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withexcerptsfromBarreviewers
zcgarcia|a2013
ConstitutionalLawICasesummariesandReviewer
Prof.HarryRoque,Jr.
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2 PRELIMINARYCONCEPTSI.Introduction:TheConstitution,ConstitutionalismandConstitutionalLawA.PoliticalLawdefined
Thatbranchofpubliclawwhichdealswiththeorganizationandoperationofthegovernmentorgansofthestateanddefinestherelationsofthestatewiththeinhabitantsofitsterritory.1ScopeofPoliticalLaw:Theentirefieldofpoliticallawmaybesubdividedintotheffa) lawofpublicadministration‐dealswiththeorganizationandmanagementofthedifferentbranchesofthegovernment,
b) constitutionallaw–dealswiththeguarantiesoftheconstitutiontoindividualrightsandthelimitationsongovernmentalaction
c) administrativelaw–dealswiththeexerciseofexecutivepowerinthemakingofrulesandthedecisionofquestionsaffectingprivaterightsand
d) lawofpubliccorporations–dealswithgovernmentalagenciesforlocalgovernmentorforotherspecialpurposes.
B.ConstitutionalLawDefined
Inthesenseinw/ctheconceptisunderstoodinAmericanandPhilippineJurisprudence,constitutionallawisatermusedtodesignatethelawembodiedintheconstitutionandthelegalprinciplesgrowingoutoftheinterpretationandapplicationmadebycourtsoftheprovisionsoftheconstitutioninspecificcases.xxxConstitutionallawformsadistinctbranchofjurisprudencedealingw/thelegalprinciplesaffectingthenature,adoption,amendment,andoperationoftheconstitution.2(Sinco67.)
C.ConstitutionDefined
TañadaandFernando:"Itmaybemorespecificallydefinedasawritteninstrumentorganizingthegovernment,distributingitspowersandsafeguardingtherightsofthePeople."MalcolmandLaurel:"Itisthewritteninstrumentbywhichthefundamentalpowersofgovernmentareestablished,limitedanddefined,andbywhichthosepowersaredistributedamongtheseveraldepartmentsfortheirsafeandusefulexerciseforthebenefitofthebodypolitic."JudgeCooley:“Bodyofrulesandmaximsinaccordancewithwhichthepowersofsovereigntyarehabituallyexercised.”3
D.ClassificationofConstitutions
E.QualitiesandContentsofaConstitution
1. Qualitiesa. Clearness–“conducivetoacorrectandproper
1Sinco,PhilPoliticalLaw1,11thed.,19622Idat673Idat66
understandingofitsprovisions”4b. Brevity‐“itsgreatoutlinesshouldbemarked,its
importantobjectsdesignated,andtheminoringredientsw/ccomposethoseobjectsbededucedfromthenatureoftheobjectsthemselves.”5
c. Comprehensive–“coveralltheessentials….generaltermsareused”6
2. Contentsa. Preamble–statingthemotivesfortheformulationofthe
constitutionanditsbasicpurposes7b. Billofrights–“astatementoftherightsoftheindividual
whicharenormallyprotectedagainstimpairment,usurpation,orremovalbyanyformofgovernmentalaction”8
c. FrameworkoftheGovernmentd. ProvisionsforAmendment–bothprocedural(orderly
methodofbringingaboutthemostradicalconstitutionalreformsthatthepeopledesire)andsubstantive(offeranopportunityforthedeletionofobsoleteorill‐suitedportionsoftheConstitutionandforthefillingupofundesirablegapsw/crendertheconstitutionalsysteminadequate)9
II.HISTORYOFTHEPHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONA.VVMendoza’sFromMcKinley’sInstructionstotheNewConstitution Unlikeothercountries inSoutheastAsia, thenotionofacentralor
national government was unknown in the Philippines until theestablishmentofSpanishsovereignty.
Even after the establishment of sovereignty, the notion ofconstitutionalism did not gain ground until about 1869, whenlibertarian ideas fromEurope found theirway to the country as aresultoftheopeningoftheSuezCanal.
TheTreatyofParis,bywhich thePhilippine Islandswerecededtothe United States, is generally regarded as establishing thefoundationoftheconstitutionalsystemofthecountry.TheMalolosConstitutiondidnotlast,wasmoreofahistoricalinterestaccordingtotheauthor.
PhilippineConstitutionalDevelopmentTheEarlyAmericanGovernment PhilippinesasUnincorporatedTerritory‐‐TreatyofPariscededthe
Philippines to the US. The US constitution, however, was notextended by the terms of the treaty. Administration of the islandswasconductedbymeansofcharters(organicacts)derivedfromtheformallyexpressedwilloftheUSPresidentandCongress.
Principal Organic Acts ‐‐ President McKinley’s Instructions to theSecond Philippine Commission, Act of Congress of July 1, 1902(PhilippineBill),ActofCongressofAugust29,1916(JonesLaw).
o PresidentMcKinley’sInstructions
directed the Second Philippine commission to givepriority to the establishment of municipal andprovincial governments, giving Filipinos theopportunity to manage their local affairs to thefullestextentofwhichtheywerecapable,subjecttothe least degree of supervision and control …consistent with themaintenance of law, order andloyalty.
provided for the transfer of legislative authorityfrom theMilitaryGovernor to theCommission, butMilitary Governor was to remain the chief executiveheadofgovernment.
directed the commission to consider the customs,habits, and even prejudices of the natives in theenactment of laws, but there were certain greatprinciples andpractical rules of governmentwhich
4Idat705Idat71citingMcCulloughv.Maryland6Id7Idat728Id9Idat76
Type1Classidication
Written
Democratic Monarchial
Unwritten
Type2Classidication
Flexible Rigid
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3 mustbeestablishedandmaintainedhowevermuchthey conflict with the customs and laws of theinhabitants.
Spooner Amendment transformed the government from amilitary to civil one, transferred the executive powers of themilitary governor to the President of the PhilippineCommission.
By an act of the Philippine Commission, a court system wasestablished consisting of a Supreme Court, Courts of FirstInstance,andJusticeofthePeaceCourts.
o PhilippineBill
BymeansoftheActofJuly1,1902(PhilippineBill),theUSCongressassumed theadministrationof theisland.Initially,nosubstantialchangesweremade.
On October 16, 1907, the structure of the lawmaking body was altered. The PhilippineCommission became the upper chamber, an allFilipinoassembly(thePhilippineAssembly)actedasthelowerhouse.
Enacted laws were to be reported to the USCongress, Philippine Supreme Court decisionssubjecttothejudicialreviewofUSSupremeCourt.
The Philippine Bill defined for the first time whoweredeemedcitizensofthePhilippineIslands.
ThelawcontainedaslightlyexpandedBillofRights.Some of the modern limitations on the legislativepowerowetheirexpressiontothePhilippineBill.
Italsocontainedprovisionsforthesaleandleaseofpubliclands,gavecitizensoftheUStherighttoourminerallands.
o PhilippineAutonomyAct
BythisacttheUnitedStatesformallyannounceditsintentiontowithdrawfromthe islands.TheActsetupanelectivePhilippineLegislaturecomposedofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives.
The supreme executive power was vested in theGovernor General whose officewasmade separateanddistinctfromthatofthelegislature.Theactgavethe Governor General the authority to appoint byand with the consent of the Senate executiveofficials. Concurrence of the lawmaking body wasnot required in suspending thewritorproclaimingmartial law. The Governor General was given theexclusivepowertograntpardonsandreprieves,thepowertovetolegislativeenactments.
Osmeña‐Roxas mission secured the passage of Hare‐Hawes
CuttingActwhichpromised independence for thePhilippinesafter10years.RejectedbythePhilippineLegislatureundertheleadershipofManuelQuezon.
Quezon led another mission and was able to secure theTydings‐Mcduffie Act which authorized the PhilippineLegislature to call an election of delegates to a constitutionalconventionasfirststeptoindependence.Theactprescribed3steps for the adoption of a constitution: (1) the calling of aconstitutional convention (2) the submission of theconstitution to the president of the US (3) submission of theconstitutiontothepeopleforratification.
The 1935 constitution was ratified, Commonwealthgovernmentwasinaugurated.
B.The1935ConstitutionCommonwealthGovernment
Formo Executive power was vested in a President, legislative
powerinaunicameralNationalAssembly.o Separation of 3 Powers. But, as in the Philippine
Autonomy Act, the three departments were not evennearly equal. Strong President. The 1935 ConstitutionmadetheofficeofthePhilippinepresidentmorepowerfulthanthatoftheAmericanchiefexecutive.
o Whilesomeofthefeaturesofthe1935constitutionsuchas the Bill of Rights and provisions governing internalbusinessoftheNationalAssemblywereadoptedfromtheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates,itisanerrortoconclude
that the American constitutional system was therebytransplanted into the Philippines. The governmentalstructure provided in the Philippine Autonomy Act,rather than the set‐up in the US, was the model of the1935constitution.
BasisandNatureofGovernment
o The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty residesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.(ArticleII,Sec.1)
o Not completely sovereign. Conditions were imposed bytheTydings‐McduffieActwith respect to trade relationswithUS,financialoperationsandcurrency,andcontrolofforeignrelations.
o EnactedlawswerereportedtotheUSCongress,decisionsofPhilippineSupremeCourtsubjecttoreview.
SalientFeaturesoftheConstitution
o RightofSuffrage‐‐MaleCitizens,21yearsofageorover,abletoreadandwrite(lateronextendedtowomen).
o BillofRightscarriedoverfrompreviousOrganicActso Provisions on Social Justice, Conservation of Natural
Resources,Nationalizationofpublicutilities,MeritocracyintheCivilService.
TheGovernmentoftheRepublic In accordancewith the Tydings‐Mcduffie Act, the independence of
the Philippines was proclaimed. The Commonwealth GovernmentbecametheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
The same government under the same constitution…but fullysovereign politically (?). Powers of government were distributed,albeitunequally,amongthePresident,Congress,andtheJudiciary.
ParityRightsAmendment–TheUSCongresspassedalawcalledthePhilippineTradeActof1946whichallowedtheentryofPhilippinearticles into theUS free of ordinary customs duties. In return, thePhilippinegovernmentamendedtheconstitutionandgrantedparityrights (right to the disposition, exploitation, development andutilizationofthecountry’sresources)toUScitizens.
RevisionoftheConstitution–Mountingdifficultiesandwidespreaddissatisfactionwith theworkingsof thesystem indealingwith theproblemsof thenation in the late1960s reinforceddemands forareexaminationof the constitution.A constitutional conventionwasconvenedthat,lateron,gavebirthtotheconstitutionof1973.
B.The1973Constitution The new constitution establishes a parliamentary form of
governmentbydrasticallychangingthedistributionofpowers.TheLegislative power was vested in a National Assembly, executivepowerwasvested in thePrimeMinisterwith theassistanceof thecabinet.
Unlike the Presidential system, the parliamentary system did notlook to the legislature to play the role of opposition. The rolewasgivenovertotheminorityparty.
While the separationof executive and legislativedepartmentswasobliterated, the line drawn between the judiciary and the politicalorgansismaintained.Thecourtsremainindependentofthepoliticalbranchesofgovernment.
Aquino v. Enrile, 1973 • In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA
183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC, 1985 • The constitutionality of BP 883, calling for special elections (snap
election with Marcos vs. Aquino as candidates), was contested since there is no actual vacancy in the office of the president
• “… Petitioners failed to demonstrate that BP 883 clearly contravenes any applicable constitutional provision. Besides, the issue posed by these petitions is essentially political in character… the Supreme Court has no authority to determine whether or not the act of the Legislature of Chief Executive is
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4 against the Constitution”
• The main doctrine here is that the Supreme Court recognizes the separation of powers. There is what we call a political question wherein only the involved department may resolve to the exclusion of the other two. One division is not more powerful than the other and the decision of each is accorded great respect.
• II.THE1987CONSTITUTIONA.ProclamationNo.1,25February1986(Provisionalgovernment).ButProclamationNo.3whichannouncedtheProvisionalConstitution,seemedtosuggestthatitwasarevolutionarygovernment,sinceinoneofitswhereasesitannouncedthatthe"newgovernmentwasinstalled,throughadirectexerciseofthepoweroftheFilipinopeopleassistedbyunitsoftheNewArmedForces,"referringtotheEDSArevolution.
B.ProclamationNo.3,March25,1986(ProvisionalConstitution).TheProvisionalConstitutionorFreedomConstitutionwasadoptedon25March1986throughProclamationNo.3.Itabrogatedthelegislativeprovisionsofthe1973Constitution,modifiedtheprovisionsregardingtheexecutivedepartment,andtotallyreorganizedthegovernment.(Itsuseofthe1973Constitution,however,isnotbetoconstruedthatitwasacontinuationthereof.)ThenitprovidedforthecallingofaConstitutionalCommission,composedof30to50membersappointedbythePresidentwithin60days.
C.AdoptionandEffectivity1.ProvisionalConstitution
Art.V.ADOPTIONOFANEWCONSTITUTION“Section1.WithinsixtydaysfromthedateofthisProclamation,aCommissionshallbeappointedbythePresidenttodraftaNewConstitution.TheCommissionshallbecomposedofnotlessthanthirtynormorethanfiftynaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,ofrecognizedprobity,knownfortheirindependence,nationalismandpatriotism.TheyshallbechosenbythePresidentafterconsultationwithvarioussectorsofsociety.Section5.TheNewConstitutionshallbepresentedbytheCommissiontothePresidentwhoshallfixthedatefortheholdingofaplebiscite.Itshallbecomevalidandeffectiveuponratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinsuchplebiscitewhichshallbeheldwithinaperiodof60daysfollowingitssubmissiontothePresident.”
2.1987Constitution
“Art.XVIII,sec.27.ThisConstitutionshalltakeeffectimmediatelyuponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteheldforthepurposeandshallsupersedetheallpreviousConstitutions.TheforegoingproposedConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippineswasapprovedbytheConstitutionalCommissionof1986onthetwelfthdayofOctober1986,andaccordinglysignedonthefifteenthdayofOctober1986atthePlenaryHall,NationalGovernmentCenter,QuezonCity,bytheCommissionerswhosesignaturesarehereunderaffixed.”
3.ProclamationNo.58(ProclaimingtheRatificationofthe1987Constitution),February11,1987 Lawyer’s League vs. Aquino • The legitimacy of the Aquino government was being contested • The Court ruled that the legitimacy of this government is a non-
justiciable matter. “It is only the people of the Philippines who may be the judge of its legitimacy. Since such government is accepted by the people, it is not merely a de facto government but also a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized its legitimacy”
• With all this in mind, the petitioners have no personality to sue and no cause of action
• The Court again reiterates the doctrine of separation of powers, deciding that such case is not for the courts to decide on.
In re: Saturnino Bermudez • The petitioner is asking for a declaratory relief and to explain the
‘ambiguity’ in the proposed 1986 Constitution as to who was being referred to as President and Vice-President in Art XVIII Sec 7.
• “The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of 30 June 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.”
De Leon v. Esguerra, 1987 • Petitioners de Leon et al were elected as officials of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay Rizal on May 17, 1982 and their terms were to expire after 6 years under BP222 or the Barangay Election Act of 1982. Respondents Esguerra, the OIC Governor, designated Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain on Feb 8, 1987.
• The Provisional Constitution states that “All elective and appointive officials SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986. By reason of the foregoing provision, the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.”
• The 1987 Constitution took effect immediately upon its ratification in a plebiscite. Thus, when the plebiscite ratification was conducted in 1987, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Bp 222 wasn’t repealed by the 1987 Constitution thus the tenure of the Petitioners continues.
III.CONSTITUTIONALISMANDCONSTITUTIONALSUPREMACY:JUDICIALREVIEWUNDERTHE1987CONSTITUTIONA.SupremacyoftheConstitution
Marbury v. Madison Boumediene v. Bush David v. Macapagal-Arroyo Angara v. Electoral Commission • In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all
members- elect, with no election protest filed on or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election protest. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the Electoral Commission juris-diction over election protests.
• “The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
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5 allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.”
• B.TheoryofJudicialReviewArt.VIII,Sec.1.“Thejudicialpowershallbevestedinonesupremecourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofcourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovernment.”
AngaravElectoralCommission
Ashwander vs. Tennessee Valley Authority Seven (7) rules of avoidance of constitutional questions (J. Brandeis). In the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from exercising judicial review.
1. "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. "The Court will not 'anticipate question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
4. "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. "The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. . Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
6. “The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.'
B.PrudentialConsiderationsC.RequisitesfortheExerciseofJudicialReview1. ACTUALCASESORCONTROVERSY
2. LOCUSSTANDI
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance • The petitioners, as taxpayers and legislators, brought a suit
questioning the constitutionality of the EVAT law on account of its passage. They contend that the passage of the law was not in accordance with the constitutional requirement in the origination of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debts, bills of local application, and private bills.
• Legislator’s standing – that the Senators’ • Daza v. Singson •
3. RAISEDATTHEEARLIESTOPPORTUNITY
4. LISMOTAOFTHECASED.HurdlestoJusticiability1. POLITICALQUESTIONS
Baker v. Carr • The case is about the reapportionment of districts as an
effect of the creation of new legislative districts under a new law.
• The ponente pointed out 6 cases of political questions: 1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department;" 2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it;" 3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"
4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;"
5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"
6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
Casibang v. Aquino • Tañada v. Cuenco • Sanidad v. COMELEC • Abueva v. Wood • IBP v. Zamora • Estrada v. Desierto • Marcos v. Manglapus • Daza v. Singson •
2. MOOTNESS
Gonzales v. Narvasa • Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary • Lacson v. Executive Secretary • Francisco v. HREP, supra •
PeoplevVeraJ.Laurellaiddownthedoctrinethatjudicialreviewcanonlybeexercisedinanactualcaseorcontroversy.Thismeans:1) apartywithapersonalandsubstantialinterest2) anappropriatecase3) aconstitutionalquestionraisedattheearliestpossibletime4) aconstitutionalquestionthatistheverylismotaofthecase,i.e.an
unavoidablequestion.1.ActualCaseorControversy
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6 Thisisdefinedasaconflictoflegalrightsoranassertionofoppositelegalclaimssusceptibleofjudicialdetermination(Nachura)Thus,arequestforanadvisoryopinionisnotanactualcaseorcontroversy.But,anactionfordeclaratoryreliefisproperforjudicialdetermination(Perezvs.ProvincialBoard).
a.RipenessAconstitutionalquestionmaycometothecourteithertooearlyorprematurely,sothatitisstillabstract(advisoryopinion),ortoolate,sothatthecourt'sdecisionwouldnolongeraffecttheparties(mootness).Thecourtmustresolveconstitutionalissuesonlywhentheycometoitattherighttime(ripeness).Gonzalesvs.COMELECPetitionerschallengetheconstitutionalityofastatute[RA4880ortheRevisedElectionCode]whichcallstoahalttheundesirablepracticeofprolongedpoliticalcampaigns.Moreprecisely,thebasiclibertiesoffreespeechandfreepress,freedomofassemblyandfreedomofassociationareinvokedtonullifytheact.Thepetitionwasdismissed."AlthoughtheinstantpetitiondidnotseektorestrainrespondentCommissiononElectionsfromperforminganyspecificact,itcouldstillrightfullybetreatedasapetitionforprohibition.TheexceptionalcharacterofthesituationthatconfrontsthisCourt,theparamountpublicinterest,andtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelectionsbeingbarelysixmonthsaway,reinforcethisstand.Itwouldappearundeniable,therefore,thatbeforethisCourtisanappropriateinvocationofthisCourt'sjurisdictiontopreventtheenforcementofanallegedunconstitutionalstatute.TheCourtisleftwithnochoice.Then,itmustactonthematter.
"ThelanguageofJusticeLaurelfitsthecase:'AllawaitthedecisionofthisCourtontheconstitutionalquestion.Considering,therefore,theimportancewhichtheinstantcasehasassumedandtopreventmultiplicityofsuits,strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthat[its]constitutionality...benowresolved.'[quotedfromPeoplevVera]Itmaylikewisebeaddedthattheexceptionalcharacterofthesituationthatconfrontsus,theparamountpublicinterest,andtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelectionsbeingbarelysixmonthsaway,reinforceourstand."b.MootnessAcasebecomesmootwhentherearefacts,injuriesandheatedargumentsbutforsomereasonthelegalproblemhasbecomestale.Whenacaseismootandacademic,itceasestobeacaseandcontroversy.Anydecisionreachedbythecourtwouldnotbeconclusiveontheparties.Exceptionstomootness:1) Ifthequestioniscapableofrepetitionandevasiveofreview.2) Ifthereexitsamerepossibilityofcollaterallegalconsequencesif
thecourtdoesnotact.3) Voluntarycessationfromthewrongfulactbythedefendant,ifheis
freetoreturntohisoldways.2.StandingAproperpartyisonewhohassustained,orisinimminentdangerofsustaining,aninjuryasaresultoftheactcomplainedof.Standingisestablishedbytwonexuses:theparty'sstatusandthetypeoflegislativeactbeingquestioned,orhisstatusandtheprecisenatureoftheconstitutionalinfringement.Thetestofstandingiswhetherthepartyhasallegedsuchapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversyastoassuresuchconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofissuesuponwhichthecourtsolargelydependsforilluminationofdifficultconstitutionalquestions(BakervCarr)Apersonhasstandingtochallengethegovernmentalactonlyifhehasapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecasesuchthathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultofitsenforcement.(PeoplevVera)
Assenator,onehastherequisitestandingtobringasuitassailingtheissuanceorimplementationofalawasanusurpationoflegislativepower.Asataxpayer,onecouldimpugnthelegalityofthemisalignmentofpublicfunds(Oplevs.Torres)Whereaconstitutionalquestionisraised,asenatorhasbeenconsideredaspossessedoftherequisitepersonalitytobringasuit,e.g.,inMabanagvs.LopezVitoandTolentinov.CommissiononElections.]Aparty’sstandingincourtisaproceduraltechnicalitywhichmaybesetasidebytheCourtinviewoftheimportanceoftheissuesinvolved.Thus,wheretheissuesraisedbypetitionersareofparamountpublicinterest(Kilosbayan,Inc.vs.Morato)oroftranscendentalimportance(Tatadvs.SecretaryofDepartmentofEnergy),theCourtmay,inexerciseofitsdiscretion,brushasidetheproceduralbarrier.
Itiswellsettledthatthevalidityofastatutemaybecontestedonlybyonewhowillsustainadirectinjury,inconsequenceofitsenforcement.Yet,therearemanydecisionsnullifying,attheinstanceoftaxpayers,lawsprovidingforthedisbursementofpublicfunds,uponthetheorythatthe'expenditureofpublicfunds,byanofficeroftheStateforthepurposeofadministeringanunconstitutionalactconstitutesamisapplicationofsuchfunds,'whichmaybeenjoinedattherequestofataxpayer."(PascualvTheSecretaryofPublicWorks)3.QuestionRaisedattheEarliestOpportunity
Asageneralrule,thequestionmustberaisedinthepleadings.Thus,inUmalivs.Guingona.ThequestionoftheconstitutionalityofthePCAGCwasnoentertainedbecausetheissuewasraisedbythepetitioneronlyinhisMotionforReconsiderationbeforetheRTCofMakati.Itwastoolatetoraisetheissueforthefirsttimeinthatstageoftheproceedings.
4.LisMotaBecauseofthedoctrineofseparationofpowerswhichdemandsthatproperrespectbeaccordedtheotherbranchesofgovernment,courtsareloathetodecideonconstitutionalquestionsaslongasthereissomeotherbasisthatcanbeusedtoresolvethecase.
InArcetavs.JudgeMangrobang,theconstitutionalityofBP22(BouncingChecksLaw)waschallenged.TheSCdidnotfindtheconstitutionalquestiontobetheverylismotapresentedinthecontroversy.Everylawhasinitsfavorthepresumptionofconstitutionalityand,tojustifyitsnullification,theremustbeaclearandunequivocalbreachoftheConstitution,andnotonethatisdoubtful,speculativeorargumentative.
C.FunctionsofJudicialReview1.Checking‐invalidatingalaworanexecutiveactthatisfoundtobecontrarytotheConstitution.2.Legitimating(legitimizing)‐upholdingthevalidityofthelawwhichresultsfromameredismissalofacasechallengingthevalidityofthatlaw.WhentheCourtexercisesthisfunction,itusesthedoublenegativebydeclaringthatthelawis"notunconstitutional".Thisisnomeresemantics.TheCourtcannotdeclarethelawconstitutionalforitenjoysthepresumptionofconstitutionality,sothatadeclarationtothateffectbythecourtwouldnotmakeitmoreconstitutional.Ontheotherhand,anyonewhochallengesthevalidityofalawhastheburdenofprooftoshowitsinvalidity.Declaringthatthelawisnotunconstitutionalistantamounttosayingthatthechallengerhasnotmettheburdenrequired.*LegitimatingandCheckingAspectsofJudicialReview.DismissalofChallengetoaLaw'sValidityLegitimizesit.InOccenavCOMELEC(whichsoughtaninjunctiontoprohibittheCOMELECfromproceedingwiththeplebiscitefortheproposed1981amendments)andinMitravCOMELEC,(whichsoughtamandamusto
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7 compeltheCOMELECtoholdaplebiscitetoratifythe1973Constitution)bothprayerswerebasedonthepremisethatthe1973Constitutionhadnotbeenratified,theSCheldthatthefailureoftheCourtinJavellanavExecutiveSecretarytomusterthevotesrequiredtodeclarethe1973Constitutionasbeinginvalidlyratified,whichresultedinthedismissalofthesuitquestioningthevalidityoftheratificationoftheConstitution,ineffectlegitimatedtheratification.InOccena,theCourtruledthat:
"TheSupremeCourtcancheckaswellaslegitimate.Inthelattercase,thereisanaffirmationthatwhatwasdonecannotbestigmatizedasconstitutionallydeficient.Themeredismissalofasuitofthischaractersuffices.ThatisthemeaningoftheconcludingstatementintheJavellanaresolution.Sincethen,theCourthasinvariablyappliedthepresentConstitution."
3.Symbolic‐toeducatethebenchandbarastothecontrollingprinciplesandconceptsonmattersofgreatpublicimportance.SalongavCruzPanoThecaseagainstpetitionerforsubversionwhichwasfiledbythefiscalonthebasisofflimsytestimonygivenbyVictorLovelywasalreadydismissedwithoutprejudicebythefiscal(uponanticipationofadverseruling).Andyet,theSCnotingthatasthefiscalsaidthedismissalofthechargeswaswithoutprejudicetothefilingofnewonesforthesameactsbecausethepetitionerhasnotbeenarraignedanddoublejeopardydoesnotapply,thecaseisnotentirelymoot,decidedtoperformitsdutyto"formulateguidingandcontrollingconstitutionalprinciples,preceptsanddoctrinesorrules"fortheguidanceofthebarandbench.JaviervCOMELECThecasewasalreadymootednotonlybythedeathofEvelioJavier,butalsobytheabolitionofBatasan,theAntiqueseatwhichheandPaci‐ficadorwerecontestingfor.AndyettheSC,claimingtobe"notonlythehighestarbiteroflegalquestionsbutalsotheconscienceofthegovernment,"decidedthecaseanyway"fortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture.Thecitizencomestousinquestoflawbutwemustalsogivehimjustice.The2arenotalwaysthesame.Therearetimeswhenwecannotgrantthelatterbecausetheissuehasbeensettledandthedecisionisnolongerpossibleaccordingtothelaw.Buttherearealsotimeswhenalthoughthedisputehasdisappeared,asinthiscase,itneverthelesscriesouttoberesolved.Justicedemandsthatweactthen,notonlyforthevindicationoftheoutragedright,thoughgone,butalsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture."
DemeteriavAlbaTheSCstruckdownSec.44ofPD1177,authorizingthePresidenttotransferfundsfromonedepartmenttoanother,onthegroundthatitoverextendedtheprivilegegrantedunderArt.VIII,sec.16(5)ofthe1973Constitution,evenifsuchprovisionwasalreadyabrogatedbytheFreedomConstitution.Then,citingtheJaviercaseontheneed"notonlyforthevindicationofanoutragedright,thoughgone,butalsofortheguidanceofandasarestraintuponthefuture,"itlecturedonhowthislawwouldopenthefloodgatesfortheenactmentofunfundedappropriations,uncontrolledexecutiveexpenditures,diffusionofaccountabilityforbudgetaryperformance,andentrenchmentoftheporkbarrelsystem,andonhowthiswouldcreatetemptationsformisappropriationandembezzlement.*AllcourtscanexercisejudicialreviewArt.VIII,Sec.5(2).TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx(2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:a) Allcasesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,
internationalorexecutiveagreement,law,presidentialdecree,proclamation,order,instruction,ordinance,orregulationisinquestion.
b) Allcasesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost,assessment,ortoll,oranypenaltyimposedinrelationthereto.
c) Allcasesinwhichthejurisdictionofanylowercourtisinissue.d) Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusion
perpetuaorhigher.e) Allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved.D.PoliticalQuestionAnissueisapoliticalquestionwhenitdoesnotdealwiththeinterpretationofalawanditsapplicationtoacase,butwiththeverywisdomofthelawitself.Whenajudgeattemptstoresolveapoliticalquestion,heisnotexercisingajudicialfunction,butisrathersupplantinghisconsciencetothatofthepoliticalbranchofthegovernment. Bakerv.Carr:guidelinesfordeterminingwhetheraquestionispoliticalornot.
‐“Prominentonthesurfaceofanycaseheldtoinvolveapoliticalquestionisfoundatextuallydemonstrableconstitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoapoliticaldepartment;oralackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingit;ortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofakindclearlyfornon‐judicialdiscretion;ortheimpossibilityofacourt'sundertakingindependentresolutionwithoutexpressinglackoftherespectduecoordinatebranchesofgovernment;oranunusualneedforunquestioningadherencetoapoliticaldecisionalreadymade,orthepotentialityofembarrassmentfrommultifariouspronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsononequestion.”Tañadavs.CuencoTheSCheldthattheterm"politicalquestion"connotes,aquestionofpolicy.Itreferstothosequestionswhich,undertheConstitution,aretobedecidedbythepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegatedtotheLegislatureorexecutivebranchoftheGovernment(16C.J.S.,413).Itisconcernedwithissuesdependentuponthewisdom,notlegality,ofaparticularmeasure.TheSenateisnotclothedwith"fulldiscretionaryauthority"inthechoiceofmembersoftheSenateElectoralTribunal.Theexerciseofitspowerthereonissubjecttoconstitutionallimitations.Itisclearlywithinthelegitimateprovinceofthejudicialdepartmenttopassuponthevalidityoftheproceedingsinconnectiontherewith.Hence,thisCourthas,notonlyjurisdiction,but,alsotheduty,toconsideranddeterminetheprincipalissueraisedbythepartiesherein.
RomulovYniguezWhatseemslikealegalquestionwhenviewedinisolation(namely,whethertherulesoftheBatasanenablingittoshelfacomplaintforimpeachmentagainstthePresidentisconstitutional.)isreallyapoliticalquestionwhenviewedinabroadercontext(i.e.,thatthecasewasfiledagainsttheSpeakerofaco‐equalbranchtocompelhimbymandamustorecallthecomplaintfromthearchive,andthattheultimateresultofthecasewastoquestionthedecisionoftheBatasantoshelvethecase,amatter,thatissolelycommittedtothatdepartment.)Yet,despitethereallypoliticalnatureofthequestion,theSCpassedonthevalidityoftherulestoerasedoubtsthatmaystillbeentertained.AdvisoryOpinionAcasebecomesanadvisoryopinionwhenthereisnoactualcaseandcontroversythatdemandsconstitutionalconstructionforitsresolution.Thismaytaketheformofdeclaratoryrelief.Itisnotwiseforthecourttoengageinanadvisoryopinionbecause:a)Thisonlyleadstodialectics,toabstractlegalargumentsandsterileconclusions(LaurelquotingFrankfurter)b)Thejudicialfunctionisimpoverishedsinceitthrivesonfactsthatdrawoutthemeaningofthelaw.E.EffectofaDeclarationofUnconstitutionality
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8 CivilCode,Art.7. Xxx Whenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeconstitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern. xxxTheeffectofadeclarationthatalawisunconstitutionalistomakethelaweithervoidorvoidable.a.VoidItisvoidifonitsface,itdoesnotenjoyanypresumptionofvalidity.Assuch,itproducesnoeffectwhatsoever,createsnorightoroffice,itimposesnoduty.Whateverpenaltywaspaidduringtheperiodofitsoperationmustberemitted.AnexampleisBP52inIgotvCOMELEC,providingthatanyonewhohasbeenchargedofrebellion,etc.isprimafaciepresumedtobedisqualifiedfromrunningforalocalpost.Onitsface,itblatantlygoesagainsttheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence.b.VoidableAlawdeclaredunconstitutionalisonlyvoidableif,onitsface,itenjoysthepresumptionofvalidity.Inthiscase,itbecomesinoperativeonlyuponthejudicialdeclarationofitsinvalidity.Andevenso,theinvalidationproducesnoretroactiveeffect,sinceitwouldbeunjusttoholdthatthelawdidnotproduceanyeffectatallpriortoitsnullification.Fromthetimethelawwaspromulgatedtothetimeitwasdeclaredinvalid,peoplewouldhaveenteredintovarioustransactionsandrelations,expectingandinfactcompelledtopresumethatthelawisvalid.Thus,tonowholdthatthelawneverproducedanyeffectwouldpenalizethosewhoinfaithbelievedthelawspassedbytheirrepresentativestobeinaccordancewiththeirsolemndutyundertheConstitution.SerranodeAgbayanivPNBIn1939,AgbayanisecuredaloanfromPNB.In1944,theloanmaturedbutPNBcouldnotcollectbecauseofthewar.In1945,Pres.OsmenaissuedtheDebtMoratoriumLaw(EO#32),suspendingthepaymentofloansforfouryearsduetotheravagesofwar.In1948,RA342extendedtheDebtMoratoriumLawforanothereightyears(upto1956).In1953,however,theSCdeclaredRA342asunconstitutionalinthecaseofRuttervEsteban.In1959,PNBfiledasuitforpaymentoftheloan.Theissuewaswhetherornottheactionhasprescribed.Takingtheorthodoxview,theactionhasprescribed,sincethedeclarationofRA342asunconstitutionalretroactedto1945whenEO32wasfirstissued.Between1944whentheloanmaturedand1959,whenPNBcollectedtheloan,15yearshadelapsed. Takingtheunorthodoxview,astheSCdid,theactioncouldstillprosper.Theperiodfrom1945whenthelawwaspromulgated,to1953whenitwasdeclaredunconstitutionalshouldnotbecountedforthepurposeofprescriptionsincetheDebtMoratoriumLawwasoperativeduringthistime.Ineffect,only7yearshadelapsed(1944‐45,1953‐59).Itwouldbeunjusttopunishthecreditorwhocouldnotcollectpriorto1953becausetheDebtMoratoriumLawwaseffective,onlytobetoldlaterthathisrespectforanapparentlyvalidlawmadehimlosehisrighttocollect.Art.7oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthat,"WhenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern."seemstobetheorthodoxview.THESTATEI.STATEDEFINED.Prof.Borlongay,quotingGarner,IntroductiontoPoliticalLaw,41:AStateisacommunityofpersons,moreorlessnumerous,permanentlyoccupyingafixedterritoryandpossessedofanindependentgovernmentorganizedforpoliticalendstowhichthegreatbodyofinhabitantsrenderhabitualobedience.
ELEMENTS:a. People‐‐‐inhabitantsoftheStateb. Territory‐‐‐fixedportionofthesurfaceoftheearthinhabitedby
thepeopleoftheStatec. Government‐‐‐agency/instrumentalitythroughwhichthewillof
theStateisformulated,expressed,andrealizedd. Sovereignty‐‐‐supremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentina
StatebywhichthatStateisgovernedCIRv.CamposRueda(1971):AStateisapoliticallyorganizedsovereigncommunity,independentofoutsidecontrol,boundbytiesofnationhood,legallysupremewithinitsterritory,andactingthroughgovernmentfunctioningunderaregimeoflaw.II.COMPONENTSOFTHEPHILSTATEA.TERRITORYARTICLEI,1987Constitution“ThenationalterritorycomprisesthePhilippinearchipelago,withalltheislandsandwatersembracedtherein,andallotherterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction,consistingofitsterrestrial,fluvial,andaerialdomains,includingitsterritorialsea,theseabed,thesubsoil,theinsularshelves,andothersubmarineareas.Thewatersaround,between,andconnectingtheislandsofthearchipelago,regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions,formpartoftheinternalwatersofthePhilippines.”Philippineterritoryconsistsof:• thePhilippinearchipelago;and• allterritoriesoverwhichthePhilippineshassovereigntyor
jurisdictionTheArchipelagicDoctrine:Bodiesofwaterwithinthebaseline,regardlessofbreadth,formpartofthearchipelagoandareconsideredasinternalwaters.B.PEOPLE–3meanings1.Inhabitants,asusedin:ARTICLEII,Section15,1987Constitution“TheStateshallprotectandpromotetherighttohealthofthepeopleandinstillhealthconsciousnessamongthem.”ARTICLEII,Section16,1987Constitution“TheStateshallprotectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthfulecologyinaccordwiththerhythmandharmonyofnature.”ARTICLEIII,Section2,1987Constitution“Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolablexxx”ARTICLEXIII,Section1,1987Consti“TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasuresthatprotectandenhancetherightofallthepeopletohumandignity,reducesocial,economic,andpoliticalinequalities,andremoveculturalinequitiesbyequitablydiffusingwealthandpoliticalpowerforthecommongood.”QuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard(1963):TherightofanindividualtobesecureinhispersonisguaranteedbytheConstitution.UnderourConstitution,thesameisdeclaredapopularrightofthepeopleandindisputablyappliestobothcitizensandforeignersinthiscountry.2.Electors,asusedin:ARTICLEVII,Section4,1987Constitution“ThePresidentandtheVice‐Presidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeoplexxx”ARTICLEXVI,Section2,1987Constitution“TheCongressmay,bylaw,adoptanewnameforthecountry,anationalanthem,oranationalseal,whichshallallbetrulyreflectiveandsymbolicoftheideals,history,andtraditionsofthepeople.Suchlawshalltake
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9 effectonlyuponitsratificationbythepeopleinanationalreferendum.”ARTICLEXVIII,Section25,1987Consti“Aftertheexpirationin1991oftheAgreementbetweentheRPandUSAconcerningMilitaryBases,foreignmilitarybases,troops,orfacilitiesshallnotbeallowedinthePhilippinesexceptunderatreatydulyconcurredinbytheSenateand,whentheCongresssorequires,ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendumheldforthatpurpose,andrecognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingState.”3.Citizens,asusedin:PREAMBLE,1987Constitution“We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustandhumanesocietyandestablishagovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritytheblessingsofindependenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love,equality,andpeace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.”ARTICLEII,Section1,1987Constitution“ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.”ARTICLEII,Section4,1987Constitution“TheprimedutyoftheGovernmentistoserveandprotectthepeople.TheGovernmentmaycalluponthepeopletodefendtheStateand,inthefulfillmentthereof,allcitizensmayberequired,underconditionsprovidedbylaw,torenderpersonalmilitary,orcivilservice.”ARTICLEIII,Section7,1987Constitution“Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcernshallberecognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocuments,andpaperspertainingtoofficialacts,transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.”a.Whoarecitizens:ARTICLEIV,Section1,1987Constitution• citizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthis
Constitution;• thosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines;• thosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelect
Philippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority;and• thosenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.TherightofelectionpermittedunderARTICLEIV,Section1(3),1987Constitution,isavailableonlytothoseborntoFilipinomothersunderthe1935Constitution,who,hadthatcharternotbeenchanged,wouldhavebeenabletoelectPhilippinecitizenshipuponattainingmajorityage.Obviously,electionisnotnecessaryinthecaseofachildborntoaFilipinomotherunderthepresentConstitution,assuchchildisconsideredaFilipinocitizenatbirth.Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives(1991)ARTICLEIV,Section1(3),1987ConstitutionappliesnotonlytothosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipafterFebruary2,1987,butalsotothosewho,havingbeenbornofFilipinomothers,electedcitizenshipbeforethatdate.ThisistocorrecttheanomaloussituationwhereonebornofaFilipinofatherandanalienmotherwasautomaticallygrantedthestatusofanatural‐borncitizen,whileonebornofaFilipinomotherandanalienfatherwouldstillhavetoelectPhilippinecitizenship.b.Whoarenaturalborncitizens:ARTICLEIV,Section2,1987Constitution• citizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformany
acttoacquireorperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship;and• thosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithARTICLE
IV,Section1(3)Thefollowingarenatural‐borncitizens:• citizensofthePhilippinesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthe1987
Constitution• thosebornofFilipinomothers/fathers(after17January1973)• thosebornbefore17January1973,ofFilipinomothers,whoelect
Philippinecitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority• thosenaturalizedinaccordancewithlawc.Whomustbenaturalborncitizens:• President:ARTICLEVII,Section2• Vice‐President:ARTICLEVII,Section3• MembersofCongress:ARTICLEVI,Sections3and6• JusticesofSCandlowercollegiatecourts:ARTICLEVIII,Section7
(1)• Ombudsmanandhisdeputies:ARTICLEXI,Section8• MembersofConstitutionalCommissions
o CSC:ARTICLEIXB,Section1(1)o COMELEC:ARTICLEIXC,Section1(1)o COA:ARTICLEIXD,Section1(1)
• MembersoftheCentralMonetaryAuthority:ARTICLEXII,Section20
• MembersoftheCommissiononHumanRights:ARTICLEXIII,Section17(2)
AsperARTICLEXII,Section8,1987Constitution,anatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipmaystillbeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.d.GroundsforLossofCitizenship:
1) Naturalizationinaforeigncountry[CA63,Sec.1(1)]2) Expressrenunciationorexpatriation[CA63,Sec.1(2)]3) Takinganoathofallegiancetoanothercountryuponreachingthe
ageofmajority4) Acceptingacommissionandservinginthearmedforcesofanother
country,unlessthereisanoffensive/defensivepactwiththecountry,oritmaintainsarmedforcesinRPwithRP’sconsent
5) Denaturalization6) BeingfoundbyfinaljudgmenttobeadeserteroftheAFP7) MarriagebyaFilipinowomantoanalien,ifbythelawsofher
husband’scountry,hebecomesacitizenthereof• Expatriationisaconstitutionalright(GoGullianv.Government).
NoonecanbecompelledtoremainaFilipinoifhedoesnotwantto.EXCEPTION:AFilipinomaynotdivesthimselfofPhilippinecitizenshipinanymannerwhiletheRepublicofthePhilippinesisatwarwithanycountry.(Sec.1(3),Com.ActNo.63)e.Howmaycitizenshipbereacquired?1.Naturalization(CANo.63andCANo.473)• nowanabbreviatedprocess,withnoneedtowaitfor3years(1year
fordeclarationofintent,and2yearsforthejudgmenttobecomeexecutory)
• applicantmust:a.) be21yearsofageb.) bearesidentfor6monthsc.) havegoodmoralcharacterd.) havenodisqualification
• Republicvs.Guy:Naturalizationisneverfinalandmayberevokedifonecommitsactsofmoralturpitude.
2.Repatriation• womanwhobyhermarriagelosthercitizenship• thosedeclaredbyauthoritiestobedesertersoftheArmedForces• BengsonIIIvs.HRET:Repatriationresultsintherecoveryofthe
originalnationality.Therefore,ifheisanatural‐borncitizenbeforehelosthiscitizenship,hewillberestoredtohisformerstatusasanatural‐bornFilipino.
3.LegislativeAct• bothamodeofacquiringandreacquiringcitizenship
e.Dualallegiance• Dualallegiance(ARTICLEIV,Section5,1987Constitution)
contemplatesthecaseofalienswhoarenaturalizedasFilipinosbut
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10 remainloyaltotheircountryoforigin,aswellasthecaseofpublicofficerswho,whileservingthegovernment,seekcitizenshipinanothercountry.
• UnderSec.40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,thosewithdualcitizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition.(butseeMercadov.Manzano(1999),whichaccordingtoDanGat,madeSec40(d)inexistentbecauseonceacandidatefileshiscandidacy,heisdeemedtohaverenouncedhisforeigncitizenship)
Frivaldov.COMELEC(1989):Merefilingofcertificateofcandidacyisnotasufficientactofrepatriation.Repatriationrequiresanexpressandequivocalact.Labov.COMELEC(1992):Intheabsenceofanyofficialactionorapprovalbyproperauthorities,amereapplicationforrepatriationdoesnot,andcannot,amounttoanautomaticreacquisitionoftheapplicant’sPhilippinecitizenship.Aznarv.COMELEC(1990):LossofPhilippinecitizenshipCANNOTBEPRESUMED.Consideringthefactthatadmittedly,OsmeñawasbothaFilipinoandanAmerican,themerefactthathehasacertificatestatingthatheisanAmericandoesnotmeanthatheisnotstillaFilipino,sincetherehasbeenNOEXPRESSrenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenship.C.GOVERNMENT“Government”isthatinstitutionoraggregateofinstitutionsbywhichanindependentsocietymakesandcarriesoutthoserulesofactionwhicharenecessarytoenablementoliveinasocialstateorwhichareimposeduponthepeopleformingthatsocietybythosewhopossessthepowerorauthorityofprescribingthem.(USv.Door2Phil332)
“GovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines”isdefinedas“thecorporategovernmentalentitythroughwhichthefunctionsofgovernmentareexercisedthroughoutthePhilippines,including,saveasthecontraryappearsfromthecontext,thevariousarmsthroughwhichpoliticalauthorityismadeeffectiveinthePhilippines,whetherpertainingtotheautonomousregions,theprovincial,city,municipal,orbarangaysubdivisions,orotherformsoflocalgovernment.”(Sec.2(1),AdministrativeCodeof1987)1.Functionsa.Constituentfunctions‐constitutetheverybondsofsociety;compulsoryb.Ministrantfunctions‐undertakentoadvancethegeneralinterestsofsociety;optional(e.g.publicworks,publiccharity,andregulationoftradeandindustry)• HOWEVER,thedistinctionbetweenconstituentandministrant
functionsisnotrelevantinourjurisdiction.PVTAv.CIR[65SCRA416]reiteratedtherulinginACCFAv.FederationofLaborUnions[30SCRA649]thatthedistinctionhasbeenblurredbecauseoftherepudiationofthelaissez‐fairepolicyintheConstitution.
2.DoctrineofparenspatriaeParenspatriaeisthetaskofthegovernmenttoactasguardianoftherightsofthepeople.Thisprerogativeofparenspatriaeisinherentinthesupremepowerofeverystate,whetherthatpowerislodgedinaroyalpersonorinthelegislature…Cruz)3.Dejureanddefactogovernmentsa.Dejuregovernment‐hasrightfultitlebutnopowerorcontrol,eitherbecausethishasbeenwithdrawnfromit,orbecauseithasnotyetactuallyenteredintotheexercisethereof.b.Defactogovernment‐agovernmentoffact,thatis,itactuallyexercisespowerorcontrolbutwithoutlegaltitle.D.SOVEREIGNTY
SovereigntyisthesupremeanduncontrollablepowerinherentinaStatebywhichtheStateisgoverned1.Kinds
a) Legalsovereignty‐powertoissuefinalcommandsb) Politicalsovereignty‐powerbehindthelegalsovereign,orthe
sumtotaloftheinfluencesthatoperateuponitc) Internalsovereignty‐powertocontroldomesticaffairsd) Externalsovereignty(alsoknownasindependence)‐powerto
directrelationswithotherstates2.TheoryofAutoLimitationItisthepropertyoftheState‐forceduetowhichaStatehasexclusivelegalcompetenceofself‐limitationandself‐restriction.3.“Dominium”v“imperium”“Dominium”‐capacityoftheStatetoownproperty.Itcoverssuchrightsastitletoland,exploitationanduseofit,anddispositionorsaleofthesame.TheRegaliandoctrinewherebyalllandsofthepublicdomainbelongtotheState,andanyoneclaimingtitlehastheburdentoshowownership,comeswithinthisconcept.Inthiscapacity,theStatedescendstothestatusofordinarypersonsandthusbecomesliableassuch.“Imperium”referstotheState’sauthoritytogovern.Itcoverssuchactivitiesaspassinglawsgoverningaterritory,maintainingpeaceandorderoverit,anddefendingitagainstforeigninvasion.WhentheStateactsinthiscapacity,itgenerallyenjoyssovereignimmunity.4.JurisdictionJurisdictionisthemanifestationofsovereignty.Thejurisdictionofthestateisunderstoodasbothitsauthorityandthesphereoftheexerciseofthatauthority.(Sinco)KINDS:
1.) Territorialjurisdiction‐authorityoftheStatetohaveallpersonsandthingswithinitsterritoriallimitstobecompletelysubjecttoitscontrolandprotection
2.) Personaljurisdiction‐authorityoftheStateoveritsnationals,theirpersons,property,andacts,whetherwithinoroutsideitsterritory.
3.) Extraterritorialjurisdiction‐authorityoftheStateoverpersons,things,oracts,outsideitsterritoriallimitsbyreasonoftheireffectstoitsterritory
4.SuitsAgainsttheStateandtheDoctrineofSovereignImmunity• BasedonARTICLEXVI,Section3,1987Constitution:TheStatemay
notbesuedwithoutitsconsent.• Positivisttheory:Therecanbenolegalrightasagainstthe
authoritythatmakesthelawsonwhichtherightdepends.[Kawananakoav.Polyblank205US349]alsocalledthedoctrineofRoyalPrerogativeofDishonesty
• Sociologicaltheory:IftheStateisamenabletosuits,allitstimewouldbespentdefendingitselffromsuitsandthiswouldpreventitfroperformingitotherfunctions.[Republicv.Villasor]
Q:Isthe“doctrineofsovereignimmunity”availabletoforeignStates?YES,itis,insofarastheyaresoughttobesuedinthecourtsofthelocalState.TheaddedbasisistheprincipleofsovereignequalityofStates,underwhichoneStatecannotassertjurisdictionoveranother.Todosowould“undulyvexthepeaceofnations.”(Cruz)Thisisconsistentwiththeinternationallawprincipleofparinparemnonhabetimperium.Q:WhenisasuitagainsttheState?AsuitisagainsttheStateregardlessofwhoisnamedthedefendant,ifitproducesadverseconsequencestothepublictreasuryintermsofdisbursementofpublicfundsandlossofgovernmentproperty.WhenasuitisagainsttheState,itcannotprosperunlesstheStatehasgivenits
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11 consent.Inthefollowingcases,itwasheldthatthesuitisnotagainsttheState:a) whenthepurposeofthesuitistocompelanofficerchargedwiththe
dutyofmakingpaymentspursuanttoanappropriationmadebylawinfavoroftheplaintifftomakesuchpayment,sincethesuitisintendedtocompelperformanceofaministerialduty.(Begosov.PVA)
b) whenfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint,itisclearthatthe
respondentisapublicofficersuedinaprivatecapacity;c) whentheactionisnotinpersonamwiththegovernmentasthe
nameddefendant,butanactioninremthatdoesnotnamethegovernmentinparticular.
HowistheState’sconsenttobesuedgiven?Expressconsent‐maybeembodiedinagenerallaworaspeciallaw.Itiseffectedonlybythewillofthelegislaturethroughthemediumofadulyenactedstatute.Impliedconsent‐whentheStateentersintoabusinesscontractoritselfcommenceslitigation.ConsentisalsoimpliedlyassumedwhenitwouldbeinequitablefortheStatetoinvokeitsimmunityandininstanceswhentheStatetakesprivatepropertyforpublicuseorpurpose.• However,distinctionsmustbemadebetweensovereign(jure
imperii)andproprietaryacts(juregestioni)sincetheStatemayonlybeliableforproprietaryacts,aswhenitentersintocommercialcontracts.Asforthefilingofacomplaintbythegovernment,suabilitywillresultonlywherethegovernmentisclaimingaffirmativerelieffromthedefendant.
• Allmoneyclaimsagainstthegovernmentmustbefiledwiththe
CommissiononAudit,whichhas60dayswithinwhichtoact.Ifitfailstosoact,theclaimantmustcontinuetowait.Onceadecisionhasbeenmade,hehas30daystoappealbycertioraritotheSupremeCourt.
• TheGovernmentisonlyliablefortheactsofitsagents,officersand
employees,whentheyactasspecialagentswithinthemeaningof(ART.2180(6)CC).Aspecialagentisonewhoreceivesadefiniteandfixedorderorcommission,foreigntotheexerciseofthedutiesofhisofficeifheisaspecialofficial.ThespecialagentactsinrepresentationoftheStateandexecutesthetrustconfidedtohim.Thisconceptdoesnotapplytoanyexecutiveagentwhoisanemployeeoftheactiveadministrationandwhoonhisownresponsibilityperformsthefunctionswhichareinherentinandnaturallypertaintohisofficeandwhichareregulatedbylawandtheregulations(Merrittv.GovtofthePhilippineIslands)
• WhentheGovernmentcreatesacorporation,itinvariablyprovides
thiscorporationaseparateentityandwiththecapacitytosueandbesued.Ifthegovernmententityisgiventhecapacitytobesued,thesuitencompassesanykindofaction,includingonefromtort.
• Consenttobesuedincludesactionsbasedonquasi‐delicteven
thoughcommittedbyregular,andnotspecial,agents.Sotherule,itseems,isthatagovernmententitycanbesuedfortort,butifitis,itcaninvokethedefensethatitactedthroughitsregularemployee,andnotthroughaspecialagent.
Shaufv.CA(1990)InasmuchastheStateauthorizesonlylegalactsbyitsofficers,unauthorizedactsofgovernmentofficialsorofficersarenotactsoftheState,andanactionagainsttheofficialsorofficersbyonewhoserightshavebeeninvadedorviolatedbysuchacts,fortheprotectionofhisrights,isnotasuitagainsttheState.Thedoctrineofimmunityfromsuitwillnotapplyandmaynotbeinvokedwherethepublicofficialisbeingsuedinhisprivateandpersonalcapacityasanordinarycitizen,foractswithoutauthorityorinexcessofthepowersvestedinhim.Apublicofficialmaybeliableinhispersonal
capacityforwhateverdamagehemayhavecausedbyhisactdonewithmaliceandinbadfaith,orbeyondthescopeofhisauthorityorjurisdiction.Republicv.Sandoval(1993)TheprincipleofStateimmunityfromsuitdoesnotapplywhenthereliefdemandedrequiresnoaffirmativeofficialactiononthepartoftheStatenotheaffirmativedischargeofanyobligationwhichbelongstotheStateinitspoliticalcapacity,eventhoughtheofficersoragentswhoaremadedefendantsclaimtoholdoractonlybyvirtueofatitleoftheStateandasitsagentsandservants.STRUCTUREANDPOWERSOFTHENATIONALGOVERNMENTI.LEGISLATIVEDEPARTMENT1. NatureandClassificationLegislativePowerNature:• Theauthoritytomakelawsandtoalterorrepealthem.• VestedinCongress,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebyprovisiononinitiativeandreferendum• Plenary(TheCongressmaylegislateonanysubjectmatterprovidedthatthelimitationsareobserved.)ClassificationofLegislativePower:1.Original‐possessedbythesovereignpeople2.Derivative‐delegatedbythesovereignpeopletolegislativebodiesand
issubordinatetotheoriginalpowerofthepeople3.Constituent‐powertoamendandrevisetheConstitution4.Ordinary‐powertopassordinarylaws2. Composition,QualificationsandTermofOfficea.Senate(Art.VIsecs.2‐4)CompositionoftheSenate:24senatorselectedatlargeQualificationsofSenators:1. Natural‐borncitizen2. Atleast35yearsoldonthedayoftheelection3. Abletoreadandwrite4. Aregisteredvoter5. ResidentofthePhilippinesforatleast2yearsimmediately
precedingthedayoftheelectionTermofOffice:6years,commencingatnoononthe30thdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelectionTermLimits:NoSenatorshallserveformorethan2consecutiveterms.However,theymayserveformorethan2termsprovidedthatthetermsarenotconsecutive.b.HouseofRepresentatives(Art.VIsecs.5‐8)CompositionoftheHouseofRepresentatives:Notmorethan250members,unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,consistingof:1. DistrictRepresentatives‐electedfromlegislativedistrictsapportionedamongtheprovinces,cities,andtheMetroManilaarea.2.Party‐ListRepresentatives‐constitute20%ofthetotalnumberofrepresentatives‐ For3consecutivetermsfrom2February1987,25seatsshallbeallottedtosectoralrepresentatives.Thesectoralrepresentativesaretobechosenbyappointmentorelection,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Untilalawispassed,theyareappointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesbytherespectivesectors.(Art.XVIII,sec.7)RulesonApportionmentofLegislativeDistricts:1. Maintainproportionalrepresentationbasedonnumberofinhabitants.
a. Eachcitywithapopulationofatleast250,000,oreachprovince,shallhaveatleast1representative.Eachprovince,irrespectiveofthenumberofinhabitants,shallhaveatleast1
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12 representative.
b. Eachlegislativedistrictshallcomprise,asfaraspracticable,contiguous,compact,andadjacentterritory.
2. Legislativedistrictsshallbere‐apportionedbyCongresswithin3yearsafterthereturnofeachcensus.QualificationsofRepresentatives:1. 1.Natural‐borncitizens2. 2.Atleast25yearsoldonthedayoftheelection3. 3.Abletoreadandwrite4. 4.Registeredvoterinthedistrictheseekstorepresent5. 5.Aresidentofthesaiddistrictforatleast1yearimmediately
precedingthedayoftheelectionTermofOffice:3years,commencingatnoononthe30thdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelection.TermLimits:NomemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms.Veteran’sFederationv.COMELEC(2000)FormulaforthenumberofadditionalseatstobeawardedtoalltheotherpartiesundertheParty‐listSystem:No.ofadd’lseatsforotherparties
=
No.ofvotesfortheconcernedpartyNo.ofvotesforfirstparty
x
Add’lseatsgarneredbyfirstparty
AngBagongBayaniv.COMELEC(2001)TheruleswithregardtotheParty‐listSystemarethat:
1) Thepartiesmustrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresented.
2) Majorpoliticalpartiesmustcomplywiththisstatutorypolicy3) ReligioussectsareprohibitedbytheConstitution4) ThepartymustnotbedisqualifiedunderRA79415) Thepartmustnotbeanadjunctofanentityorprojectfunded
bythegovernment6) Thepartyanditsnomineesmustcomplywiththe
requirementsofthelaw7) Themembersmustcomefromthemarginalizedand
underrepresentedsectors8) Thenomineemustbeabletocontributetotheformulationand
enactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenation
Theirnomineesmustcomefromthesameparty.Dimaporov.Mitra(1991)InB.P.Blg.881membersofthelegislatureincludedintheenumerationofelectivepublicofficialsaretobeconsideredresignedfromofficefromthemomentofthefilingoftheircertificatesofcandidacyforanotheroffice,exceptforPresidentandVice‐President.ThetermofofficeprescribedbytheConstitutionmaynotbeextendedorshortenedbythelegislature(22R.C.L.),buttheperiodduringwhichanofficeractuallyholdstheoffice(tenure)maybeaffectedbycircumstanceswithinorbeyondthepowerofsaidofficer.Tenuremaybeshorterthanthetermoritmaynotexistatall.Thesesituationswillnotchangethedurationofthetermofoffice.Underthequestionedprovision,whenanelectiveofficialcoveredtherebyfilesacertificateofcandidacyforanotheroffice,heisdeemedtohavevoluntarilycutshorthistenure,nothisterm.Thetermremainsandhissuccessor,ifany,isallowedtoserveitsunexpiredportionc.SynchronizedtermsofofficeArt.XVIIIsecs12Section1.ThefirstelectionsofMembersoftheCongressunderthisConstitutionshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay,1987.ThefirstlocalelectionsshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybesimultaneouswiththeelectionoftheMembersoftheCongress.ItshallincludetheelectionofallMembersofthecityor
municipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.Section2.TheSenators,MembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,andthelocalofficialsfirstelectedunderthisConstitutionshallserveuntilnoonofJune30,1992.OftheSenatorselectedintheelectionsin1992,thefirsttwelveobtainingthehighestnumberofvotesshallserveforsixyearsandtheremainingtwelveforthreeyears. 3. Electiona.RegularElectionArtVIsec.8Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionoftheSenatorsandtheMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay.b.SpecialElectionArtVIsec.9IncaseofvacancyintheSenateorintheHouseofRepresentatives,aspecialelectionmaybecalledtofillsuchvacancyinthemannerprescribedbylaw,buttheSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesthuselectedshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredterm.Lozadav.COMELECTheConstitutionmandatesthatthereshouldalwaysbeadequaterepresentationforeveryprovinceorlegislativedistrict.IfavacancyoccursinamannercontemplatedintheConstitution,thenCongresshastheauthorityifnotthedutytocallforspecialelections(subjectofcoursetothelimitationoftimeasspecifiedintheConstitution;seeArtVISect9ofConstitutionandRA6645).4. Salaries,PrivilegesandDisqualificationsa.SalariesArticleVI,Section10ThesalariesofSenatorsandMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesshallbedeterminedbylaw.NoincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefulltermofalltheMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesapprovingsuchincrease.ArticleXVIII,Section17UntiltheCongressprovidesotherwise,thePresidentshallreceiveanannualsalaryofthreehundredthousandpesos;theVice‐President,thePresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,andtheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,twohundredfortythousandpesoseach;theSenators,theMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,theAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourt,andtheChairmenoftheConstitutionalCommissions,twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;andtheMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.PHILCONSAv.MathayInthiscase,theSupremeCourtheldthatthephrase"allmembers"ofbothhouses,referstohousesasasingleunit,withoutdistinctionorseparationbetweenthem,thefundamentalconsiderationbeingthatthetermsofofficeofallmembersofthelegislaturethatenactedthemeasure(whetherSenatorsorRepresentatives)musthaveexpiredbeforetheincreaseincompensationcanbecomeoperative.Ligotv.MathayWhileitisCongress,thruasalarylaw,thatpossesstheauthoritytodeterminethesalaryofeachmember,theConstitutionprohibitsanyincreaseinsaidcompensationtotakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthefulltermofallthemembersofthetwohousesapprovingsuchincrease.TheSupremeCourtheldthatalawincreasingthe"retirementgratuity"ofmembersofCongressfallswithintheprohibitionstatedabove.Inthiscase,thelaw(CommonwealthAct186,section12(c)asamendedbyRepublicAct4968)providedthatalthoughtheincreaseinsalarywasnotgoingtotakeeffectuntilthenextterm,suchincreasedsalarywouldbemadethebasisincomputingtheretirementpayoftheincumbentmembers.ThiswasdeemedbytheSupremeCourtasacircumventionof
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13 theConstitutionalprovisionandthusvoid.b.FreedomfromarrestArticleVI,Section11ASenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesshall,inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethansixyearsimprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisinsession.NoMembershallbequestionednorbeheldliableinanyotherplaceforanyspeechordebateintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof.Martinezv.MorfeAlegislatorshallbeprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisinsession.Inthe1935Constitution,underwhichthiscasewasdecided,immunityfromarrestwasonlyfromcivilarrest.Thisverylimited(privilegeagainstcivilarrestsonly)immunityprovidedunderthe1935Constitution(oratleastaswasinterpretedbythecourtinthisparticularcase)wasexpandedunderthe1987Constitutionstatingthatamember"shall,inalloffensespunishablebynotmorethan6yearsimprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisinsession."c.SpeechandDebateClauseJimenezv.CabangbangInthiscase,aclarificationofthescopeandlimitationoftheparliamentaryimmunitywasmade.Therewasreiterationthat,first,Congressionalimmunityisaguaranteeofimmunityfromanswerabilitybeforeanoutsideforumbutnotfromanswerabilitytothedisciplinaryauthorityofcongressitself;second,tocomeundertheguaranteethespeechordebate"mustbeonemade"inCongressorinanycommitteethereof.""SaidexpressionreferstoutterancesmadebyCongressmenintheperformanceoftheirofficialfunctions,suchasspeechesdelivered,statementsmade,orvotescastinthehallsofCongress,whilethesameisinsession,aswellasbillsintroducedinCongress,whetherthesameisinsessionornot,andotheractsperformedbyCongressmen,eitherinCongressoroutsidethepremiseshousingitsoffices,intheofficialdischargeoftheirdutiesasmembersofCongressandofCongressionalCommitteesdulyauthorizedtoperformitsfunctionsassuch,atthetimeoftheperformanceoftheactsinquestion."Osmenav.PedantunEachHouseoftheCongresscandisciplineitsmembersfordisorderlyconductorbehavior.WhatconstitutesdisorderlybehaviorisentirelyuptoCongresstodefine.AlthoughamemberofCongressshallnotbeheldliableinanyotherplaceforanyspeechordebateintheCongressorinanycommitteethereof,suchimmunity,althoughabsoluteinitsprotectionofthememberofCongressagainstsuitsforlibel,doesnotshieldthememberagainstthedisciplinaryauthorityoftheCongress.TheCourtupheldthe15monthsuspension,butinretrospect,itwassuchaharshpunishment(readnoteonAlejandrinocase)thatmeasuresweretakenin1973andsubsequentlyinthe1987Constitutiontodeviseasystemofallowingsuspensionasapenaltybutlimiteditsperiodtosixtydays.(ArtVI,Sec16(3))d.Disqualifications1. Maynotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernment
duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghisseat.2. Maynotbeappointedtoanyofficecreatedortheemoluments
thereofwereincreasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.3. Cannotpersonallyappearascounselbeforeanycourt,electoral
tribunal,quasi‐judicialandadministrativebodiesduringhistermofoffice.
4. Shallnotbefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orfranchiseorspecialprivilegegrantedbythegovernmentduringhistermofoffice.
5. Shallnotinterveneinanymatterbeforeanyofficeofthegovernmentwhenitisforhispecuniarybenefitorwherehemaybecalledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice.
e.DutytoDisclose
ArticleXI,Section17Apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumptionofofficeandasoftenthereafterasmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnetworth.InthecaseofthePresident,theVice‐President,theMembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupremeCourt,theConstitutionalCommissionsandotherconstitutionaloffices,andofficersofthearmedforceswithgeneralorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemannerprovidedbylaw.ArticleVI,Section12AllMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshall,uponassumptionofoffice,makeafulldisclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests.TheyshallnotifytheHouseconcernedofapotentialconflictofinterestthatmayarisefromthefilingofaproposedlegislationofwhichtheyareauthors.ArticleVI,Section20TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbeopentothepublicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAuditwhichshallpublishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachMember.5. InternalGovernmentofCongressa.ElectionofofficersOFFICERS:1. SenatePresident2.SpeakeroftheHouse3.SuchofficersasdeemedbyeachhousetobenecessaryElectionofofficers:Byamajorityvoteofallrespectivemembersb.QuorumMajorityofeachHouseshallconstituteaquorum.Asmallernumbermayadjournfromdaytodayandmaycompelthe
attendanceofabsentmembers.Incomputingaquorum,memberswhoareoutsidethecountry,thus
outsideofeachHouse’scoercivejurisdiction,arenotincluded.Avelinov.CuencoWhentheConstitutiondeclaresthatamajorityof"eachHouse"shallconstituteaquorum,"theHouse"doesnotmean"all"themembers.Evenamajorityofallthemembersconstitute"theHouse".Thereisadifferencebetweenamajorityof"allmembersoftheHouse"andamajorityof"theHouse",thelatterrequiringlessnumberthanthefirst.Therefore,anabsolutemajority(12)ofallmembersoftheSenatelessone(23)constitutesconstitutionalmajorityoftheSenateforthepurposeofthequorum.Insimpleterms,“majority”referstothenumberofmemberswithinthe“jurisdiction”oftheCongress(thoseitcanorderarrestedforthepurposeofquestioning).Inthiscase,oneSenatorwasoutofthePhilippineswhichisnotwithinthe“jurisdiction”oftheSenate,sothattheworkingmajoritywas23Senators.c.RulesofProceedingsEachHouseshalldetermineitsownproceduralrules.Onmattersaffectingonlyinternaloperationofthelegislature,the
legislature’sformulationandimplementationofitsrulesisbeyondthereachofthecourts.However,whenthelegislativeruleaffectsprivaterights,thecourtscannotbealtogetherexcluded.
CorollarytoCongress’powertomakerulesisthepowertoignorethemwhencircumstancessorequire.
d.DisciplineofMembersEachhousemaypunishitsmembersfordisorderlybehavior,andwiththeconcurrenceof2/3ofALLitsmembers:1.Suspension(shallnotexceed60days)2.Expulsion
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14 Alejandrinov.QuezonThehistoryofthesixty‐daylimitationontheperiodofsuspensionofelectedofficialstracesbacktothiscase.TheSupremeCourtsaidthatitwasnotintherealmofpoweroftheLegislaturetosuspenditsmembersincesuspensiondeprivedtheconstituents(ofthesuspendedmember)therighttoberepresentedinCongress.Ineffect,thesuspensioncanbecomeanactofpunishmentoftheconstituents.e.JournalandCongressionalRecords(1)TheEnrolledBillTheoryAnenrolledbillistheofficialcopyofapprovedlegislationandbearsthecertificationsofthepresidingofficersofeachHouse.Thuswherethecertificationsarevalidandarenotwithdrawn,thecontentsoftheenrolledbillareconclusiveuponthecourts.Therespectduetoaco‐equaldepartmentrequiresthecourtstoacceptthecertificationofthepresidingofficerofthelegislativebody.Mabanagv.LopezVitoAdulyauthenticatedbillorresolutionimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.ThisCourthelditselfboundbyanauthenticatedresolution,despitethefactthatthevoteofthree‐fourthsofthemembersoftheCongress(asrequiredbytheConstitutiontoapproveproposalsforconstitutionalamendments)wasnotactuallyobtainedonaccountofthesuspensionofsomemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesandSenate.Cascov.GimenezThe“enrolledbill”istheofficialcopyofapprovedlegislationandbearsthecertificationofthepresidingofficerofthelegislativebody.Courtsmustacceptcertificationofthepresidingofficerasconclusiveassuranceofthebill’sauthenticity.Theenrolledbillprevailsoverthejournal.(2)ProbativevalueoftheJournalTheJournalisconclusiveuponthecourts.Butwhenthecontentsofthejournalconflictswiththatofanenrolledbill,theenrolledbillprevailsoverthecontentsofthejournal.USv.PonsCongressmayvalidlycontinueenactingbillsevenbeyondthereglementaryperiodofadjournment.WhenthejournalshowsthatCongressconductedasinediesessionwherethehandsoftheclockarestayedinordertoaffordCongresstheopportunitytocontinueitssession.AllbillsenactedduringthesinediesessionarevalidandconclusiveupontheCourts.TheJournalsareconclusiveevidenceofthecontentsthereofandCourtsareboundtotakejudicialnoticeofthem.(3)MattersrequiredtobeenteredintheJournalYeasandNaysonthirdandfinalreadingofabillVetomessageofthePresidentYeasandNaysontherepassingofabillvetoedbythePresidentYeasandNaysonanyquestionattherequestof1/5ofmemberspresent(4)JournalEntryRulev.EnrolledBillTheoryAstorgav.VillegasThebillwasnotdulyenactedandthereforedidnotbecomelawasindeedboththePresidentoftheSenateandtheChiefExecutivewithdrewtheirsignaturestherein.InthefaceofthemanifesterrorcommittedandsubsequentlyrectifiedbytheSenatePresidentandbytheChiefExecutive,forthisCourttoperpetuatethaterrorbydisregardingsuchrectificationandholdingthattheerroneousbillhasbecomelawwouldbetosacrificetruthtofictionandbringaboutmischievousconsequencesnotintendedbythelaw‐makingbody.
(5)CongressionalRecordf.Sessions(1)RegularSessionsConvenesonceeveryyearonthe4thMondayofJuly.Continuestobeinsessionuntil30daysbeforethestartofitsnextregular
session,exclusiveofSaturdays,Sundays,andlegalholidays.(2)SpecialSessionsCalledbythePresidentatanytimewhenCongressisnotinsession(3)AdjournmentsNeitherHousecanadjournformorethan3daysduringthetimeCongress
isinsessionwithouttheconsentoftheotherHouse.Neithercantheyadjourntoanyotherplacethanthatwherethetwo
housesaresitting,withouttheconsentoftheother.(4)JointSessions (a)Votingseparately‐ChoosingthePresident(Art.VII,sec.4)‐DeterminingthePresident’stemporarydisability(Id.,sec.11,par4) ‐ConfirmingthenominationofaVice‐President(Id.,sec.9)‐Declaringastateofwar(Art.VI,sec.23(1)‐AmendingtheConstitution(Art.XVII,sec.1(1) (b)VotingJointly‐Torevokeorextendmartiallaworsuspensionofprivilegeofhabeascorpus(Art.VII,sec.18)6. ElectoralTribunalsa.Composition1. 3SupremeCourtJusticestobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice(TheseniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunalshallbeitsChairman.)2.6MembersoftheSenateorHouse,asthecasemaybe,chosenonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandparty‐listorganizationsTheETshallbeconstitutedwithin30daysaftertheSenateandtheHouse
shallhavebeenorganizedwiththeelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.
Memberschosenenjoysecurityoftenureandcannotberemovedbymerechangeofpartyaffiliation.
Abbasv.SETThefiveLDPmemberswhoarealsomembersoftheSenateElectoralTribunalmaynotinhibitthemselvessinceitisclearthattheConstitutionintendedlegislativeandjudiciarymembershiptothetribunal.Asamatteroffact,the2:1ratiooflegislativetojudiciaryindicatesthatlegislativemembershipcannotbeignored.Toexcludethemselvesistoabandonadutythatnoothercourtcanperform.b.NatureofFunctionJurisdiction:bethesolejudgeofallCONTESTSrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectivemembers.EThasjurisdictiononlywhenthereisanelectioncontest.An‘electioncontest’isonewhereadefeatedcandidatechallengesthequalificationandclaimsforhimselftheseatofaproclaimedwinner.Angarav.ElectoralCommissionTheElectoralTribunalofeachHouseistheSOLEjudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthemembersofCongress.Intheabsenceofelectioncontest,theElectoralTribunalhasnojurisdiction.TheElectoralTribunalsareindependentconstitutionalbodiesandcannotberegulatedbyCongress.SupremeCourthasjurisdictionovertheElectoralCommissionandthesubjectmatterofthepresentcontroversyforthepurposeofdeterminingthecharacter,scopeandextentoftheconstitutionalgranttotheElectoral
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15 Commissionas"thesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofthemembersoftheNationalAssembly."c.IndependenceoftheElectoralTribunalsSincetheET’sareindependentconstitutionalbodies,independentevenoftherespectiveHouse,neitherCongressnortheCourtsmayinterferewithproceduralmattersrelatingtothefunctionsoftheET’s.Bondocv.PinedaThetribunalwascreatedtofunctionasanonpartisancourtalthoughtwo‐thirdsofitsmembersarepoliticians.Itisanon‐politicalbodyinaseaofpoliticians."ThepurposeoftheconstitutionalconventioncreatingtheElectoralCommissionwastoprovideanindependentandimpartialtribunalforthedeterminationofconteststolegislativeoffice,devoidofpartisanconsideration,andtotransfertothattribunalallthepowerspreviouslyexercisedbythelegislatureinmatterspertainingtocontestedelectionsofitsmembers."ThepowergrantedtotheelectoralCommissiontojudgecontestsrelatingtotheelectionandqualificationofmembersoftheNationalAssemblyisintendedtobeascompleteandunimpairedasifithadremainedinthelegislature."Tobeabletoexerciseexclusivejurisdiction,theHouseElectoralTribunalmustbeindependent.ItsjurisdictiontohearanddecidecongressionalelectioncontestsisnottobesharedbyitwiththeLegislaturenorwiththeCourts."TheElectoralCommissionisabodyseparatefromandindependentofthelegislatureandthoughnotapowerinthetripartiteschemeofgovernment,itistoallintentsandpurposes,whenactingwithinthelimitsofitsauthority,anindependentorgan;whilecomposedofamajorityofmembersofthelegislatureitisabodyseparatefromandindependentofthelegislature."Validgrounds/Justcauseforterminationofmembershiptothetribunal.ExpirationofCongressionaltermofofficeDeathorpermanentdisabilityResignationformpoliticalpartywhichonerepresentsinthetribunalRemovalformofficeforothervalidreasonsd.PowersLazatinv.HRETSincethecandidatehasalreadybeenproclaimed,jurisdictionnowbelongstotheHRET,thusitsrulesmustbeapplied.TheHRETwillonlygainjurisdictionuponproclamationofthecandidate.Untilsuchproclamation,heisnotyetamemberoftheHouse;hence,theHRETwillnothavejurisdictionoverhim.JurisdictionoversuchremainswiththeCOMELEC.e.JudicialreviewofdecisionsofElectoralTribunalsJudicialreviewofdecisionsoftheET’smaybehadwiththeSConlyinsofarasthedecisionorresolutionwasrenderedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretiontantamounttodenialofdueprocess.Cov.HRETAsconstitutionalcreationsinvestedwithnecessarypower,theElectoralTribunals,althoughnotpowersinthetripartiteschemeofthegovernment,are,intheexerciseoftheirfunctionsindependentorgans—independentofCongressandtheSupremeCourt.ThepowergrantedtoHRETbytheConstitutionisintendedtobeascompleteandunimpairedasifithadremainedoriginallyinthelegislature(Angaravs.ElectoralCommission[1936]).6. CommissiononAppointmentsComposition:1. SenatePresidentasex‐officiochairman(shallnotvoteexceptin
caseofatie.)2.12Senators
3.12MembersoftheHouse
The12Senatorsand12Representativesareelectedonthebasisofproportionalrepresentationfromthepoliticalpartiesandparty‐listorganizations.
TheCAshallbeconstitutedwithin30daysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeshallhavebeenorganizedwiththeelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.
TheCAshallactonallappointmentswithin30sessiondaysfromtheirsubmissiontoCongress.
TheCAshallrulebyamajorityvoteofallitsmembers.Meetings:CAmeetsonlywhileCongressisinsession.MeetingsareheldeitheratthecalloftheChairmanoramajorityofallits
members.• SincetheCAisalsoanindependentconstitutionalbody,itsrulesof
procedurearealsooutsidethescopeofcongressionalpowersaswellasthatofthejudiciary.
Jurisdiction:1. CAshallconfirmtheappointmentsbythePresidentwithrespecttothefollowingpositions:
a) HeadsoftheExecutiveDepartments(exceptifitistheVice‐Presidentwhoisappointedtothepost)
b) Ambassadors,otherpublicministersorconsulsc) OfficersoftheAFPfromtherankofColonelorNavalCaptaind) Otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhimbythe
Constitution(e.g.COMELECmembers)
2. CongresscannotbylawrequirethattheappointmentofapersontoanofficecreatedbysuchlawshallbesubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA.3.AppointmentsextendedbythePresidenttotheabove‐mentionedpositionswhileCongressisnotinsessionshallonlybeeffectiveuntildisapprovalbytheCAoruntilthenextadjournmentofCongress.Dazav.SingsonThecourtresolvesthatissueinfavoroftheauthorityoftheHouseofRepresentativestochangeitsrepresentationintheCommissiononAppointmentstoreflectatanytimethechangesthatmaytranspireinthepoliticalalignmentsofitsmembership.Itisunderstoodthatsuchchangesinmembershipmustbepermanentanddonotincludethetemporaryalliancesorfactionaldivisionsnotinvolvingseveranceofpoliticalloyaltiesorformaldisaffiliationandpermanentshiftsofallegiancefromonepoliticalpartytoanother.GuingonavGonzalesTheprovisionofSection18onproportionalrepresentationismandatoryincharacteranddoesnotleaveanydiscretiontothemajoritypartyintheSenatetodisobeyordisregardtheruleonproportionalrepresentation;otherwise,thepartywithamajorityrepresentationintheSenateorthehouseofRepresentativescanbysheerforceofnumbersimposeitswillonthehaplessminority.ByrequiringaproportionalrepresentationintheCommissiononAppointments,Section18ineffectworksasacheckonthemajoritypartyintheSenateandhelpstomaintainthebalanceofpower.Nopartycanclaimmorethanwhatitisentitledtoundersuchrule.ToallowittoelectmorethanitsproportionalshareofmembersistoconferuponsuchapartyagreatershareinthemembershipintheCommissiononAppointmentsandmorepowertoimposeitswillontheminority,whobythesametoken,suffersadiminutionofitsrightfulmembershipintheCommission."TheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethatthefullcomplementof12SenatorsbeelectedtothemembershipintheCommissiononAppointmentsbeforeitcandischargeitsfunctionsandthatitisnotmandatorytoelect12SenatorstotheCommission.TheoverridingdirectiveofArticleVI,Section18isthattheremustbeaproportionalrepresentationofthepoliticalpartiesinthemembershipoftheCommissiononAppointmentsandthatthespecificationof12memberstoconstituteitsmembershipismerelyanindicationofthemaximumcomplementallowableundertheConstitution.Theactoffilingupthemembershipthereofcannotdisregardthemandateofproportionalrepresentationofthepartiesevenifitresultsinfractionalmembershipinunusualsituationslikethecaseatbar.
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16 8. PowersofCongressa.GeneralPlenaryPowersb.Limitationsonthelegislativepower1. Substantive‐curtailsthecontentsofalaw2.Procedural–curtailsthemannerofpassinglawsCorollaries:1. Congresscannotpassirrepealablelaws.2.Asageneralrule,Congresscannotdelegateitslegislativepower(Potestasdelegatanonpotestdelegare)
Exceptions:1.DelegationoftariffpowerstothePresident(ArtVIsec.28(2)).2.DelegationofemergencypowerstothePresident(ArtVIsec.
23(2)).3.Delegationtothepeopleatlarge.4.Delegationtolocalgovernments.5.Delegationtoadministrativebodies(rule‐makingpower).
TestsforaValidDelegation(Pelaezvs.AuditorGeneral):1.TheCompletenessTest–Thelawmustbecompleteinallitstermsandconditionswhenitleavesthelegislaturesothattherewillbenothingleftforthedelegatetodowhenitreacheshimexceptenforceit.2.TheSufficientStandardTest–Thelawmustfixastandard,thelimitsofwhicharesufficientlydeterminateordeterminable,towhichthedelegatemustconformintheperformanceofhisfunctions.(2)ProceduralLimitationsArt.VISecs2627Section26.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof.(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.Section27.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesameheshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesamewithhisobjectionstotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,two‐thirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomealaw.Inallsuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesoftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehisvetoofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginatedwithinthirtydaysafterthedateofreceiptthereof,otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.c.QuestionHourArt.VISec.22Theheadsofdepartmentsmay,upontheirowninitiative,withtheconsentofthePresident,orupontherequestofeitherHouse,astherulesofeachHouseshallprovide,appearbeforeandbeheardbysuchHouseonanymatterpertainingtotheirdepartments.WrittenquestionsshallbesubmittedtothePresidentoftheSenateortheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesatleastthreedaysbeforetheirscheduledappearance.Interpellationsshallnotbelimitedtowrittenquestions,butmaycover
mattersrelatedthereto.WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequiresandthePresidentsostatesinwriting,theappearanceshallbeconductedinexecutivesession.d.LegislativeinvestigationsLimitations:1. Theinquirymustbeinaidoflegislation.2.Theinquirymustbeconductedinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure.3.Therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected.Corollaries:1. Thepowerofinvestigationnecessarilyincludesthepowertopunishacontumaciouswitnessforcontempt.2.However,legislature’spowertocommitawitnessforcontemptterminateswhenthelegislativebodyceasestoexistuponitsfinaladjournment.
a. HouseofRepresentatives–3yearsb. Senate–indefinite(Senate,withitsstaggeredterms,isa
continuingbody.)3. ThepowertopunishforcontemptisinherentinCongressandthispowerissuigeneris.Arnaultv.NazarenoTheinquiry,tobewithinthejurisdictionofthelegislativebodymakingit,mustbematerialornecessarytotheexerciseofapowerinitvestedbytheConstitution,suchastolegislateortoexpelamember.Inordertoascertainthecharacterornatureofaninquiry,resortmustbehadtothespeechorresolutionunderwhichsuchaninquiryisproposedtobemade.Onceaninquiryisadmittedorestablishedtobewithinthejurisdictionofalegislativebodytomake,theinvestigatingcommitteehasthepowertorequireawitnesstoansweranyquestionpertinenttothesubjectoftheinquiry,subjectofthecoursetohisconstitutionalprivilegeagainstself‐incrimination.Thepowerofinvestigationnecessarilyincludesthepowertopunishacontumaciouswitnessforcontempt.Arnaultv.BalagtasTheprinciplethatCongressoranyofitsbodieshasthepowertopunishrecalcitrantwitnessesisfoundeduponreasonandpolicy.Saidpowermustbeconsideredimpliedorincidentaltotheexerciseoflegislativepower,ornecessarytoeffectuatesaidpower.TheSenatebeingacontinuingbodyunliketheHousehasthepowertoordersuchwitnesstoremainindetention.Bengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee[T]heinvestigationmustbe"inaidoflegislationinaccordancewithitsdulypublishedrulesofprocedure"andthat"therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshallberespected."ItfollowsthenthattherightsofpersonsundertheBillofRightsmustberespected,includingtherighttodueprocessandtherightnottobecompelledtotestifyagainstone'sself.ThepowertoconductformalinquiriesorinvestigationsisspecificallyprovidedforinSec.1oftheSenateRulesofProcedureGoverningInquiriesinAidofLegislation.Suchinquiriesmayrefertotheimplementationorre‐examinationofanylaworinconnectionwithanyproposedlegislationortheformulationoffuturelegislation.TheymayalsoextendtoanyandallmattersvestedbytheConstitutioninCongressand/orintheSenatealone.e.ActasaboardofcanvassersforPresidentialandVicePresidentialelections· ArticleVII,Section4,par4· Rep.ActNo.7166,Section30f.CallspecialelectionforPresidentandVicePresident· ArticleVII,Section10g.RevokeorextendsuspensionofprivilegeofHabeasCorpusordeclarationofmartiallaw· ArticleVII,Section18
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17 h.ApprovePresidentialamnesties· ArticleVII,Section19i.ConfirmcertainappointmentsByCongress· ArticleVII,Section9ByCommissiononAppointmentsSarmientov.Mison(1987)Inthiscase,SCconstruedSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutiontomeanthatonlyappointmentstoofficesmentionedinthefirstsentenceofthesaidSection16,ArticleVIIrequireconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.TherulingwasreiteratedinMaryConcepcionBautistavs.Sen.JovitoSalonga,etal.(1989).Sincetheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentativesinparagraph2,Section5,Art.VImaybefilledbyappointmentbythePresidentbyexpressprovisionofSection7,Art.XVIIIoftheConstitution,itisindubitablethatsectoralrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesareamongthe"otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentinthisConstitution,"referredtointhefirstsentenceofSection16,Art.VIIwhoseappointmentsaresubjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.j.Concurintreaties· ArticleVII,Section21(throughsenate)k.Declarationofwaranddelegationofemergencypowers· ArticleVI,Section23l.BethejudgeofthePresident’sphysicalfitness· ArticleVII,Section11,par4m.Powerofimpeachmenti. whoaresubjecttoimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section2ii.groundsforimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section2iii.Procedureforimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section3(1)‐(6)iv.Consequenceofimpeachment· ArticleXI,Section3(7)v. Mustimpeachmentprecedefilingofcriminalcase?Yes,itwon’tprosperifnoconviction(Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan)n.PowerwithregardtoutilizationofnaturalresourcesArticleXII,Section2o.AmendmentoftheconstitutionArticleXVII,Sections12Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthree‐fourthsofallitsMembers;or(2)Aconstitutionalconvention.Section2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.NoamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthisConstitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter.TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.9. LegislativeProcess
a.Requirementsastobills(1)Astotitlesofbills• Everybillshallembraceonly1subjectwhichshallbeexpressedin
thetitlethereof.• Thetitledoesnothavetobeacompletecatalogueofeverything
statedinthebill.Itissufficientifthetitleexpressesthegeneralsubjectofthebillandalltheprovisionsofthestatutearegermanetothatgeneralsubject.
• Abillwhichrepealslegislationregardingthesubjectmatterneednotstateinthetitlethatitisrepealingthelatter.Thus,arepealingclauseinthebillisconsideredgermanetothesubjectmatterofthebill.
(2)Requirementsastocertainlaws (a)AppropriationlawsLimitations:ForGeneralAppropriationsBills· CongressmaynotincreasetheappropriationsrecommendedbythePresidentfortheoperationoftheGovernmentasspecifiedinthebudget.· Form,contentandmannerofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw.· Noprovisionorenactmentshallbeembracedinthegeneralappropriationsbillunlessitrelatesspecificallytosomeparticularappropriationtherein.· ProcedureinapprovingappropriationsFORTHECONGRESSshallstrictlyfollowtheprocedureforapprovingappropriationsforotherdepartmentsandagencies.· Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations.However,thefollowingmay,BYLAW,beauthorizedtoAUGMENTanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations:1. President2. SenatePresident3. SpeakeroftheHouse4. ChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt5. HeadsoftheConstitutionalCommissions· DISCRETIONARYFUNDSappropriatedFORPARTICULAROFFICIALSshallbedisbursedonly:· Forpublicpurposes· Tobesupportedbyappropriatevouchers· Subjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybeprescribedbylaw· Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated· IfCongressfailstopassthegeneralappropriationsbillbytheendofanyfiscalyear:· Thegeneralappropriationsbillforthepreviousyearisdeemedreenacted· ItshallremaininforceandeffectuntilthegeneralappropriationsbillispassedbyCongress.ForSpecialAppropriationsBill· Shallspecifythepurposeforwhichitisintended· ShallbesupportedbyfundsactuallyavailableascertifiedbytheNationalTreasurerortoberaisedbycorrespondingrevenueproposalthereinLimitationonUseofPublicFunds—Art.VI,§29· NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheNationalTreasuryEXCEPTinpursuanceofanappropriationmadebylaw.· However,thisruledoesnotprohibitcontinuingappropriations,e.g.fordebtservicing,forthereasonthatthisruledoesnotrequireyearlyorannualappropriation.Limitations:· AppropriationsmustbeforaPUBLICPURPOSE· Cannotappropriatepublicfundsorproperty,directlyorindirectly,infavorof1. Anysect,church,denomination,orsectarianinstitutionorsystemofreligionor2. Anypriest,preacher,minister,orotherreligiousteacherordignitaryassuch.EXCEPTifthepriest,etcisassignedto:
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18 1. theArmedForces;or2. anypenalinstitution;or3. governmentorphanage;or4. leprosarium· However,thegovernmentisnotprohibitedfromappropriatingmoneyforavalidsecularpurpose,evenifitincidentallybenefitsareligion,e.g.appropriationsforanationalpoliceforceisvalidevenifthepolicealsoprotectsthesafetyofclergymen.· Also,thetemporaryuseofpublicpropertyforreligiouspurposesisvalid,aslongasthepropertyisavailableforallreligions.Demetriavs.AlbaTheprovisioninquestionundulyoverextendstheprivilegegrantedtothepresidentunderSec.16(5)oftheConstitutioninsofarasitempowersthePresidenttoindiscriminatelytransferfundswithoutregardastowhetherornotthefundstobetransferredareactuallysavingsintheitemfromwhichthesamearetobetaken,orwhetherornotthetransferisforthepurposeofaugmentingtheitemtowhichsaidtransferistobemade.FourphasesofGovernment’sbudgetingprocess.1. Budgetpreparation2. Legislativeauthorization3. Budgetexecution4. Budgetaccountability (b)TaxlawsRequirement:NolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceofaMAJORITYofALLthemembersoftheCongress.ConstitutionalTaxExemptions:1.ThefollowingpropertiesareexemptfromREALPROPERTYtaxes:a. Charitableinstitutionsb. Churches,andparsonagesorconventsappurtenanttheretoc. Mosquesd. Non‐profitcemeteries;ande. Alllands,buildingsandimprovementsactually,directlyandexclusivelyusedforreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposes.2.AllrevenuesandassetsofNON‐STOCKNON‐PROFITEDUCATIONALinstitutionsareexemptfromtaxesanddutiesPROVIDEDthatsuchrevenuesandassetsareactually,directlyandexclusivelyusedforeducationalpurposes(Art.XIVsec.4(3)).3.Grants,endowments,donationsorcontributionsusedactually,directlyandexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax,subjecttoconditionsprescribedbylaw(Art.XIVsec.4(4)).Limitations:1. TheruleoftaxationshallbeUNIFORMandEQUITABLE.2. CongressshallevolveaPROGRESSIVEsystemoftaxation.3. Thepowertotaxmustbeexercisedforapublicpurposebecausethepowerexistsforthegeneralwelfare4. ThedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitutionshouldbeobserved.SpecialFunds· Moneycollectedonataxleviedforaspecialpurposeshallbetreatedasaspecialfundandpaidoutforsuchpurposeonly.· Oncethespecialpurposeisfulfilledorabandoned,anybalanceshallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernmentb.ProcedureforthepassageofbillsBillsthatMustOriginateEXCLUSIVELYfromtheHouseofRepresentatives(Sec.24,ArtVI):1. Appropriationbills(Abillappropriatingasumofmoneyfromthepublictreasury.)‐Abillcreatinganewoffice,andappropriatingfundsthereforisNOTanappropriationbill.2. Revenuebills(Abillspecificallydesignedtoraisemoneyorrevenuethroughimpositionorlevy.)3. Alawregulatinganindustry,thoughincidentallyimposingatax,doesnotmakethelawarevenuebill.4. Tariffbills
5. Billsauthorizingtheincreaseofpublicdebt6. Billsoflocalapplication7. PrivatebillsInTolentinovs.SecretaryofFinance,itwasheldthatRA7716(EVATLaw)didnotviolateSec.24,Art.VI(OriginationClause).Itisimportanttoemphasizethatitisthelaw,andnotthebill,whichisrequiredtooriginateexclusivelyfromtheHoR,becausethebillmayundergosuchextensivechangesintheSenatethattheresultmaybetherewritingofthewhole.Toinsistthatarevenuestatute,andnotjustthebill,mustbesubstantiallythesameastheHousebillwouldbetodenytheSenate’spowernotonlyto“concurwithamendments”butalsoto“proposeamendments”.Itwouldviolatetheco‐equalityoflegislativepoweroftheSenate.Readings:· Eachbillmustpass3readingsinbothHouses.· Eachreadingshallbeheldonseparatedaysandprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformshallbedistributedtoitsmembers3daysbeforeitspassage.Exception:IfabilliscertifiedasurgentbythePresidentastothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency,the3readingscanbeheldonthesamedayTheSCdeclaredinTolentinovs.SecretaryofFinancethataPresidentialcertificationdispensedwithonlythreethings:(1)printing,(2)distributionand(3)readingthebillonseparatedays.Itstillhastopassthroughthreereadings.Firstreading:Onlythetitleisread;thebillispassedtothepropercommitteeSecondreading:Entiretextisreadanddebatesareheld,andamendmentsintroduced.Thirdreading:Onlythetitleisread,noamendmentsareallowed.Voteshallbetakenimmediatelythereafterandtheyeasandnaysenteredinthejournal.c.ThePresident’sVetopowerArt.VI,§27· Everybill,inordertobecomealaw,mustbepresentedtoandsignedbythePresident.· IfthePresidentdoesnotapproveofthebill,heshallvetothesameandreturnitwithhisobjectionstotheHousefromwhichitoriginated.TheHouseshallentertheobjectionsinthejournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.· ThePresidentmustcommunicatehisdecisiontovetowithin30daysfromthedateofreceiptthereof.Ifhefailstodoso,thebillshallbecomealawasifhesignedit.· Tooverridetheveto,atleast2/3ofALLthemembersofeachHousemustagreetopassthebill.Insuchcase,thevetoisoverriddenandbecomesalawwithoutneedofpresidentialapproval.Itemveto· ThePresidentmayvetoparticularitemsinanappropriation,revenueortariffbill.· Thisvetowillnotaffectitemstowhichhedoesnotobject.· VetoofaRider · Ariderisaprovisionwhichdoesnotrelatetoaparticular
appropriationstatedinthebill. · SinceitisaninvalidprovisionunderSection25(2),the
Presidentmayvetoitasanitem.BolinaoElectronicsCorpvs.ValenciaAninvalidvetoisasifthePresidentdidnotactonthebillatall.Billbecomesalawbyexecutiveinaction.Aconditioninanappropriationbillmaybenotbevetoedwithoutvetoingtheitemtowhichitisattached.ThevetomadebythePresidentisinvalidsincetheExecutive’svetopowerdoesnotcarrywithitthepowertostrikeoutconditionsattachedtoanitem.Further,theconditionsvetoedweregermanetotheappropriationhenceshouldhavenotbeenvetoed.Ifthevetoisunconstitutional,itproducesnoeffectwhatsoever.Therestriction/conditionimposedbytheappropriationbillremains.
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19 Gonzalesvs.Macaraig.DOCTRINEOFINAPPROPRIATEPROVISIONSAprovisionthatisconstitutionallyinappropriateforanappropriationbillmaybesingledoutforvetoevenifitisnotanappropriationorrevenueitem.Presidentmayveto“riders”.ThePresident’svetooftheprovisioninquestionisconstitutionalsincetheprovisiondoesnotrelatetoanyparticular/distinctiveappropriationinthebill.Rather,itappliestoallitemsdisapproved/reducedbyCongressinthebudgetproposalsubmittedbythePresident.Thedisapproved/reduceditemsarenowheretobefoundinthefaceofthebill.Todiscoverthem,resortshouldbemadetotheoriginalrecommendationsmadebythePresident.VetoedsectionsaremoreofanexpressionofCongressionalpolicyinrespecttheaugmentationfromthesavingsratherthananbudgetaryappropriation.Bengzonvs.DrilonPresidentAquinovetoedtheappropriationofthe(increased)pensionofretiredjusticessettingupasadefensethestandardizationofcompensationinthegovernment.TheactoftheExecutiveinvetoingtheparticularprovisionsisanexerciseofaconstitutionallyvestedpower.Butthevetopowerisnotabsolute.TheConstitutionreads:"ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,revenueortariffbillbutthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject."(Section27(2),ArticleVI,Constitution)TheExecutivemustvetoabillinitsentiretyornotatall.Heorshecannotactlikeaneditorcrossingoutspecificlines,provisions,orparagraphsinabillthatheorshedislikes.Intheexerciseofthevetopower,itisgenerallyallornothing.However,whenitcomestoappropriation,revenueortariffbills,theAdministrationneedsthemoneytorunthemachineryofgovernmentanditcannotvetotheentirebillevenifitmaycontainobjectionablefeatures.ThePresidentis,therefore,compelledtoapproveintolawtheentirebill,includingitsundesirableparts.ItisforthisreasonthattheConstitutionhaswiselyprovidedthe"itemvetopowers"toavoidinexpedientridersbeingattachedtoanindispensableappropriationorrevenuemeasure.TheConstitutionprovidesthatonlyaparticularitemoritemsmaybevetoed.Thepowertodisapproveanyitemoritemsinanappropriatebilldoesnotgranttheauthoritytovetoapartofanitemandtoapprovetheremainingportionofthesameitem.“Thetermsitemandprovisioninbudgetarylegislationsandpracticeareconcededlydifferent.Aniteminabillreferstotheparticulars,thedetails,thedistinctandseverableparts...ofthebill.Itisanindivisiblesumofmoneydedicatedtoastatedpurpose.An'item'ofanappropriationbillmeansanitemwhichinitselfisaspecificappropriationofmoney,notsomegeneralprovisionoflaw,whichhappenstobeputintoanappropriationbill.'"ThepresidentcannotvetounavoidableobligationssuchasthepaymentofPensionswhichhasalreadybeenvestedbythelaw.Thevetoisinvalidsinceitisviolatedtheseparationofpropertyandthejudiciary’sfiscalautonomy.d.EffectivityoflawsArticle2(CC)LawsshalltakeeffectafterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationintheOfficialGazette,unlessitisotherwiseprovided.Thiscodeshalltakeeffectoneyearaftersuchpublication.“unlessotherwiseprovided”–thisphrasereferstothedateofeffectivity,andnotthepublication.Completepublicationisindispensable.· ExecutiveOrderNo.200(June18,1987)Tanadavs.TuveraDueprocessrequiresthatlawsofgeneralapplicationtohaveforceandeffectmustbepublished.
Tanadavs.Tuvera,ResolutionofMFRThepriorpublicationoflawsbeforetheybecomeeffectivecannotbedispensedwith.10. InitiativeandReferendumArt.VI,§32TheCongressshall,asearlyaspossible,provideforasystemofinitiativeandreferendum,andtheexceptionstherefrom,wherebythepeoplecandirectlyproposeandenactlawsorapproveorrejectanyactorlaworpartthereofpassedbytheCongressorlocallegislativebodyaftertheregistrationofapetitionthereforsignedbyatleasttenpercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvotersthereof.RA6735(Aug4,1989)II.EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTA.ThePresident 1.Qualifications,election,termandoathArt.VII,Sec.2.NopersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheisanatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippines,aregisteredvoter,abletoreadandwrite,atleastfortyyearsofageonthedayoftheelection,andaresidentofthePhilippinesforatleasttenyearsimmediatelyprecedingsuchelection.Thecandidatemustbequalifiedonthedayoftheelections.Bearinmindthatresidencyanddomicilemeanthesamethingunderelectionlaw,i.e.,theffmustbetakenintoconsideration:bodilypresence,animusmanendiandanimusrevertendi.Art.VII,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVice‐PresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayoftheelectionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyreelection.NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfouryearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime. NoVice‐Presidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVice‐PresidentshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay. ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice‐President,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationoftheauthenticityanddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvass(i.e.,tallythecertificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately. TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates. TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,orVice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose.RegularElectionandTerm
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20 ThePresidentandVice‐President(whoshallbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident)shallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermof6years,whichshallbeginonthenoonofJune30nextfollowingthedayofelection.TheregularelectionforPresidentandVice‐Presidentshallbeheldonthe2ndMondayofMay.(Art.VII,Sec.4pars.1&3).SpecialElectionandTerm IfavacancyoccursintheofficesofPresidentandVice‐Presidentmorethan18monthsbeforethedateofthenextregularpresidentialelection,aspecialelectiontoelectthePresidentandVice‐PresidentshallbecalledbyCongress,pursuanttoVII,10.(SeediscussionunderOtherPowersofCongress,supraandSuccession,infra.)AconditionalresignationbytheincumbentPresidentisnotarealresignationthatcreatesavacancyforthepurposeofcallingaspecialelection.ButinthePhilippineBarAssociation,Inc.vCOMELEC,thefailureoftheSCtoissueaninjunctionontimeisalreadyadecisioninitselfinfavorofthevalidityofthelawcallingforSnapElectionsdespitetheabsenceofvacancy;only,itisadecisionthatisnotsupportedbyaratiodecidendi.Indeed,amidtermelectioninapresidentialsystemofgovernmentinresponsetopopularclamorforit,isalegalanomaly.TheConstitutionissilentastowhetherthepersonselectedinthespecialelectionshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredportionoftheterm,andwhetherthenewPresidentcanrunforre‐electionifhehasnotservedmorethan4years,whichdependsontheconstructionofthephrase"hassucceededasthePresident,"discussedinthenextsection.JusticeVVMendoza:Onlyunexpiredportion.Reelection ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyre‐election.Furthermore,nopersonwhohas"succeeded"asPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethan4years,shallbequalifiedforanyelectiontothesameoffice(thePresidency)atanytime.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.1)ThepersonwhosucceedsasPresidentandnotjustinanactingcapacity,couldeitherbe(i)theVice‐President,or(ii)onewhowaselectedPresidentinaspecialelection.Inbothcases,ifhehasservedformorethan4years,heisineligibleforre‐electionasPresident. TheVice‐Presidentontheotherhand,shallnotserveformorethan2successiveterms.Andforthispurpose,avoluntary(butnotinvoluntary)renunciationofofficeforanylengthoftime,shallnotbeconsideredaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermsforwhichhewaselected.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.2).Thisisapplicable,however,beginning1992,becauseoftheTransitoryProvisions.(ThisprohibitionissimilartothatapplicabletoSenators.)CanvassingofElectionReturns ItistheCongressthatactsasBoardofCanvassersofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice‐President.ElectoralTribunalfortheElectionofthePresidentandVicePresidentTheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresidentorVice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthatpurpose.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.) NotethatwhileelectioncontroversiesintheCongressareundertheexclusivejurisdictionoftheirrespectiveElectoralTribunals,thoseintheExecutiveareundertheSupremeCourtitself.OathofOfficeArt.VII,Sec.5.Beforetheyenterontheexecutionoftheiroffice,thePresident,theVice‐PresidentortheActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation: "Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmydutiesasPresident(orVice‐PresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveanddefenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyselftothe
serviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewillbeomitted.)2.PrivilegeandsalaryArt.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhichsuchincreasewasapproved.TheyshallnotreceiveduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromtheGovernmentoranyothersource.Art.XVIII.Sec17.UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,thePresidentshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP300,000;xxx. 3.ProhibitionsArt.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,Vice‐President,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.Theyshallnot,duringsaidtenure,directlyorindirectlypracticeanyotherprofession,participateinanybusiness,orbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice.ThespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.CivilLibertiesUnionvExecutiveSecretaryPetitionerchallengedExec.OrderNo.284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesandasst.secretariesandotherappointiveofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit,subjectofthelimitationsimposedtherein.IndeclaringtheEOunconstitutional,theSCheldthatbyostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthatCabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretariesmayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethan2positionsinthegovt.andGOCCs,EO284actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateofArt.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.ThestricterprohibitionappliedtothePres.andhisofficialfamilyunderSec.13,Art.VIIascomparedtotheprohibitionapplicabletoappointiveofficialsingeneralunderArt.IX,B,Sec.7,par.2areproofoftheintentofthe1987Consti.totreatthemasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibitions.Thus,whileallotherappointiveofficialsinthecivilserviceareallowedtoholdotherofficeoremploymentinthegovtduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheirpositions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedbytheConsti.itself.xxxHowever,theprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderArt.VII,Sec.13mustnotbeconstruedasapplyingtopostsoccupiedbytheExecutiveofficialsspecifiedthereinw/oadditioncompensationinanex‐officiocapacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofsaidofficial'soffice.Thereasonisthatthesepostsdonotcomprise"anyotheroffice"w/inthecontemplationoftheconstitutionalprohibitionbutareproperlyanimpositionofadditionaldutiesandfunctiononsaidofficials.CompareProhibitionsagainstotherofficialsArt.VI,Sec.13.
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21 NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernment,oranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries,duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghisseat.Neithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedortheemolumentsthereofincreasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.Art.IXA,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdanyotherofficeoremployment.Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilegegrantedbytheGovernment,anyofitssubdivisions,agencies,orinstrumentalities,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Art.IX,B,Sec.7.Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Art.VIII,Sec.12.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylawshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunctions.Exceptionstoruleprohibitingexecutiveofficialsfromholdingadditionalpositions:a.President (1)ThePresidentcanassumeaCabinetpost,(becausethedepartmentsaremereextensionsofhispersonality,accordingtotheDoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,sonoobjectioncanbevalidlyraisedbasedonArt.VII,Sec.13.) (2)ThePresidentistheChairmanofNEDA.(Art.XII,Sec.9)b.Vice‐PresidentArt.VII,Sec.3.xxxTheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmationc.Cabinet (1)TheSecretaryofJusticeshallbeanex‐officiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.(Art.VIII,Sec.8[1]) 2)Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,appointiveofficialsshallnotholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.(Art.IX,B,7,par.2)Art.VII,Sec.13talksof"unlessotherwiseprovidedbytheConstitution."InthecaseofCabinetmembers,thisreferstoArt.IX,B,7,par.2.Thus,theConstitutionallowsaCabinetmembertoholdanotherofficeprovidedeither(1)suchisnecessitatedbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition(e.g.SecretaryofTradeandIndustryasChairmanofNDC,SecretaryofAgrarianReformasChairmanoftheLandBank),or(ii)isallowedbylaw.ThevalidityofEO284allowingmembersoftheCabinetandtheirUnder‐Secretariestohold2additionalofficeswasdecidedinthecaseofCLUvsExec.Secretary. 4.Succession (1)Atthebeginningofterm
Art.VII,Sec.7.ThePresident‐electandtheVice‐Presidentelectshallassumeofficeatthebeginningoftheirterms. xxx ‐ThisprovisionreferstothePresidentandVice‐Presidentelectedintheregularelection,andsothetermreferredtobeginsonJune30nextfollowingtheelectiononthe2ndMondayof1992,andevery6yearsthereafter.VacancyinthePresidency Therearetwosetsofrulesonsuccession,dependingonwhetherthevacancytookplacebeforethebeginningofthetermonJune30,orduringthependencyofthetermsthatcommencesonJune30.(Thecut‐offpointisunsettled.Oneviewisthatthecut‐offisnoonofJune30,asexpressedinArt.VII,Sec.4,par.1.Theotherviewisthatthecut‐offismidnightofJune29whenJune30begins.) A.TemporaryorpermanentvacancyinthePresidencybeforetheterm 1.IfthePresident‐electcannotassumehispostatthebeginningofhistermbecausei)hehasnotqualifiedasyet(e.g.hehadanoperationandsohecouldnottakehisoathofofficeonJune30),ii)oraPresidenthasnotbeen"chosen"andqualifiedasyet(e.g.thereisatieandCongresshasnotyetbrokenthetie),thentheVice‐PresidentshallactasPresidentuntilthePresident‐electshallhavequalified,orshallhavebeen"chosen:andqualified,asthecasemaybe.(Art.VII,Sec.7,pars.2&3).Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxIfthePresident‐electfailstoqualify,theVice‐President‐electshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified. IfaPresidentshallnothavebeenchosen,theVice‐President‐electshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified. xxx 2.IfthePresident‐electi)dies,orii)becomespermanentlydisabled"atthebeginningofthetermofthePresident"(i.e.,beforetheterm),thentheVice‐PresidentelectshallbecomethePresident.(Id.,par.4)Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxIfatthebeginningofthetermofthePresident,thePresident‐electshallhavediedorshallhavebecomepermanentlydisabled,theVice‐President‐electshallbecomePresident.3.IfbothPresidentandVice‐President(i)havenotbeen"chosen"or(ii)havenotqualified,or(iii)die,or(iv)becomepermanentlydisabled,thenthePresidentoftheSenate,orincaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouse,shallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVice‐Presidentshallhavebeen"chosen"andqualified.(par.5)Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxWherenoPresidentandVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenchosenorshallhavequalified,orwherebothshallhavediedorbecomepermanentlydisabled,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesshallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentoraVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenchosenandqualified.(par.5thereof.) IncaseboththePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseareunabletoactasPresident,thenCongressshallbylaw,provideforthe"mannerofselecting"theonewhowillactasPresidentuntilaPresidentofVice‐Presidentshallhave(beeneither"chosen"or"elected"pursuanttothespecialelectionreferredtoinVII,10,andqualified. Art.VII,Sec.7.xxxTheCongressshall,bylaw,provideforthemannerinwhichonewho
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22 istoactasPresidentshallbeselecteduntilaPresidentoraVice‐Presidentshallhavequalified,incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,orinabilityoftheofficialsmentionedinthenextprecedingparagraph.(par.6thereof.) Art.VII,Sec.10.TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthevacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresidentandaVice‐Presidenttobeheldnotearlierthanforty‐fivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeofsuchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbeexemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.TheconveningoftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed.Nospecialelectionshallbecalledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection. (2)DuringtermArt.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthePresident,theVice‐PresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVice‐President,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthenactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified. TheCongressshall,bylaw,providewhoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanentdisability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified,andbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualificationsastheActingPresident.B.PermanentVacancyinthePresidencyduringtheterm 1.IncaseofthePresident's(i)death(ii)permanentdisability,(iii)removalfromoffice(theonlywayisbyimpeachment),or(iv)resignation,theVice‐PresidentshallbecomePresidentfortheunexpiredportionoftheterm.(par.1) 2.IncaseofboththePresident'sandVice‐President'sdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice(byimpeachment),orresignation,thentheSenatePresidentor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouse,shallactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecialelectioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified.(par.1.) WhentheActingPresident(i.e.,theSenatePresident,orSpeakeroftheHouse)dies,becomespermanentlydisabled,orresigns(butisnotremoved,becausethereisnoneedtoimpeachhim,hisstaybeingtemporary),thentheCongressshallbylaw,provide"who"shallbeActingPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeen"elected"(pursuanttothespecialelectioninArt.VII,Sec.10)andqualified.ThisActingPresidentshallbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualifications.(par.2)EstradavArroyoTheSCheldthatPresEstradaresigned,therebyleavingthepositionvacant.ThiswasbasedonstatementsheexecutedbeforeheleftMalacanangandthepublisheddiaryofE.AngarainthePhilippineDailyInquirer.Estradav.Desierto(2001)Thepresident’sresignationmustbewillfulandintentional,anditmustbestrictlyconstrued.WhenimpeachmentproceedingshavebecomemootduetotheresignationofthePres,propercriminalandcivilcasesmayalreadybefiledagainsthim.
Res’nontheMotionforRecon(2001)Thetotalitytestwasappliedtodeterminewhetherornotthepresidenthasindeedresigned.ManythingswereconsideredincludingtheAngaraDiary.Comparisonsanddistinctionsbetweenthetwovacancies: a)TheincumbentPresidentneverholds‐overthePresidencyinanycase. b)ThevacancymustoccurintheofficesofboththePresidentandVice‐PresidentinorderfortheSenatePresident,ortheSpeaker,or,intheirinability,theoneprovidedtosucceedaccordingtotheLawofSuccessionpassedbytheCongress,tosucceedasActingPresidentuntilthequalificationofthePresident. c)TheLawonSuccessionmustbepassedbytheCongressinbothcasesintheeventthatthePresident,Vice‐President,SenatePresidentandtheSpeakerareallunabletoactasPresident.Butinthecaseofavacancyoccurringbeforetheterm,thelawprovidesonlyforthe"mannerofselecting"theActingPresident,whileinthecaseofavacancyoccurringduringtheterm,itprovidesfor"theperson"whoshallactasPresident.Inbothcases,thestintoftheActingPresidentistemporary. d)Whenthevacancycomesbeforetheterm,theConstitutiontalksofthesuccessoractingasPresidentuntilaPresidenthasbeen"chosen"and"qualified";whenitcomesduring,ittalksof"elected"andqualified.Thereasonisthatbeforetheterm,thevacancyinthePresidencyneednotbefilledupbyelection,sinceitmaybefilledupbyavoteofCongressincaseofatie(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.5);butduringtheterm,theonlywaytofillupthevacancyisbyspecialelection. e)Aspecialelectioninbothcasesisheld,pursuanttoArt.VII,Sec.10,onlywhenbothofficesofPresidentandVice‐Presidentarevacant.However,ifthevacancyoccursbeforetheterm,thegroundsarelimitedto2(deathandpermanentdisabilityorboth),whileifthevacancyoccursduringtheterm,thegroundsare4(death,permanentdisability,removal,andresignation). f)Thevacancythatoccursbeforethetermofofficemaybetemporaryorpermanent;thevacancythatoccursduringthetermofofficecanonlybeapermanentone.Thus,adifferentsetofrulesapplies,tobediscussednextfollowing,incaseofthetemporaryinabilityofthePresidentduringthetermofoffice.Art.VII,Sec.10.TheCongressshall,atteno'clockinthemorningofthethirddayafterthevacancyintheofficesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentoccurs,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresidentandaVice‐Presidenttobeheldnotearlierthanforty‐fivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeofsuchcall.Thebillcallingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,ArticleVIofthisConstitutionandshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.Appropriationsforthespecialelectionshallbechargedagainstanycurrentappropriationsandshallbeexemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.TheconveningoftheCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed.Nospecialelectionshallbecalledifthevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection. 3.IncaseoftemporarydisabilityArt.VII,Sec.11.WheneverthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice‐PresidentasActingPresident. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowersanddutiesoftheofficeasActing
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23 President.Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfivedaystothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshalldecidetheissue.Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinforty‐eighthours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession,withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo‐thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. *TemporaryVacancyinthePresidencyduringthetermAvacancyinthePresidencyarisingfromhisdisabilitycanoccurinanyoftheffways: 1.AwrittendeclarationbythePresident 2.WrittendeclarationbytheCabinet 3.FindingbyCongressby2/3votethatthePresidentisdisabled. Inallthesecases,theVice‐PresidenttemporarilyactsasthePresident.VoluntarydeclarationofinabilitybyPresident a.WhenthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakerhiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice‐PresidentasActingPresident. b.TheVice‐PresidentshallsoactuntilthePresidenttransmitstotheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakerawrittendeclarationthatheisnolongerunabletodischargehisoffice.ContestedinabilityofthePresident a.WhenmajorityofallthemembersoftheCabinettransmittotheSenatePresidentandSpeakertheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargehisoffice,thentheVice‐PresidentshallimmediatelyassumethePresidencyinanactingcapacity. b.ThePresidentcancontestthisbysendinghisownwrittendeclarationtotheSenatePresidentandSpeaker,thatnoinabilityexists.Uponsuchtransmittal,thePresidentshallautomaticallyassumehisoffice.c.ShouldthemajorityoftheCabinetinsistontheiroriginalstandbytransmittingasecondwrittendeclarationofthePresident'sinabilitywithin5daysfromresumptionofofficeofthePresident,thenCongressshallstepin. d.UponreceiptofthisseconddeclarationbytheCabinet,Congressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,within48hours,withoutneedofcall,inaccordancewithitsrules.(Ifitisalreadyinsession,itmustmeetrightaway,asglimpsedfromthefactthattheyonlyhave10daystodecide,whereasifitisnotinsession,itmustconvenein2daysanddecidebeforethe12thday.) e.CongressshalldeterminethePresident'sinabilitywithin10daysafterreceiptofthesecondwrittendeclarationbytheCabinetifitisinsession,orwithin12daysafteritisrequiredtoassemblebyitsrespectivepresidingofficerifitisnotinsession. f.IfthePresident,bya2/3voteofbothhousesvotingseparately,determinedtobe"unable"todischargehisoffice,thentheVice‐PresidentshallactasPresident.Iflessthan2/3findhimunable,thenthePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.SeriousIllnessofthePresident
Art.VII,Sec.12.IncaseofseriousillnessofthePresident,thepublicshallbeinformedofthestateofhishealth.ThemembersoftheCabinetinchargeofnationalsecurityandforeignrelationsandtheChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,shallnotbedeniedaccesstothePresidentduringsuchillness. 5.RemovalArt.XI,Sec.2.ThePresident,theVice‐President,theMembersoftheSupremeCourt,theMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheOmbudsmanmayberemovedfromoffice,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.Art.XI,Sec.3.(1)TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment. (2)AverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentmaybefiledbyanyMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbeincludedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithinthreesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,shallsubmititsreporttotheHousewithinsixtysessiondaysfromsuchreferral,togetherwiththecorrespondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithintensessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)Avoteofatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirmafavorableresolutionwiththeArticlesofImpeachmentoftheCommittee,oroverrideitscontraryresolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenateshallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithinaperiodofoneyear.(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensittingforthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesisontrial,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtshallpreside,butshallnotvote.Nopersonshallbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7)JudgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw. Bernas:Theofficercanstillbetriedforacriminalcaseasidefromimpeachment“Initiation”isgovernedbytherulesoftheHouseofReps;“trial”isgovernedbytherulesoftheSenate.Whatissoughttobediscoveredisnotjusttheguiltorinnocenceinthecriminalsense,butapublicofficial’sworthinessorunworthinessofthesolemntrustconferreduponhimbythepeople.Thus,impeachmentispoliticalinnature. 6.PowersandFunctionsofthePresident (1)ExecutivePowerTheexecutivefunctionisessentiallythedutytoimplementthelawswithinthestandardsimposedbythelegislature.UndertheConstitution,thispowerisexercisedbythePresident.Thus,whentheCabinetandotherbranchesoftheExecutiveDepartmentimplementthelaw,theyareactingunderthecontrolofthePresident.
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24 Art.VII,Sec.1.TheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresidentofthePhilippines.Sec.17.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.InNationalElectrificationCommissionvs.CA,theCourtsaidthatasadministrativeheadofthegovernment,thePresidentisvestedwiththepowertoexecute,administerandcarryoutlawsintopracticaloperation.MarcosvsManglapusThisisapetitionformandamusaskingtheCourttoordertherespondentstoissuetraveldocumentstoMr.MarcosandhisimmediatefamilyandtoenjointheimplementationofthePresident'sdecisiontobartheirreturntothePhilippines.Theissueiswhetherornot,intheexerciseofexecutivepower,thePresidentmayprohibittheMarcosesfromreturningtothePhilippines.Althoughthe1987ConstitutionimposeslimitationsontheexerciseofspecificpowersofthePresident,itmaintainsintactwhatistraditionallyconsideredaswithinthescopeofexecutivepower.Corollarily,thepowersofthePresidentcannotbesaidtobelimitedonlytothespecificpowerenumeratedintheConstitution.Inotherwords,executivepowerismorethanthesumofspecificpowerssoenumerated. TheframersdidnotintendthatbyenumeratingthepowersofthePres,heshallexercisethosepowersandnoother.TheseunstatedresidualpowersareimpliedfromthegrantofexecutivepowerandwhicharenecessaryforthePrestocomplywithhisdutiesundertheConsti. (2)ControlofexecutivedepartmentsArt.VII,Sec.17.ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.Controlisthepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyornullifyortosetasidewhatasubordinatehasdoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstituteone'sownjudgmentinthatofasubordinate. Underthequalifiedpoliticalagencydoctrine(alsoalteregoprinciple),“allthedifferentexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsaremereadjunctsoftheExecutiveDept,theheadsofthevariousexecutivedepts.AreassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExecutive,and,exceptincaseswhereintheChiefExecutiveisrequiredbytheConstiorbythelawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthesituationdemandthatheactpersonally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChiefExecutiveareperformedbyandthroughtheexecutivedepts.,performedandpromulgatedintheregularcourseofbusiness,are,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbytheChiefExecutive,presumptivelyactsoftheChiefExecutive.”(FreeTelephoneWorkersUnionvs.MinisterofLaborandEmployment) (3)GeneralsupervisionoflocalgovernmentsandautonomousregionsArt.X,Sec.4.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.xxxArt.X,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregionstoensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted. Supervisionmeansthemereoverseeing,orthepowerorauthorityoftheofficertoseethatsubordinateofficersperformtheirduties,andifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem,thentheformermaytakesuchactionorstepsasprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheseduties.Butthisdoesnotincludethepowertooverruletheiracts,iftheseactsarewithintheirdiscretion.(4)PowerofappointmentCruz:Appointmentmaybedefinedastheselection,bytheauthorityvestedw/thepower,ofanindividualwhoistoexercisethefunctionsofa
givenoffice. Thepowerofappointmentis,accordingtotheSCinConcepcionvParedes,themosteminentlyexecutivepower,becauseitisthroughhisappointeesthatthePresidentcanexecutelaws. Distinguishappointmentfrom:
1. Designation–impositionofadditionalduties,usuallybylaw,onapersonalreadyinthepublicservice
2. Commission–writtenevidenceoftheappointmentThepowerofappointmentbythePresidentunderthe1987Constitutionhasbeensignificantlycurbed.Itcanbeclassifiedasfollows: 1.WiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentsSarmientovsMisonThereare4groupsofofficerswhomthePresmayappoint:
1. headsoftheexecdept,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptandotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhim;
2. allotherofficersofthegov’twhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedbylaw;
3. thosewhomthePresmaybeauthorizedtoappoint;4. officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentsCongressmayby
lawvestinthePresaloneHeadsofbureausweredeliberatelymovedfromtheprovisionofappointmentsrequiringconfirmationandwereincludedinthe4thgroupandhence,theirappointmentsnolongerneedconfirmation.BautistavsSalongaThepositionofChairmanoftheCHRisnotspecificallyenumeratedinthe1stsentenceofArtVII,Sec16.CHRshouldbeindependent,andtheofficers’tenureshouldnotbedependentonthePres.Hence,CommissionerBautistashouldberemovedonlyforcause.QuintosDelesvsCommissiononAppointmentsTheseatsreservedforsectoralrepsmaybefiledbyappointmentbythePresunderArtXVIII,Sec7.ItisindubitablethatsectoralrepstotheHouseareamongthe“otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresinthisConsti”,referredtointhe1stsenrtenceofArtVII,Sec16.TheseappointmentsrequiretheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointments.Notes:FromtherulingsinSarmientoIIIv.Mison,156S549),Bautistav.Salonga,172S160,andDelesv.ConstitutionalCommission,177S259,thesedoctrinesarededucible: 1.ConfirmationbytheCAisrequiredonlyforpresidentialappointeesasmentionedinthefirstsentenceofSec.16,Art.VII,including,thoseofficerswhoseappointmentsareexpresslyvestedbytheConstitutionitselfinthepresident(likesectoralrepresentativestoCongressandmembersoftheconstitutionalcommissionsofAudit,CivilServiceandElection). 2.ConfirmationisnotrequiredwhenthePresidentappointsothergovernmentofficerswhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaworthoseofficerswhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint(liketheChairmanandMembersoftheCom.onHumanRights).Also,asobservedinSarmientov.Mison,whenCongresscreatesinferiorofficesbutomitstoprovideforappointmentthereto,orprovidesinanunconstitutionalmannerforsuchappointments,theofficersareconsideredasamongthosewhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw. (a)HeadsoftheexecutivedepartmentsArt.VII,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmed
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25 forcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution.HeshallalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress. (b)Ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls(Id.) (c)OfficersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippineswiththerankofcolonelornavalcaptain(becausetheseareofficersofasizeablecommandenoughtostageacoup) (d)OtherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentintheConstitution:
(i)ChairmanandCommissionersoftheConstitutionalCommissions
Art.IXB,Sec.1.(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCivilServiceCommission)shallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerforfiveyears,andanotherCommissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.Id.,C,Sec.1.(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononElections)shallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,threeMembersshallholdofficeforsevenyears,twoMembersforfiveyears,andthelastMembersforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.Id.,D,Sec.1(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissioners(oftheCommissiononAudit)shallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointmentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Ofthosefirstappointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerforfiveyears,andanotherCommissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity. (ii)RegularmembersoftheJudicialandBarCouncilComposedoftheIBPrepresentative,professoroflaw,retiredSCjustice,andrepresentativeoftheprivatesector.Notetheex‐officiomembers:ChiefJustice,SecretaryofJustice,andrepresentativeofCongress)Art.VII,Sec.8.(2)Theregularmembersofthe(JudicialandBar)CouncilshallappointedbythePresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments.OftheMembersfirstappointed,therepresentativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear. (iii)SectoralrepresentativesArt.XVIII,Sec.7.Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistofnomineesbytherespectivesectorstheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentationinparagraph(2)ofSection5ofArticleVIofthis
Constitution. (iv)RegionalConsultativeCommissionArt.X,Sec.18.TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththeassistanceandparticipationoftheregionalconsultativecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesappointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.Theorganicactshalldefinethebasicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislativeassembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganicactsshalllikewiseprovideforspecialcourtswithpersonal,family,andpropertylawjurisdictionconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws. Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,andgeographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion. 2.UponrecommendationoftheJudicialandBarCouncil (a)MembersoftheSupremeCourtandallothercourtsArt.VIII,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentswithinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist. (b)Ombudsmanandhis5deputies(forLuzon,Visayas,Mindanao,generalandmilitary)Art.XI,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesforeveryvacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilledwithinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur. 3.AppointmentofVicePresidentasMemberoftheCabinetArt.VII,Sec.3.XxxTheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation 4.AppointmentssolelybythePresidentArt.VII,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallxxxalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhom,hemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofdepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards. ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress. 1.ThosevestedbytheConstitutiononthePresidentalone(e.g.appointmentofVice‐PresidenttotheCabinet)[Art.VII,Sec.3(2)] 2.Thosewhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedbylaw. 3.Thosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint. 4.ThoseotherofficerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentisvestedbylawinthePresident(alone). Thephraseologyismuddled. Themeaningof#4wastoucheduponinSarmientovMison.Inarguingthatevenbureauchiefsneededconfirmationeveniftheyareofinferiorrank,theargumentwasthephrase,"TheCongressmay,bylaw,vestin
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26 theappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone"meantthatuntilalawispassedgivingsuchappointingpowertothePresidentalone,thensuchappointmenthastobeconfirmed.Onlyaftersuchlawispasseddoesthenecessityforconfirmationnolongerhold.TheSCdismissedthisviewhowever,sayingthattheinclusionoftheword"alone"wasanoversight.Thus,theConstitutionshouldread"TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident." (5)LimitationsonappointingpowerofthePresident`Art.VII,Sec.13.XxxThespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.Id.,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointmentstoexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublicsafety. a.Thespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe4thcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnot,duringhis"tenure".beappointedas(i)membersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,(ii)memberoftheOfficeofOmbudsman,(iii)Secretaries,(iv)Undersecretaries,(v)Chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries. b.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelections(2ndMondayofMarch),anduptotheendofhis"term"(June30),aPresident(orActingPresident)shallnotmakeappointments. Exception:Temporaryappointments,toexecutivepositions,whencontinuedvacancieswill(1)prejudicepublicservice(e.gPostmaster)or(2)endangerpublicsafety(e.g.ChiefofStaff).ThisprovisionseemstohaveoverruledpreviouspronouncementsoftheSupremeCourtonthevalidityof"midnightappointments".(Adinterimappointmentscouldeitherbe"midnight",ifmadebythePresidentbeforehestepsdownfromofficeorrecess,ifmadebythePresidentwhenCongressisnotinsession.)AytonavCastillo,TheSCruledthatwhile"midnightappointments"(note:madebyoutgoingPresidentneartheendofhisterm)arenotillegal,theyshouldbemadeinthecapacityofa"caretaker"doublycarefulandprudentinmakingtheselection,soasnottodefeatthepoliciesoftheincomingadministration.Thefillingupofvacanciesinimportantposts,iffew,andsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentandtheappointeesqualifications,maybeundoubtedlypermitted.Buttheissuanceof350appointmentsinonenight,andtheplannedinductionofalmostallofthemafewhoursbeforetheinaugurationofthenewPresidentmayberegardedasabuseofpresidentialprerogatives.QuisumbingvTajanglangitTheSCemphasizedthattheAytonarulingdoesnotdeclareallmidnightappointmentsasinvalid,andthattheadinterimappointmentofthepetitionerchiefofpolicehere,whosequalificationandregularitywerenotdisputed,exceptforthefactthatitwasmadeduringthelastfewdaysoftheoldadministration,isthusnotinvalid.DeRamav.CA(2001)Theprohibitionagainstmidnightappointmentsappliesonlytothe
presidentanddoesnotextendtolocalelectiveofficials.Moreover,thereisnolawthatprohibitslocalelectiveofficialsfrommakingappointmentsduringthelastdaysofhisorhertenure.InterimorrecessappointmentsArtVI,Sec.19.TheElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointmentsshallbeconstitutedwithinthirtydaysaftertheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavebeenorganizedwiththeelectionofthePresidentandtheSpeaker.TheCommissiononAppointmentsshallmeetonlywhiletheCongressisinsession,atthecallofitsChairmanoramajorityofallitsMembers,todischargesuchpowersandfunctionsashereinconferreduponit.Art.VII,Sec.16.xxxThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessofCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.Regularandrecess(ad‐interim)appointmentsAppointmentsrequiringconfirmationareoftwokinds,(i)regular,iftheCA,thatis,Congress,isinsession,or(ii)duringtherecessofCongress(becausetheCommissionshallmeetonlywhileCongressisinsession[Art.VI,Sec.19]). RegularappointmentonemadebythePresidentwhileCongressisinsession,takeseffectonlyafterconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments,andonceapproved,continuesuntiltheendofthetermoftheappointee. Adinterimappointment‐onemadebythePresidentwhileCongressisnotinsession,takeseffectimmediately,butceasestobevalidifdisapprovedbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruponthenextadjournmentofCongress.(Art.VII,Sec.16,par.2)MatibagvsBenipayoAdinterimappointment–apermanentappointmentmadebythePresinthemeantimethatCongresisinrecess.ItispermanentasittakeseffectimmediatelyandcannolongerbewithdrawnbythePresoncetheappointeehasqualifiedintooffice.ThefactthatitissubjecttotheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointmentsdoesnotalteritspermanentcharacter.Hence,saidappointmentiseffectiveuntil(1)disapprovedbytheCAor(2)thenextadjournmentofCongressActing/Temporaryappointment–canbewithdrawnorrevokedatthepleasureoftheappointingpower.Theappointeedoesnotenjoysecurityoftenure.ThisisthekindofappointmentthattheConstiprohibitsthePresfrommakingtotheindependentconstitutionalcommissions.PacetevsSecretaryThemerefilingofamotionforreconsiderationoftheconfirmationofanappointmentcannothavetheeffectofrecallingorsettingasidesaidappointment.TheConstiisclear–theremusteitherbearejectionbytheCommissiononAppointmentsornon‐actiononitspartfortheconfirmationtoberecalled.Also,thepowertoapproveordisapproveappointmentsisconferredontheCAasabodyandnotontheindividualmembers.TemporaryDesignations:AdminCodeof1987,BookIIISec.17ThePresidentmaydesignateanofficeralreadyinthegovt.serviceoranyothercompetentpersontoperformthefunctionsofanyofficeintheexecutivebranch,appointmenttowhichisvestedinhimbylaw,when: (a)Theofficerregularlyappointedtotheofficeisunabletoperformhisdutiesbyreasonofillness,absenceoranyothercause;or (b)Thereexistsavacancy; Innocaseshallatemporarydesignationexceedone(1)year.
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27 (6)LimitationsontheappointingpoweroftheActingPresidentArt.VII,Sec.14.AppointmentsextendedbyanActingPresidentshallremaineffectiveunlessrevokedbytheelectedPresidentwithinninetydaysfromhisassumptionorreassumptionofoffice.*dealswithapptsmadebyanactingPresArt.VII,Sec.15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhisterm,aPresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments,excepttemporaryappointmentstoexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicserviceorendangerpublicsafety.*dealswithapptsmadebyaPreswithin2monthsbeforethenextPresidentialelectionsanduptotheendofhisterm Art.VII,Sec.16.xxxThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.*dealswithregularpresidentialappointments.WithorwithoutconfirmationoftheCA,andwithrecessoradinterimappointments. (7)ExecutiveclemenciesArt.VII,Sec.19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,thePresidentmaygrantreprieves,commutations,andpardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment.HeshallalsohavethepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrenceofamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCongress.Art.IX,C,Sec.5.Nopardon,amnesty,paroleorsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelectionlaws,rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationbytheCommission(onElections.) *ThePresidentmaygrant(i)reprieves,(ii)commutations,and(iii)pardons,and(iv)remitfinesandforfeitures,afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment,except: (a)Incasesofimpeachment,and (b)AsotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitutionReprieveatemporaryrelieffromorpostponementofexecutionofcriminalpenaltyorsentenceorastayofexecution.(Black)Itisthewithholdingofasentenceforanintervaloftime,apostponementofexecution,atemporarysuspensionofexecution.(Peoplevs.Vera) Commutation‐reductionofsentence.(Black)Itisaremissionofapartofthepunishment;asubstitutionofalesspenaltyfortheoneoriginallyimposed.(Peoplevs.Vera) Amnesty‐asovereignactofoblivionforpastacts,grantedbygovernmentgenerallytoaclassofpersonswhohavebeenguiltyusuallyofpoliticaloffensesandwhoaresubjecttotrialbuthavenotyetbeenconvicted,andoftenconditionedupontheirreturntoobedienceanddutywithinaprescribedtime.(Black;BrownvWalker,161US602).Probation‐adispositionunderwhichadefendantafterconvictionandsentenceisreleasedsubjecttoconditionsimposedbythecourtandtothesupervisionofaprobationofficer.[Sec.3(a),PD968.] Parole‐isthesuspensionofthesentenceofaconvictgrantedbyaParoleBoardafterservingtheminimumtermoftheindeterminatesentencepenalty,withoutgrantingapardon,prescribingthetermsuponwhichthesentenceshallbesuspended.
Pardon‐permanentcancellationofsentence.(Black)Itisanactofgraceproceedingfromthepowerentrustedwiththeexecutionofthelaws,whichexemptstheindividualonwhomitisbestowed,fromthepunishmentthelawinflictsforthecrimehehascommitted.Itisaremissionofguilt,aforgivenessoftheoffense.(PeoplevVera) Pardonmaybeplenaryorpartial.Aplenarypardonextinguishesallthepenaltiesimposedupontheoffender,includingaccessorydisabilities,whereaspartialpardondoesnot. Pardonmaybeabsoluteorconditional.Wherethepardonisconditional,theoffenderhastherighttorejectthesamesincehemayfeelthattheconditionimposedismoreonerousthanthepenaltysoughttoberemitted.Butinthecaseofanabsolutepardon,thepardoneehasnooptionatallandmustacceptitwhetherhelikesitornot.Inthissense,anabsolutepardonissimilartocommutation,w/cisalsonotsubjecttoacceptancebytheoffender.EffectsofPardonCristobalvLabradorThereare2limitationsupontheexerciseoftheconstitutionalprerogativeofthePres.tograntpardon:(1)thatthepowerbeexercisedafterconviction;(2)thatsuchpowerdoesnotextendtocasesofimpeachment.xxxAnabsolutepardonnotonlyblotsoutthecrimecommittedbutitalsoremovesalldisabilitiesresultingfromconviction.Inthepresentcase,thedisabilityistheresultofconvictionw/ow/ctherewouldbenobasisforthedisqualificationfromvoting. Thepardonextendedisconditionalinthesensethat"hewillbeeligibleforappointmentonlytopositionsw/careclericalormanualinnatureinvolvingnomoneyorprop.resp.,"itisabsoluteinsofarasit"restorestheresp.tofullcivilandpoliticalrights."Pelobellov.PalatinoAbsolutepardonhastheeffectofremovingthedisqualificationfromvotingandbeingelectedincidenttocriminalconvictionunderSec94(a)oftheElectionCode.TheChiefExecutive,afterinquiryintotheenvironmentalfacts,shouldbeatlibertytoatonetherigidityofthelawtotheextentofrelievingcompletelythepartyorpartiesconcernedfromtheaccessoryandresultantdisabilitiesofcriminalconviction.MonsantovsFactoranPardonimpliesguiltanddoesnoterasethefactofthecommissionofthecrimeandtheconvictionthereof.Itdoesnotipsofactorestoreaconvictedfelontoapublicofficenecessarilyrelinquishedorforfeitedbyreasonoftheconvictionalthough *Notes:"Pardongrantedafterconvictionfreestheindividualfromallthepenaltiesandlegaldisabilitiesandrestoreshimtoallhiscivilrights.Butunlessexpresslygroundedontheperson'sinnocence(w/cisrare),itcannotbringbacklostreputationforhonesty,integrityandfairdealing.Thismustbeconstantlykeptinmindlestwelosetrackofthetruecharacterandpurposeoftheprivilege.xxx" Doespardoningpowerapplytoadministrativecases?LlamasvExecutiveSecretary TheConst.doesnotdistinguishbetweenwhichcasesexecutiveclemencymaybeexercisedbythePres.,withthesoleexclusionofimpeachmentcases. IfthePresidentcangrantreprieves,commutationsandpardons,andremitfinesandforfeituresincriminalcases,withmuchmorereasoncanshegrantexecutiveclemencyinadministrativecases,whichareclearlylessseriousthancriminaloffenses.However,thepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemencyinadministrativecasesrefersonlytoadministrativecasesintheExecutivebranchandnotintheJudicialorLegislativebranchesofthegovt. UnderthedoctrineofQualifiedPoliticalAgency,thedifferentExecutive
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28 departmentsaremereadjunctsofthePresident.TheiractsarepresumptivelytheactsofthePresidentuntilcountermandedorreprobatedbyher.Inthiscase,thePresidentintheexerciseofherpowerofsupervisionandcontroloverallexecutivedepartments,maysubstituteherdecisionforthatofhersubordinate.ItisclearlywithinthepowerofthePresidentnotonlytogrant"executiveclemency"butalsotoreverseormodifyarulingissuedbyasubordinateagainstanerringpublicofficial,whereareconsiderationofthefactsallegedwouldsupportthesame.Itisinthissensethattheallegedexecutiveclemencywasgranted.Sec.53,Chapter7,SubtitleA,TitleI,BookV,AdministrativeCodeof1987RemovalofAdministrativePenaltiesorDisabilities.‐‐Inmeritoriouscasesanduponrecommendationofthe(CivilService)Commission,thePresidentmaycommuteorremoveadministrativepenaltiesordisabilitiesimposeduponofficersoremployeesindisciplinarycases,subjecttosuchtermsandconditionsashemayimposeintheinterestoftheservice Whomayavailofamnesty?TolentinovsCatoyPetitionerwasaHukbalahapwhowasfoundguiltyofillegalassembly.Afterthejudgmentwaspromulgated,thePresidentissuedProc.No.76grantingamnestytoleadersandmembersoftheHukbalahap.Petitionerwhowasalreadyservinghissentence,sentapetitiontothePresidentforhisreleaseundertheprovisionsoftheproclamation.Noactionwastakenonhispetition.Hethenwenttocourtandfiledanapplicationforawritofhabeascorpus.AmnestyProclamationNo.76applieseventoHukbalahapsalreadyundergoingsentenceuponthedateofitspromulgation.ThemajorityoftheCourtbelievethatbyitscontextandpervadingspirittheproclamationextendstoallmembersoftheHukbalahap.ItmakesnoexceptionwhenitannouncesthattheamnestyisproclaimedinfavoroftheleadersandmembersoftheassociationsknownastheHukbalahapandPambansangKaisahanngMagbubukid(PKM).MacagaanvsPeople PetitionerswerechargedandconvictedofestafathroughfalsificationofpublicandcommercialdocumentsbytheSandiganbayan.TheyclaimedthattheyhadbeengrantedamnestybyPresidentMarcos.TheSandiganbayanclaimedthatthebenefitsofamnestywereneveravailabletopetitionersunderPD1182.TheSCagreedwiththeSandiganbayanthatinfactthepetitionerswereexpresslydisqualifiedfromamnesty.Theactsforwhichtheywereconvictedwereordinarycrimeswithoutanypoliticalcomplexionandconsistingonlyofdiversionofpublicfundstoprivateprofit.TheamnestyproclamationcoveredonlyactsinthefurtheranceofresistancetodulyconstitutedauthoritiesoftheRepublicandappliesonlytomembersoftheMNLF,orotheranti‐gov’tgroups. (8)PowersascommanderinchiefArt.VII,Sec.18.ThePresidentshallbetheCommander‐in‐ChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippines,andwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemay,foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusorplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Withinforty‐eighthoursfromtheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thePresidentshallsubmitareportinpersonorinwritingtotheCongress.TheCongress,votingjointly,byavoteofatleastamajorityofallitsMembersinregularorspecialsession,mayrevokesuchproclamationorsuspension,whichrevocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongressmay,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbytheCongress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit. TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwenty‐fourhoursfollowing
suchproclamationorsuspension,conveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacall. TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. AstateofmartiallawdoesnotsuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution,norsupplantthefunctioningofthecivilcourtsorlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconfermentofjurisdictiononmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilianswherecivilcourtsareabletofunction,norautomaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit. Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeshallapplyonlytopersonsjudiciallychargedforrebellionoroffensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion.Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbejudiciallychargedwithinthreedays,otherwiseheshallbereleased.Art.III,Sec.13.Allpersons,exceptthosechargedwithoffensespunishablebyreclusionperpetuawhentheevidenceofguildisstrong,shall,beforeconviction,bebailablebysufficientsureties,orbereleasedonrecognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.Art.VIII,Sec.1.xxxJudicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment. PowersasCommander‐in‐Chief:a.Hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.b.Hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,or c.HemayproclaimmartiallawovertheentirePhilippinesoranypartthereof.Subjectto:Art.VIII,Sec.1par.2.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovt.a.CallouttheAFPtopreventlawlessviolence‐Thisismerelyapolicemeasuremeanttoquelldisorder.Assuch,theConstitutiondoesnotregulateitsexerciseradicallyb.Suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus‐A"writofhabeascorpus"isanorderfromthecourtcommandingadetainingofficertoinformthecourt(i)ifhehasthepersonincustody,and(ii)whathisbasisindetainingthatperson. The"privilegeofthewrit"isthatportionofthewritrequiringthedetainingofficertoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbetested.Notethatitistheprivilegethatissuspended,notthewrititself.Requisites: 1)Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and2)Thepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspension. Effectsofthesuspensionoftheprivilege: 1)Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritappliesonlytopersons"judiciallycharged"forrebellionoroffensesinherentinordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5).Suchpersonssuspected
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29 oftheabovecrimescanbearrestedanddetainedwithoutawarrantofarrest. "Judiciallycharged"asusedintheConstitutionisimprecise.Forifonewerealreadyjudiciallycharged,hisdetentionwouldbelegalandsohecouldnolongerpetitionforhabeascorpus.Habeascorpuspreciselycontemplatesasituationinwhichapersonisbeingdetainedwithoutbeingchargedincourt.Thus,theprovisionshouldread"onewhoissuspectedofcomplicityin"thetwocrimesabove. Asageneralrule,nopersoncouldbearrestedwithoutawarrantofarrest(validlyissueduponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafterexaminationunderoathoraffirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesses,(cf.Art.III,Sec.2),unless(i)thearrestwasmadeinconnectionwithacrimecommittedinthepresenceofthedetainingofficer,or(ii)theprivilegeofthewritwassuspended.Ifthepublicofficerarrestshimwithoutawarrant,theofficerbecomesliablefor"arbitrarydetention"underArt.124oftheRPC,andapetitionforhabeascorpuscanbefiledtoseekhisrelease. Thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotmakethearrestwithoutwarrantlegal.Butthemilitaryis,ineffect,enabledtomakethearrest,anywaysince,withthesuspensionoftheprivilege,thereisnoremedyavailableagainstsuchunlawfularrest(arbitrarydetention).Thearrestwithoutwarrantisjustifiedbytheemergencysituationandthedifficultyinapplyingforawarrantconsideringthetimeandthenumberofpersonstobearrested.Butthecrimeforwhichheisarrestedmustbeonerelatedtorebellionortheinvasion.Astoothercrimes,thesuspensionoftheprivilegedoesnotapply. 2)Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedordetainedshallbejudiciallychargedwithin3days,orotherwiseheshallbereleased.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.6). Inotherwords,thepublicofficercandetainapersonwithoutwarrantofarrest,buthecanonlydosofor72hours.Beforethelapseof72hours,aninformationmusthavebeenfiledinthepropercourtcharginghimoftheoffenseforwhichhewasarrested.UndertheRulesofCriminalProcedure,ifthedetaineewantsapreliminaryinvestigationtobefirstconductedbythefiscal,hemustsignawaiveroftheeffectsofArt.125.(delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons) Theeffectofthesuspensionoftheprivilege,therefore,isonlytoextendtheperiodsduringwhichhecanbedetainedwithoutawarrant.UnderArt.125,asamendedbyEO272,thepublicofficercanonlydetainhimfor12,18or36hoursdependingonthegravityoftheoffenseofwhichheischarged;withinthistime,hemustbejudiciallycharged,otherwise,hemustbereleased.Whentheprivilegeissuspended,theperiodisextendedto72hours.Whathappensifheisnotjudiciallychargednorreleasedafter72hours?ThepublicofficerbecomesliableunderArt.125for"delayinthedeliveryofdetainedpersons."Astothedetainee,itissubmittedthatheorsomeoneelseinhisbehalfcanfileapetitionforhabeascorpus.Forevenifthesuspensionhasalifetimeof60daysingeneral,astothatperson,thesuspensiononlyhasaneffectivityof72hours,sothatafterthistime,thesuspensionisliftedastohim. 3)Therighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.(Art.III,Sec.13)Art.III,Sec.13.xxxTherighttobailshallnotbeimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofHCissuspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired.c.ProclaimMartialLaw Requisites: 1)Theremustbeaninvasionorrebellion,and 2)PublicsafetyrequirestheproclamationofmartiallawalloverthePhilippinesoranypartthereof.Effectsoftheproclamationofmartiallaw:ThePresidentcan:
1)Legislate 2)Orderthearrestofpeoplewhoobstructthewareffort. Butthefollowingcannotbedone(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.4) a. SuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution. b. Supplantthefunctioningofthecivilcourtsandthelegislative
assemblies. TheprincipleisthatmartiallawisproclaimedonlybecausethecourtsandothercivilinstitutionslikeCongresshavebeenshutdown.Itshouldnothappenthatmartiallawisdeclaredinordertoshutdownthecivilinstitutions. c. Conferjurisdictionuponmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilians,
wherecivilcourtsareabletofunction.Thisisthe"opencourt"doctrinewhichholdsthatcivilianscannotbetriedbymilitarycourtsifthecivilcourtsareopenandfunctioning.Butifthecivilcourtsarenotfunctioning,thencivilianscanbetriedbythemilitarycourts.Martiallawsusuallycontemplatesacasewherethecourtsarealreadyclosedandthecivilinstitutionshavealreadycrumbled,thatisa"theaterofwar."Ifthecourtsarestillopen,thePresidentcanjustsuspendtheprivilegeandachievethesameeffect.d. Automaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.
Underthepresentrule,thePresidentcanstillsuspendtheprivilegeevenasheproclaimmartiallaw,buthemustsosuspendexpressly.TheRoleofCongress a.WhenthePresidentproclaimsmartiallaworsuspendstheprivilegeofthewrit,suchproclamationorsuspensionshallbeeffectiveforaperiodof60days,unlesssoonerrevokedbytheCongress.b.Uponsuchproclamationorsuspension,Congressshallconveneatonce.Ifitisnotinsession,itshallconveneinaccordancewithitsruleswithoutneedofacallwithin24hoursfollowingtheproclamationorsuspension. c.Within48hoursfromtheproclamationorthesuspension,thePresidentshallsubmitareport,inpersonorinwriting,totheCongress(meetinginjointsessionoftheactionhehastaken). d.TheCongressshallthenvotejointly,byanabsolutemajority.Ithastwooptions: (i)Torevokesuchproclamationorsuspension. Whenitsorevokes,thePresidentcannotsetaside(orveto)therevocationashenormallywoulddointhecaseofbills.IfCongressdoesnotdoanything,themeasurewillexpireanywayin60days.Sotherevocationmustbemadebeforethelapseof60daysfromthedatethemeasurewastaken. (ii)Toextenditbeyondthe60‐dayperiodofitsvalidity. CongresscanonlysoextendtheproclamationorsuspensionupontheinitiativeofthePresident.Theperiodneednotbe60days;itcouldbemore,asCongresswoulddetermine,basedonthepersistenceoftheemergency.IfCongressfailstoactbeforethemeasureexpires,itcannolongerextendituntilthePresidentagainredeclaresthemeasure,forhowdooneextendsomethingthathasalreadylapsed? NotethatCongresscannot"validate"theproclamationorsuspension,becauseitisalreadyvalid.Itisthusrestrictedtothe2measuresabove.IfCongressextendsthemeasure,butbeforetheperiodofextensionlapses,therequirementsfortheproclamationorsuspensionnolongerexist,Congresscanlifttheextension,sincethepowertoconferimpliesthepowertotakeback.IfCongressdoesnotrevieworlifttheorder,thiscanbereviewedbytheSupremeCourtpursuanttothenextsection.TheRoleoftheSupremeCourt TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfilledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisof(a)theproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,or
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30 (b)theextensionthereof.Itmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithin30daysfromitsfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18par.3) ThisisbecausejudicialpowerincludesthedutytodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.(Art.VIII,Sec.1,par.2) ThejurisdictionoftheSCmaybeinvokedinapropercase.Apetitionforhabeascorpusisonesuchcase.Whenapersonisarrestedwithoutawarrantforcomplicityintherebellionorinvasion,heorsomeoneelseinhisbehalfhasthestandingtoquestionthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension.ButbeforetheSCcandecideonthelegalityofhisdetention,itmustfirstpassuponthevalidityoftheproclamationorsuspension. ThetesttobeusedbytheSupremeCourtinsoreviewingtheactofthePresidentinproclaimingorsuspending,ortheactofCongressinextending,isthetestofarbitrarinesswhichseekstodeterminethesufficiencyofthefactualbasisofthemeasure.ThequestionisnotwhetherthePresidentorCongressactedcorrectly,butwhetherheactedarbitrarilyinthattheactionhadnobasisinfact.Decidingonwhethertheactwasarbitraryamountstoadeterminationofwhetherornottherewasgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,whichisnowmadepartofjudicialpowerbyArt.VIII,Sec.1,par.2.Thiscurbsradicallytheapplicationofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.LansangvGarcia,Theissuethereraisedwaswhetherinsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritin1971,Marcoshadabasisfordoingso.TheSC,inconsideringthefactthatthePresidentbasedhisdecisionon(a)theSenatereportontheconditioninCentralLuzonand(b)acloseddoorbriefingbythemilitaryshowingtheextentofsubversion,concludedthatthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily.Onemaydisagreewithhisappreciationofthefacts,butonecannotsaythatitiswithoutbasis.2conditionsmustconcurforthevalidexerciseofauthoritytosuspendtheprivilege:(a)theremustbeanactualinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerand(b)publicsafetymustrequirethesuspensionoftheprivilege.ThisholdingoftheSCisnowfoundinArt.VII,Sec.18,par.3.]Thefunctionofthecourtistocheckandnotsupplanttheexecutiveortoascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofjurisdiction.Theproperstandardisnotcorrectnessbutarbitrariness. Thereare4ways,then,fortheproclamationorsuspensiontobelifted:1)LiftingbythePresidenthimself 2)RevocationbyCongress 3)NullificationbytheSupremeCourt 4)Operationoflawafter60daysMilitaryTrialofCiviliansVoidEvenUnderMartialLaw,IfCivilCourtsAreOpen.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.5.).OlaguervsMilitaryCommissionNo.34TheAquinovs.MilitaryCommissionNo.2decisionwasreversed.(Inthatcase,theSCupheldthepowerofthePresidenttocreatemilitarytribunalsauthorizedtotrynotonlymilitarypersonnelbutciviliansevenifcivilcourtswereopen).AccordingtotheSC,civilianswhoareplacedontrialforciviloffensesundergenerallawareentitledtotrialbyjudicialprocess.Sincewearenotenemy‐occupiedterritorynorareweunderamilitarygovt.andevenonthepremisethatmartiallawcontinuesinforce,themilitarytribunalscannottryandexercisejurisdictionoverciviliansforciviloffensescommittedbythemwhichareproperlycognizablebythecivilcourtsthathaveremainedopenandhavebeenregularlyfunctioning.TheassertionofmilitaryauthorityovercivilianscannotrestonthePresident'spowerasCommanderinChieforonanytheoryofmartiallaw.Aslongascivilcourtsremainopenandareregularlyfunctioning,militarytribunalscannottryandexercisejurisdictionoverciviliansforoffensescommittedbythemandwhichareproperlycognizablebycivilcourts.Toholdotherwiseisaviolationoftherighttodueprocess.(9)EmergencypowersArt.VI,Sec.23.“xxx(2)Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongress,may,
bylaw,authorizethePresident,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.” ThisgrantofemergencypowertothePresidentisdifferentfromtheCommander‐in‐Chiefclause.WhenthePresidentactsundertheCommander‐in‐Chiefclause,heactsunderaconstitutionalgrantofmilitarypower,whichmayincludethelaw‐makingpower.ButwhenthePresidentactsundertheemergencypower,heactsunderaCongressionaldelegationoflaw‐makingpower. Thescopeofthegrantissuch"powersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy."Underthe1935Constitution,thiswasconstruedthepowertoissuerulesandregulationstocarryoutthedeclaredpolicy.The1987Constitution,itissubmitted,doesnotchangethescope."Powernecessaryandproper"shouldmeanlegislativepower,becauseCongressisonlyallowedtodelegatelegislativepower,beingitsonlyinherentpower.ItsotherpowersareonlygrantedtoitbytheConstitution,andsoitcannotdelegatewhathasonlybeendelegatedtoit.Thispoweris(1)foralimitedperiod,and(2)subjecttosuchrestrictionsasCongressmayprovide.Thepowerceases(a)uponbeingwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,or,ifCongressfailstoadoptsuchresolution,(b)uponthenext(voluntary)adjournmentofCongress.ForthefactthatCongressisabletomeetinsessionuninterruptedlyandadjournofitsownwillprovesthattheemergencynolongerexistsistojustifythedelegation.Thisruleortheterminationofthegrantofemergencypowersisbasedondecidedcases,whichinturnbecameArt.VII,Sec.15ofthe1973Constitution.AranetavDinglasan,TheCongressgrantedthePresidentcertainemergencypowers.(CA671)Afterthewar,Congressheldaspecialsession.TheSCheldthattheemergencypowerlastedonlyuntilCongresshelditsregularsession.ThefactthatCongresscouldnowmeetmeantthattherewasnoemergencyanymorethatwouldjustifythedelegation.TheassertionthatnewlegislationisneededtorepealCA671isnotinharmonywiththeConsti.Ifanewlawwerenecessarytoterminateit,thenitwouldbeunlimitedandindefinite.Thiswouldcreateananomalysincewhatwasintendedtomeetatemporaryemergencybecomesapermanentlaw.RodriguezvGella,Thespecificpowertocontinueinforcelawsandappropriationswhichwouldlapseorotherwisebecomeinoperativeisalimitationonthegeneralpowertoexercisesuchotherpowersastheexecutivemaydeemnecessarytoenablethegov’ttofulfillitsresponsibilitiesandtomaintainandenforceitsauthority.Barlongay:Noticetheapparentinconsistencybet.theConstitutionandthecases.TheConsti.[Art.VI,Sec.23(2)]statesthattheemergencypowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongressunlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionofCongresswhereasthecasestellusthattheemergencypowersshallceaseuponresumptionofsession.Toreconcilethetwo,IbelievethatitwouldnotbeenoughforCongresstojustresumesessioninorderthattheemergencypowersshallcease.Ithastopassaresolutionwithdrawingsuchemergencypowers,otherwisesuchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentofCongress. (10)ContractingandguaranteeingforeignloansArt.VII,Sec.20.ThePresidentmaycontractorguaranteeforeignloansonbehalfoftheRepublicofthePhilippineswiththepriorconcurrenceoftheMonetaryBoard,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.TheMonetaryBoardshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheendofeveryquarterofthecalendaryear,submittoCongressacompletereportofitsdecisionsonapplicationsforloanstobecontractedorguaranteedbythe
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31 Government,orgovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporations,whichwouldhavetheeffectofincreasingtheforeigndebt,andcontainingothermattersprovidedbylaw.Art.XII,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationofthemonetaryauthority.InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbemadeavailabletothepublic.CfRepublicAct4860(AnActAuthorizingThePresidentOfThePhilippinesToObtainSuchForeignLoansAndCredits,OrToIncurSuchForeignIndebtedness,AsMayBeNecessaryToFinanceApprovedEconomicDevelopmentPurposesOrProjects,AndToGuarantee,InBehalfOfTheRepublicOfThePhilippines,ForeignLoansObtainedOrBondsIssuedByCorporationsOwnedOrControlledByTheGovernmentOfThePhilippinesForEconomicDevelopmentPurposesIncludingThoseIncurredForPurposesOfRe‐LendingToThePrivateSector,AppropriatingTheNecessaryFundsTherefore,AndForOtherPurposes.)Approved,September8,1966.DoesCongresshavetobeconsultedbythePresidentwhenhecontractsorguaranteesforeignloansthatincreasetheforeigndebtofthecountry? Thenegative,andstrongerview,isthatthePresidentdoesnotneedpriorapprovalbyCongressbecausetheConstitutionplacesthepowertocheckthePresident'spowerontheMonetaryBoardandnotonCongress.Congressmay,ofcourse,provideguidelinesforcontractingorguaranteeingforeignloans,andhavetheserulesenforcedthroughtheMonetaryBoard.ButthatCongresshaspriorapprovalisatotallydifferentissue. Atanyrate,thepresentpower,whichwasfirstintroducedinthe1973Constitution,wasbasedonRA4860ortheForeignLoanAct.WhatusedtobeastatutorygrantofpowerisnowaconstitutionalgrantwhichCongresscannottakeaway,butonlyregulate.(11)Powersoverforeignaffairs (a)TreatymakingpowerArt.VII,Sec.21.Notreatyorinternationalagreementshallbevalidandeffectiveunlessconcurredinbyatleasttwo‐thirdsofallthemembersoftheSenate. *ByreasonofthePresident'suniquepositionasheadofstate,heisthelogicalchoiceasthenation'sspokesmaninforeignrelations.TheSenate,ontheotherhand,isgrantedtherighttoshareinthetreaty‐makingpowerofthePresidentbyconcurringwithhimwiththerighttoamend.TreatydistinguishedfromexecutiveagreementsExecutiveagreementsenteredintobythePresidentneednoconcurrence.Thereasonisthatalthoughexecutiveagreementsareakindofinternationalagreements,whentheConstitutionintendstoincludeexecutiveagreements,itsayssospecifically,asinArt.VIII,Sec.5,par.2,whenitspeaksofthepoweroftheSCtoreviewfinaljudgmentsoflowercourtsincasesinwhichtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofanytreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,isinquestion.CommissionerofCustomsvs.EasternSeaTrading InternationalagreementsinvolvingpoliticalissuesorchangesinnationalpolicyandthoseinvolvinginternationalagreementsofpermanentcharacterusuallytaketheformofTREATIES.Buttheinternationalagreementsinvolvingadjustmentsindetailcarryingoutwell‐establishednationalpoliciesandtraditionsandthoseinvolvingamoreorlesstemporarycharacterusuallytaketheformofEXECUTIVEAGREEMENTS. USAFFEVeteransAssn.vsTreasurerThecentralissueinthiscaseconcernsthevalidityoftheRomulo‐SnyderAgreement(1950)wherebythePhil.Govt.undertooktoreturntotheUSGovt.intenannualinstallments,atotalof$35MdollarsadvancedbytheUSto,butunexpendedby,theNationalDefenseForcesofthePhilippines.TheScheldthatthefundsinvolvedhavebeenconsistentlyregardedas
fundsadvancedandtobesubsequentlyaccountedfor.Sucharrangementthereforeincludestheobligationtoreturntheunexpendedamounts.Inthiscase,Pres.Quirinoapprovedthenegotiations.HehadpowertocontractloansunderRA213amendingRA16.AstothecontentionthattheagreementlacksratificationbytheSenate,itwasheldthattheyearlyappropriationsbyCongressoffundsascompliancewiththeagreementconstitutedratification.Buteveniftherewasnoratification,theagreementwouldstillbevalid.Theagreementisnota"treaty"asthetermisusedintheConstitution.TheagreementwasneversubmittedtotheSenateforconcurrence.Itmustbenotedthatatreatyisnottheonlyformthataninternationalagreementmayassume.ForthegrantoftreatymakingpowertotheExecutiveandtheSenatedoesnotexhaustthepowerofthegovt.overinternationalrelations.Consequently,executiveagreementsmaybeenteredintowithotherstatesandareeffectiveevenwithouttheconcurrenceoftheSenate.Fromthepointofviewofinternationallaw,thereisnodifferencebetweentreatiesandexecutiveagreementsintheirbindingeffectuponstatesconcernedaslongasthenegotiatingfunctionarieshaveremainedwithintheirpowers.Thedistinctionbetweenanexecutiveagreementandatreatyispurelyaconstitutionaloneandhasnointernationallegalsignificance. NatureofExecutiveAgreements:Thereare2classes:(1)agreementsmadepurelyasexecutiveactsaffectingexternalrelationsandindependentoforwithoutlegislativeauthorization,whichmaybetermedaspresidentialagreements,and(2)agreementsenteredintoinpursuanceofactsofCongress,orCongressional‐ExecutiveAgreements.TheRomulo‐SnyderAgreementmayfallunderanyofthesetwoclasses,forpreciselyonSept.18,1946,CongressspecificallyauthorizedthePresidenttoobtainsuchindebtednessw/theGovtoftheUS,itsagenciesorinstrumentalities.Evenassuming,arguendo,thattherewasnolegislativeauthorization,itisherebymaintainedthattheRomulo‐SnyderAgreementwaslegallyandvalidlyenteredintotoconformtothesecondcategory.This2ndcategoryusuallyincludesmoneyagreementsrelatingtothesettlementofpecuniaryclaimsofcitizens.BayanvsExecutiveSecretaryTheissueinthiscaseistheconstitutionalityoftheVFA.TheSCHheldthatoncetheSenateperformsthepowertoconcurwithtreatiesorexerciseitsprerogativewithintheboundariesprescribedbytheConstitution,theconcurrencecannotbeviewedasanabuseofpower,muchlessagraveabuseofdiscretion.ThePres,inratifyingtheVFAandsubmittingthesameforconcurrenceoftheSenate,actedwithintheconfinesandlimitsofthepowervestedinhimbytheConstitution.ThePresmerelyperformedaconstitutionaltaskandexercisedaprerogativethatchieflypertainstothefunctionsofhisoffice.(b)DeportationofundesirablealiensQuaCheeGanvDeportationBoard1.ThePresmaydeportonlyaccordingtogroundsenumeratedbylawsinceitwouldbeunreasonableandundemocratictoholdthatanalienbedeporteduponanunstatedorundefinedgrounddependingmerelyontheuseofanunlimiteddiscretionbythePres.2.2waysofdeportinganundesirablealien:(a)byorderofthePresafterdueinvestigationand(b)bytheCommissionerofImmigration3.ThePrescandelegatethepowerofinvestigationnottoorderthearrestofanalien.4.TheDeportationBoardmaynotorderthearrestofthealieninthiscase.Ifanimpliedgrantofpower,consideringthatnoexpressauthoritywasgrantedbylaw,wouldcurtailtherightofapersonthenadelegationoftheimpliedpowermustberejectedasinimicaltothelibertiesofthepeople.GoTekvDeportationBoard
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32 1. TheDeportationBoardcanentertaindeportationbasedongroundsnotspecifiedinSec37oftheImmigrationLaw.TheBoardhasjurisdictiontoinvestigateGoTekevenifhehadnotbeenconvictedyet.2. ThePresident’spowertodeportaliensandtoinvestigatethemsubjecttodeportationareprovidedintheRevisedAdminCode.3.TheStatehasinherentpowertodeportundesirablealiens.ThispowerisexercisedbythePres.ThereisnolegalnorconstitutionalprovisiondefiningthepowertodeportaliensbecausetheintentionofthelawistogranttheChiefExecutivethefulldiscretiontodeterminewhetheranalien’sresidenceinthecountryissoundesirableastoaffectthesecurity,welfareorinterestofthestate.TheChiefExecutiveisthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceoffactswhichwouldwarrantthedeportationofaliens.(12)Poweroverlegislation (a)MessagetoCongressArt.VII,Sec.23.ThePresidentshalladdresstheCongressattheopeningofitsregularsession.Hemayalsoappearbeforeitatanyothertime. *Every4thMondayofJuly,thePresidentdeliverstheStateoftheNationAddress,whichcontainshisproposalsforlegislation.Throughthisspeech,hecaninfluencethecourseoflegislationthatCongresscantakeduringtheregularsession. (b)PrepareandsubmitthebudgetArt.VII,Sec.22.ThePresidentshallsubmittoCongresswithinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeveryregularsession,asthebasisofthegeneralappropriationsbill,abudgetofexpendituresandsourcesoffinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures. *Thebudgetistheplanindicatingthe(a)expendituresofthegovernment,(b)sourcesoffinancing,and(c)receiptsfromrevenue‐raisingmeasures.ThisbudgetistheupperlimitoftheappropriationsbilltobepassedbyCongress.Throughthebudget,therefore,thePresidentrevealstheprioritiesofthegovernment. (c)VetopowerArt.VI,Sec.27(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesalaw,bepresentedtothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit;otherwise,heshallvetoitandreturnthesamewithhisobjectiontotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallentertheobjectionsatlargeinitsJournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,two‐thirdsofalltheMembersofsuchHouseshallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththeobjections,totheotherHousebywhichitshalllikewisebereconsidered,andifapprovedbytwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersofthatHouse,itshallbecomealaw.Insuchcases,thevotesofeachHouseshallbedeterminedbyyeasornays,andthenamesoftheMembersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicatehisvetoofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginatedwithinthirtydaysafterthedateofreceiptthereof,otherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.(2)ThePresidentshallhavethepowertovetoanyparticularitemoritemsinanappropriation,revenue,ortariffbill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject. Asageneralrule,allbillsmustbeapprovedbythePresidentbeforetheybecomelaw,exceptwhen(i)thevetoofthePresidentisoverriddenby2/3vote,and(ii)thebillpassedisthespeciallawtoelectthePresidentandVice‐President.ThisgivesthePresidentanactualhandinlegislation.However,hiscourseofactionisonlytoapproveitorvetoitasawhole.(SeeLegislativePowerofCongress) (d)EmergencyPower
Art.VI,Sec.23.xxx(2)Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongress,may,bylaw,authorizethePresident,foralimitedperiod,andsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessaryandpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof. (e)FixingoftariffratesArt.VI,Sec.28.xxxTheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresidenttofixwithinspecifiedlimits,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsandrestrictionsasitmayimpose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageandwharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramoftheGovernment. Thereasonforthedelegationisthehighlytechnicalnatureofinternationalcommerce,andtheneedtoconstantlyandwithrelativeeaseadapttheratestoprevailingcommercialstandards. (13)ImmunityfromsuitCarillovs.Marcos ThePresidentassuchcannotbesued,enjoyingashedoesimmunityfromsuit,butthevalidityofhisactscanbetestedbyanactionagainsttheotherexecutiveofficialsorsuchindependentconstitutionalagenciesastheCommissiononElectionsandtheCommissiononAudit.InReBermudezThepetitionseeksclarificationastowhomtheConstireferstoastheincumbentPresandVicePres.Prescindingfromthepetitioner'slackofcapacitytosue,itiselementarythatthisCourtassumesnojurisdictionoverpetitionsfordeclaratoryrelief.Moreimportantly,thepetitionamountsineffecttoasuitagainsttheincumbentPres.AquinoanditisequallyelementarythatincumbentPresidentsareimmunefromsuitorfrombeingbroughttocourtduringtheperiodoftheirincumbencyandtenure.Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendtohisalteregos?A:No.SolivenvsMakasiar;BeltranvsMakasiarThisisthelibelcaseinvolvingBeltran'sallegationsthatPresidentAquinowashidingunderherbed.OneoftheissueswaswhetherthePresidentmayinitiatecriminalproceedingsagainstthepetitionersthroughthefilingofacomplaint‐affidavit.BeltrancontendedthatifcriminalproceedingsensuebyvirtueofthePresident'sfilingofhercomplaint‐affidavit,shemaysubsequentlyhavetobeawitnessfortheprosecution,bringingherundertheTC'sjurisdiction.Thiswouldbeanindirectwayofdefeatingherprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,sincebytestifyingonthewitnessstand,shewouldbeexposingherselftopossiblecontemptofcourtorperjury.TheSCheldthattheprivilegeofimmunityfromsuit,pertainstothePresidentbyvirtueoftheofficeandmaybeinvokedonlybytheholderoftheoffice;notbyanyotherpersoninthePresident'sbehalf.Thus,anaccusedinacriminalcasewherethePresidentisacomplainantcannotraisethepresidentialprivilegeasadefensetopreventthecasefromproceedingagainsttheaccused.Moreover,thereisnothinginourlawsthatwouldpreventthePresidentfromwaivingtheprivilege.ThePresidentmayshedtheprotectionaffordedbytheprivilegeandsubmittothecourt'sjurisdiction.Q:DoesthePresident'simmunityfromsuitextendevenbeyondhisterm?A:Yes.Solongastheactwasdoneduringhisterm. B.VICEPRESIDENT (1)Qualifications,election,termandoath
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33 Art.VII,Sec.3.ThereshallbeaVice‐PresidentwhoshallhavethesamequalificationsandtermofofficeandbeelectedwithandinthesamemannerasthePresident.HemayberemovedfromofficeinthesamemannerasthePresident.TheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation.Id.,Sec.4.ThePresidentandtheVice‐PresidentshallbeelectedbydirectvoteofthepeopleforatermofsixyearswhichshallbeginatnoononthethirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingthedayoftheelectionandshallendatnoonofthesamedatesixyearsthereafter.ThePresidentshallnotbeeligibleforanyreelection.NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuchformorethanfouryearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesameofficeatanytime. NoVice‐Presidentshallserveformorethantwosuccessiveterms.Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityoftheserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected. Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,theregularelectionforPresidentandVice‐PresidentshallbeheldonthesecondMondayofMay. ThereturnsofeveryelectionforPresidentandVice‐President,dulycertifiedbytheboardofcanvassersofeachprovincesorcity,shallbetransmittedtotheCongress,directedtothePresidentoftheSenate.Uponreceiptofthecertificatesofcanvass,thePresidentoftheSenateshall,notlaterthanthirtydaysafterthedayofelection(w/cisthe2ndTuesdayofJune),openallthecertificatesinthepresenceoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesinjointpublicsession,andtheCongress,upondeterminationoftheauthenticityanddueexecutionthereofinthemannerprovidedbylaw,canvass(i.e.,tallythecertificatesofcanvass)thevotes. Thepersonshavingthehighestnumberofvotesshallbeproclaimedelected,butincasetwoormoreshallhaveanequalandhighestnumberofvotes(tie),oneofthemshallforthwithbechosenbythevoteofamajorityofallthemembersofCongress,votingseparately.TheCongressshallpromulgateitsrulesforthecanvassingofthecertificates. TheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,orVice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsrulesforthepurpose. Id.,Sec.5.Beforetheyenterontheexecutionoftheiroffice,thePresident,theVice‐PresidentortheActingPresidentshalltakethefollowingoathoraffirmation: "Idosolemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillfaithfullyandconscientiouslyfulfillmydutiesasPresident(orVice‐PresidentorActingPresident)ofthePhilippines,preserveanddefenditsConstitution,executeitslaws,dojusticetoeveryman,andconsecratetomyselftotheserviceoftheNation.SohelpmeGod."(Incaseofaffirmation,lastsentencewillbeomitted.) (2)PrivilegeandsalaryArt.VII,Sec.6.ThePresidentshallhaveanofficialresidence.ThesalariesofthePresidentandVice‐Presidentshallbedeterminedbylawandshallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.Noincreaseinsaidcompensationshalltakeeffectuntilaftertheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentduringwhichsuchincreasedwasapproved.TheyshallnotreceivedduringtheirtenureanyotheremolumentfromtheGovernmentoranyothersource.Art.XVIII,Sec17.xxxtheVice‐President,xxxP240,000 (3)ProhibitionsArt.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,Vice‐President,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputiesorassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthis
Constitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.Theyshallnot,duringsaidtenure,directlyorindirectlypracticeanyotherprofession,participateinanybusiness,orbefinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice. ThespouseandrelativesbyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,ortheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,includinggovernment‐ownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.Art.VII,Sec.3.XxxTheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation. (4)SuccessionArt.VI,Sec.9.WheneverthereisavacancyintheOfficeoftheVice‐Presidentduringthetermforwhichhewaselected,thePresidentshallnominateaVice‐PresidentfromamongthemembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives,whoshallassumeofficeuponconfirmationbyamajorityvoteofallthemembersofbothhouses,votingseparately. *NotethatincasethevacancyoccursinboththeofficesofPresidentandVice‐President,thereisnoActingVice‐Presidentspokenof.ThereasonisthattheVice‐PresidentdoesnothaverealfunctionswhenthePresidentisaround. Whenavacancyoccursinbothoffices,theVice‐Presidentiselectedinaspecialelection.IfthevacancyoccursonlyintheVice‐Presidency,thesuccessorisnotelectedanymore,butmerelychosenfromtheCongress. (5)Removal Art.XI,Sec.2.ThePresident,theVice‐President,theMembersoftheSupremeCourt,theMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheOmbudsmanmayberemovedfromoffice,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.Id.,Sec.3.(1)TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment. (2)AverifiedcomplaintforimpeachmentmaybefiledbyanyMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbeincludedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithinthreesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,shallsubmititsreporttotheHousewithinsixtysessiondaysfromsuchreferral,togetherwiththecorrespondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithintensessiondaysfromreceiptthereof. (3)Avoteofatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirmafavorableresolutionwiththeArticlesofImpeachmentoftheCommittee,oroverrideitscontraryresolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded. (4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastone‐thirdofalltheMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenateshallforthwithproceed. (5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithinaperiodofoneyear.(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensittingforthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesisontrial,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtshallpreside,butshallnotvote.Nopersonshallbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo‐thirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate. (7)Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthan
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34 removalfromofficeanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw. (6)Functions (a)RightofsuccessionArt.VII,Sec.8.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofthePresident,theVice‐PresidentshallbecomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,removalfromoffice,orresignationofboththePresidentandVice‐President,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhisinability,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,shallthenactasPresidentuntilthePresidentorVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified. TheCongressshall,bylaw,providewhoshallserveasPresidentincaseofdeath,permanentdisability,orresignationoftheActingPresident.HeshallserveuntilthePresidentortheVice‐Presidentshallhavebeenelectedandqualified,andbesubjecttothesamerestrictionsofpowersanddisqualificationsastheActingPresident.Id.,Sec.11.WheneverthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatheisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,anduntilhetransmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowersanddutiesshallbedischargedbytheVice‐PresidentasActingPresident. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmittothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallimmediatelyassumethepowersanddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident.Thereafter,whenthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativeshiswrittendeclarationthatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmitwithinfivedaystothePresidentoftheSenateandtotheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativestheirwrittendeclarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theCongressshalldecidetheissue.Forthatpurpose,theCongressshallconvene,ifitisnotinsession,withinforty‐eighthours,inaccordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthelastwrittendeclaration,orifnotinsession,withintwelvedaysafteritisrequiredtoassemble,determinesbyatwo‐thirdsvoteofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice,theVice‐PresidentshallactasPresident;otherwise,thePresidentshallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. (b)MembershipinCabinetArt.VII,Sec.3.xxxTheVice‐PresidentmaybeappointedasmemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation.III.JUDICIALDEPARTMENTA.ThesupremeCourtBarlongay:Ofthethreedepartmentsofgovernment,twodepartments(ExecutiveandLegislative)areconsideredasactive.Ontheotherhand,theJudiciaryisconsideredaspassive.Itispassiveinthesensethatithastowaitforacasetobefiledbeforeitcanact.Cruz:TomaintaintheindependenceoftheJudiciary,thefollowingsafeguardshavebeenembodiedintheConsti: (1)TheSCisaconstitutionalbody.Itcannotbeabolishednormayitsmembershiporthemannerofitsmeetingsbechangedbymerelegislation.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(1)] (2)Themembersofthejudiciaryarenotsubjectto
confirmationbytheCA. (3)ThemembersoftheSCmaynotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.(Art.IX,Sec.2.) (4)TheSCmaynotbedeprivedofitsminimumoriginalandappellatejurisdictionasprescribedinArt.X,Sec.5oftheConsti.(Art.VIII,Sec.2.) (5)TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSCmaynotbeincreasedbylaww/oitsadviceandconcurrence.(Art.VI,Sec.30.) (6)TheSCnowhasadministrativesupervisionoveralllowercourtsandtheirpersonnel.(Art.VIII,Sec.6.) (7)TheSChasexclusivepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.11.) (8)ThemembersoftheSCandalllowercourtshavesecurityoftenure,w/ccannotbeunderminedbyalawreorganizingthejudiciary.(Id.) (9)Theyshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunctions.(Art.VIII,Sec.12.) (10)Thesalariesofjudgesmaynotbereducedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice.(Art.VIII,Sec.10.) (11)Thejudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.(Art.VIII,Sec.3.) (12)TheSCalonemayinitiaterulesofcourt.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5).] (13)OnlytheSCmayorderthetemporarydetailofjudges.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(3)] (14)TheSCcanappointallofficialsandemployeesofthejudiciary.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(6)]
(1)CompositionArt.VIII,Sec.4.
(1)TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeandfourteenAssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Anyvacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof. (2)Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,orlaw,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality,application,oroperationofpresidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinances,andotherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (3)CasesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.TheSupremeCourtisaconstitutionalbody.AssuchitcannotbeabolishedbytheCongressforthepowertodestroyonlyresidesintheonewhohasthepowertocreate.Thelowercourtsontheotherhand,areestablishedbylaw,andsocouldbeabolishedbylaw,providedthesecurityoftenureisnotundermined.VargasvRillorazaTheSCheldthat:(1)CongressdoesnothavethepowertoaddtotheexistinggroundsfordisqualificationofajusticeoftheSC.Todisqualifyanyoftheseconstitutionalcomponentmemberofthecourt‐especiallyasinthiscase,amajorityofthem‐‐inatreasoncase,isnothingshortofdeprivingthecourtitselfofitsjurisdictionasestablishedbythefundamentallaw.Disqualificationofajudgeisadeprivationofhisjudicialpower.ItwouldseemevidentthatifCongresscoulddisqualifymembersofSCintakingpartinthehearinganddeterminationofcertain"collaboration"cases,itcouldextendthedisqualificationtoothercases.(2)Thedesignationprovided(aCFI‐judgetositasaSCjusticeinthePeople’sCourtiftheSCdoesnothavetherequiredquorum)isrepugnanttotheconstitutionalrequirementthatmembersbeappointedbythePres.w/theconsentoftheCA.(Thiswasunderthe1935Constitutionw/crequiredconfirmationfromtheCommissiononAppointments.)Itwill
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35 resultinasituationwherein6memberssittingwillnotbeappointedandconfirmedinaccordancew/theConsti.(3)Howeverbriefortemporarymaybetheactionorparticipationofajudgedesignated,thereisnoescapingthefactthathewouldbeparticipatinginthedeliberationsandactsoftheSCandifallowedtodoso,hisvotewouldcountasmuchasanyregularjustice. OneSupremeCourtWhentheSCsitsindivisions,itdoesnotviolatetheconceptofa"oneSupremeCourt"because,accordingtheUSvLimsiongco,thedivisionsoftheSCdonotdiminishitsauthority,becausealthoughitsitsindivisions,itremainsandco‐functionsasonebody.This"oneSupremeCourt"doctrineisstrengthenedbytheprovisionthat"whentherequirednumber(inadivision)isnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]StrictCompositionInVargasvRilloraza,theSCheldthatthetemporarydesignationofjudgesoftheCFIandtheCourtofAppealsintheSupremeCourttoconstituteaquorumduetodisqualificationofsomeofthejustices,isunconstitutional.ThereisbutoneSupremeCourtwhosemembershipappointmentsarepermanent.
(2)Appointment&qualificationsArt.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourtmustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourtorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines. xxx(3)Amemberofthejudiciarymustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependenceSec.8.(5)Thecouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestothejudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.Sec.9.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation. xxx
(3)SalaryArt.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalaryshallnotbedecreased.Art.XVIII,Sec.17.UnlesstheCongressprovidesotherwise,xxx;theChiefJusticeshallreceiveanannualsalaryofP240,000andtheAssociateJusticesshallreceiveP204,000each;xxx,theAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourt,xxx,P204,000each;xxx.Althoughthesalariesmaynotbedecreased,theymaybeincreasedbylaw,totakeeffectatonce.Reasons:(1)theConstitutiondoesnotprohibitit;(2)theJudiciaryplaysnopartinthepassageofthelawincreasingtheirsalaryunliketheCongressandtheExecutive,andsotherecanbenoconflictofinterest;and(3)thiswillpromotetheindependenceoftheJudiciary.
IstheimpositionofincometaxonthesalaryoftheJusticesandJudgesadiminutionoftheirsalaryasprohibitedbytheConstitution?NO.(Judiciarynotexemptfromincometax)NitafanvCIR
Underthe1987Constitution,thesalariesofmembersoftheJudiciaryarenotexemptfromtaxes.ItanchoreditsdecisiononthedeliberationoftheConstitutionalCommission,thatis,onthelegislativehistoryofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10.AdraftofthepresentArt.VIII,Sec.10whenoriginallypresentedtothebody,expresslyexemptedthesalaryofjudgesfromtaxation.Butwhenthisdraftwasdiscussedonsecondreading,thesentimentwasagainsttheexemption,thereasonbeingthatlikeanyothercitizen,judgesandjusticesmustpaytheirshareintheburdenofmaintainingthegovernment.SothisexpressexemptionwasdeletedfromArt.VIII,Sec.10andsoitwaswhenthedraftwasadoptedbythebody. (4)SecurityofTenureArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.Id.,Sec.2.xxx NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsMembers.ReorganizationDelaLlanavs.AlbaSec.144ofBP129replacedtheexistingcourtsystem,w/theexceptionoftheSCandtheSB,w/anewoneandprovidedthatuponthecompletionofthereorganizationbythePres.,thecourtsaffected"shallbedeemedautomaticallyabolishedandtheincumbentsthereofshallceasetoholdoffice."Petitioner,judgeofthecitycourtofOlongapo,and7membersoftheBarquestionedthevalidityoftheActinanactionforprohibition,onthegroundthatitcontravenedthesecurityoftenureofjudges.TheyimputedlackofgoodfaithintheenactmentoftheActandcharacterizeditasanunduedelegationoflegislativepower.TheSCheldthattheimputationoflackofgoodfaithdisregardsthefactthattheActwastheproductofcarefulstudyanddeliberationnotonlybytheBPbutalsobyaPresidentialstudycommittee(whereCJandjusticesweremembers).[T]heabolitionofanofficeisw/inthecompetenceofalegislativebodyifdoneingoodfaith.Thetestiswhethertheabolitionisingoodfaith.AsthatelementispresentintheenactmentofBP129,thelackofmeritofthepetitionbecomesapparent. However,whiletherecanbenoclaimtosecurityoftenurewheretheofficenolongerexists,intheireffectthereisnodifferencebet.removalandtheabolitionofoffice.Ineithercase,theeffectontheincumbentisoneofseparation.Accordingly,intheimplementationofthelawitwouldbeinkeepingw/thespiritoftheConstitutionthat,asfarasincumbentjusticesandjudgesareconcerned,theSCbeconsultedandthatitsviewbeaccordedfullestconsideration.Thisisnotrenderingadvisoryopinionbecausethereisnoquestionoflawinvolved.Neitheristhereintrusionintotheappointingprocessbec.onlyincumbentsareinvolved. (5).RemovalArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.
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36 Art.XI,Sec.2.ThexxxMembersoftheSupremeCourtxxxmayberemovedfromoffice,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.MembersoftheSCcannotberemovedexceptbyimpeachment.Thus,aSCjusticecannotbechargedinacriminalcaseoradisbarmentproceeding,becausetheultimateeffectofeitheristoremovehimfromoffice,andthuscircumventtheprovisiononimpeachmentandviolatinghissecurityoftenure(InRe:FirstIndorsementfromHon.RaulM.Gonzalez,A.M.No.8845433). (6)FiscalAutonomyArt.VIII,Sec.3.TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.AppropriationsfortheJudiciarymaynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,afterapproval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased. (7)JurisdictionSupremeCourtA)Originaljurisdiction[Art.VIII,Sec.5(1)]
(1)Casesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls. (2)Petitionsforcertiorari,prohibition,mandamus,quowarrantoandhabeascorpus. (3)SufficiencyoffactualbasisofproclamationofmartiallawandsuspensionofprivilegeofwritofHCNotethattheSCdoesnothavejurisdictionoverdeclaratoryreliefcases,whichmustbefiledwiththeRTC(InReBermudezsaidsotoo,andyetgaveduecoursetothepetition.)Thefirstcase(ambassadors,etc.)ismadeconcurrentwithRTCsbylaw(JudiciaryActof1948).Thesecondcase(specialcivilactions)isconcurrentwiththeCAandtheRTC,withrespecttoinferiorbodies.B)AppellateJurisdiction
TheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertoreview,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmon(i)ordinaryappeal,or(ii)petitionforreviewoncertiorari,asthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentandordersoflowercourtsinthefollowingcases: (1)Casesquestioningtheconstitutionalityorvalidityofany(a)treaty,(b)internationalandexecutiveagreement,(c)laworstatute,(d)presidentialdecree,(e)proclamation,(f)order,(g)instruction,(h)ordinance,or(i)regulation. (2)Casesquestioningthelegalityofan(a)tax,(b)impost,(c)assessment,or(d)toll,or(e)anypenaltyimposedinrelationthereto. (3)Casesinwhichthejurisdictionoflowercourtsisinissue. (4)Criminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher. (5)Casesinw/conlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved. (6)OrdersoftheConstitutionalCommissions.JurisdictionovercriminalcaseswherepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx (2)Review,revise,reverse,modify,oraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin: (d)Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.PeoplevDaniel;PeoplevRamos Botharerapecaseswherethetrialcourtimposedlesserpenalties
becauseofmisappreciationoftheaggravatingandqualifyingcircumstancesandonappealthepenaltywasincreased.ChiefJusticeCastro,forthemajority,explained:Art.X,Sec.5(2)(d)[nowArt.VIII,Sec.5(2)(d)]providesthattheSCshallhaveappellatejurisdictionover"finaljudgementsanddecreesofinferiorcourts"incriminalinw/cthe"penaltyimposedisdeathorlifeimprisonment."UnlesstheCArendersjudgmentandimposesthepenaltyofdeathorreclusionperpetua,therewouldbenojudgmentforSCtoreview.Indeed,Section34oftheJudiciaryActof1948andthepresentRule124,Sec.13providethat,whenevertheCAshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofdeathorlifeimprisonmentshouldbeimposed,"thesaidcourtshallrefrainfromenteringjudgmentthereon,andshallforthwithcertifythecasebroughtbeforeitonappeal,"whichthatitisnotprohibitedfromrenderingjudgment.Inotherwords,theCAisnotprohibitedfromrenderingjudgmentbutfrom"enteringjudgment."Thedistinctionbetweenthetwoiswellestablished.Thephrase"enteringjudgment"isnottobeequatedw/an"entryofjudgment"asthelatterisunderstoodinR36inrelationtoSec.8,R121andSec.16,R124,ROC."Entryofjudgment"presupposesafinaljudgment‐‐finalinthesensethatnoappealwastakenfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtorappellatecourtw/inthereglamentaryperiod.Ajudgmentinacriminalcasebecomesfinalafterthelapseoftheperiodforperfectinganappeal,orwhenthesentencehasbeenpartiallyortotallysatisfiedorserved,orthedef.hasexpresslywaivedinwritinghisrighttoappeal.Itisonlythenthatthereisajudgmentwhichistobeenteredorrecordedinthebookofentriesofjudgments.Rule124,Sec.13.xxxWhenevertheCourtofAppealsshouldbeoftheopinionthatthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaorhighershouldbeimposedinacase,theCourtafterdiscussionoftheevidenceandthelawinvolved,shallrenderjudgmentimposingthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaorhigherasthecircumstanceswarrant,refrainfromenteringjudgmentandforthwithcertifythecaseandelevatetheentirerecordthereoftotheSupremeCourtforreview.Art.VII,Sec.18.xxxTheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.Art.VII,Sec.4.xxxTheSupremeCourt,sittingenbanc,shallbethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsofthePresident,Vice‐President,andmaypromulgateitsruleforthepurpose.Lopezvs.RoxasSection1,Art.VIIIoftheConstitutionvestsinthejudicialbranchofthegovernment,notmerelysomespecifiedorlimitedjudicialpower,buttheentiretyor"all"ofsaidpower,except,only,somuchastheConstitutionconfersuponsomeotheragency,suchasthepowerto"judgeallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualifications'ofmembersoftheSenateandthoseoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whichisvestedbytheConstitutionsolelyintheSenateElectoralTribunalandtheHouseElectoralTribunal,respectively.R.A1793,creatingthePET,hastheeffectofgivingadefeatedcandidatethelegalrighttocontestjudiciallytheelectionofthePresident‐electortheVP‐elect.ByprovidingthatthePET"shallbecomposedoftheChiefJusticeandtheother10MembersoftheSC",R.A.1793hasconferreduponsuchcourtanadditionalexclusiveoriginaljurisdiction.Ithasnotcreatedanewandseparatecourt.IthasmerelyconferredupontheSCthefunctionsofaPET.ThePETisnotinferiortotheSCsinceitisthesamecourt,althoughthefunctionspeculiartosaidTribunalaremorelimitedinscopethanthoseoftheSCintheexerciseofitsordinaryfunctions.Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.Acaseormatterisdeemed
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37 submittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself.UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebroughttotheSupremeCourtoncertioraribytheaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthecopythereof. (8)CongressionalPoweroverJurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtArt.VIII,Sec.2.“TheCongressshallhavethepowerthedefine,prescribeandapportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourtsbutmaynotdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsjurisdictionovercasesenumeratedinSection5hereof. Xxx” Whilethejurisdictionofcourtsisamatteroflegislativeapportionment,theConstitutionsetscertainlimitationsonthisprerogative:
1.ItcannotdecreasetheconstitutionallysetjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.(ItmaynotdeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsjurisdictionovercasesenumeratedinSection5hereof.)2.ItcannotincreasetheconstitutionallysetappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.(Art.VI,Sec.30).
Thus,inthecaseofFabianvs.Desierto,Sec.27,RA6770,whichauthorizesanappealtotheSupremeCourtfromdecisionsoftheOmbudsmaninadministrativedisciplinarycases,wasdeclaredunconstitutionalbecausetheprovisionwaspassedwithouttheadviceandconsentoftheSupremeCourt.
3.Itcannotpassalawreorganizingthejudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsmembers.(Art.VI,Sec.2,par.2)
4. ItcannotamendtheRulesofCourt.
InEchegarayvs.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.No.132601,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatthe1987ConstitutiontookawaythepowerofCongresstorepeal,alter,orsupplementrulesconcerningpleading,practice,andprocedure.Infine,thepowertopromulgatesuchrulesisnolongersharedbythisCourtwithCongress,moresowiththeExecutive.However,Congresscan:
increasetheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSC(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower).
ItcanmakethejurisdictionoftheSCconcurrentwithlowercourts(pursuanttoitsgeneralpower).
Thus,undertheRulesofCourt,theoriginaljurisdictionoftheSCisconcurrentwiththeRTCandinthecaseofthespecialcivilactions,withtheCA. MantrusteSystems,Inc.vsCASection31ofProclamationNo.5‐A(Privatizationlaw)prohibitedcourtsandadministrativeagenciesfromissuinganyrestrainingorderorinjunctionagainsttheAssetPrivatizationTrustinconnectionwiththeacquisition,saleordispositionofassetstransferredtoit,noragainstanypurchaserofassetssoldbytheTrusttopreventsuchpurchaserfromtakingpossessionofanyassetspurchasedbyhim.SaidSectiondoesnotinfringeanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Itdoesnotimpairtheinherentpowerofthecourts"tosettleactualcontroversieswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceableandtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovt."ThePresident,intheexerciseofherlegislativepowerundertheFreedomConstitution,issuedsaidProclamationtopreventcourtsfrominterferinginthedischargeoftheExecutiveDepartmentofitstaskofcarryingouttheexpeditiousdispositionandprivatizationofcertaingovt.corporationsand/ortheassetsthereof,absentanygraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessorlackofjurisdictiononitspart.Thisproclamation,notbeinginconsistentwiththeConstitutionandnothavingbeenrepealedorrevokedbyCongress,hasremainedoperative.
Administrativepowers (9)SupervisionoflowercourtsArt.VIII,Sec.6.TheSupremeCourtshallhaveadministrativesupervisionoverallcourtsandthepersonnelthereof.NoblejasvTeehankee,TheSCheldthatalthoughtheCommissionerofLandRegistrationisgiventherankofjudgeoftheCFI,heisstillanadministrativeofficial,henceoutsidethejurisdictionoftheSCandcannotbeinvestigatedbyitasifhewerealowercourtjudge.Otherwise,theSCwouldbeperforminganon‐judicialwork. (10)TemporarilyassignjudgestootherstationsinthepublicinterestArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to) xxx (3)Assigntemporarilyjudgesoflowercourtstootherstationsaspublicinterestmayrequire.Suchtemporaryassignmentshallnotexceedsixmonthswithouttheconsentofthejudgeconcerned. (11)Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrialtoavoidmiscarriageofjustice[Art.VIII,Sec.5(4)] (12)DisciplineoflowercourtjudgesArt.VIII,Sec.11.xxx TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissal,byavoteofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (13)AppointmentofofficialsandemployeesofentirejudiciaryArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethexxxpower(to) xxx (6)AppointallofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw. (14)RulemakingArt.VIII,Sec.5.TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers: xxx (5)Promulgaterulesconcerningtheprotectionandenforcementofconstitutionalrights,pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts,theadmissiontothepracticeoflaw,theIntegratedBar,andlegalassistancetotheunderprivileged.Suchrulesshallprovideasimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedureforthespeedydispositionofcases,shallbeuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshallnotdiminish,increase,ormodifysubstantiverights.Rightsofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourt. InRe:requestforaCreationofaSpecialDivison,A.M.No.02109SC,itwasheldthatitiswithinthecompetenceoftheSupremeCourttocreateaSpecialDivisionintheSandiganbayanwhichwillhearanddecidetheplundercaseagainstformerPresidentJosephEstrada.PowerofCongresstorepealRulesofCourt‐ArticleXVIII,Sec.10.AllcourtsexistingatthetimeoftheratificationofthisConstitutionshallcontinuetoexercisetheirjurisdiction,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw.TheprovisionsoftheexistingRulesofCourt,judiciaryacts,andprocedurallawsnotinconsistentwiththisConstitutionshallremainoperativeunlessamendedorrepealedbytheSupremeCourtorthe
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38 Congress.Co‐Judicialpowers AsidefromthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtmentionedabovethefollowingareitsotherpowersrelatedto,thoughnotexactlyconstituting,itsjudicialfunction: 1.Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrial,inordertoavoidamiscarriageofjustice.Art.VIII,Sec.5(4)] 2.Rulemaking‐Promulgaterulesconcerning(a)theprotectionandenforcementofconstitutionalrights,(b)pleading,practiceandprocedureinallcourts,(c)theadministrationtothepracticeoflaw,(d)theIntegratedBar,and(e)legalassistancetotheunderprivileged.Limitstorule‐makingpower:Suchrulesshall
(i) providesimplifiedandinexpensiveprocedure,forthespeedydispositionofcases
(ii)beuniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,and(iii)notdiminish,increaseormodifysubstantiverights.
Rulesofprocedureofspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodiesshallremaineffectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSC.[Art.VIII,Sec.5(5)]Itisonthebasisofthispower,thattheRulesofCourt,theBar,IBP,LegalAidOfficewereadopted.PracticeofProfessionsArt.XII,Sec.14.xxxThepracticeofallprofessionsinthePhilippinesshallbelimitedtoFilipinocitizens,saveincasesprescribedbylaw.MartialLawArt.VII,Sec.18.TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofMartialLaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysformitsfiling.(par.3thereof.) (15)NoquasijudicialandadministrativeworkofjudgesGenerally:Nonon‐judicialworkforjudges;Noquasi‐judicialandadministrativeworkforjudges. Asageneralrule,membersofthejudiciaryshallonlyhavejudicialfunctions,inlinewiththeseparationofpowersprincipleoftheConstitution.Thus:Art.VIII,Sec.12.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylawshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunction.MeralcovPasayTransportationCoTheissueconcernsthelegalrightofthemembersoftheSC,sittingasaboardofarbitrators,thedecisionofamajorityofwhomshallbefinal,toactinthatcapacity.ItwasheldthattheSCanditsmembersshouldnotandcannotberequiredtoexerciseanypowerortoperformanytrustortoassumeanydutynotpertainingtoorconnectedw/theadministeringofjudicialfunctions.GarciavMacaraigTheSCsaidthatitdidnotlookwithfavoratthepracticeoflongstandingofjudgesbeingdetailedwiththeDepartmentofJusticetoassisttheSecretary,evenifitwereonlyinconnectionwithhisworkofexercisingadministrativeauthorityovercourts.Thebasisofthisruleistheseparationofpowers.Inthiscase,respondentMacaraigwasappointedtooneofthenewly‐createdCFIbranchesw/stationatCalambaLaguna.Atthetimeofhisappointment,respondentwasthechiefofTechnicalStaffoftheDOJandconcurrentlymemberoftheBoardofPardonsandParole.
xxxInRe:RodolfoManzanoEONo.856createdtheProvincial/CityCommitteesonJusticetoinsurethespeedydispositionofcasesofdetainees.Amongthefunctionsofsaidcommitteearetoreceivecomplaintsagainstanyapprehendingofficer,jailwarden,fiscalorjudgewhomaybefoundtohavecommittedabusesinthedischargeofhisdutiesandreferthesametoproperauthorityforproperaction,torecommendrevisionofanylaworregulationwhichisbelievedprejudicialtotheproperadministrationofcriminaljustice.JudgeManzano,ExecutiveJudgeOfIlocosNortewasappointedasmemberofsaidCommittee.TheSCheldthatsuchcommitteeperformsadministrativefunctions.Administrativefunctionsarethosewhichinvolvetheregulationandcontrolovertheconductandaffairsofindividualsfortheirownwelfareandthepromulgationofrulesandregulationstobettercarryoutthepolicyofthelegislatureorsuchasaredevolvedupontheadministrativeagencybytheorganiclawofitsexistence.UndertheConstitution,themembersofthecourtsshallnotbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasi‐judicialoradministrativefunctions.ConsideringthatmembershipofJudgeManzanoinsuchcommittee,willviolatetheConstitution,theSupremeCourtisconstrainedtodenyhisrequestthathebeallowedtoservetherein.Hecanonlyrenderassistancetosuchcommitteeandonlywhensuchassistancemaybereasonablyincidentaltothefulfillmentofhisjudicialduties.Exceptions:Constitutionallyappointednon‐judicialfunctionsoftheSupremeCourt a.ActasPresidentialElectoralTribunalWhileCongressactsastheNationalBoardofCanvassersforthePresidentialelection,theSupremeCourtactsastheElectoralTribunalforsuchelectionasprovidedinArt.Art.VII,Sec.4,lastpar.ThismeansthatbeforetheproclamationbytheCongressofthewinner,Congressisthejudgeofanyelectoralissue,buttheproclamation,whenthereisanelectoralcontestalready,thentheSCbecomesthesolejudge.b.ChiefJusticeaspresidingofficerinimpeachmenttrialofthePresident.[Art.XI,Sec.3(6)]c.ChiefJusticeasChairmanoftheJudicialandBarCouncil. (16)ReportonthejudiciaryArt.VIII,Sec.16.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeachregularsessionoftheCongress,submittothePresidentandtheCongressanannualreportontheoperationsandactivitiesoftheJudiciary. (17)MannerofsittingandvotesrequiredInthe1987Constitution,notonlywasthediscretion(tositenbancorin2divisions)retained,butalsothedivisionswereincreased.Theremaybe5,3or2divisionsmadeupof3,5or7members,respectively.Atpresent,theSCsitseitherenbancorin3divisions.Art.VIII,Sec.4.(1)TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeandfourteenAssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancoritsdiscretion,indivisionsofthree,five,orsevenMembers.Anyvacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.(2)Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreement,orlaw,whichshallbeheardbytheSupremeCourt,enbanc,includingthoseinvolvingtheconstitutionality,application,oroperationofpresidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinances,andotherregulations,shallbedecidedwiththeconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon. (3)Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolvedwith
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39 theconcurrenceofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocase,withouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeofsuchMembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc:Provided,thatnodoctrineorprincipleorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.ThefollowingcasesshallbeheardbytheSCenbanc: 1.Casesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,inter‐nationalorexecutiveagreementorlaw.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 2.Casesinvolvingthe(a)constitutionality,(b)application,or(c)operationofpresidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinancesandotherregulations.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 3.AllothercaseswhichundertheRulesofCourtarerequiredtobeheardbytheSCenbanc.[Id.,Sec.4(2)] 4.Casesormattersheardbyadivisionwheretherequirednumberofvotestodecideorresolve(themajorityofthosewhotookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,andinnocaselessthan3members)isnotmet.[Id.,Sec.4(3)] 5.Tomodifyorreverseadoctrineorprincipleoflawlaiddownbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivision.[Id.,Sec.4(3)] 6.Administrativedisciplinarycasesinvolvingjudgesoflowercourts.(Id.,Sec.11.) 7.Actionsinstitutedbycitizentotestthevalidityofaproclamationofmartiallaworsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit.(Art.VII,Sec.18.) 8.ThecourtsittingasPresidentialElectoralTribunal.(Art.VII,Sec.4,par.7.)Rule56Sec.11.ProcedureifopinionisequallydividedWherethecourtenbancisequallydividedinopinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbere‐heard,andifonrehearingnodecisionisreached,theactionshallbedismissediforiginallycommencedinthecourt;inappealedcases,thejudgmentororderappealedfromshallstandaffirmed;andonallincidentalmatters,thepetitionormotionshallbedenied.Rule125,Sec.3.DecisionifopinionisequallydividedWhenthecourtenbancisequallydividedinopinion,orthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseshallbere‐heard,andifonrehearingnodecisionisreached,thejudgmentofconvictionofthelowercourtshallbereversedandtheaccusedacquitted
(18)RequirementastodecisionsDeliberationsArt.VIII,Sec.13.“TheconclusionsoftheSupremeCourtinanycasesubmittedtoitfordecisionenbancorindivisionshallbereachedinconsultationbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberforthewritingoftheopinionoftheCourt.AcertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeshallbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseandservedupontheparties.AnyMemberwhotooknopart,ordissented,orabstainedfromadecisionorresolutionmuststatethereasontherefor.Thesamerequirementsshallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.”Thereasonfortherequirementthatthedecisionmustbereached"inconsulta"(i.e.,afterdeliberationsbythegroup)istoemphasizethattheSCisonebody,albeitcollegiate,sothatthedecisionofthecaseisbythecourtitselfandnottheponente.Thewriteroftheopinionismerelythespokesmanofthebody.ConsingVCATheabsenceofcertificationbytheCourtofAppealsdoesnotrenderthatdecisioninvalid.Thecertificationrequirementimposedbythe1987constitutionwasmeanttoensuretheimplementationoftheconstitutionalrequirementthatdecisionsoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourts,suchastheCA,CTAandSandiganbayan,arereachedafterconsultationwiththemembersofthecourtsittingenbancorinadivisionbeforethecaseisassignedtoamemberthereoffordecisionwriting.
Theabsencewouldnotnecessarilymeanthatthecasesubmittedfordecisionhadnotbeenreachedinconsultationbeforebeingassignedtoonememberforthewritingoftheopinionofthecourtsincetheregularperformanceofofficialdutyispresumed.Thelackofcertificationservesasanevidenceoffailuretoobservethecertificationrequirementbutitwouldnothavetheeffectofinvalidatingthedecision.Art.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefusedduecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.VotingVotesrequiredto"renderadecisionorresolution"A)Enbanc‐Concurrenceofamajorityofthememberswho(i)actuallytookpartinthedeliberations(i.e.,theconsultation)ontheissuesinthecase,and(ii)votedthereon.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(2)andSec.11.] B)Indivisions‐Casesormattersheardbyadivisionshallbedecidedorresolved(a)withtheconcurrenceofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon,and(b)innocasewithouttheconcurrenceofatleast3ofsuchmembers.Whentherequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecidedenbanc.Nodoctrineorprincipleoflawlaidbythecourtinadecisionrenderedenbancorindivisionmaybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc.[Art.VIII,Sec.4(3)]a.Inadivisionof7members,themajorityifallarepresentis4.Ifonly6arepresent,4.Ifonly5or4,3.Ifonly3,noquorum. b.Inadivisionof5members,3votesareneededregardlessofwhether5,4,or3arepresent.c.Indivisionof3members,3votesareneeded.d.Inanyofthesecases,whenthevotescannotbemustered,thecasemustberaisedtothecourtenbanc.Effectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajority:Ifthenecessarymajoritycannotbehad,thecaseisagainreheard.Ifuponrehearing,nomajorityisstillhad,thefollowingaretheeffects: a.)Ifacaseisonappeal,thejudgmentappealedfromisdeemedaffirmedexcept: (i)Criminalcaseswherethejudgmentisthatofconviction:theconvictionisreversed,andtheaccusedisacquitted. (ii)Caseswherethelowercourtdeclaredalaw,etc.unconstitutional:thejudgmentisreversed,andthevalidityofthelawisdeemedsustained,pursuanttothepresumptionofconstitutionalityunderSec.9oftheJudiciaryActof1948.(Ifthelowercourtdeclaredthelawasnotunconstitutional,thisjudgmentisdeemedaffirmedpursuanttothegeneralruleabove.) (Thus,if12arepresent,5votedthelawunconstitutional,4votedforitsvalidity,and3abstained,thereisnodecisionandsothelawremainsvalid.) b.)Ifthecaseisanoriginalpetition,thenthecaseisdeemeddismissed.Writingofthedecision Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.(Art.VIII,Sec.14.) InthecaseoftheSCandlowercollegiatecourt,thisruleisaddressedtotheonetowhomthewritingoftheopinionwasassignedafterconsultation,thatis,theponente.Inthecasebyothercourts,thisruleisaddressedtothejudge.
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40 Decisionsonthemerit. Therulerequiringstatementoftherelevantfacts,theissues,theruling,andthereasonedopinioninsupportoftheruling,appliesonlytodecisionsonthemeritbyacourtofrecord,basedonthefollowingrulingsoftheSC:ValladolidvInciongitwasheldthattheOrderoftheDeputyMinisterofLabordidnotcontainastatementoffactsandconclusionsoflawisnotcoveredbytheconstitutionalrequirementbecauseitisnotadecisionofacourtofrecord,theMinistryofLaborbeinganadministrativeagencywithquasi‐judicialfunctions,withrulesofproceduremandatedtobenon‐litigious,summaryandnon‐technical.Section14,Chapter3,BookVII,AdministrativeCodeof1987.Decision.‐‐Everydecisionrenderedbytheagencyinacontestedcaseshallbeinwritingandshallstateclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.xxxBacolodMurciaMillingCo.vHenares,TheSCruledthatordersofacourtonanincidentalmatter(inthiscase,theorderimposingthepaymentofattorney'sfees)neednotstatethelegalbasisoftheruling.MinuteResolutionCruz: Injustifyingtheso‐calledminuteresolution,theSCsaidinBorromeov.CA, "TheSCdisposesofthebulkofitscasesbyminuteresolutionsanddecreesthemasfinalandexecutory,aswhereacaseispatentlyw/omerit,wheretheissuesraisedarefactualinnature,wherethedecisionappealedfromissupportedbysubstantialevidenceandisinaccordw/thefactsofthecaseandtheapplicablelaws,whereitisclearfromtherecordsthatthepetitionswerefiledmerelytoforestalltheearlyexecutionofjudgmentandfornon‐compliancew/therules.Theresolutiondenyingduecourseordismissingapetitionalwaysgivesthelegalbasis.xxxx TheCourtisnotdutyboundtorendersigneddecisionsallthetime.Ithasamplediscretiontoformulatedecisionsand/orminuteresolutions,providedalegalbasisisgiven,dependingonitsevaluationofacase."AndneitherdoestheruleapplytoadministrativecasesdecidedbytheSCitself,asitheldinPrudentialBankv.Castro,thus:"NoconstitutionalprovisionisdisregardedintheSC'sMinuteResolutiondenyingamotionforreconsideration'forlackofmerit,theissuesraisedthereinhavingbeenpreviouslydulyconsideredandpassedupon.Inanadministrativecase,theconstitutionalmandatethat'no***motionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallbe***deniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasisthereforisinapplicable.Andevenifitwere,saidresolutionstatedthelegalbasisforthedenial,and,therefore,adheredfaithfullytotheconstitutionalrequirement.'Lackofmerit,'asagroundfordenialislegalbasis.Petitionsforreviewandmotionsforreconsideration Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefusedduecourseordenied,withoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.14,par.2.)
Thisruleappliestoadismissalofamotionforreconsiderationofa"decisiononthemerits",saidtheSCinMendozavCFI,).Itdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,toadismissalofamotionforreconsiderationofapreviousdismissalofapetitionforhabeascorpus.(Thedismissalofthepetitionforhabeascorpusisnotadecisiononthemerits,butissimilartoadismissalofapetitionforreview,whichisadecisionnottogiveduecoursetothepetition.) Thepastpracticeusedtobethatwhentheappellatecourtdeniedapetitionforreview,ordeniedaMFR,itsimplydidsoinaMinuteResolution,statingthatthecasewasdismissedforlackofbasis.This
aggrievedmanyalawyer,speciallythosewhowouldspenddayspreparingpagesofbriefs,onlytofindoutthatalltheireffortwasansweredbyaone‐liner"Dismissedforlackofbasis".
Thispromptedtheframersofthe1987ConstitutiontoforcetheCourttoatleastwritedownthelegalbasisforthedenial.Thismeansthatwhileafullydetaileddecisionisnotrequired,neitherisaskimpyone‐linerisallowed.Thelegalreasonforthedismissalmustbewritten.DissentersandAbstainers Inthecaseofadecisiononthemerits,ifamember(a)tooknopart,or(b)dissented,or(c)abstainedfromadecisionorresolution,hemuststatehisreasontherefor.(Art.VIII,Sec.13.)Eventhosewhotooknopartinthedeliberationsbutwerepresent,andthosewhoabstainedarerequiredtowritetheirreasonsforthesearereallyformsofcastingtheirvote.Thosewhoinhibitedthemselvesare,ofcourse,notrequiredtovote,sincetheydidnotreallyparticipate. Procedurally,thepurposeistoenablethepartytofindoutthereasonfortheactiontaken.ForcourtslowerthantheSC,andeventheSCitself,thisisimportantforappealormotionforreconsiderationpurposes,asthebasisfortheassignmentoferror. (19)MandatoryperiodfordecidingcasesArt.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedorresolvedwithintwenty‐fourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and,unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsforallotherlowercourts.(2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.(3)Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.(4)Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudicetosuchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseormattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.Art.VII,Sec.18. xxx TheSupremeCourtmayreview,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritortheextensionthereof,andmustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling. xxx(par.3thereof.)Art.XVIII,Sec.12.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinoneyearaftertheratificationofthisConstitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodies.Id.,Sec.13.Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.Id.,Sec.14.Theprovisionsofparagraphs(3)and(4),Section15ofArticleVIIIofthisConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.A)CasesfiledafterFebruary2,1987
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41 AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedwithintwenty‐fourmonthscountedfromthedateofsubmission."[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)] Acaseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolu‐tionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(2)]MandatoryperiodintheSupremeCourt:24months[Art.VIII,Sec.15(1)]Except:Apropercasequestioningthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartiallaworsuspensionoftheprivilegewhichmustbedecided30daysfromfiling.(Art.VII,Sec.18,par.1.)Butwhathappensifthejudgeorcourtfailstomeetthedeadlineanyway?TheConstitutionprovides: Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeorthepresidingJudgeshallforthwithbeissued,andacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(3)] Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudicetosuchresponsibility(administrativedisciplinaryactionagainstthejudgeorjustices)shalldecideorresolvethecaseormattersubmittedtheretofordeterminationwithoutfurtherdelay.[Art.VIII,Sec.15(4)] Inotherwords,failuretodecidethecase[forreasonsotherthantheinabilitytoreachthenecessarymajority]hasnoconsequenceonthecase.Thus,acertificationisrequiredthattheperiodhaslapsedwithoutanydecisionbeingmade,statingthereasonforsuchinaction.Thenthecourtmustdecidewithoutanyfurtherdelay.Theconsequencesareonthejudge:(a)hecouldnotdrawouthissalary,sincehewouldnotbeabletocertifythathehasresolvedallcasessubmittedtohimin90daysand(b)heissubjecttoadministrativesanctions.B)CasesfiledbeforeFebruary2,1987butexpireafterthisdate TheprovisionsofArt.VIII,Sec,15(3)‐(4)shallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.(Art.XVIII,Sec.14) Inotherwords,itisasifthesecaseswerefiledafterFebruary2,1987.C)CasesthatexpiredbeforeFebruary2,1987
Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbytheSCassoonaspracticable.(Art.XVIII,Sec.13.)
TheSupremeCourtshall,within1yearfromFebruary2,1987adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSCorlowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodies.(Art.XVIII,Sec.12.)B.LOWERCOURTS (1)QualificationsandappointmentArt.VIII,Sec.7.(1)NopersonshallbeappointedMemberoftheSupremeCourtoranylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural‐borncitizenofthePhilippines.AmemberoftheSupremeCourtmustbeatleastfortyyearsofage,andmusthavebeenforfifteenyearsormoreajudgeofalowercourtorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.(2)theCongressshallprescribethequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudgethereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippineBar.Id.,Sec.8.
(5)The(JudicialandBar)CouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatlistthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.
Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentwithinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist.Composition Thecompositionoflowercourtsshallbeprovidedbylaw.ThelawsaretheJudiciaryActof1948andBP129.QualificationsLowerCollegiateCourt(CourtofAppeals)(1)Nopersonshallbeappointedmemberofanylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural‐borncitizen.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(1)]andamemberofPhilippineBar.(2)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)](3)Amemberofthejudiciarymustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependence.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)]LowerCourts(1)TheCongressshallprescribequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudgethereofunlessheisacitizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippinebar.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(2)](2)Hemustbeapersonofprovencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence.[Art.VIII,Sec.7(3)] (2)SalaryArt.VIII,Sec.10.ThesalaryoftheChiefJusticeandoftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremecourtandofjudgesoflowercourtsshallbefixedbylaw.Duringtheircontinuanceinoffice,theirsalaryshallnotbedecreased. (3)CongressionalpowertoreorganizeandsecurityoftenureArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.Id.,Sec.2.xxx NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsMembers.ThepowerofCongresstoreorganizelowercourtshasbeenupheldbytheSCpriorto1987.OcampovSecretaryofJustice,TheSCbyfailingtomusterthe2/3voterequiredthentodeclarealawunconstitutionalineffectsustainedthevalidityofthelawpassedbyCongressabolishingtheofficesof"judges‐at‐large"and"cadastraljudges"andtheconsequentremovalofjudgesoccupyingtheseposts.Notingthatthepurposeofthelawwastopromotetheindependenceofthejudiciary(byavoidingforum‐shopping),itheldthatanabolitionofanofficemadeingoodfaithdoesnotviolatesecurityoftenure.Securityoftenurepresupposesthecontinuedexistenceoftheofficefromwhichonewasremovednotremovalfromanofficethathasbeenabolishedingoodfaith
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42 andnotmerelypartisanpoliticalreasons. (4)RemovalArt.VIII,Sec.11.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallholdofficeduringgoodbehavioruntiltheyreachtheageofseventyyears,orbecomeincapacitatedtodischargethedutiesoftheiroffice.TheSupremeCourtenbancshallhavethepowertodisciplinejudgesoflowercourts,orordertheirdismissalbyavoteofamajorityoftheMemberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.Cruz:"Judgesoflowercourt,"ashereused,includesjusticesoftheSandiganbayan.Thisrulecastsmuchdoubtonthelegalityofthepresidentialdecreemakingthemremovableonlybythelegislaturethroughtheprocessofimpeachment. (5)JurisdictionArt.VIII,Sec.1.JudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.J.M.Tuason&Co.vCA;YnotvIAC,Thereisineffecta"constitutionalconfermentoforiginaljurisdictiononthelowercourtsinthosefivecasesforwhichtheSupremeCourtisgrantedappellatejurisdictionin5(2)."UndertheprovisiongrantingtheSCjurisdiction"toreview,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmonappealorcertiorariasthelaworRulesofCourtmayprovide,judgmentsoflowercourts,"lowercourtscanpassuponthevalidityofastatuteinthefirstinstance. (6)RequirementsastopreparationofdecisionsArt.VIII,Sec.14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefusedduecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.Mannerofsitting TheCourtofAppealssitsindivisionswhenithearscases;theonlytimeitconvenesasonebodyistotakeupmattersofadministration. Thetrialandinferiorcourts,ofcourse,donothavethisproblemsincethereisonlyonejudge.Deliberations Thesamerequirements(forconsulta)shallbeobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts.(Art.VIII,Sec.13).Forobviousreasons,thisrequirementdoesnotapplytothetrialandinferiorcourts.Voting Forcollegiatecourts,liketheCourtofAppeals,thelawprovidesthatitsitsonlyindivisionswhendecidingcases.Fortrialandinferiorcourts,noproblemarisessinceonlyonejudgeisinvolved.EffectoffailuretomusterthenecessarymajorityCourtofAppeals.‐‐Thesamerulesapply,exceptthatthedecisioncannowbeappealedtotheSC.InferiorCourts.‐‐Failuretodecidehasnoconsequenceonthedecisionofthecourt.TheCourtisnotoustedofitsjurisdiction,butthejudgesuffers
administrativeconsequences. (7)Mandatoryperiodfordeciding Art.VIII,Sec.15.(1)AllcasesormattersfiledaftertheeffectivityofthisConstitutionmustbedecidedorresolvedwithintwenty‐fourmonthsfromthedateofsubmissionfortheSupremeCourt,and,unlessreducedbytheSupremeCourt,twelvemonthsforalllowercollegiatecourts,andthreemonthsforallotherlowercourts.(2)Acaseormattershallbedeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brieformemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.(3)Upontheexpirationofthecorrespondingperiod,acertificationtothiseffectsignedbytheChiefJusticeorthepresidingjudgeshallforthwithbeissuedandacopythereofattachedtotherecordofthecaseormatter,andservedupontheparties.Thecertificationshallstatewhyadecisionorresolutionhasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.(4)Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt,withoutprejudicetosuchresponsibilityasmayhavebeenincurredinconsequencethereof,shalldecideorresolvethecaseormattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.Art.XVIII,Sec.12.TheSupremeCourtshall,withinoneyearaftertheratificationofthisConstitution,adoptasystematicplantoexpeditethedecisionorresolutionofcasesormatterspendingintheSupremeCourtorthelowercourtspriortotheeffectivityofthisConstitution.Asimilarplanshallbeadoptedforallspecialcourtsandquasi‐judicialbodies.Id.,Sec.13.Thelegaleffectofthelapse,beforetheratificationofthisConstitution,oftheapplicableperiodforthedecisionorresolutionofthecasesormatterssubmittedforadjudicationbythecourts,shallbedeterminedbytheSupremeCourtassoonaspracticable.Id.,Sec.14.Theprovisionsofparagraphs(3)and(4),Section15ofArticleVIIIofthisConstitutionshallapplytocasesormattersfiledbeforetheratificationofthisConstitution,whentheapplicableperiodlapsesaftersuchratification.MandatoryPeriodLowercollegiatecourts:12months,unlessreducedbytheSCOtherlowercourts:3months,unlessreducedbytheSCTheConstitutionnowexplicitlyprovidesinSec.15(1)thattheperiodsaremandatory,asidefromusingtheword"must"(not"shall"asin1973)inSec.15(1).ThecaseofMarcelinovCruz,whichheldthattheperiodsinthe1973Constitutionwereonlydirectory,isthusnow,overruled.Cruz:Itshouldbenotedthat,althoughdecisionwithinthemaximumperiodisnowmandatory,failuretoarriveatthesamewillnotdivestthecourtofjurisdiction,withoutprejudicetoanyresponsibilitythatmayattachtothejudge.Thecourtmuststillresolvethecasew/ofurtherdelay,unliketheoldrulewhenthedecisionappealedwasdeemedautomaticallyaffirmedandthepetitionwasdeemedautomaticallydismissedasaresultoftheinactionofthecourt.C.JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCILArt.VIII,Sec.8.(1)AJudicialandBarCouncilisherebycreatedunderthesupervisionoftheSupremeCourtcomposedoftheChiefJusticeasexofficioChairman,theSecretaryofJustice,andarepresentativeoftheCongressasexofficioMembers,arepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar,aprofessoroflaw,aretiredMemberoftheSupremeCourt,andarepresentativeoftheprivatesector.(2)TheregularmembersoftheCouncilshallbeappointedbythePresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsentoftheCommissionon
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43 Appointments.OftheMembersfirstappointed,therepresentativeoftheIntegratedBarshallserveforfouryears,theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear.(3)TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtshallbetheSecretaryexofficiooftheCouncilandshallkeeparecordofitsproceedings.(4)TheregularMembersoftheCouncilshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSupremeCourt.TheSupremeCourtshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriationsfortheCouncil.(5)TheCouncilshallhavetheprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary.ItmayexercisesuchotherfunctionanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.Ex‐officiomembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)] (1)ChiefJusticeasex‐officioChairman (2)SecretaryofJustice (3)RepresentativeofCongressRegularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(1)] (4)RepoftheIntegratedBar (5)ProfessorofLaw (6)RetiredmemberoftheSC (7)RepresentativeofprivatesectorSecretaryex‐officio[Art.VIII,Sec.8(3)] ClerkoftheSC,whoshallkeeparecordofitsproceedingsAppointment,Tenure,SalaryEx‐officiomembers‐ForobviousreasonsthisdoesnotapplysincethepositionintheCouncilisgoodonlywhilethepersonistheoccupantoftheoffice. Regularmembers[Art.VIII,Sec.8(2)]‐TheregularmembersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments. Thetermoftheregularmembersis4years.Butthetermofthoseinitiallyappointedshallbestaggeredinthefollowingwaysoastocreatecontinuityinthecouncil: IBPrepresentative‐4years Lawprofessor‐3years Retiredjustice‐2years Privatesector‐1year RegularmembersshallreceivesuchemolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSC.TheSCshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriationsfortheCouncil.[Art.VIII,Sec.8(4)]Functions: 1.RecommendappointeestotheJudiciary[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)] 2.RecommendappointeestotheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandhis5deputies.(Art.XI,Sec.9) 3.SuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSCmayassign[Art.VIII,Sec.8(5)]Id.,Sec.9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentswithinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist.D.AutomaticreleaseofappropriationforthejudiciaryArt.VIII,Sec.3.TheJudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy.AppropriationsfortheJudiciarymaynotbereducedbythelegislaturebelowtheamountappropriatedforthepreviousyearand,afterapproval,
shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.