to Islam.127 He spoke of the inexorablespread of his Society’s message from the individual member to his family, to soci-ety at large, to the government, to the umma and, finally, to the whole worldwhen, ‘religion [will be] all for Allah’ (Koran 8:39).128 The initial strategy to bringabout that vision was to educate the masses, but al-Bann[amacr ] warned that othermeasures would be needed, ‘some soft, others hard’ because the Brothers wouldhave to confront the opposition and hostility of those who did not understand thetruth of Islam.129 He had an action plan to be implemented in three stages: in thefirst, the Society would spread by preaching, providing social services and settingup projects and businesses. The second stage would require the spiritual and mili-tary formation of the troops. The third and final stage would see the implementa-tion of the message through an Islamic government.130 By 1943, the shaykh saw theMuslim Brothers well into the second stage, and getting ready for the third.131

Al-Bann[amacr ] explored lawful means of gaining power: in 1939 he tried to persuadeprime minister Al[imacr ] M[amacr ] hir to put the ministry of social affairs and the territorialarmy effectively in the hands of the Muslim Brothers, ‘who have been performingthose functions with great effectiveness for many years’.132 He also decided to runfor parliament twice, in 1942 and 1945, although on the first occasion he reachedan agreement with the government to withdraw his candidature, while his 1945attempt was thwarted by electoral corruption. He did not, however, rule out theuse of violence if other methods proved ineffective.133 He warned those whostood in the way of the Muslim Brothers that the choice was between loyalty andenmity, and that they would not hesitate to declare war on anybody ‘who d[id]not work for the victory of Islam’.134 In addition, he wrote that holy war was a

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prescription as important as prayer or fasting, to be included among the fivepillars of Islam,135 and stressed that the da wa requires Jihad and sacrifice, and thatmartyrdom is the highest level of faith.136 He vowed to his disciples, eager to seeaction, that he would lead them against ‘all the obstinate despots’ once they hadformed, ‘three hundred brigades equipped spiritually with faith and doctrine,mentally with knowledge and culture, physically with training and exercise’ –and reassured them that the wait would not be long.137

The same ambiguity characterised the shaykh’s attitude to non-Muslims. On theone hand, he highlighted Islam’s protective and benevolent attitude to minoritiesand foreigners,138 and even conceded that they might be employed by a Muslimgovernment, as long as they did not occupy positions of leadership.139 He alsodeclared that peaceful relations with non-Muslim states were possible, althoughMuslims had the duty to invite them ‘insistently’ to embrace Islam.140 Still, hiswritings suggest that his tolerance was limited to non-Muslims prepared toaccept Muslim domination and the implementation of the shar[imacr ] a.141 Moreover, hedeclared that the Muslim Brothers should not content themselves with liberatingMuslim lands from the colonisers’ yoke, but that they should chase the oppres-sors back to their own countries, ‘until everyone is convinced of the Koran’steachings and calls out the prophet’s name, and the shadow of Islam stretchesover the whole world’.142 His treatise ‘Peace in Islam’, which discusses thecircumstances in which war is permissible, quotes the Koranic verse that legiti-mates the extortion of jizya [a tax paid by non-Muslims], and a had[imacr ] th according towhich Muslims must fight until all people proclaim that, ‘there is no God but Godand Mu ammad is the prophet of God’.143 His epistle ‘On jih[amacr ] d’ quotes the sameverse, together with a had[imacr ] th which asserts that fighting ahl al-kit[amacr ] b [people of theBook, i.e. Jews and Christians] carries a double reward from God.144

Conclusion

This essay has illustrated the impact of totalitarianism on the founder of theMuslim Brothers’ Society, shaykh asan al-Bann[amacr ] . The evidence strongly indicatesthat he was a man fascinated by fascism – like many of his compatriots at thattime – and well aware of the propagandistic effect of resounding slogans andmass rallies. There were striking similarities between his Society and the mostfascist of Egyptian parties, Young Egypt, and both received generous supportfrom the pro-Axis palace and, possibly, the Axis powers themselves.145 Al-Bann[amacr ]

reformulated Islam into an ‘integral’ or ‘total’ system, capable of offering acomprehensive solution to all the problems of modernity. Finally, his worldviewfits into the structure of other totalitarianisms, with its portrayal of history as aprocess of decline from a mythical past, its depiction of the Muslim Brothers asthe saviours of the nation (in this case, the umma), and his plan to recover the lostutopia. The shaykh was also a social conservative who courted the king’s favour,insisted on the sacredness of private property and longed for a more innocenttime when cabarets did not exist and women stayed at home. Yet again, thefascists’ praxis was always rather more conservative than their rhetoric.

That conservatism is perhaps the most notable difference between asan al-Bann[amacr ] and Sayyid Qutb, and reflects their different circumstances. Al-Bann[amacr ]

believed that power was obtainable, and therefore behaved as a pragmatic politi-cian, although his bargaining power depended to a great extent on his controlover his young, excitable followers, and he must have been aware that he was

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playing a dangerous game. By the mid-1950s, the situation had radically changed.For a brief period, the Muslim Brothers had come tantalisingly close to power as aresult of their alliance with the Free Officer, only to see it slip away and findthemselves the target of terrible repression. Isolated from the world in his prisoncell, Qutb condemned all Muslim societies as un-Islamic and, no longer burdenedby practical considerations, imagined a pristine Islamic order under which every-thing would be transformed. As well as bitter disappointment, Ayubi addsanother reason for this radicalisation: the failure of the Nasserist socio-economicproject, which was very similar to that espoused by the Brothers. ‘The immediatetask had therefore to be to break completely with that project … and to transmitthe whole situation to the Almighty in the hope that, with His grace, somethingbetter might eventually emerge.’146 Given the messianism already present in al-Bann[amacr ] ’s discourse, that transition was fairly straightforward.

Establishing the totalitarian roots of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s thought is not merely anacademic exercise. Modern-day Muslim Brothers and so-called moderate Islamistslike Y[umacr ] suf al-Qara [amacr ] w[imacr ] , Jam[amacr ] l al-Bann[amacr ] or, in Europe, Tariq Ramadan, continueto defend al-Bann[amacr ] ’s legacy and to peddle the fiction that the radicalisation ofthe Muslim Brothers was the work of Sayyid Qutb and the Nasserist prisons. The‘martyred imam’ remains untouchable, unassailable, only on a par with theprophet’s Companions, or even the revered imam Al[imacr ] .147 Such veneration couldreadily be interpreted as an enduring adherence to his project, which, as we haveseen, was far from moderate. In fact, Islamism thrives not only on the perpetuationof the political, economic and social grievances that provoked its birth, but also onrhetoric derived from that of al-Bann[amacr ] , which feeds a radicalism always at risk ofspiralling out of control. Until mainstream Islamists deal with the most trouble-some aspects of this legacy, their moderation will remain questionable.

Notes

1. The exact date is not known. The confusion stems from the fact that al-Bann[amacr ] wrote that theSociety was established in Dhu al-Qi da 1347/March 1928; in reality, the Hegira date corre-sponds to April or May 1929.

2. The Sunna is the collection of ad[imacr ] ths, reports of prophet Mu ammad’s words and actions.3. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , Mudhakkar[amacr ] t al-da wa wa-l-d[amacr ] iya (Cairo: D[amacr ] r al-Shih[amacr ] b, 1966), pp.76–8.4. The main source of information about the early years of the Muslim Brothers’ Society is al-

Bann[amacr ] ’s memoirs, Mudhakkar[amacr ] t al-da wa wa-l-d[amacr ] iya (note 3), which first appeared in instalmentsin the Society’s newspaper in 1947. By then, the shaykh had become an important politicalfigure, so it is reasonable to assume that those memoirs were coloured by subsequent events.For instance, he recalls the feelings of grievance and disaffection he felt in Ismailia, a townthat symbolised foreign military and economic domination (ibid., p.75). However, he admitsaccepting a donation from no other than the Suez Canal Company (ibid., pp.94–5), whichwould seem to indicate that, back then, he was no firebrand anti-colonialist.

5. The im[amacr ] m is the prayer leader in the mosque. The ma dh[umacr ] n is the official authorised to conductMuslim marriages. The term shaykh designates someone with knowledge of the religioussciences. The nickname al-S[amacr ] [amacr ] t[imacr ] , ‘the watchmaker’, is an allusion to Abd al-Ra m[amacr ] n al-Bann[amacr ] ’strade.

6. Al-Man[amacr ] r was founded in 1898 and soon became one of the most influential Islamic publicationsin the Arab and Muslim worlds. Rash[imacr ] d Ri [amacr ] ’s stated intent was to follow in the footsteps ofmodernist reformers Jam[amacr ] l al-D[imacr ] n al-Afgh[amacr ] n[imacr ] and Mu ammad Abduh, although his thoughtwas rather more conservative than that of his predecessors. For more on this topic, see Ana BelénSoage, “Rash[imacr ] d Ri [amacr ] ’s Legacy”, The Muslim World 98/1 (January 2008).

7. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 3), p.16.8. Ibid., pp.18–19.9. Ibid., pp.24–5.

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10. Ibid., pp.50–51.11. Ibid., pp.58–9.12. Ibid., p.76. The term umma designates the community of all Muslims, but it can also mean

‘nation’ in the sense of a group of people who share a history and a language.13. Interview with Jam[amacr ] l al-Bann[amacr ] on 10 July 2007. Now in his eighties, asan al-Bann[amacr ] ’s younger

brother has become a noteworthy Islamist scholar on his own right.14. Richard P. Mitchell: The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969),

pp.214–16.15. Ras[amacr ] il is the plural of ris[amacr ] la, which means ‘message’, from the prosaic letter to the divine revela-

tion. The religious overtone of ‘epistle’ is intentional; that is how al-Bann[amacr ] ’s followers under-stood the messages from their leader. The shaykh’s grandson, Tariq Ramadan, uses the term‘épître’ in his apologetic Aux sources du renouveau musulman. D’al-Afghani à Hassan al-Bann[amacr ] : Unsiècle de réforme islamique (Paris: Bayard, 1998). David Wendell prefers ‘tract’, which isprobably more descriptive of the messages’ content and intent; see his Five Tracts of asan al-Bann[amacr ] (1906–1949): A Selection from the Majm[umacr ] at ras[amacr ] il al-im[amacr ] m al-shah[imacr ] d asan al-Bann[amacr ] (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1978).

16. Olivier Carré, Les Frères musulmans. Égypte et Syrie (1928–1982) (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p.21.17. Renato Moro, “Religion and Politics in the Time of Secularisation: the Sacralisation of Politics and

Politicisation of Religion”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 6/1 (2005), pp.82–3.18. Another interesting, and almost contemporary, example of the politisation of Islam is that of Ab[umacr ]

al-A là al-Mawd[umacr ] d[imacr ] , who founded Jam[amacr ] at-e-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] in Pakistan in 1941. The influence of Marxismon his thought has often been remarked.

19. The youth organisations were officially banned in 1938 – although not the Muslim Brothers’Rovers, thanks to their powerful connections and their registration with the Egyptian NationalScout Movement. However, the paramilitary groups continued to operate unofficially at leastuntil the 1952 revolution, and remained the most active section of the nationalist and anti-Britishmovement. In the post-1945 period, it was frequent for students of the different political partiesto clash with the police, and for members of the Muslim Brothers’ Society and of Young Egypt tobattle the Wafdists and the communists on the streets.

20. The Society’s press was extravagant in its praising of King F[amacr ] r[umacr ] q, and whole-heartedly supportedhis pretension to the caliphate. Al-Bann[amacr ] sycophantically described him as ‘the defender of theKoran’ and dubbed him ‘al-F[amacr ] r[umacr ] q’ – a reference to Umar ibn al-Kha [amacr ] b, the second caliph. Thatsupport would continue even as the king became increasingly unpopular due to his despotism anddissoluteness; see La [imacr ] fa Mu ammad S[amacr ] lim, F[amacr ] r[umacr ] q wa-suq[umacr ] al-malakiyya f[imacr ] Mi r (1936–1952) (Cairo:Maktabat Madb[umacr ] l[imacr ] , 1996), pp.696–9, 702–6.

21. British intelligence suspected both Young Egypt and the Muslim Brothers of receiving fundingfrom the Axis powers throughout the 1930s; see S[amacr ] lim (note 20), pp.659, 699. For his part, the kinghad known pro-Axis sympathies and sought to get closer to the likely future masters of the world.

22. Quoted in Abd al- A im Rama [amacr ] n, Dir[amacr ] s[amacr ] t f[imacr ] t[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh Mi r al-mu [amacr ] ir (Cairo: Al-markaz al- arab[imacr ]

li-l-ba th wa-l-nashr, 1980), p.286; al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (2), p.58. Even after the Axis powers’defeat, al-Bann[amacr ] kept a certain admiration for their regimes. He wrote in 1947: ‘Nazism andFascism came to power in Germany and Italy, and both Hitler and Mussolini guided theirpeople to unity, order, progress, strength and glory. Very soon, those countries ascended thesteps of internal rectitude and external prestige. Thus, hope was renewed in the souls, stagnantaspirations were reawakened and the whole country was united under one leader. When theFuhrer or the Duce spoke, the heavenly bodies trembled and the age took notice. And thenwhat happened? It became apparent that these powerful and cohesive systems in which thewill of the individual vanished in the will of the leaders went wrong when those leaders erred,were oppressive when they oppressed, strayed when they strayed, collapsed when they fell’;“Al-sal[amacr ] m f[imacr ] -l-Isl[amacr ] m” (1947), in asan al-Bann[amacr ] , Al-sal[amacr ] m f[imacr ] -l-Isl[amacr ] m wa-bu [umacr ] th ukhrà (Cairo: D[amacr ] ral-Fikr al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] , 195?, pp.5–50), pp.8–9. To be fair, the shaykh also contrasted Mussolini, Hitlerand Stalin’s aggressive militarism to Islam, which ‘has sanctified the use of force but leanstowards peace’; see Appendix (3), p.58. Furthermore, he often compared Muslim nationalism,based on love and fraternity, to the ‘racist’ and ‘aggressive’ European nationalism; seeAppendix (2), p.44; Appendix (3), pp.70–71; Appendix (8), pp.192–3.

23. Abd al- A im Rama [amacr ] n (note 22), pp.303–4.24. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (8), p.199.25. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), pp.20–21.26. Al-Bann[amacr ] , ibid., p.25; Appendix (6), pp.123–4; Appendix (8), p.192.27. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 3), p.263; Appendix (4), p.98; Appendix (5), p.109; Appendix (9), p.211.

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28. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), pp.86, 71–3.29. Al-Bann[amacr ] was probably right when he denounced the Egyptian political parties as corrupt and

self-serving. However, his opposition to them was more fundamental, and derived from hisconviction that Islam provides a clear and unambiguous programme for which there should be noalternative; see Appendix (10), pp.235–7; Appendix (14), pp.305–6; Appendix (8), p.197. He evenclaimed that parliamentarianism does not require parties, as shown in ‘many countries’; seeAppendix (8), p.197; Appendix (16), p.235. Mitchell quotes two articles published in the Society’snewspaper in 1946 in which the shaykh offers Russia and Turkey as examples of successful one-party systems – which is rather odd, given his profound dislike of communism and ‘kemalism’(see note 14, p.216).

30. The term used is al-fuqah[amacr ] al-mujt[amacr ] hid[umacr ] n, i.e. jurists able to derive rulings from the Koran and theSunna through ijtih[amacr ] d (personal effort of interpretation).

31. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (10), pp.238–40. Al-Bann[amacr ] refers to the three groups by the classical term ahlal- all wa-l- aqd, ‘those who [have the power to] bind and unbind’.

32. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (2), p.52; Appendix (8), p.190; Appendix (10), p.232.33.Quoted in riq al-Bishr[imacr ] , Al- araka al-siy[amacr ] siyya f[imacr ] Mi r 1945–1952 (Cairo: Al-Hay a al-Mi riyya al-

mma li-l-Kit[amacr ] b, 1972), p.57; and Rif at al-Sa [imacr ] d, Al-muta slim[umacr ] n. M[amacr ] dh[amacr ] fa al[umacr ] bi-l-Isl[amacr ] m … wa bi-n[amacr

] ? (Cairo: Maktabat al-Usra, 2004), p.150.34. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), p.74; Appendix (8), pp.170–1.35. As explained in an article published by Majallat al-Da wa quoted in Mitchell (note 14), p.201, n.

40. Mitchell adds that ‘scientific’ observers attributed to this fact the Society’s success amongstuniversity students.

36. In the Muslim Brothers’ third general conference, held in 1935, al-Bann[amacr ] defined four levels ofmembership: assistant, associate, active and ‘struggler’ (muj[amacr ] h[imacr ] d) (see note 3, p.194).

37. Mu ammad Shawq[imacr ] Zak[imacr ] , Al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[umacr ] n wa-l-mujtama al-mi r[imacr ] (Cairo: D[amacr ] r al-An [amacr ] r,1980), p.162. Mitchell gives the more modest figure of 40,000 (see note 14, p.201).

38. Zak[imacr ] (note 37), pp.159–62; Mitchell (note 14), p.202.39. Abd al- A [imacr ] m Rama [amacr ] n, Al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[umacr ] n wa-l-tan [imacr ] m al-sirr[imacr ] (Cairo: Maktabat R[umacr ] z al-Y [umacr

]suf, 1982), p.37; Mitchell (note 14), p.203.40. A mad [Amacr ] dil Kam[amacr ] l, Al-nuqa fawqa al- ur[umacr ] f. Al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[umacr ] n wa-l-ni [amacr ] m al-kh[amacr ] (Cairo:

Al-Zahr[amacr ] li-l-I l[amacr ] m al- Arab[imacr ] , 1989), pp.62–4. Kam[amacr ] l later became one of the leaders of the SecretApparatus.

41. The date for the establishment of the Secret Apparatus varies widely. Even its own membersprovide conflicting information: Kam[amacr ] l affirms that it was set up in 1938, although he was notrecruited until 1946 (see note 40, p.150). Fellow member Mu ammad Kham[imacr ] s umayda declaredin the 1954 trial of the Muslim Brothers that it was launched ‘around 1942 or before’; quoted inAbd al- A [imacr ] m Rama [amacr ] n (note 39), p.44. Carré believes that there is no definitive proof of the

Apparatus’s existence before 1943 (see note 16, p.29). Mitchell opts for late 1942 or early 1943 (seenote 14, p.30). Regarding the Society’s anti-British activities, another leading member, Ma m[umacr ] dAbd al- al[imacr ] m, remembers that al-Bann[amacr ] formed a ‘Salvation Front’ with Palestinian mufti Am[imacr ] n

al- usayn[imacr ] , former Egyptian prime minister Al[imacr ] M[amacr ] hir and other leading personalities to try toreach an agreement with Germany, but the plan came to nothing; quoted in al-Sayyid Y[umacr ] suf, Al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[umacr ] n: Hal hiya a wa isl[amacr ] miyya? asan al-Bann[amacr ] wa-l-bin[amacr ] ’ al-fikr[imacr ] , vol. II (Ma [amacr ] d[imacr ] ,Cairo: Markaz al-Ma r[umacr ] sa, 1994), pp.102–3.

42. Umar al-Tilmis[amacr ] ni, Dhikray[amacr ] t l[amacr ] mudhakkar[amacr ] t (Cairo: D[amacr ] r al- ab[amacr ] a wa-l-nashr al-isl[amacr ] miyya, 1985),pp.36–7; Jam[amacr ] l al-Bann[amacr ] , Mas [umacr ] liyyat fashl al-dawla al-isl[amacr ] miyya f[imacr ] al- a r al- ad[imacr ] th wa-bu [umacr ] th ukhrà(Cairo: D[amacr ] r al-Fikr al-Isl[amacr ] mi, 1994), pp.49–50. Y[umacr ] suf al-Qara [amacr ] wi, “F[imacr ] rakb al-Ikhw[amacr ] n” and “M[amacr ]

ba da all al-ikhw[amacr ] n”, in Al-Qara [amacr ] w[imacr ] s[imacr ] ra wa-mas[imacr ] ra, available at: http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/personality/2001/12/article8.SHTML and http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/person-ality/2001/12/article13.SHTML (last accessed 5 September 2007).

43. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , Qa iyatu-n[amacr ] bayna yaday al-r[amacr ] ’[imacr ] al- [amacr ] mm al-mi r[imacr ] wa-l- arab[imacr ] wa-l-isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] wa-l- am[imacr ] ral-[amacr ] lam[imacr ] (Cairo: ?, 1948? 1949?), pp.32–3, 41.

44. During the 1936–9 Arab revolt, the Muslim Brothers collected funds, organised demonstrationsand published pamphlets, and it is quite likely that some of their volunteers took part in militaryoperations inside Palestine. In 1948, several hundred of them went to fight in the first Arab–Israeli war. In the Society’s mythology, the persecution the movement suffered in 1948–9was brought about by their ‘heroic role’ in that war; see, for instance, Jam[amacr ] l al-Bann[amacr ] (note 42),pp.49–50; al-Qara [amacr ] w[imacr ] , “Filis in, in[amacr ] at al-mawt”, in Al-Qara d w[imacr ] s[imacr ] ra wa-mas[imacr ] ra, available at:http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/personality/2001/12/article6.SHTML (last accessed 5September 2007).

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45. Al-Bann[amacr ] , “Na ar[amacr ] t f[imacr ] i l[amacr ] al-nafs wa-l-mujtama ”, in A mad sà sh[umacr ] r (ed.), ad[imacr ] th al-thul[amacr

] th[amacr ] li-l-im[amacr ] m asan al-Bann[amacr ] (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qur [amacr ] n, 1985; pp.314–416), pp.408–9, 406. Seealso Appendix (11), pp.249–50; “ Aq[imacr ] datu-n[amacr ] ”, in (note 3) (pp.173–4), p.173. The Protestanttheme comes from Shak[imacr ] b Arsil[amacr ] n’s Li-m[amacr ] dh[amacr ] ta akhkhara al-muslim[umacr ] n wa-li-m[amacr ] dh[amacr ] taqaddamaghayru-hum? (Why did the Muslims remain behind while others moved forward?), whichadopted the thesis of Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Al-Bann[amacr ]

recommended Arsl[amacr ] n’s work in al-Man[amacr ] r XXXV, p.69.46. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), p.86; Appendix (11), p.257; note 45, pp.409–11.47. According to Mitchell, that was one of the main topics of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s lectures to union groups;

(note 14), pp.253–4, n. 71.48. Mitchell (note 14), pp.42, 182; S[amacr ] lim (note 20), pp.699–700; al-Bishr[imacr ] (note 33), p.51.49. Mitchell (note 14), pp.47, 182.50. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), p.41; Appendix (4), p.99; Appendix (8), p.181; Appendix (15), pp.313–14.51. Jam[amacr ] l al-Bann[amacr ] has written that the Egyptian ruling classes never forgave the Brothers their

promotion of working men to leading positions; see note 42, pp.44–7. However, in our 10 Julyinterview he admitted that their workers’ section was ‘very weak’. Tariq Ramadan’s ‘theology ofliberation’ parallelism is questioned even in the prologue of his Aux sources du renouveau musul-man (note 15), written by Alain Gresh.

52. Mitchell (note 14), pp.330–31; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Faber &Faber, 2002), pp.349, 399.

53. Quoted in Moro (note 17), p.80.54. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (8), p.167.55. The term Jihad literally means ‘effort’ or ‘endeavour’. We have translated it as ‘holy war’

because, more often than not, that was the meaning given to it by al-Bann[amacr ] ; see note 135 below.The literal meaning of dawa is ‘invitation’; in a religious context, it means ‘inviting to Islam’.

56. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (17), p.372.57. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (15), p.312.58. [amacr ] riq al-Bishr[imacr ] , Al-mal[amacr ] mi al-[amacr ] mma li-l-fikr al-siy[amacr ] s[imacr ] al-isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] f[imacr ] al-t[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh al-mu [amacr ] ir (Cairo: D[amacr ] r al-

Shur[umacr ] q, 2005), p.24. Y[umacr ] suf al-Qara [amacr ] w[imacr ] , “Shum[umacr ] liyyat al-Isl[amacr ] m”, in Al-Shar[imacr ] a wa-l- ay[amacr ] t 20-2-2005; transcript available at http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=3959&version=1&template_id=105&parent_id=16# 20% (last accessed30 August 2007).

59. Al-Bann[amacr ] took the ulema to task for failing to undertake the reform of Islam, which he attributedto pessimism that they would not be listened to, or to dismay before the enormity of the task; see“Iftit[amacr ] ”, Majallat al-Shih[amacr ] b I, November 1947, reproduced in Mu ammad Fat [imacr ] Al[imacr ] Sha [imacr ] r, Was[amacr

] il al-i l[amacr ] m f[imacr ] da wat al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslimin (Jedda, al-Khubar: D[amacr ] r al-Mujtama , 1985; pp.568–77),pp.570–71. He also pretended that one of the main obstacles to adopting laws derived from Islamwas foreign opposition; see his Appendix (8), p.190.

60. In spite of the Islamists’ protestations, the shar[imacr ] a’s jurisdiction was never much wider than it istoday in most Muslim countries: in caliphal times, there was a dual system of courts in whichthe representative of God’s law, the q[amacr ] [imacr ] , dealt with private matters (family law, inheritance,civil transactions and injuries, and religious endowments), and the representative of the ruler’slaw, the [amacr ] ib al-ma [amacr ] lim, took care of all others. In most cases brought before a shar[imacr ] a court, theonly admissible evidence was the oral testimony of two adult Muslim males (or four Muslimwomen); in cases of adultery, four male witnesses had to swear that they saw ‘the pen enter theinkpot’, as stated in the consecrated formula. That made successful prosecutions extremelydifficult and contributed to the marginalisation of the shar[imacr ] a. See Noel J. Coulson, A History ofIslamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), especially chapter 9; andW. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999),chapters 8 and 9.

61. See, for instance, al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (6), pp.120–21; Appendix (18), p.398; and his statementsagainst ‘philosophical speculations’. Moussalli distinguishes ‘modernists’ such as al-Afgh[amacr ] n[imacr ]

and Abduh from ‘fundamentalists’ like al-Bann[amacr ] and Sayyid Qu b based on their differentapproach to reason; see Amad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological andPolitical Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), pp.126ff.

62. Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991),p.231.

63. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), p.18; Appendix (6), p.130; Appendix (10), p.233.64. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (14), p.299; “Al-Ikhw[amacr ] n bayna al-d[imacr ] n wa-l-siy[amacr ] sa”, al-Nadh[imacr ] r X, 22 April

1939, quoted in al-Bishr[imacr ] (note 33), p.54.

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65. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (14), p.300.66. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (4), pp.93, 97; Appendix (10), p.227; Appendix (14), p.297.67. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), p.19; Appendix (4), p.93; Appendix (14), p.308; Appendix (15), p.323;

Appendix (8), p.164.68. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , “Li-l-ghay[umacr ] riy[imacr ] n min abn[amacr ] al-isl[amacr ] m”, Jar[imacr ] dat al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[imacr ] n XV, 17

August 1934, in Majm[umacr ] at al-ras[amacr ] il (pp.336–8), p.336; Appendix (15), p.325; note 3, 193. Thephrase ‘the Lord of the two worlds’ comes from the Koran and alludes to the world of men andthat of jinn (spirits, normally malefic, that can exert an influence on men).

69. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), pp.69–77.70. All translations of the Koran are from M. M. Picktall’s classical translation.71. According to Muslim tradition, that was the first Koranic verse the archangel Gabriel revealed to

Mu ammad. It is interpreted as an injunction to acquire knowledge.72. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (5), pp.109–10.73. For al-Bann[amacr ] , rib[amacr ] (usury) was any commercial operation that involved the charging of interest, no

matter how small. That contrasts with the position of Mu ammad Abduh and Rash[imacr ] d Ri [amacr ] , forwhom only abusive rates of interest constituted rib[amacr ] .

74. The vagueness of the language is symptomatic of al-Bann[amacr ] ’s approach to the issue of the caliphate.He spoke of it as a final goal, the culmination of a process that should be preceded by the liberationof Muslim countries from colonialism and the creation of Islamic governments; these would thendevelop links and alliances, eventually leading to the election of a caliph; see al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix(8), pp.194–5; Appendix (17), p.377. As we have already mentioned (see note 20), the Society’snewspapers enthusiastically supported the candidature of king Fu [amacr ] d and, later, of his son, F[amacr ] r[umacr ] q,to the caliphate, but al-Bann[amacr ] must have known that the possibility of its re-establishment wasrather remote.

75. Al-Bann[amacr ] defended the ud[umacr ] d penalties (amputation of limbs for stealing, stoning for adultery,etc.) as a deterrent against crime; see Appendix (2), pp.52–3; “Mudhakkirat al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[imacr ] n li-ma [amacr ] l[imacr ] waz[imacr ] r al- aq[amacr ] niyya f[imacr ] wuj[umacr ] b al- amal bi-l-shar[imacr ] a al-isl[amacr ] miyya”, al-Nadh[imacr ] rVII, 11 July 1938, p.7.

76. Elsewhere, al-Bann[amacr ] argued that social contact between men and women leads to all kinds ofevils, from home-wrecking to crime, from the femenisation of men to economic ruin – because ofall the money women spend on cosmetics and adornments (!); see Hasan al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix(13), pp.287–8.

77. Al-Bann[amacr ] argued that a girl’s education should be just enough to allow her to fulfil her obliga-tions as wife and mother; anything else would be frivolous and counterproductive; see Appendix(13), pp.286–7.

78. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), pp.83–7.79. Ibid.80. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (11).81. Ibid., p.256.82. Albert Hourani has indicated that although derived – in theory – from Islamic principles, the

programme of the Muslim Brothers did not differ materially from that of the radical nationalistsof the time; see Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),p.360. Afaf Lufti al-Sayyid-Marsot has pointed to its similarity with that of Young Egypt;see Egypt’s Liberal Experiment: 1922–1936 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977),pp.192–3. The Free Officers had close links with the Muslim Brothers (some of them weremembers of the Society), as well as with palace man Az[imacr ] z Al[imacr ] al-Mi r[imacr ] , who had known sympa-thies with Young Egypt.

83. Hendrik Hansen & Peter Kainz, “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison ofSayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and PoliticalReligions 8/1 (2007), p.68.

84. The first denunciation of Sayyid Qu b was Du [amacr ] t, l[amacr ] qu [amacr ] t (Preachers, Not Judges), written byasan al-Hu ayb[imacr ] , al-Bann[amacr ] ’s successor as General Guide, in the early 1970s. However, Qu b’s

standing among the Society’s rank-and-file was such that al-Hu ayb[imacr ] did not dare to disownhim openly, and he criticised instead the thought of Ab[umacr ] al-A là al-Mawd[umacr ] d[imacr ] , from whom Qu bhad borrowed a number of central concepts.

85. The last point of the Muslim Brothers’ creed, written around 1931, reads: ‘I believe that thereason for the Muslims’ backwardness is their turning away from their religion, and that thebasis of reform must be the return to the teachings and rulings of Islam’; see “ Aq[imacr ] datu-n[amacr ] ” (note3, pp.173–4), p.174. See also his 1939 letter to prime minister Al[imacr ] M[amacr ] hir (note 3, pp.261–7), p.264,and passim.

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86. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), pp.66–7.87. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (12), pp.276–9; Appendix (2), pp.39, 55–6.88. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), pp.141–2. The shaykh’s aggressive anti-Semitism must be put in the

context of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, although there are plenty of unpleasantreferences to the Jews in the Koran due to Mu ammad’s own difficulties with them.

89. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.142.90. The term ‘Daylamites’ designates the B[umacr ] yid dynasty, which came from the Persian region of

Daylam. They ruled the Abbasid Empire from 945 to 1055. The Mamluks were a military cast ofslave soldiers who occasionally seized power, like in India (1206–90) or, more lastingly, in Egypt(1250–1517).

91. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.143.92. Ibid.93. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 45), p.403; Appendix (2), p.51; Appendix (3), p.75; Appendix (8), p.164.94. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , “ Ajaban! Hal k[amacr ] na ya lim ras[umacr ] l all[amacr ] h m[amacr ] sa-yak[umacr ] n?”, quoted in Ibr[amacr ] h[imacr ] m al-

Bay[umacr ] m[imacr ] Gh[amacr ] nim, Al-fikr al-siy[amacr ] s[imacr ] li-l-im[amacr ] m asan al-Bann[amacr ] (Cairo: D[amacr ] r al-tawz[imacr ] wa-l-nashr al-isl [amacr ]miyya, 1992), pp.211–12.

95. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , “Min a l[amacr ] m al-nubuwwa”, quoted in Gh[amacr ] nim (note 94), p.212. Al-Bann[amacr ] feltthat the task of women was to take care of the home and raise the next generation of believers. Heridiculed the arguments of those who contended that Islam allows them to go out to workbecause no sacred text forbids it, saying that no text explicitly forbids beating one’s parentseither; see Appendix (13), pp.287, 292.

96. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.143; see also note 45, p.413; “Kayfa aktub al-qism al-d[imacr ] n[imacr ] li-jar[imacr ] dat al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[imacr ] n”, Majallat al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[imacr ] n I, 15 June 1933, reproduced in Sha [imacr ] r (note59, pp.541–9), pp.544–6.

97. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 59), p.573; Appendix (8), p.169.98. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), pp.27–9; Appendix (8), pp.172–3; Appendix (17), p.373; “Kayfa aktub

…”, p.549.99. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.144; Appendix (8), p.373.

100. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), pp.142–5. Of course, the Crusades started at the end of the eleventhcentury, and the Tatar – or Mongol – invasion was in the mid-thirteenth century. Al-Bann[amacr ] tookmany liberties with history; in the following pages, he characterised the Spanish Reconquest as aFrank invasion (ibid., p.146) and asserted that the British had sold Palestine to the Jews (ibid., p.147).

101. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), pp.30–31; Appendix (9), pp.320–21.102. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), pp.144, 151; Appendix (5), pp.107, 114; Appendix (15), p.321. The dichot-

omy between an irreligious ruling class and a pious people is a recurrent theme in al-Bann[amacr ] ’s writ-ings; see, for instance, “A-fa- ukma al-j[amacr ] hiliyyati yabgh[umacr ] na wa-man a sanu mina all[amacr ] hu ukmanli-qawmin y[umacr ] qin[umacr ] na”, al-Nadh[imacr ] r VI, 4 July 1938, pp.4–5.

103. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), p.86.104. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (5), p.107; Appendix (6), p.122; Appendix (7), p.150.105. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.149.106. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (5), pp.107–8; note 22, p.6.107. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 22), pp.7–8; Appendix (2), pp.51–2; “Kayfa aktub …”, p.573.108. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.151; Appendix (9), p.216; Appendix (15), pp.320–21.109. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), pp.148, 153.110. Ibid., p.154; see also Appendix (15), p.322; Appendix (3), p.66; note 102, p.4.111. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), p.82.112. Ibid., pp.67–8.113. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (9), pp.207–9.114. Ibid., p.209. See also Appendix (4), p.94; Appendix (5), p.144.115. “Iftit[amacr ] ”, al-Nadh[imacr ] r I, 30 May 1937 (reproduced in note 3, pp.145–7), p.147. See also al-Bann[amacr ]

(note 3), pp.183–4; “L[amacr ] nur[imacr ] du f[imacr ] uf[umacr ] fi-n[amacr ] ill[amacr ] mu min yata ammil a b[amacr ] al-jih[amacr ] d”, al-Nadh[imacr ] r X,22 April 1939, reproduced in Abbas al-S[imacr ] s[imacr ] , F[imacr ] q[amacr ] filat al-Ikhw[amacr ] n al-Muslim[umacr ] n. Al-juz al-awwal(Alexandria: D[amacr ] r al- ib[amacr ] a wa-l-nashr wa-l- aw iyy[amacr ] t: 1987, pp.59–60).

116. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), p.16; Appendix (4), p.116; Appendix (17), pp.379, 385. In a work verycritical of al-Bann[amacr ] , ar[imacr ] q al-Bishr[imacr ] remarked on the Society’s extreme demands on its members,which went as far as telling them how to speak and laugh, and argued that the intention was tocancel their individuality (see note 33, p.71). Incidentally, the 1972 edition of this work, which isused here, was written when al-Bishr[imacr ] was still a Marxist. He later ‘converted’ to Islamism andextensively revised it to take account of his change in perspective. Its 1983 edition was publishedby the Islamist D[amacr ] r al-Shur[umacr ] q.

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asan al-Bann or the Politicisation of Islam 41H· a

117. Al-Bann[amacr ] , “L[amacr ] nur[imacr ] du f[imacr ] uf[umacr ] fi-n[amacr ] …” (note 115), p.59; Appendix (1), p.16.118. One such categorisation was for Muslims: the believer, who has faith in the Society; the unde-

cided, who hesitates before it; the opportunist, who seeks to benefit from it; and the prejudiced,who is hostile to it; see al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (1), pp.14–15. Another, more general, categorisation –inspired by the mediaeval treatises – divided people into six groups: the diligent Muslim; thenegligent Muslim; the sinning Muslim; the dhimm[imacr ] (Christian or Jew) allied to a Muslim state; theneutral dhimm[imacr ] ; and the belligerent dhimm[imacr ] ; see Appendix (17), p.379.

119. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (15), pp.311, 313.120. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), p.158.121. Quoted in al-S[imacr ] s[imacr ] (note 115), p.176.122. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 3), p.232; Appendix (4), p.98; Appendix (5), p.115; see also Appendix (2), p.47,

and Appendix (14), p.300. Al-Bann[amacr ] used the term a [amacr ] b, instead of the most usual a [amacr ] ba, todesignate the prophet’s Companions – i.e. the people closest to him – and also to refer to theMuslim Brothers. The connotations are clear.

123. The meaning of that slogan is explained in detail in al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (17), pp.372–8.124. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , “Fann al-mawt”, in Mu ammad Abd al- ak[imacr ] m Khay[amacr ] l (ed.), Minbar al-jum a

li-l-im[amacr ] m al-shah[imacr ] d asan al-Bann[amacr ] , vol. I (Alexandria: D[amacr ] r al-Da wa, 1978?, pp.152–6); Appendix(17), p.379; Appendix (4), p.91.

125. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (9), p.218; Appendix (7), p.157; Appendix (1), p.31; Appendix (8), p.203;“M[amacr ] bayna al-ya s wa-l-amal”, in Minbar al-jum a (note 124), pp.111–14.

126. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), p.68.127. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (2), pp.38–9; Appendix (14), p.301; Appendix (15), p.312.128. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (4), pp.95–6; Appendix (5), p.110; Appendix (6), pp.129–30; Appendix (17),

pp.375–7. Sometimes, al-Bann[amacr ] alluded directly to the reconquest of ‘those lands which Islamrendered happy’: al-Andalus, Sicily, the Balkans, the south of Italy and the Mediterraneanislands. And he warned Muslims that they would have to answer before God for their failure torecover them; see Appendix (4), p.96; Appendix (3), p.71.

129. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (7), pp.155–8; Appendix (8), pp.185–6; “L[amacr ] nur[imacr ] du f[imacr ] uf[umacr ] fi-n[amacr ] …” (note 115).130. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (8), p.174; Appendix (17), p.378.131. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (17), p.379.132. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 3) (pp.261–7), p.265.133. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (8), pp.185–6; Appendix (15), p.322.134. Al-Bann[amacr ] , “Iftit[amacr ] ” (note 115), pp.147, 146.135. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (12), pp.263–5; see also Appendix (3), p.71. Of course, in that case the

five pillars would become six. The same idea constitutes the central argument of Al-far[imacr ] a al-gh[amacr ] iba (The Neglected Duty), the influential pamphlet written by the Jihad group’s ideologueAbd al-Sal[amacr ] m Faraj, who was executed in 1982 for his part in the assassination of Anwar al-S[amacr

] d[amacr ] t. Some authors quote a ad[imacr ] th, in which the prophet distinguishes military Jihad frominternal Jihad, referring to the former as ‘small’ and to the latter as ‘great’, to emphasise thatthe effort to control one’s appetites is the most difficult and important. However, al-Bann[amacr ] leftno doubt that he meant ‘war, the armed forces, the reinforcement of all means of defence andattack’, and dismissed the ad[imacr ] th as having a weak chain of transmission; see Appendix (12),pp.263, 279.

136. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (9): pp.217–18; “L[amacr ] nur[imacr ] du f[imacr ] uf[umacr ] fi-n[amacr ] …” (note 115), p.60; Appendix (15),p.322; Appendix (17), p.377.

137. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (8), p.177. The figure of 300 hundred brigades was not arbitrary; al-Bann[amacr ]

quotes the ad[imacr ] th ‘and twelve thousand will not be overcome through smallness of numbers’ –i.e. 300 brigades of 40 fighters each. A few months after that speech, a large group of Brothers,exasperated by the wait, split to establish the Society of Our Master Mu ammad’s Youth.

138. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), p.78; see also Appendix (14), p.302. Oddly enough, al-Bann[amacr ] illustratedthe tolerance of Islam with some rather intolerant Koranic verses: ‘And if they believe in the likeof that which ye believe, then they are rightly guided. But if they turn away, then they are inschism, and Allah will suffice thee [for defence] against them. He is the Hearer, the Knower’(Koran 2:137); and ‘O ye who believe! Take not for intimates others than your own folk. [They]would spare no pains to ruin you; they love to hamper you. Hatred is revealed by [the utteranceof] their mouths, but that which their breasts hide is greater’ (Koran 2:137; we have slightlymodified Picktall’s translation to render it clearer); al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (3), pp.78–9. Innocentmistake or subliminal message?

139. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (17), p.376.140. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (5), p.114; Appendix (1), p.25.

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42 A. B. Soage

141. For instance, he asserted that the implementation of the shar[imacr ] a is a demand of both Muslims and‘reasonable non-Muslims’; see al-Bann[amacr ] (note 102), p.4.

142. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (5), p.109. Note the contradictory statements in the same message.143. Al-Bann[amacr ] (note 22), p.32.144. Al-Bann[amacr ] , Appendix (12), pp.265, 270.145. See note 21 above.146. Ayubi (note 62), pp.141–2.147. Islamist author A mad Shurb[amacr ] j[imacr ] uses the formula ra iyà all[amacr ] h an-hu (may God be pleased with

him) after al-Bann[amacr ] ’s name, an honour normally reserved to the prophet’s Companions; see hisAl-im[amacr ] m al-shah[imacr ] d asan al-Bann[amacr ] : Mujaddid al-qarn al-r[amacr ] bi ashr al-hijr[imacr ] (Alexandria: Dar al-Da wa, 1998), passim. Jam[amacr ] l al-Bann[amacr ] has compared al-Bann[amacr ] ’s assassination to that of Al[imacr ] ,cousin and son-in-law of the prophet and last of the Rightly Guided Caliphs; see his Ris[amacr ] la ilà al-da aw[amacr ] t al-isl[amacr ] miyya (Cairo: D[amacr ] r al-Fikr al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] : 1991), p.21.

Appendix: asan al-Bann[amacr ] ’s Epistles

1. “Da watu-n[amacr ] ” (1936), in Majm[umacr ] at al-ras[amacr ] il, pp.11–33.2. “Ilà ayy shay nad [umacr ] al-n[amacr ] s” (1936), ibid., pp.5–61.3. “Na wa al-n[umacr ] r” (1936), ibid., pp.63–87.4. “Ilà al-shab[amacr ] b wa-ilà al- alaba kh[amacr ] atan” (1936), ibid., pp.89–116.5. “Ta ta r[amacr ] yat al-Qur [amacr ] n” (1939), ibid., pp.101–16.6. “Da watu-n[amacr ] f[imacr ] awr jad[imacr ] d”, ibid., pp.117–35.7. “Bayna al-ams wa-l-yawm [Ris[amacr ] lat al-nab[imacr ] al- am[imacr ] n]” (1942), ibid., pp.136–59.8. “Ris[amacr ] lat al-mu tamar al-kh[amacr ] mis” (1938), ibid., pp.161–204.9. “Mishkilatu-n[amacr ] f[imacr ] aw al-ni [amacr ] m al-isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] ” (1946?), ibid., pp.205–23.10. “Ni m al- ukm” (1947), ibid., pp.225–43.11. “Al-ni [amacr ] m al-iqti [amacr ] d[imacr ] ” (1947), ibid., pp.245–60.12. “Ris[amacr ] lat al-jih[amacr ] d” (1935), ibid., pp.261–80.13. “Al-mar a al-muslima”, ibid., pp.281–92.14. “Ilà al- ull[amacr ] b” (1938), ibid., pp.293–308.15. “Ris[amacr ] lat al-mu tamar al-s[amacr ] dis” (1941), ibid., pp.309–30.16. “Hal na nu qawm amaliyy[umacr ] n?” (1934), ibid., pp.331–67.17. “Ris[amacr ] lat al-ta [amacr ] l[imacr ] m” (1943), ibid., pp.369–86.18. “Al- aq[amacr ] id”, ibid., pp.393–431.

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