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This article was downloaded by: [Forman Christian College]On: 02 December 2014, At: 00:51Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
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Harold lasswell's problem orientation
for the policy sciencesNick Turnbull
ab
aSchool of Social Science and Policy , University of New South Wales
bPolitics , The University of Manchester
Published online: 11 Mar 2010.
To cite this article:Nick Turnbull (2008) Harold lasswell's problem orientation for the policysciences, Critical Policy Studies, 2:1, 72-91, DOI: 10.1080/19460171.2008.9518532
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2008.9518532
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Harold Lasswell's
Problem Orientation for
the Pol icy Sciences
Nick Turnbul l
Schoo l of Social Science and Policy, U niversity of New South W ales and
Politics, The University of M anchester.
Abstract
Harold Lasswell s problem orientation is the keystone in his concept of the policy
sciences . How ever, many critics have since rejected his view of policymaking as a
problem solving science. I explain and critique Lasswell s problem orientation in a new
way, in terms of his scientific conception of problem and solution. Lasswell derived his
vision of the policy sciences from Dew ey s conception of knowledge as problem solving.
Lasswell modified Dewey s pragmatism by proposing a policy sciences composed of
two separate poles, the scientific study of problems and policymaking around these
problems. These were synthesized in a larger scientific perspective, the problem
orientation for the policy sciences. How ever, this synthesis is neither scientific in theory
nor in practice. The link between the two poles is contingent, rather than necessary.
Lasswell suppressed the problematic to cast policy science as a non-political politics.
The relationship between the two poles, and the problem orientation in general, should
be theorized as contingent and political.
7 2 Critical Policy Analysis 2008),vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 72-91.
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Main Articles
The American political scientist Harold Lasswell had a vision for the 'policy sciences' which
would bring togetherthe social sciences and practical policymaking to solve public problems.
1
The concept of the 'problem orientation' was the keystone in this vision which, for many, still
animates the scholarly f ield of policy analysis. Contemporary writers both within and outside
the United States continue to draw on Lasswell's ideas and reiterate his key them es, particularly
his concern for public problems and democracy (Ascher and Hirschfelder-Ascher 2004; de
Leon, 1981;Dryzek, 1989; Dryzek and Torgerson, 1993; Fischer, 2003 ;Hajer and Wagenaar,
2003a; Torgerson, 19 85,1995 ;W eissandW ittrock, 1991). Lasswell explicitly framed his
vision as an adaptation of John Dewey 's general approach to public policy (Lasswell, 1971:
pp.
xiii-xiv).
11
We seeD ew ey's problem solving logic at work in Lassw ell's pragmatic vision
of the policy sciences. Torgerson outlines the strong influenceofDeweyihroughoutLassw ell's
thought, noting that Dew ey's
How We Thinkwas
Lasswell's point of departure forunderstanding
the policy process, his ideas reflecting Dewey's step-wise model of problem solving (Torgerson,
1995:p. 236). Lasswell was important in founding a key journal of the field,
PolicySciences,
and wrote of how the 'problem orientation' should animate the policy sciences as distinctive
from other forms of scholarship.
Lasswell is important to academic policy analysis for several reasons: heis the founder of
the 'po licy sciences' ideal;his work is one manifestation of the largermovement of science
against politics;hetried to formalise the relationship between social science and policymaking;
and he made problem solving the defining characteristic of policy analysis. However, the
problem solving ideal h e espoused has come under considerable criticism. Among the telling
objections are that it presumes an inadequate, univocal definition of social problems (Lindblom
and Woodh ouse, 1993: p. 2 1 ; Ro se, 1977); excludes the symbolic dimension of policy
meanings (Yanow, 1996); pays insufficient attention to problem setting and problem framing
(Rein and Schon, 1977: pp. 236-9); and does not deal with political agenda setting (Kingdon,
1984).
hi general, the problem solving view of policy science has been debunked as a 'myth '
(Rein and W hite, 1977). Since then, interpretative policy analysishas emerged as a broad
alternative to the 'policy sciences' vision (see, for exam ple, Fischer
2003;
G ottweis 2007;
Hajer and Wagenaar 2003a; Yanow 1996).
m
Interpretative researchers hav e drawn on
alternative epistemological perspectives which differ markedly from mainstream political science.
But while different, they also value Lasswell's interest in dem ocracy and carry on his belief
that scholars should be concerned with policymaking in practice rather than in abstract theory.
I think it is worth returning to Lassw ell's problem orientation to see where it went wrong in
constructing itself as
science
while also retaining what is of most value in itthe problem
orientation.
1V
While the specifics of my discussion only apply to Lassw ell, his thought reflects
the broad hope for a science of politics. Through Lasswell w e can consider the question of
how to relate science and politics and what this means for our conception of policy analysis as
a field of scholarly inquiry. This debate is not new, but in examining Lassw ell's conception of
'problem ' we can view the origin of the scientific approach in a new way, and also see how
to retain the problem concept and extract it from its scientific connotations. The advent of this
new journal,
Critical Policy Analysis,
affords us the opportunity to consider Lassw ell in a
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Harold Lassw ell's 'Problem Orientation' for the Policy Sciences
new light and reassert the value of his ideas for contemporary interpretative policy analysis.
Firstly, I describe how L asswell extended upon D ew ey's problem solving logic in his
vision of the policy sciences as a m ultidisciplinary approach to problem solving, made up of
two poles of one larger scientific rationality. Secondly, I review some of the critiques of this
construction by examining the literature on the use of scientific knowledge in policymaking.
Thirdly, I discuss the policy sciences vision as an attempt to scientifically solve the problem of
politicsby suppressing problematicity. I concludeby arguing that Lasswell's two poles should
be rethought in political terms, groundedupon a contingent logic of questioning which accounts
for the interpretative and rhetorical relationship between the social scientific study of public
problems and the use of social science in policymaking around these problems. Such a logic
would overturn the problem solving (scientific) assumption and be consistent in posing this
relationship itself in terms of questioning.
1. Harold Lasswell: theorising the policy sciences
The social sciences have always been interwoven with politics and government but the idea to
construct a research programm e specifically oriented towards policy emerged only in the
1940s and 1950s with Lasswell and hisfellow scholars in the United States (Wittrock, Wagner,
and Wollmann, 1991: p.28,31;Lerner and Lassw ell, 1951). Atypically modern idea, Lasswell
had a grand vision that the policy sciences would scientifically address fundamental problems
of employment, peace and equality (Wagner, Weiss, Wittrock and Wollmann, 1991b: p. 7).
While the term 'policy sc iences'is not used universally, Wagner etal . (1991b: p. 4) define it
well as 'the tradition within the social sciences that seeks 'relevance to contemporary affairs'
The development of the policy sciences was itself very much a part of the increasing demand
for social science research as the state took on new functions, such as macroeconomic planning
and redistributing wealth (Gagnon, 1990: p. 1). Th e social sciences at large developed with
the success of the natural sciences in mind, seeking control of the social environment just as
science commanded the natural one (Fay, 1975: p. 19). From the Enlightenment notion of a
world of puzzles to be solved, the policy sciences developed as the desire for knowledgeable
governance (Parsons, 1995: p. 17). Scientific politic s would provide technical arguments to
reach mutually acceptable answers, and disagreements based on values would drop away, as
would rhetoric and concern for power and position (Fay, 1975: p. 22). Wolin describes the
depth and extent of the assumption that social phenomena could be rationally understood and
society advanced by scientific means(1961:pp. 35 8-60). The last two centuries saw a long
termmovem ent against politics and political philosophy in favour of science that even extended
beyond positivists to reactionary theocrats(1961:pp. 358 -60 ). All of them saw facts as
central to questions of policy and government, and all of them utilised 'necess ity' as a bridge
for smuggling facts into the territory of norms
(1961:
p. 360). As such, the social sciences
depicted a model of society which left no room either for politics and the practice of the
political art, orfor a distinctively political theory(1961:p. 360). But even where policymaking
was not explicitly theorised as a science, scientific ideas about policy and politics were
widespread and elements persist in contemporary policy theory (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003b:
p. 18).
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/.Policy science as problem solving
Lasswell derived his vision of the policy sciences from Dewey's conception of knowledge as
problem solving. Dewey contended that problem solving pertained only to experience, therefore
to the problems of the public, an idea reflected in LassweU's dream of the policy sciences of
democracy (1951a: p. 10). Lasswell shared Dew ey 's rejection of private abstract thought in
the form of metaphysics and theology, citing the philosopher's focus on social institutions as
exemplary of the pragmatist attitude (195 la : p. 12). The 'problem orientation' w as to be the
distinctive outlook of the practical policy sciences (1970,1971). Lasswell adopted Dew ey's
definition of problems and solutions in terms of
experience:
by definition a problem is a perceived
discrepancy between goals and an actual or anticipated stateof affairs
(1971:
p. 56). Lasswell
tried to develop policy science as a distinct field, a 'policy orientation' distinguishable by its
particular focus on problems (195 la). These problems were to be addressed w ith the goal of
realising hum an dignity (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 15; 1951b: p. 5; 1971: p. 41). The problem
orientation of the policy sciences combined the twin questions of knowledge of the world and
the best mo deo f democracy (Lasswell, 1971: p. 4). Th e policy sciences were 'the policy
sciences of democracy' (195 la) because the problem orientation was the regulative criterion
which w ould integrate scientific inquiry with solving the problems of the public. Lassw ell's
support for democracy, scientific inquiry, and practical policymaking are not in dispute: it is
the orm
of this integration that is in question here.
Lasswell and his colleagues favoured a scientific approach to solving policy problems.
Desp iteDew ey's concern to distinguish practical science from abstract science, Lasswell saw
that policy science
v
had much in common w ith the logical positivism of Carnap and that it
could be of great benefit, for example in developing indexes of social attitudes 1951a: p. 12).
It is important to note that early writers in the policy sciences did not propose a sim ple
mechanistic interpretation of social action. In the seminal edited collection
The Policy Sciences
(Lerner and Lassw ell, 1951), Hilgard and Lerne r noted the great changes to social theory
brought about by Darw in, Marx and Freud, all of whom recognised greater social flux and
individual autonomy against perfect predictability
(1951:
pp. 17 -18). Policy science was
both a symptom of, and a response to, the new problem s of social coordination that arrived
with modernity. But while acknowledging the impossibility of predicting human behaviour and
making scientific generalisations about the future, Lasswell said that such projections should
still be appraised in a scientific frame of reference (195 lb : p. 28).
Policy science was to be an interdisciplinary science to address social changeby improving
policymaking (Hilgard and Lerner, 1951: pp. 42 -3). H enc eLerne rand La ssw ell's (1951)
inaugural volume
T he Policy Sciences
not only discussed policymaking but also included
chapters by social scientists such as Margaret Mead and Edward Shils. The five chapters on
research methods in this same volume (notably by Kenneth Arrow and Paul Lazarsfeld) reflect
the methodological bent of policy science 's origins. The idea was not simply to apply scientific
knowledge to policy problems. They supposed that ideal rationality was scientific rationality
and that decision making could also be conducted according to scientific methods and principles.
Th e empirical criterion marked the distinction between science and non-science , and the
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Harold Lassw ell's 'Problem Orientation' for the Policy Sciences
emphasis on decision making marked the difference between policy science and other
disciplines (Lasswell, 1971: p. 1).
Despite his scientific outlook, Lasswell and the positivists differed regarding the question
of values, a position he shared with Dewey. Dewey criticised other forms of empiricism for
separating questions of fact and value (M oore, 1961: p. 266). Hebelieved that philosophy
oriented towards practical action overcame scientific elitism and demanded that inquiry b e
directed towards practical measures in line with fundamental hum an values. Lasswell also
dealt with the problem of values and was keen to indicate how important they w erefor the
policy orientation.
vm
He argued that practical science does involve values because the goals
of policymaking should produce the type of hum an relations we find most desirable
1951
a:
p.
9). He defined value instrumentally as a category of preferred ev en ts,' such as peace
rather than war, high levels of productive employment rather than mass unemployment' and so
forth (195 la: pp. 9 -1 0) . Although values introduce an element of subjectivity to science,
Lasswell argued that this does not totally undermine scientific objectivity since non-objective
values could be considered in advance when determining the goals of policy inquiry, after
which 'the scholar proceeds with maximum objectivity and uses all available methods ' (195 la:
p.
11).
Although Lasswell included values in the choice of problems, he separated them from the
rational process of scientific policymaking, which required 'scrupulous objectivity and maximum
technical ingenuity in executing the projects undertaken' (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 14). Setting
value questions comprises an entirely different process than the scientific procedure that solves
them in experience. We see this division elsewhere in Lasswell's writing when he described
clarifying goal values as a preliminary step to selecting hypotheses (195 lb : p. 5). So, he did
think values important, however in suggesting such a separation in
the process
of thinking,
Lasswell divided rationality and limited the flexibility of reason in order to support a
methodological, staged model of policymaking. The question here is whether we can divide
rationality in such a way. Is it possible to fix social values, or do they change with the very
process of inquiry regardless of the goals w e set? Even if w e could establish clear values,
would policy prescriptions which are consistent with those values automatically follow ?
Lasswell's vision was distinct from the specialist sciences becausehe saw policy science
not as just another new science nor as just another term for social science. All scientific
know ledge is relevant to public problems so the disparate sciences would com e together in
the policy sciences. Thus there is no singular policy science but policy sciences in the plural
(1951a). Lasswell stressed that the policy sciences should investigate the most important,
fundamental problems, and that policy scientists should not becom e distracted from this by
attending o nly to the urgent issues of theday (1951a: p. 8). It is the orientation towards these
important problems that is different about the policy sciences, since they a re a fraction of the
issues wh ich fall und er the purview of a range of sciences (Lassw ell, 1951a: p. 4). This
encompassed both the social and natural sciences since any item of knowledge whether
about social attitudes or the range of weapons was potentially u seful for policy
1951
a: p.
3).
Lasswell identified two m ain forces driving the need for interdisciplinary inquiry. Firstly,
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social problems are complex and a great variety of scientific information is relevant to complex
problems. Understanding such problems required a way to integrate different types of
know ledge for decision making (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 14;seealsoM ertonan dL erner, 1951:
p.
300). Second ly,he understood tha tw eencounter problems and solutions in context. He
sought to overcome the fragmentation characteristic of the sciences through his attention to
context, multi-method inquiry, and practical problem solving
(1971:
pp. xiii, 8,13 -15) . He
argued that this integrative impetus constituted 'a reversal of nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century trends toward specialisation'
(1971:
p. 8).
//.
The two poles of the policy sciences
Lassw ell formalised his vision through the twofold orientation of the policy sciences: 1) 'the
development of a science of policy forming and execu tion' using social and psychological
inquiry, and 2) improving 'the concrete content of the information and the interpretations
available to policy makers' (1951a: p. 3). H ela terrep hrasedth isas 'the policy sciences are
concerned with knowledge
of
and
in
the decision processes of the public and civic ord er'
(1971:
p. 1). Knowledge o /the decision process is achieved by 'systematic, empirical studies
of how policies are made and put into effect', while knowledge
in
the decision process draws
upon the various scientific disciplines to increase the stock of knowledge relevant to public
policy
(1971:
pp. 1-2). Since the policy orientation includes many existing disciplines, he had
to identify for it a distinguishing characteristic; integrating science with the decision process
(1971:
p. 1). That is , synthesising scientific decision making and scientific know ledge via the
common focus on policy problems produces a larger, unique policy orientation. Policy science
advances knowledge 'whenever the methods a re sharpened by which authentic information
and responsible interpretations can be integrated w ith judgment' (Lasswell, 195 la: p. 4). Just
as Dewey wished to redress the denigration of applied knowledge, Lasswell stressed that
while policy sciencehad practical importance it was not simply an applied science, that is, of
less value than pure science (195 la: p. 4; see also, in the same volume, Hilgard and Lerner,
1951:p . 42).
1X
He insisted that focusing on how policy is made and executed 'identifies a
unique frame of reference', w hilealso utilising other pre-existing sciences
(1971:
p. 1). The
orientation towards public problems followed directly from Dewey's pragmatism, but it is the
synthesis
of Lasswell's two poles that establishes the distinct nature and identity of the policy
sciences; science encompasses both in an overall problem orientation.
To digress for a moment to the important, subtle distinction betw een Lassw ell's policy
science and other versions of policy science inspired by logical empiricism, Torgerson has
interpreted Lassw ell'suse of the term 'judgment' as closer to political prudence(phronesis),
than technocratic policy science (1995: pp. 238-9). H e sees Lasswell's work as very different
from positivist policy theory, resonating with the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practice
as a postpositivist alternative (Torgerson, 1995; on
phronesis
see Fischer,
2003:
p. 133; for
an example, seeFlyvbjerg, 2001). Thisinvolves emphasising Lasswell's concern for context
and improving public deliberation, distinct from a purely technocratic policy science (Fischer,
2003:
p. 221). Lassw ell's and Dewey's pragmatism differed from positivism in important
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Harold Lassw ell's 'Problem Orientation' for the Policy Sciences
respects but I do not think it has been established that their approach was logically different;
they both shared an underlying 'scientific' problem solving rationality. Lasswell did say that
the yardsticks for analysis used by the policy scientist and the decision maker must be
distinguished, since decision makers m ighthave tobe satisfied with achieving less (1951b: p.
16).Taking account of political circumstances and other constraints requires some degree of
intuition over pure em piricism. E ven so, Lassw ell's theory is still scientific at its root and
employs scientific method in devising and implementing solutions to problems. His pragmatist
heritage is different from positivismin valuing practical action as the primary goal of knowledge,
how ever this is a normative criterion. The underlying logic of both is to resolve questions by
reference to experience, which is, and only is, what counts as knowledge in the end (on the
primacy of experience, see Dew ey 1938: pp. 105-6 ; 1958: pp. 8,11 ; 1971: p. 236; and on
knowledge as the elimination of questions via experience seeDewey 1938: pp. 104-5; 1958:
p.
7; 1971: p. 100). Authentic interpretation and decision making eliminates questions
apodictically by referring to experience and therefore the most rigorous and sophisticated
policymaking integrates scientific knowledge with a scientific decision making procedure.
Whatever similarities and differences there were between positivism and pragmatism, in
elaborating the policy sciences Lasswell moved qualitatively away from practical reason and
further towards science. Dew ey acknow ledged that inquiry could conclude with a directive
for action rather than definitive prob lem solving action. However, his main idea was that
knowledge
shouldhave
instrumental, practical consequences, and these were not to be
distinguished from the process of inquiry itself (Dewey 1938: pp. 118 ,12 0-1 ,49 9). Rather
than seeing practical reason as necessarily concluding with action, Lasswell formulated the
practical stage as a different but related question, subsuming the two under a larger synthesis
true to Dew ey's 'problem orientation'. Indeed, even apodictic judgem ents about the world
do not necessarily entail only one possible way to achieve our ends in practice (see Hintikka,
1974:
pp. 80-97), so there is always a choice when it comes to the mechanisms for bringing
about policy prescriptions. Therefore w e can say Lasswell correctly divided policymaking
into two dimensions. He acknowledged that scientific inquiry can produce knowledge without
necessarily making directives for action. It can do, and one could suppose that perhaps scientists
should be civic-minded, but it is not necessarily in the nature of inquiry to do so. Lasswell saw
that a synthesis of the two poles of the policy sciences was necessary to bring science together
with an orientation towards solving public problems.
In sum, Lasswell divided what was for pragmatism a singular questioning process into a
dual questioning process. He transformed a holistic procedure that moves us from problem to
solution as practical effect into two inquiries; one into the nature of the problem and another
into how best to effectit. Lasswell's two poles of the policy sciences divided scientific find ings
from the practical methods of bringing them about. He moved beyond the Deweyan model
and established a distinction between science and scientific politics, even though he did not
think that policymaking w as logically different from scientific inquiry. To me, Lassw ell's
approach seems right insofar as he identified a conceptual limitation of Dewey's pragmatism
although arguments about the nature of practical reason are com plex and far from settled.
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Whatever the case, at the same time as Lasswell explicated Dew ey's program in the form of
a policy sciences that would draw science and policymaking together, we see a fragmentation
of
the
theoretical model despite his attempts to establish a unified field. Science still encompassed
the dual questioning process overall but separating these questions made explicit what w as at
stake and allowed us to see the distinction between science and policymaking, a distinction
that becam e the source of later critiques.
The question w e must now ask is this: is Lasswell's synthesis of the two poles of the policy
orientation itself scientific? Without even considering whether policymaking can be conducted
scientifically, for Lassw ell's vision to be consistent the relationship between the two poles
must itself be scientific. However, it is not. A scientific verification would draw on the empirical
as the criterion of judgment but Lasswell made this conclusion theoretically, without reference
to experience. His synthesis of the two poles is not scientific at all. It is based on a norm ative
view that policymaking should be 'rational' (where rationality equals problem solving) and
that science is the most rational logic for researching and practically solving public problems.
Therefore the construction of the policy sciences is not consistent with the criterion for scientific
problem solving h e proposes. We now need to examine the literature to find examples which
will allow us to
ftiitherunravel
Lasswell's theoretical synthesis of social science and policymaking.
Questioning the scientific model
/.
The use of scientific knowledge
Lasswell's formulation of the two poles of the policy sciences raises thequestion of how one
pole relates to the other, how scientific knowledgeis used in policymaking. Why is theuse of
knowledgein policymaking important? The link between scientific theory and practical control
was essential to positivist science (Fay, 1975: pp. 2948) even where it was not theorised in
quite this way. The policy sciences ideal supposes that the two poles of social scientific research
and practical political action can be subsumed under a singular rational process.
I noted above that the theoretical relationship between Lasswell's two poles is not scientific.
Empirical research has also shown the progress of knowledge between the two poles of the
policy sciences to be far from continuous. Scientific information is often used in policymaking
in a manner that is neither objective nor goal-directed (Weiss, 1991). Indeed, in
The Policy
Sciences
Merton and Lerner (1951) pointed to the insidious possibilities for policy makers to
us e scientific research forulterio r purposes. They noted that decision makers som etimes
comm ission scientific studies on problems upon which they do
not
wish to act so as to delay
action and allay criticism against them
(1951:
p. 299). H ence they distinguished between two
types ofknow ledgeused in policymaking. The first type, they argue, conductedb y groups
with self-interest in mind, is more likely to be exploited for propaganda, to justify a
predetermined decision, and the research findings less likely 'to be subjected to the test of
experience'
(1951:
p. 299). The second type of research, research for action, is subjected to
the test of experience by scientists and is therefore a genuine response to a problem
(1951:
p.
299).
W e must admit the possibility that know ledge can beused for other than instrumental
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purposes, no matter how undesirable this m ight be.
What has been the experience in practice? Over the last few decades many scholars hav e
examined th eu se of scientific knowledge in policymaking (see Brooks and Gagnon, 1990;
Wagner et al.,
1991
a; Weiss, 1977). Despite the great volum e of social science developed
for policymaking many researchers have concluded that social sciencehas had mixed or even
little success in influencing policy solutions (Jenkins-Sm ith, 1990: p. 47 ; Rein and Schon,
1977:
p. 235). The idea that analysis is used to solve problems has been debunked as a
'problem solving m yth '(R ein and W hite, 1977: p. 262). Weiss, for exam ple, outlines the
many disappointments of social scientists: research find ings were not as influential on policy as
scholars had hoped; scientists naively failed to appreciatehow important ideology and interests
are in politics; research was more likely to influence how policy makers conceptualised problems
than provide solutions, or it was used to move issues higher or lower on the public agenda;
and policy makers often used research as an argument to advocate for a favoured position
(1991:
pp. 311 -14). T he ways science and the state interact continue to be an important
research area, and the sociology of know ledge is now an established theme of policy studies.
Because scientific know ledgeis notused consistently in the two poles of the policy sciences
Lassw ell's synthesis is not coherent. At the end of the volum e by Wagner et al. (1991a),
Weiss and Wittrock (1991) review the Lassw ellian vision of the policy sciences in light of the
relationship between social science and policy in practice. They emphasise that policy theorists
must move away from a simplistic understanding of theuse of scientific research in policymaking,
stressing how historical forces and institutional structures impact upon the relationship between
social science and the state
(1991:
p. 356). They call for a re-examination of Lassw ell's
programme, saying we should pay particular attention to its historicity, epistemology, and
ontology and that, importantly, we must account for human agency
(1991:
pp. 366-7). They
state that this is not a call 'for abstruse philosophising', but say that social science will only be
relevant to human concerns if it accounts for how social structures condition those concerns,
and how w e can act independently of them
(1991:
p. 367).
Weiss and Wittrock rightly move away from a naive scientific view and locate the source
of the difficulties in understanding policy in fundamental philosophical questions. But their
qualification about philosophy illustrates their keen awareness of how difficult it is to broach
such questions within such a practically-oriented concern as policy analysis. If the problems
underlying the policy sciences concept stem from fundamental questions of knowledge and
human nature then why not return to philosophy to see what it can offerus? Such an inquiry is
beyond the scope of this paper, but for now I would simply note that the use of research for
a variety of purposes other than problem solving in the policy arena confirms th e conceptual
break between social scientific know ledge and problem solving action envisioned by both
Dewey and Lasswell.
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//. Reconsidering the relationship between science and policy
Understanding the relationship between social science and policy, Wittrock says, 'ultimately
rests on an assumption about the analogy between the operational modes of the realms of
research and of policy'(1991:p. 336). If policymaking deploys scientific knowledge to varying
effect and for non- scientific purposes then w e cannot m aintain that the two poles of the policy
sciences fall under one larger, scientific rationality
3
. Wittrock examines this relationship anew
by considering the logical assumptions behind the various theories of how social scienceand
policy interact(1991:pp. 33 7-9 ). Firstly, theenlightenment modelsees social science as
identifying problems ratherthan solving them, i.e., supplying general orientations and concepts
which filter into public consciousness. Secondly, theengineering modelis utilitarian and
subordinates research to the demands of policy. Third is the technocraticm odel, where
research is primary and to which policy is subordinated. Finally, the classical bureaucratic
modelgives primacy to politics and administration. From these he identifies two separate
logics; the enlightenment model and the classical bureaucratic model suppose that the research
and policymaking/administration domains operate according to distinct logics, whereas the
technocratic and engineering m odels suppose a unitary logic in which the only perceivable
obstacles are practical and organisational(1991:pp. 339,341).
Both these logics are paradoxical. If science and politics operate according to entirely
different logics then it is difficult to see how enlightenment could occur
(1991:
p. 344). That is,
were the two domains distinctly different epistemologies it would b e impossible to translate
know ledge from one to the other. But were we to accept the contrary, that the two realms
operate according to a unitary logic, it would be embarrassing to admit that the planned
interaction rarely happens and that the technical and engineering models rarely seem to apply
(1991:
p. 344). Despite this, Wittrock argues that the domains a re 'roughly analogous and
com patible 'ifnotiden tical(19 91:p . 344). He proposes an alternative theory, describing the
two logics as 'strongly analogous and continuous' and 'weakly analogous and discontinuous'
respectively
(1991:
p. 344). He goes on to exam inehow other policy theorists conceive of
the relationship between the two dom ains, concluding in favour of an interactive depiction
whichhe describes as 'discourse structuration'
(1991:
p. 351). This takes the historical and
institutional context of political activity into account while still allocating an important role to
the agency of the political actors involved
(1991:
pp. 350-1 ). The two processes feed back
upon each other to create policy discourse. W ittrock's final, interactional m odel best
characterises the two-way process in which policy makers utilise scientific knowledge and
how they also influence scientific research; it is not a unified logic but nor is it necessarily an
entirely political process in which evidence plays no part at all.
From this critique, what should we conclude about the relationship between the two poles
of social science for policy and policymaking in practice? Such studies of how scientific
know ledge is used in policy have 'problem atised' the idea of a direct, logical connection
between the two poles of the policy sciences. That is, they questioned the relationship between
social science and policy and showed th e link to be
contingent
rather than necessary. In
logical term s, this link is not scientific but rhetorical and political. Th e two domains interact,
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but know ledge flows between them in variable ways and for variable ends, without being
confined to a singular meaning oru sageby the larger problem solving criterion. Politics cannot
be entirely removed
in
policymaking nor from scientific research /or policy, despite attempts
to quarantine policy science from political contamination. The overall rationality of the policy
sciences has fragmented. Colebatch points out that the scientific model of policymaking is not
so much an accurate theory as an idealistic view of how people think policy
shouldbe
made
(2002:
p. 125). In reality, official versions of the policy process are often only rationalisations,
rhetorical constructions that touch up a chaotic process with a rational gloss (2002: p. 129).
This forces us to reconsider both the nature of politics and its distinctiveness from science in
order to understand th e relationsh ip between the two. If we do not bring po litics into the
frame of rationality then w e allow science to be the standard by default. This entails creating a
space for the problematicity of politics, where p roblem setting is as important as problem
solving and where solutions are only arguments rather than problem dissolving solutions. While
problem solving is the unquestioned standard of rationality w e will not establish a place for
political discourse nor be able to distinguish when it is manipulative from when it is sincere.
This is because politics is a far more problematic realm of rationality which appears inferiorto
science when judged b ythe problem solving standard desired by Lasswell. The real interaction
between science and policy indicates that we need to thematise it as a non-necessary
relationship: thisrequires a logic of contingency.
How are we to
theorise
this difference between social science and a related but qualitatively
different policymaking domain? Given that ideology, interests and power are prevalent in
policymaking, we can say that it is political. How can we m ake sense of the political aspects
of policy and articulate its intricacies within a larger theory? W ittrock's discussion is productive
but weha ve a new question for
policy
theory;how can it provide an overarching conceptual
framework that deals with the problematic relationship between science and politics without
separating them into incommensurate domains? We lack an interpretative schema which can
replace the problem solving model. It remains the standard, in principle, even though w e all
acknowledge it is conditioned by other factors in p ractice. With problem solving science as
thebenchmark, the goal of replacing politics with policy science persists. Without articulating
a space for political rationality on its own terms it will be difficult to understand policymaking
outside the scientific framework.
3. Policy science as a solution to the problem of politics
Considering the extensive discussion of methods in Lerner and Lasswell's
The PolicySciences,
Wagner et al. (1991b: p. 9) are not surprised by th e methodological focus of United States
public policy schools. This methodologismdidnot justreflect the fashion of theday butfollowed
from the idea that rational thought involves the methodological justification of solutions to
problems. The elimination of the problem is what counts as knowledge , an epistemology
which tends to exclude the social construction of problems and political rhetoric around
problems that have equally possible, multiple solutions. In general, Michel Meyernotes that
the scientific view of rationality does not deal with questioning as such but with hypotheses
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(1994:p. 136). Inpolicy science , policy solutionsarehypothetical conclusions whichare
supposedtoresolve social problemsinpractice.
301
Thequestionhasalready been partially
resolved intoahypothetical answer,theempiricalorpractical verificationofwhichis allthat
remains
to
convert the hypothesis into
an
independent result.
For
example, Campbell proposed
a scientific modelofpolicymaking w ithhis'experimenting society'theory, derivedinpart from
Popper's philosophy (Campbell, 1988). Popperians viewed policies ashypothesesandpolicy
implementation
as
correspondent with scientific experiment (Dryzek, 1993:
p.
219). Campbell
argued that testing policy hypotheses empirically,bytrialanderror, leadsto thegrowthof
knowledge (Dunn, 1993:pp.256-7).Ifproblems cannotberesolvedin thefirst instance,the
principleoffalsification permits partial explanationstosufficeassolutions until better onescan
befound (Dunn,1993: p. 257).
This
is not to say
that policymaking does
not
sometimes proceed
by
trial
and
error,
in
incremental steps (Lindblom),butsimply thatfor policy theorythisis alimitation because
suchaconception actually resolves its questionsinadvanceby converting them into hypotheses.
It tells
us
nothing about
the
process required
to
arrive
at
those hypotheses, particularly
the
political dimensionsofconstructing social problemsandarguingforsolutions. The movement
frominitial questiontoanswer-as-hypothesis doesnotappear becausetheproblemisalready
solvedandpresentedas anautonomous judgment (Meyer,1995: p.103).Thedemandfor
problem solving thus shifts the focus
to the
methodological treatment
of
hypothetical solutions,
emphasisingthemethodological validation orfalsificationofhypotheses.Thehypothetico-
deductivemethod thus suppresses the initial questioning and becomes the wholeofthe process.
The initial questioning
is
lost, being either entirely suppressed
or
removed
to a
prior
and
separate stageofdiscovery. Justification becom esthewholeofrationalityandsciencethe
most rigorous
and
technically proficient form
of
justifying results. This
is the
source
of the
methodologismweassociate with science generally,andwiththescientific conceptionof
policymakinginthis particular case.
Policymakingisthen judgedby itsdecision processes,i.e.,whether they w ere scientific,
by how well scientific techniques were appliedtoverifying policy solutionsandaction. Simon's
Administrative Behavior,for
example,
is a
seminal work
in the
application
of
scientific
techniquestogovernance (1976). Policy scienceisaninstrumental rationality that interprets
the world scientificallyandemploys scientific techniquestoeffect change. Even though this
mightbepractical, stipulating thatthecriterionforanswering questionsis themodificationof
existence shifts the focus ontothemethodby whichweverify solutions.Thepragmatic criterion
isaworthyone but thelogic w hereby problemsareassumedto beknowninadvance
emphasises technological rigouras themeasureofrationality even m ore thantheefficacyof
the solution.
We can
point
to
some shortcomings
of
this idealised view
in
practice. Dunn notes
that different stakeholdersin apolicy area can hold conflicting interpretationsat thesame time
andinrealityfewidealsareshared around ill-structuredormessy policy problems
(1993:
pp.
259-60;
see
also Rose, 1977). Furthermo re, Dryzek points
out
that this view requires
normative schemestoremain fixedandclosedtodiscussion, allowingfor animpoverished
conception
of
politics which fails
to
take proper account
of
the context
for
policy implementation
(1993:
p. 220).
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App lying scientific m ethod to policymaking bracke ts out impo rtant quali t ies of the policy
process, including com plexity and contextually-situated kno wled ge. At a m ore fundamental
level, Lin dblo m and W ood hou se describe this shift to science as 'a deman d that seems to call
for a redu ction of partisan political conflict, of political m ane uv erin g, of pow er, of 'po litic s'
(1993:p. 6). Scientific prob lem solving wou ld succeed in solving problem s wher e po liticshad
failed. P olicy scienc e thu s com prised a general solution to the prob lem s of the pub lic, i. e.,
science wa s prop osed as
ia general
answer to the question of politics.
To reiterate m y discussion abov e, a major
the m e of posit ivist social science was to repla ce subjective po lit ics with rational social
engineering . Lasswell w as clear on the benefits of science in this respect: 'W ha t ha s elud ed
scientific and policy attention is a large num ber of the hum an factors w hich p revent Ihe resolution
of thes e difficultiesby rational me an s' (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 8). H e believed psycholog y, for
exam ple , had grea t potent ia l to change des truc t ive hu m an n a ture for ins t rumen ta l en ds ,
conclud ing that treating policy prob lems scientif ically provide d theb as is ' for a profound
reconstruction of culture by continual s tudy and emen dation , and not by (or certainly no t
alone by) th e traditional mean s of political agitation' (195 la: p. 8). His cautionary parenthetical
remark h ere is just that: the grounding idea is to replace politics with scientific decision m aking.
Polit ical problems in general ar et ob er es ol v ed b y science, using scientific me thods a nd by
recou rse to experience. Scientific rationality wou ld eliminate the hu m an and b y im plication,
irrational practice of political agitation. Lass we ll's scientific theo ry of inquiry terminates in
an instrum ental, scientific rationality w hich ideally seeks to replace politics altogether.
By exc ludin g p olitics from th e field of rationality La sswe ll was also able to d istinguish
betw een pol icy and pol i t ics . H e wro te tha t ' po l icy is f ree of m any of the undes irab le
connotations clustered about the
word political,which
is often believed to imp ly partisansh ip
or corrup t ion ' (1951a: p .5 .
1
Scien ce is 'disinte rested ' , in contrast to self-interested,
partisan po litics, so policy science is a non-political mo de of finding solutions to public problems.
F o r Lass we ll, policy science was firmly o n the side of dispassio nate rationality. T h e ideal of a
problem solving policy science survives for ma ny today (see, for examp le, Johnso n, 20 04;
Lau der, Bro wn and Halsey, 2004 ). Th is is no t to suggest that policy canno t solve prob lem s,
only that unde rstanding policy is m or e comp lex in theory and in practice. In other wo rds, the
difficulty is not that w e consider policym aking to b e scientific in practice bu t that ou r
theoretical
basis for examining policy continues to b e groun ded in a problem solving rationality, of which
science is the m ost soph isticated expression.* Bu t even as an analogy the prob lem solving
framework has fundamental theoretical shortcomings.
In regard to the 'p rob lem o rientatio n, ' w hat is imp ortant her e is that science is a general
answ erwh ich artificially eliminates any constitutive role for questioning and for'prob lem aticity'
in general. I suggest that the incom patibility of sc ience and politics arises from this su ppression
of question ing or m ore particularly, in conceiving of questioning in only a scientific w ay, as
prob lem solving. Th is is exemplified in the wa y Lasswell co nstructed the problem orientation.
De spite the imp ortanc e of questions and prob lems in policy theory, h e located know ledg e in
solutions and the mea ns for obtaining the m , not within the question -answ er link. C ertainly,
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solutions are important. But his approach excludes questions over the normative formulation
of problems and the political rhetoric necessary to justify policy in the event of differences of
opinion. ForLasswell, scientific rationality covered both the input of information to policymaking
and the process of decision making based on that information. He made scientific problem
solving encompass both poles of the policy sciences and, even if w e allow for 'satisficing'
solutions (Simon, 1976), the contingencies of budgets, and other institutional and contextual
constraints on perfect decision making, the scientific rationality underlying the policy sciences
tends to marginalise the political by excluding the problematic. Scientific method relates back
to experience, the ultimate determinant of knowledge and that which eliminates questions
a
priorihy
suppressing the problematic. Method guarantees Ihe meaning of policy by constructing
an artificial, instrumental path from problem to solution, where the nature of the problem has
been decided in advance as also residing in experience. In fact, science is the answer to the
very question of politics, eliminating the latter as a mode of resolution because science dissolves
its questions in its answers. Politicsw hich deals with opinion, values and a debatebetween
pro and con where questions remain open and solutions are par tial is excluded from ideal
rationality
a priori.
All that remains is to eliminate the residual problematicity by devising
sufficiently sophisticated research methods and a technico-administrative regime to implement
the scientific program. But can wereally eliminate politics from policy? Attempting to establish
science as the supreme problem solver limits our view of policymaking and fragments our
theory of the policy process.
4.
Conclusion: politicising the problem orientation
Lasswell's 'problem orientation' is a useful construct forthinking about the scholarly analysis
of policymaking as dealing with twin questions: the social scientific study of public problems
and policymaking in response to those problems. However, Lasswell sought to conceive of
both questions and the relationship between them in scientific terms. Instead, wehave theoretical
and empirical reasons to reconceptualisehow we think about these two poles of policy analysis.
Many critics have already pointed out that policymaking is far from a perfectly rational,
scientific enterprise. At the sam e time, social science is still extensively used by policymakers.
By
problematising
the problem orientation I wish to point out that w e should think of the
relationship between these poles as being itself
in question.
We cannot subsume both poles
within a scientific frameof reference because this excludes what is political about policymaking
and theuse of knowledge in policymaking (not to mention the other direction of influence, the
politics of funding social scientific research). Instead, the relationship between science and
policymaking is
contingent,
not necessary (or causal). It poses a question because there is no
seamless logical path from scientific inquiry to policy solution. Knowledge can beu sed for
many different purposes in policymaking, and our theories should reflect this full range of
possibilities; from genuinely informing decisions , to being used to obfuscate and delay, to
justifying decisions already taken for other reasons. In short, by acknowledging tha t this
relationship is always in
question,
we
seethe political
dimension of theu se of knowledge in
politics. This overturns the presupposition that the problem of the two poles canbe solved by
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imposing a scientific framework. Most importantly, it renders the problem orientation consistent
at an epistemological level by conceptualising the relationship between the two poles in terms
of questioning. This opens up a political frame of reference for the entire problem orientation.
Furthermore, the emphasis on questioning shows that what knowledge is and how it is used
depends on
interpretations
of the problem and on the
rhetorical
purposes to which
knowledge is put, i.e., by political actors seeking to legitima te their positions. H ence the
problem orientation can be reconceptualisedinterpretativelyusinghermeneutics and rhetoric.
Important theoretical difficulties result from our inability to thematise problematicity in a
positive light because we ha ve assumed problem solving to be the standard. Dewey rejected
abstract metaphysics and construed know ledge as the dissolution of problems by practical
action, borrowing h is model of resolution from science. Lasswell formalised this logic as the
policy sciences, emphasising the methodological treatmen t of problems for instrumental
outcomes. But the link between research and policy fails to conform to the scientific norm.
Th e general cy nicism held for politics and po liticians is no reason to ignore the reality of
politics, no matter how much we m ight hope for sober and objective policymaking. Even if
only to critici
se
it more effectively, our task should be to understand the politic
s
of policymaking
for what it is and not as what obstructs the imposition of a scientific decision process. We
need to understand what is political about policy in order to reveal the differences between
sincere and manipu lative uses of science. N either science nor practical reason provide a
satisfactory theoretical response to the question of politics: an
alternativeanswer
is required,
one that does not seek to eliminate politic s altogether in answering it, but is rather an answer
which reflects what politics actually is, a mode of questioning defined by the problematic.
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Notes
i
Thanks to the anonymous referees for their helpful advice on improving the paper and to
Susan Keen for our many stimulating discussions on theuseof knowledge in policymaking.
ii
For a range of perspectives on Lasswell 's work see the edited collection by Rogow (1969).
In this volume, Eulau (1969) argues for the influence of A.
N.
Whitehead on Lasswell's
ideas;
Smith (1969) points out Dewey and GH. M ead's influence on Lasswell along with
that of Whitehead and Merriam; and Janowitz (1969) also points to the influence of Dewey,
Mead and Thomas on Lasswell at the University of Chicago.
iii I do not deal with the UK strand of interpretivism here (for exam ple, Bevir and Rhodes
2003) as Lasswell is not well known in the UK. H owever, it has much in com mon with
continental European and US interpreti vism and these various approaches could fruitfully
be brought together,
iv This a rticle is a preliminary analysis which forms the basis of a reconstructed problem
orientation more appropriate to interpretative policy analysis, a reconstruction I havebegun
elsewhere (Turnbull 2006).
v From here on I will refer interchangeably to 'policy science ' or 'the policy sciences' for
stylistic purposes, while noting that Lasswell used the plural sense to indicate an important
conceptual distinction, which I discuss later in this paper.
vi See Dryzek
(1993:
pp. 217-22) for the distinction between logical empiricism, positivism
and related concepts in policy analysis.
vi i
Lasswell developed a stepwise, linearmodel of decision making consistent with this scientific
view
(1971:
pp. 56-7).
viii For a general discussion of values in policy analysis, see Fischer and Forester (1987); and
for a critique of the positivist separation of fact and value in policy science see Fischer
(1998) and Hawkesworth (1988).
ix Lassw ell also noted that the popular conception of a division between science and its
application produced status problems forthe policy scientist. Th e scholar or scientist
involved in the policy realm may be perceived as a careeristby scientific colleagues and as
a half-hearted participant or as intellectually threatening to those operating primarily in the
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Main Articles
policy field
(1971:
pp. 120-1 ). Such a person appears to be 'a second class man of
knowledge and a second-class man of action'
(1971:
p. 120) or, more colloquially, a 'half
man , half b rain'
(1971:
p. 121).
x
While the policy sciences referred to the natural sciences as well as the social sciences, it
is the latter that occupy m uch of the debate because these are directly relevant to the
question of the science of governing.
xi Although, Lasswell qualified this by noting that these hypotheses are not strictly scientific
because he did not hold a determinist view of social change(1951a: p. 11).
xi i
Parsons (1995: pp. 13-16) provides a good discussion of the varying historical meanings
of the 'policy ' concept. He notes the primarily Anglo-Saxon use of the word, as distinct
from 'politics' in other languages, and the post-Second World War association of policy
as a 'rational' plank upon which the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state is built.
xiii
Wolin (1961) describes a general theme in political theory of the 'sublimation' of politics.
For a broad discussion of the decline of traditional political theory in the face of political
science, see Gunnell (1979).
xiv
On rhetoric in policy analysis, see Gottweis (2006, 2007) and Turnbull (2005-06).